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1.1. object of study And reseArch questIons
Within the European Union (EU) considerable diversity exists in respect of morally 
sensitive issues like abortion, assisted human reproduction (AHR), surrogacy and 
legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. The EU Member States have made 
diverging choices in respect of these matters and followed different tracks in their 
regulation of these areas. States often expressly claim recognition of such national 
specificities at the European level. While the twentieth century has witnessed an 
increased intergovernmental cooperation between States as well as an increased 
transferral of state powers to supranational organisations such as the EU, certain 
competences have traditionally remained with the States. The aforementioned 
morally sensitive issues are areas of law par excellence where standards are primarily 
set at State level. It is usually considered that it should be left to each State to decide 
whether, for example, abortion is available on social grounds, whether couples can 
become parents with the involvement of a surrogate mother and whether same‑sex 
couples can marry and/or adopt children.
While there is no strong degree of European regulation in these areas, and while 
diversity is generally respected at European level, there is nonetheless a certain body 
of European law applicable in these fields. The EU has competences in respect of 
issues that are strongly related to, and at times intertwined with, reproductive matters 
and legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. Here, one may think of competences 
in the areas of health and equal treatment.1 In addition, several of these morally 
sensitive issues come within the scope of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), for instance by means of the right to respect for private life under 
Article 8 ECHR.2 That raises the question whether such European standard‑setting 
(potentially and indirectly) affects the room for States to regulate in these areas and 
thus whether this has implications for the existing diversity in the European Union 
in morally sensitive issues.
Cross‑border movement within the EU adds a new dimension to this already complex 
picture. Cross‑border movement is a given within the EU; people move around in 
the EU for various reasons and purposes, not uncommonly pursuing economic 
1 Arts. 168 and 19 TFEU. See more elaborately Ch. 3, section 3.1.3.1 and Ch. 9, section 9.3.
2 See more elaborately Ch. 2 and Ch. 8.







objectives.3 Such mobility is enabled and stimulated by the EU free movement rules 
that, inter alia, protect the free movement of persons and the freedom to receive 
services in another EU Member State.4 Diverging regimes in the aforementioned 
morally sensitive matters may, however, create obstacles to such cross‑border 
movement; they may hinder or deter persons from making use of their free movement 
rights. For instance, same‑sex couples may be discouraged from moving to an EU 
Member State where they have no possibility of having their relationship legally 
recognised by means of a civil partnership or marriage. Differences in regimes in 
morally sensitive issues may, by contrast, also be the direct impetus for cross‑border 
movement within the EU as people from Member States with less permissive regimes 
may wish to enjoy the possibilities, rights and benefits of more permissive regimes 
of other States. For example, in Member States with restrictive abortion regimes, 
women who wish to have their pregnancy terminated may want to travel to Member 
States with more liberal regimes.
Such cross‑border movement and the existing obstacles thereto do not only highlight 
existing diversity, they also imply, among other things, that States are increasingly 
more confronted with (the consequences and effects of) other States’ regimes. For 
example, same‑sex couples residing in one EU Member State may claim recognition 
of their marriage concluded in another Member State, while women or couples 
who had a certain type of AHR treatment in another State that is outlawed under 
the law of their own State, may claim reimbursement of the costs involved in that 
treatment under the national health system of their State. Such confrontation may 
require a reaction from the States involved, whether they function as country of 
origin or as country of destination or both. That raises the question of how national 
and European law respond to such cross‑border movement. Are States receptive to 
cross‑border movement in respect of morally sensitive issues, or do they (try to) ward 
it off? Also, it may be asked how much room do EU law and the ECHR actually 
leave States to respond to such cross‑border movement in different ways? A related 
question is whether and to what extent such cross‑border movement, and the legal 
responses thereto, impact national standard‑setting in these morally sensitive issues, 
and, consequently, how they influence both the existing diversity and the legal 
development regarding these matters in Europe.
The present research explores this cross‑border dimension of morally sensitive 
issues within the European Union. It aims to provide an overview of trends and 
developments in national law and European law, as well as to give insight into the 
interests that are at stake both in internal and in cross‑border situations. Such an 
overview allows for taking stock of the situation and it enables further analysis of the 
various interests involved in this multi‑level picture. Thus, this research may assist 
legislatures and judiciaries in answering the question how the relevant interests 
3 See, for example, Statistics of Eurostat, as online available at www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics‑explained/index.php/EU_citizenship_‑_statistics_on_cross‑border_activities, visited 
February 2015. More elaborately, see Ch. 9, section 9.5.
4 Inter alia Arts. 21, 45 and 56 TFEU and Art. 45 CFR. More elaborately, see Ch. 3, section 3.5 and Ch. 9, 
section 9.6.







should be balanced and at what level (e.g. European or national) that balance should 
be struck. Importantly, this research does not aim to take any normative stance 
towards the issues it focuses on. Instead it wants to observe, clarify and typify an 
existing dynamic, whereby various areas and levels of law interact, and in doing so it 
aims to reveal the analytical framework for decision‑making regarding these issues.
1.2. ApproAch And methodology
The basic ingredients of the present research are two thematic case studies – one 
on reproductive matters (Case Study I) and one on legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships (Case Study II) – which focus on five jurisdictions. The latter encompass 
three national jurisdictions – Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands – and two 
European jurisdictions or systems, namely the EU and the ECHR. Justification of 
this selection of jurisdictions, as well as further definition of the two case studies 
is given below in sections 1.3 and 1.4, while an outline of the present volume is 
provided in section 1.5 below.
The two thematic case studies investigate for the three national jurisdictions as well 
as for the relevant European jurisdictions what – if any – standard‑setting is in place 
in respect of reproductive matters and legal recognition of same‑sex relationships 
respectively, and how this developed over time. This analysis, inter alia, provides 
insight into what considerations and interests play, or have played, a role in legislative 
debates and case law and how change was, or may be, brought about. It also makes 
clear in what respects the regimes studied differ and how European law has 
influenced, or may influence, national standard‑setting in these areas. Apart from 
providing insight into these matters, and apart from substantiating the claim that 
considerable diversity indeed exists within the EU in morally sensitive issues, this 
analysis of the internal picture per jurisdiction provides the basis for the subsequent 
analysis of the cross‑border picture per jurisdiction.
After briefly indicating the scale at which cross‑border movement takes place, both 
case studies subsequently involve further examination for each of the five jurisdictions 
of how they have dealt and deal with cross‑border situations in these areas and how 
they interact in this regard. Thereby, inter alia, Private International Law regimes 
and (national implementation of) the EU free movement rules are studied, in order to 
answer questions like whether foreign marriages and civil partnerships of same‑sex 
couples are recognised or whether women who wish to have an abortion in another 
country have a right to access to information about such foreign abortion services, 
as well as a right to follow‑up treatment upon return.
The analysis provided in the two case studies makes it possible to discern trends in 
standard‑setting and in judicial and legislative processes regarding these morally 
sensitive issues. Also, various legal responses to cross‑border movement in respect 
of these issues can be identified. The analysis further allows for observations about 
what interests and considerations have informed the relevant legal responses, what 







implications these responses have for the individuals involved in the cross‑border 
movement and how the various legal responses interrelate. Finally, it allows for some 
conclusions to be drawn as to the extent to which cross‑border movement impacts 
national standard‑setting.
The methodology adopted in this research has consisted first and foremost of a 
doctrinal approach. The current book presents a systematic analysis of applicable 
standards in two areas of law in five jurisdictions and provides insight in how 
these interact. This descriptive legal analysis5 includes binding or ‘positive’ law 
(legislation, case law), as well as legal doctrine and academic literature. Further, 
in order to provide for a more complete picture, non‑binding documents (so‑called 
‘soft law’), such as policy documents, reports of government appointed committees, 
guidelines of the medical profession and resolutions of the European Parliament have 
been studied. This is only different for the chapters on the ECHR (Chapters 2 and 8). 
Given that when it comes to the ECHR, it is the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) that sets the relevant framework, these chapters contain first 
and foremost a case law analysis, and only incidentally refer to legal doctrine and 
academic literature. Also, non‑binding standard‑setting in these areas in the context 
of the Council of Europe (CoE) more broadly is not separately discussed.
The research not only describes the positive law, however, but also the development 
of the relevant law. Moreover, it aims to provide some insight in the preceding and 
accompanying political and public debates. In that sense, the research fits in with the 
‘law in context’ approach.6 Concretely this means that also parliamentary documents, 
pre‑legislative initiatives that did not make it into law and sometimes references to 
newspaper articles are included in the analysis in the case studies. Further, while 
for the present research no empirical legal science was carried out, incidentally 
reference is made to existing sociological studies, for instance to studies based on 
surveys amongst services recipients involved in cross‑border reproductive care 
(CBRC), as these studies gave insight into the implications of certain legal responses 
to cross‑border movement in these areas. Also, reference is made to statistics on the 
actual scale at which cross‑border movement in respect of morally sensitive issues 
takes place within the European Union and to and from the States studied in this 
research. With respect to these figures the research relies completely on secondary 
sources.
5 Smits describes descriptive legal science as ‘[…] the systematic description of the law in a certain field.’ 
The author notes that it is ‘[…] usually seen as a synonym for a legal doctrinal approach or for legal 
systematization […]’. J.M. Smits, The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic (Cheltenham, Elgar 
2012) p. 11.
6 Nelken has described ‘law in context’ as ‘[…] learning to think of law in terms of larger 
processes – bringing out, for example, the similarities between decision‑making in legal and other 
settings. It suggests that we configure law as one stage, aspect, or method, of dealing with wider 
processes of disputing or social regulation, and that we treat these processes as related in some way 
to the needs, (social) problems and conflicts of social groups.’ D. Nelken, Beyond law in context: 
developing a sociological understanding of law (London, Ashgate 2009) pp. xii‑xiii. Nelken refers (at 
p. xii (in footnote 4) and at p. xxvii) to Twining as ‘one of the founders of the law in context approach’. 
See also W. Twining, Law in context, enlarging a discipline (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1997).







The subject‑matters of the present research have turned out to be ‘moving targets’. 
Legislation and case law on the issues discussed are in a constant state of flux and the 
topics are characterised by fast‑moving social and scientific developments. Even since 
2009, the year this research was commenced, important changes have occurred, both 
at national level and at European level. The continuous succession of developments 
rendered it inescapable to choose a clear cut‑off date, which was set at 31 July 2014. 
The case studies cover developments until that date7 and the observations and 
conclusions, while also reflecting upon possible future developments, are based on 
that analysis.
Selection of the ‘starting point’ of the relevant analysis has appeared more naturally, 
as the discussion of the relevant national and European standard‑setting begins with 
the first steps of regulation in the respective jurisdictions. As generally fairly ‘new’ 
topics are concerned,8 at least when it comes to the regulation thereof by European 
States, this generally concerns the 1960s for liberalisation of abortion laws, the 1980s 
for AHR treatment and surrogacy and the 1990s for legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships. Evidently, as further explained in the respective chapters, sometimes 
much older developments lay at the basis of this standard‑setting.
1.3. the two cAse studIes
The case studies on reproductive matters and legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships respectively have been chosen because they concern pre‑eminently 
morally sensitive issues and, consequently, politically controversial matters, in 
respect of which EU Member States have long take different positions, and still did 
so at the time this research was commenced (i.e., in 2009). For example, in respect of 
abortion it has been observed:
‘It is difficult to imagine a more controversial and divisive topic around which opinions 
as to the associated penumbra of moral/legal issues are so radically and conclusively 
polarised than that of abortion.’9
In respect of equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersexual persons 
(LGBTIs) the following was observed as recently as 2013 by a Member of the 
European Parliament: ‘Next to abortion, it is the single most sensitive issue to work 
on. Politicians just prefer to stay away from it […].’10
7 While there have been further interesting developments after 31 July 2014, particularly in respect of 
surrogacy (e.g. ECtHR 27 January 2015, Paradiso and Campabello, no. 25358/12; M.R. and D.R. (suing 
by their father and next friend O.R.) & ors v. An t‑Ard‑Chláraitheoir & ors [2014] IESC 60 and BGH 
10 December 2014, Az XII ZB 463/13) these have thus not been included in this research.
8 Evidently, the themes as such are not necessarily new, as for instance same‑sex relationships and 
surrogacy (the low‑technological form, see 1.3.1 below) have been held to have taken place since the 
birth of mankind.
9 D. Curtin, ‘Case note to CJEU C‑159/90’, 29 CML Rev (1992), p. 585.
10 Dutch Liberal MEP Sophie in ‘t Veld as quoted in: H. Mahoney, ‘Reding should ‘stick neck out’ on gay 
rights’, euobserver.com 7 May 2013, www.euobserver.com/lgbti/119977, visited 10 July 2014.







Moreover, the issues covered by the two case studies are not ‘just’ morally sensitive 
issues, they also concern areas in which fundamental rights claims can be made. 
While this implies that there is room for European influence, this has been the case 
to a limited extent only. Particularly when this research was commenced (i.e., in 
2009) there was, and in fact there is still, limited European standard‑setting in these 
areas.11 This makes these case studies all the more interesting for investigating the 
interaction and interrelationship between European law and national law.
Further, and importantly given the focus of this research, these also concern 
areas that have a demonstrable cross‑border dimension. Not only has cross‑border 
movement for abortion – in the past often referred to as ‘abortion tourism’ – been 
much reported on,12 but cross‑border reproductive care (CBRC) has also become a 
widely recognised phenomenon.13 Further, it is self‑evident that same‑sex couples 
(often referred to as ‘rainbow families’, particularly where they have children) cross 
borders within the EU, even though exhaustive statistics on the scale at which they 
do so are lacking.14 Over the years there has been increasingly more academic and 
political attention for the free movement of rainbow families within the EU.15
1.3.1.	 Definition	of	Case	Study	I
Case Study I on reproductive matters covers three subjects, namely abortion, 
assisted human reproduction (AHR) and surrogacy. In the discussion of regulation 
of AHR a number of issues that may occur in the course of AHR treatment are 
included. Firstly, AHR may involve the donation of gametes (both sperm (semen) 
and egg cells (ovum)) and embryos. In the discussion of the relevant standard‑setting 
in Case Study I, attention is paid to the question of whether, and if so, under what 
circumstances, donors can remain anonymous.16 Further, standard‑setting in respect 
of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is explored. PGD ‘[…] involves checking 
the genes and/or chromosomes of embryos created through [in vitro fertilisation (IVF 
treatment)].’17 It ‘[…] enables people with an inheritable condition in their family to 
11 As set out more elaborately in Ch. 2, Ch. 3, Ch. 8 and Ch. 9.
12 See, inter alia, Ch. 5, section 5.4.
13 See, inter alia, A.P. Ferraretti et al., ‘Cross‑border reproductive care: a phenomenon expressing the 
controversial aspects of reproductive technologies’, 20 Reproductive BioMedicine Online (2010), 
p. 261. See also Ch. 3, section 3.4.2.
14 More elaborately, see Ch. 9, section 9.5.
15 For instance, ‘freedom of movement for LGBT people’ is one of the five priorities of the European 
Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT rights. See www.lgbt‑ep.eu/work/priority‑1, visited January 2015. 
More elaborately, see Ch. 9, section 9.6.
16 In the context of high‑technological surrogacy (see below) a distinction can be made between the 
biological mother (the woman who carries and gives birth to the child) and the genetic mother (the 
woman whose egg‑cell is used in creation of the embryo). Evidently no such distinction can be made 
between biological and genetic fathers. For purposes of clarity, however, the choice has been made in 
this research to use the terms ‘genetic parents’ and also ‘genetic father’ in most cases. Only where the 
term ‘biological’ has been referred to expressly in regulations or case law, this may be different.
17 Website of the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) www.hfea.gov.uk/
preimplantation‑genetic‑diagnosis.html, visited 12 March 2015.







avoid passing it on to their children.’18 A related issue that is addressed is whether 
gender selection in the course of IVF treatment is allowed for under the national law. 
Also addressed is the vitrification of egg cells (also referred to as oocyte freezing), 
whereby egg cells are frozen and stored for use in future treatment.19 Lastly, 
surrogacy, a highly divisive topic which may include AHR treatment, is included 
in the case study. Surrogacy concerns the situation where another woman carries 
and gives birth to a child for an individual or couple who want(s) to have a child. 
There are two types of surrogacy: so‑called low‑technological surrogacy, where the 
surrogate mother is also the genetic mother of the child; while high‑technological 
surrogacy refers the situation where the surrogate mother is not genetically related 
to the child, because the child that she carries and to which she gives birth was 
conceived during IVF treatment with the use of the gametes of donors (often, but not 
necessarily the intended parents).
For each of these topics, Case Study I first of all sets out whether the relevant 
reproductive service is at all legalised and if so under what conditions access to 
these services is provided. Also, the financing of abortion and AHR treatment 
under each State’s national health system is briefly addressed. Thereby only State 
regulation is discussed, since that gives the clearest expression of a State’s (moral) 
position on the matter. Private regulation (i.e., private insurance) is thus excluded. 
In the discussion of national regulation of surrogacy, the possibilities (if they exist 
at all) for intended parents to establish parental links with a child born following a 
surrogacy arrangement are also discussed.
Because the focus lies on reproductive treatment, scientific biomedical research and 
cloning fall outside the scope of the case study. Also, Case Study I does not cover 
adoption. While a means of family building as well, it has been considered too remote 
from the issue of reproduction. Further, this Case Study concentrates on the rights 
and interests of services recipients, not on care providers and intermediaries. For that 
reason, areas of law like EU competition law, state aid rules and public procurement 
rules in respect of (cross‑border) health care are not included in the analysis.20
18 Idem.
19 The website of the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) explains this method 
as follows: ‘The use of frozen eggs in treatment is a relatively new development. […]. […] vitrification 
(a new method for egg storage) has recently been shown to improve the chance of eggs surviving the 
freeze‑thaw process and therefore increase the success rate. To help boost egg production, fertility 
drugs are used to stimulate the ovaries to produce follicles (which contain the eggs). The developing 
follicles are monitored and when they are large enough, they are carefully emptied to collect the eggs 
that they have produced. […] To freeze the eggs, they are placed in storage in liquid nitrogen.’ See 
www.hfea.gov.uk/46.html, visited 12 March 2015.
20 See, inter alia, J.W. van de Gronden et al. (eds.), Health care and EU law (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
2011) pp. 265–359 and L. Hancher and W. Sauter, ‘One step beyond? From Sodemare to Docmorris: 
The EU’s freedom of establishment case law concerning healthcare’, 47 CMLRev (2010) p. 117.








Case Study II explores what the various jurisdictions provide in respect of legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships. Thereby a first focal point is whether 
same‑sex couples have (a right to) access to a registration form – civil partnership 
or marriage – under the relevant jurisdictions and, if so, what these entail. The 
discussion thus focuses on special institutes; other forms of granting of certain rights 
or benefits to unmarried (stable) couples, such as housing benefits for cohabiting 
couples, are not discussed separately. The Case Study aims not so much to provide an 
exhaustive comparative overview of all public and private effects of these institutes, 
but mainly to give insight into the differences between the protection that same‑sex 
couples enjoy under the law of the relevant regimes if compared to different‑sex 
couples. Hence, the public effects of these institutes in areas like taxes and pensions 
are discussed in some detail where there have been noteworthy developments in this 
regard in case law or legislation in the various jurisdictions. The applicable property 
regimes and rules concerning private law aspects like name and inheritance, are 
not included in the research, although developments in this regard are sometimes 
noted where they appear to be highly relevant for the overall picture. Also, while 
briefly addressed, no detailed assessment of the regulation of divorce and separation 
is included in Case Study II.
Secondly, especially since this has proven a controversial matter in many EU Member 
States, the case study also covers the question of parental rights for same‑sex couples. 
Thereby various forms of adoption are discussed, namely second‑parent adoption,21 
successive adoption22 and joint adoption. Also, legal parenthood by operation of the 
law and access to AHR treatment for same‑sex couples are addressed.
Case Study II, in the same vein as Case Study I, focuses on services recipients, 
thereby concentrating on the rights and interests of same‑sex couples and rainbow 
families. Standard‑setting regarding third parties, such as civil servants, is not 
included in the case study.23
1.4. the fIve jurIsdIctIons
As noted above, the present book presents an in‑depth study of the moral choices of 
three EU Member States, namely Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. Thereby 
the deliberate choice has been made to study three national jurisdictions in‑depth, 
instead of covering a wider array of States more superficially. Only such an in‑depth 
study provides a true insight into the development of the relevant legal frameworks, 
in legislative and judicial processes and in the relevant legal dynamics.
21 The term second‑parent adoption concerns the adoption of a child by the partner of the child’s legal and 
genetic parent.
22 Successive adoption concerns the situation where a partner adopts the child of an adoptive parent.
23 Hence, the issue of conscientious objections of civil servants against concluding marriages or civil 
partnerships between same‑sex couples is not discussed separately.







In selecting three States, it was first of all ensured that these States cover a certain range 
in approaches in respect of reproductive matters and legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships; that they are, so to speak, on different sides of the moral spectrum. 
Generally speaking, although one must be very careful with such generalisations, 
one could say that Ireland represents the more traditional approach in Europe, or at 
least did so at the time the research was commenced (in 2009). The Netherlands, on 
the other hand, belongs to the more progressive, liberal tradition, while Germany 
may – or in any case could – be seen as representing the middle ground.
Further, the three States selected have different (constitutional) profiles. While 
Germany and Ireland have a strong Constitution, whereby the German Constitutional 
Court and the Irish Supreme Court can review the constitutionality of legislation,24 
in the Netherlands the Constitution is comparatively ‘weak’, and Dutch courts 
cannot review the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament.25 Also, the relationship 
with European law differs or has differed amongst the three States. For example, the 
Irish Constitution is strongly dualist26 and implementation the ECHR27 has appeared 
to be a lengthy and rather arduous process, while in respect of EU law various 
reservations and opt‑outs apply.28 The Dutch legal order, by contrast, is very open 
to European and International Law, as self‑executing International Law standards, 
have direct effect in the Dutch legal order.29 The German legal order has its own 
24 The German Constitutional Court may rule upon the formal or substantive compatibility of Federal 
Law or Land law with the Basic Law (Art. 94(2) Basic Law). This Court also has jurisdiction to rule 
upon constitutional complaints from individuals, who are alleging that one of their basic rights has been 
infringed by a public authority (Arts. 93(2) and 93 (4a) Basic Law). In Ireland, the President may, after 
consultation with the Council of State, refer a bill passed by both Houses of Parliament to the Supreme 
Court for a decision on the question of whether such a bill or any specified provision or provisions 
of such a bill is or are repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof (Art. 26.1.1° Irish 
Constitution). Although some type of bills are excluded, the President has total discretion in referring 
any bill (see B. McCracken, ‘The Irish Constitution – an overview’, in: J. Sarkin and W. Binchy (eds.), 
Human Rights, the Citizen and the State. South African and Irish Approaches (Dublin, Round Hall 
Sweet & Maxwell 2001) p. 52 at pp. 56–57). The President shall not sign any bill which is the subject of 
a reference to the Supreme Court pending the pronouncement of the decision of the Court (Art. 46.3° 
Irish Constitution). The Court has to give a ruling within 60 days. If the Supreme Court decides that 
any provision of a bill is repugnant to the Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President must 
decline to sign such a bill.
25 Art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution reads: ‘Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall 
not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or of resolutions 
by international institutions that are binding on all persons.’ Translation taken from www.
government.nl/documents‑and‑publications/regulations/2012/10/18/the‑constitution‑of‑the‑ 
kingdom‑of‑the‑netherlands‑2008.html, visited 12 March 2015.
26 Art. 29 Irish Constitution.
27 See, inter alia, D. O’Connell, ‘Ireland’, in: R. Blackburn and J. Polakiewicz (eds.), Fundamental Rights 
in Europe. The ECHR and its Member States 1950–2000 (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) p. 425 
and S. Besson, ‘The Reception Process in Ireland and the United Kingdom’, in: H. Keller and A. Stone 
Sweet (eds.), A Europe of Rights. The impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2008) p. 31 at p. 52.
28 See more elaborately Ch. 5, section 5.2.
29 Art. 93 of the Dutch Constitution. In practice, Dutch Courts tend to examine the compatibility of 
statutory law with International Treaty law, with the general effect that the European Convention has 
come to serve as a kind of shadow constitution. J.H. Gerards and M. Claes, ‘National report – The 
Netherlands’, in: J. Laffranque (ed.), The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post‑Lisbon: The Interaction 







relationship with European law,30 and the German Constitutional Court in particular 
has been both an important generator of European integration and has at the same 
time applied the brakes on various occasions.31
Lastly, language considerations have also played a role in the selection of these three 
national jurisdictions. Given the aim of making an in‑depth analysis of the laws of 
the various jurisdictions, it is considered important to study them in their original 
language, without needing to rely on secondary sources or translations. It is for that 
reason that jurisdictions like Poland or Greece – even though highly interesting 
for the present research and even though they concern non‑Western European 
systems – have not been included in the present research.
The two European jurisdictions studied are EU law and the ECHR. The 
standard‑setting in these jurisdictions gives context to and sets limits to national 
standard‑setting in these areas. It requires little explanation that EU law is included 
in this research, which concentrates on the legal dynamics within the EU. Also, 
EU law standards are binding upon the Member States and have primacy over 
conflicting national standards,32 and many EU law provisions are directly applicable 
in the legal orders of the Member States.33 The ECHR, for its part, sets the context for 
any State or Union action in these areas, as not only all EU Member States are High 
Contracting Parties to the Convention, but the fundamental rights as guaranteed 
under the ECHR also constitute general principles of EU law.34
International standards, such as human rights standards other than the ECHR or 
(non‑binding) standard‑setting within the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law,35 or the International Commission on Civil Status,36 are not separately discussed 
in this study. There are only few applicable binding international standards, and such 
between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and National Constitutions, Reports of the XXV FIDE Congress Tallinn, Vol. 1 (Tartu, 
Tartu University Press 2012) p. 613.
30 Following Art. 25 German Basic Law, the general rules of international law form an integral part of 
and take precedence over German Federal Law and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants 
of the federal territory. The Basic Law furthermore contains a particular provision concerning the 
European Union (Art. 23). It provides that the Federal Republic of Germany shall ‘[…] participate in 
the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, 
to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of 
basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law.’ To this end the Federation may 
transfer sovereign powers. The establishment of the European Union, as well as changes in its treaty 
foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement the German Basic Law, or make 
such amendments or supplements possible, are subject to the procedure for amendment of the German 
Basic Law (Art. 23(1) in combination with Art. 79(2) and (3) German Basic Law).
31 For example, BVerfG 29 May 1974, Az. 2 BvL 52/71, NJW 1974 p. 1697 (Solange I); BVerfG 22 October 
1986, Az. 2 BvR 197/83, NJW 1987 p. 577 (Solange II); BVerfG 14 October 2004, Az. 2 BvR 1481/04, 
NJW 2004 p. 3407 and BVerfG 30 June 2009, Az. 2 BvE 2/08 a.o., NJW 2009 p. 2267 (Lissabon Urteil).
32 Case 6/64 Costa/ ENEL [1964] ECR 585, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66 and Case C‑399/11, Melloni [2013] ECR 
0000, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107.
33 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 0001, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
34 Art. 6(3) TEU.
35 See www.hcch.net/index_en.php, visited June 2014.
36 See www.ciec1.org, visited June 2014.







standards as exist have often been integrated in standard‑setting in one or more of the 
jurisdictions studied.37 Hence, where relevant, international standards are covered by 
the discussion of the relevant standard‑setting in the jurisdictions studied.
1.5. outlIne
The two case studies introduced above, form the backbone of this volume. Each 
one consists of six chapters, five describing the standard‑setting in the five selected 
jurisdictions, and one drawing conclusions for the case study.
Each of the ten substantive chapters of the two case studies first sets out the development 
of the law in respect of reproductive matters, respectively legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships in the five jurisdictions, as well as their current state of affairs. 
For a better understanding of the relevant standard‑setting and – where relevant – the 
debates in politics and legal scholarship concerning these often controversial matters, 
a general (constitutional) framework is sketched first. A brief introduction is given to 
very prominent rights in the relevant jurisdictions (e.g. the protection of the unborn 
on the Irish jurisdiction and the protection of marriage under the German Basic Law), 
as well as to a selection of themes and – in the case of the EU – competences that are 
key in the respective case studies. Subsequently, the chapters sketch both the internal 
picture and the cross‑border picture. The analysis of the internal picture addresses 
matters like whether, and if so under what conditions, (a right to) access to a certain 
reproductive treatment is in place under the law of the respective jurisdictions or what 
parental rights same‑sex couples enjoy under the respective regimes. The relevant 
discussions of the cross‑border picture, start – where available – with some statistics 
on the scale of cross‑border movement in the context of the respective case study. 
Thereafter there is discussion of what the various jurisdictions provide in respect of 
issues like access to information about foreign reproductive treatment options and 
the recognition of parental links established abroad.
On the basis of the analysis provided in the various substantive chapters, conclusions 
are drawn per case study (Chapters 7 and 13). The concluding chapter, Chapter 14, 
provides a synthesis of the relevant findings of Chapters 7 and 13, as well as a number 
of observations about morally sensitive issues and cross‑border movement within the 
EU more generally.
37 For example, as further explained in Ch. 12, section 12.4.2, Dutch Private international law is firmly 
rooted in international Treaty law. In respect of marriage, the applicable law was for 70 years, the 
Hague Convention relating to the settlement of the conflict of the laws concerning marriage of 1902.
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2.1. reproductIve mAtters under the echr
2.1.1.	 A	right	to	respect	for	the	decision	(not)	to	become	a	genetic	parent
When it comes to reproduction both Articles 8 and 12 ECHR have played a role in 
the case law of the ECtHR. While ‘the right to found a family’ ex. Article 12 ECHR 
may seem the most obvious provision to base any claim in this respect on, it has in 
fact been the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR) on the 
basis of which the most substantive case law in this field has been decided.1 This has 
everything to do with the narrow wording and interpretation of Article 12, which 
reads:
‘Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.’
With the wording ‘this right’ at the end of the provision, the right to marry and the 
right to found a family are firmly bracketed together.2 The Court has repeatedly 
held that the right to marry under Article 12 ECHR refers to the ‘traditional marriage 
between persons of opposite biological sex’ (see also Chapter 8, section 8.2).3 In 
the 1950s, when the Convention was drafted, the founding of a family may well 
have been considered to be the primary function of the institution of marriage. 
The Court has, however, since observed ‘major social changes in the institution of 
marriage since the adoption of the Convention’4 and held that ‘[…] the inability of 
any couple to conceive or parent a child cannot be regarded as per se removing their 
right to enjoy the first limb of this provision.’5 Thereby also different‑sex couples 
who do not wish to or are unable to found a family may exercise the right to marry. 
Still, Article 12 offers no protection to unmarried couples who wish to found a 
family; the right to found a family within the meaning of Article 12 exists only 
1 Various judges held in a dissenting opinion of 2011 that Art. 8 of the Convention by then appeared to 
play ‘an enhanced role […] regarding questions related to procreation and reproduction.’ Joint dissenting 
opinion of Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria to ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, 
S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 3.
2 Compare C.A. White and C. Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey, The European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010) p. 354.
3 Inter alia ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04.
4 ECtHR 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, no. 28657/95, para. 100.
5 Inter alia ECtHR 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, no. 28657/95, para. 100. See 
also ch. 8, section 8.2.1.







within marriage.6 In other words, only married different‑sex couples can claim a 
right to found a family under Article 12.7 Besides, as is clear from its wording, the 
exercise of this right is subjected to the national laws of the Contracting Parties to the 
ECHR. Article 12 furthermore primarily entails a negative obligation; States must 
refrain from interfering with the having of children within marriage. In exceptional 
circumstances, an interference with this right may be justified, for example if a 
person is detained.8 The primary negative reading of Article 12 is affirmed by the 
Court’s explicit finding that this provision ‘or any other Article of the Convention’9 
does not guarantee a right to procreation.10
The right to found a family ex. Article 12 is furthermore closely interlinked with the 
right to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR. As the Court has explained:
‘The exercise of the right to marry and found a family gives rise to personal, social and 
legal consequences as a result of which there is a close affinity between the rights under 
Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention […].’11
Whilst the concept of ‘family’ in Article 12 is limited to the circle of parents and 
children,12 the notion ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR has been 
given a much broader reading.13 This notion is not confined to blood relationships or 
marriage‑based relationships and may encompass other de facto family ties where 
6 See Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2009) p. 554 and H.L. Janssen, ‘Commentaar op art. 12 EVRM, para. C.1.8’, [‘Commentary to Art. 12 
ECHR, para. C.1.8’], in: Sdu Commentaar EVRM, Deel 1 – Materiele bepalingen [‘Sdu Commentary 
to the ECHR, Part 1 – Material provisions’] (Den Haag, Sdu Uitgevers 2013).
7 Compare White and Ovey 2010, supra n. 2, at p. 354 and Harris et al. 2009, supra n. 6, at p. 554.
8 In Dickson the Court held that the Convention did not require States to allow for conjugal visits. 
ECtHR [GC] 4 December 2007, Dickson v. the United Kingdom, no. 44362/04, para. 81. In 1975 the 
Commission had held the right to found a family to be absolute. See ECmHR 21 May 1975 (dec.), X. v. 
the United Kingdom, no. 6564/74.
9 ECtHR 6 March 2003 (dec.), Margarita Šijakova and Others v. “the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia”, no. 67914/01.
10 Idem and ECtHR 15 November 2007 (dec.), S.H. and others v. Austria, no. 57813/00. In the latter case 
the ECtHR declared Art. 12 inapplicable to a complaint about an Austrian prohibition of the use of 
donated gametes in AHR treatment. The Court reiterated that ‘[…] the right to procreation [was] not 
covered by Art. 12’. On the basis of this decision Harris et al. concluded that ‘[…] there is no positive 
obligation on the State to facilitate the having of children within marriage by legislation to permit 
artificial insemination or, a fortiori, by providing for it through state funded medical institutions.’ 
Harris et al. 2009, supra n. 6, at p. 555. On this question see also section 2.3.1 below. See furthermore 
M. Eijkholt, ‘The right to found a family as a stillborn right to procreate?’, 18 Medical Law Review 
(2010) p. 127.
11 ECtHR 8 November 2011, V.C. v. Slowakia, no. 18968/07, para. 159, referring to ECtHR 5 January 
2010, Frasik v. Poland, no. 22933/02, para. 90. In this case about the forced sterilisation of a woman of 
Roma origin, the Court found a violation of Art. 8 and therefore considered it not necessary to examine 
separately the applicant’s complaint under Art. 12 of the Convention (para. 160).
12 P. van Dijk et al. (eds.), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Antwerpen, 
Intersentia 2006) p. 856. The right to found a family does not extend to having grandchildren. 
ECtHR 6 March 2003 (dec.), Sijakova and others v. “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, 
no. 67914/01.
13 Compare White and Ovey 2010, supra n. 2, at p. 354.







the parties are living together outside of marriage.14 The Court has, furthermore, 
held that the relationship of a cohabiting same‑sex couple living in a stable de facto 
partnership also falls within the notion of ‘family life’.15 Still, also this right does not 
grant a right to procreate. The Court has held that
‘[…] the right to respect for family life presupposes the existence of a family and does not 
safeguard the mere desire to found a family.’16
The Court has recognised, however, that the notion ‘private life’ (Article 8 ECHR) 
includes a right to respect for the decision to become a parent.17 The first judgment in 
which the Court accepted this to be so was Evans v. the UK (GC, 2007).18
The applicant in the Evans case claimed that the provisions of the UK Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 which required her former partner’s consent 
before embryos made with their joint genetic material could be implanted in her 
uterus, violated her rights under Article 8 (in conjunction with Article 14, the 
prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention.19 In the course of fertility treatment 
Ms. Evans was diagnosed with a pre‑cancerous condition of her ovaries and was 
offered one cycle of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment prior to the surgical removal 
of her ovaries. Before the embryos created could be implanted into Ms. Evans’ 
uterus, the relationship between her and her partner broke down. Subsequently her 
former partner did not consent to Ms. Evans using the embryos alone nor did he 
consent to their continued storage. Ms. Evans’ claims before the domestic courts, 
seeking an injunction against her former partner to give his consent, were rejected. 
After exhaustion of domestic remedies she lodged a complaint with the ECtHR.20 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR noted that the applicant did not complain that she 
was in any way prevented from becoming a mother in a social, legal, or even physical 
sense, since there was no rule of domestic law or practice to stop her from adopting a 
14 Inter alia ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 91 and ECtHR 
8 November 2011, V.C. v. Slowakia, no. 18968/07, para. 142.
15 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 94.
16 ECtHR 26 February 2002, Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, para. 32, where the Court referred to ECtHR 
13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, para. 31 and ECtHR 28 May 1985, Abdulaziz, Cabales 
and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, nos. 9214/80 a.o., para. 62.
17 ECtHR [GC] 4 December 2007, Dickson v. the United Kingdom, no. 44362/04, para. 66. The Court 
referred to ECmHR 22 October 1997 (dec.), E.L.H. and P.B.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 32568/96; 
ECtHR 18 September 2001 (dec.), Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99; ECtHR 29 April 2003, Aliev 
v. Ukraine, no. 41220/98, paras. 187–189; ECtHR 7 March 2006, Evans v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 6339/05, paras. 71–72 and ECtHR 30 October 2012, P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375/08, para. 111. 
The Court has also spoken of ‘the right to respect for both the decisions to have and not to have a child’. 
ECtHR 8 November 2011, V.C. v. Slovakia, no. 18968/07, para. 138.
18 ECtHR [GC] 10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05. The Chamber judgment in this 
case dates from 7 March 2006.
19 Ms. Evans furthermore claimed that the legislation violated the embryos’ right to life under Article 2 
ECHR, but that claim will not be discussed here.
20 The application in this case was lodged on 11 February 2005. On 7 March 2006 a Chamber delivered 
its judgment in the case. On 5 June 2006 the applicant requested the referral of the case to the Grand 
Chamber, which delivered its judgment on 10 April 2007. ECtHR 7 March 2006, Evans v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 6339/05 and ECtHR [GC] 10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05.







child or even giving birth to a child originally created in vitro from donated gametes. 
Her complaint was, more precisely, that the consent provisions of the respective 
UK law prevented her from using the embryos that she and her former partner had 
created together, and thus, given her particular circumstances, from ever having a 
child to whom she was genetically related. The Grand Chamber considered that this 
more limited issue, concerning the right to respect for the decision to become a 
parent in the genetic sense, fell within the scope of Article 8 since
‘[…] “private life”, which is a broad term, encompassing, inter alia, aspects of an 
individual’s physical and social identity including the right to personal autonomy, personal 
development and to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world […], incorporates the right to respect for both the decisions to become and 
not to become a parent.’21
After the recognition of this right in Evans, the Court has in some – but not all 
relevant – later cases based this right on both the notion of private life and of 
family life.22 Also, the Court has spoken of ‘a right to respect for [the] decision to 
become a genetic [emphasis added] parent’.23 The Court has furthermore – albeit 
incidentally – considered this choice to be ‘a particularly important facet of an 
individual’s existence or identity’.24
In the case of Ternovsky v. Hungary (2010),25 concerning the choice of giving birth 
in one’s home, the Court also recognised a right to decide upon circumstances of 
becoming a parent.26 States have, further, an obligation under the Convention to 
protect the reproductive health of women.27 Lastly, important for the present case 
study is that the Court has held that the right of a couple to conceive a child includes 
a right to make use of medically assisted procreation for that purpose.28 The relevant 
ruling and its implications are discussed more elaborately in section 2.3 below.
21 ECtHR 7 March 2006, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 57 and ECtHR [GC] 10 April 
2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 71.
22 ECtHR [GC] 4 December 2007, Dickson v. United Kingdom, no. 44362/04, para. 66 and ECtHR 
28 August 2012, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, no. 54270/10.
23 Idem.
24 ECtHR [GC] 4 December 2007, Dickson v. United Kingdom, no. 44362/04, para. 78. As discussed 
below (section 2.3), the Court has not expressly repeated this in later case‑law.
25 ECtHR 14 December 2010, Ternovsky v. Hungary, no. 67545/09.
26 The Court held: ‘“Private life” […] incorporates the right to respect for both the decisions to become 
and not to become a parent […]. The notion of a freedom implies some measure of choice as to its 
exercise. The notion of personal autonomy is a fundamental principle underlying the interpretation 
of the guarantees of Article 8 […]. Therefore the right concerning the decision to become a parent 
includes the right of choosing the circumstances of becoming a parent. The Court is satisfied that 
the circumstances of giving birth incontestably form part of one’s private life for the purposes of 
this provision […]’. The Court found that legislation which arguably dissuades health professionals 
who might otherwise be willing from providing the requisite assistance in giving birth in one’s home 
constituted an interference with the exercise of the right to respect for private life by prospective 
mothers. ECtHR 14 December 2010, Ternovsky v. Hungary, no. 67545/09, para. 22.
27 The Court has ruled so in several cases about forced sterilisation of Roma women, e.g. ECtHR 
8 November 2011, V.C. v. Slovakia, appl. no. 18968/07, para. 145.
28 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 78.








When it comes to the rights of the unborn child, the ECtHR has never taken a strong 
position. In X v. the United Kingdom (1980)29 the Commission considered that the 
general usage of the term ‘everyone’ (‘toute personne’) in the Convention and the 
context in which it was used in its Article 2 (the right to life) did not include the 
unborn. The Commission noted a ‘[…] divergence of thinking on the question of 
where life begins’, and took a clear stance in holding that the unborn did not enjoy an 
absolute right to life, as ‘[…] the “life” of the foetus is intimately connected with, and 
it cannot be regarded in isolation of, the life of the pregnant woman.’
This early decision was later confirmed in the case of Vo v. France (2004),30 where 
the Court observed that ‘[…] if the unborn [did] have a “right” to “life”, it [was] 
implicitly limited by the mother’s rights and interests.’31 The Court did not rule out 
the possibility that in certain circumstances safeguards may be extended to the 
unborn child,32 but considered it neither desirable, nor even possible, to answer in 
the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of 
Article 2 ECHR.33 In the absence of any European consensus on the scientific and 
legal definition of the beginning of life, the issue of when the right to life begins 
came within the margin of appreciation that States enjoyed in this sphere.
The term ‘unborn’ usually refers to an embryo in vivo, that is, an embryo in the 
woman’s body. In respect of in vitro embryos there is even less case law. In Evans 
(2007),34 a Chamber of the Court referred to both the Vo judgment and to national 
law, when it held that the embryos created in the course of the IVF treatment as 
commenced by Ms. Evans and her former partner did not enjoy the right to life 
under Article 2 ECHR.35 Remarkably, in Costa and Pavan v. Italy (2012, see also 
section 2.3.4 below) the Court stressed that ‘the concept of “child” [could] not be put 
in the same category as that of “embryo”’,36 without explaining this finding further.37
29 ECmHR 13 May 1980 (dec.), X v. The United Kingdom, no. 8416/79.
30 ECtHR [GC] 8 July 2004, Vo v. France, no. 53924/00.
31 Idem, para. 80.
32 Idem, para. 80.
33 Idem, para. 85.
34 See section 2.1.1 above and section 2.3.2 below.
35 ECtHR [GC] 10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 56, confirming ECtHR 
7 March 2006, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 46. The subsequent case Knecht (2012) 
did not address the question as to the status of (frozen) embryos. The case concerned a complaint 
lodged by a woman who lost access to her frozen embryos when they were taken from the clinic storing 
them and transferred to the Romanian Institute of Forensic Medicine in connection with a criminal 
investigation. According to the statement of facts in the case the complaint was originally also based 
on Art. 2 of the Convention, but it was ultimately phrased and examined under Art. 8 ECHR only. 
The Court did not find a violation of that provision, as the breach of the applicant’s rights had yet been 
expressly acknowledged and redressed at national level. ECtHR 2 October 2012, Daniela Knecht v. 
Romania, no. 10048/10.
36 ECtHR 28 August 2012, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, no. 54270/10, para. 62.
37 Possibly the Grand Chamber of the Court will give more clarification on the matter in a pending case 
on donation of in vitro embryos for scientific research. In Parrillo v. Italy, a woman who wished to 
donate embryos created in the course of AHR treatment for scientific research, complained that she was 








The ECHR does not contain a specific Article on the rights of the child, but all its 
provisions also apply to children. Further, the rights of the child have been given an 
increasingly more prominent role in the ECtHR’s case law. This is first and foremost 
underlined by the fact that the Court has held that in judicial decisions where the rights 
under Article 8 ECHR of parents and those of a child are at stake, the rights of the 
child must be the paramount consideration. If any balancing of interests is necessary, 
the interests of the child must prevail.38 The Court has held such in the context of 
adoption of a child, parental authority and child care,39 in immigration cases40 and 
in cases concerning child abduction.41 This means, for example, that recognition of 
paternity cannot take place if such recognition is not in the child’s interest.42 The 
principle has also increasingly been recognised in cases where children claimed a 
right to know their genetic origins, although there the Court has still allowed States 
to balance the rights of the child against those of the parents concerned and the 
public interest (see section 2.1.4 hereafter).
The Court has further strengthened the protection of the rights of the child by 
interpreting the notion ‘family life’ under Article 8 ECHR extensively. In the ground 
breaking Marckx judgment of 1979, the Court for the first time held that de facto 
family life was also worthy of protection under Article 8 ECHR.43 Consequently, 
States may not discriminate between children born within marriage and children 
born outside marriage, as such discrimination based on birth cannot be justified. 
The Court furthermore recognised that family life includes not only social, moral or 
cultural relations, but also comprises interests of a material kind such as inheritance 
rights.44 Interpreting Article 8 in light of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,45 
banned from doing so because of an Italian law prohibiting such scientific research. The fact that the 
Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber in this case, may be an indication 
that the Court will set out more general principles in this case. ECtHR 28 May 2013 (dec.), Parrillo 
v. Italy, no. 46470/11. On 28 January the Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand 
Chamber in this case. The Grand Chamber held a hearing in the case in June 2014. See press release 
ECHR 173 (2014).
38 ECtHR 5 November 2002, Yousef v. the Netherlands, no. 33711/96, para. 73.
39 E.g. ECtHR 10 June 2006, Schwizgebel v. Switzerland, no. 25762/07; ECtHR 21 December 2010, Anayo 
v. Germany, no. 20578/07 and ECtHR [GC] 13 July 2000, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, nos. 39221/98 
and 41963/98, para. 148.
40 E.g. ECtHR [GC] 18 October 2006, Üner v. the Netherlands, no. 46410/99, para. 58 and ECtHR 
23 June 2008, Maslov v. Bulgaria, no. 1638/03.
41 E.g. ECtHR [GC] 6 July 2010, Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, no. 41615/07, paras. 135–136 and 
ECtHR [GC] 26 November 2013, X v. Latvia, no. 27853/09, paras. 93–108.
42 ECtHR 5 November 2002, Yousef v. the Netherlands, no. 33711/96, para. 73.
43 ECtHR 13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, para. 31.
44 It is not, as such, a requirement of Art. 8 that a child should be entitled to some share in the estates of his 
parents, as such an entitlement is not indispensable in the pursuit of a normal family life. However, once 
States grant such rights, they must, again, do so without discriminating on grounds of birth. ECtHR 
13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, paras. 52–53.
45 ECtHR 28 June 2007, Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, para. 120, under reference to 
ECtHR 26 June 2003, Maire v. Portugal, no. 48206/99, para. 72.







the Court has, moreover, held that States have a positive obligation to protect 
children’s family ties:
‘[…] where the existence of a family tie with a child has been established, the State must 
act in a manner calculated to enable that tie to be developed and legal safeguards must 
be established that render possible, from the moment of birth or as soon as practicable 
thereafter, the child’s integration in his family […]’.46
The child’s right to personal identity, which is an aspect of the right to respect for 
private life under Article 8 ECHR, has proven key in parent‑child relations. In the 
cases of Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France (2014), for example, the Court 
ruled that establishment of parentage for a child born through surrogacy affected 
the establishment of the essence of his or her identity. As further explained in 
section 2.4.2 below, in these cases a refusal to recognise parental links between 
the intended and genetic father of the children concerned, has been found to violate 
these children’s rights.
2.1.4. The right to know one’s genetic origins
As far as the present author is aware, there has not been any case before the ECtHR 
in which a donor‑conceived child claimed that he or she had a right to access to 
information about his or her genetic parent(s). In a case of the late 1990s, however, 
which indirectly touched upon the matter, the Court observed that there was no 
consensus amongst the member States of the Council of Europe on the question 
of whether the interests of a child conceived in such a way were best served by 
preserving the anonymity of the donor of the sperm or whether the child should have 
the right to know the donor’s identity.47
The Court has furthermore examined several cases where children born out of 
wedlock or children who were given up for adoption anonymously relied on Article 8 
in their claim that they had a right to know whom their natural parent(s) were.48 The 
Court’s rulings in these cases have proven indicative for the situation of children 
conceived by means of AHR or through surrogacy.
46 ECtHR 22 April 1997, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, no. 21830/93, para. 43. See also ECtHR 
28 June 2007, Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, para. 119, under reference to ECtHR 
27 October 1994, Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 18535/91, para. 32.
47 ECtHR 22 April 1997, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, no. 21830/93, para. 44. See also ECtHR [GC] 
3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 83; C. Lind, ‘Perceptions of sex in the legal 
determination of fatherhood – X, Y and Z v UK’, 9 Child & Fam. L. Q. (1997) p. 401.
48 The Court has also examined cases in which a man wished to institute proceedings to contest his 
paternity of a child born in wedlock or, alternatively, to have his putative biological paternity 
recognised. ECtHR 24 November 2005, Shofman v. Russia, no. 74826/01, para. 30; ECtHR 19 October 
1999 (dec.), Yildirim v. Austria, no. 34308/96; ECtHR 28 November 1984, Rasmussen v. Denmark, 
no. 8777/79, para. 33 and ECtHR 18 May 2006, Różański v. Poland, no. 55339/00, para. 62.







In Mikulic (2002),49 the ECtHR ruled that there is ‘a direct link’ between the 
establishment of paternity and a child’s private life. The Court recognised that each 
individual has a vital interest, protected by Article 8 of the Convention, in receiving 
the information necessary to uncover the truth about an important aspect of one’s 
personal identity.50 The Court has confirmed the right to know one’s origins and 
the child’s vital interest in its personal development in later cases. Birth, and in 
particular the circumstances in which a child was born, form part of a child’s private 
life guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR.51 The Court has held that ‘[…] an individual’s 
interest in discovering his or her parentage does not disappear with age, quite the 
reverse’.52 It has furthermore recognised that the process of ascertaining the identity 
of one’s parents may imply mental and psychological suffering.53
On the other hand, the Court has also explicitly recognised the rights of the parents in 
this context. In Godelli (2012), a case concerning a woman who had been given up for 
adoption anonymously after her birth, the Court noted that the expression ‘everyone’ 
in Article 8 ECHR applies to both the child and the mother: ‘[o]n the one hand, the 
child has a right to know its origins […] [o]n the other hand, a woman’s interest in 
remaining anonymous in order to protect her health by giving birth in appropriate 
medical conditions cannot be denied.’54 The Court has, furthermore, held that the 
protection of third persons may preclude their being compelled to make themselves 
available for medical testing of any kind, including DNA testing. Also, there may be 
a general interest at stake. For example in the cases concerning anonymous adoption, 
the Court accepted this to be the general interest ‘[…] to protect the mother’s and 
child’s health during pregnancy and birth […] and to avoid illegal abortions and 
children being abandoned other than under the proper procedure.’55
The Court has never ruled in abstracto whose interests should prevail in situations 
where these rights collide, except for when the parent is already deceased. In the 
latter situation, the deceased no longer enjoys a right to private life and the right of 
the child enjoys full protection.56 In all other situations, the national system must, 
as a minimum, provide for an independent authority that can decide about access to 
49 ECtHR 4 September 2002, Mikulic v. Croatia, no. 53176/99.
50 Idem, paras. 55 and 64.
51 ECtHR [GC] 13 February 2003, Odièvre v. France, no. 42326/98. As Bonnet has observed, in 
establishing a right to knowledge of one’s identity the Court mobilised a complexity of different 
but interconnected elements of the right to respect for private life: relations with the outside world, 
personal development and mental health are all coalescing in the vital interest of obtaining information 
concerning the identity of one’s natural parents. V. Bonnet, ‘L’accouchement sous X et la Cour 
Européenne des Droits de l’Homme (à propos de l’arrêt Odièvre c. la France du 13 février 2003)’, 58 
Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2004) p. 405 at p. 413.
52 ECtHR 25 September 2012, Godelli v. Italy, no. 33783/09, para. 56.
53 Idem.
54 Idem, para. 50. Earlier ECtHR [GC] 13 February 2003, Odièvre v. France, no. 42326/98, para. 44.
55 ECtHR 4 September 2002, Mikulic v. Croatia, no. 53176/99, para. 64.
56 ECtHR 13 July 2006, Jäggi v. Switzerland, no. 58757/00, para. 42.







information about one’s genetic origins.57 The Court has – in any case initially – left 
States a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to the actual balancing of the 
rights at stake. Exemplary in this regard is the French case Odièvre (2003)58 in which 
a woman who had been given up for adoption anonymously when she was a child 
claimed a right to knowledge about their personal history. Ms. Odièvre had been 
able to obtain non‑identifying information about her natural family, but her request 
for disclosure of details about the identity of her brother was refused as it would 
entail a breach of confidence. The ECtHR observed that there were two competing 
interests in the case before it: on the one hand, the right to know one’s origins and 
the child’s vital interest in its personal development; and, on the other, a woman’s 
interest in remaining anonymous in order to protect her health by giving birth in 
appropriate medical conditions.59 The Court considered that those interests were 
not easily reconciled, as they concerned two adults, each endowed with free will. 
Furthermore, the Court noted, the rights of third parties – essentially the adoptive 
parents, the father and the other members of the natural family – and the general 
interest to avoid (illegal) abortions and children being abandoned other than under 
the proper procedure, were at issue. The Court left the respondent state a wide 
margin of appreciation ‘[…] in view of the complex and sensitive nature of the issue 
of access to information about one’s origins, an issue that concern[ed] the right to 
know one’s personal history, the choices of the natural parents, the existing family 
ties and the adoptive parents.’60 It found that France had sought to strike a balance 
and to ensure sufficient proportion between the competing interests and concluded 
that the national authorities had not overstepped their wide margin of appreciation.
The seven dissenters to this judgment were of the opinion that the relevant French 
law had not provided for any balancing of interests, but merely ‘[…] accepted that 
the mother’s decision constituted an absolute defence to any requests for information 
by the applicant, irrespective of the reasons for or legitimacy of that decision.’61 The 
dissenters stressed that the right to respect for private life62 included the right to 
personal development and to self‑fulfilment, and underlined that the issue of access 
to information about one’s origins concerned the essence of a person’s identity 
and therefore constituted an essential feature of private life protected by Article 8 
ECHR.63 The dissenting judges linked personal identity to personal autonomy, more 
expressly than the majority of the Court had done, when considering that ‘[…] being 
given access to information about one’s origins and thereby acquiring the ability 
57 ECtHR 4 September 2002, Mikulic v. Croatia, no. 53176/99, para. 64. This also holds for access 
to information about one’s childhood ECtHR [GC] 7 July 1989, Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 10454/83, para. 49.
58 ECtHR [GC] 13 February 2003, Odièvre v. France, no. 42326/98.
59 Idem, para. 44.
60 Idem, para. 49.
61 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Sir Nicolas Bratza, Bonello, Loucaides, Cabral Barreto, 
Tulkens and Pellonpää to ECtHR [GC] 13 February 2003, Odièvre v. France, no. 42326/98, para. 7.
62 Idem. Literally the dissenting opinion here speaks of ‘familiy life’, however from the context one can 
distract that this was a mistake.
63 Idem, para. 3.







to retrace one’s personal history [was] a question of liberty and, therefore, human 
dignity that lie[d] at the heart of the rights guaranteed by the Convention.’64
The Court subsequently accorded more weight to the child’s interests in Kalacheva 
v. Russia (2009),65 where a mother of a child born out of wedlock complained that 
unsuccessful court proceedings against the putative father of the child in order to 
establish his paternity had violated her Article 8 rights. The Court considered that 
establishment of paternity of the applicant’s daughter was a matter related to her 
private life. Importantly, the Court held that the best interest of the child implicated 
an unambiguous answer on whether or not the putative father was indeed the father.66 
It concluded that the domestic authorities’ approach in handling the applicant’s case 
had fallen short ‘[…] of the State’s positive obligation to strike a fair balance between 
competing interests of the parties to the proceedings with due regard to the best 
interests of the child’. The Court thus took the child’s best interests – inter alia, the 
child’s right to personal identity and personal autonomy – into account in finding a 
violation of the Article 8 rights of the mother.
Moreover, in Godelli (2012) – a case already briefly discussed (see section 2.1.4 
above) – the Court found that the competing interests had not been adequately 
balanced at national level. In this case the Court accorded a fairly narrow margin 
of appreciation to the State, basing itself on a reasoning which resembled that of the 
dissenters to the Odièvre judgment. That is, the Court considered that the right to an 
identity, which includes the right to know one’s parentage, was an integral part of 
the notion of private life and held that in such cases, ‘particularly rigorous scrutiny’ 
was called for when balancing the competing interests. The Court subsequently 
distinguished the case at hand from Odièvre on the point that the applicant in Godelli 
did not have access to any information about her mother and birth family, not even 
non‑identifying information.67 The Court found a violation of Article 8 on the 
ground that there was no machinery in place enabling the applicant’s right to learn 
about her genetic origins to be balanced against the mother’s interests in remaining 
anonymous. The Godelli judgment did not grant children an unqualified right to 
know all details about their genetic origins, however. After all, if non‑identifying 
information had been made available, possibly no violation may have been found 
in this case. The fact that the Court has shifted from according a wide margin of 
appreciation in these matters, to according a narrow one, is proof, however, of the 
Court’s increased attention to, and protection of, the rights of the child.
2.2. AbortIon under the echr
Abortion is and has always been a delicate issue within the Council of Europe. Views 
on the circumstances under which an abortion may be permissible, differ widely 
64 Idem.
65 ECtHR 1 May 2009, Kalacheva v. Russia, no. 3451/05.
66 Idem, para. 36.
67 ECtHR 25 September 2012, Godelli v. Italy, no. 33783/09, para. 55.







between the High Contracting parties to the ECHR. Obviously, what makes abortion 
such a delicate matter is the fact that primarily two (conflicting) rights are at stake: 
those of the mother and arguably those of the unborn child.68 Further, the (future) 
father may also claim certain rights. As observed by the Court:
‘[…] the issue has always been determined by weighing up various, and sometimes 
conflicting, rights or freedoms claimed by a mother or a father in relation to one another 
or vis‑à‑vis the foetus.’69
Because of the lack of consensus on the issue, the Court – as earlier the Commission 
did – left and still leaves states a wide margin of appreciation in abortion issues. It finds 
that in such a delicate area the Contracting States must have a certain discretion.70 
The Court considers abortion issues to be up to national courts particularly because 
‘[…] the central issue requires a complex and sensitive balancing of equal rights 
to life and demands a delicate analysis of country‑specific values and morals.’71 
Consequently, the Court has been hesitant to recognise a right to abortion as such. 
However, already in the early case of Brüggeman and Scheuten (1976) the former 
Commission recognised that Article 8 is applicable to abortion issues:
‘[…] legislation regulating the interruption of pregnancy touches upon the sphere of private 
life, since whenever a woman is pregnant her private life becomes closely connected with 
the developing foetus.’72
The Court confirmed this finding in later case law. In R. R. v. Poland (2011)73 it spoke 
of ‘[…] the right to decide on the continuation of pregnancy’74 and ruled that:
‘[…] the decision of a pregnant woman to continue her pregnancy or not belongs to the 
sphere of private life and autonomy.’75
Incidentally, the Court has spoken of ‘the right to decide on the termination of a 
pregnancy’, but at the same time stressed that this right was not absolute.76 Also, this 
phrasing has not been repeated in later case law. In fact, in that very same ruling 
the Court confirmed that Article 8 cannot be interpreted as conferring a right to 
abortion.77 In other cases the ECtHR considered it not to be its task to examine 
68 As yet discussed (see section 2.1.2 above), the Court has considered it neither desirable, nor even 
possible to answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes 
of Art. 2 of the Convention (the right to life). ECtHR [GC] 8 July 2004, Vo v. France, no. 53924/00, 
para. 85.
69 ECtHR 26 May 2011, R. R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04, para. 181, referring to ECtHR [GC] 8 July 2004, Vo 
v. France, no. 53924/00, para. 82.
70 E.g. ECmHR 19 May 1992 (dec.), Hercz v. Norway, no. 17004/90.
71 ECtHR 27 June 2006 (dec.), D. v. Ireland, no. 26499/02, para. 90.
72 ECmHR 19 May 1976 (dec.), Brüggeman and Scheuten v. Germany, no. 6959/75.
73 ECtHR 26 May 2011, R. R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04.
74 Idem, para. 188.
75 ECtHR 26 May 2011, R. R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04, para. 181.
76 ECtHR 30 October 2012, P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375/08.
77 Idem. See earlier ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 214.







whether the Convention guarantees a right to have an abortion.78 The Court thus 
seems very reluctant to give a principled ruling on the matter.
The following subsections discuss the ECtHR’s case law on abortion in chronological 
order. Not surprisingly, a considerable number of cases originate from Ireland. The 
fact that Ireland is one of the national jurisdictions included in this research, justifies 
a somewhat more extensive discussion of the facts of these cases. Also, exactly 
because of Ireland’s very restrictive abortion regime, many Irish women have gone, 
and still go, abroad for an abortion.79 The ECtHR has accordingly heard various 
cases from Ireland containing cross‑border elements. For example, the first Irish 
case relating to abortion before the Strasbourg Court, Open Door v. Ireland (1992)80 
concerned not so much the question of a right to abortion in itself, but the issue of the 
provision of information about foreign abortion services. This case is, like particular 
cross‑border aspects of the other relevant abortion cases, (further) discussed in 
section 2.4.1 below. The second Irish abortion case before the ECtHR, D. v. Ireland 
(2006),81 could have resulted in a more substantial ruling of the Court on the scope 
of Article 8 in abortion matters, had the case not been declared inadmissible on 
grounds of non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies.
2.2.1.	 The	case	of	D. v. Ireland	(2006)
Ms. D. complained before the ECtHR about the need to travel abroad to have an 
abortion in the case of a lethal foetal abnormality and about the restrictions for which 
the 1995 Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination 
of Pregnancies) Act provided.82 She thereby invoked Articles 3, 8 and 10 of the 
Convention. Ms. D. submitted that she was obliged to research abortion options 
in the United Kingdom and to travel abroad to be treated by unknown medical 
personnel in an unknown hospital, without the involvement of her treating doctor. 
She pointed out that certain follow‑up matters were not available in Ireland following 
an abortion abroad and, with two children in Ireland, she could not remain in the UK 
for counselling there. She held that the State placed an unduly harsh burden on the 
few women in her situation, by denying them an abortion in Ireland, and claimed that 
Irish law was ‘arbitrary and draconian’.83
In its decision of 27 June 2006, the ECtHR declared her application inadmissible 
for non‑compliance with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies as regards 
the availability of abortion in Ireland in the case of fatal foetal abnormality.84 In 
the absence of a domestic decision, the ECtHR held it impossible to establish that 
78 E.g. ECtHR 20 March 2007, Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, para. 103.
79 See also ch. 5, section 5.4.
80 ECtHR 29 October 1992, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88. 
See also ch. 5, section 5.2.
81 ECtHR 27 June 2006 (dec.), D. v. Ireland, no. 26499/02.
82 See ch. 5, section 5.2.3.
83 ECtHR 27 June 2006 (dec.), D. v. Ireland, no. 26499/02, para. 59.
84 Idem, paras. 103–104.







Article 40.3.3° clearly excluded an abortion in the applicant’s situation in Ireland 
and that no effective remedies were available to request an exemption.85 The Court 
acknowledged that Article 40.3.3° had to be understood as excluding a liberal abortion 
regime, but considered that the Irish courts were, nonetheless, unlikely to interpret 
the provision with remorseless logic, particularly when the facts were exceptional. 
The Court held it possible that an Irish court might, in fact, have allowed for her 
abortion to be carried out, through a further interpretation of the term ‘unborn’. 
If it had been established that there was no realistic prospect of the foetus being 
born alive, then there was ‘at least a tenable’ argument which would be seriously 
considered by the domestic courts to the effect that the foetus was not an ‘unborn’ 
for the purposes of Article 40.3.3° or that, even if it was an ‘unborn’, its right to life 
was not actually engaged as it had no prospect of life outside the womb.86 It has been 
suggested that by taking this approach the Court basically sought, and found, a way 
out of this case.87 For one thing, the Court’s suggestion that abortion on grounds 
of lethal foetal abnormality could potentially form a ground for a legal abortion in 
Ireland has not materialised (see Chapter 5).
While the D. case thus stranded in the admissibility stage, the case of the Polish 
Ms. Tysiąc was the first case in which the Court can be said to have given a more 
substantive answer to the question of whether the Convention provides for a right 
to abortion. The issue of needing to travel abroad for an abortion, as put forward in 
the D. case, was addressed in the subsequent ruling A, B and C v. Ireland (2010), as 
discussed thereafter in section 2.2.3.
2.2.2.	 The	case	of	Tysiąc v. Poland	(2007)
The applicant in Tysiąc (2007) suffered, for many years, from severe myopia, a 
disability of medium severity whereby her eyesight had severely deteriorated. 
When in February 2000 she discovered that she was pregnant for the third time, she 
decided to consult several doctors as she was concerned that her pregnancy could 
have an impact on her health. Various medical experts concluded that there would be 
a serious risk to her eyesight if she carried the pregnancy to term. However, the head 
of the gynaecology and obstetrics department of a public hospital in Warsaw, found 
that there were no medical grounds for performing a therapeutic abortion. Ms. Tysiąc 
was therefore unable to have her pregnancy terminated and gave birth to her third 
child in November 2000. Following the delivery, the applicant’s eyesight deteriorated 
considerably as a result of what was diagnosed as a retinal haemorrhage. A panel of 
doctors concluded that her condition required treatment and daily assistance and 
declared her to be significantly disabled. Her criminal complaint against the head of 
the gynaecology and obstetrics department was unsuccessful.
85 Idem, para. 69.
86 ECtHR 27 June 2006 (dec.), D. v. Ireland, no. 26499/02, para. 69.
87 B. Daly, ‘“Braxton Hick’s” or the Birth of a New Era? Tracing the Development of Ireland’s Abortion 
Laws in Respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence’, 18 European Journal of Health 
Law (2011) p. 375 at p. 386.







Before the ECtHR, Ms. Tysiąc claimed, inter alia, that she satisfied the Polish 
statutory conditions for access to abortion on therapeutic grounds. She maintained 
that the fact that she was not allowed to terminate her pregnancy in spite of the 
risks to which she was exposed, amounted to a violation of Article 8.88 She further 
complained that no procedural and regulatory framework had been put in place to 
enable a pregnant woman like herself to assert her right to a therapeutic abortion, 
thus rendering that right ineffective.
The Court reiterated that ‘private life’ was a broad term, encompassing, inter 
alia, aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity, including the right to 
personal autonomy, personal development and to establish and develop relationships 
with other human beings and the outside world. Furthermore, the Court referred to 
previous case law in which it had held that private life included a person’s physical 
and psychological integrity and that the State was under a positive obligation to 
secure to its citizens their right to effective respect for this integrity. The Court noted 
expressly that in the case before it ‘a particular combination of different aspects 
of private life’ was concerned. It found that, apart from balancing the individual’s 
rights against the general interest in the case of a therapeutic abortion the national 
regulations on abortion also had to be assessed against the positive obligations of the 
State to secure the physical integrity of mothers‑to‑be.89 The ECtHR further held 
explicitly that it did not consider it to be its task to examine whether the Convention 
guaranteed a right to have an abortion.90 Instead, the Court chose a procedural 
approach and formulated the central question of this case as:
‘[…] whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the 
nature of the decisions to be taken, an individual has been involved in the decision‑making 
process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide her or him with the requisite 
protection of their interests.’91
Having chosen this approach, the conclusion of the Court was that ‘[…] once the 
legislature decides to allow abortion, it must not structure its legal framework in a 
way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it.’92 With respect to the specific 
case at hand, the Court concluded that Polish law, as applied to Ms. Tysiąc’s case, did 
88 Ms. Tysiąc also complained under Arts. 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and 13 
(right to an effective remedy). As regards her complaint under Art. 3, the Court found that the facts 
did not reveal a breach of that provision and considered that it was more appropriate to examine 
Ms. Tysiąc’s complaints under Art. 8. Relying on Art. 14, Ms. Tysiąc furthermore alleged that she had 
been discriminated against on the grounds of her sex and her disability. Having regard to its reasons for 
finding a violation of Art. 8, however, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the applicant’s 
complaints separately under Art. 14 ECHR.
89 ECtHR 20 March 2007, Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, paras. 107–108.
90 Idem, para. 103. In his dissenting opinion to the judgment, Judge Bonello considered: ‘In this case the 
Court was neither concerned with any abstract right to abortion, nor, equally so, with any fundamental 
human right to abortion lying low somewhere in the penumbral fringes of the Convention.’ Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Bonello to ECtHR 20 March 2007, Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, para. 1.
91 ECtHR 20 March 2007, Tysiąc v. Poland, no. 5410/03, para. 113.
92 Idem, para. 116.







not contain any effective mechanism capable of determining whether the conditions 
for obtaining a lawful abortion had been met.93
2.2.3.	 The	case	of	A, B and C v. Ireland	(2010)
A fresh application against Ireland lodged in 2005 challenged the ECtHR’s line of 
case law as regards abortion once again. Three women residing in Ireland claimed 
that, given their financial situation and/or their state of health, they had to be allowed 
to have an abortion within Ireland, instead of being forced to travel to the United 
Kingdom to procure one.94
The first applicant, referred to as ‘A’, was an unmarried and unemployed mother of 
four children, all of whom had been placed in foster care. She was a former alcoholic 
struggling with depression and living in poverty. In 2005 she unintentionally became 
pregnant again. She decided to have an abortion to avoid jeopardising her health and 
her chances of reuniting her family. She paid for the abortion in a private clinic in 
the UK by borrowing money from a money lender. She travelled back to Ireland by 
plane the day after the abortion for her contact visit with her youngest child. On the 
train returning from Dublin she began to bleed profusely, and an ambulance met 
the train. At a nearby hospital she underwent a dilation and curettage. The applicant 
claimed she experienced pain, nausea and bleeding for weeks thereafter but did not 
seek further medical advice.
The second applicant (‘B’) became pregnant unintentionally. She had taken the 
‘morning‑after pill’ and was advised by two different doctors that there was therefore 
a substantial risk of an ectopic pregnancy, a condition which could not be diagnosed 
until six to ten weeks of pregnancy. Since she could not care for a child on her own 
at that time of her life, the applicant decided to have an abortion. Believing that she 
was not entitled to an abortion in Ireland, the applicant travelled to England for an 
abortion when she was seven weeks pregnant. By that time it had been confirmed 
that it was not an ectopic pregnancy. The applicant had had difficulty meeting the 
costs of the travel and, not having a credit card, had used a friend’s credit card to 
book the flights.
Lastly ‘C’, the third applicant, was suffering from a rare form of cancer for which 
she had been treated with chemotherapy since 2002. Before the treatment she had 
discussed with her doctor the implications of her illness as regards her desire to 
have children. She had been advised that it was not possible to predict the effect of 
pregnancy on her cancer and that, if she did become pregnant, it would be dangerous 
for the foetus if she were to have chemotherapy during the first trimester. In 2005, 
while in remission from the cancer, the applicant had become pregnant without being 
aware of it. In the mean time, she underwent a series of tests for cancer for which 
93 Idem, para. 124.
94 As explained in Ch. 5, under Irish law abortion is prohibited safe in the exceptional circumstance that 
the life of the mother is endangered by the pregnancy.







pregnancy is a contraindication. When she discovered her pregnancy, she consulted 
various medical practitioners and searched the Internet, as she was concerned about 
the impact of the pregnancy on her health and life and about the risks the prior tests 
for cancer posed to the health foetus. C alleged that the information she had received 
from Irish medical experts was insufficient and unclear. Given the uncertainty about 
the risks involved, she decided to travel to England for an abortion. As her pregnancy 
was at an early stage, the applicant wished to have a medical abortion, whereby 
drugs would be administered to induce a miscarriage. She could not, however, find a 
clinic which would provide this treatment as she was a non‑resident and because of 
the need for follow‑up care. According to C, she consequently had to wait a further 
eight weeks until a surgical abortion was possible. After having returned to Ireland 
after the abortion, she suffered complications of an incomplete abortion, including 
prolonged bleeding and infection, allegedly without receiving adequate medical care.
All three applicants complained that the impossibility for them to have an abortion 
in Ireland placed an excessive burden on them, making their abortion procedures 
unnecessarily expensive, complicated and traumatic. They asserted that the 
restriction on abortion stigmatised and humiliated them and entailed the risk of 
damaging their health in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Relying on Article 8, 
the applicants argued that the fact that it was open to women – provided they had 
sufficient resources – to travel outside Ireland to have an abortion, defeated the aim 
of the restriction. They also alleged that fact that abortion was available in Ireland 
only in very limited circumstances was disproportionate and excessive. The third 
applicant furthermore complained that the restriction on abortion, and the lack of 
clear legal guidelines regarding the circumstances in which a woman could have an 
abortion to save her life, infringed upon her right to life under Article 2 ECHR.95
In 2009 the Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in this case in favour of the Grand 
Chamber, which issued its judgment a year later, in December 2010.96 The Court 
explicitly determined the scope of the case. In this regard it stressed that it did not 
consider it its role ‘[…] to examine submissions which do not concern the factual 
matrix of the case before it’.97 Rather, the Court held it to be its task to assess
‘[…] the impugned legal position on abortion in Ireland in so far as it directly affected 
the applicants, in so far as they belonged to a class of persons who risked being directly 
affected by it or in so far as they were required to either modify their conduct or risk 
prosecution […].’98
Before addressing this question on the merits, the Court first had to examine the 
admissibility of the case.
95 The applicants furthermore invoked Arts. 13 (right to an effective remedy) and 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) of the Convention.
96 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05.
97 Idem, para. 123.
98 Idem, para. 123.








Contrary to the D case as discussed above, the applications of A, B and C were not 
declared inadmissible for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies, even though that 
point was raised by the respondent government. The government claimed that the 
applicants could and should have started a constitutional action. In this context, they 
underlined ‘the interpretative potential of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution’. The 
government suggested that there was potential that the claim of C would have been 
accepted, as ‘[…] the domestic courts would be unlikely to interpret Article 40.3.3° 
with “remorseless logic”’, as the ECtHR itself had held in the D decision (see above). 
It was, however, acknowledged that this Article ‘on no analysis’ permitted abortion 
in Ireland for social reasons. Particularly the latter acknowledgment was ground for 
the Court to consider it not demonstrated ‘[…] that the first and second applicants 
had an effective domestic remedy available to them as regards their complaint about 
a lack of abortion in Ireland for reasons of health and/or well‑being.’99 With the 
respect to the third applicant’s complaint, the Court joined the examination of this 
objection to examination of the merits of her complaint (see section 2.2.3.5 below).100
2.2.3.2. Assessment of the complaints under Articles 2 and 3
The third applicant was the only one to also rely on Article 2 (the right to life). She 
maintained that even in a life‑threatening situation abortion was not available in 
Ireland, because there was no legislation implementing Article 40.3.3° of the Irish 
Constitution and providing clarity as to the circumstances under which an abortion 
could be legally performed in Ireland. All three applicants furthermore complained 
that the impact of the restrictions on abortion in Ireland and of travelling abroad 
for an abortion constituted treatment which breached Article 3 of the Convention. 
According to the applicants the criminalisation of abortion was ‘[…] discriminatory 
(crude stereotyping and prejudice against women), caused an affront to women’s 
dignity and stigmatised women, increasing feelings of anxiety’. Women in their 
situation only had two options; ‘[…] overcoming taboos to seek an abortion abroad 
and aftercare at home or maintaining the pregnancy in their situations’. These options 
were ‘degrading and a deliberate affront to their dignity’.101 The government, for its 
part, argued that no issue arose under Article 2 of the Convention and denied the 
stigma and taboo effect of the criminalisation of abortion.102
The Court declared the Article 2 complaint manifestly ill‑founded. It held that there 
was ‘no evidence of any relevant risk’ to C’s life, as there was no legal impediment 
to her travelling for an abortion abroad, and she had not submitted that possible 
post‑abortion complications concerned a risk to her life.103 By adopting this reasoning, 
the Court thus did not give a conclusive answer to the question whether the provision 
99 Idem, para. 152.
100 Idem, para. 155.
101 Idem, para. 162.
102 Idem, para. 161.
103 Idem, para. 158.







of abortion in case of a real threat to the life of the mother is required as a minimum 
level of protection offered to the pregnant woman under Article 2 of the Convention.
The complaints of the applicants under Article 3 (prohibition of degrading 
treatment), were likewise rejected. The Court considered it evident that travelling 
abroad for an abortion was ‘[…] both psychologically and physically arduous for 
each of the applicants’ and that it was financially burdensome for the first applicant. 
Still – without further explaining this point – the Court did not consider that these 
circumstances disclosed a level of severity falling within the scope of Article 3 of 
the Convention.104
2.2.3.3. Assessment of the complaints under Article 8
The applicants accepted that the restrictive Irish abortion legislation pursued the 
aim of protecting foetal life, but they questioned whether the laws were effective 
in achieving that aim. They also questioned how the State could maintain the 
legitimacy of that aim ‘[…] given the opposite moral viewpoint espoused by human 
rights bodies worldwide’. In this regard they furthermore argued that ‘[…] there 
was evidence of greater support for broader access to legal abortion’, within Ireland 
itself. Also, they asserted that the restrictive nature of the legal regime in Ireland 
disproportionately harmed women and therefore urged the Court ‘[…] to express 
the minimum requirements to protect a woman’s health and well‑being under the 
Convention’.
The Irish government, for its part, adduced that the protection accorded under 
Irish law to the right to life of the unborn was ‘[…] based on profound moral values 
deeply embedded in the fabric of society in Ireland and the legal position was 
defined through equally intense debate’ and that this had been a ‘long, complex and 
delicate process’. They, inter alia, argued that the Court had to respect ‘a diversity 
of traditions and values’ amongst the Contracting States and that the Court was 
not to scrutinise or measure the moral validity, legitimacy or success of this aim 
pursued with the Irish abortion laws, namely the protection of morals and the rights 
and freedoms of others including the protection of pre‑natal life. The government 
denied the existence of a consensus in Europe in favour of greater access to abortion, 
including on social grounds. In any case, so they warned, it was difficult to determine 
the scope of fundamental rights based on any such consensus. Also, the protection 
of ECHR rights was not to be made dependent upon popular will. In conclusion the 
government claimed that it would be inappropriate for the ECtHR ‘[…] to attempt to 
balance the competing interests where striking that balance domestically has been a 
long, complex and delicate process, to which a broad margin of appreciation applied 
and in respect of which there was plainly no consensus in member States of the 
Council of Europe’.105
104 Idem, paras. 163–164.
105 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 191.







The Court started its assessment of the complaints under Article 8 with a repetition 
of its previous finding that this provision could not be interpreted as conferring a 
right to abortion.106 At the same time it found in the case at hand that the prohibition 
of the termination of the first and second applicant’s pregnancies sought for reasons 
of health and/or well‑being amounted to an interference with their right to respect 
for their private lives:
‘While Article 8 cannot […] be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion, the Court 
finds that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion where sought for reasons of health and/
or well‑being about which the first and second applicants complained, and the third 
applicant’s alleged inability to establish her qualification for a lawful abortion in Ireland, 
come within the scope of their right to respect for their private lives and accordingly 
Article 8.’107
The implications of this important and new ruling were played down, however, as 
subsequently the Court effectively accepted even the most far‑reaching interference 
with this right. The ECtHR held a complete prohibition on abortions for health and/
or well‑being reasons, to constitute no violation of Article 8, but to fall within the 
State’s margin of appreciation.
2.2.3.4. A wide margin of appreciation, no violation
The Court considered that the Irish abortion prohibition was based on ‘[…] profound 
moral values concerning the nature of life which were reflected in the stance of 
the majority of the Irish people against abortion during the 1983 referendum and 
which had […] not been demonstrated to have changed significantly since then.’108 
The Irish choice had thus emerged from ‘the lengthy, complex and sensitive debate 
in Ireland’.109 The Court was not convinced by evidence such as opinion polls, which 
the applicants had put forward, as proof that the views of the Irish people in respect 
of abortion had changed. It held that this could not displace the State’s opinion to the 
Court on the exact content of the requirements of morals in Ireland.110
The Court ruled that Ireland enjoyed a wide margin ‘[…] in determining the question 
whether a fair balance had been struck between the protection of the public interest, 
notably the protection accorded under Irish law to the right to life of the unborn, and 
the conflicting rights of the applicants to respect for their private lives under Article 8 
of the Convention.’111 Such a wide margin of appreciation was accorded, because 
of ‘the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised by the question of 
abortion’.112 Although the Court observed a consensus amongst a substantial majority 
106 Idem, para. 214.
107 Idem, para. 214.
108 Idem, para. 226.
109 Idem, para. 239.
110 Idem, para. 226.
111 Idem, para. 233.
112 Idem, para. 233.







of the Contracting States of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion on 
broader grounds than accorded under Irish law,113 the Court did not consider this 
consensus to decisively narrow the broad margin of appreciation of the State:
‘Of central importance is the finding in the […] Vo case […] that the question of when the 
right to life begins came within the States’ margin of appreciation because there was no 
European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, so that 
it was impossible to answer the question whether the unborn was a person to be protected 
for the purposes of Article 2. Since the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus and those 
of the mother are inextricably interconnected […], the margin of appreciation accorded to 
a State’s protection of the unborn necessarily translates into a margin of appreciation for 
that State as to how it balances the conflicting rights of the mother. It follows that, even 
if it appears from the national laws referred to that most Contracting Parties may in their 
legislation have resolved those conflicting rights and interests in favour of greater legal 
access to abortion, this consensus cannot be a decisive factor in the Court’s examination 
of whether the impugned prohibition on abortion in Ireland for health and well‑being 
reasons struck a fair balance between the conflicting rights and interests, notwithstanding 
an evolutive interpretation of the Convention […].’114
The margin of appreciation was not unlimited, however, the Court clarified. 
A prohibition of abortion to protect unborn life was ‘[…] not automatically justified 
under the Convention on the basis of unqualified deference to the protection of 
pre‑natal life or on the basis that the expectant mother’s right to respect for her 
private life is of a lesser stature.’115
The Court attached considerable, if not decisive, weight to the fact that under Irish 
abortion law women who wished to have an abortion for health and well‑being reasons 
were allowed the option of lawfully travelling to another State to do so.116 The Court 
did not underestimate the serious impact of the impugned restriction on the first and 
second applicant and accepted that the process of travelling abroad for an abortion 
was ‘psychologically and physically arduous for the first and second applicants, 
additionally so for the first applicant given her impoverished circumstances’.117 The 
Court even did not exclude, as the first two applicants had argued, that the impugned 
prohibition on abortion was to a large extent ineffective in protecting the unborn in 
the sense that a substantial number of women took the option open to them in law 
113 Idem, para. 235. In particular, the Court noted that the first and second applicants could have obtained an 
abortion on request (according to certain criteria including gestational limits) in some 30 Contracting 
States. The first applicant could have obtained an abortion justified on health and well‑being grounds in 
approximately 40 Contracting States and the second applicant could have obtained an abortion justified 
on well‑being grounds in some 35 Contracting States. The Court further noted that only three States 
had ‘more restrictive access to abortion services than in Ireland namely, a prohibition on abortion 
regardless of the risk to the woman’s life’ and that certain States had in recent years extended the 
grounds on which abortion could be obtained.
114 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 237.
115 Idem, para. 238.
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of travelling abroad for an abortion not available in Ireland. It held it, however to be 
‘[…] not possible to be more conclusive, given the disputed nature of the relevant 
statistics provided to the Court […].’118 With a view to the wide margin of appreciation 
accorded to the Irish State, the Court concluded that Article 8 had not been violated 
in respect of the first and the second applicant:
‘[…] having regard to the right to lawfully travel abroad for an abortion with access to 
appropriate information and medical care in Ireland, the Court does not consider that 
the prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well‑being reasons, based as it is 
on the profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life […] and as to 
the consequent protection to be accorded to the right to life of the unborn, exceeds the 
margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to the Irish State. In such circumstances, 
the Court finds that the impugned prohibition in Ireland struck a fair balance between 
the right of the first and second applicants to respect for their private lives and the rights 
invoked on behalf of the unborn.’119
Six dissenting judges strongly disagreed with the approach of the majority.120 They 
argued that the margin should have been significantly reduced on grounds of the 
existing consensus on the balancing of the right to life of the foetus with the right to 
health and well‑being of the mother. The dissenters considered the fact that the Court 
for the first time had disregarded the existence of a European consensus on the basis 
of ‘profound moral views’ to be a dangerous development:
‘Even assuming that these profound moral views are still well embedded in the conscience 
of the majority of Irish people, to consider that this can override the European consensus, 
which tends in a completely different direction, is a real and dangerous new departure in 
the Court’s case‑law.’121
The dissenters were also very critical that the majority referred in its reasoning to 
the right to lawfully travel abroad for an abortion. They argued that the majority 
based its reasoning on the ‘disputable’ premise that ‘[…] the fact that Irish law 
allows abortion for those who can travel abroad suffices to satisfy the requirements 
of the Convention concerning applicants’ right to respect for their private life’.122 
According to the dissenters, the position taken by the Court on the matter did ‘[…] 
not truly address the real issue of unjustified interference in the applicants’ private 
life as a result of the prohibition of abortion in Ireland’.123
The Court’s approach in respect of the margin of appreciation doctrine was 
unprecedented. It has been qualified as an ‘[…] unwelcome new approach that 
118 Idem, para. 239.
119 Idem, para. 241.
120 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Fura, Hirvelia, Malinverni and Poalelungi to 
ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05.
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threaten[ed] to undermine the evolutive nature of the Convention’s obligations’.124 
Others acknowledged that the approach was new and ‘from an argumentative 
perspective at least remarkable’, but nevertheless welcomed the Court’s reluctance 
in taking a firm stance in controversial moral issues.125 In (Irish) legal scholarship 
critique was also issued on how the ECtHR had established the position of the Irish 
people. It was held that the Court had too easily accepted that the Irish Protocols 
to the EU Treaties and the results of the Irish abortion referenda were sufficient 
to determine the views of the Irish people.126 More fundamentally, the question 
was raised whether such an internal consensus could and should indeed trump an 
existing European consensus.127
2.2.3.5. Procedural approach; violation in respect of third applicant
The third applicant – who was suffering from a rare form of cancer – furthermore 
claimed that there was no legal framework in place ‘[…] through which the relevant 
risk to her life and her entitlement to an abortion in Ireland could have been 
established’. This point was supported by third party interveners Doctors for Choice, 
Ireland and the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, who submitted:
‘Irish medical professionals were in an unclear position and unable to provide adequate 
medical services. Doctors advising a patient on the subject faced criminal charges, on 
the one hand, and an absence of clear legal, ethical or medical guidelines, on the other. 
The Medical Council Guidelines were of no assistance. They had never heard of any 
case where life‑saving abortions had been performed in Ireland. Irish doctors did not 
receive any training on abortion techniques and were not therefore equipped to carry out 
an abortion or to provide adequate post‑abortion care.’128
124 E. Wicks, ‘A, B, C v Ireland: Abortion Law under the European Convention on Human Rights‘, 11 
HRLR (2011) p. 556 at p. 562. According to Wicks ‘[t]he margin of appreciation is controversial enough 
already without the Court choosing to depart from its previous practice of restricting the margin on the 
rare occasions when a moral consensus can be identified.’ The author also claimed (at p.565) that the 
explicit recognition of an emerging consensus hinted at ‘a more interventionist Court in future abortion 
cases’.
125 J.H. Gerards, ‘Case note to ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05’, 12 
European Human Rights Cases 2011/40 (in Dutch).
126 For example, McGuinness held: ‘The Court seems to rely on […] Protocol [17] and Protocol 35 of the 
Lisbon Treaty (which is essentially cut and pasted from Maastricht) as evidence against the argument 
that the will of the people had changed. This is at best a questionable argument which provides a 
shaky foundation for an already shaky application of the margin of appreciation.’ S. McGuinness, 
‘Commentary A, B, and C leads to D (for Delegation!)’, 19 Medical Law Review (2011) p. 476 at p. 486. 
De Londras and Dzehtsiarou held: ‘The Court accepted that the net result in these referenda could be 
read as communicating accurately the position of the Irish people, i.e. that they were happy with the 
abortion regime as it stands in Ireland. However, a closer mining of the materials relied upon by the 
Court tells a somewhat more complex story.’ They observed that ‘[…] perhaps the best course of action 
for the Court is not to read any meaning into these results at all outside of their role in determining the 
current legal position.’ F. de Londras and K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights, A, B & C v Ireland’, 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2013) p. 250 at 
pp. 260 and 261.
127 De Londras and Dzehtsiarou 2013, supra n. 126, at p. 257.
128 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 207.







The government had maintained that effective and accessible medical and 
judicial procedures existed whereby a woman could establish her entitlement to 
a lawful abortion in Ireland. The Court however, had ‘a number of concerns’ as 
to the effectiveness of the existing medical consultation procedure as a means of 
establishing the third applicant’s eligibility for a lawful abortion in Ireland.129 The 
ground upon which a woman could seek a lawful abortion in Ireland was expressed 
in broad terms and the Irish professional medical guidelines did not give sufficiently 
precise guidance for doctors to assess whether the life of the pregnant woman was 
at risk. Also, there was
‘[…] no framework whereby any difference of opinion between the woman and her doctor 
or between different doctors consulted, or whereby an understandable hesitancy on the 
part of a woman or doctor, could be examined and resolved through a decision which 
would establish as a matter of law whether a particular case presented a qualifying risk to 
a woman’s life such that a lawful abortion might be performed.’130
‘Against this background of substantial uncertainty’, the Court considered it 
‘evident’ that the provisions of the Irish Criminal Code on abortion constituted ‘[…] 
a significant chilling factor for both women and doctors in the medical consultation 
process.’131
Furthermore, the ECtHR did not accept that the litigation options relied on by the 
government constituted effective and accessible procedures which allowed the third 
applicant to establish her right to a lawful abortion in Ireland. The government had 
submitted that the third applicant could have initiated a constitutional action in 
which she could have obtained mandatory orders requiring doctors to terminate her 
pregnancy. The ECtHR did not consider constitutional courts to be the appropriate 
forum for such determinations, however, and it was not clear how the courts would 
enforce a mandatory order requiring doctors to carry out an abortion.
The Court accordingly rejected the government’s submission that the third applicant 
had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. It concluded that Article 8 ECHR had been 
violated as the Irish authorities had failed to comply with their positive obligation 
to secure to the applicant’s effective respect for her private life ‘[…] by reason of 
the absence of any implementing legislative or regulatory regime providing an 
accessible and effective procedure by which [she] could have established whether 
she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ireland in accordance with Article 40.3.3° 
of the Constitution.’132 Because of this finding, the Court found it not necessary to 
address the parties’ additional submissions concerning the timing, speed, costs and 
confidentiality of the domestic proceedings.133
129 Idem, para. 252.
130 Idem, para. 252.
131 Idem, para. 254.
132 Idem, para. 267.
133 Idem, para. 263.







The Court noted in conclusion that Ireland had failed to implement Article 40.3.3° of 
the Irish Constitution and that the government had not given convincing explanations 
for this failure. In respect of the burden of such implementation it noted:
‘As to the burden which implementation of Article 40.3.3 would impose on the State, the 
Court accepts that this would be a sensitive and complex task. However, […] it is not for 
this Court to indicate the most appropriate means for the State to comply with its positive 
obligations […]. Equally, implementation could not be considered to involve significant 
detriment to the Irish public since it would amount to rendering effective a right already 
accorded, after referendum, by Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution.’
The – more pragmatic – procedural approach taken by the court in respect of the 
complaint of the third applicant originated from the Tysiąc case.134 It was further 
developed by the Court in the subsequent abortion case law, which is discussed 
hereafter.
2.2.4.	 Consolidation	of	the	procedural	approach	in	abortion	cases
The most prominent abortion case law of the ECtHR since the A, B and C judgment 
originates from complaints against Poland, another Council of Europe Member State 
with more restrictive abortion laws. R. R. v. Poland (2011)135 is an important case 
in this regard, in which the Court also made important observations in respect of 
genetic screening (see section 2.3.4 below). The applicant in this case was 18 weeks 
pregnant when her family doctor estimated in February 2002 that it could not be 
ruled out that the foetus was affected with some malformation. R. R. informed her 
doctor that she wished to have an abortion if this suspicion proved true. Two further 
ultrasound scans confirmed that her foetus was probably malformed. R. R. was 
advised to have an amniocentesis, but all doctors she turned to refused to carry this 
out. When requesting an abortion, she was repeatedly refused. As a result of this 
hindrance to access to prenatal genetic screening, the statutory time limit for a legal 
abortion on the grounds of foetal abnormality passed. Subsequently, in July 2002, 
R. R. gave birth to a child suffering from Turner syndrome.
In 2004, R. R. lodged a complaint with the ECtHR. Relying on Articles 3, 8 and 13 
ECHR, she complained that she was denied access to the prenatal genetic tests to 
which she was entitled when pregnant due to her doctors’ lack of proper counselling, 
procrastination and confusion. The Court found that her suffering reached the 
minimum threshold of severity under Article 3, calling it ‘[…] a matter of great regret 
that the applicant was so shabbily treated by the doctors dealing with her case.’ The 
Court noted that she was in a situation of great vulnerability, deeply distressed as she 
was by the information that the foetus could be affected with some malformation. 
She had to endure weeks of painful uncertainty concerning the health of the foetus 
134 McGuinness considered the A,B and C v. Ireland judgment ‘a logical and conservative follow‑on from 
the decision in Tysiac v Poland’. McGuinness 2011, supra n. 126, at p. 483.
135 ECtHR 26 May 2011, R. R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04.







and she suffered acute anguish through having to think about how she and her family 
would be able to ensure the child’s welfare, happiness and appropriate long‑term 
medical care. Her concerns were not properly acknowledged and addressed by the 
health professionals dealing with her case and no regard was had to the temporal 
aspect of her predicament. This suffering could be said to have been aggravated by 
the fact that the diagnostic services which she had requested early on at all times 
had been available and that she had been entitled as a matter of domestic law to avail 
herself of them. In conclusion, the Court found a violation of Article 3, which was 
the first time it had done so in an abortion case.136
In its examination of the complaint under Article 8, the Court once again confirmed 
that the matter before it fell within the scope of this provision. Like in the case of A, 
B and C v. Ireland, the ECtHR observed a consensus amongst a substantial majority 
of the Contracting States of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion.137 And 
again, the Court chose a procedural approach. Referring to the A, B and C case, the 
Court reiterated:
‘While a broad margin of appreciation is accorded to the State as regards the circumstances 
in which an abortion will be permitted in a State, once that decision is taken the legal 
framework devised for this purpose should be “shaped in a coherent manner which allows 
the different legitimate interests involved to be taken into account adequately and in 
accordance with the obligations deriving from the Convention” […].’138
The Court held that the State’s positive obligation to secure to their citizens their 
right to effective respect for their physical and psychological integrity could include 
an obligation to adopt regulations concerning access to information about an 
individual’s health. It added:
‘While the State regulations on abortion relate to the traditional balancing of privacy and 
the public interest, they must – in case of a therapeutic abortion – be also assessed against 
the positive obligations of the State to secure the physical integrity of mothers‑to‑be 
[…].’139
The Court underlined that these positive obligations had to be assessed on the 
basis of the rule of law, which presupposed that domestic law had to provide for 
legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the 
rights safeguarded by the Convention.140 The Court furthermore reiterated that the 
Convention was intended to guarantee rights that were practical and effective.141 
This meant that the relevant decision‑making process had to be fair and it had to 
136 See also S. Donoghue and C.‑M. Smyth, ‘Abortion for Foetal Abnormalities in Ireland; The Limited 
Scope of the Irish Government’s Response to the A, B and C Judgment’, 20 European Journal of Health 
Law (2013) p. 117 at p. 133.
137 ECtHR 26 May 2011, R. R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04, para. 186.
138 ECtHR 26 May 2011, R. R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04, para. 187.
139 Idem, para. 188.
140 Idem, para. 190.
141 The Court referred to ECtHR 9 October 1979, Airey v. Ireland, no. 6289/73, para. 24.







afford due respect for the interests safeguarded by it. Having regard to the particular 
circumstances of the case, and notably the nature of the decisions to be taken, it had to 
be examined if an individual had been involved in the decision‑making process, seen 
as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide her or him with the requisite protection 
of his or her interests.142 The Court continued:
‘The Court has already held that in the context of access to abortion a relevant procedure 
should guarantee to a pregnant woman at least a possibility to be heard in person and 
to have her views considered. The competent body or person should also issue written 
grounds for its decision […].’143
Apart from a right to be heard in person, the Court also recognised a right to timely 
access to information about one’s health. In the context of pregnancy, this included 
information about the foetus’ health, as ‘during pregnancy the foetus’ condition and 
health constitute an element of the pregnant woman’s health’.144 The Court considered 
the effective exercise of this right to relevant information on the mother’s and foetus’ 
health to be ‘directly relevant’ and ‘often decisive’ for the possibility of exercising 
personal autonomy, also covered by Article 8 of the Convention’.145
In the case before it, the Court observed ‘a striking discordance’ between the 
theoretical right to a lawful abortion in Poland and the reality of its practical 
implementation.146 It found that the relevant Polish law did not contain any effective 
mechanisms which would have enabled R. R. to seek access to a diagnostic service, 
decisive for the possibility of exercising her right to take an informed decision as 
to whether to seek an abortion or not.147 The Court concluded that Article 8 was 
violated, because the Polish State had not complied with its positive obligations to 
safeguard the applicant’s right to respect for her private life ‘[…] in the context of 
controversy over whether she should have had access to, firstly, prenatal genetic tests 
and subsequently, an abortion, had the applicant chosen this option for her’.148 This 
aspect of the case, concerning genetic testing, is further discussed below under 2.3.4.
The R. R. judgment by some has been read as containing another indication that a 
right to abortion on medical grounds could be read into the Convention.149 While 
later case law has not shown this to be the case, the principles as established in the R. 
R. case as regards the procedure allowing for a timely decision that must be in place, 
have been subsequently confirmed in the Strasbourg case law.150
142 The Court referred to mutatis mutandis ECtHR 8 July 1987, W. v. the United Kingdom, no. 9749/82, 
paras. 62 and 64.
143 ECtHR 26 May 2011, R. R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04, para. 191.
144 Idem, para. 197.
145 Idem, para. 197.
146 Idem, para. 210.
147 Idem, para. 208.
148 ECtHR 26 May 2011, R. R. v. Poland, no. 27617/04, para. 211.
149 E.g. Donoghue and Smyth 2013, supra n. 136, at p. 133, referring to para. 159 of the R. R. judgment.
150 For instance, in P. and S. v. Poland, concerning a minor pregnant girl, the Court ruled that in such a 
situation, the interests and life prospects of the mother of the girl were also involved in the decision 








There have been a few claims before the ECtHR by fathers‑to‑be who opposed to an 
intended abortion by the mother‑to‑be. They were however not very successful, as 
the Court found the interference with the father’s rights justified in order to protect 
the rights of the mother‑to‑be, whose pregnancy was terminated ‘in accordance with 
her wish’ and ‘[…] in order to avert the risk of injury to her physical or mental 
health’.151 In Boso (2002) the Court held that:
‘[…] any interpretation of a potential father’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention when 
the mother intends to have an abortion should above all take into account her rights, as she 
is the person primarily concerned by the pregnancy and its continuation or termination.’152
The interests of fathers‑to‑be can thus only be defined by taking account of the 
mother’s rights to physical integrity and personal autonomy.
2.3. AssIsted humAn reproductIon And surrogAcy under the 
echr
As to date there have been relatively few cases on AHR before the ECtHR, but 
the fast‑moving scientific developments in this field may well lead to a growing 
number of cases in the future. So far, there have been cases about IVF treatment 
and the use of donated gametes during such treatment as well as cases concerning 
prenatal or preimplantation genetic screening. There have not been any cases 
concerning the commensurability of surrogacy or gender selection brought before 
the Court, but there have been cases on the question of the recognition of parentage 
of intended (commissioning) parents who engaged in a surrogacy arrangement in a 
foreign country. All these cases – that are discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
sections – were decided on the basis of Article 8 ECHR (the right to respect for 
private and family life).
whether to carry the pregnancy to term or not. This implied that there had to be a procedure in place 
‘[…] for the determination of access to a lawful abortion whereby both parties [could] be heard and 
their views fully and objectively considered, including, if necessary, the provision of a mechanism 
for counselling and reconciling conflicting views in favour of the best interest of the minor.’ The 
Court once again stressed that ‘[…] effective access to reliable information on the conditions for the 
availability of lawful abortion, and the relevant procedures to be followed, [was] directly relevant for 
the exercise of personal autonomy’ and underlined that the time factor was of critical importance. 
ECtHR 30 October 2012, P. and S. v. Poland, no. 57375/08, para.111.
151 E.g. ECmHR 13 May 1980 (dec.), X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 8416/79 (by some this case is referred to 
as ‘Paton v. UK’, see J. McHale, ’Fundamental rights and health care’, in: E. Mossialos et al. (eds.), Health 
Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2010) p. 282 at p. 289, online available at www.euro.who.int/en/who‑we‑are/partners/
observatory/studies/health‑systems‑governance‑in‑europe‑the‑role‑of‑eu‑law‑and‑policy, visited 
June 2014) and ECmHR 19 May 1992 (dec.), Hercz v. Norway, no. 17004/90.
152 ECtHR 5 September 2002 (dec.), Boso v. Italy, no. 50490/99.







In the case of Dickson (2007) – which concerned the refusal of facilities for artificial 
insemination to a prisoner and his wife – the Court found that Article 8 was 
applicable and that the artificial insemination facilities at issue concerned the private 
and family life of the applicants which notions incorporated the right to respect for 
their decision to become genetic parents.153 Subsequently – under reference to this 
paragraph of the Dickson judgment – the Grand Chamber of the Court in S.H. and 
Others v. Austria (2011) held for the first time that:
‘[…] the right of a couple to conceive a child and to make use of medically assisted 
procreation for that purpose is also protected by Article 8, as such a choice is an expression 
of private and family life. Article 8 of the Convention therefore applies to the present 
case.’154
This finding may give the impression that the Court recognised an enforceable right 
to conceive a child and to make use of medically assisted procreation to that end, 
and has thus defined positive obligations for the State to enable such access.155 This 
reading has, however, been refuted by the Court itself. The S.H. and Others case was 
about an Austrian prohibition on the use of donated gametes in the course of AHR 
treatment. The Chamber, ruling first in the case in 2010, had already emphasised 
that there was ‘no obligation on a State to enact legislation of the kind and to allow 
artificial procreation’.156 After the case was referred to it, the Grand Chamber 
acknowledged that the matter before it could be seen as ‘[…] raising an issue as to 
whether there exist[ed] a positive obligation on the State to permit certain forms of 
artificial procreation using either sperm or ova from a third party.’ It however chose 
to approach the case as one involving an interference with the applicants’ right to 
avail themselves of techniques of artificial procreation as a result of the operation of 
the relevant sections of the Austrian Artificial Procreation Act. The outcome of this 
assessment is discussed in further detail below (see 2.4.3). For now it suffices to say 
that the most plausible reading of the above quoted paragraph is that it confirms that 
there is a right to respect for the decision to conceive a child and for the decision to 
resort to assisted human reproduction techniques to that end. The wording ‘such a 
choice’ also affirms that the Court had a somewhat narrow interpretation of this right 
in mind.157
A further and related question is how important the words ‘a couple’ are in the 
above quoted paragraph. The question is whether it includes individuals who wish 
153 ECtHR [GC] 4 December 2007, Dickson v. the United Kingdom, no. 44362/04, para. 66.
154 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 82. Subsequently confirmed in, 
inter alia, ECtHR 2 October 2012, Daniela Knecht v. Romania, no. 10048/10, para. 54.
155 This wording was used by Brems in her case note to the 2006 Chamber judgment in Evans. E. Brems, 
‘Case note to Evans v. the United Kingdom (2006)’, 7 European Human Rights Cases 2006/47 (in 
Dutch).
156 ECtHR 4 April 2010, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 74.
157 This approach was also taken by the respondent government. In accepting that Art. 8 ECHR was 
applicable to the case it referred to the judgment of the Austrian Constitutional Court in the case which 
had held that the decision of spouses or a cohabiting couple to conceive a child and to make use for that 
end of medically assisted procreation techniques fell within the sphere of protection of Art. 8.







to become a genetic parent and who need help from a third party to that end. From 
cases like Evans, it follows that Article 8 grants individuals a right to respect for the 
decision to become a genetic parent. In Costa and Pavan (2012, see section 2.3.4 
below), the Court held – under reference to Dickson – that it had acknowledged a 
right to respect for the decision to become genetic parents and that it had concluded 
in S.H. and Others as referred to above that Article 8 applies to heterologous 
insemination techniques for in vitro fertilisation.158 On the basis of this phrasing it 
has been suggested that the Court acknowledged in Costa and Pavan that individuals 
also enjoy the right to conceive a child and to make use of medically assisted 
procreation for that purpose.159 It is true that the Court referred to the more neutral 
term ‘parents’ and not to a ‘couple’, and to heterologous insemination, which – other 
than homologous insemination – involves a third party. Still, future case law will 
have to show if the right to make use of medically assisted procreation is also enjoyed 
by individuals. Also, it remains to be seen if the term ‘couple’ in this context will be 
held to include same‑sex couples (see also Chapter 8, section 8.2.4.3).
The following subsections discuss the ECtHR’s case law in the field of AHR on a 
thematic basis, starting with the question of access to such treatment. There are 
no separate subsections on gender selection, vitrification of egg cells, post‑mortem 
reproduction or public funding for AHR treatment, as there has so far simply not 
been any case law of the Strasbourg Court on these matters. From this discussion 
it will become clear that once States introduce possibilities for AHR, they are 
bound by certain obligations under the Convention. For example, they must create a 
transparent system of procedural safeguards and they must respect the principle of 
non‑discrimination when offering such services.
2.3.1. Access to AHR treatment
To date there have been few cases brought before the ECtHR concerning a complaint 
about limited or obstructed access to AHR treatment. The only case decided by 
the Court where this matter was at stake, concerns Gas and Dubois (2012).160 A 
same‑sex couple in a French civil partnership (PACS), inter alia, complained that 
they did not have access to IVF treatment involving anonymous donor insemination. 
As further explained in Chapter 8, section 8.2.4.3, the Court rejected this complaint, 
first of all because the applicants had not challenged the legislation in question before 
the national courts. The Court further noted that such treatment was available in 
France only for different‑sex couples and ‘[…] for therapeutic purposes only, with 
a view in particular to remedying clinically diagnosed infertility or preventing the 
transmission of a particularly serious disease’. Without explaining this further, the 
Court concluded that the applicants’ situation was not comparable to that of infertile 
158 ECtHR 28 August 2012, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, no. 54270/10, para. 49.
159 A. Hendriks, ‘Case‑note to ECtHR 2 October 2012, Daniela Knecht v. Romania, no. 10048/10’, 13 
European Human Rights Cases 2012/228 (in Dutch).
160 EHRM 15 March 2012, Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07.







heterosexual couples and held that they were therefore no victim of a difference in 
treatment.161
Given that various Council of Europe Member States – including the three States 
studied in this research162 – have set conditions for access to AHR treatment, for 
instance in respect of civil status or age, it is not unlikely that more ECtHR case law 
on the question will develop in the future. This may also involve questions as to the 
positive obligations of the States in this area, for instance in relation to funding of 
AHR treatment.
2.3.2.	 Balancing	the	rights	of	parties	to	AHR	treatment
The Evans case – as discussed in section 2.1.1 above – concerned the question 
whether IVF treatment could be continued if one of the parties withdrew his or 
her consent. The crux of the matter was that the Article 8 rights of two private 
individuals, Ms. Evans and her former partner, were in conflict. Moreover, as the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR underlined in its judgment, each person’s interest 
was entirely irreconcilable with the other’s, since if Ms. Evans was permitted to 
use the embryos, her former partner would be forced to become a father, whereas 
if his refusal or withdrawal of consent was upheld, Ms. Evans would be denied the 
opportunity of becoming a genetic parent. In the difficult circumstances of the case, 
whatever solution the national authorities adopted would result in the interests of one 
of the parties being wholly frustrated.163 In addition, so the ECtHR observed, the 
case did not involve simply a conflict between individuals: the legislation in question 
also served a number of wider public interests for instance in upholding the principle 
of the primacy of consent and promoting legal clarity and certainty.164
The Grand Chamber acknowledged that the issues raised by the case before it were 
undoubtedly of a morally and ethically delicate nature and that there was no uniform 
European approach in the field.165 It considered it relevant that the relevant domestic 
law was the culmination of an exceptionally detailed examination of the social, 
ethical and legal implications of developments in the field of human fertilisation and 
embryology, and the fruit of much reflection, consultation and debate.166
As regards the balance struck between the conflicting Article 8 rights of the parties 
to the IVF treatment, the Court had great sympathy for Ms. Evans, who clearly 
desired a genetically‑related child above all else. However, it did not consider that 
her right to respect for the decision to become a parent in the genetic sense was to be 
accorded greater weight than her former partner’s right to respect for his decision not 
161 Idem, para. 63.
162 See Ch. 4, section 4.3.3, Ch. 5, section 5.3.3 and Ch. , section 6.3.2.
163 ECtHR [GC] 10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 73.
164 Idem, para. 74.
165 Idem, paras. 78–79.
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to have a genetically‑related child with her.167 Given the lack of European consensus, 
the fact that the domestic rules had been clear and had been brought to the attention 
of Ms. Evans and the fact that they had struck a fair balance between the competing 
interests, the ECtHR concluded that there was no violation of Article 8.168 The 
absolute nature of the rules ‘[…] served to promote legal certainty and to avoid the 
problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in weighing, on a case‑by‑case 
basis, […] “entirely incommensurable” interests […].’169
The four dissenters on the contrary did not consider that the domestic legislation 
had struck a fair balance in the special circumstances of the case.170 While they 
agreed with the majority that, in particular where an issue was of a morally and 
ethically delicate nature, a bright‑line rule could best serve the various – often 
conflicting – interests at stake, in the particular circumstances of the case, however, 
the bright‑line rule had been too absolute in nature.171 The dissenters argued that 
the fact that the legislation in place effectively deprived Ms. Evans from ever again 
being able to decide to become a genetic mother inflicted a disproportionate moral 
and physical burden that could ‘[…] hardly be compatible with Article 8 and the very 
purposes of the Convention protecting human dignity and autonomy.’172
2.3.3.	 Donation	of	gametes
The question as to whether a prohibition on gamete donation was in violation of 
the Convention was put before the Court in S.H. and Others v. Austria (2011), by 
167 ECtHR [GC] 10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 90. Earlier the Chamber 
had regarded it not self‑evident that in the process of IVF treatment the balance of interests would 
always tip decisively in favour of the female party. The Chamber had not been persuaded that the 
situation of the male and female parties to IVF treatment could not be equated. It held that ‘[…] 
while there [was] clearly a difference of degree between the involvement of the two parties in the 
process of IVF treatment, the Court [did] not accept that the Article 8 rights of the male donor would 
necessarily [have been] less worthy of protection than those of the female […]’. The Grand Chamber 
did not examine this specific question in detail, but it also did not refute this finding. ECtHR 7 March 
2006, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 66. Ben‑Naf’tali and Canor acknowledged that 
Ms. Evans could well have had a fundamental human right to be a mother to a genetically related child, 
but they did not think that she had a human right to be the genetically related mother of her former 
partner’s child. In their view her desire, or ‘human aspiration’ to that effect did not rise to the level of a 
human right. O. Ben‑Naf’tali and I. Canor, ‘Case note to Evans v. United Kingdom (2007)’, American 
Journal of International Law (2008), p. 132. See also R. Thorton, ‘European Court of Human Rights: 
Consent to IVF treatment’, in: International journal of Constitutional Law 2008, p. 325 and Brems 
2006, supra n. 155.
168 ECtHR [GC] 10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 92.
169 Idem, para. 89. The Chamber had noted in this regard that ‘[…] strong policy considerations underlay 
the decision of the legislature to favour a clear or “bright line” rule which would serve both to produce 
legal certainty and to maintain public confidence in the law in a sensitive field.’ As paraphrased in 
ECtHR [GC] 10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 60.
170 Joint dissenting opinion by Judges Türmen, Tsatsa‑Nikolovska, Spielmann and Ziemele to ECtHR 
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two Austrian married couples who wanted a child but suffered from infertility.173 
Owing to their medical conditions only in vitro fertilisation with the use donor 
gametes would allow the couples to have a child of whom one of them would be the 
genetic parent. The one couple was in need of sperm of a donor, whereas the other 
couple wished to use donor ova in the in vitro fertilisation process. The applicable 
Austrian Artificial Procreation Act of 1992, allowed for certain assisted procreation 
techniques, in particular in vitro fertilisation with ova and sperm from the spouses 
or cohabitating partners themselves (homologous methods) and, in exceptional 
circumstances, the donation of sperm when introduced into the reproductive organs 
of a woman. In vitro fertilisation techniques with the use of donated sperm or ova from 
a third party, as requested by the applicants in this case, were, however, prohibited 
under Austrian law. With this prohibition the Austrian legislature aimed to avoid 
the forming of unusual personal relationships such as a child having ‘more than 
one biological mother (a genetic one and one carrying the child)’.174 The prohibition 
also aimed to avoid the risk of the exploitation of women, as pressure might be put 
on a woman from an economically disadvantaged background to donate ova, who 
otherwise would not be in a position to afford an in vitro fertilisation in order to have 
a child of her own. In 1998 the two women lodged an application with the Austrian 
Constitutional Court for a review of the constitutionality of the prohibition. This 
Court ruled that the legislature had not overstepped its margin of appreciation when 
it established the permissibility of homologous methods as a rule and insemination 
using donor sperm as an exception.
The couples subsequently lodged a complaint with the ECtHR in 2000.175 They alleged 
in particular that the provisions of the Austrian Artificial Procreation Act prohibiting 
the use of ova from donors and sperm from donors for in vitro fertilisation, the only 
medical techniques by which they could successfully conceive children, violated 
their rights under Article 8 of the Convention read alone and in conjunction with 
Article 14 (the prohibition of discrimination). The Austrian government claimed in 
response that States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in the area and had to 
decide for themselves what balance had to be struck between the competing interests 
‘in the light of the specific social and cultural needs and traditions of their countries.’176 
They pointed out that in Austria unease existed ‘[…] among large sections of society 
about the role and possibilities of modern reproductive medicine.’177 Ovum donation 
entailed a risk of exploitation and humiliation of women involved. Also, it raised 
questions of divided motherhood and the child’s right to know its genetic origins.178 
Because there was, furthermore, a risk of selective reproduction involved, the matter 
173 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00.
174 In the terminology of this research these concern the genetic mother and the biological mother (the 
birth mother).
175 Both the Chamber, and later the Grand Chamber rejected the government’s preliminary objections that 
the two husbands had failed to exhaust domestic remedies their personal situation was intrinsically 
linked to that of their spouses. ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, 
para. 47.
176 Idem, para. 63.
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raised ‘[…] fundamental questions regarding the health of children thus conceived 
and born, touching essentially upon the general ethical and moral values of society.’179 
The Austrian legislature had ‘after thorough preparation’, balanced the interests at 
stake and had come to a law that took into account human dignity, the well‑being of 
the child and the right to procreation.180
In 2010 the Chamber of the ECtHR, by a majority, found a violation of Article 8 in 
conjunction with Article 14.181 It held that the applicants were subject to an unjustified 
difference in treatment,182 vis‑à‑vis other couples who, owing to their medical 
condition, did not need egg cell donation or sperm donation for in vitro fertilisation. 
The Chamber was not persuaded that a complete prohibition was the only or the 
least intrusive means to prevent the risks associated with egg cell donation.183 It 
saw no insurmountable obstacles to bringing family relations which would result 
from a successful use of the artificial procreation techniques at issue into the general 
framework of family law and other related fields of law. The Chamber considered that 
the various arguments advanced by the government in order to justify the prohibition 
of egg cell donation were of little relevance for the examination of the prohibition 
on the use of donor sperm. The government had asserted that non‑in vitro artificial 
insemination had been in use for some time, that it was easy to handle and that its 
prohibition would therefore have been hard to monitor. Balancing this argument of 
‘mere efficiency’ against the interests of the applicants, the Chamber found that the 
difference in treatment at issue was not justified. It therefore concluded, by six votes 
to one, that there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 
ECHR.
Not surprisingly, the Austrian government requested the case to be referred to the 
Grand Chamber. This was accepted, and by judgment of 3 November 2011 the Grand 
Chamber overturned the Chamber judgment, ruling that the Convention had not been 
violated. The Grand Chamber assessed the matter on the basis of Article 8 only.184 It 
accepted that the issue fell within the scope of this Article, that the measure at issue 
was provided for by law, and that it pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of 
179 Idem, para. 65.
180 Idem, para. 65.
181 ECtHR 4 April 2010, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00.
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183 Idem, paras. 77–78. The Court considered the risk that women might be exploited and that the technique 
might be used for selective reproduction, an argument directed against artificial procreation in general. 
In this respect the Court observed that under Austrian law remuneration of ova and sperm donation was 
prohibited. Further, the risks to the health of the mother were not any different from those in the case of 
ova taken from the woman aspiring to be a mother herself, an in vitro fertilisation technique allowed in 
Austria. In response to the government’s argument concerning unusual family relationships, the Court 
noted that family relationships which do not follow the typical parent‑child relationship based on a 
direct biological link, were nothing new.
184 Initially, the Grand Chamber did not justify this decision, but after having found no violation of Art. 8 
ECHR, it considered that that the substance of this complaint had been sufficiently taken into account 
in examination of the applicants’ complaints under Art. 8 of the Convention. There was therefore no 
cause for a separate examination of the same facts from the standpoint of Art. 14 read in conjunction 
with Art. 8 of the Convention. ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, 
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health or morals and the protection of the rights and freedom of others.185 The Court 
stressed that it was not its task to review the Austrian legislation or practice in the 
abstract, but that it had to confine itself, ‘without overlooking the general context’, to 
an examination of the issues raised by the case before it.186
In respect of the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the State when deciding 
any case under Article 8 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber reiterated its 
standing case law concerning the various factors that influenced the width of the 
margin to be accorded. It first considered that where a particularly important facet 
of an individual’s existence or identity was at stake, the margin allowed to the State 
would normally be restricted. The Court did not make explicit, however, whether it 
considered the matter at hand to concern such a particularly important facet of an 
individual’s existence or identity.187 Still, this was not the only factor influencing the 
width of the margin, as the Court continued by repeating its standing case law:
‘Where, however, there is no consensus within the member States of the Council of 
Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means 
of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the 
margin will be wider […]. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital 
forces of their countries, the State authorities are, in principle, in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion, not only on the “exact content of the requirements 
of morals” in their country, but also on the necessity of a restriction intended to meet 
[…]. There will usually be a wide margin of appreciation accorded if the State is required 
to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights 
[…].’188
The Court observed a clear trend in the legislation of the Contracting States towards 
allowing gamete donation for the purpose of in vitro fertilisation, reflecting an 
emerging European consensus. The Court, however, did not consider this emerging 
consensus sufficient to narrow the margin of appreciation of the State for the 
following reasons:
‘That emerging consensus is not, however, based on settled and long‑standing principles 
established in the law of the member States but rather reflects a stage of development 
within a particularly dynamic field of law and does not decisively narrow the margin of 
appreciation of the State. Since the use of IVF treatment gave rise then and continues to 
185 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 90.
186 Idem, para. 92.
187 Idem, para. 82. In its earlier judgment in ECtHR [GC] 4 December 2007, Dickson v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 44362/04, the Court had held that the choice to become a genetic parent indeed concerned 
such a matter.
188 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 94, referring to: ECtHR [GC] 
10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 77; ECtHR [GC] 22 April 1997, X, Y and 
Z v. the United Kingdom, no. 21830/93, para. 44; ECtHR 26 February 2002, Fretté v. France, para. 41; 
ECtHR [GC] 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, no. 28957/95, para. 85; ECtHR 
[GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 232 and ECtHR [GC] 4 December 
2007, Dickson v. the United Kingdom, no. 44362/04, para. 78.







give rise today to sensitive moral and ethical issues against a background of fast‑moving 
medical and scientific developments, and since the questions raised by the case touch on 
areas where there is not yet clear common ground amongst the member States, the Court 
considers that the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State must be a 
wide one […]. The State’s margin in principle extends both to its decision to intervene in 
the area and, once having intervened, to the detailed rules it lays down in order to achieve 
a balance between the competing public and private interests […]. However, this does not 
mean that the solutions reached by the legislature are beyond the scrutiny of the Court. It 
falls to the Court to examine carefully the arguments taken into consideration during the 
legislative process and leading to the choices that have been made by the legislature and 
to determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the competing interests of 
the State and those directly affected by those legislative choices.’189
The four dissenting judges were very critical in respect of this approach. They found 
that instead a narrow margin had to be accorded as the right at stake was crucial to 
the individual’s effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights. They furthermore held 
that the Court was overextending the margin of appreciation:
‘The Court […] takes the unprecedented step of conferring a new dimension on the 
European consensus and applies a particularly low threshold to it, thus potentially 
extending the States’ margin of appreciation beyond limits. The current climate is 
probably conducive to such a backward step. The differences in the Court’s approach to 
the determinative value of the European consensus and a somewhat lax approach to the 
objective indicia used to determine consensus are pushed to their limit here, engendering 
great legal uncertainty.’190
The majority of the Grand Chamber found that ‘concerns based on moral 
considerations or on social acceptability’ were to be taken seriously in a sensitive 
domain like artificial procreation. Given the fact that ‘the field of artificial 
procreation is developing particularly fast both from a scientific point of view and 
in terms of the development of a legal framework for its medical application’,191 
the Court was sympathetic to States acting with particular caution in the field of 
artificial procreation, also because the consequences of legislative measures could 
well become apparent only after a considerable length of time.192 At the same time, 
it held that moral concerns were not in themselves sufficient reasons for a complete 
ban on a specific artificial procreation technique; the State had to provide for a legal 
framework concerning AHR ‘[…] which allow[ed] the different legitimate interests 
involved to be adequately taken into account.’193 Thereby it was not, however, 
required that legislation governing important aspects of private life provided for 
the weighing of competing interests in the circumstances of each individual case. 
189 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, paras. 96–97.
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Where such important aspects were at stake, the legislature could adopt rules of an 
absolute nature which served to produce legal certainty (see also section 2.3.2 on the 
weighing of interests in reproduction matters).194
The Court examined the situation of the two couples, the first and second 
applicants and the third and fourth applicants respectively, separately. In respect 
of the prohibition on egg cell donation, the Court attached weight to the fact that 
the Austrian legislature had not completely ruled out artificial procreation, since it 
allowed the use of homologous techniques. It also noted that the Austrian Artificial 
Procreation Act provided for specific safeguards and precautions, which intended 
to prevent potential risks of eugenic selection and their abuse and to prevent the 
risk of exploitation of women in vulnerable situations as ovum donors.195 According 
to the Court, the Austrian legislature could theoretically have adopted a legal 
framework satisfactorily regulating the problems arising from ovum donation, such 
as the creation of relationships in which the social circumstances deviated from the 
biological ones. At the same time, however, the Court was mindful of ‘[…] the fact that 
the splitting of motherhood between a genetic mother and the one carrying the child 
differs significantly from adoptive parent‑child relations and has added a new aspect 
to this issue.’196 The Court emphasised that the central question in terms of Article 8 
of the Convention was not ‘[…] whether a different solution might have been adopted 
by the legislature that would arguably have struck a fairer balance, but whether, in 
striking the balance at the point at which it did, the Austrian legislature exceeded the 
margin of appreciation afforded to it under that Article.’197 By a majority of 13 out of 
17 judges, the Grand Chamber concluded that it had not. Thereby it attached some 
importance to the fact that there was no sufficiently established European consensus 
in respect of the use of donated egg cells in AHR treatment.
The Court assessed the Austrian prohibition on sperm donation against the 
background of the wider context of the legislative framework of which it formed a 
part.198 The Court took into account that the prohibition of the donation of gametes 
was a controversial issue in Austrian society, ‘[…] raising complex questions of 
a social and ethical nature on which there was not yet a consensus in the society 
and which had to take into account human dignity, the well‑being of children thus 
conceived and the prevention of negative repercussions or potential misuse.’199 
According to the Court, the Austrian legislature had adopted a careful and cautious 
approach in seeking to reconcile social realities with its approach of principle in this 
field. The Court observed in this respect:
194 Idem, para. 110.
195 Idem, para. 105. The Court noted that the use of artificial procreation techniques was reserved to 
specialised medical doctors who had particular knowledge and experience in this field and were 
themselves bound by the ethical rules of their profession. Also the remuneration of ovum and sperm 
donation was statutorily prohibited.
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‘[…] that there [was] no prohibition under Austrian law on going abroad to seek treatment 
of infertility that uses artificial procreation techniques not allowed in Austria and that in 
the event of a successful treatment the Civil Code contain[ed] clear rules on paternity and 
maternity that respect the wishes of the parents (see, mutatis mutandis, A. B. and C. v. 
Ireland, cited above, § 239).’200
The four dissenting judges considered this argument ‘particularly problematical’. 
They held:
‘In our view, the argument that couples can go abroad (without taking into account the 
potential practical difficulties or the costs that may be involved) does not address the 
real question, which is that of interference with the applicants’ private life as a result 
of the absolute prohibition in Austria; it totally fails to satisfy the requirements of the 
Convention regarding the applicants’ right to compliance with Article 8. Furthermore, 
by endorsing the Government’s reasoning according to which, in the event that treatment 
abroad is successful, the paternity and maternity of the child will be governed by the 
Civil Code in accordance with the parents’ wishes, the Grand Chamber considerably 
weakens the strength of the arguments based on “the unease existing among large 
sections of society as to the role and possibilities of modern reproductive medicine”, 
particularly concerning the creation of atypical family relations […]. Lastly, if the concern 
for the child’s best interests – allegedly endangered by recourse to prohibited means of 
reproduction – disappear as a result of crossing the border, the same is true of the concerns 
relating to the mother’s health referred to several times by the respondent Government to 
justify the prohibition.’201
These judges were, furthermore, critical of the Court’s dealing with the time‑aspect 
in the case. They held that the majority should have taken account of developments 
since 1999, when the Austrian Constitutional Court had dismissed the application 
lodged by the applicants. They found this approach ‘[…] all the more problematical in 
that the main thrust of the Grand Chamber’s reasoning [was] based on the European 
consensus regarding gamete donation […] [had] evolved considerably.202
The Grand Chamber concluded its ruling with noting that this area – which was 
subject to a particularly dynamic development in science and law – was to be kept 
under review by the Contracting States.203 Thereby the Court referred to its own 
case law in the field of legal recognition of transsexuality in which the Court had 
repeatedly issued similar warnings, before changing its position, on the basis of 
evolved European consensus.204
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The S.H and Others case thus set some general principles in respect of AHR, the wide 
margin of appreciation granted to States in such matters being the most prominent. 
On the matter of donation of gametes in particular, there have been no further cases 
decided by the Court since S.H. and Others.205
2.3.4. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis
The ECtHR has firstly ruled upon cases concerning prenatal screening. The first case 
in which it did so, albeit indirectly, concerned a situation where compensation was 
claimed for the birth of children with severe disabilities which had not been detected 
during pregnancy on account of negligence in establishing a prenatal diagnosis. The 
applicants in the French cases of Draon and Maurice (2005)206 were parents who 
had brought proceedings against hospitals because of such negligence, but while 
these proceedings were pending, a new law on medical liability was introduced in 
France. This new law no longer provided for a possibility to claim compensation 
from the hospital or doctor responsible for life‑long ‘special burdens’ resulting from 
the child’s disability. Consequently the applicants were not awarded compensation 
for such special burdens. The ECtHR found that the law in question violated their 
right to protection of property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR). The Court did 
not find it necessary to examine, ‘[…] whether the measures taken by the respondent 
State in relation to disabled persons [had] anything to do with the applicants’ right 
to lead a normal family life’.207 The Court thus left undecided whether Article 8 
was applicable to the case, but nonetheless considered that – even supposing it 
was applicable – the situation complained of by the applicants did not constitute 
a breach of that provision.208 The Court noticed that the new rules were ‘[…] the 
result of comprehensive debate in Parliament, in the course of which account [had 
been] taken of legal, ethical and social considerations’, and concerns relating to 
the proper organisation of the health service and the need for fair treatment for all 
disabled persons.209 They at least pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of 
health or morals.210 The Court left the State a wide margin of appreciation in ‘this 
difficult social sphere’211 and concluded that by deciding to reorganise the system of 
compensation for disability in France, the French legislature had not overstepped its 
margin of appreciation.212
Another important case on the issue of prenatal screening concerned R. R. v. Poland 
(2011),213 as discussed in section 2.2.4 above. In that case, the Court found a violation 
205 See, however, the pending case Parrillo v. Italy, no. 46470/11.
206 ECtHR 16 October 2005, Draon v. France, no. 1513/03 and ECtHR 16 October 2005, Maurice v. 
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of Article 3 ECHR, but also concluded that Article 8 ECHR had been violated, 
because the relevant Polish law did not contain any effective mechanisms which 
would have enabled R. R. to seek access to a diagnostic service, decisive for the 
possibility of exercising her right to take an informed decision as to whether to seek 
an abortion or not.214 It was also in this case that the Court explicitly recognised 
a right to timely access to information about the foetus’ health (see section 2.2.4 
above).215
In Costa and Pavan (2012)216 the Court assessed whether a legal prohibition on 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) was in violation of the Convention. The 
applicants in this case were a couple who had found in 2006, when their daughter 
was born, that they were healthy carriers of cystic fibrosis. In 2010 the woman had 
fallen pregnant again and a prenatal test had shown that the unborn child had also 
been affected by the disease. They had decided to have the pregnancy terminated on 
medical grounds. The couple subsequently wished to have access to AHR treatment 
including PGD but had been denied such access as there was a blanket ban on the use 
of PGD in place in Italy. That same year they lodged a complaint with the ECtHR, 
who decided to give priority to the case.
The Court was not convinced by the government’s argument that the case did not 
come within the scope of the Convention because the applicants in fact claimed ‘a 
right to have a healthy child’. The Court held that Article 8 ECHR was applicable to 
the case before it as ‘[…] the applicants’ desire to conceive a child unaffected by the 
genetic disease of which they are healthy carriers and to use [AHR treatment] and 
PGD to this end […] [was] a form of expression of their private and family life.’217 
There had been an interference with these Article 8 rights, because the applicants 
had had no access to AHR under Italian law, in particular to PGD, as the relevant law 
had imposed a blanket ban on access to this technique. The Court accepted that this 
interference was in accordance with the law and that it could be regarded as pursuing 
the legitimate aims of protecting morals and the rights and freedoms of others. The 
interference was, however, disproportionate.
The government’s arguments that the interference was justified because of ‘[…] 
concern to protect the health of “the child” and the woman, the dignity and freedom of 
conscience of the medical professions and the interest in precluding a risk of eugenic 
selection’218 were not persuasive to the Court. It considered the Italian legislation 
incoherent and inconsistent:
‘While stressing that the concept of “child” cannot be put in the same category as that 
of “embryo”, [the Court] fails to see how the protection of the interests referred to by the 
214 Idem, para. 208. A violation of the procedural limb of Art. 8 ECHR in a case concerning prenatal 
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Government can be reconciled with the possibility available to the applicants of having an 
abortion on medical grounds if the fœtus turns out to be affected by the disease, having 
regard in particular to the consequences of this both for the fœtus, which is clearly far 
further developed than an embryo, and for the parents, in particular the woman […]. […] 
Furthermore, the Government have failed to explain how the risk of eugenic selection 
and affecting the dignity and freedom of conscience of the medical professions would be 
averted in the event of an abortion being carried out on medical grounds. […] The Court 
cannot but note that the Italian legislation lacks consistency in this area. On the one hand 
it bans implantation limited to those embryos unaffected by the disease of which the 
applicants are healthy carriers, while on the other hand it allows the applicants to abort a 
fœtus affected by the disease […].’
As a result of this incoherent and inconsistent legislation, so the Court continued, 
the couple had been left with only one choice, which, moreover, brought anxiety and 
suffering, namely to start a pregnancy by natural means and terminate it if prenatal 
tests showed the foetus to have the disease, a situation which involved anxiety for the 
woman particularly. The applicants had already terminated one earlier pregnancy for 
that reason.
The Court distinguished the case from S.H. and Others v. Austria (2011), in 
which it, as discussed above, had held a ban on gamete donation not to violate the 
Convention. The case before it namely concerned homologous insemination instead 
of heterologous insemination. Also, the Italian ban on PGD had to be assessed in 
the light of the Italian abortion legislation.219 The Court subsequently noted that 
while PGD raised sensitive moral and ethical questions, the national ‘solutions’ were 
not beyond the scrutiny of the Court.220 The Court did not explicitly address the 
government’s argument that there was no consensus on the matter, but noted and 
stressed that this concerned a specific case, which affected apart from Italy only 
two more High Contracting Parties. Unanimously the Court concluded that the 
interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life had 
been disproportionate.221
2.3.5. Surrogacy
To date there have been no cases before the ECtHR where the Court was asked to 
rule on the compatibility of surrogacy with the Convention. The Court has, however, 
examined – and will in future cases examine – complaints about the non‑recognition 
of parental links that were established abroad in cross‑border surrogacy cases. 
Because of their cross‑border aspects, these judgments are discussed below in 
section 2.4.2. The Court noted in these judgments that surrogacy concerns a delicate 
ethical issue in respect of which no consensus exists in Europe. The Court also 
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importantly held that establishment of parentage for a child born through surrogacy 
affects the establishment of the essence of his or her identity, as protected by the 
right to respect for private life.
2.3.6.	 Establishment	of	parental	links	after	AHR	treatment
The Court’s case law on the right to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR 
is elaborate. There have been, however, only few cases where this right was relied 
upon to claim legal recognition of family ties with a child that was conceived in the 
course of AHR treatment with the use of donor gametes and/or a surrogate mother.
In a case of the early 1990s the Commission held that the situation in which a 
person donates sperm only to enable a woman to become pregnant through artificial 
insemination does not of itself give the donor a right to respect for family life with 
the child.222 In this case a refusal to grant him visitation rights to the child was held 
not to be in violation of Article 8 ECHR, as the Commission was of the opinion that 
the applicant’s contact with the child, both in itself and together with his donorship, 
formed an insufficient basis for the conclusion that as a result thereof such close 
personal ties had developed between them that their relationship fell within the 
scope of ‘family life’ as referred to in Article 8.
Mere genetic parenthood has thus not been held to be sufficient for protection of 
the right to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR. This has been confirmed 
by case law outside the area of gamete donation, for example in situations where a 
woman who had given her children up for adoption after birth, claimed a right to 
contact with and information about her genetic children.223 There have also been 
various cases before the Court where a man unsuccessfully tried to challenge the 
paternity of another man’s paternity of his (presumed) genetic child.224 The Court 
accepted in those cases that a decision to reject a request to legally establish paternity 
of a (presumed) genetic child interfered with the right to respect for private life under 
Article 8 ECHR. However, such an interference could be justified so long as there 
was no close personal relationship between the (presumed) genetic father and the 
respective child.
Hence, for genetic parents it may not be sufficient to rely on their genetic parenthood 
in order to establish parental links with their child. The actual existence of family life 
is what counts under the right to respect for family life. This is not to say that genetic 
parenthood does not play a role in the Court’s case law on reproductive matters. 
In fact, in the French cross‑border surrogacy cases to which already reference 
was made in section 2.1.3 above, genetic parenthood can be held to have played a 
decisive role. As discussed in more detail below in section 2.4.2, the Court ruled 
that where the legal parent‑child relationship is concerned, an essential aspect of the 
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identity of individuals is at stake and stressed the importance of biological parentage 
as a component of identity, as protected under the right to respect for private life 
(Article 8 ECHR).225
There have, further, been cases before the Strasbourg Court where a person claimed 
the recognition of parenthood of a child conceived with the use of donor gametes, 
and to whom he or she was thus not genetically related. The first time the Court was 
confronted with such a question was in 1997 in the X, Y and Z case. A female‑to‑male 
post‑operative transsexual was not permitted under UK law to marry a woman and 
could therefore not be regarded as the father of the child born with his female partner. 
The child had been conceived by artificial insemination, using sperm from an 
anonymous donor. The Grand Chamber of the Court noted that until then it had been 
called upon to consider only family ties existing between genetic parents and their 
offspring, while the case at hand ‘raised different questions’.226 The Court continued:
‘[…] it has not been established before the Court that there exists any generally shared 
approach amongst the High Contracting Parties with regard to the manner in which 
the social relationship between a child conceived by AID [‘artificial insemination by 
donor’] and the person who performs the role of father should be reflected in law. Indeed, 
according to the information available to the Court, although the technology of medically 
assisted procreation has been available in Europe for several decades, many of the issues 
to which it gives rise, particularly with regard to the question of filiation, remain the 
subject of debate. For example, there is no consensus amongst the member States of the 
Council of Europe on the question whether the interests of a child conceived in such a 
way are best served by preserving the anonymity of the donor of the sperm or whether the 
child should have the right to know the donor’s identity. […] In conclusion […], the Court 
is of the opinion that Article 8 cannot, in this context, be taken to imply an obligation for 
the respondent State formally to recognise as the father of a child a person who is not the 
biological father.’227
The fact that this case concerned a transsexual, while there was at the time no 
European consensus on transsexuality, has unmistakably been an important, if not 
crucial, factor in the Court’s conclusion in this case. One must therefore be careful 
not to disentangle this ruling from the particular factual circumstances of the case 
at hand. Still, the finding that Article 8 would not imply an obligation for States to 
formally recognise as the father of a child a person who was not the biological father 
is interesting. The Court adopted a similar line of reasoning in later case involving 
a same‑sex couple who had a child after resorting to AHR treatment. Here a clear 
overlap with Case Study II is visible. As further explained in Chapter 8, section 8.2.4.2, 
in Boeckel and Gessner‑Boeckel (2013),228 the Court declared manifestly ill‑founded 
the complaint of two women in a civil partnership, who wished to be both registered 
as parents in the birth certificate of the child to whom one of them had given birth. 
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The Court held that it could be ruled out ‘[…] on biological grounds that the child 
descended from the other partner.’ It accepted that, under these circumstances, there 
was ‘[…] no factual foundation for a legal presumption that the child descended from 
the […] partner [of the woman who had given birth to the child]’.229
2.4. cross‑border cAses And the echr
The ECtHR has decided a couple of interesting cross‑border cases involving either 
abortion or surrogacy. While there have been no cases on travel bans as such or on 
refusals to reimburse the costs of treatment obtained abroad, there have been cases 
on access to and provision of information about foreign treatment options. Also, 
the matter of after care, after abortions abroad has been addressed in the case law. 
Lastly, the Court has decided cases about the recognition of parental links with a 
child born after surrogacy in a foreign country. These three limbs of case law are 
discussed in the three following subsections.
2.4.1.	 Information	about	foreign	treatment	options	and	follow‑up	treatment
In Open Door (1992) an injunction had been granted restraining the Irish counselling 
agencies Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman Centre from assisting 
pregnant women in seeking legal abortion services abroad (see also Chapter 5, 
section 5.2.2). In its report of March 1991 the European Commission on Human 
Rights had held that this injunction was not prescribed by law and therefore violated 
their right to freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR).230 While the Commission 
had thus not decided the nub of the matter before it, the Court instead addressed the 
proportionality of the injunction.231
The Court firstly noted that there was no doubt that the injunction constituted an 
interference with the applicants’ freedom to impart and receive information.232 The 
229 Idem, para. 30. At the time this research was concluded (i.e. 31 July 2014) there was another (potentially) 
relevant case pending (Francine Bonnaud and Patricia Lecoq v. France, no. 6190/11), where two 
women who live as a couple and who both had a child following AHR treatment complain about the 
rejection of the their requests to be granted parental authority each in respect of the other’s child. In 
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Gas and Dubois v. France and X and Others v. Austria, and the adoption in France of the law of 17 May 
2013 opening marriage to same sex couples.’ ECtHR, Factsheet Sexual Orientation Issues, edn. April 
2015.
230 ECmHR 7 March 1991 (report), Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, nos. 14234/88 
and 14235/88. By decision of 15 May 1990 the ECmHR had already declared the complaint admissible. 
After the delivery of this report, both the Commission and the Irish government decided to bring the 
case before the ECtHR.
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Court furthermore held that the restriction was prescribed by law233 and pursued the 
legitimate aim of ‘[…] the protection of morals of which the protection in Ireland of 
the right to life of the unborn [was] one aspect’.234 It acknowledged that since it was 
not possible to find in the legal and social orders of the Contracting States a uniform 
European conception of morals, ‘[…] national authorities enjoy[ed] a wide margin of 
appreciation in matters of morals, particularly in an area such as [abortion] which 
touche[d] on matters of belief concerning the nature of human life.’235 However, 
the restriction was disproportionate to the aims pursued. The Court was struck by 
‘the absolute nature of the Supreme Court injunction which imposed a “perpetual” 
restraint on the provision of information to pregnant women concerning abortion 
facilities abroad, regardless of age or state of health or their reasons for seeking 
counselling on the termination of pregnancy’.236
In assessing the proportionality of the restriction, the Court took into consideration 
a number of other factors. First, it assessed that the link between the provision of 
information and the destruction of unborn life was not as definite as contended;237 and 
that information could be obtained from other sources in Ireland.238 The restriction 
was further ineffective in protecting the right to life of the unborn since it did not 
prevent large numbers of Irish women from continuing to obtain abortions in Great 
Britain.239 Also, the injunction created a risk to the health of those women seeking 
abortions at a later stage in their pregnancy due to the lack of proper counselling 
and had adverse effects on women who were not sufficiently resourceful or did 
not have the necessary level of education to have access to alternative sources of 
information.240 The Court accordingly found a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
Having regard to this finding, the Court – like the Commission earlier – considered 
it unnecessary to examine the case under Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) 
and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) ECHR.241
Later, in A, B and C v. Ireland, the Court – as discussed above – set access to 
information about foreign abortion services as an element of the minimum level of 
protection that States with a restrictive abortion regime had to offer under Article 8. 
The Court held that Ireland had met that minimum standard because:
‘[…] the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution removed any legal 
impediment to adult women travelling abroad for an abortion and to obtaining information 
in Ireland in that respect. Legislative measures were then adopted to ensure the provision 
of information and counselling about, inter alia, the options available including 
abortion services abroad, and to ensure any necessary medical treatment before, and 
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more particularly after, an abortion. The importance of the role of doctors in providing 
information on all options available, including abortion abroad, and their obligation to 
provide all appropriate medical care, notably post abortion, is emphasised in CPA work 
and documents and in professional medical guidelines […]. The Court has found that the 
first two applicants did not demonstrate that they lacked relevant information or necessary 
medical care as regards their abortions […].’242
The ECtHR concluded that because Ireland had provided for ‘[…] the right to travel 
abroad lawfully for an abortion with access to appropriate information and medical 
care in Ireland’, the prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well‑being 
reasons had not exceeded the margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to the 
Irish State.243
A somewhat different, but nonetheless much connected, question was at issue in the 
case of Women on Waves (2009). In 2004 the ‘abortion boat’ of the Dutch foundation 
Women on Waves set sail to Portugal to campaign in favour of the decriminalisation 
of abortion (see also Chapter 6, section 6.4.1.3). The ship was, however, blocked 
from entering Portuguese territorial waters by a Portuguese warship acting on 
the basis of a ministerial order banning such entry. After being unsuccessful in 
challenging the ban before the national courts, Women on Waves and two Portuguese 
organisations who had invited the foundation to come to Portugal, filed a complaint 
with the ECtHR. They based their complaints on a number of Convention provisions, 
including Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (freedom of movement). The Court decided 
to examine the case on the basis of Article 10 (the freedom of expression) only and 
found a violation of this provision. The Strasbourg Court accepted that the measure 
pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of disorder and the protection of health, 
but also noted that these had affected the very substance of the ideas and information 
imparted. It further took into account that the case did not involve private land or 
publicly owned property but the territorial waters of the respondent State, and that 
it had not been shown that the applicant associations had intended to deliberately 
breach Portuguese legislation on abortion. The Court reiterated that freedom to 
express opinions in the course of a peaceful assembly was so important that it could 
not be restricted in any way, so long as the person concerned did not commit any 
reprehensible acts. Lastly, the Portuguese authorities could have resorted to other 
means of preventing disorder and protecting health than taking such a radical measure 
as dispatching a warship, with a serious deterrent effect. The Court unanimously 
found a violation of Article 10 ECHR in this case.
2.4.2.	 Legal	recognition	of	parental	links	established	abroad
The issue of legal recognition of parental links established in another country, has, 
incidentally, come before the Strasbourg court. Until the Mennesson and Labassee 
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judgments (as discussed in greater detail below) were issued, cross‑border adoption 
cases like Wagner and Negrepontis‑Giannisis244 were the most cited authorities in 
relation to this question. The applicants in the Wagner case were a Luxembourg 
national and her adoptive child, who has been born in Peru. They had unsuccessfully 
applied to the Luxembourg Courts to have the adoption decision pronounced in Peru 
declared enforceable in Luxembourg. The Luxembourg courts had dismissed the 
application because the Luxembourg Civil Code made no provision for full adoption 
by a single woman. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 ECHR (to right to 
respect for private and family life) in this case. While the Court accepted that the 
refusal pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the ‘health and morals’ and the ‘rights 
and freedoms’ of the child,245 the Court found that the failure of the Luxembourg 
courts to recognise the family ties created by the judgment of full adoption delivered 
in Peru, was disproportionate. The Court stressed the importance of carrying out an 
actual examination of the situation246 and held:
‘The Court considers that the decision refusing enforcement fails to take account of the 
social reality of the situation. Accordingly, since the Luxembourg courts did not formally 
acknowledge the legal existence of the family ties created by the Peruvian full adoption, 
those ties do not produce their effects in full in Luxembourg. The applicants encounter 
obstacles in their daily life and the child is not afforded legal protection making it 
possible for her to be fully integrated into the adoptive family. Bearing in mind that the 
best interests of the child are paramount in such a case […], the Court considers that the 
Luxembourg courts could not reasonably disregard the legal status validly created abroad 
and corresponding to a family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention.’247
The Court also found a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken 
in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR. While it again could not exclude that the aim 
invoked by the government could be considered legitimate, the unequal treatment of 
the applicant,248 was disproportionate. The Court considered:
‘The consequence of this refusal to order enforcement is that the second applicant suffers 
on a daily basis a difference in treatment by comparison with a child whose full adoption 
is recognised in Luxembourg. It is an inescapable finding in this case that the child’s 
ties with her family of origin have been severed but that no full and entire substitute 
tie exists with her adoptive mother. The second applicant is therefore in a legal vacuum 
which has not been remedied by the fact that simple adoption has been granted in the 
meantime […] It follows in particular that, not having acquired Luxembourg nationality, 
the second applicant does not have the advantage of, for example, Community preference; 
244 ECtHR 28 June 2007, Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01 and ECtHR 3 May 2011, 
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if she wished to serve an occupational apprenticeship she would not obtain a work permit 
unless it were shown that an equivalent candidate could not be found on the European 
employment market. Next, and above all, for more than ten years the minor child has had 
to be regularly given leave to remain in Luxembourg and has had to obtain a visa in order 
to visit certain countries, in particular Switzerland.’249
The mother was held to indirectly suffer, on a daily basis, the obstacles experienced 
by her child and therefore also to be discriminated against. The Court did not find 
any ground in the present case to justify such discrimination of the applicants.250 In 
any event, the child could not be blamed for circumstances for which she was not 
responsible.251
This line of reasoning was pursued in two recent judgments that come within the 
scope of this case study. In June 2014, the Court decided two important cases against 
France on international surrogacy.252 The applicants in Mennesson and Labassee 
were two couples who had engaged in heterologous surrogacy in the United States 
of America (USA), as well as their children whom were consequently born in 
California and Minnesota respectively. In both cases the couple had had recourse to 
in vitro fertilisation using a donated ovum and the sperm of Mr. Mennesson and Mr. 
Labassee respectively. The embryos thus obtained were subsequently implanted into 
the uterus of a surrogate mother. The surrogate mother for the Mennesson couple 
gave birth to twins in October 2001, while the surrogate mother for the Labassee 
couple gave birth to a daughter in November 2001.
In both cases the couples had been legally recognised as the parents of the children 
by Court order in the relevant US State. In the case of the Mennessons this was 
done before the birth of the twins and the Californian Court had yet recognised 
Mrs. Mennesson, the intended non‑genetic mother, as legal mother of the child. 
Subsequently, in both cases a birth certificate had been drafted, stating that the couple 
(the intended parents) were the parents of the child. Upon return to France, the couples 
unsuccessfully sought to have these birth certificates entered in the French register 
of births, marriages and deaths. The French authorities refused such entries, because 
they suspected that the cases involved surrogacy arrangements, surrogacy being 
unlawful under French law. In the Mennesson case, the public prosecutor instructed 
that the birth certificates be, nevertheless, entered in the register and subsequently 
brought proceedings against the couple with a view to having the entries annulled. 
The Labassee couple instead obtained an ‘acte de notoriété’, a document issued by a 
judge attesting to the existence of a de facto parent‑child relationship. However, the 
public prosecutor refused to enter this in the French register, after which the couple 
appealed the case to the courts.
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Both domestic proceedings ended before the Court of Cassation, which ruled on 
6 April 2011 that recording such entries in the register would give effect to a surrogacy 
agreement that was null and void on public policy grounds under the French Civil 
Code. This Court ruled that the right to respect for private and family life had not 
been infringed now that the annulment of the entries had not prevented children 
from living in France with the intended parents. Also, the legal parenthood of the 
parents was still recognised under the laws of California and Minnesota respectively. 
That very same day the couples filed a complaint with the ECtHR. Mr. Mennesson 
also lodged an application with the Paris District Court for a certificate of French 
nationality for the twins. In March 2014 he was informed that the request was still 
being processed.253
Before the Strasbourg Court, the applicants in both cases invoked Article 8 ECHR 
(the right to respect for private and family life) and complained of the fact that, to the 
detriment of the children’s best interests, they were unable to obtain recognition in 
France of legal parent‑child relationships that had been lawfully established abroad 
as the result of a surrogacy agreement.
In Mennesson, the Court found that the refusal of the French authorities to legally 
recognise the family tie between the applicants constituted an interference with 
Article 8, of both its private life aspect and its family life aspect. The Court referred 
in this regard to its approach in Wagner and Negrepontis‑Giannisis (see above). 
The Court furthermore accepted that this interference had a sufficient legal basis 
in domestic law, which was foreseeable and accessible.254 Also, the interference 
pursued a legitimate aim, but the Court did not accept all aims put forward by the 
French government. The government had claimed that the refusals to record the 
American birth certificates in the French register, were based on ‘[…] ethical and 
moral principles according to which the human body could not become a commercial 
instrument and the child be reduced to the object of a contract.’255 The Court did not 
accept that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder 
or crime, as the government had not established that where French nationals had 
recourse to a surrogacy arrangement in a country in which such an agreement was 
legal this amounted to an offence under French law. The Court understood, however, 
that the government sought ‘[…] to deter its nationals from having recourse to 
methods of assisted reproduction outside the national territory that [were] prohibited 
on its own territory and aim[ed], in accordance with its perception of the issue, to 
protect children and […] surrogate mothers’. Accordingly, the Court accepted that the 
interference pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of health and the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.256 The Court did not further elaborate on the 
first legitimate aim, but basically focused on the latter in its subsequent assessment 
of the necessity of the measure, in particular on the protection of the child.
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The French government had pointed out that to authorise entry in the register of births, 
marriages and deaths of the details of foreign civil‑status documents of children 
born as the result of a surrogacy agreement performed outside France, would have 
been ‘[…] tantamount to tacitly accepting that domestic law had been circumvented 
and would have jeopardised the consistent application of the provisions outlawing 
surrogacy.’257 The Court acknowledged that the community had an interest ‘[…] in 
ensuring that its members conform to the choice made democratically within that 
community’,258 but found that it had to be verified whether the domestic courts had 
duly taken account of the need to strike a fair balance between this interest and ‘[…] 
the interest of the applicants – the children’s best interests being paramount – in fully 
enjoying their rights to respect for their private and family life.’259
The Court defined the interests of the child in this case in the context of the right to 
personal identity. It held in this regard:
‘Respect for private life requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their 
identity as individual human beings, which includes the legal parent‑child relationship. 
[…] an essential aspect of the identity of individuals is at stake where the legal parent‑child 
relationship is concerned […].’260
This was also reason for the Court to reduce the margin of appreciation, despite 
the fact that surrogacy raised sensitive ethical questions and the fact that there was 
accordingly no consensus in Europe on the lawfulness of surrogacy arrangements or 
the legal recognition of the relationship between intended parents and children thus 
conceived abroad.261
The Court noted that the children concerned were in a position of legal uncertainty, 
about their lineage and their nationality, and this uncertainty was liable to have 
negative repercussions on the definition of their personal identity. Although aware 
that the children had been identified in the USA as the children of Mr. and Mrs. 
Mennesson, France nonetheless denied them that status under French law. The Court 
considered that this ‘contradiction’ undermined the children’s identity within French 
society.262 The non‑recognition of the legal parenthood of the French couple also had 
implications for the children’s inheritance rights. All together ‘a serious question’ 
arose as to the compatibility of this situation with the child’s best interests:
‘The Court can accept that France may wish to deter its nationals from going abroad to 
take advantage of methods of assisted reproduction that are prohibited on its own territory 
[…]. […] [H]owever, the effects of non‑recognition in French law of the legal parent‑child 
relationship between children thus conceived and the intended parents are not limited to the 
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parents alone, who have chosen a particular method of assisted reproduction prohibited by 
the French authorities. They also affect the children themselves, whose right to respect for 
their private life – which implies that everyone must be able to establish the substance of 
his or her identity, including the legal parent‑child relationship – is substantially affected. 
Accordingly, a serious question arises as to the compatibility of that situation with the 
child’s best interests, respect for which must guide any decision in their regard.’263
The Court, moreover, found that this analysis took on ‘a special dimension’ where one 
of the intended parents was also the child’s genetic parent. It stressed the importance 
of biological parentage ‘as a component of identity’ and continued:
‘[…] it cannot be said to be in the interests of the child to deprive him or her of a legal 
relationship of this nature where the biological reality of that relationship has been 
established and the child and parent concerned demand full recognition thereof. Not only 
was the relationship between the third and fourth applicants and their biological father 
not recognised when registration of the details of the birth certificates was requested, but 
formal recognition by means of a declaration of paternity or adoption or through the effect 
of de facto enjoyment of civil status would fall foul of the prohibition [on attribution of the 
status of father or mother by contract and on giving effect to a parent‑child relationship 
provided for in a surrogacy agreement] established by the Court of Cassation in its 
case‑law in that regard […]. The Court considers, having regard to the consequences of 
this serious restriction on the identity and right to respect for private life of the third and 
fourth applicants, that by thus preventing both the recognition and establishment under 
domestic law of their legal relationship with their biological father, the respondent State 
overstepped the permissible limits of its margin of appreciation. […] Having regard also 
to the importance to be given to the child’s interests when weighing up the competing 
interests at stake, the Court concludes that the right of the third and fourth applicants to 
respect for their private life was infringed.’264
While the Court thus found a violation of the right to respect for private life of the 
children, the Court found no violation of the right to respect for family life of the 
parents and the children. The Court accepted that this right had been interfered with, 
but held that a fair balance had been struck between the interests of the applicants 
and those of the State. The applicants had put forward that on account of the lack 
of recognition in French law of the legal parent‑child relationship, the children did 
not have French civil‑status documents or a French family record book, and were 
therefore obliged to produce – non‑registered – US civil documents accompanied 
by an officially sworn translation each time access to a right or a service required 
proof of the legal parent‑child relationship. They were sometimes met with ‘[…] 
suspicion, or at the very least incomprehension, on the part of the person dealing 
with the request’. Moreover, the children had not been granted French nationality, 
which complicated travel as a family and raised concerns about the stability of 
the family unit.265 The Court noted it was not established that it was impossible to 
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overcome these practical difficulties. Also, the inability to obtain recognition of the 
legal parent‑child relationship under French law had not prevented the applicants 
from enjoying in France their right to respect for their family life. The family had 
been able to settle in France shortly after the birth of the children and had been in a 
position to live there together ‘[…] in conditions broadly comparable to those of other 
families […]’. There was nothing to suggest that they were at risk of being separated 
by the authorities on account of their situation under French law.266
In the case of the Labassee family, the Court adopted the same approach as in 
Mennesson, finding that there had been no violation of Article 8 concerning the 
applicants’ right to respect for their family life, and a violation of Article 8 concerning 
the right of the child concerned to respect for her private life. The Chamber was 
unanimous in both cases, and both judgments became final in September 2014.
In legal scholarship it was noted that the fact that the Court had examined the issue 
(also) from the perspective of the right of the child to personal identity, made this 
judgment widely applicable, including in international surrogacy cases where no 
family life had yet been established between the intended – and genetic – parent(s) 
and the child. In this regard, the question was posed whether or not the personal 
identity of the intended (genetic) parents was also at stake.267 Further, the question 
was raised regarding what the Court would have ruled if none of the intended parents 
were also genetic parents of the child.268
A month after the Mennesson and Labassee judgments, the Court decided another 
international surrogacy case, which concerned the length of a procedure for the 
issuing of travel documents for a child born via heterologous surrogacy in the 
Ukraine. The applicants in D and Others269 were a Belgian married couple who 
had entered into a surrogacy agreement in the Ukraine, following which a child 
was born in February 2013. The intended father was also the genetic father of the 
child, while the genetic mother was the woman who had donated the egg cell. In 
accordance with Ukrainian law, the Belgian couple had been recorded on the child’s 
birth certificate as the parents of the child. When they subsequently applied to the 
Belgian embassy in Ukraine for a passport, this was denied, because they failed to 
prove that they were the genetic parents of the child. The couple subsequently had 
started proceedings before the Belgian courts in order to obtain emergency travel 
documents (a ‘laissez‑passer’). The competent court had given the case priority, but 
had refused the issuing of the travel documents, so long as the genetic parenthood 
of the intended father was not established. It took four months and 12 days before 
the Belgian court found it established in August 2013 that the intended father was 
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also the genetic father of the child and ordered the issuing of the required travel 
documents. While the proceedings were pending, the child remained in the Ukraine, 
while the parents had to go back to Belgium, because their visas had expired. They 
visited the child twice for a duration of one month in total. Since August 2013 the 
couple and the child lived together in Belgium.
The legal situation of the applicants had thus significantly changed since their 
lodging of a complaint with the ECtHR in April 2013. The Court accordingly struck 
down their complaint about the Belgian authorities’ refusal to authorise the child’s 
entry to the national territory. This had been adequately and sufficiently remedied 
and the dispute was to be considered as resolved.
The applicants had further alleged that their effective separation from the child, 
on account of the Belgian authorities’ refusal to issue a travel document, had been 
contrary to the best interests of the child and in breach of their right to respect for 
family life under Article 8 ECHR. The Court found the duration of the temporary 
separation, for the duration of the proceedings, not unreasonable. The Court held that 
States were under no obligation under the Convention to authorise the entry of a child 
born with a foreign surrogate mother, without first subjecting the case to some form 
of legal examination.270 It further took into account that the Belgian couple – who 
had sought legal advice of both a Belgian and a Ukrainian lawyer – could have 
reasonably foreseen that a court procedure was required, before they could bring 
the child to Belgium. The Belgian State could not be held responsible for the fact 
that the couple had not been granted a visa in the Ukraine for an extended period. 
Furthermore, while their case had been pending before the Belgian court, the couple 
had been enabled to spend time with the child in the Ukraine, without any interference 
from the authorities. Also, the Belgian court had given the case priority. The Court 
concluded that the Belgian state had not exceeded the margin of appreciation and 
declared the complaint manifestly ill‑founded.
The Court thus did not hold, in D and Others, that States were under no obligation 
under the Convention to authorise the entry of a child born with a foreign surrogate 
mother, but it accepted that the authorities first subjected the case to some form of 
legal examination.271 Even more fundamental questions in respect of international 
surrogacy may be addressed in an Italian case that was still pending before the Court 
at the time this research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014).272 In that international 
surrogacy case, the child had been placed for adoption by the Italian authorities 
after it had become clear that the intended parents were not the genetic parents of 
the child.
270 Idem, para. 59.
271 N.R. Koffeman, ‘Case‑note to ECtHR 8 July 2014 (dec.), D. a.o. v. Belgium, no. 29176/13’, 15 European 
Human Rights Cases 2014/269 (in Dutch).
272 Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, no. 25358/12, lodged on 27 April 2012. This application was 
communicated to the Italian Government on 9 May 2012.








The ECtHR’s case law with regard to reproductive matters, while still fairly limited, 
is steadily expanding. The overall first impression that arises from the case law 
discussed in this chapter is that of a rather reluctant, sometimes evasive and overall 
pragmatic Court when it comes to reproduction matters. Having regard to the wide 
variety of views in this ethically and morally sensitive field and the fast‑moving 
scientific developments, the Court has left many reproductive matters up to the 
national authorities to decide. It has not, for example, taken a strong stance on 
the status of the unborn life. The Court generally leaves States a wide margin of 
appreciation in dealing with as morally and ethically sensitive issues as reproductive 
matters, which involve a complex balancing of various individual and general 
interests, and upon which generally no European consensus exists. As a result, even 
far‑reaching interferences, such as an absolute prohibition on abortion on social and 
medical grounds or on the use of donated gametes in the course of IVF treatment, 
have been held not to violate the Convention.
The Court has, furthermore, introduced some variations on its well‑established 
margin of appreciation doctrine, especially in the context of reproductive rights. 
In S. H. and Others, the Court seemed to set the barrier higher than it had done 
previously in its case law, by holding that for a common ground to decisively narrow 
the margin, it had to be ‘based on settled and long‑standing principles established in 
the law of the member States’. The Court’s approach in defining the issue on which 
consensus had to exist in A, B and C – whereby an existing consensus on allowing 
for abortion on social and medical grounds was outweighed by a lack of European 
consensus in respect of the right to life of the unborn – was also unprecedented. 
These variations on the margin of appreciation doctrine illustrate that the Court is 
generally reluctant to intervene in reproductive matters. States are left much room 
to introduce change at their own pace, as long as the competing interests have been 
weighed in the national legislative process, and as long as they keep this area under 
review.273
Although the life, physical integrity and personal autonomy of pregnant women 
enjoy protection as rights under the ECHR, the ECtHR has repeatedly held that 
neither Article 8 ECHR, nor any other Convention Article, can be interpreted as 
conferring a right to abortion. Nonetheless, it has found that a prohibition on abortion 
for reasons of health and/or well‑being amounted to an interference with the right 
to respect for private life. Further, it has held that the right to respect for private life 
incorporates the right to respect for the decision not to become a (genetic) parent. 
From the A, B and C case it follows that a State may completely ban abortion on such 
grounds, as long as it allows women the option of lawfully travelling to another State 
to undergo an abortion and as long as women have access to appropriate information 
273 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, paras. 103 and 118. The Court 
accepted that States adopt rules in this area which do not provide for the weighing of competing 
interests in the circumstance of each individual case.







and medical care before and after the abortion. The burden of travelling as such was 
not considered in violation of the Convention.
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the Convention only sets a 
minimum standard and that States are free to offer a higher level of protection to 
the Convention rights. Also, there has been an increasingly greater impact of the 
ECHR on national abortion regimes through the Court’s procedural approach in 
these matters. Apart from violations of the right to respect for private life (Article 8), 
this has even resulted in the finding of a violation of Article 3 ECHR (the prohibition 
of inhuman and degrading treatment). A similar impact of the ECtHR’s case law is 
visible in the area of AHR. States must shape their legal frameworks in the area of 
reproductive matters ‘[…] in a coherent manner which allows the different legitimate 
interests involved to be adequately taken into account.’274 In Costa and Pavan this 
resulted in an obligation for Italy to legalise PGD. States must, furthermore, provide 
for an independent authority that can decide about access to information about one’s 
genetic origins (see section 2.1.4 above).
Hence, while principled choices in reproductive matters are left to the States, the 
fact that reproductive matters fall within the scope of the Convention means that, 
as soon as a State regulates this area of law, certain general obligations resulting 
from the Convention apply. As the discussed case law shows, these entail that the 
right or entitlement granted at national level must be effective, and that the relevant 
legislation must be coherent and allow for the different legitimate interests involved 
to be adequately taken into account. In abortion situations this means concretely 
that the pregnant woman has the right to be heard in person, that the competent 
body or person should issue written grounds for its decision and the woman must 
be given timely access to information about her and the foetus’ health. The right 
or entitlement must, furthermore, be granted in a non‑discriminatory manner,275 
although the Court has also held a same‑sex couple as not being in a similar situation 
to infertile different‑sex couples with regard to access to AHR treatment (see 
section 2.3.1 above).
The ECtHR’s case law has also had an impact on the States’ standard‑setting in 
cross‑border situations. In respect of cross‑border abortions, States must ensure that 
women can freely travel to another country, that they have access to information 
about foreign abortion options and that they have access to follow‑up treatment upon 
return to their home countries. These minimum requirements were, at the same time, 
considered sufficient to justify very restrictive national abortion legislation (see 
section 2.2.3). In cross‑border surrogacy cases, States must recognise parental links 
274 Idem, para. 100.
275 The Chamber judgment in the case of S.H. and Others v. Austria (2010)(see sections 2.3 and 2.3.3 
above) illustrated this approach well. While the Convention does not guarantee a right to access to 
assisted human reproduction, the Chamber held that the prohibition of discrimination entailed that 
an Austrian prohibition on IVF treatment with the use of donor gametes could not be justified. This 
judgment was, however, overruled by the Grand Chamber, and such reasoning has since not been 
repeated by the Court.







established abroad between a genetic intended father and a child born with a surrogate 
mother in a foreign country. Here, the Court based its reasoning completely on the 
right to personal identity of the child, and this was, in Mennesson and Labassee, also 
ground for narrowing the margin of appreciation.
All in all, it seems that the Court’s case law in reproductive matters, particularly in 
the field of assisted human reproduction and surrogacy, is not yet crystallised. The 
Court has stressed that this area needs to be kept under review by the Contracting 
States, and at the time of conclusion of this research (i.e., 31 July 2014) various 
cases were still pending, which could potentially challenge the Court to tackle (more) 
substantive claims.
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A common conception of the status of the unborn does not exist in EU law. The 
beginning of life has not been defined in any EU legislative instrument, nor in any 
ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It is not, for example, 
decided how the term ‘everyone’ under Article 2(1) Charter (‘Everyone has the right 
to life’) is to be defined.1 This matter is – so it can be concluded – left to the discretion 
of the Member States.
Two CJEU rulings have, nevertheless, indirectly touched upon this sensitive issue. 
The cases Sabine Mayr (2008)2 and Brüstle (2011)3 concerned the interpretation of 
terms and concepts in EU Directives which have a (remote) connection to the unborn. 
While these judgments give some clues with regard to the CJEU’s approach to the 
unborn, it must be underlined that it remains impossible to draw any substantive 
conclusions as to the status of the unborn in EU law from these rulings. This has 
everything to do with the fact that the definitions given by the CJEU were strictly 
confined to the context of the relevant Directives, which concerned employment law 
and patent law respectively.
The case of Sabine Mayr (2008) concerned the question whether a female worker who 
was undergoing in vitro fertilisation treatment was protected against dismissal under 
EU law.4 The Grand Chamber of the Court ruled that the prohibition of dismissal of 
pregnant workers in Article 10(1) of Council Directive 92/85/EEC,5 did not extend 
1 The explanations to the Charter provide no clarification on this point. Guiding is therefore the case law 
of the ECtHR on this point. As set out in Ch.2, the ECtHR left this matter to the States to decide upon. 
It is, furthermore, noted that the European Parliament held in a Resolution of 1989 that there was a 
need ‘ to protect human life from the moment of fertilization’. Resolution of the European Parliament 
on artificial insemination in vivo and in vitro of 16 March 1989, Preamble under C, [1989] OJ C96/127, 
p. 172.
2 Case C‑506/06 Sabine Mayr [2008] ECR I‑1017, ECLI:EU:C:2008:119.
3 Case C‑34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669.
4 The preliminary reference, inter alia, concerned the interpretation of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 
19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health 
of pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth and women who are breastfeeding [1992] 
OJ L348/1.
5 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth and 
women who are breastfeeding [1992] OJ L348/1.







to a female worker who was undergoing in vitro fertilisation treatment where, on 
the date she was given notice of her dismissal, her ova had already been fertilised 
by her partner’s sperm, so that in vitro fertilised ova existed, but they had not yet 
been transferred into her uterus.6 Such dismissal was, however, precluded by EU law 
if the woman was in ‘an advanced stage’ of IVF treatment and inasmuch as it was 
established that the dismissal was essentially based on the fact that the woman had 
undergone such treatment.7 The Court defined an ‘advanced stage’ of IVF treatment 
as ‘[…] between the follicular puncture and the immediate transfer of the in vitro 
fertilised ova into [the woman’s] uterus’.8
Hence, apparently the CJEU considered an advanced stage of IVF treatment to 
come so close to pregnancy that the protection against dismissal as afforded by the 
Directive to pregnant women had to be extended to this situation. To infer from this 
ruling any finding in respect of the beginning of life or the status of the unborn under 
EU law, would not, however, be possible without resorting to speculation.
In Brüstle (2011)9 the German Federal Court of Justice had made a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU concerning the patentability of biotechnological inventions 
in which human embryos were used. The CJEU gave an autonomous interpretation 
of the term ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Directive 98/44/EC on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions (‘the Biotechnology Directive’).10 The 
Court underlined that such a uniform definition was desired, to avoid the ‘[…] risk 
of the authors of certain biotechnological inventions being tempted to seek their 
patentability in the Member States which [had] the narrowest concept of human 
embryo and [were] accordingly the most liberal as regards possible patentability, 
because those inventions would not be patentable in the other Member States.’ 
According to the Court such a situation would have adversely affected the smooth 
functioning of the internal market which was the aim of the Directive.11 The Court 
also underlined the following:
6 Case C‑506/06 Sabine Mayr [2008] ECR I‑1017, ECLI:EU:C:2008:119, para. 53.
7 Idem, para. 54. The Court based its finding on Arts. 2(1) and 5(1) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC 
of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.
8 Idem, para. 54.
9 Case C‑34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669; see also 
S. Henette‑Vauchez, ‘L’embryon de l’Union’, 48 RTD eur. (2012) pp. 355–368.
10 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L213/13.
11 Case C‑34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669, para. 28. 
For critique in this respect, see H. Somsen, ‘Brüstle: embryonale fout met grote gevolgen’ [‘Brüstle: 
embroynic mistake with major consequences’], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 
(2012) p. 33 at p. 37 and F.M. Fleurke, ‘Case note to Case C‑34/10 (Brüstle)’, 13 European Human 
Rights Cases 2012/54 (in Dutch). Spranger held it to be ‘hardly comprehensible’ how the Court 
could arrive at this ‘unambiguous evaluation’. The author held that the existing divergences in 
patent law ‘in no way’ needed necessarily to be aligned in the direction of a wide embryo‑concept. 
T.M. Spranger, ‘Case C‑34/10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 18 October 2011’, 49 CLMRev. (2012) p. 1197 at 1202.







‘[…] although, the definition of human embryo is a very sensitive social issue in many 
Member States, marked by their multiple traditions and value systems, the Court is not 
called upon, by the present order for reference, to broach questions of a medical or ethical 
nature, but must restrict itself to a legal interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 
Directive.’12
Hence, the Court confined itself to the legal interpretation of the concept of ‘human 
embryo’ within the meaning of the Biotechnology Directive, i.e., within the context 
of patent law.13 According to the Court this concept was to be understood in a wide 
sense however, as the ‘context and aim’14 of the Directive showed that the European 
Union legislature intended to exclude any possibility of patentability where respect 
for human dignity could be affected.15 The Court held that any human ovum after 
fertilisation, any non‑fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from 
a mature human cell had been transplanted, and any non‑fertilised human ovum 
whose division and further development had been stimulated by parthenogenesis 
constituted a ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of the Directive.16 The CJEU 
left it for the referring court to ascertain, in the light of scientific developments, 
whether this also held for a stem cell obtained from a human embryo at the so‑called 
blastocyst stage (i.e., approximately five days after fertilisation).17
Precisely because the Court stressed that it only gave a ‘legal interpretation’ of the 
term ‘human embryo’ and only within the context of the Biotechnology Directive, 
one has to be very careful in making any inferences from this judgment in respect 
of the status of the unborn in EU law in a broader sense,18 such as the question as 
12 Case C‑34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669, para. 30. The 
Court referred to Case C‑506/06 Sabine Mayr [2008] ECR I‑1017, ECLI:EU:C:2008:119, para. 38.
13 Art. 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC.
14 Remarkably, the Court did not refer to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, nor to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. See also Fleurke 2012, supra n. 11.
15 Case C‑34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669, para. 34.
16 Idem, para. 38. Spranger observed that this definitely was ‘[…] not only extremely broad, but also open 
towards further extension, with further developments of modern life sciences.’ Spranger 2012, supra 
n. 11, at p. 1203. AG Cruz Villalón has held in a case of a later date that an ovum whose development 
has been stimulated without fertilisation and which was not capable of becoming a human being could 
not be considered a human embryo. However, if this ovum was genetically manipulated in such a way 
that it could develop into a human being, it had to be regarded as a human embryo and as such excluded 
from patentability, the AG held. Case C‑364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v. Comptroller 
General of Patents, nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2104, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón.
17 Case C‑34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669, para. 38. At 
the blastocyst stage, embryonic stem cells are pluripotent, which means that there are able to develop 
into various organs and tissues, but not into a complete individual.
18 Advocate General Bot had also warned that from the ‘legal definition’ as chosen by him, no inferences 
could be drawn ‘for other areas which relate to human life, but which are on an entirely different level 
and fall outside the scope of Union law.’ For that reason, Bot considered that the reference made at the 
hearing to judgments delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on the subject of abortion 
was, ‘by definition’, outside the scope of the Brüstle case. He held it not to be possible to compare the 
question of the possible use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes ‘with national 
laws which seek to provide solutions to individual difficult situations.’ Case C‑34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. 
Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:138, Opinion of AG Bot, para. 49.







from which developmental stage an embryo is an independent bearer of rights.19 In 
the words of Spranger ‘[…] all attempts to ascribe a general legal significance to 
the decision of the Court of Justice going beyond the realm of patent law must be 
emphatically opposed.’20 The author underlined ‘the limited relevance of patent law’, 
which understood itself ‘[…] basically as a value‑neutral subject matter and [was], 
also for systematic reasons, not the right place for the establishment of all‑purpose 
new standards for the entire European legal order.’21 Nevertheless, some have argued 
that the approach taken by the Court presupposed a certain bio‑ethic vision, that was 
however not made explicit.22
For one thing, the cases of Sabine Mayr and Brüstle confirmed the observation 
that the CJEU shows considerable judicial restraint in cases which touch upon 
such sensitive and ethical issues such as the status of the unborn. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of Union law that the CJEU gave was in both these cases confined to 
the very specific subject matter at stake.
3.1.2.	 (Potentially)	relevant	Charter	rights
Several Articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFR)23 relate in one way or another to reproductive rights.24 The CJEU’s case law on 
these provisions is, however, still fairly limited and therefore provides little guidance 
in respect of application of these Articles in the context of the present case study. It 
is recalled in this regard, that the CFR also has a limited scope of application; its 
provisions ‘[…] are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
19 T. Groh, ‘Anmerkung zu C‑34/10 (Brüstle)’ [‘Case note to Case C‑34/10 (Brüstle)’], 23 Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2011) p. 910 at p. 910.
20 Spranger 2012, supra n. 11, at p. 1205.
21 Idem.
22 B. van Beers, ‘Het Europese Hof van Justitie over de vermarkting van menselijke embryo’s. Van 
economische naar ook bio‑ethische integratie binnen de EU?’ [‘The European Court of Justice on the 
commercialisation of human embryos. From economic to also bio‑ethical integration in the EU?’], 37 
NTM/NJCM‑Bull. (2012) p. 242 at pp. 255–256. Without substantiating this with references, Spranger 
held that ‘[a]lready shortly after the publication of the decision, the opinion that the Court of Justice 
has delivered a complete embryo definition for all areas of European Law or that this complete, or 
all‑purpose, definition should at least be indirectly derived from the decision in the interest of a 
consistent legal order, has actually been expressed by various stakeholders. The author held ‘[t]hese 
attempts at interpretation’, to be ‘falsified by the remarks of the Court of Justice itself’. He furthermore 
held that they misjudged the ‘scope’ which the CJEU and the ECtHR had so far, ‘and with good 
reasons’ attributed to the Member States, ‘ in view of the concretization of ethically problematic or 
socially controversial concepts of the modern life sciences’. Spranger 2012, supra n. 11, at p. 1205. See 
also at pp. 1208–1209.
23 Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/1.
24 Yet in 1989 – hence much before the Charter of Fundamental Rights even existed – the European 
Parliament had held in a Resolution that the main criteria governing the area were ‘[…] the mother’s 
right to self‑determination and the respect of the rights and interests of the child, i.e. the right to life 
and physical, psychological and existential integrity, the right to a family, the right to be looked after 
by its parents and to grow up in a suitable family environment and the right to its own genetic identity. 
Resolution of the European Parliament on artificial insemination in vivo and in vitro of 16 March 1989, 
Preamble under D [1989] OJ C96/127, p. 172.







Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only 
when they are implementing Union law’.25
Article 1 CFR, to start with, contains a fundamental right to human dignity.26 While 
there is little case law on this specific Charter Article, the right to human dignity 
was already recognised by the CJEU as part of Union law in 2001.27 Also, it has 
been upheld as a justification for restrictive measures in free movement cases.28 The 
CJEU, furthermore, considered it ‘not indispensable’ in that regard for the restrictive 
measure issued by the authorities of a Member State to correspond to a conception 
shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which the fundamental 
right or legitimate interest in question was to be protected.29
The right to life and the right to integrity of the person are codified in Articles 2 
and 3 CFR, respectively. The latter Article provides that in the fields of medicine and 
biology the free and informed consent of the person concerned; the prohibition of 
eugenic practices; the prohibition on making the human body and its parts, as such, 
a source of financial gain;30 as well as the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of 
human beings, must be respected in particular.31
25 Art. 51 TFEU. See also, inter alia, Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECR 0000, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:105; K. Lenaerts, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Scope of Application and 
Methods of Interpretation’, in: V. Kronenberger et al. (eds.), De Rome à Lisbonne: les juridictions de 
l’Union européenne à la croisée des chemins: mélanges en l’honneur de Paolo Mengozzi (Bruxelles, 
Bruylant 2013) p. 107 and W.B. van Bockel and P.J. Wattel, ‘New Wine into Old Wineskins: the Scope 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU after Åkerberg Fransson’, 38 European law review 
(2013) p. 866.
26 Art. 1 CFR reads: ‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.’
27 Case C‑377/98 Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I‑7079, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:523, paras. 70–77.
28 In Omega (2004), the Court held that there was no doubt that the objective of protecting human dignity 
was compatible with EU law. Case C‑36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I‑9609, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614.
29 Idem, para. 37.
30 As McHale has pointed out, the prohibition on making (parts of) the human body a source of financial 
gain is also recognised in the Tissue and Cells Directive (see also section 3.3.2 below). J. McHale, 
’Fundamental rights and health care’, in: E. Mossialos et al. (eds.), Health Systems Governance in 
Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010) 
p. 282 at p. 300, online available at www.euro.who.int/en/who‑we‑are/partners/observatory/studies/
health‑systems‑governance‑in‑europe‑the‑role‑of‑eu‑law‑and‑policy, visited June 2014.
31 The official explanation to this Article reads:
‘1. In its judgment of 9 October 2001 in Case C‑377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council 
[2001] ECR‑I 7079, at grounds 70, 78 to 80, the Court of Justice confirmed that a fundamental right 
to human integrity is part of Union law and encompasses, in the context of medicine and biology, the 
free and informed consent of the donor and recipient.
2. The principles of Article 3 of the Charter are already included in the Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine, adopted by the Council of Europe (ETS 164 and additional protocol ETS 168). The 
Charter does not set out to depart from those principles, and therefore prohibits only reproductive 
cloning. It neither authorises nor prohibits other forms of cloning. Thus it does not in any way prevent 
the legislature from prohibiting other forms of cloning.
3. The reference to eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of persons, relates 
to possible situations in which selection programmes are organised and implemented, involving 
campaigns for sterilisation, forced pregnancy, compulsory ethnic marriage among others, all acts 







A related Charter provision that may potentially prove of relevance for the status 
and development of reproductive rights within EU law is Article 35 CFR. Following 
this Article ‘[e]veryone has the right of access to preventive health care and the 
right to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national 
laws and practices.’32 This provision thus ‘[…] does not recognize per se a right to 
health assured by EU law, but rather a principle of access to health based on national 
legislation’.33 The Article has been categorised amongst the Charter rights which in 
fact merely constitute ‘pure objectives’ of the Union34 and it has been questioned 
whether it will make a practical difference in terms of litigation.35
Article 7 of the Charter contains a right to respect for private and family life which 
corresponds to Article 8 ECHR.36 Article 9 CFR lays down the right to found a 
family, a right that is disconnected from the right to marry, that is also provided for 
in Article 9.37 The Commentary to the Charter by the EU Network of Independent 
Experts on Fundamental Rights of 2006 noted – without specifying this further – that 
the right to found a family provided ‘[…] for some aspects of reproductive choice 
including the use of new procreative technologies’.38 At the same time, it was noted 
that there was ‘a diversity of domestic legislation on this subject’.39 This diversity 
is implied in the fact that this right – like under Article 12 ECHR on which it is 
deemed to be international crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in 
Rome on 17 July 1998 (see its Article 7(1)(g)).’ 
 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, p.18.
32 Art. 35 CFR further provides that ‘[a] high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the 
definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities.’
33 S. De la Rosa, ‘The directive on cross‑border healthcare or the art of codifying complex case law’, 49 
CML Rev. (2012) p. 15 at p. 35, footnote 75. The Explanations to this Article also speak of ‘principles’ 
that are set out in this Article, which are based on Art. 168 TFEU and Arts. 11 and 13 of the European 
Social Charter.
34 T. K. Hervey, ‘We don’t see a Connection: the “Right to Health” in the EU Charter and European Social 
Charter’, in: G. De Búrca et al. (eds.), Social rights in Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press) p. 305 
at p. 318.
35 J. McHale, ’Fundamental rights and health care’, in: E. Mossialos et al. (eds.), Health Systems Governance 
in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2010) p. 282 at pp. 304 and 306–307, online available at www.euro.who.int/en/who‑we‑are/partners/
observatory/studies/health‑systems‑governance‑in‑europe‑the‑role‑of‑eu‑law‑and‑policy, visited 
June 2014. McHale refers (in footnote 98), to T. Hervey, ‘The right to health in European Union law’, 
in: T. Hervey and J. Kenner (eds.), Economic and social rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: a legal perspective (Oxford, Hart 2003) p. 193 at p. 210.
36 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, p. 20.
37 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, June 2006, online available at www.ec.europa.eu/justice/
fundamental‑rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf, visited June 2014. In this Commentary it 
was observed (at p. 103): ‘Article 9 of the Charter approaches the rights at stake, i.e. the right to found 
a family and the right to marry as two different and separate rights, suggesting that the former is not 
necessarily connected with the latter. Apparently, it seems from the wording, i.e., the usage of the plural 
form ‘these rights’, that a disconnection between the right to marry and to found a family has been 
envisaged. In other words, a marriage does not necessarily imply procreation.’
38 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, June 2006, p. 104, online available at www.ec.europa.eu/
justice/fundamental‑rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf, visited June 2014.
39 Idem.







based40 – is guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise 
of this right. The right to found a family under Article 9 CFR has never been referred 
to in a CJEU judgment, let alone interpreted by the Court.
Article 33(1) CFR is also related to the family and provides that the family shall enjoy 
‘legal, economic and social protection’.41 Further, other than the ECHR, the Charter 
provides expressly for the rights of the child, which is based on the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.42 Its Article 24(2) provides that ‘[…] in all actions relating 
to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s 
best interests must be a primary consideration.’ Following the third paragraph of 
Article 24, every child has the right ‘[…] to maintain on a regular basis a personal 
relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to 
his or her interests.’43
Article 21 CFR lays down a prohibition on discrimination. Contrary to Article 14 
ECHR this is a self‑standing right that can be invoked independently from other 
Charter rights. The provision is not intended to introduce ‘a sweeping ban of 
discrimination’ that covers any Member States’ action and private action, but, like 
all Charter rights, addresses the institutions and the Member States when they are 
implementing Union law.44 According to the Explanations to the Charter, this Article 
draws, inter alia, on Article 11 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
which contains a prohibition on discrimination on the basis of genetic heritage.
Lastly, Article 45 EU Charter grants every EU citizen the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States.45 While this right is thus granted 
to those with EU citizenship only, it is provided that such freedom of movement and 
residence may be granted to third‑country nationals who are legally resident in the 
territory of a Member State.46
40 See Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17.
41 This Article has not been applied in CJEU case law. It has only been briefly mentioned in Case C‑147/08 
Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I‑3591, ECLI:EU:C:2010:425, Opinion of 
AG Jääskinen, para. 174.
42 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, p. 25.
43 The explanations to the Charter explain that this paragraph of Art. 24 ’[…] takes account of the fact 
that, as part of the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice, the legislation of the Union 
on civil matters having cross‑border implications, for which Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union confers power, may include notably visiting rights ensuring that children can 
maintain on a regular basis a personal and direct contact with both of their parents.’ Explanations 
relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, p. 25.
44 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, p. 24.
45 The Explanations to the Charter clarify that this right is guaranteed by Arts. 20(2)(a) and 21 TFEU as 
well as Case C‑413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I‑7091, ECLI:EU:C:2002:493.
46 Art. 45(2) CFR. According to the Explanations to the Charter this second paragraph refers to the power 
granted to the Union by Arts. 77, 78 and 79 TFEU. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, p. 29.







Whether the Charter supports the ‘right to reproduce discourse’47 is as yet an open 
question. The explanations to the Charter and the CJEU case law as they currently 
stand do not provide sufficient ground for such a conclusion. McHale has pointed 
out that in developing health policies or in litigation, use of the Charter may prove 
problematic because it has a limited scope, because it does not make clear how to 
balance conflicting rights and because it contains concepts, such as dignity, which 
are very broad and therefore difficult to enforce. The author has also warned that 
there are ‘[…] differing religious, cultural and ethical perspectives regarding certain 
fundamental rights questions’ within the EU and that ‘[r]espect for equality and 
diversity of cultural and religious viewpoints does not sit easily with a single “EU” 
approach to fundamental human rights in health care.’48
3.1.3. Relevant EU competences
The EU Treaties provide for various Union competences that apply or may apply in 
the context of the present case study. The most general one for cross‑border situations 
is of course the EU’s competence in respect of the internal market.49 The application 
of the EU’s free movement rules to cross‑border health care cases, and cross‑border 
abortions and AHR treatment in particular, is discussed in more detail in sections 3.5 
and 3.6.2 below. Another general competence that may be of relevance for the present 
case study concerns the EU’s competence to adopt (harmonising) legislation to 
combat certain forms of discrimination.50 The coming into being of this competence 
and its general application are discussed more extensively in Chapter 9,51 while its 
(potential) application in respect of reproductive matters in particular is discussed in 
sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 below.
The present section briefly sets out four more specific EU competences. Most of 
these concern primarily the present case study, namely public health, social security 
and criminal law. The EU’s competence in respect of civil matters (including family 
law) having cross‑border implications, as discussed in section 3.1.3.3 below, is also 
relevant for Case Study II.
47 T.K. Hervey and J.V. McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2004) p. 145, referring (in footnote 219) to S. Millns, ‘Reproducing inequalities; assisted 
conception and the challenge of legal pluralism’, 24 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law (2002) 
p. 19 at p. 32.
48 J. McHale, ’Fundamental rights and health care’, in: E. Mossialos et al. (eds.), Health Systems 
Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2010) p. 282 at pp. 312–313, online available at www.euro.who.int/en/who‑we‑are/
partners/observatory/studies/health‑systems‑governance‑in‑europe‑the‑role‑of‑eu‑law‑and‑policy, 
visited June 2014.
49 Art. 114 TFEU.
50 Art. 19 TFEU.
51 In particular in section 9.3.








Public health is generally considered a ‘[…] particularly sensitive area of national 
competence involving complex, costly, and important political and social choices’.52 
The Union’s competences in respect to public health have therefore always been, 
and still are, rather limited. Under the Treaty of Rome (the EEC Treaty) of 1957 
there was no Community competence in this field. Public health was only referred 
to as a ground for derogation from the free movement rules.53 The Maastricht Treaty 
(1992)54 was the first to provide for a limited Union competence regarding public 
health. Article 129 EC Treaty provided that the (then) European Community was 
to ‘[…] contribute towards ensuring a high level of human health protection by 
encouraging Member States, and if necessary, by lending support to their action’. 
The Lisbon Treaty (2009), as presently still in force, changed little in this regard. On 
the basis of Article 168 TFEU the European Union has a coordinating competence 
in respect of the ‘protection and improvement of human health’.55 This means that 
the Union may support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States 
in this field. Following Article 168(7) TFEU Union action in the field of public health 
must respect the responsibilities of the Member States ‘[…] for the definition of their 
health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical 
care’. The responsibilities of the Member States include the ‘[…] management of 
health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources assigned to them’. 
The Union has the task of encouraging cooperation between the Member States, 
especially to improve the complementarity of the Member States’ health services in 
cross‑border areas.56 New is that Article 9 TFEU expressly provides that the EU has 
the duty to protect human health in all its policies and activities.57 Even though this 
‘multi‑sector social clause’58 is no basis for any EU competence, some have argued 
that it shows the ‘social commitment’ of the Union.59
3.1.3.2. Social security
The picture in respect of the regulation of social security is fairly similar. By way 
of Article 118 Maastricht Treaty (1992) the Commission was given the task of 
promoting close cooperation between Member states in respect of social security. 
Following the present Article 153 TFEU the Union supports and complements the 
activities of the Member States in the field of social security. It is emphasised that 
52 S. O’Leary, ‘Free movement of persons and services’, in: P. Craig and G. de Búrca, The Evolution of EU 
law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011) p. 499 at p. 522.
53 Art. 36 EEC Treaty.
54 Treaty of the European Union, together with the complete text of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [1992] OJ C224/1.
55 Art. 6(a) TFEU. Shared competence between the Union and the Member States are confined only to 
‘common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty’. Art. 4(2)(k) 
TFEU.
56 Art. 168(2) TFEU.
57 Art. 9 TFEU however reads that ‘in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union 
takes into account requirements linked to the […] protection of human health’.
58 De la Rosa 2012, supra n. 33 at p. 35.
59 Idem.







Member States retain the right ‘[…] to define the fundamental principles of their 
social security systems’.60 The CJEU has repeatedly affirmed that EU law ‘[…] does 
not detract from the powers of the Member States to organise their social security 
systems’.61 It is well‑established case law that in the absence of harmonisation at 
EU level, it is for the legislature of each Member State to determine the conditions 
concerning the right or duty to be insured with a social security scheme62 and the 
conditions for entitlement to benefits.63
3.1.3.3. Civil matters (including family law) having cross‑border implications
In principle, the EU has no competences in respect of family law, however, 
Article 81(3) TFEU, confers on the Council the power to adopt ‘measures concerning 
family law having cross‑border implications’. This forms part of the Union’s 
competence to develop ‘[…] judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross‑border 
implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of 
decisions in extrajudicial cases.’64 Article 81 TFEU explicitly provides that ‘[s]uch 
cooperation may include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws 
and regulations of the Member States’, such as measures aimed at ensuring ‘[…] the 
compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning conflict of 
laws’.65
This legal basis for judicial cooperation in cross‑border civil matters was first 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999).66 The Presidency Conclusions of the 
Tampere European Council of 1999 had held that mutual recognition had to become 
‘[…] the cornerstone of judicial co‑operation in both civil and criminal matters within 
the Union.’67 At the time, it was provided under the then Article 65 EC Treaty that 
measures could only be adopted ‘insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of 
the internal market’. The Lisbon Treaty (2009) changed this into ‘particularly when 
necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market’, thus making Article 81 
60 Art. 153(4) TFEU.
61 Case 238/82 Duphar and Others v. Netherlands [1984] ECR 523, ECLI:EU:C:1984:45, para.16 and 
Case C‑70/95 Sodemare and Others v. Regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I‑3395, ECLI:EU:C:1997:301, 
para. 27.
62 Case 110/79 Una Coonan v. Insurance Officer [1980] ECR 1445, ECLI:EU:C:1980:112, para. 12, 
and Case C‑349/87 Paraschi v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Württemberg [1991] ECR I‑4501, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:372, para. 15.
63 Joined Cases C‑4/95 and C‑5/95 Stöber and Piosa Pereira v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1997] ECR 
I‑511, ECLI:EU:C:1997:44, para. 36 and Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, 
para. 18.
64 Art. 81(1) TFEU. Storskrubb has questioned whether this cross‑border limitation ‘[…] is still able 
to stem the dynamism of the policy area’. The author furthermore posed questions as to the exact 
implications of the inclusion of the principle of mutual recognition in this Article. E. Storskrubb, ‘Civil 
Jusitice – A newcomer and an unstoppable wave?’, in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca, The evolution of EU 
Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2011) p. 307.
65 Art. 81(2)(c) TFEU.
66 Art. 65 EC (old).
67 Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 Presidency Conclusions, para. VI, online available 
at www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, visited June 2014.







TFEU a more independent legal basis.68 In the subsequent Stockholm Programme 
(2010–2014)69 it was held that mutual recognition had to be extended ‘[…] to fields 
that [had] not yet [been] covered but [were] essential to everyday life […] while 
taking into consideration Member States’ legal systems, including public policy, and 
national traditions in this area.’70
If ‘measures concerning family law with cross‑border implications’ are concerned, 
the Council can only act in accordance with a special legislative procedure; it has to 
consult the European Parliament first and can only adopt measures with a unanimous 
vote. Exceptionally, acts concerning family law with cross‑border implications may 
be adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure. That requires a proposal from 
the Commission, after which the Council has to act unanimously after consulting 
the European Parliament.71 Unique to this ‘PIL passerelle’ clause is that national 
parliaments must be notified of a Commission proposal and any national parliament 
can in principle block the adoption of the proposal by the Council.72 This has been 
held to demonstrate ‘[…] the balance between the political desire to move forward 
in the area of family law and the politically sensitive nature of the area.’73 Further, 
since the Treaty of Lisbon national courts may request preliminary rulings in respect 
of this provision.74
3.1.3.4. Criminal law
The Union has little competences with respect to criminal law. Possible approxi‑
mation of substantive criminal laws is limited to narrowly defined ‘[…] areas of 
particularly serious crime with a cross‑border dimension resulting from the nature 
or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common 
68 It has therefore been concluded that ‘[t]he position that Article 81 TFEU is but merely a lex specialis of 
Article 114 TFEU can no longer be maintained.’ G.‑R. de Groot and J.‑J. Kuipers, ‘The New provisions 
on Private international law in the Treaty of Lisbon’, 15 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law (2008) p. 109 at p. 112. But see in respect of the old Art. 65 EC Treaty: R. Baratta, 
‘Problematic elements of an implicit rule providing for mutual recognition of personal and family 
status in the EC’, IPRax (2007) p. 4 at p. 5 and J. Meeusen et al., ‘General Report’, in J. Meeusen et al. 
(eds.), International family law for the European Union (Antwerpen, Intersentia 2007) p. 1 at p. 13.
69 The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens [2010] OJ 
C115/1.
70 Idem, para. 3.1.2.
71 Art. 81(3) TFEU reads: ‘Notwithstanding paragraph 2, measures concerning family law with 
cross‑border implications shall be established by the Council, acting in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament.
 The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a decision determining those aspects of 
family law with cross‑border implications which may be the subject of acts adopted by the ordinary 
legislative procedure. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament.
 The proposal referred to in the second subparagraph shall be notified to the national Parliaments. If a 
national Parliament makes known its opposition within six months of the date of such notification, the 
decision shall not be adopted. In the absence of opposition, the Council may adopt the decision.’
72 See also Groot, de and Kuipers 2008, supra n. 68, at pp. 112–114, who sketch three scenarios in which 
they consider the passerelle clause likely to be used.
73 Storskrubb 2011, supra n. 64, at p. 307.
74 Art. 267 TFEU.







basis’, none of which appears relevant for the present case study.75 The Union may, 
however, take measures for coordination and cooperation between police and 
judicial authorities and other competent authorities.76 There is, furthermore, foreseen 
in mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters.77 It has been in this context 
that the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was drafted. The (potential) application of 
that instrument in the context of the present case study is discussed in section 3.6.4 
below.
3.2. Absence of eu stAndArds on AbortIon
As the Council has acknowledged ‘[t]he Treaties do not provide a basis for the Union 
to adopt measures with respect to questions related to abortion.’78 As explained 
in section 3.1.3 above, the Union’s competences in the field of health care, social 
security law and criminal law are generally limited. The only case that came before 
the CJEU which had to do with abortion was the Grogan case (see section 3.5.2.1 
below). While – as explained below – the CJEU took a much debated approach in 
deciding this free movement case, no substantive conclusion in respect of abortion 
can be drawn from this judgment. The substantive legal regulation of abortion has 
always been, is, and is anticipated to remain in the near future, a matter for the 
Member States.
The issue of abortion has nonetheless incidentally been debated at EU level. As 
explained in section 3.5.1 below, particularly cross‑border movement that has taken 
place for this purpose has caught the attention of the EU institutions. EU institutions 
have, however, been very hesitant to take any position in respect of substantive 
regulation of abortion. By way of exception, in 2013 the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality invited the European Parliament 
to take a strong stance in favour of abortion, when it tabled a motion for a resolution 
on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights.79 The Resolution held that women 
75 Art. 83(1) TFEU limits these areas of crime to the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings 
and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money 
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime. On 
the basis of developments in crime, the Council may – unanimously and after obtaining the consent 
of the European Parliament – adopt a decision identifying other areas of crime that meet the criteria 
specified in this paragraph.
76 Art. 67(3) TFEU.
77 Arts. 67(3) and 82 TFEU.
78 Answer of the Council of 15 March 2010 to written question by Magdi Cristiano Allam (PPE) to the 
Council: Member States’ autonomy and the right to life, P‑6267/09 of 9 December 2009, www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=P‑2009‑6267&language=HU, visited July 2014. In a 
similar vein the Commission held back in 1989 that it ‘[…] did not consider the approximation of national 
rules concerning the prevention and termination of pregnancy to be necessary for the completion of 
the internal market.’ A. Sherlock, ‘The Right to life of the unborn and the Irish Constitution’, 24 Irish 
Jurist (1989) p. 13, referring (in footnote 29) to European Parliament – Written Questions with Answer 
[1989] OJ C111/1, p. 16.
79 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 
(2013/2040(INI)), online available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=‑//EP//
NONSGML+REPORT+A7‑2013‑0306+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN, visited 24 July 2014.







had ‘[…] the right to decide freely and responsibly the number, timing and spacing 
of their children’ and recommended that high‑quality abortion services were made 
legal and accessible to all women, including non‑resident women.80 The motion was 
rejected and the very brief Resolution that was adopted instead in Parliament merely 
noted that the formulation and implementation of policies on sexual and reproductive 
health and rights was a competence of the Member States.81
3.3. (lImIted) eu stAndArds relAted to AssIsted humAn 
reproductIon And surrogAcy
There are very few EU law standards relating to assisted human reproduction (AHR). 
Various of the existing standards in this regard, are, moreover, non‑binding. For 
example, in a Resolution of 1989 the European Parliament (EP) took a clearly directive 
stance on assisted human reproduction.82 The EP, inter alia, called on Member States 
to limit the number of egg cells fertilised by in vitro fertilisation to the number that 
could actually be implanted. The Parliament also called for a prohibition on ‘any 
form of genetic experiments on embryos outside the womb’ and considered that the 
storage of frozen embryos was only to be permitted if the woman’s state of health 
temporarily prevented her from having the embryo implanted and she had stated that 
she was willing to have it implanted at a later date. Heterologous insemination was, 
moreover, considered ‘not desirable’. The Resolution set out a number of conditions 
that States had to meet if they did not accept the latter principles, including, inter 
alia, that only altruistic donation of gametes would be allowed.
Other examples of non‑binding EU instruments and documents relating to AHR 
are the Opinion of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
(EGE)83 on ethical aspects of prenatal diagnosis (PND) of the year 199684 and a 2008 
80 Idem, paras. 28, 30 and 38.
81 European Parliament Resolution of 10 December 2013 on Sexual and Reproductive Health 
and Rights (2013/2040(INI)), online available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?type=TA&reference=P7‑TA‑2013‑0548&language=EN&ring=A7‑2013‑0426, visited 24 July 2014.
82 Resolution of the European Parliament on artificial insemination in vivo and in vitro of 16 March 1989, 
[1989] OJ C96/127, p.171.
83 The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) advises the European 
Commission on ethical questions relating to sciences and new technologies, either at the request of the 
Commission or on its own initiative. Commission Decision 2010/1/EU of 23 December 2009 on the 
renewal of the mandate of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies [2010] OJ 
L1/8. The Group of advisers to the European Commission on the ethical implications of biotechnology 
(GAEIB) as established in 1991 (see Commission, ‘Promoting the competitive environment for 
industrial activities based on biotechnology within the Community’ (Communication), SEC(91) 629 
final), was followed‑up by the present EGE in 1998. See also H. Bubsby et al., ‘Ethical EU law? The 
influence of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies’, 33 European Law 
Review (2008) p. 803.
84 Opinion of the group of advisers on the ethical implications of biotechnology to the European 
Commission, Ethical aspects of prenatal diagnosing, Opinion no. 6, 20 February 1996, online available 
at www.ec.europa.eu/archives/european_group_ethics/docs/opinion6_en.pdf, visited 5 June 2012. The 
Opinion only dealt with PND which was defined as allowing ‘[…] the examination of pregnancies at 
high risk of fetal anomaly or genetic disease to rule out or confirm the presence of such an anomaly or 







Resolution on the demographic future of Europe, in which the European Parliament 
called on Member States ‘[…] to ensure the right of couples to universal access to 
infertility treatment’.85 Furthermore, the European Institutions have commissioned 
and financed various research studies in the field. An example concerns a 2008 
Comparative Analysis of Medically Assisted Reproduction in the EU by the 
European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE), which was 
commissioned and financed by the Directorate‑General for Health and Consumers 
of the European Commission.86 This and other studies are referred to throughout this 
chapter, particularly in section 3.4, concerning statistics on CBRC.87
Only few binding EU standards on AHR exist. The EU has very limited competences 
in this field, which has everything to do with the sensitivity of the matter. This 
sensitivity was underlined by the CJEU in its judgment in the Sabine Mayr case 
(2008), which, as noted above (see section 3.1.1), revolved around the question of 
whether women who are in an advanced stage of IVF treatment are also protected 
against dismissal under EU law.88 Using a wording comparable to the equally yet 
discussed Brüstle case (also section 3.1.1), the Court held that it was not called upon 
to broach medical or ethical questions:
‘[…], although, […], artificial fertilisation and viable cells treatment is a very sensitive 
social issue in many Member States, marked by their multiple traditions and value systems, 
the Court is not called upon, by the present order for reference, to broach questions of a 
medical or ethical nature, but must restrict itself to a legal interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of Directive 92/85 taking account of the wording, the broad logic and the 
objectives of that directive.’89
disease using invasive techniques: amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling or fetal blood sampling.’ It 
did not deal with prenatal screening, neither preconceptional testing or screening, nor preimplantation 
diagnosis. It was held that these techniques introduced ‘additional ethical issues which would require 
separate consideration.’ The EGE advised that the use of PND relied on the free and informed consent 
of the woman or couple concerned. It stressed the importance of careful non‑directive genetic 
counselling. In this respect, the EGE held that ‘[i]n accordance with the subsidiarity principle, the 
European Union [had] strive to achieve a high and comparable level of quality of the training of the 
professionals, namely concerning the genetic counselling, and of the services provided in different 
Member States.’ The EGE furthermore held that PND had to always be offered on the basis of specific 
medical indications. It considered the choice of sex or other characteristics for nonmedical reasons an 
ethically unacceptable indication for PND and held that it therefore had to be prohibited. The present 
author is not aware of any follow‑up to this EGE‑Opinion.
85 European Parliament Resolution of 21 February 2008 on the demographic future of Europe, 
Resolution 2007/2156 INI9, P6_TA(2008)0066, www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pub 
Ref=‑//EP//TEXT+TA+P6‑TA‑2008‑0066+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, visited July 2014.
86 ESHRE, Comparative Analysis of Medically Assisted Reproduction in the EU: Regulation and 
Technologies, SANCO/2008/C6/051, online available at www.ec.europa.eu/health/blood.../study_
eshre_en.pdf, visited July 2014.
87 Another example concerns A. Coverleyn et al., Pre‑implantation Genetic Diagnosis in Europe (Joint 
Research Centre of the European Commission, January 2007), online available at www.ftp.jrc.es/
EURdoc/eur22764en.pdf, visited 24 July 2014.
88 Case C‑506/06 Sabine Mayr [2008] ECR I‑01017, ECLI:EU:C:2008:119, para. 53–54.
89 Idem, para. 38.







Hence, from this judgment, no normative position on the issue of (access to) AHR 
treatment can be inferred. The judgment nonetheless had some impact on national 
policies in this field, as States from then on had to protect women who were in an 
advanced stage of IVF treatment against dismissal.
No normative stance was taken either in the In vitro diagnostic medical devices 
Directive (1998) and the EU Tissues and Cells Directive (2004) which set safety and 
quality requirements for in vitro diagnostic medical devices and AHR treatments for 
those Member States in which such devices are legally on the market, or in which 
such treatment is provided. The following subsections discuss these Directives. As 
yet no case law exists in which any of these Directives has been applied in a manner 
that has direct (substantive) relevance to the present case study.
3.3.1.	 The	EU	In	vitro	diagnostic	medical	devices	Directive	(1998)
Following a Commission Proposal of 1995,90 Directive 98/79/EC on in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices was adopted in 1998.91 It provides for harmonisation 
of national provisions governing the placing on the market of in vitro diagnostic 
medical devices,92 including in vitro fertilisation and assisted reproduction 
technologies products.93 Such harmonisation was considered desired as disparities 
as regards ‘[…] the content and scope of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions in force in the Member States with regard to the safety, health protection 
and performance, characteristics and authorisation procedures for in vitro diagnostic 
medical devices’ were considered to create barriers to trade.94 Such harmonisation 
was, however, not to affect the ability of the Member States to manage the funding 
of public health and sickness insurance schemes relating directly or indirectly to 
in vitro diagnostic medical devices.95 On the basis of the Directive, Member States 
90 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on in vitro diagnostic medical devices 
[1995] OJ C172/21.
91 Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices [1998] OJ L331/1 amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 September 2003.
92 Art. 1(2)(b) of the Directive defines the term ‘in vitro diagnostic medical device’ as: ‘[…] any medical 
device which is a reagent, reagent product, calibrator, control material, kit, instrument, apparatus, 
equipment, or system, whether used alone or in combination, intended by the manufacturer to be used in 
vitro for the examination of specimens, including blood and tissue donations, derived from the human 
body, solely or principally for the purpose of providing information: concerning a physiological or 
pathological state, or concerning a congenital abnormality, or to determine the safety and compatibility 
with potential recipients, or to monitor therapeutic measures.’
93 European Commission, DG Health and Consumer Protection, Guidelines for conformity assessment 
of including In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) and Assisted Reproduction Technologies (ART) products, 
Guidance Document Meddev 2.2/4, January 2012, p. 2, www.ec.europa.eu/health/.../meddev/2_2_4_
ol_en.pdf, visited July 2014.
94 Recital No. 2 Directive 98/79/EC. Accordingly, the legal basis of the Directive was Art. 95 EC Treaty 
(old), concerning the approximation of laws in respect of the internal market. The harmonisation of 
national legislation was considered ‘the only means of removing such barriers to free trade and of 
preventing new barriers from arising’ (Recital No. 3 Directive 98/79/EC).
95 Recital 4 Directive 98/79/EC.







must monitor the security and quality of in vitro diagnostic medical devices, which 
may be placed on the market and/or put into service only if they comply with 
certain (design and manufacturing) requirements, when duly supplied and properly 
installed, maintained and used in accordance with their intended purpose.96 Member 
States may not create any obstacle to the placing on the market or the putting into 
service within their territory of devices which meet these requirements.97 Hence, the 
objective of this Directive was, and is, primarily the optimisation of trade in in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices, and not to regulate AHR treatment substantively. This 
purely economic objective fits in with the broader internal market objectives of the 
EU.
While Member States may thus not create any obstacle to the placing on the market 
or the putting into service within their territory of in vitro diagnostic medical devices 
which meet the above‑described requirements, they may, nevertheless, regulate – or 
even prohibit – the use of such devices within their territory, probably including on 
moral grounds. Such a regulation or prohibition would hinder market access,98 but 
could possibly be justified on grounds of protection of public morals or protection 
fundamental rights such as human dignity, or on grounds of public order, public 
health or consumer protection. This only holds, of course, as long as the national 
measure would also be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective 
pursued and would not go beyond what would be necessary in order to attain it.99
3.3.2.	 The	EU	Tissues	and	Cells	Directive	(2004)
The EU Tissues and Cells Directive (2004)100 provides for a unified framework in 
order to ensure high standards of safety and quality with respect to the procurement, 
96 Art. 3 Directive 98/79/EC.
97 Art. 5(1) Directive 98/79/EC.
98 Compare Case C‑110/05 Commission v. Italy [2009] ECR I‑519, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66, para. 56, where 
the Court held that ‘[…] a prohibition on the use of a product in the territory of a Member State has 
a considerable influence on the behaviour of consumers, which, in its turn, affects the access of that 
product to the market of that Member State.’
99 E.g. Case C‑110/05 Commission v. Italy [2009] ECR I‑519, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66, para. 59.
100 The Tissues and Cells Directive is made up of three Directives: the parent Directive 2004/23/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on setting standards of quality and safety 
for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human 
tissues and cells [2004] OJ L102/48, which provides the framework, and two technical directives: 
Directive 2006/17/EC of 8 February 2006 implementing Directive 2004/23/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards certain technical requirements for the donation, procurement 
and testing of human tissues and cells [2006] OJ L38/40 and Directive 2006/86/EC of 24 October 
2006 implementing Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
traceability requirements, notification of serious adverse reactions and events and certain technical 
requirements for the coding, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and 
cells [2006] OJ L294/32. Directive 2006/17/EC was amended by Commission Directive 2012/39/EC 
(Commission Directive 2012/39/EU of 26 November 2012 amending Directive 2006/17/EC as regards 
certain technical requirements for the testing of human tissues and cells [2012] OJ L327/24), which, 
inter alia, amended one of the selection criteria and laboratory tests required for donors of reproductive 
cells, as set out in Annex III to Directive 2006/17/EC. As a complement to the Tissues and Cells 
Directive the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) issued a revised 







testing, processing, storage and distribution of tissues and cells across the EU and to 
facilitate exchanges thereof.101 Such EU standards are supposed to reassure the public 
that tissues and cells procured in other Member States carry the same guarantees as 
those in their own Member States.102 The Directive explicitly covers gametes, foetal 
tissue and embryonic stem cells.103 Hence, as observed in a report of 2008:
‘[…] implementation of this Directive requires clinics in all […] EU Member States, 
specialized in Medically Assisted Reproductive (MAR) technologies, including fertility 
treatment and pre‑implantation genetic diagnosis, to adapt to stringent measures and 
to implement systems and operating procedures concerning accreditation, designation, 
authorization, licensing, inspection and registration of MAR‑treatments.’104
Both third party gametes donors and individuals or couples from whom gametes 
are taken in the course of an IVF cycle are considered ‘donors’ within the meaning 
of this Directive.105 The Directive provides that Member States must ‘endeavour to 
ensure’ voluntary and unpaid donations.106 Donors may receive compensation, but 
this is ‘[…] strictly limited to making good the expenses and inconveniences related 
to the donation procedure.’ Member States define the conditions under which the 
compensation may be granted.107 Furthermore, as a matter of principle, donation 
must be anonymous.108 In respect of donation of gametes in particular, Article 14(3) 
provides that
‘Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the identity of the 
recipient(s) is not disclosed to the donor or his family and vice versa, without prejudice to 
legislation in force in Member States on the conditions for disclosure, notably in the case 
of gametes donation.’
Following Article 9 of the Directive, Member States ‘[…] shall take all necessary 
measures to ensure that all imports of tissues and cells from third countries are 
undertaken by tissue establishments accredited, designated, authorised or licensed 
for the purpose of those activities, and that imported tissues and cells can be traced 
version of its guidelines for good Practices in IVF clinics. These guidelines were published in 23 
Human Reproduction (2008) p. 1253.
101 Recital 4 Directive 2004/23/EC.
102 Idem.
103 Recital 7 Directive 2004/23/EC.
104 ESHRE 2008, supra n. 86, at p. 1.
105 Following Art. 3(c) a ‘donor’ means ‘every human source, whether living or deceased, of human tissues 
and cells’. ‘Donation’ is defined as donating human tissues or cells intended for human application 
(Art. 3(d)). ESHRE explained in its position paper on the Directive that in a couple, man and woman 
are considered donors to each other (see Annex 9 to the study).
106 Art. 12(1) and Preamble under 18 Directive 2004/23/EC.
107 Art. 12(1) Directive 2004/23/EC. The Commission considered the paying of substantial fees to 
obtain human egg cells to be against the principles expressed in Directive 2004/23/EC. See European 
Commission, Health & Consumer Protection Directorate‑General, Report on the Regulation of 
Reproductive Cell Donation in the European Union, February 2006, p. 2, online available at www.
ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_threats/human_substance/documents/tissues_frep_en.pdf, visited 
23 June 2014.
108 Art. 15(1) and Preamble under 18 Directive 2004/23/EC.







from the donor to the recipient and vice versa […]’.109 States are free to introduce 
more stringent protective measures.110 For example, they may prohibit the donation, 
processing or procurement of gametes, they may prohibit or restrict the import of 
gametes and they are free to introduce requirements for voluntary unpaid donation.111 
Lastly, the Directive is not to interfere ‘[…] with provisions of the Member States 
defining the legal term ‘person’ or ‘individual’.’112
The European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) considered 
execution of some of the areas in the Directive problematic, due to its wide coverage 
in comparison to the ‘very specific nature’ of AHR, ‘[…] including numerous 
repeated procedures on the same patient and the usually long duration of treatments 
at the clinics/units.’113 To complement the Directive, the ESHRE Guidelines for 
good practice in IVF laboratories were drafted, ‘[…] to promote assurance of good 
laboratory practice and to define the concept of qualified embryologists.’114
While anonymous donation is thus clearly the point of departure of the Directive,115 
it nevertheless seems to leave some room for States to give prevalence to protection 
of the future child’s interest in knowing his or her genetic parents, by prohibiting 
anonymous donation within their territory.116 Whether this also holds in the case 
of IVF clinics importing gametes from other States, is less clear.117 Another open 
question in this regard is if it would be an ‘import’ within the meaning of the 
Directive if a woman receives a donated gametes in the course of treatment in a third 
country and then travels back to her home Member State. It was observed in 2006 
109 Following Art. 8(4) Directive 2004/23/EC data required for full traceability shall be kept for a minimum 
of 30 years after clinical use.
110 Art. 4(2) Directive 2004/23/EC.
111 Art. 4(2) and (3) Directive 2004/23/EC.
112 Recital No. 12 Directive 2004/23/EC. This sentence was yet included in Recital No. 7 of the original 
Commission proposal for the Directive. The explanatory Memorandum to this Proposal does not give 
any further clarification on this point, rendering it difficult to draw any conclusions in respect of the 
interpretation of this consideration. Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, 
processing, storage, and distribution of human tissues and cells’, COM (2002) 319 final.
113 ESHRE position paper on the EU Tissues and Cells Directive EC/ 2004/23, November 2007, Annex 9 
to ESHRE 2008, supra n. 86.
114 M.C. Magli et al., ‘Revised guidelines for good practice in IVF laboratories’, 23 Human Reproduction 
(2008) at p. 1253.
115 Art. 15(1) and Recital No. 18 of the Preamble to Directive 2004/23/EC.
116 See also Health & Consumer Protection Directorate‑General of the European Commission, Report on 
the Regulation of Reproductive Cell Donation in the European Union – Results of Survey ‑, Directorate 
C – Public Health and Risk Assessment C6 – Health measures, February 2006, p. 3, online available 
at www.ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_threats/human_substance/documents/tissues_frep_en.pdf, 
visited June 2014.
117 While Art. 9 holds that States ‘shall take all necessary measures to ensure’ that the donor can be 
traced back, Art. 4(3) holds that the Directive ‘does not affect the decisions of the Member States 
prohibiting the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage, distribution or use 
of any specific type of human […] cells or cells from any specified source, including where those 
decisions also concern imports of the same type of human […] cells (emphasis added).’







that in any case not many Member States appeared to have regulated the import and 
export of gametes.118
All in all, the Directive leaves considerable room to Member States to regulate gamete 
donation. In a Resolution of 2005, the European Parliament called on the Commission 
to assess national legislations governing gamete donation.119 The resulting Report of 
2006 showed that national approaches in respect of ‘[…] confidentiality, anonymity 
and non‑remuneration in the donation of reproductive cells, as well as donor 
compensation, consent for egg cell donations and the importation and exportation 
of reproductive cells’ varied greatly.120 This supports the conclusion that in respect 
of reproductive treatment the Tissues and Cells Directive has – in any case until that 
time – had little to no harmonising effect. At the same time, this is a particularly 
dynamic field of law and as a consequence the situation may have changed since 
2006.
3.3.3.	 EU	non‑discrimination	law	and	access	to	AHR	treatment
Various EU Member States – including the three EU Member States included in 
this research121 – restrict access to AHR treatment on grounds of age, civil status or 
combined gender of the couple that wishes to have access to it. Even though this may 
be perceived as discrimination, EU non‑discrimination law as it stands provides no 
ground for challenging such national regulations and it seems unlikely that this will 
change in the near future. Under the present EU legal framework, discrimination 
based on age and sexual orientation is prohibited in employment, occupation and 
vocational training only.122 While in 2008 a broader Equal Treatment Directive was 
proposed,123 which was intended to expand the reach of EU non‑discrimination law 
to matters like social protection, health care and access to goods and services which 
are available to the public,124 reproductive rights were explicitly excluded from the 
118 European Commission, Health & Consumer Protection Directorate‑General, Report on the Regulation 
of Reproductive Cell Donation in the European Union, February 2006, p. 5, online available at www.
ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_threats/human_substance/documents/tissues_frep_en.pdf, visited 
23 June 2014. At p. 6 of this report it was held that ‘[f]or reproductive cells in general, no serious report 
or suspicion of unauthorised, illegal or otherwise suspect import/export of these human cells [had] 
been detected in any of the Member States.’
119 European Parliament Resolution on the trade in human egg cells (P6_TA(2005)0074).
120 European Commission, Health & Consumer Protection Directorate‑General, Report on the Regulation 
of Reproductive Cell Donation in the European Union, February 2006, p. 2, online available at www.
ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_threats/human_substance/documents/tissues_frep_en.pdf, visited 
23 June 2014.
121 See Ch. 4, section 4.3.3, Ch. 5, section 5.3.3 and Ch. 6, section 6.3.2.
122 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22 and Council Directive 2000/78/
EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation [2000] OJ L303/16.
123 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’, COM (2008) 
426 final. For further discussion of this proposal for a Directive, see Ch. 9, section 9.3.4.1.
124 Proposed Recital No. 17 and Art. 3(2) of COM (2008) 426 final.







scope of the Directive as proposed by the Commission. The European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC) was very critical on this point, holding that access to 
reproductive services was an integral part of health services, in respect of which under 
both EU law and national law there was to be no discrimination on any grounds.125 
The EESC accordingly proposed that the Directive should apply to national laws 
relating to reproductive rights.126 The European Parliament, for its part, amended the 
relevant proposed Article 3(2) from ‘[t]his Directive is without prejudice to national 
laws on marital or family status and reproductive rights’, to the more neutral ‘[t]his 
Directive does not alter the division of competences between the European Union 
and its Member States.’127 The legislative process stagnated in 2011 and it is therefore 
yet to be seen to what extent the Directive – if ever adopted128 – will have a bearing 
on Member States’ legislative choices in respect of access to reproductive care.
3.3.4. EU law and surrogacy
As matters stand today, no EU standards on surrogacy exist.129 This, again, has 
everything to do with a lack of EU competences in this field. In 2011, the Commission, 
in answering a question by a Member of Parliament who claimed that the sensitive 
issue of surrogacy warranted a coordinated stance within the EU, put it as follows:
‘The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
do not give the European Union powers to adopt legislation on harmonisation of national 
laws on methods of reproduction with the help of surrogate mothers. It is therefore 
incumbent on individual Member States to regulate this matter in the light of their social 
and cultural traditions.’130
125 The EESC held there to be evidence of discrimination in relation to reproductive services on grounds 
of sexual orientation, disability and age. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on 
the ‘Proposal for a Council directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’, para. 3.2.2.4 [2009] OJ C182/19, 
p. 21.
126 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council directive 
on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation’, para. 3.2.2.5 [2009] OJ C182/19, p. 21.
127 Accordingly, Recital No. 17 was proposed to be amended from ‘This Directive is without prejudice 
to national laws on marital or family status, including on reproductive rights’ to ‘This Directive does 
not alter the division of competences between the European Union and its Member States, including 
in the area of marital and family law and health law.’ European Parliament legislative resolution of 
2 April 2009 on the proposal for a Council directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM (2008) 
0426 – C6‑0291/2008 – 2008/0140(CNS)) [2010] OJ C137E/68, pp. 75 and 81.
128 See Ch. 9, section 9.3.4.1.
129 It is reminded that this study was concluded on 31 July 2014.
130 Answer by the Commission of 10 March 2011, to written question no. 42 to the Commission by Ivo 
Belet (PPE) of 21 February 2011, H‑000096/2011, online available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20110310&secondRef=ANN‑01&language=EN&detail=H‑2011‑
000096&query=QUESTION, visited June 2014.







The Commission at the time made clear that it had no plans to explore coordination 
of the issue of surrogate motherhood within the EU. Instead, it referred to the work 
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, of which the EU is a full 
member. It is in this context that the Commission follows developments on surrogate 
motherhood at international level (see also section 3.6.1 below).131
Surrogacy has incidentally been debated in European Parliament. In a Resolution of 
1989, the European Parliament considered that in in general, any form of surrogate 
motherhood had to be rejected and that the procuring of surrogate mothers for gain 
had to be punishable by law.132 While the matter was subsequently not on the table 
for decades, more recently the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs 
took on the issue again, thereby focussing mainly on its cross‑border aspects (see 
3.6.3 below). In 2013 a study came out that had been ordered by this Committee,133 
which gave a comparative overview of the Member States’ legal situations in respect 
of surrogacy. The question was also addressed if this matter called for regulation at 
EU level. In this regard the conclusion was drawn that prohibiting the conception 
of a child through surrogacy under EU law was impossible, because no consensus 
on this issue consisted among the EU Member States. The report concluded that 
‘a global response’ to surrogacy was most desirable, as ‘a purely intra‑EU regime’ 
had territorial limitations.134 In respect of possible EU action in the field, the report 
observed that this would have to respect the different (moral) attitudes towards 
surrogacy across the Member States:
‘[…] what seems clear in thinking about the future competency of the EU in this area is 
that Member States will retain the competency to decide on what moral grounds to act 
and what policy decisions to make on the permissibility of surrogacy. If an action or a 
legislative act was adopted, the instrument in which any harmonised response would be 
delivered would be required to recognise the wide spectrum of domestic law attitudes 
to surrogacy across states: if, as a matter of policy, a given legal system does not admit 
surrogacy in its domestic law, it would be inappropriate to impose on it a (European) 
structure of cross‑border surrogacy regulation.’135
The report made a number of recommendations in respect of cross‑border surrogacy 
that are discussed in section 3.6.3.2 below.
131 Idem and Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission on 5 May 2011, to question for 
written answer by Ivo Belet (PPE) to the Commission of 21 March 2011, E‑002642/2011, online available 
at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E‑2011‑002642&language=EN, 
visited June 2014.
132 Resolution of the European Parliament on artificial insemination in vivo and in vitro of 16 March 1989 
[1989] OJ C96/127, p. 173.
133 For the relevant terms of reference, see www.europarl.europa.eu/tenders/2012/20120423/ANNEX%20
I%20Global%20terms%20of%20reference.pdf, visited June 2014.
134 L. Brunet et al., A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States, 2013, PE 
474.403, pp. 157 and 194, online available at www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/
join/2013/474403/IPOL‑JURI_ET(2013)474403_EN.pdf, visited 31 March 2014.
135 Idem, at p. 195.







The only existing CJEU case law that relates to surrogacy concerned two joined 
employment cases decided by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in 2014. In both C.D. 
and Z. the question was raised whether EU law provided for entitlements for female 
employees who, as an intended mother136 had a child through a surrogacy agreement 
to paid leave equivalent to maternity leave or adoption leave.137
In C.D. the woman concerned, Ms. D., was a UK national who had concluded a 
surrogacy agreement in accordance with UK law. Ms D.’s partner (the intended 
father) provided the sperm, but the egg cell was not Ms. D.’s. Right after the child 
was born, Ms. D. began to mother and breastfeed the child and some months later 
a UK court granted her and her partner full and permanent parental responsibility 
for the child. Yet before the baby was born Ms. D., had made an application to 
her employer for paid leave under its adoption policy, but was informed that there 
was ‘no legal right to paid time off for surrogacy’. Ms. D. subsequently brought an 
action before the Employment Tribunal claiming that she had been the subject of 
discrimination on the grounds of sex and/or pregnancy and maternity. This Tribunal 
made a preliminary reference to the CJEU, asking the Court whether the Pregnant 
Workers’ Directive (Directive 92/85)138 provided a right to receive maternity leave 
to an intended mother who had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement, and who 
was breastfeeding the child. The Tribunal also wondered whether a refusal to grant 
such leave constituted discrimination in breach of the Equal Treatment Directive 
(Directive 2006/54).139 The CJEU joined this case with another case raising similar 
questions, namely the Z. case.
The Z. case concerned Irish school teacher, Ms. Z., who, together with her husband, 
had entered into a surrogacy agreement in California. Ms. Z. had a rare condition 
which had the effect that, although she had healthy ovaries and was fertile, she had 
no uterus and could not support a pregnancy. The child born with the surrogate 
mother was genetically related to both Ms. Z. and her husband, and in accordance 
with Californian law the child’s birth certificate provided that they were the child’s 
parents. Ms. Z. applied to the government department for leave equivalent to 
adoptive leave, but the department refused that application on the ground that she did 
not satisfy the requirements laid down by the relevant maternity or adoptive leave 
schemes. Ms. Z. subsequently brought an action against the government department 
before the Equality Tribunal, claiming that she was discriminated against on the 
grounds of gender, family status and disability. The Equality Tribunal stayed the 
proceedings and referred preliminary questions to the CJEU. It, inter alia, asked the 
136 The CJEU employed the term ‘commissioning mother’ instead of ‘intended mother’ in these cases.
137 Case C‑167/12 C.D. v. S.T., nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2014:169 and Case C‑363/12, Z., nyr, ECLI:EU:C: 
2014:159.
138 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of 
Directive 89/391/EEC) [1992] OJ L348/1.
139 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23.







Court whether such a refusal to grant leave constituted discrimination on the ground 
of sex within the meaning of Directive 2006/54 and/or discrimination on grounds 
of disability within the meaning of the Employment Equality Framework Directive 
(Directive 2000/78).140
In both cases an Opinion was delivered by an Advocate General (AG). In C.D. AG 
Kokott held that an intended mother who had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement 
and who took the child into her care following birth – irrespective of whether she 
was also breastfeeding her child – had a right to receive maternity leave under the 
Pregnant Workers’ Directive, as this leave was not intended solely to protect the 
health of workers, but also ‘[…] to protect the special relationship between a woman 
and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth’.141 In practical 
terms the AG suggested that the leave of the intended mother was to amount to at 
least two weeks and that any other maternity leave taken by the surrogate mother had 
to be deducted. Kokott found no discrimination or unfavourable treatment in breach 
of the Equal Treatment Directive (Directive 2006/54) in the C.D. case. AG Wahl, 
who gave an Opinion in the Z. case,142 even held that this Directive did not apply at 
all, as the differential treatment of which Ms. Z complained was not based on sex, 
so he held, ‘[…] but on the refusal of national authorities to equate the situation of 
a commissioning mother with that of either a woman who [had] given birth or an 
adoptive mother.’143 Wahl, furthermore, found that the inability to have a child by 
conventional means was not linked to the capacity of the person concerned to work, 
and thus did not constitute ‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78. The 
AG concluded his opinion with the following remark:
‘[…] I have considerable sympathy with the difficulties that [intended] parents undoubtedly 
face because of the legal uncertainty surrounding surrogacy arrangements in a number 
of Member States. However, I do not believe that it is for the Court to substitute itself for 
the legislature by engaging in constructive interpretation that would involve reading into 
Directives 2006/54 and 2000/78 (or, indeed Directive 92/85) something that is simply not 
there.’144
These words must have found an audience at CJEU, as the Court subsequently ruled 
in both cases that there was no breach of EU law. In respect of the Pregnant Workers’ 
Directive the Court held that its objective was to encourage improvements in the health 
and safety at work of pregnant workers and workers who had recently given birth or 
who were breastfeeding. Maternity leave aimed to protect the health of the mother of 
the child in the particularly vulnerable situation arising from her pregnancy.145 The 
140 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16.
141 Case C‑167/12 C.D. v. S.T., nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2013:600, Opinion of AG Kokott of 26 September 2013, 
para. 45.
142 Case C‑363/12 Z., nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2013:604, Opinion of AG Wahl of 26 September 2013.
143 AG Wahl used the term ‘commissioning mother’ instead of ‘intended mother’ as the CJEU would later 
also do. For the sake of consistency, this chapter only employs the term ‘intended’ in this context.
144 Case C‑363/12 Z., nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2013:604, Opinion of AG Wahl of 26 September 2013, para. 120.
145 Case C‑167/12 C.D. v. S.T., nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2014:169, paras. 29 and 35.







CJEU acknowledged, as AG Kokott had called to mind, that maternity leave was also 
intended ‘[…] to ensure that the special relationship between a woman and her child 
is protected’, but held that this objective concerned only the period after pregnancy 
and childbirth.146 This implied that the grant of maternity leave pursuant to the 
Directive presupposed that the worker concerned had been pregnant and had given 
birth to a child. The Court therefore concluded that Directive 92/85 did not apply 
to a female worker who as an intended mother had had a baby through a surrogacy 
arrangement, even in circumstances where she was (to be) breastfeeding the baby 
following the birth. The Court noted that States were not, of course, precluded by the 
Directive from allowing intended mothers to take maternity leave.
The CJEU further ruled that there was no discrimination on grounds of sex in 
breach of Directive 2006/54. There was no direct discrimination because under 
the applicable national legislation intended fathers were treated in the same way as 
intended mothers, in that they were not entitled to paid leave equivalent to maternity 
leave either.147 The Court held that there was, furthermore, nothing that established 
that the refusal of leave at issue put female workers at a particular disadvantage 
compared with male workers.148 Lastly, because an intended mother who had a 
baby through a surrogacy arrangement had not been pregnant, she could not, by 
definition, be subject to less favourable treatment related to her pregnancy. The 
Court thus did not equate any unfavourable treatment that is related to pregnancy 
with sex discrimination.149 It furthermore did not at all refer to the general principle 
of equal treatment.
The question of whether the refusal to grant Ms. Z. leave constituted discrimination 
on grounds of disability in breach of Directive 2000/78 was also answered in the 
negative. In line with AG Wahl’s Opinion, the Court found that the inability to have 
a child by conventional means did not constitute ‘disability’ within the meaning of 
the Directive, as this concept presupposed that the limitation from which the person 
suffered, in interaction with various barriers, could hinder that person’s full and 
effective participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers. This 
did not hold for Ms. Z., and the fact that she had been responsible for the care of 
the child from birth, was not such as to call that finding into question. The Court 
‘consequently’ held it unnecessary to examine the validity of Directive 2000/78 
in the light of Article 10 TFEU150 and the Charter,151 as the referring Tribunal had 
asked. It held such an examination in the light of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (the CRPD) not even possible, as the provisions of that 
146 Idem, para. 36.
147 Idem, para. 47 and Case C‑363/12 Z., nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2014:159, para. 52.
148 Case C‑167/12 C.D. v. S.T., nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2014:169, para. 49 and Case C‑363/12 Z., nyr, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:159, para. 54.
149 Compare and contrast Case C‑177/88 Dekker [1990] ECR I‑3941, ECLI:EU:C:1990:383.
150 Art. 10 TFEU reads: ‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.’
151 In particular Arts. 21, 26 and 34 CFR.







Convention had a programmatic character and were therefore not unconditional and 
sufficiently precise to have direct effect in EU law.
3.4. cross‑border movement for reproductIve mAtters In the 
eu: some stAtIstIcs
3.4.1.	 Statistics	on	cross‑border	abortions	within	the	EU
On the basis of the existing studies, it is impossible to give a (complete) overview of 
the scale on which cross‑border abortions take place within the EU. Not all Member 
States keep statistics of the number of abortions carried out within their territories on 
an annual basis, let alone the number of non‑national or non‑resident women involved 
in these abortions. An EU‑wide study of 2011 has held that ‘[a] more consistent and 
coherent reporting of terminations of pregnancy is needed in the EU.’152 The authors 
of this study explicitly underlined that data had to be collected ‘[…] to ascertain how 
often women [had] to cross country borders to access a termination of pregnancy.’153
It would go outside the scope of this legal study to examine whether statistics on 
cross‑border abortions are kept for all 28 EU Member States and to analyse these 
statistics (if they exist at all). Such an exercise has been carried out, however, for 
the three jurisdictions selected for this research. Therefore, reference is made to 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 where relevant statistics are discussed for Ireland, Germany and 
the Netherlands respectively. These three Member States have, or at least have had 
in the past, diverging abortion regimes, which can, to a certain extent, be considered 
representative of the entire EU. The statistics indicate that it is quite probable that 
cross‑border abortions take place throughout the entire European Union. It is highly 
likely that all EU Member States function either as a country of origin, or a country 
of destination, or even both, in this respect. The existence of cross‑border movement 
for abortions within the entire EU, can, it is submitted, therefore be presumed. The 
actual scale of this phenomenon can, however, only be estimated.
152 M. Gissler et al., ‘Terminations of pregnancy in the European Union’, 119 BJOG An International 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology (2012) p. 324 at p. 324.
153 Idem, at p. 330. The report furthermore held that ‘[t]he data for countries with restricted access to 
termination of pregnancy (Ireland, Malta, and Poland) did not cover terminations performed in other 
countries or illegal terminations, for example in private clinics. The true rates for these countries are 
likely to be much higher than those presented here. […] National statistics on terminations of pregnancy 
in Romania, Ireland, Spain, and Greece have been reported to be too low according to national and 
international sources. The European statistical system should expand its quality reporting to data on 
terminations of pregnancy to get more detailed information on the coverage of the current reporting. 
[…] There are no clear guidelines for including temporary migrants and visitors in the national health 
information systems. For most countries, this did not affect the national figures on terminations of 
pregnancy. In Portugal, however, the termination rate decreased by more than one‑sixth after taking 
out the terminations of pregnancy performed for non‑resident women. The rate for the Netherlands, on 
the other hand, increases by one‑sixth if non‑residents are included in the national statistics.’







3.4.2. Statistics on CBRC within the EU
Although increasingly more comparative and international research is conducted 
in respect of cross‑border reproductive care (CBRC),154 no exhaustive statistics are 
available for the entire European Union in respect of such cross‑border movement. 
This is so because for many States it holds that ‘[…] data are incomplete or not 
collected at all’.155 It has been submitted that ‘[i]n practice, it is almost impossible to 
obtain an estimate of the proportion of patients exiting their own country, as no data 
are kept in countries of origin.’156 The European Society of Human Reproduction and 
Embryology (ESHRE) nevertheless estimated in 2008 in its comparative analysis 
of medically assisted reproduction (MAR) in the EU that a minimum number of 
11,000–14,000 services recipients were involved in CBRC within the EU every 
year.157 As the ESHRE acknowledged, these numbers may be even higher in reality. 
Further, they may have increased since 2008 and may continue to increase in the 
future.
The relevant studies on CBRC in various EU Member States provide information 
in respect of origin, age and civil status of CBRC services recipients. They also 
show that reasons for crossing borders for AHR treatment vary between countries of 
origin and concern (predominantly) legal reasons as well as accessibility and quality 
of AHR treatment.158
3.4.3.	 Statistics	on	cross‑border	surrogacy	within	the	EU
As is the case for cross‑border abortions and CBRC, there are no complete or 
exhaustive EU‑wide statistics in respect of cross‑border surrogacy. As pointed out in 
a 2012 study commissioned by the European Parliament:
‘Precise statistics relating to surrogacy are […] hard to estimate. This is for a number of 
key reasons. First, traditional surrogacy does not necessarily require medical intervention 
and can thus be arranged on an informal basis between the parties concerned. Second, 
although gestational surrogacy does require medical intervention, officially reported 
statistics do not necessarily record the surrogacy arrangement but often only the IVF 
procedure. Third, in many countries there is simply no legal provision, regulation or 
licensing regime for either fertility treatment and/or surrogacy, to include commercial 
surrogacy in countries where such is not otherwise legally prohibited. This means that 
there are no formal reporting mechanisms, which can lead to a rather ad hoc collection 
of statistics by individual organisations, if indeed they are available at all. Finally, in 
154 See for example F. Shenfield et al., ‘Cross border reproductive care in six European countries’, 25 
Human Reproduction (2010) p. 1361 and G. Pennings et al., ‘Cross‑border reproductive care’, 23 
Human Reproduction (2008) p. 2182. See also Coverleyn et al. 2007, supra n. 87, at p. 80.
155 ESHRE 2008, supra n. 86, at p. 77.
156 Idem, Annex 6a, at p. 138.
157 Idem, at. p. 78.
158 Idem, Annex 6a, at pp. 136–137.







countries where surrogacy is legally prohibited, those involved could potentially face 
criminal prosecution, thus exacerbating the difficulties of collecting relevant and accurate 
data.’159
Incidentally statistics as discussed in the previous section include reports of cases of 
surrogacy. Further incidental evidence proving the existence of this phenomenon can 
be found in case law from various (inter)national courts.160 It must be noted, however, 
that such cross‑border movement seems to take place primarily to States outside 
the EU, such as Ukraine and certain States of the United States of America, where 
(commercial) surrogacy is legalised.161 Still, there is also cross‑border movement 
taking place within Europe, for example to the UK and Greece, where surrogacy is 
legalised and regulated.
3.5. eu stAndArds on cross‑border heAlth cAre
Even though the Treaties firmly hold that health care and social security are 
primarily Member State competences (see 3.2.3 above), national health care systems 
have not escaped considerable influence of EU law. This is mainly the result of the 
CJEU’s internal market case law, which was triggered by the movement of workers 
and – later – patients throughout the Union.162 In its case law, the CJEU has developed 
the ‘[…] basic components of a regulatory framework on cross‑border healthcare 
services’.163 In this exercise, the Court has always been aware of the Member States’ 
discretion in this field:
‘[EU law] does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social 
security systems and to adopt, in particular, provisions intended to govern the organisation 
of health services […]. In exercising that power, however, the Member States must comply 
with [EU law], in particular the provisions of the Treaty on the freedoms of movement, 
including freedom of establishment. Those provisions prohibit the Member States from 
introducing or maintaining unjustified restrictions on the exercise of those freedoms in 
the healthcare sector […]. When assessing whether that obligation has been complied 
with, account must be taken of the fact that the health and life of humans rank foremost 
among the assets and interests protected by the Treaty and that it is for the Member States 
to determine the level of protection which they wish to afford to public health and the way 
in which that level is to be achieved. Since the level may vary from one Member State to 
another, Member States must be allowed discretion […].’164
159 Brunet et al. 2013, supra n. 134, at p. 21.
160 See for example Ch.2, Ch. 4, Ch. 5 and Ch. 6.
161 Brunet et al. 2013, supra n. 134, at p. 2.
162 See J.W. van de Gronden, ‘Richtlijn rechten van patiënten bij grensoverschrijdende gezondheidszorg: 
veel huiswerk voor de Nederlandse zorgwetgever?’ [‘Directive on rights of patients in cross‑border 
health care: too much homework for the Dutch legislature on health?’], 59 Tijdschrift voor Europees en 
economisch recht, SEW (2001), p. 373.
163 O’Leary 2011, supra n. 52, at p. 522.
164 Joined Cases C‑171/07 and C‑172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes a.o. and Helga 
Neumann‑Seiwert [2009] ECR I‑4171, ECLI:EU:C:2009:316, paras. 18–19, referring to Case C‑372/04 







Primarily two EU law regimes, with different rationales,165 apply to matters 
concerning access to, and reimbursement for, cross‑border health care, of which 
cross‑border abortions and cross‑border reproductive care (CBRC) form a part. 
These are the Social Security Regulation166 and the free movement rules.167 The 
case law of the CJEU on the basis of the free movement rules has contributed 
considerably to the development of rights (and not merely privileges)168 for patients 
who are crossing borders. Several of the principles as developed in the CJEU’s case 
law on cross‑border health care were subsequently codified in the Patient Mobility 
Directive of 2011,169 which, in fact, now constitutes the third applicable regime. The 
Social Security Regulation has a primarily coordinating character: it contains no 
individual entitlements, but provides for equal access for services recipients from 
other EU Member States to entitlements provided at the national level. The Patient 
Mobility Directive, on the contrary, provides for (minimum) harmonisation. All in 
all, some have concluded that a process of ‘EU competence creep’ into the national 
health care systems is taking place.170
Watts [2006] ECR I‑4325, ECLI:EU:C:2006:325, paras. 92 and 146; Case C‑169/07 Hartlauer [2009] 
ECR I‑1721, ECLI:EU:C:2009:141, paras. 29–30; Case C‑322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband [2003] 
ECR I‑14887, ECLI:EU:C:2003:664, para. 103 and Case C‑141/07 Commission v. Germany [2008] ECR 
I‑6935, ECLI:EU:C:2008:492, para. 51.
165 As De la Rosa explains, the Regulation ‘seeks to mitigate the negative consequences that may result 
from the coexistences of national systems of social protection that are rigidly different. By contrast, the 
system based on the freedom to provide services under the Treaty is based on a functional and finalist 
logic that […] involves eliminating all obstacles “to intra‑Community trade with a view to the merging 
of national markets into a single market”.’ De la Rosa 2012, supra n. 33, at p. 22, referring (in footnote 
33) to Case 15/81 Gaston Schul Douane Epediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 
Roosendaal [1982] ECR 1409, ECLI:EU:C:1982:135, para. 33.
166 Council Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L149/2, consolidated 
version OJ L28/1, accompanied by implementing Regulation (EEC) No 574/72. The 1971 Regulation 
was (partly) repealed by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1, which in turn was 
accompanied by a 2009 implementation Regulation.
167 Arts. 28–39 and 45–66 TFEU. Palm and Glinos spoke of ‘[…] a dual system of access to cross‑border 
care’. The authors discerned a third ‘[…] arrangement through which patient mobility takes 
place’, namely ‘the contractual route initiated bilaterally between actors in the field.’ This matter 
will not be discussed here, as the present research focusses on State regulation in the area (see 
ch. 1, section 1.3.1). W. Palm and I.A. Glinos, ‘Enabling patient mobility in the EU: between free 
movement and coordination’, in: E. Mossialos et al. (eds.), Health Systems Governance in Europe: 
The Role of European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010) p. 509 
at pp. 521 and 529, online available at www.euro.who.int/en/who‑we‑are/partners/observatory/studies/
health‑systems‑governance‑in‑europe‑the‑role‑of‑eu‑law‑and‑policy, visited June 2014.
168 Van der Mei observed that under the Regulation regime reimbursement for cross‑border treatment was 
‘a privilege, not a right’. A.P. van der Mei, ‘Zorg over de grens’ [‘Care across the border’], in: M. Faure 
and M. Peeters (eds.), Grensoverschrijdend recht [Cross‑border law] (Antwerpen, Intersentia 2006) 
p. 49 at p. 49.
169 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application 
of patients’ rights in cross‑border healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45, p. 46.
170 J. van de Gronden and E. Szyszczak, ‘Conclusions: Constructing a ‘Solid’ Multi‑Layered Health Care 
Edifice’, in: J.W. van de Gronden et al. (eds.), Health care and EU law (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
2011) p. 481 at p. 484.







This section sets out this general framework on cross‑border health care. The 
relevant aspects of the EU Social Security Regulation are described in section 3.5.1. 
Subsequently, the case law in which the Court applied EU free movement rules 
to cases of cross‑border health care is examined (section 3.5.2). The more recent 
important development in respect of cross‑border health care, the Patient Mobility 
Directive, is discussed in section 3.5.3. As yet open questions as to the application of 
these regimes in cases of cross‑border abortions and CBRC are raised – and to the 
extent possible – (tentatively) answered, in section 3.6.2.
3.5.1.	 The	Social	Security	Regulation	and	cross‑border	health	care
Since the early 1970s an EU regulation on the application of social security schemes 
to workers and their families who are moving within the European Union, has been 
in force.171 Over the years it has been amended several times, most profoundly in 
2004.172 The present Regulation 883/2004 provides that EU citizens and residents, 
as well as their families, and, in certain cases, their survivors, may seek health 
care in other Member States, with the costs covered under the insurance of the 
State of affiliation, provided they have obtained authorisation from the competent 
institution.173 The basic principle is that benefits in kind provided by the institution 
of one Member State on behalf of the institution of another Member State have to be 
fully refunded.174
Initially the Regulation provided that the required authorisation could not be refused 
where the treatment in question could not be provided for the person concerned 
within the territory of the Member State in which he or she resided. The CJEU 
interpreted this extensively by holding in Pierik (1978) that the duty to grant 
authorisation covered both cases where the treatment provided in another Member 
State was more effective than that which the person concerned could receive in the 
Member State where he or she resided and those situations in which the treatment 
in question could not be provided on the territory of the State of residence.175 Out 
of dissatisfaction with this broad interpretation which opened the door widely to 
patient mobility, the EU Member States subsequently set limits to the duty to grant 
171 Regulation 1408/71 [1971] OJ L149/1, consolidated version OJ L28/1, accompanied by implementing 
Regulation (EEC) No 574/72. Self‑employed were included in the Regulation as of 1981. See 
H. Vollaard, ‘Patiëntenmobiliteit in een Europese zorgruimte’ [‘Patient mobility in the European area 
of care’], in: A.C. Hendriks and H.‑M. Th. D. ten Napel, Volksgezondheid in een veellalige rechtsorde. 
Eenheid en verscheidenheid van norm en praktijk [Public health in a multilevel jurisdiction. Unity and 
diversity in standards and practice] (Alphen aan de Rijn, Kluwer 2007) p. 291 at p. 296.
172 The 1971 Regulation was (partly) repealed by Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1, 
which in turn was accompanied by a 2009 implementation Regulation.
173 Arts. 2 and 22 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Hervey and McHale define the term ‘benefits in kind’ as 
‘health care services given free at the point of access’. Hervey and McHale 2004, supra n. 47, at p. 114.
174 Art. 36 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.
175 Case 117/77 Pierik (No.1) [1978] ECR 825, ECLI:EU:C:1978:72, para. 22.







authorisation by amending the Regulation.176 The present Article 22(2) of the present 
Regulation 883/2004 accordingly provides:
‘An insured person who is authorised by the competent institution to go to another Member 
State with the purpose of receiving the treatment appropriate to his condition shall receive 
the benefits in kind provided, on behalf of the competent institution, by the institution of 
the place of stay, in accordance with the provisions of the legislation it applies, as though 
he were insured under the said legislation. The authorisation shall be accorded where the 
treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the legislation in the Member 
State where the person concerned resides and where he cannot be given such treatment 
within a time‑limit which is medically justifiable, taking into account his current state of 
health and the probable course of his illness.’177
As explained in section 3.5.2.3 below, the compatibility of this Regulation provision 
with the free movement rules has been questioned by some, but upheld by the CJEU.178 
Particularly important for the present case study is the rule that authorisation is to be 
accorded ‘[…] where the treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by 
the legislation in the Member State where the person concerned resides’.179 Hence, if 
the national law has constrained or prohibited a certain treatment on ethical grounds 
and therefore does not provide for reimbursement under its national social security 
regime, no authorisation has to be accorded to an insured person who wishes to 
obtain such treatment abroad.180 Accordingly, no costs have to be reimbursed either.
3.5.2.	 EU	free	movement	law	and	cross‑border	health	care
In the mid‑1980s, the CJEU ruled that the freedom to provide services (presently 
Articles 56 and 57 TFEU) includes the freedom to receive medical treatment. In 
Luisi and Carbone (1984) the CJEU held:
176 Mei, van der 2006, supra n. 168, at. p. 53.
177 Art. 22(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.
178 Case C‑56/01 Inizan [2003] ECR I‑12403, ECLI:EU:C:2003:578. Critical in this respect was P. Cabral, 
‘The internal market and the right to cross border medical care’, 29 European Law Review (2004) 
p. 673.
179 Art. 20(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.
180 In line herewith, already in Pierik No. 2 (1979), the Commission emphasised in its submissions to the 
Court, that ‘[…] Member States retain certain powers in areas concerning morality. These powers could 
possibly be based on the reservations of sovereignty made by the Treaty in areas concerning public 
policy. Thus it can be accepted, on the basis of this principle that a competent institution can refuse the 
authorization where it concerns a treatment which is seriously contrary to the ethical rules prevailing in 
the Member State in question. However, since it is an exception to the Treaty, this principle must be very 
strictly construed, as meaning that the treatment in question must also be prohibited in the Member 
State in question. Thus a competent institution can refuse the authorization to undergo an abortion in 
another Member State only if abortion is prohibited in the competent institutions’ own country.’ Case 
182/78 Pierik (No.2) [1979] ECR 1977, ECLI:EU:C:1979:142. See also Hervey and McHale 2004, supra 
n. 47, at p. 118.







‘[…] the freedom to provide services includes the freedom, for the recipients of services, 
to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there, without being obstructed 
by restrictions, even in relation to payments and that […] persons receiving medical 
treatment […] are to be regarded as recipients of services.’181
In this regard the Court does not distinguish between care provided in a hospital 
environment and care provided outside such an environment: all medical activities 
normally provided for remuneration constitute ‘services’ within the meaning of the 
Treaty.182 This also holds for morally controversial, and in some Member States, even 
prohibited, medical activities such as AHR treatment183 and abortion services, as 
follows from Grogan (1991).184
In Grogan, the Court did not accept that the termination of pregnancy could not 
be regarded as being a service, on the grounds that it was ‘grossly immoral’ and 
involved ‘the destruction of the life of a human being, namely the unborn child’.185 
The CJEU considered:
‘Whatever the merits of those arguments on the moral plane, they cannot influence 
the answer to the national court’s first question. It is not for the Court to substitute its 
assessment for that of the legislature in those Member States where the activities in 
question are practised legally. Consequently, the answer to the national court’s first 
question must be that medical termination of pregnancy, performed in accordance with 
the law of the State in which it is carried out, constitutes a service within the meaning of 
Article 60 [presently Article 56 TFEU] of the Treaty.’186
Hence, the fact that abortion was (and is) prohibited in Ireland in almost all situations, 
did (and does) not remove it from the scope of the free movement rules, because there 
were (and are) other Member States where abortion was (and is) legal.187 Decisive 
181 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377, 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:35, para. 16.
182 Case C‑368/98 Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I‑5363, ECLI:EU:C:2001:400, para. 41; Case C‑157/99 
Geraets‑Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, para. 53, referring to Joined 
Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377, ECLI:EU:C:1984:35, 
para. 16, Case C‑159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I‑4685, ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, para. 18, and Case C‑158/96 
Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, paras. 29 and 51.
183 See also Hervey and McHale 2004, supra n. 47, at p. 150, who conclude that all forms of assisted 
conception and the service of surrogate motherhood, if remunerated, fall within the scope of EU law. 
However, goods and services that are prohibited in all EU Member States are excluded from the scope of 
the free movement rules. Compare Case C‑137/09 Josemans [2010] ECR I‑13019, ECLI:EU:C:2010:774.
184 Case C‑159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I‑4685, ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, paras. 20 and 21.
185 This argument was put forward by the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd, the 
plaintiff in the main proceedings. See subsection 3.6.2.1 below.
186 Case C‑159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I‑4685, ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, paras. 20 and 21. Advocate General 
Van Gerven had come to the same conclusion, which he formulated as follows: ‘The medical operation, 
normally performed for remuneration, by which the pregnancy of a woman coming from another 
Member State is terminated in compliance with the law of the Member State in which the operation 
is carried out is a (cross‑border) service within the meaning of Article 60 of the EEC Treaty.’ Case 
C‑159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I‑4685, ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, Opinion of AG Van Gerven, para. 10.
187 Idem.







is, further, whether the activity is ‘normally provided for remuneration’.188 For the 
fulfilment of this requirement, the financing basis of the national health system does 
not matter.189 From the perspective of the freedom to provide services, the Court has 
seen no reason to draw a distinction ‘[…] by reference to whether the patient pays the 
costs incurred and subsequently applies for reimbursement thereof or whether the 
sickness fund or the national budget pays the provider directly.’190 As phrased by the 
CJEU in Geraets‑Smits and Peerbooms (2001):
‘It must be accepted that a medical service provided in one Member State and paid for by 
the patient should not cease to fall within the scope of the freedom to provide services 
guaranteed by the Treaty merely because reimbursement of the costs of the treatment 
involved is applied for under another Member State’s sickness insurance legislation which 
is essentially of the type which provides for benefits in kind. Furthermore, the fact that 
hospital medical treatment is financed directly by the sickness insurance funds on the 
basis of agreements and pre‑set scales of fees is not in any event such as to remove such 
treatment from the sphere of services within the meaning of Article 60 of the Treaty [now 
Article 57 TFEU].’191
While some criticised that this ruling was ‘[…] hard to reconcile with the traditional 
case law on the notion of remuneration within the meaning of the Treaty’,192 the 
Court pursued the approach taken in this case in later case law and has brought 
all sorts of national health systems within the scope of the free movement rules, 
such as a national social security framework,193 a benefits‑in‑kind system,194 and 
a reimbursement system. In Watts (2006) the Court also brought medical services 
provided under a national health service system, within the scope of EU law.195
Given that medical activities are ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaty – and 
hence the free movement rules apply – the next question to be answered is to what 
extent States may restrict the freedom to receive and provide cross‑border health 
services, for instance by subjecting access to, and reimbursement for, such treatment 
to certain conditions. The first question that needs to be answered in this regard is 
188 More generally the Court has held that the ‘[…] special nature of certain services does not remove them 
from the ambit of the fundamental principle of freedom of movement’. Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] 
ECR I‑1931, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, para. 20. See also Palm and Glinos 2010, supra n. 167, at p. 517.
189 Inter alia Case C‑372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I‑4325, ECLI:EU:C:2006:325. As Hervey and McHale 
explained ‘[…] remuneration need not come directly from the recipient of the services.’ Hervey and 
McHale 2004, supra n. 47, at p. 120, referring (in footnote 64) to Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders 
[1988] ECR 2085, ECLI:EU:C:1988:196.
190 Case C‑385/99 Müller‑Fauré and van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, para. 103. See 
also Cabral 2004, supra n. 178, at p. 676.
191 Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, paras. 55–56.
192 Cabral 2004, supra n. 178, at p. 677. The author alleged that ‘treatment provided in the framework of 
a benefits‑in kind system does not include the element of remuneration necessary to come within the 
scope of the Treaty’s free movement of services provisions’. See also V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Killing National 
Health and Insurance Systems but Healing Patients? The European Market for Health Care after the 
Judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’, 39 CMLRev. (2002) p. 683 at pp. 705–720.
193 Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171.
194 Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, para. 55.
195 Case C‑372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I‑4325, ECLI:EU:C:2006:325.







whether there is indeed a restriction. While this test is generally a very generous 
one,196 in the quoted Grogan case,197 the Court answered this question in the negative. 
It concluded that the Irish prohibition on the distribution of information about foreign 
abortion services, constituted no restriction within the meaning of the Treaty, as it 
considered the link between the activity of the defendant student associations and 
medical terminations of pregnancies carried out in clinics in another Member State 
to be ‘too tenuous’.198 Because of its direct relevance for the present case study this 
judgment will be discussed more elaborately in the following sub‑section.
3.5.2.1. A restriction of free movement? – The Grogan case
The Grogan case concerned a suit by the Society for the Protection of Unborn 
Children Ireland Ltd (‘SPUC’) against Stephen Grogan and 14 other officers of 
student associations who distributed free handbooks containing information about 
abortion services available in England.199 The Irish High Court made a reference 
to the CJEU200 for a preliminary ruling on three questions: (1) whether abortion 
was a ‘service’ within the meaning of the (then) EEC Treaty; (2) if so, whether the 
prohibition on distribution of information regarding those services constituted a 
restriction within the meaning of Article 59 of the Treaty; and (3) if so, whether such 
a restriction could be justified under Community law.
After having established that the termination of pregnancy was a service within the 
meaning of the Treaty (see above), the CJEU answered the second question in the 
negative. It concluded that the link between the activity of the defendant student 
associations and medical terminations of pregnancies carried out in clinics in another 
Member State was ‘too tenuous’ for the prohibition on the distribution of information 
to be capable of being regarded as a restriction within the meaning of (then) Article 59 
of the Treaty.201 The Court noted that the information concerning foreign abortion 
providers was ‘[…] not distributed on behalf of an economic operator established in 
another Member State.’ The Court concluded that, on the contrary, the information 
constituted a manifestation of freedom of expression and of the freedom to impart 
and receive information which was independent of the economic activity carried on 
by clinics established in another Member State.202 Despite this finding, the Court did 
not assess the claim of the student associations that the prohibition interfered with 
their freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR), as the Court considered itself not to 
196 T.K. Hervey, ‘The Current Legal Framework on the Right to Seek Health Care Abroad in the European 
Union’, 9 The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2007) p. 261 at p. 270. As Hervey 
explained, ‘[t]he essence of the Court’s approach is to consider the potential for the restriction to inhibit 
inter‑Member State provision of services.’
197 Case C‑159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I‑4685, ECLI:EU:C:1991:378.
198 Idem, para. 24.
199 See also Ch. 5.
200 At the time, the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
201 Presently Art. 56 TFEU.
202 Case C‑159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I‑04685, ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, para. 26.







have jurisdiction ‘[…] with regard to national legislation lying outside the scope of 
Community law’.203 In conclusion the Court ruled:
‘[…] it is not contrary to Community law for a Member State in which medical termination 
of pregnancy is forbidden to prohibit students associations from distributing information 
about the identity and location of clinics in another Member State where voluntary 
termination of pregnancy is lawfully carried out and the means of communicating with 
those clinics, where the clinics in question have no involvement in the distribution of the 
said information.’204
Advocate General Van Gerven had earlier taken another approach in his Opinion 
in this case. He had argued that the right to receive services in another Member 
State encompassed the right to receive, unimpeded, information in one’s own 
Member State about providers of services in another Member State and about how 
to communicate with them. Van Gerven had considered that the Irish prohibition 
on distribution of abortion information constituted a restriction of this freedom.205 
Accordingly he had examined if this restriction could be justified. Firstly he had held 
it to be ‘undeniable’ that the prohibition had been promoted by an objective which 
had been regarded in Ireland as an imperative requirement of public interest:
‘The protection of the unborn enshrined in the national Constitution (and the prohibition of 
abortion inherent therein) and likewise the resultant need to prevent abortions – naturally 
only within the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned – by prohibiting the distribution 
of information thereon in its territory are regarded in that Member State as forming part of 
the basic principles of society.’206
Van Gerven had accepted such an objective to be justified under Community law, 
since it related ‘[…] to a policy choice of a moral and philosophical nature the 
assessment of which [was] a matter for the Member States’ and in respect of which 
they were entitled to invoke the ground of public policy referred to in the Treaty. He 
had continued:
‘Although the scope of the concept of public policy “cannot be determined unilaterally by 
each Member State without being subject to control by the institutions of the Community”, 
nevertheless, as “the particular circumstances justifying recourse to the concept of public 
policy may vary from one country to another”, it is necessary “to allow the competent 
national authorities an area of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty and the 
provisions adopted for its implementation”. There can, in my estimation, be no doubt 
that values which, in view of their incorporation in the Constitution, number among “the 
fundamental values to which a nation solemnly declares that it adheres” fall within the 
203 Idem, para. 31.
204 Idem, para. 32.
205 Van Gerven considered that although the national measure was not discriminatory, it could overtly or 
covertly, actually or potentially, impede intra‑Community trade in services. Case C‑159/90 Grogan 
[1991] ECR I‑4685, ECLI:EU:C:1991:249, Opinion of AG Van Gerven, para. 21.
206 Idem, para. 26.







sphere in which each Member State possesses an area of discretion “in accordance with 
its own scale of values and in the form selected by it”.’207
Having accepted that there was a public interest pursued with the measure, Van 
Gerven next had assessed if the Irish prohibition had been proportionate. He had 
found that the Irish prohibition had not banned all information but only information 
which assisted pregnant women to terminate unborn life. Therefore, Van Gerven had 
considered the restriction not disproportionate.208 He had noted that his conclusion 
would have been different however, in respect of, for example, a ban on pregnant 
women going abroad or a rule under which they would be subjected to unsolicited 
examinations upon their return from abroad.
The Court’s ruling in the Grogan case met with both considerable critique and 
comprehension in legal scholarship. It has been held that the judgment led to ‘[…] 
a great deal of speculation with respect to the extent to which the (essentially 
economic) principles of EU law [had to] be permitted to undermine ethical principles, 
especially those enshrined in national constitutions.’209 By some, it was argued that 
the CJEU had unjustifiably made market freedoms triumph over human rights,210 
but others disagreed.211 It was often argued that the judgment was at variance with 
the at the time existing line of case law.212 Possibly the Court’s restrained approach 
was influenced by the sensitivity of the subject concerned.213 At the same time, as 
pointed out by many, and as feared by the Irish government, it followed from the 
judgment that if a direct link with the abortion providers could be established in a 
different case, Community law (now EU law) could potentially override the relevant 
Article 40.3.3° of the Irish Constitution.214 Hence, it was argued that ‘[…] the message 
207 Idem, para. 26, referring (in footnote 41) to Case 30–77 Regina v. Bouchereau [1977] ECR 
1999, ECLI:EU:C:1977:172, paras. 33 and 34; Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 
1337, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133; Case C‑379/87 Groener v. Minister of Education [1989] ECR 3967, 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:197, Opinion of AG Darmon, para. 21, and Case 121/85 Conegate Limited v. HM 
Customs & Excise [1986], ECR 1007, ECLI:EU:C:1986:114, para. 14.
208 Idem, para. 35. According to De Búrca this conclusion could well have represented ‘his […] substantive 
reconciliation within Community law of competing moral choices and human rights’. G. de Búrca, 
‘Fundamental Human Rights and the Reach of EC law’, 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1993) 
p. 283 at p. 300.
209 Hervey and McHale 2004, supra n. 47, at p. 152. The authors held that this debate went ‘to the heart of 
matters central to the EU’s “constitutional” law […].’
210 A.L. Young, ‘The Charter, Constitution and Human Rights: is this the Beginning or the End for Human 
Rights Protections by Community Law?’, 11 European Public Law (2005) p. 219 at p. 227, referring (in 
footnote 51) to, inter alia, D.R. Phelan, ‘Right to life of the Unborn v Promotion of Trade in Services: 
The European Court of Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European Union’, 55 Modern Law 
Review (1992), pp. 670–689.
211 E.g. De Búrca 1993, supra n. 208, at pp. 299–300.
212 E.g. S. O’Leary, ‘The Court of Justice as reluctant constitutional adjudicator: an examination of the 
abortion information case’, 17 European Law Review (1992) p. 138, particularly at p. 146.
213 Lawson pointed out that ‘virtually all commentators of the judgment’ noted that the CJEU had ‘evaded 
giving a substantive ruling on a sensitive issue’. R.A. Lawson, ‘The Irish Abortion Cases: European 
Limits to National Sovereignty?’, 1 European Journal of Health Law (1994) p. 167 at p. 173.
214 See A.‑M.E.W. Sterling, ‘The European Union and Abortion Tourism: Liberalizing Ireland’s Abortion 
Law’, 20 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review (1997) p. 385 at p. 392; B. Mercurio, 
‘Abortion in Ireland: An Analysis of the Legal Transformation Resulting from Membership in the 







left to Ireland as to the future acceptability of restrictions on abortion‑related mobility 
was nevertheless clear’.215 By some Grogan was even perceived as a triumph for the 
woman to choose.216
As elucidated in Chapter 5 after the Grogan case, the Irish government successfully 
lobbied for the adoption of Protocol 17 to the Maastricht Treaty. This Protocol 
provided:
‘Nothing in the Treaty on the European Union or in the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties shall 
affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3º of the Constitution of Ireland.’217
Because of consternation following the so‑called X Case (see Chapter 5, 
section 5.2.2),218 the Irish government, soon after the adoption of the Protocol, 
settled for a Solemn Declaration to the effect that Protocol 17 would not ‘[…] limit 
freedom either to travel between Member States or […] to obtain or make available 
in Ireland information relating to services lawfully available in Member States’.219 
Some argued that consequentially, it seemed that the status of EU law vis‑à‑vis Irish 
abortion law had not changed very much at all.220 The same text as in Protocol 17 
European Union’, 11 Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative Law (2003) p. 141 at p. 160; 
B. Moriarty and A.‑M. Mooney Cotter (eds.), Human rights law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) 
p. 18 and F. Fabbrini, Fundamental rights in Europe, Challenges and Transformations of a Multilevel 
System in Comparative Perspective (F. Fabrinni © 2012) p. 213. See also Ch. 5, section 5.2.1.1.
215 C. Hilson, ‘The Unpatriotism of the Economic Constitution? Rights to Free Movement and their Impact 
on National and European Identity’, 14 European Law Journal (2008) p. 186 at p. 189.
216 Young 2005, supra n. 210, at p. 230.
217 Protocol Annexed to the Treaty On European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992 [1992] 
OJ C191/1, p. 94.
218 See, inter alia, F. Murphy, ‘Maastricht: implementation in Ireland’, 19 European Law Review (1994) 
p. 94 at pp. 94–95.
219 Declaration of the High Contracting Parties to the Treaty on European Union Treaty on European 
Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992 [1992] OJ C191/1, p. 109. The relevant part of the 
Declaration reads: ‘That it was and is their intention that the Protocol shall not limit freedom to travel 
between Member States or, in accordance with conditions which may be laid down, in conformity 
with Community law, by Irish legislation, to obtain or make available in Ireland information relating 
to services lawfully available to Member States.’ Some uncertainty as to the legal status of this 
declaration existed. Sterling held that it neither appeared to be legally binding on the CJEU, nor to 
serve as anything more than an interpretive guide for the courts (Sterling 1997, supra n. 214, at p. 396, 
referring to A. Eggert and B. Rolston, ‘Ireland’, in B. Rolston and A. Eggert (eds.), Abortion in the 
new Europe, A comparative handbook (Westport, Greenwood Press 1994) p. 168 and D. Curtin, ‘Case 
note to ECJ C‑159/90’, 29 CML Rev (1992) p. 585 at pp. 602–03). Buckley called it ‘nothing more than 
a statement of political intent’ (A.M. Buckley, ‘The primacy of democracy over natural law in Irish 
abortion law: an examination of the C case’ 9 Duke Journal of Comparative & International law (1998) 
p. 275 at p. 289). Lawson observed that to the extent that the Protocol had legal effect, it only related 
to the application in Ireland of Art. 40.3.3° (Lawson 1994, supra n. 213, at p. 181). See D.A. MacLean, 
‘Can the EC kill the Irish unborn?; An investigation of the European Community’s ability to impinge 
on the moral sovereignty of Member States’, 28 Hofstra Law Review (1999) p. 527 at p. 560; G. Hogan 
and G. Whyte, J.M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution (Dublin, LexisNexis Butterworths 2003) p. 1506 and 
Mercurio 2003, supra n. 214, at pp. 164–165.
220 Fabbrini 2012, supra n. 214, at p. 214 referring to C. Forder, ‘Abortion: A Constitutional Problem in 
European Perspective’, 1 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (1994) p. 56 at p. 64.







was annexed to the defeated Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe221 and is 
now annexed as Protocol 35 to the Lisbon Treaty.222 By virtue of Article 51 TEU the 
Protocols and Annexes to the Treaties form an integral part thereof and consequently 
the CJEU has jurisdiction to interpret them. As yet, the Irish Protocol has not been 
invoked in any proceedings before the CJEU and it remains to be seen whether it 
ever will be invoked.223
In cross‑border health care cases of a later date and of a morally less controversial 
nature than the Grogan case, the Court had less difficulty in finding a restriction of 
free movement. In the ground‑breaking cases of Kohll and Decker (both 1998) the 
CJEU ruled that refusal to reimburse treatment obtained abroad and a requirement 
of prior authorisation for such treatment, constituted a restriction of the freedom to 
receive services.224 The Court held that:
‘[…] such rules deter insured persons from approaching providers of medical services 
established in another Member State and constitute, for them and their patients, a barrier 
to freedom to provide services.’225
Hence, any refusal to reimburse treatment obtained abroad and any requirement 
of prior authorisation for such treatment constitutes a restriction of the freedom to 
receive services. The fact that the treatment is not legal in the state of affiliation, or 
not among the benefits provided for by the legislation of that State, has no bearing 
on this finding.
3.5.2.2. Justification of restrictions of free movement
It is recalled that restrictions of the freedom to receive services can be justified 
if they fulfil the four so‑called Gebhard conditions: (1) they must be applied in a 
non‑discriminatory manner; (2) they must be justified by imperative requirements 
in the general interest; (3) they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the 
objective which they pursue; and (4) they must not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain it.226
221 Protocol 31 on Art. 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland, to the (never adopted) Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
[2004] OJ C310/1, p. 377.
222 Protocol 35 on Art. 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland to the Treaty on European Union and to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community. Protocols [2008] OJ C115/201, p. 321.
223 By contrast, Joined Cases C‑411/10 and C‑493/10 N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2011] ECR I‑13905, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, on Protocol (No 30) on the application of the Charter to 
Poland and to the United Kingdom (Protocols [2010] OJ C83/201, p. 313).
224 Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171 and Case C‑120/95 Decker [1990] ECR 
I‑3941, ECLI:EU:C:1990:383. The German Minister of Health, for example, reportedly declared not to 
follow‑up Decker and Kohll. Vollaard 2007, supra n. 171, at p. 298.
225 Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, para. 35.
226 Case C‑55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I‑4165, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, para. 37.







The first Gebhard criterion is often fulfilled.227 Further, in free movement cases, it 
is a matter of EU law, not national law, whether a justifiable public interest worthy 
of protection is present.228 In cross‑border health care cases, the CJEU has accepted 
various overriding (imperative or mandatory) reasons in the general interest capable 
of justifying a barrier to the principle of freedom to provide services. This goes, for 
example, for the possible risk of seriously undermining a social security system’s 
financial balance.229 The objective of maintaining a balanced medical and hospital 
service open to all – even if it is intrinsically linked to the method of financing 
the social security system – may also fall under grounds of public health under the 
present Article 52 TFEU,230 in so far as it contributes to the attainment of a high level 
of health protection.231 The Court has further held that Article 52 TFEU permits 
Member States to restrict the freedom to provide medical and hospital services, in 
so far as the maintenance of treatment capacity or medical competence on national 
territory is essential for the public health, and even the survival of the population.232
Until today, there has not been a case before the CJEU in which a Member State refused 
patients from other Member States access to treatment for reasons of overburdening 
of its national health services. Therefore it cannot be conclusively answered (yet) if 
the Court would accept such a ground for restriction of free movement rights.233
The following subsections discuss the conditions under which the Court has accepted 
prior authorisation requirements and reimbursement refusals as justified restrictions 
of free movement rules. Except for the above‑discussed Grogan case – in which 
the CJEU concluded that the freedom to receive and provide services was not 
restricted – there is to date no case law in which the free movement rules have been 
applied to cases concerning abortion services or AHR treatment, in particular.
227 Measures which are discriminatory on grounds of nationality can be justified only under the grounds 
set out in the Treaty (e.g. in Art. 52 TFEU). In the case of non‑discriminatory measures, public grounds 
may be based on the Treaty provisions, or on other objective public interests, as accepted by the CJEU 
under its rule of reason doctrine.
228 Hervey 2007, supra n. 196, at p. 273.
229 Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, para. 41; Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits 
and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, para. 72; and Case C‑385/99 Müller‑Fauré 
and Van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, para. 73.
230 Art. 56 EC Treaty (old).
231 Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, para. 50; Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits 
and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, para. 73; and Case C‑385/99 Müller‑Fauré 
and Van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, para. 67.
232 Case C‑158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I‑1931, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, para. 51; Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits 
and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, para. 74; and Case C‑385/99 Müller‑Fauré 
and Van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, para. 67.
233 Here, an argument in the affirmative could be made by applying with analogy the Bressol judgment. In 
this case the CJEU ruled that a limitation on enrolment by non‑resident students in certain university 
courses in the public health field is, in principle, precluded by EU law. It held such a limitation to be 
compatible with EU law, however, if proved justified with regard to the protection of public health. Case 
C‑73/08 Bressol and Others [2010] ECR I‑2735, ECLI:EU:C:2010:181.







3.5.2.3. Conditions for authorisation requirements in respect of scheduled care
Initially the finding of a restriction in Kohll (1998) appeared difficult to reconcile with 
the Social Security Regulation under which prior authorisation is a basic principle 
(see above). The Court tried to alleviate this tension, by interpreting the relevant 
Regulation provisions in line with the free movement rules.234 Put differently, the 
Court has ‘[…] cleverly facilitated the coexistence of the two systems by emphasizing 
their complementary nature as much as possible’.235 It held the relevant Article 22 of 
the Regulation in itself to be compatible with the free movement rules. National 
authorisation systems based on Article 22 of the Regulation were, however, subject 
to certain conditions.236
Firstly, the Court has made a distinction between hospital and non‑hospital care.237 
Restrictions of the freedom to provide and receive services in the form of prior 
authorisation requirements cannot be justified for non‑hospital care.238 This is, 
however, different in respect of hospital care, which, by nature, requires planning:
‘[…] by comparison with medical services provided by practitioners in their surgeries 
or at the patient’s home, medical services provided in a hospital take place within an 
infrastructure with, undoubtedly, certain very distinct characteristics. It is thus well 
known that the number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, the mode of their 
organisation and the equipment with which they are provided, and even the nature of the 
medical services which they are able to offer, are all matters for which planning must be 
possible.’239
The nucleus of this ruling is thus the ‘planning’ aspect and not so much the exact place 
where the treatment takes place.240 What is crucial is whether the objects of ensuring 
sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high‑quality and up‑to‑date 
treatment, while controlling costs and avoiding, so far as possible, any waste of 
234 Case C‑56/01 Inizan [2003] ECR I‑12403, ECLI:EU:C:2003:578.
235 De la Rosa 2012, supra n. 33, at p. 22.
236 Cabral 2004, supra n. 178, at pp. 679–680.
237 Hospital care may include private hospitals. In Stamatelaki (2007) the Court held an absolute exclusion 
of reimbursement by a national social security institution of the costs occasioned by treatment of 
persons insured with it in private hospitals in another Member State, to be incompatible with the 
freedom to provide and receive services. According to the CJEU less restrictive measures could be 
adopted, such as a prior authorisation scheme which complies with the requirements imposed by Union 
law and, if appropriate, the determination of scales for reimbursement of the costs of treatment. Case 
C‑444/05 Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I‑3185, ECLI:EU:C:2007:231.
238 Both Kohll and Decker concerned so‑called extramural care. Kohll concerned dental care, while 
Decker concerned the purchase of a pair of spectacles with corrective lenses.
239 Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, para. 76.
240 In Müller‑Fauré and van Riet the Court emphasised how difficult it is to distinguish ‘hospital services’ 
from ‘non‑hospital services’ and pointed out that services provided in a hospital environment that 
could also be provided by a practitioner in his surgery or in a health centre could, for that reason, 
be placed on the same footing as non‑hospital services. Case C‑385/99 Müller‑Fauré and van Riet 
[2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, para. 75. In Commission v. France, the Court confirmed 
that planning considerations may also prove relevant for medical treatment provided outside a hospital 
setting. Case C‑512/08 Commission v. France [2010] ECR I‑8833, ECLI:EU:C:2010:579, para. 34.







financial, technical and human resources can be guaranteed.241 Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to speak of ‘scheduled’ (generally hospital) care and ‘unscheduled’ care. 
For scheduled care a prior authorisation requirement may, in principle, be justified. 
However, it is nevertheless necessary that the conditions attached to the grant of such 
authorisation are justified in light of the relevant public imperatives, that they do not 
exceed what is objectively necessary for that purpose and that the same result cannot 
be achieved by less restrictive rules.242
In the Geraets‑Smits en Peerbooms (2001)243 and Müller‑Fauré (2003)244 cases the 
Court subjected national systems which set a prior authorisation requirement for 
hospital care to certain conditions.245 Authorisation can be refused on the ground 
of lack of medical necessity only if the same or equally effective treatment can be 
obtained without undue delay within the insured person’s own health care system. 
Hence, foreign treatment options may alleviate the burden of long waiting lists. 
Further, if national legislation subjects reimbursement for medical treatment obtained 
abroad to the condition that the treatment is regarded as ‘normal in the professional 
circles concerned’, authorisation cannot be refused on that ground where it appears 
that the treatment concerned is sufficiently tried and tested by international medical 
science.246 Prior administrative authorisation schemes must, furthermore, provide for 
certain procedural guarantees. For example, the national authorities’ discretion must 
be based on ‘objective, non‑discriminatory criteria which are known in advance’.247 
Further, a procedural system must be in place, ‘[…] which is easily accessible and 
capable of ensuring that a request for authorisation will be dealt with objectively 
and impartially within a reasonable time’. Refusals to grant authorisation must be 
capable of being challenged in judicial or quasi‑judicial proceedings.248
241 Case C‑512/08 Commission v. France [2010] ECR I‑8833, ECLI:EU:C:2010:579, para. 33, referring to 
Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, paras. 76–81; 
Case C‑385/99 Müller‑Fauré and van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, paras. 76–81, and 
Case C‑372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I‑4325, ECLI:EU:C:2006:325, paras. 108–110.
242 E.g. Case C‑173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I‑8889, ECLI:EU:C:2010:581, para. 44.
243 Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404, para. 54. See 
Hatzopoulos 2002, supra n. 192, at pp. 705–720.
244 Case C‑385/99 Müller‑Fauré and Van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270.
245 As Cabral explained: ‘While prior authorisation systems for hospital care are thus in principle 
compatible with Community law, Member States must, however, comply with a certain number of 
conditions with regard to the way these systems are organised and operated in practice.’ Cabral 2004, 
supra n. 178, at p. 683.
246 Hervey and McHale argued that ‘[p]articularly with relatively new treatments’, there was ‘likely to be 
considerable room for difference among professional opinion’. The authors warned that patients were 
likely to exploit this. Hervey and McHale 2004, supra n. 47, at pp. 136–137.
247 Case C‑173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I‑8889, ECLI:EU:C:2010:581, para. 44.
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para. 90; Case C‑385/99, Müller‑Fauré and van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, para. 85 
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3.5.2.4. The amount and the kind of costs to be reimbursed
Under the Social Security Regulation the amount to be reimbursed is determined on 
the basis of the legislation of the Member State in which the treatment is provided.249 
Even if the country of affiliation provides for a higher amount to be reimbursed, 
no more than the actual costs of treatment is reimbursed. On the basis of the free 
movement rules, the CJEU has ruled, however, that if the reimbursement of costs 
incurred for hospital services provided in a Member State of stay, calculated under 
the rules in force in that State, is less than the amount which application of the 
legislation in force in the Member State of affiliation would afford to a person 
receiving hospital treatment in that State, additional reimbursement covering that 
difference must be granted to the insured person by the competent institution.250 An 
exception is made for so‑called ‘unscheduled’ hospital treatment, obtained by an 
insured person ‘[…] whose travel to another Member State is for reasons relating to 
tourism or education, for example, and not to any inadequacy in the health service 
to which he is affiliated’.251 In that situation, so the CJEU has ruled, the rules of the 
Treaty on freedom of movement offer ‘[…] no guarantee that all hospital treatment 
services which may have to be provided to him unexpectedly in the Member State of 
stay will be neutral in terms of cost’.252
Apart from the actual care costs, additional costs involved in foreign medical 
treatment, such as costs for board, lodging, travel, visitors’ tax and the production 
of a final medical report, may also be claimed for reimbursement, to the extent that 
such costs would also be reimbursed had the treatment taken place in the country of 
affiliation.253 Although such costs are not medical in character, and are not as a rule 
paid to health care providers, the CJEU nonetheless considers them to be inextricably 
249 Art. 22(1)(c) Regulation 1408/71, as interpreted in Case C‑368/98 Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I‑5363, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:400, para. 33. On the basis of Art. 36 Regulation 1408/71 the competent institution 
remains responsible for subsequently reimbursing the institution of the place of stay.
250 Case C‑368/98 Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I‑5363, ECLI:EU:C:2001:400. Under certain circumstances also 
treatment obtained in a non‑EU‑Member State must be reimbursed. Case C‑145/03 Keller v. Instituto 
Nacional de Gestion Sanitaria (Ingesa) [2005] ECR I‑2529, ECLI:EU:C:2005:211.
251 Case C‑211/08 Commission v. Spain [2010] ECR I‑5267, ECLI:EU:C:2010:340, para. 61. In para. 58, 
the Court held that ‘[…] with regard at least to hospital care, […] cases of ‘unscheduled treatment’, 
as referred to in Art. 22(1)(a) of Regulation 1408/71 […] must be distinguished […] from cases of 
‘scheduled treatment’, as referred to in Art. 22(1)(c) of that Regulation.
252 Case C‑211/08 Commission v. Spain [2010] ECR I‑5267, ECLI:EU:C:2010:340, para. 61. The CJEU held 
(in para. 79) that to impose on Member States the obligation to guarantee to persons insured under the 
national system that the competent institution will provide complementary reimbursement whenever 
the level of cover applicable in the Member State of stay in respect of the unscheduled hospital 
treatment in question proves to be lower that that applicable under its own legislation ‘would ultimately 
undermine the very fabric of the system which Regulation No 1408/71 sought to establish’. Critical in 
this respect: A.P. van der Mei, ‘Cross‑border access to healthcare and entitlement to complementary 
“Vanbraekel reimbursement”’, 36 European Law Review (2011) p. 431.
253 Case C‑8/02 Ludwig Leichtle v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2004] ECR I‑2641, ECLI:EU:C:2004:161. See 
Mei, van der 2006, supra n. 168, at pp. 68–69.







linked to the cure itself.254 Any conditions set for the reimbursement of such costs 
have to be justified on imperative grounds and have to meet the proportionality test.255
3.5.3.	 The	EU	Patient	Mobility	Directive	(2011)
As a result of the increased number of CJEU judgments in respect of access to and 
reimbursement for cross‑border health care, the Commission and the Member States 
felt the need to codify – and to a certain extent to clarify256 – the relevant principles 
resulting from this case law in a new legislative instrument.257 In 2011, this finally 
resulted in the adoption of a separate Directive on the application of patients’ rights in 
cross‑border health care.258 The adoption of this instrument was, however, preceded 
by intense debates.
In June 2002 the Council considered that there was ‘[…] a need to strengthen 
cooperation in order to promote the greatest opportunities for access to health care 
of high quality while maintaining the financial sustainability of healthcare systems 
in the European Union’.259 Subsequently the Commission convened a ‘High‑Level 
Process of Reflection on Patient Mobility and Healthcare Developments in the EU’. 
This resulted, in April 2004, in a Commission Communication on patient mobility.260 
The Commission considered a European strategy needed to ensure that citizens 
could exercise their rights to seek care in other Member States if they wished, and to 
ensure that European cooperation could help systems to work together to better meet 
the challenges they faced.261 The Commission held that for citizens, the first step was 
‘[…] to provide them with a clearer overview of the existing EU legal framework 
regarding access to healthcare and the reimbursement of the costs incurred in 
another Member State.’262 The Services Directive draft of 2004 had included health 
care services.263 However, because of its sensitivity and public finance implications, 
254 Idem, para. 35.
255 See A. den Exter, ‘Access to Health Care in the Netherlands: The Influence of (European) Treaty Law’, 
33 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (2005) p. 698 at p. 703.
256 Following Art. 1(1) Directive 2011/24/EU, the Directive aims at clarifying its relationship with the 
existing framework on the coordination of social security systems, i.e. Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
Further, following Recital 8 of the Preamble, the Directive is intended to achieve a more general, and 
also effective, application of principles developed by the Court of Justice on a case‑by‑case basis.
257 De la Rosa call this codification exercise unique for the fact that it intervenes in a particularly sensitive 
area. De la Rosa 2012, supra n. 33, at p. 17.
258 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application 
of patients’ rights in cross‑border healthcare[2011] OJ L88/45, p. 46.
259 2440th Council meeting, Health, Luxembourg, 26 June 2002, 10090/02 (Presse 182) of 26 June 2002, 
p. 11, online available at www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/lsa/71383.
pdf, visited June 2014.
260 Commission, ‘Follow‑up to the high level reflection process on patient mobility and healthcare 
developments in the European Union’, COM (2004) 301 final.
261 Idem, at p. 2.
262 Idem.
263 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on services in the Internal Market’, COM (2004) 2 final. 
Proposed Art. 23 provided for the assumption of health care costs.







this sector was excluded from the final Services Directive of 2006.264 The Council 
and the European Parliament proffered a sector‑specific instrument. In 2006 a public 
consultation on the issue was run,265 after which a Commission proposal followed 
in 2008.266 On first reading this was rejected by the Council, the prior authorisation 
requirement for hospital care and the legal basis of the Directive, being just some of 
the issues in respect of which no agreement could be reached.267 Extensive debates and 
various amendments followed, resulting, at a certain point in time, in a ‘political and 
legislative limbo’.268 Nevertheless, in 2011 all negotiations resulted in the adoption of 
Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross‑border healthcare 
(‘the Patient Mobility Directive’).269 The Directive has a dual legal basis: Article 114 
TFEU (internal market) and Article 168 TFEU (health).270 The latter was allegedly 
chosen to secure the Member States’ competences in respect of public health.271 
The deadline for implementation of the Directive by the Member States was set at 
October 25th 2013.
The Patient Mobility Directive ‘[…] provides rules for facilitating the access to safe 
and high‑quality cross‑border healthcare and promotes cooperation on healthcare 
between Member States, in full respect of national competencies in organising and 
delivering healthcare.’272 The term ‘health care’ is broadly defined as ‘[…] health 
services provided by health professionals to patients to assess, maintain or restore 
their state of health, including the prescription, dispensation and provision of 
medicinal products and medical devices’.273
264 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services 
in the internal market [2006] OJ L376/36. See also O’Leary 2011, supra n. 52, at p. 522.
265 Commission, ‘Consultation regarding Community action on health services’ (Communication), SEC 
(2006) 1195/4. See also Commission, ‘Summary report of the responses to the consultation regarding 
“Community action on health services”’, SEC (2006) 1195/4.
266 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application 
of patients’ rights in cross‑border healthcare’, COM (2008) 414 final.
267 De la Rosa 2012, supra n. 33, at p. 26. See also T. Hervey, ‘Cooperation between health care authorities 
in the proposed Directive’, in: J.W. van de Gronden et al. (eds.), Health care and EU law (The Hague, 
T.M.C. Asser Press 2011) p. 161 at pp. 163–164.
268 G. Davies, ‘Legislating for Patient’s Rights’, in: J.W. van de Gronden et al. (eds.), Health care and EU 
law (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2011) p. 191 at p. 191.
269 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application 
of patients’ rights in cross‑border healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45. The Patient mobility Directive was 
approved by the European Parliament on 19 January 2011 and entered into force on 24 April 2011 
(Art. 22 Directive 2011/24/EU).
270 Recital No. 2 of the Preamble to the Directive explains: ‘Article 114 TFEU is the appropriate legal basis 
since the majority of the provisions of this Directive aim to improve the functioning of the internal 
market and the free movement of goods, persons and services. Given that the conditions for recourse 
to Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis are fulfilled, Union legislation has to rely on this legal basis even 
when public health protection is a decisive factor in the choices made. In this respect, Article 114(3) 
TFEU explicitly requires that, in achieving harmonisation, a high level of protection of human health 
is to be guaranteed taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts.’
271 De la Rosa 2012, supra n. 33, at p. 27.
272 Art. 1(1) Directive 2011/24/EU.
273 Art. 3(a) Directive 2011/24/EU. Recital 6 to the Preamble furthermore holds that ‘[a]s confirmed by 
the [CJEU] on several occasions, while recognising their specific nature, all types of medical care fall 
within the scope of the TFEU.’







The Directive explicitly claims not to affect ‘[…] laws and regulations in Member 
States relating to the organisation and financing of healthcare in situations not related 
to cross‑border healthcare.’274 Further, following Recital No. 4 of the Preamble, the 
transposition of the Directive into national legislation and its application was not 
intended to result in ‘[…] patients being encouraged to receive treatment outside 
their Member State of affiliation.’275 Recital No. 7 adds to this:
‘This Directive respects and is without prejudice to the freedom of each Member State 
to decide what type of healthcare it considers appropriate. No provision of this Directive 
should be interpreted in such a way as to undermine the fundamental ethical choices of 
Member States.’276
By many, the Patient Mobility Directive has been perceived as a ‘Citizenship 
Directive’277 and as a reflection of the Union’s ‘rebalancing of its action in a more 
social direction’.278 Before its adoption in amended form, Davies called mobile 
patients the ‘winners’ under the Directive.279 Van de Gronden and Szyszczak later 
pointed out, however, that those provisions of the Patient Mobility Directive giving 
patients generous entitlements to cross‑border hospital care were heavily amended 
before the Directive was finally adopted.280 They concluded that respect for Member 
States’ competences was still ‘[…] one of the underpinning principles of how EU law 
deals with health care’. Critique has been issued that the Directive is ‘[…] primarily 
aimed at individuals or groups of individuals who have the cognitive and social 
resources to engage in a process of mobility’.281 De la Rosa described the Directive 
in the following words:
‘[The Patient Mobility Directive] displays an original combination of the codifying 
solutions derived from the free provision of services; the facilitation of the exercise of 
274 Art. 2(4) Directive 2011/24/EU.
275 The ‘Member State of affiliation’ is the Member State that is competent to grant to the insured person 
a prior authorisation to receive appropriate treatment outside the Member State of residence. Art. 3(c) 
Directive 2011/24/EU.
276 Recital No. 7 of the Preamble to Directive 2011/24/EU. Recital No. 5 adds to this that ‘[…] decisions 
about the basket of healthcare to which citizens are entitled and the mechanisms used to finance and 
deliver that healthcare […] must be taken in the national context.’
277 Davies 2011, supra n. 268, at p. 207.
278 De la Rosa 2012, supra n. 33, at p. 16.
279 According to Davies mobile patients were the ‘winners’, ‘provided they get what they expect and 
treatment abroad does not turn out to be more different and less satisfactory than they had hoped.’ 
According to the author, the facilitation measures are at the heart of whether the Directive will be 
a success or not. Davies, furthermore, observes that the EU is also potentially a winner, as mobility 
of patients will tend to lead to a greater health care integration, which, he thinks, will ultimately 
strengthen the EU’s position in the global health industry. The author furthermore held that: ‘The 
rights in the Directive […], like other free movement rights, are a form of substantive constitution 
building, harnessing the needs and wishes of individuals to re‑constitute the European space.’ Davies 
2011, supra n. 268, at pp. 207–208.
280 Gronden, van de and Szyszczak 2011, supra n. 170, at p. 488, referring to Davies 2011, supra n. 268.
281 De la Rosa 2012, supra n. 33, at pp. 38–39. On the other hand, the national information points for 
which the Directive provides (see section 3.5.3.2 below) may assist in making cross‑border health care 
accessible for a wider public.







patient mobility by highlighting information in relation to such mobility; the promotion 
of cooperation between States in connection with Article 168 TFEU; and, to head the 
entire undertaking, the incessant reminder of the essentially national character of health 
policy.’282
3.5.3.1. Authorisation and reimbursement for cross‑border health care
By way of codification of the CJEU’s case law, Article 7 of the Patient Mobility 
Directive provides that the Member State of affiliation shall ensure that the costs 
incurred by an insured person who receives cross‑border healthcare are reimbursed, 
if the healthcare in question is among the benefits to which the insured person is 
entitled in the Member State of affiliation. It is for the Member State of affiliation to 
determine, whether at a local, regional or national level, the healthcare for which an 
insured person is entitled to assumption of costs and the level of assumption of those 
costs, regardless of where the healthcare is provided.283 Hence – as is the case under 
Article 22 of the Social Security Regulation – a State does not have to reimburse 
treatment obtained abroad, if such treatment is prohibited under the domestic law, 
or if the relevant national scheme does not provide for reimbursement for that kind 
of treatment.
The costs of cross‑border healthcare are reimbursed or paid directly by the Member 
State of affiliation up to the level of costs that would have been assumed by the 
Member State of affiliation, had this healthcare been provided in its territory without 
exceeding the actual costs of healthcare received.284
Prior authorisation may be required under certain conditions. It is allowed if health 
care is concerned that is made subject to planning requirements relating to the object 
of ensuring sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high‑quality 
treatment, but only if it involves overnight hospital accommodation for the patient 
in question for at least one night, or requires the use of highly specialised and 
cost‑intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment.285 Prior authorisation 
may also be required if the care is provided by a health care provider that, on a 
case‑by‑case basis, could give rise to serious and specific concerns relating to the 
quality or safety of the care, with the exception of healthcare which is subject to 
Union legislation ensuring a minimum level of safety and quality throughout the 
Union.286 This provision is difficult to reconcile with the weight attached to mutual 
recognition by the CJEU in its case law.287 Following Article 8(6) the Member 
282 Idem, at p. 18.
283 Art. 7(4) Directive 2011/24/EU.
284 Art. 7(4) Directive 2011/24/EU. It is furthermore stressed in Art. 1(4) that nothing in the Directive 
obliges a Member State to reimburse costs of healthcare provided by healthcare providers established 
on its own territory if those providers are not part of its social security system or public health system.
285 Art. 8(2)(a) Directive 2011/24/EU.
286 Art. 8(2)(c) Directive 2011/24/EU.
287 E.g. Case C‑444/05 Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I‑3185, ECLI:EU:C:2007:231, para. 37, where the Court 
held that the Greek authorities had to recognise that private hospitals located in other Member States 
were also subject, in those Member States, to quality controls and that doctors established in those 







State of affiliation may refuse to grant prior authorisation if, according to a clinical 
evaluation, the patient will be exposed, with reasonable certainty, to a patient‑safety 
risk that cannot be regarded as acceptable, taking into account the potential benefit 
to the patient of the sought after cross‑border healthcare.288 Prior authorisation may 
also be refused if the healthcare concerned can be provided on the territory of the 
Member State of affiliation within a time limit which is medically justifiable, taking 
into account the current state of health and the probable course of the illness of each 
patient concerned.289
Where medical follow‑up proves necessary after a patient has received cross‑border 
health care, the State of affiliation must ensure that the same medical follow‑up 
is available ‘[…] as would have been if that healthcare had been provided on its 
territory.’290
3.5.3.2. Information rights
The Patient Mobility Directive has introduced considerable rights to information for 
patients involved in cross‑border care.291 Appropriate information ‘on all essential 
aspects of cross‑border healthcare’ was considered ‘[…] necessary in order to 
enable patients to exercise their rights on cross‑border healthcare in practice.’292 The 
Directive, inter alia, provides for the establishment of national contact points in each 
Member State.293 These are to deliver information to patients involved in cross‑border 
care concerning healthcare providers; information on the relevant standards and 
guidelines; information on patients’ rights, complaints procedures and mechanisms 
for seeking remedies, as well as the legal and administrative options available to 
settle disputes, including in the event of harm arising from cross‑border healthcare.294 
Furthermore, in the Member State of affiliation, mechanisms have to be put in place 
to provide patients, on request, with information on their rights and entitlements 
relating to receiving cross‑border healthcare, ‘[…] in particular as regards the terms 
and conditions for reimbursement of costs […] and procedures for accessing and 
determining those entitlements and for appeal and redress if patients consider that 
States who operate in those establishments provided professional guarantees equivalent to those of 
doctors established in Greece. See also Case C‑255/09 Commission v. Portugal [2011] ECR I‑10547, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:695, para. 83, where the Court ruled that a requirement of prior authorisation for 
reimbursement of the medical expenses in question could not be justified on public health grounds 
relating to the need to control the quality of healthcare services provided abroad.
288 Art. 8(6)(a) Directive 2011/24/EU.
289 Art. 8(6)(d) Directive 2011/24/EU.
290 Art. 5(c) Directive 2011/24/EU.
291 Palm and Baeten considered that the revolutionary nature of the Directive lied in the inclusion of these 
‘“new” patient rights’. W. Palm and R. Baeten, ‘The quality and safety paradox in the patients’ rights 
Directive’, 21 Eur J Public Health (2011) p. 272 at p. 272.
292 Recital No. 48 of the Preamble to Directive 2011/24/EU.
293 The Directive makes a distinction between responsibilities of the Member State of treatment (Art. 4) 
and responsibilities of the Member State of affiliation (Art. 5). It is, however, inescapable that all 
Member States have to meet all requirements, as they may function both as States of treatment and 
States of affiliation.
294 Arts. 4(2)(a) and 6(3) Directive 2011/24/EU.







their rights have not been respected […].’295 Healthcare providers in the State where 
the treatment takes place, for their part, have to ‘[…] provide relevant information to 
help individual patients to make an informed choice, including on treatment options, 
on the availability, quality and safety of the healthcare they provide in the Member 
State of treatment and that they also provide clear invoices and clear information 
on prices, as well as on their authorisation or registration status, their insurance 
cover or other means of personal or collective protection with regard to professional 
liability.’296 The Directive does not oblige Member States to deliver information in 
other languages than their official languages.297
3.6. cross‑border movement In reproductIve mAtters 
under eu lAw
3.6.1.	 Political	attention	for	cross‑border	movement	in	reproductive	matters
Cross‑border movement for reproductive matters has occasionally been discussed 
at the EU level. Particularly cross‑border abortions have caught the attention of 
the EU institutions.298 For instance, in the early 1980s when abortion was much 
debated in most (then) EC Member States, the European Parliament adopted a 
non‑binding Resolution on the position of women in the European Community in 
which cross‑border abortions were also addressed.299 The Resolution noted ‘[…] 
the problems caused by the fact that women seeking abortions frequently [had] to 
seek the termination in another country and requested the Commission to press 
the Council for decisions at national level to obviate the need for such journeys 
and ensure that every woman who [found] herself in difficulty could obtain the 
necessary assistance in her own state.’300 It has been noted that this was particularly 
controversial in a Member State like Ireland, as it ‘[…] gave rise to concern in certain 
quarters that this was the beginning of Community pressure to liberalise Ireland’s 
abortion legislation.’301
295 Art. 5(b) Directive 2011/24/EU.
296 Art. 4(2)(b) Directive 2011/24/EU.
297 Art. 4(5) Directive 2011/24/EU. See also Palm and Baeten 2011, supra n. 291, at p. 273, who furthermore 
point out that ‘[t]he level of information provided and the way in which the contact points will work in 
the different Member States is likely to reflect cultural and organizational differences […].’
298 See also the Resolution of the European Parliament of 12 March 1990 on reports of gynaecological 
examinations by the German Federal Frontier Police [1991] OJ C106/102, pp. 103, 113 and 135, as 
discussed in Ch. 4, section 4.4.1.1.
299 European Parliament resolution of 11 February 1981 on the situation of women in the European 
Community, [1981] OJ C50/24, p. 34. The Resolution followed a Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Women’s Rights on the position of women in the European Community, A1‑0829/80. See also Sherlock 
1989, supra n. 78.
300 As paraphrased by Sherlock 1989, supra n. 78, referring (in footnote 29) to [1989] OJ C111/1, p. 16.
301 Idem. The author stressed that the Resolution was not legally binding and that the Parliament lacks the 
power to initiate legislation.







In 2004, when the Portuguese authorities refused to allow the ship of the Dutch 
organisation Women on Waves to enter Portuguese territorial waters (see Ch. 6, 
section 6.4.1.3; and Ch. 2, section 2.4.1), this also caught the attention of the European 
institutions. It caused a ‘lively, controversial and important debate’ in the European 
Parliament302 and made the Commission get involved in the matter. Upon receiving a 
complaint by Women on Waves about the refusal, the Commission inquired with the 
Portuguese authorities. It thereby made clear that Member States could restrict the 
fundamental right of free movement ‘[…] solely where it [was] justified on grounds 
of public policy, public security and public health and that where a Member State 
adopt[ed] a measure refusing entry to its territory based on one of these grounds, 
it [had to] respect the general principles of Community law and in particular the 
proportionality principle, and fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of 
information and expression.’303 The present author is not aware of any subsequent 
action from the side of the Commission in this case;304 there has not been a case 
before the CJEU resulting from any infringements proceedings initiated by the 
Commission in this matter.305
On another occasion, in 2006, the Council declined to give its opinion on a report 
that citizens of other EU Member States went to a Spanish clinic for late abortions 
(i.e., after 30 weeks of pregnancy).306 The Council answered that this matter did not 
fall within the Union’s competences.307
302 Contribution of Commissioner Wallström to the debate in European Parliament of 16 September 2004, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=‑%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bCRE%2b20040916
%2bITEM‑001%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN, visited June 2014.
303 Letter of the Commission to the Portuguese authorities on 14 October 2004 to request further 
information, as referred to in Answer of the Commission to oral Parliamentary Question No. 69 by Anne 
Van Lancker to the Commission, of 26 November 2004 (H‑0450/04), online available at www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=‑//EP//TEXT+CRE+20041216+ANN‑01+DOC+XML+V0//LV&q
uery=QUESTION&detail=H‑2004‑0450, visited June 2014.
304 On 23 November 2004, the Commission received a reply from the Portuguese authorities who justified 
their decision on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and on the need to protect 
public health, safeguard the legal order and prevent abuse of rights. Three days later the Commission 
informed Parliament that it planned to decide on the follow‑up to this official complaint in its next 
meeting on infringements. Answer of the Commission to oral Parliamentary Question No. 69 by Anne 
Van Lancker to the Commission, of 26 November 2004 (H‑0450/04), online available at www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=‑//EP//TEXT+CRE+20041216+ANN‑01+DOC+XML+V0//LV&q
uery=QUESTION&detail=H‑2004‑0450, visited June 2014.
305 The matter has, however, been decided by the ECtHR on the basis of Art. 10 ECHR. See Ch. 2, 
section 2.4.1.
306 See also Ch.6, section 6.4.1.2.
307 The Representative of the Council held that the European Union Treaties had not bestowed on the 
Community or the Union the competence whereby the Union could regulate on abortions. The Member 
States thus had the competence to regulate on this and ensure compliance in their territory with the laws 
that they passed. The EU could not interfere ‘[…] in unsatisfactory states of affairs due to differences in 
the legislation of Member States when it [came] to areas that [were] not within its competence.’ When 
a Member of Parliament submitted that this concerned a European problem of a cross‑border nature, 
the representative of the Council answered that the free mobility of people was ‘one of the European 
Union’s basic concerns’. It was held that if there were ‘illegal goings‑on in Member States’, it was their 
responsibility and duty to monitor them and intervene. In this case it was incontrovertibly clear that big 
differences between the laws in Member States led to very different practices around Europe. Answer 
of the Council to oral Parliamentary Question No. 69 by B. Belder to the Council, of 7 November 2006 







The motion for a resolution on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights,308 as 
tabled by the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender 
Equality in 2013 (see 3.2 above), deplored the fact that the restrictive abortion laws 
of certain countries resulted in a divide between those who could afford to travel, 
and those who could not and were forced to seek clandestine abortions. It called on 
Member States to ‘[…] refrain from preventing pregnant women seeking abortion 
to travel to other Member States or jurisdictions where the procedure is legal’.309 As 
explained above, the motion was not, however, adopted.310
Cross‑border surrogacy has also received attention at the EU level. For instance, 
as noted in section 3.3.4 above, in 2012 the European Parliament issued a call for 
tender for a comparative study on the regime of surrogacy in the EU Member States, 
whereby the question to be addressed was also whether solutions to existing problems 
could be better achieved on the EU level. The findings of the ensuing study in respect 
of cross‑border cases are discussed in section 3.6.3 below.
In international surrogacy cases, often third countries (non‑EU Member States), 
such as Ukraine, Russia, India or the United States of America, are involved. The EU 
has not adopted specific foreign policies in respect of international surrogacy. For 
instance, the issue is not addressed in specific country strategy papers. In relation 
to India, the Commission stressed, in 2013, in response to Parliamentary questions, 
that the EU had ‘[…] engaged with the Government of India and Indian civil society 
organisations since the early 1990s, on improvement of maternal health, reducing 
child mortality and protecting women’s rights’, but that there was ‘[…] no funding 
available for the creation of information, monitoring systems or to produce and 
publish data with regard to the phenomenon of business of surrogate motherhood in 
India.’311 The EU follows the developments on surrogate motherhood at international 
level through the Hague Conference on Private International Law, of which it has 
been a member since 2007.312
(H‑0983/06), online available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=200
61213&secondRef=ITEM‑021&language=EN#3‑429, visited June 2014.
308 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 
(2013/2040(INI)), online available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=‑//EP//
NONSGML+REPORT+A7‑2013‑0306+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN, visited June 2014.
309 Idem, paras. 28, 30 and 38.
310 See section 3.2 above.
311 Answer given by Mr. Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission (22 March 2013) to Question No 
E‑001081/13, no. P7_QE(2013)001081.
312 See 3.3.4 above. The Hague Conference decided in 2011 that issues surrounding cross‑border surrogacy 
arrangements required further examination, and in 2013 a study on the matter came out. The study 
concluded that further international work was desired with a view to ensuring legal certainty and 
security of legal status for children and families in international surrogacy situations and to protecting 
the ‘[…] rights and welfare of children, parents and other parties involved with the conception of 
children in international situations, in line with established global human rights standards.’ Following 
this study, the General Council of the Hague Conference invited the Permanent Bureau to continue 
information gathering and postponed any decision on the establishment of an Experts’ Group on the 
matter to its meeting in 2015. Permanent Bureau Hague Conference on Private international law, The 
desirability and feasibility of further work on the parentage / surrogacy project, Preliminary Document 
No 3 B of April 2014 for the attention of the Council of April 2014 on General Affairs and Policy of 









There are various open questions concerning the application the EU law standards on 
cross‑border health care, as described in section 3.5 above, to cross‑border abortions, 
cross‑border reproductive care and cross‑border surrogacy. With the exception of 
the Grogan case, none of CJEU judgments and legislative instruments as discussed 
in section 3.5 dealt explicitly with these matters. Consequently, application of 
these standards to situations of cross‑border abortions, CBRC and cross‑border 
surrogacy raises questions, which as yet, have not been explicitly addressed by the 
EU legislature, nor by the CJEU. This section identifies these open questions and 
endeavours to formulate tentative answers where possible.
For one thing, abortion and AHR treatment fall within the definition of ‘services’ 
within the meaning of the TFEU, and ‘health care’ within the meaning of the Patient 
Mobility Directive,313 as long as they are not outlawed by all Member States and 
as long and normally provided for remuneration. Only if a certain type of AHR 
treatment or abortion would be outlawed by all Member States, could this specific 
treatment be excluded from the scope of the EU free movement rules.314 While 
for abortion such a situation is in any case not anticipated in the near future, it is 
conceivable that all EU Member States could explicitly prohibit practices like gender 
selection in the course of AHR treatment for reasons other than medical ones. In 
that scenario, the EU free movement rules could not provide a basis for any claim as 
regards access to, or reimbursement for, such treatment.
Surrogacy is in itself not a medical activity, and the Patient Mobility Directive 
and specific cross‑border health care case law do not, therefore, apply. In 
high‑technological surrogacy AHR treatment is, however, involved and that type 
of medical treatment evidently comes within the scope of the EU standards on 
cross‑border health‑care. Surrogacy itself could possibly be considered a service 
within the meaning of the Treaties,315 as a result of which the general Treaty rules 
(Articles 56 and 57 TFEU) apply. This certainly holds for the services that surrogacy 
intermediaries offer.
Even though abortion, (common types of) AHR treatment and possibly also 
surrogacy thus qualify as (health care) services within the meaning of the Treaty, the 
freedom to receive such services may be restricted. A full restriction on cross‑border 
the Conference; Permanent Bureau Hague Conference on Private international law, A study of legal 
parentage and the issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements, Preliminary Document 
No 3 C of March 2014 for the attention of the Council of April 2014 on General Affairs and Policy of 
the Conference and Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council on General Affairs and 
Policy of the Conference (8–10 April 2014). All three documents are online available at www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=183, visited June 2014.
313 See Case C‑159/90 Grogan [1991] ECR I‑4685, ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, as discussed in section 3.5.2.1 
above.
314 Case C‑137/09 Josemans [2010] ECR I‑13019, ECLI:EU:C:2010:774.
315 Brunet et al. 2013, supra n. 134, at pp. 142–143.







movement for reproductive matters by means of a ban on travelling may be very hard 
to justify under EU law, however. A restriction by means of criminal prosecution 
after return to the home state may also not be easily justified. In most cases the double 
criminality rule under the European Arrest Warrant will prevent such prosecution 
anyhow (see section 3.6.4 below). Such measures are not, furthermore, very likely to 
be imposed, as the chapters on Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands for this case 
study have shown.316 It is more likely that restrictions on free movement consist of 
refusals of reimbursement;317 prior authorisation requirements; bans or limitations 
on information about foreign treatment options or refusals to provide follow‑up care 
after treatment has been obtained abroad. Restrictive regimes concerning abortion, 
AHR treatment and/or surrogacy may also in themselves constitute an obstacle to free 
movement. All these possible restrictions are addressed in the various subsections 
below.
3.6.2.1. Reimbursement for treatment obtained abroad
The basic and most relevant rule for the present case study in respect of reimbursement 
is that States do not have to reimburse treatment obtained abroad, if such treatment 
is prohibited under the domestic law, or if its national scheme does not provide for 
reimbursement for that kind of treatment.318 Additional costs, such as costs for board, 
lodging, travel, visitors’ tax and the production of a final medical report, can also not 
be claimed in this situation.319
While this, at first sight, seems to be a clear‑cut rule, to determine if the treatment 
in question is ‘[…] among the benefits provided for by the legislation in the Member 
State where the person concerned resides’ may sometimes prove problematic, 
because entitlements to medical benefits may be phrased in rather broad terms in 
national (private) social security regulations.320 For example, it may be provided 
under the social security scheme of Member State A that a couple is entitled to 
reimbursement for ‘three IVF cycles’. Suppose that, in that State IVF treatment with 
the use of donated gametes is lawfully available only if such donation is altruistic and 
if the donor is known to the woman or couple involved in the IVF treatment. Could 
reimbursement be claimed for IVF treatment obtained in Member State B, where 
316 An exception forms the (withdrawn) prosecution in the Netherlands for abortion in Spain. See Ch. 6, 
section 6.4.1.2.
317 It has also been pointed out, however, that most of cross‑border AHR treatment takes place in the 
context of private treatment, ‘[…] and so public interest justifications with respect to the burdens on 
the public purse, the organisation of national health (insurance) schemes and the need for planning, 
management and capacity building, that are at issue in the general litigation on free movement of 
patients do not apply with the same force.’ Hervey and McHale 2004, supra n. 47, at p. 152.
318 Art. 22 Regulation 883/2004 and Art. 7 Directive 2011/24/EU.
319 Case C‑8/02 Ludwig Leichtle v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2004] ECR I‑2641, ECLI:EU:C:2004:161. 
Mei, van der 2006, supra n. 168, at pp. 68–69.
320 See Case C‑173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I‑8889, ECLI:EU:C:2010:581, para. 59, where the Court 
considered that ‘[…] it is for each Member State to decide which medical benefits are reimbursed by 
its own social security system. To that end, the Member State concerned is entitled to list precisely 
treatments or treatment methods or to state more generally the categories or types of treatments or 
treatment methods.’







commercial and anonymous donation of gametes is legal and common practice? 
The answer is most likely in the negative, as such treatment would not have been 
reimbursed if obtained in Member State A, the State of affiliation. In other words, it 
is not among the benefits provided for by the legislation in Member State A. Whether 
this is indeed the correct reading of the law has not been confirmed at EU level.321
Another question is, where a new type of AHR treatment has become available 
that is not (yet) available in Member State A, and therefore also not (yet) explicitly 
provided for or prohibited in the State of affiliation, whether it should be reimbursed 
by the latter state. On the basis of the existing case law there is no definite answer 
to this question (yet). Some guidance may be found in the case of Elchinov (2010) 
where the CJEU ruled that:
‘[…] where the list of medical benefits reimbursed does not expressly and precisely specify 
the treatment method applied but defines types of treatment […] it is for the competent 
institution of the Member State of residence of the insured person to assess, applying the 
usual principles of interpretation and on the basis of objective and non‑discriminatory 
criteria, taking into consideration all the relevant medical factors and the available 
scientific data, whether that treatment method corresponds to benefits provided for by the 
legislation of that Member State.’322
It must be noted that the Elchinov case did not concern morally controversial 
treatment. It seems very likely that in cases concerning such controversial treatment, 
the national authorities would rule that foreign treatment options do not correspond 
to treatment available in the state of affiliation. If the authorities nevertheless come 
to the conclusion that the treatment methods do correspond, prior authorisation – so 
the Court has ruled – may not be refused on the ground that such a treatment method 
is not available in the Member State of affiliation.323 That brings us to the question 
of whether States may restrict access to, and reimbursement for, abortions and AHR 
treatment that has been provided in another EU Member State, for example, by 
setting prior authorisation requirements.
3.6.2.2. Prior authorisation requirements and refusal of authorisation
Two issues warrant particular attention when the EU rules in respect of prior 
authorisation are applied in the present case study. These are the questions of whether 
abortions and AHR treatment qualify as ‘scheduled treatment’,324 and whether safety 
and quality concerns may be accepted as a ground for the refusal of authorisation for 
such treatment.
321 Dutch courts have in any case taken different views in this regard. See Ch. 6, section 6.5.2.
322 Case C‑173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I‑8889, ECLI:EU:C:2010:581.
323 Idem, para. 62, where the Court ruled that ‘[…] such a ground, if it were accepted, would imply a 
restriction on the scope of the second subparagraph of Article 22(2) of Regulation No 1408/71.’
324 From the CJEU’s case law it follows that in this regard, not so much the hospital environment, but the 
planning element is decisive (see 3.5.2.3 above).







Under the Patient Mobility Directive a prior authorisation requirement for scheduled 
treatment can only be set if the treatment involves overnight hospital accommodation 
for the patient in question for at least one night, or if it requires use of highly specialised 
and cost‑intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment.325 As a rule, no 
hospital accommodation is required for abortion and AHR treatment.326 Whether 
any of these types of treatment involve ‘highly specialised and cost‑intensive medical 
infrastructure or medical equipment’, within the meaning of the Directive, is less 
obvious.327 The CJEU has so far given only limited guidance on the interpretation of 
this condition for authorisation. In Commission v. France (2010)328 the Court accepted 
a prior authorisation requirement for treatment requiring the use of ‘major medical 
equipment’329 available outside hospital infrastructures, because the conditions for 
the installation, operation and use of this equipment were ‘especially onerous’, while 
both its purchase and its installation and use represented high costs of ‘hundreds of 
thousands, even millions, of euro’.330 The Court held that the planning endeavours of 
the national authorities and the financial balance of the supply of up‑to‑date treatment 
would be jeopardised, if persons insured in one Member State could, freely and in 
any circumstances, obtain at the expense of the competent institution, from service 
providers established in other Member States, treatment involving the use of major 
medical equipment.331 It is submitted that generally medical equipment for abortion 
does not qualify as ‘major medical equipment’. Presumably this also holds for 
equipment for most – if not all – (common) types of AHR treatment. New medical and 
technological developments may, nevertheless, lead to different conclusions in this 
regard. Hence, it cannot be ruled out that (certain types of) AHR treatment qualify 
as scheduled treatment, on the grounds of which a prior authorisation requirement 
in principle may be set. Generally, however, it is concluded that abortion and AHR 
treatment are not made subject to planning requirements, and that therefore no prior 
authorisation requirements may be set on that ground.
325 Art. 8(2)(a) Directive 2011/24/EU.
326 Within the EU practices vary as to the place where abortions and AHR treatment take place; this may 
be in (special clinics within) hospitals or in private clinics. In Ireland, for example, only private AHR 
clinics exists, whereas in the Netherlands all AHR‑clinics are accommodated in public hospitals. In 
Germany both private and public clinics provide AHR treatment. Generally, also in situations where 
the treatment is carried out in a hospital, no accommodation for the night is required.
327 Art. 8(2)(a) Directive 2011/24/EU.
328 Case C‑512/08 Commission v. France [2010] ECR I‑8833, ECLI:EU:C:2010:579.
329 In the relevant case, under national (French) law the term ‘major medical equipment’ was held to 
include: a ‘PET scanner’; a nuclear magnetic resonance imaging or spectrometry apparatus for clinical 
use; a medical scanner; a hyperbaric chamber and a cyclotron for medical use. See Case C‑512/08 
Commission v. France [2010] ECR I‑8833, ECLI:EU:C:2010:579, para. 9.
330 Idem, para. 39. Advocate General Sharpston had proposed that ‘highly specialised and cost‑intensive 
medical infrastructure or medical equipment’ could concern ‘major medical equipment’ that is 
very expensive to acquire, that may need to be installed in a specific setting and may need to be 
used and maintained by suitably qualified and trained personnel. Opinion of Advocate General 
Sharpston delivered on 15 July 2010, Case C‑512/08 Commission v. France [2010] ECR I‑8833, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:579, para. 73.
331 Case C‑512/08 Commission v. France [2010] ECR I‑8833, ECLI:EU:C:2010:579, para. 40.







The rule that safety and quality issues can provide grounds for setting a prior 
authorisation requirement332 may prove particularly relevant in the present case 
study.333 For example, Dutch genealogists have expressed their concerns about the 
safety and quality of AHR treatment in Spanish clinics, where various fertilised 
egg cells are implanted in one cycle.334 Could such concerns constitute ground for 
Dutch insurers to refuse to authorise women to have AHR treatment in Spain?335 The 
answer is most likely in the negative, as the Patient Mobility Directive provides that 
an authorisation requirement is not allowed for types of healthcare that are subject 
to Union legislation ensuring a minimum level of safety and quality throughout the 
Union.336 As explained in section 3.3.2 above, this is indeed the case in respect of 
IVF treatment, by means of the EU Tissues and Cells Directive. This minimum 
harmonisation therefore seems to bar the setting of prior authorisation requirements 
for AHR treatment such as IVF treatment. In respect of abortion there is, on the 
other hand, no such harmonisation in place.337
The foregoing conclusions render it less imperative to apply the CJEU’s case law and 
the rules under the Patient Mobility Directive in respect of refusal of authorisation 
to the present case study. After all, there seems to be little ground for the setting of 
such authorisation requirements in the first place. Still, it may be worth examining 
the rule that authorisation can be refused if the same or equally effective treatment 
can be provided on the territory of the Member State of affiliation within a time 
limit which is medically justifiable, taking into account the current state of health 
and the probable course of the illness of each patient concerned.338 This rule – which 
concerns remedying the disadvantageous consequences of waiting lists – is relevant 
only in situations where the treatment concerned is, in principle, legally available in 
the State of affiliation.
332 Art. 8(2)(c) Directive 2011/24/EU, as discussed in section 3.5.3.1 above.
333 A further question is if the conditions concerning quality and safety could also be interpreted in a moral 
sense. Could the (moral or psychological) effects of certain types of treatment – such as abortion – be 
considered to be an unacceptable patient‑safety risk, justifying a prior authorisation requirement? 
While, again, no final answer to this question can be given as no CJEU ruling has been made on this 
particular question, it is submitted that this would stretch the interpretation of these rules – which 
concern integrity, quality and safety of the health care provider – too far.
334 Nieuwsuur 9 September 2010, www.nieuwsuur.nl/onderwerp/183384‑spanje‑is‑hoop‑voor‑onvruchtba
re‑vrouwen.html, visited January 2011.
335 Under the Patient Mobility Directive, prior authorisation may also be required (1) if the care is provided 
by a health care provider that could give rise to serious and specific concerns relating to the quality or 
safety of the care, or (2) if the patient will be exposed with reasonable certainty to a patient safety risk. 
Art. 8(2)(c) Directive 2011/24/EU.
336 Art. 8(2)(c) Directive 2011/24/EU.
337 As Palm and Baeten explained in respect of the Patient Mobility Directive: ‘The idea that the Directive 
would impose Member States to define clear quality and safety standards and to establish mechanisms 
to ensure that providers would have to meet these standards and could be sanctioned if they did not, was 
considered by the Member States a bridge too far, as it would touch upon their freedom and competence 
to organize and deliver health care according to national principles and priorities.’ Palm and Baeten 
2011, supra n. 291, at p. 273.
338 Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404 and Art. 8(6)
(d) Directive 2011/24/EU.







In various EU countries, waiting lists exist for donated gametes, which reportedly 
are reason for couples to go abroad.339 This raises the question of whether the time 
limits involved in such waiting lists can be considered ‘medically justifiable’. The 
answer may depend on the question if infertility – which often constitutes ground 
for people to wish to resort to (certain types of) AHR treatment – is considered an 
illness. This concerns a sensitive question, which has not (yet) been conclusively 
answered at EU level and may not be easily done so either. It may also depend on the 
age of the couple involved in the AHR treatment and the age limits that national law 
has set for access to AHR treatment.
Another as yet undecided issue concerns the question of whether certain types 
of AHR treatment or abortion can be held to be ‘sufficiently tried and tested by 
international medical science’, in which case authorisation for reimbursement cannot 
be refused.340
3.6.2.3. Medical follow‑up after cross‑border treatment
There are some open issues in respect of the obligation on the State of affiliation to 
provide the necessary medical follow‑up in the context of the present case study. 
In principle, the State of affiliation must ensure that the same medical follow‑up is 
available ‘as would have been if that healthcare had been provided on its territory.’341 
It is insufficiently clear how this provision must be interpreted in situations where 
the respective treatment is prohibited in the country of affiliation. Can an Irish 
medical practitioner or psychologist thus refuse to treat an Irish woman who had an 
abortion on therapeutic or social grounds in England? Are those Dutch genealogists 
who refuse to treat women who underwent AHR treatment in Spain acting in breach 
of EU law?342 The literal text of the Directive does not give a conclusive answer 
and the primary free movement rules do not give much guidance either. It may be 
assumed that any refusal to give a medical follow‑up to a medical service received 
abroad constitutes a barrier to the freedom to receive services. After all, the prospect 
of such a refusal may withhold certain services recipients from even making use of 
their free movement rights. Whether such a restriction could be justified is, however, 
an open question. The protection of the reputation (and credibility) of the medical 
profession may possibly constitute an overriding public interest in such situations. 
Next the proportionality of the restriction must be assessed. A refusal of life‑saving 
treatment in case of a bleeding after an abortion appears evidently disproportional, 
but in respect of psychological treatment after an abortion on social grounds, this 
disproportionality may be less evident. There are thus many open questions here.
339 E.g. Shenfield et al. 2010, supra n. 154.
340 Hervey and McHale argued that ‘[p]articularly with relatively new treatments’, there was ‘likely to be 
considerable room for difference among professional opinion’. The authors warned that patients were 
likely to exploit this. Hervey and McHale 2004, supra n. 47, at pp. 136–137.
341 Art. 5(c) Directive 2011/24/EU.
342 See Ch. 6, section 6.5.3.







3.6.2.4. Information about foreign abortion and AHR services and surrogacy
There is nothing to indicate that the provisions of the Patient Mobility Directive in 
respect of information rights, as set out in section 3.5.3.2 above, would not apply in 
respect of cross‑border abortions or reproductive care. Hence, national information 
points should also provide information about these types of treatment. As noted 
above, surrogacy does not in itself come within the scope of the Patient Mobility 
Directive, however. There is consequently no obligation on Member States to actively 
provide information about such services in other Member States. Whether they may, 
on the other hand, restrict access to such information, is another question that must 
be assessed on the basis of the Treaty free movement rules. As yet, this issue has not 
been addressed by the CJEU.
3.6.2.5. Different regimes as an obstacle to free movement?
EU citizens may be deterred from making use of their free movement rights under 
Article 21 TFEU, if the host State prohibits abortion (on certain grounds), surrogacy 
or (certain types of) AHR treatment. This may even be the case if the conditions 
for access to such treatment are stricter under the law of the host state, than under 
the law of the state of origin. For example, a same‑sex couple may be deterred from 
moving to a State where access to IVF treatment is limited to (married) different‑sex 
couples. While this matter has never been decided by the CJEU, it cannot be ruled 
out that the CJEU would accept that such (more) restrictive regimes constitute a 
restriction on free movement rights. The next question is then whether such a 
restriction could be justified. Various possible justification grounds are conceivable, 
such as the protection of public health, the protection of morals, public order 
grounds, protection of the unborn child, and the interests of the (future) child. The 
assessment of the proportionality depends on the justification ground and on the 
particular circumstances of the case and in this regard there are, again, various open 
questions.343
3.6.3.	 Recognition	of	parental	links	established	abroad
There is, as matters stand, no provision of EU law that requires expressly that Member 
States must recognise parental links that have been established in another country 
in a cross‑border surrogacy situation. As explained in section 3.1.3.3 above, the EU 
has a competence to develop judicial cooperation within the EU in civil matters 
with cross‑border implications. None of the instruments that have been adopted on 
this legal basis are applicable to cross‑border surrogacy cases and it is consequently 
the Private International Law regimes of States that are primordially decisive. For 
example, (non‑)contractual obligations arising out of family relationships are excluded 
from the scope of the so‑called Rome Regulations that provide for uniform rules for 
343 One factor which may be of relevance is the internal consistency of the national law. For example, in 
case a Member State prohibits surrogacy, it may be taken into account whether surrogacy intermediaries 
that collaborate with foreign surrogacy agencies are also prohibited.







determining the law applicable to contractual and non‑contractual obligations in the 
European Union.344 Further, the so‑called Brussels I Regulation of 2000345 provides 
for rules governing the jurisdiction of courts and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters in EU Member States, but it does 
not apply to ‘the status or legal capacity of natural persons’.346 The Brussels II bis 
Regulation (2003)347 provides for automatic recognition of all judgments issued 
by courts of other Member States relating to parental responsibility without any 
intermediary procedure being required.348 However, it is made very clear that the 
Regulation ‘[…] does not apply to the establishment of parenthood, since this is a 
different matter from the attribution of parental responsibility, nor to other questions 
linked to the status of persons.’349 Apart from ‘the establishment or contesting of a 
parent‑child relationship’ also ‘judgments on adoption and the related preparatory 
measures, and annulment or revocation of adoption’ are excluded from the scope of 
the Regulation.350
There is, moreover, as yet no EU instrument that provides for mutual recognition 
of birth certificates within the EU, although the first explorative steps in this regard 
have been taken by the European Commission, as explained hereafter.351 A study of 
2013 commissioned by the European Parliament also made suggestions for possible 
EU approaches to the issue (see section 3.6.3.2 below).
Whether a refusal by one Member State to recognise parental links as established 
in another EU Member State would constitute a violation of the free movement 
rules is a question that has never been conclusively answered by the CJEU. Intended 
parents who are EU citizens may rely on their free movement rights and if the child 
has EU‑citizenship, they may also invoke the EU‑citizenship rights of the child 
(Article 21 TFEU). A refusal by an EU Member State to give recognition to a birth 
certificate issued in another Member State may consequently well be considered a 
restriction of the latter right, but whether such a restriction could be upheld on public 
344 See Art. 1(2)(b) Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 (‘Rome I’) and Art. 1(2)(a) Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 
(‘Rome II’). See Brunet et al. 2013, supra n. 134, at p. 148.
345 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The Regulation superseded the Brussels 
Convention of 1968, which was applicable between the EU countries before the Regulation entered into 
force.
346 Art. 1(2)(a). This is not different in the new version of the Regulation, European Parliament and Council 
Regulation 1215/2012/EU of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ L351/1.
347 Council Regulation 2201/2003/EC of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, 
repealing Regulation 1347/2000/EC [2003] OJ L338/1.
348 Recognition may be refused if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy, but only if it is 
in the best interests of the child. Art. 23 Regulation 2201/2003.
349 Recital 10 Regulation 2201/2003.
350 Art. 3(a) and (b) Regulation 2201/2003.
351 Commission, ‘Green Paper ‘Less bureaucracy for citizens: promoting free movement of public 
documents and recognition of the effects of civil status records’, COM (2010) 747 final.







order grounds is as yet another open question.352 Some guidance may be found in the 
Dafeki case (1997), where the Court held that:
‘[…] the exercise of the rights arising from freedom of movement for workers [was] 
not possible without production of documents relative to personal status, which [were] 
generally issued by the worker’s State of origin.’353
Therefore, Member States were obliged to accept such documents, unless their 
accuracy was seriously undermined in an individual case. Cross‑border surrogacy 
cases generally do not concern the free movement of workers, and it is therefore to 
be awaited if a similar reasoning would be applied in this context.354
3.6.3.1. Green Paper on recognition of civil status records (2010)
In the year 2010 the Commission published a Green Paper on the free movement 
of public documents and recognition of the effects of civil status records.355 For the 
present research – both for this case study as well as for Case Study II – particularly 
the issue of recognition of the effects of civil status records is relevant. Civil status 
records were defined in the Green Paper as:
‘[…] records executed by an authority in order to record the life events of each citizen such 
as birth, filiation, adoption, marriage, recognition of paternity, death and also a surname 
change following marriage, divorce, a registered partnership, recognition, change of sex 
or adoption.’356
The fact that this definition thus includes records concerning birth, filiation and 
adoption, renders the Green Paper also relevant for cross‑border surrogacy situations.
352 States will presumably invoke public policy grounds and possibly also national identity. The CJEU 
has proven respectful for national identity arguments in cases concerning the spelling of names, which 
case‑law may be relevant for the present case. However, it is uncertain if such a case would pass the 
proportionality test. Forceful counter‑arguments would be the rights of the child and the right to respect 
for family life, which States have to protect when they act within the scope of EU law. Thereby note 
must be taken of the ECtHR judgments in the Mennesson and Labassee cases (ch. 2). See also Ch. 9, 
section 9.6.3.
353 Case C‑336/94 Dafeki [1997] ECR I‑6761, ECLI:EU:C:1997:579, para. 19.
354 Possibly another avenue could be via the right to receive services (Art. 56 TFEU), if surrogacy can 
indeed be qualified as a service. The non‑recognition of parental links with a child born through 
surrogacy in another Member State could then possibly be seen as discouraging and thus restricting 
the right to receive services.
355 COM (2010) 747 final. In the so‑called Stockholm programme (OJ C115/1, p. 13), the European Council 
had yet invited the Commission to: ‘[…] follow up on the recent study on the possible problems 
encountered with regard to civil status documents and access to registers of such documents.’ It was 
held that ‘[i]n the long term, it might be considered whether mutual recognition of the effects of civil 
status documents could be appropriate, at least in certain areas. Work developed by the International 
Commission on Civil Status should be taken into account in this particular field.’
356 According to the Green paper, civil status records are ‘[…] records executed by an authority in order 
to record the life events of each citizen such as birth, filiation, adoption, marriage, recognition of 
paternity, death and also a surname change following marriage, divorce, a registered partnership, 
recognition, change of sex or adoption.’ See COM (2010) 747 final, para. 4.1.







The Commission’s main policy objectives were: (1) to reduce obstacles to the free 
movement of citizens; (2) to guarantee the continuity and permanence of the civil 
status situation to European citizens exercising their right to free movement and (3) 
to increase legal certainty in relation to civil status matters.357 It was held that it had 
to be possible to guarantee the continuity and permanence of a civil status situation 
to all European citizens exercising their right of freedom of movement:
‘[…] the legal status acquired by the citizen in the first Member State […] should not be 
questioned by the authorities of the second Member State since this would constitute a 
hindrance and source of objective problems hampering the exercise of citizens’ rights.’358
The Commission saw three policy options in regard of recognition of the effects of 
civil status records: (1) assisting national authorities to cooperate more effectively 
‘until there is greater convergence of MS’ substantive family law’; (2) automatic 
recognition ‘of civil status situations established in other Member States’ or (3) 
harmonisation of conflict‑of‑laws rules.359
The second option was the most far‑reaching, as it implied that once parental links 
had been established in one Member States, all other Member States had to accept 
these – even if surrogacy had been involved. The various contributions by national 
authorities in the public consultation process showed that such automatic recognition, 
if indeed proposed by the Commission, is not very likely to meet with unanimity 
in the Council. The German Federal Government, for example, put forward that 
in cases concerning issues like ‘the filiation of a child in the case of a “surrogate 
mother”’ and ‘the introduction of presumptions of filiation in favour of the mother’s 
registered female partner’, the EU could not require a Member State’s legislature 
‘[…] to place its family law at the disposal of the […] other Member States without 
restriction, allowing the persons concerned to have a family law relationship that 
exist[ed] under the law of another Member State to be registered in that State even 
though they [had] no close ties with that state’s legal order.’360 According to the 
German government,
‘[i]n such a case there would be no justification for this legal order, which is purely 
fortuitous or chosen comparatively freely by the persons concerned, to take precedence 
over the assessments of legal orders which – on the basis, say, of the nationality of the 
persons concerned or where they actually live – have an objectively closer connection 
with the facts and hence a greater claim to be applied.’361
357 COM (2010) 747 final.
358 Idem, para. 4.1.
359 The Green Paper made clear that the Commission had ‘neither the power nor the intention […] to 
modify the national definition of marriage.’ Idem, para. 4.3.
360 Federal Government observations on COM (2010) 747 final, pp. 12–13, online available at w w w .
ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/110510/public_authorities/germany_minjust_
en.pdf, visited June 2014.
361 Idem.







The option of harmonisation of conflict‑of‑laws rules received more support during 
the public consultation, but met with critique as well. It therefore seems more 
realistic to anticipate that only the first policy option – i.e., closer cooperation 
between Member States – could receive the required unanimity in the Council. Such 
cooperation, by nature, does not affect the Member States’ possibilities to uphold 
and apply their own national standards in cross‑border situations, for instance by 
means of public policy exceptions.
The public consultation was closed in May 2011. Both the EESC362 and the Committee 
of the Regions have published an Opinion on the matter.363 In a Resolution of 2012, 
the European Parliament called on the Commission to propose measures to mutually 
recognise the effects of civil status documents on the basis of the principle of mutual 
recognition.364 In the subsequent year the Commission published a proposal for 
a regulation on the free movement of public documents, which aimed to abolish 
requirements of proof of the genuineness of public documents, or the signatures of 
national officials on such documents, as issued by public authorities in other Member 
States.365 The question of the recognition of the effects of civil status records was 
not, however, addressed in this proposal.366 On that point so far no further legislative 
initiative has been taken.367
3.6.3.2. EP study on surrogacy in the EU (2013)
The European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs has in recent years expressed 
a particular interest in surrogacy in the European Union. In 2010 at the request of this 
Committee a note was published on mutual recognition of surrogacy agreements. 
The note proposed
362 European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion on the Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector’, COM 
(2010) 716 final. The EESC considered that, in connection with civil status records, the Commission 
had to: (1) establish a supranational optional system for the European civil status record; (2) start the 
work needed to harmonise rules concerning conflicts of law, and (3) ‘[…] establish mutual recognition 
by identifying the minimum requirements to be met by civil status records and consensus on the 
presumption of their general validity within the EU, once it has been verified that the relevant authority 
has issued them lawfully.’
363 Committee of the Regions, ‘Opinion on Green Paper ‘Less bureaucracy for citizens: Promoting free 
movement of public documents and recognition of the effects of civil status records’, [2012] OJ C54/23.
364 European Parliament Resolution of 24 May 2012 on the fight against homophobia in Europe 
(2012/2657(RSP)) P7_TA(2012)0222). In a Resolution of November 2010 the European Parliament 
had yet welcomed the Commission’s efforts to empower citizens to exercise their free movement 
rights and ‘strongly’ supported plans to enable the mutual recognition of the effects of civil status 
documents. European Parliament Resolution on civil law, commercial law, family law and Private 
international law aspects of the Action plan implementing the Stockholm Programme, 23 November 
2010, P7_TA(2010)0426.
365 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on promoting 
the free movement of citizens and businesses by simplifying the acceptance of certain public documents 
in the European Union and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012’, COM (2013) 228 final.
366 It was stressed in the proposal (at p. 7) that the draft Regulation did ‘[…] not deal with the recognition 
of the content of public documents issued by the authorities of the Member States.’
367 It is noted that this research was concluded on 31 July 2014.







‘[…] concerted efforts at the level of the EU and the Hague Conference for Private 
International Law in two directions: (i) to study cross‑border surrogacy (its nature, 
magnitude and personal experiences) and (ii) to produce an international Convention on 
private international aspects of surrogacy arrangements following the model of the Hague 
Intercountry Adoption Convention.’368
Subsequently, in 2013 a comparative study on surrogacy regimes of the EU Member 
States came out, which also addressed the question of whether there was a need 
for a common EU approach to the issue (see also 3.4.4 above). The authors of the 
report alleged that leaving the free movement rules to operate as they did amounted 
to ‘an implicit authorisation of surrogacy’. They also observed that ‘[…] mutual 
recognition within the EU (mostly via national laws and not EU law) allow[ed] the 
desired civil and parental status of children born though surrogacy to be recognised 
in their State of residence.’369 Because ‘[…] a fragile consensus […] in relation to 
the acknowledgment of the child’s civil status and legal parenthood’ could perhaps 
be identified, the authors of the report held it imaginable that EU law ‘authorised’ 
what they called ‘ex‑post mechanisms of recognition’.370 The report made no specific 
proposals for possible EU law instruments to enable such recognition, but merely 
held ‘[…] a harmonisation of conflict‑of‑law rules or a mutual recognition’ on the 
basis of Articles 67(4) and 81 TFEU imaginable and ‘[t]he deepening of civil status 
mutual recognition […] a good solution’.371 When no unanimity could be found 
for such an EU response to surrogacy, the enhanced cooperation procedure was 
considered ‘an interesting one’.372 Another possible approach suggested in the report 
was that the EU could join a (to be drafted) international instrument on surrogacy.373 
The report concluded that further research was needed in respect of, inter alia, ‘the 
EU legal basis and their potential to frame surrogacy’.374 The report was presented by 
the Committee on Legal Affairs in July 2013, but has not resulted in any legislative 
action at EU level in this field.
3.6.4. The European Arrest Warrant and reproductive matters
Following the adoption of the Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW) in 2002, the then existing complex and time‑consuming formal 
European extradition system, was replaced by a system of surrender between judicial 
368 European Parliament, Policy Department C, Citizen’s rights and constitutional affairs, Recognition 
of parental responsibility: biological parenthood v. legal parenthood, i.e. mutual recognition of 
surrogacy agreements: What is the current situation in the MS? Need for EU action? Note PE 432–738, 
2010, p. 9.
369 Brunet et al. 2013, supra n. 134, at p. 197.
370 Idem, at p. 197.
371 Idem, at p. 198–199.
372 Idem, at p. 198.
373 Idem, at p. 199.
374 Idem, at p. 199.







authorities.375 This was seen as ‘[…] the first concrete measure in the field of criminal 
law implementing the principle of mutual recognition which the European Council 
referred to as the “cornerstone” of judicial cooperation.’376
On the basis of Article 2 of the Framework Decision a European Arrest Warrant may 
be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or, where 
a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at 
least four months.
Under the old extradition system every extradition request was tested on the basis 
of the principle of double‑criminality following which the acts for which extradition 
was requested constituted an offence under the law of both the extraditing and 
the executing Member State. Because this was a time‑consuming assessment, the 
Commission proposed to abolish this principle. This was not, however, acceptable to 
many Member States, including the Netherlands and Germany. Inter alia, concerns 
were expressed that in some States abortion was perceived as murder or grievous 
bodily injury and that consequently States with a more liberal regime would risk 
needing to surrender citizens to States where abortion was criminalised.377 The 
Netherlands pled for the drafting of a ‘negative’ list of offences that would be 
excluded from the scope of application of the EAW.378 Such list was to include issues 
like euthanasia, abortion and certain drugs offences.379
A compromise was found by the drawing‑up of a list of certain offences in respect 
of which States have to surrender pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant, without 
verification of the double criminality of the act. This is the case only if the offences are 
punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order 
for a maximum period of at least three years. The list includes, inter alia, murder, 
375 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/
JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/
JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and 
fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of 
the person concerned at the trial [2009] OJ L81/24.
376 Recital 6 in the Preamble to Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.
377 Sections 58 and 59 of the Irish Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
378 The implementation of the EAW Framework Decision in the Netherlands involved extensive 
parliamentary debates, in which concerns were expressed this endangered the Dutch legislation 
concerning abortion, drugs and – in particular – euthanasia. Other than is the case concerning 
euthanasia (Art. 13 Overleveringswet [Act on the surrender of persons]) the Dutch implementation Act 
does not provide for a special regulation in respect of abortion.
379 The Irish Minister of Justice supported the inclusion of list with offences to which the double criminality 
principles would not apply, but he was against the Dutch proposal. D. Staunton, ‘Disagreements slow 
plans for anti‑terrorism laws in EU; A proposed European arrest warrant has caused clashes among 
states, writes Denis Staunton’, The Irish Times 17 October 2001, p. 13. Ireland, furthermore, protested 
as it had to amend its Constitution in order to provide for surrender of its nationals to other EU Member 
States. ‘Euthanasie ongewild hoger op EU‑agenda’, NRC Handelsblad 17 October 2001, pp. 1–2. 
Compare F. Kools, ‘Gedoogbeleid onder vuur EU; Europees strafrecht’, Trouw 18 October 2001, p. 4.







grievous bodily injury and illicit trade in human organs and tissue.380 For all other 
offences, not listed in the relevant Article 2(2), the principle of double criminality 
applies; surrender may be subject to the condition that the acts for which the EAW 
has been issued constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State, 
whatever the constituent elements or however it is described.381 Following Article 4(7)
(a), the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute the EAW where it relates 
to offences which are regarded by the law of the executing Member State as having 
been committed in whole or in part in the territory of the executing Member State.382
Article 2(3) provides for a possibility for the Council to extend or amend the list of 
categories of offence as contained in Article 2(2). It may do so in the light of reports 
submitted by the Commission on the operation of the Framework Decision.383 In its 
2006 review of the application of the EAW, the Commission observed that some 
Member States had indeed expressed the intention to review the list of crimes in 
respect of which the double criminality requirement was lifted ‘[…] in particular 
due to concerns in relation to abortion, euthanasia and possession of drugs.’384 The 
present author is not, however, aware of any follow‑up in this respect.385 In an annex 
to its 2011 report, the Commission noted that the Netherlands had stated that it would 
not surrender a national for the prosecution ‘[…] for an offence that [was] not an 
offence under Dutch law, because it [was] impossible under the relevant treaties and 
the national law to transfer a person where the requirement of double criminality 
380 Art. 2(2) Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.
381 Arts. 2(4) and 5(1) Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. On the basis of Art. 2 of the Framework 
Decision a European Arrest Warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing 
Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months 
or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four 
months.
382 As Blekxtoon and Van Ballegooij explain, this provision respects the interests of the requested state 
might have ‘[…] in the case not being prosecuted, at least in not being obliged to arrest and surrender 
the requested person, because the act is not punishable under its law and is in that state perhaps even 
valued positively instead of being condemned.’ The authors give ‘the obvious example’ of ‘’murder’ 
committed by a physician who has ended the life of an incurable patient (at his/her sincere request) 
whose severe suffering could no be relieved (euthanasia)’. R. Blekxtoon and W. van Ballegooij, 
Handbook on the European Arrest Warrant (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2005) p. 161. Under 
Art. 4(7)(b) such refusal is also permitted if the EAW relates to offences which have been committed 
outside the territory of the issuing Member State and the law of the executing Member State does not 
allow prosecution for the same offences when committed outside its territory.
383 Arts. 2(2) and 34(3) Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.
384 Commission, ‘Staff Working Document annexed to the Report from the Commission based on Art. 34 
of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (revised version)’, COM (2006) 8 final, p. 6. The Commission held 
the fact that Belgian legislation provided that abortion and euthanasia were not covered by ‘murder or 
grievous bodily harm’, to be contrary to the Framework Decision, since it is the law of the issuing state 
and not the executing state which determines whether an offence is within the list.
385 The 2009 amendment (supra n. 375), did not provide for any such change. A 2011 Commission working 
documents notes in respect of Belgium: ‘The limitation of the list of offences with regard to euthanasia 
and abortion was made at the time of the legislative adoption of the Belgian implementing legislation. 
There is no political will to change it.’ Commission, ‘Staff working document to the 2011 report of 
the Commission Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States’, COM (2011) 175 final.







ha[d] not been met.’ The Netherlands reportedly did not see a contradiction with the 
Framework Decision, since the Framework Decision did not regulate return but left 
that to the Member State. The Commission held it nevertheless to be ‘[…] clear that 
one of the principal advantages of this Framework Decision compared with previous 
extradition arrangements [was] the removal of the double criminality requirement 
in relation to the Article 2(2) list of categories of offences.’ It held that the Dutch 
position ‘obviously’ ran counter to this.’386
Under the EAW Framework as currently in force, it is, in theory, possible that 
Member States with restrictive abortion laws, such as Ireland, can issue an EAW 
in a case where a national had an abortion in a Member State with more permissive 
abortion regimes. For such an EAW to escape the double criminality requirement, 
the issuing Member State would have to qualify the offences as any of the offences 
enlisted in Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision, for example ‘murder’ or ‘grievous 
bodily injury’.387 While the minimum requirement of three years of Article 2(2) may 
have been met in some cases,388 it is not, from a language perspective a foregone 
conclusion that the aforementioned qualifications would indeed be employed by the 
issuing State. The requested State can, furthermore, refuse to execute the EAW if the 
abortion has taken place on its territory (Article 4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision). 
Moreover, it may not be very likely that States would indeed proceed to issue such 
an EAW, not only from a diplomatic viewpoint, considering the sensitivity of the 
matter in Europe, but also considering the low prosecution practice of most States.389 
Hence, the practical relevance of the EAW for abortion cases may after all prove to 
be limited.
In respect of AHR treatment or surrogacy no specific concerns were expressed in 
the process towards adoption of the EAW and the present author is not aware of any 
such discussions since. It is therefore equally uncertain whether the EAW regime 
could possibly and would ever be applied to matters related to AHR or surrogacy. 
As yet open questions are, for example, if trade in gametes could be qualified as 
‘illegal trade in human cells and tissue’, in some circumstances,390 and whether certain 
types of AHR treatment could be considered as ‘grievous bodily injury’ within the 
meaning of Article 2(2). So far, the CJEU has not given any ruling on these matters.
386 COM (2011) 175 final, pp. 131–132.
387 Douglas‑Scott considered abortion to be indeed ‘capable of falling within Art. 2(2). S. Douglas‑Scott, 
‘The rule of law in the European Union – putting the security into the area of freedom, security and 
justice’, 29 European Law Review (2004) p. 219 at p.225.
388 See for example Ch. 5, section 5.2.8.
389 See for example Ch. 5, section 5.2.9 and ch. 6, section 6.2.4.
390 Blekxtoon and Van Ballegooij have put forward that even if the conduct described in the arrest warrant 
is not illicit under the law of the state where the arrest warrant is meant to be executed, surrender is not 
barred ‘as the illicit trafficking as such falls within the category and consequently double criminality is 
not to be verified.’ Blekxtoon and  Ballegooij, van 2005, supra n. 382, at p. 161.








EU law contains little to no substantial standard‑setting in respect of abortion, AHR 
treatment or surrogacy. These matters have not gone unnoticed at the EU political 
level, but the EU legislature has been quite firm in stressing that there is no EU 
competence to regulate for these sensitive issues substantively. EU law only sets 
certain quality and safety standards for AHR services and for the placing in the 
market of in vitro diagnostic medical devices. While these contain certain rules on 
the donation of gametes, States are given much discretion in this regard (section 3.3.2 
above). The EU’s non‑discrimination law, furthermore, has only limited implications 
for Member States’ regulation of this area. States must provide for protection of 
women who are in an advanced stage of IVF treatment against dismissal, but there is 
no obligation under EU law to grant paid leave to intended mothers who had a child 
through a surrogacy agreement and restrictions on access to AHR treatment cannot 
be challenged on the basis of EU non‑discrimination law (sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4).
If one thing, the present chapter shows that as a result of EU (free movement) law 
EU citizens and residents of EU Member States have a broader range of choice 
when it comes to medical treatment.391 Although exhaustive statistics are lacking, 
it is obvious that such cross‑border movement in reproductive matters indeed takes 
place within the EU (section 3.4). Once treatment can be qualified as a ‘medical 
service’ – which is the case when it is lawful in at least one Member State and 
normally provided for remuneration – the EU regime on cross‑border health care as 
set out in section 3.5 applies. This means that people have access to medical services, 
including abortion and AHR treatment, that may not be available or even prohibited 
in their home country. States remain free, however, to decide what treatment they 
wish to regulate or to prohibit within their own jurisdictions.392
While EU law has thus increased access to medical treatment, free movement can, 
nevertheless, be restrained. For instance, States are under no obligation to reimburse 
treatment obtained abroad, if that treatment is not among the benefits provided for 
by their national legislation (section 3.6.2.1). Whether they can set prior authorisation 
requirements in cases concerning abortion and AHR treatment, can not be said with 
absolute certainty (section 3.6.2.2). There are equally questions as to the obligations 
of States under EU law to provide medical follow‑up care after a patient has had an 
abortion or has obtained AHR treatment in another Member State (section 3.6.2.3). It 
furthermore remains to be seen if the CJEU will some day rule that different regimes 
391 Compare Van de Gronden and Szyszczak who held that ‘[…] the freedom of choice (of medical 
treatment) of individuals is a value that is protected in the case law of the EU Courts.’ Gronden, van 
de and Szyszczak 2011, supra n. 170, at p. 487. De la Rosa observed that ‘[t]hrough [the] facilitation of 
access to care, citizens can access forms of care that, in the State in which they are insured, are either 
non‑existent or rare, and thereby benefit from the various structures and health facilities found in 
different States.’ De la Rosa 2012, supra n. 33, at p. 23.
392 Presumably, it is for that reason that Hervey and McHale observed in 2004 that until that time, 
‘little concrete success’ could be reported in cases where parties had, by relying on EU law, sought 
to undermine national legal standards on human reproduction, including those enshrined in national 
constitutions. Hervey and McHale 2004, supra n. 47, at p. 153.







in respect of abortion, AHR treatment and/or surrogacy may in themselves constitute 
an obstacle to free movement (section 3.6.2.5). What seems established, however, is 
that States must actively provide information about foreign abortion services and 
AHR treatment options through national contact points (section 3.6.2.4). This does 
not hold for surrogacy, however, as that does not qualify as health care under the 
Patient Mobility Directive.
In respect of surrogacy there is certainly nothing provided at EU level. Intended 
mothers are not protected under EU employment law (section 3.3.4) and none of 
the existing EU PIL instruments provides for the recognition of parental links 
established in another Member State (section 3.6.3). The latter issue has, however, 
caught the attention of EU institutions and the first careful initiatives have been 
taken that could lead to the adoption of EU instruments in the future. Whether this 
indeed materialises, yet remains to be seen, particularly now that unanimity in the 
Council is required. In any case, any possible EU instrument could only regulate for 
cross‑border surrogacy cases within the EU, while in many international surrogacy 
cases third countries are involved.
All in all, while EU law may potentially have even more impact on the reproductive 
matters that are central to this case study, it may well be that this potential will not 
be exploited, exactly because of the sensitivity of the matter at stake.









The relevant constitutional framework for the German law on reproductive issues 
relates to various provisions of the German Basic Law. Prominent and important 
rights that are involved in reproductive matters are the right to human dignity 
(Article 1(1) Basic Law), the right to free development of the personality (Article 2(1) 
Basic Law) and the special protection of the family (Article 6(1) Basic Law).1 
This section firstly gives a brief introduction to the first two Articles. The special 
protection of the family is closely intertwined with the special protection of marriage 
and is therefore set out elaborately in Chapter 10.2 Subsection 4.1.3 explains how a 
right to procreate has been held to follow from these rights. Next, three interrelated 
issues concerning the rights of the (future) child are discussed, namely; the status of 




With the atrocities of World War II freshly in mind, the drafters of the German Basic 
Law (1949) wanted the new constitution to provide an answer to the totalitarian 
contempt of the individual by the National Socialistic regime.3 Human dignity (‘die 
Würde des Menschen’) was therefore taken as the basic and guiding principle of the 
Basic Law.4 It was included in its first provision, Article 1(1), which reads:
‘Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state 
authority.’5
Illustrative of its fundamental significance in German law is the fact that 
this provision is protected from amendment (the so‑called eternity clause 
1 Art. 6(1) Basic Law reads: ‘Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.’
2 The right to equal treatment as protected under Art. 3 of the German Basic Law is also discussed in 
Ch. 10. 
3 H. Dreier, ‘Art. 1’, in H. Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz‑Kommentar, Band 1, Präambel, Artikel 1–19 
[Commentary to the Basic Law, Volume 2, Preamble, Articles 1–19], 2nd edn. (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 
2004) p. 39 at p. 161.
4 Idem, at p. 154.
5 English translation by C. Tomuschat and D.P. Currie, online available at: www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/
englisch_gg/index.html, visited June 2014.







(‘Ewigkeitsgarantie’6)).7 Over the years, human dignity – interpreted by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) as the supreme 
value (‘obersten Wert’) of the Basic Law8 – has come to serve as an interpretative 
and guiding principle (‘Grundnorm’9) for the other provisions of the Basic Law.10 
Next to this ‘Fundierungscharakter’, human dignity is also a right of its own (‘Norm 
des objektiven Verfassungsrecht’). While an exact definition is difficult to find, the 
Constitutional Court held in 2009 that the protection of human dignity was based 
‘[…] on the idea of Man as a spiritual and moral being which [had] the capabilities of 
defining himself, and of developing, in freedom.’11 The common denominator of the 
protection of Article 1(1) has accordingly been held to be to prevent the human being 
from being downgraded to a simple means (‘der konkrete Mensch [wird] zum Objekt, 
zu einem Bloßen Mittel, zur vertretbaren Größe herabgewuridgt’).12
Numerous individual rights have been brought under the scope of this first and 
fundamental provision of the German Basic Law. Authors who have been critical of 
the frequent invocation of human dignity in all sorts of contexts have warned against 
inflation (‘Trivialisierung’ and ‘Inflationierung’) of the principle.13 It is disputed 
in German legal scholarship whether it follows from the fundamental character of 
the right to human dignity of Article 1(1) Basic Law that it is absolute, i.e., that no 
balancing against other fundamental rights is allowed.14
4.1.2.	 Article	2:	personal	freedoms
Article 2 of the German Basic Law contains a number of personal freedoms that 
are relevant for the present case study on reproductive matters. Its first paragraph 
provides for a general personality right (das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht) and 
reads:
‘Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does 
not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.’
6 Dreier 2004, supra n. 3, at p. 163.
7 On the basis of Art. 79(3) Basic Law, the principles of Arts. 1 and 20 Basic Law cannot be amended.
8 Inter alia BVerfG 16 January 1957, Az. 1 BvR 253/56, NJW 1957 p. 297 and BVerfG 16 July 1969, Az. 
1 BvL 19/63, NJW 1969 p. 1707. See Dreier 2004, supra n. 3, at p. 161, footnote 125.
9 Dreier 2004, supra n. 3, at p. 161.
10 Idem, at p. 155.
11 BVerfG 30 June 2009, Az. 2 BvE 2/08 a.o., NJW 2009 p. 2267, para. 364.
12 Dreier 2004, supra n. 3, at p. 167, referring to ‘G. Dürig, AöR 81 (1956)’.
13 Dreier 2004, supra n. 3, at pp. 164–166.
14 Dreier for instance argues that such balancing is not possible. Dreier 2004, supra n. 3, at p. 163, 
referring to BVerfG 10 October 1995, Az. 1 BvR 1476/91 a.o., NJW 1995 p. 3303 and BVerfG 11 March 
2003 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 426, NJW 2003 p. 1303.







This right is considered one of the most fundamental rights in the German 
Constitution,15 as underlined by its position in the Basic Law, directly after the first 
Article on human dignity.16 No exhaustive definition of this personality right exists,17 
but it in any case contains a right to respect for the private and intimate sphere, a right 
to personal autonomy, as well as a right to free development of the personality.18 As 
explained further in the subsequent subsection, the latter right, inter alia, includes a 
right to procreate.
Further, on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 2, every person has the right 
to life and physical integrity. As explained in more detail below, the right to life has 
been held to apply from the moment of nidation.19 The right to free development 
of the personality in combination with the right to physical integrity has also been 
understood as to contain a right to bio‑ethical self‑determination.20
4.1.3.	 The	fundamental	right	to	procreate
German legal scholarship generally accepts that a fundamental right to procreate 
(‘Recht auf Fortpflanzung’) exists. This right is also referred to as right to reproductive 
autonomy (‘Recht auf reproduktive Autonomie’) or right to have offspring (‘Recht auf 
Nachkommenschaft’).21 The foundation of the right to procreate in the German Basic 
Law, however, is debated. Some hold that a right to procreate can be derived from the 
right to free development of the personality (‘das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht’) 
of Article 2(1) in combination with Article 1(1) Basic Law.22 It was also Article 2(1) 
from which the Federal Financial Court (Bundesfinanzhof, BFH) derived a right for 
women to bear children. According to the BFH, this includes a right to make use of 
15 H. Lang, ‘BeckOK GG Art. 2’ [‘Beck online Commentary to Art. 2 GG’], in: V. Epping and 
C. Hillgruber (eds.), Beck’scher Online‑Kommentar GG [Beck Online Commentary to the German 
Basic Law], 22nd edn. (München, Verlag Beck 2014) Rn. 31.
16 U. Di Fabio, ‘GG Art. 2’ [‘Art. 2 German Basic Law’], in: R. Herzorg et al. (eds.) Maunz und Dürig 
Grundgesetz‑Kommentar [Maunz and Dürig Commentary to the Basic Law], 71st edn. (München, 
Verlag C.H. Beck 2014) Rn. 127–131.
17 Idem, Rn. 147–148.
18 Idem, Rn. 204.
19 See section 4.1.4.
20 Di Fabio 2014, supra n. 16, Rn. 204.
21 See R. Müller‑Terpitz, ‘Das Recht auf Fortpflanzung – Vorgaben der Verfassung und der EMRK’ 
[‘The right to procreate – guidelines of the German Constitution and the ECHR’], in: H. Frister and 
D. Olzen (eds.), Reproduktionsmedizin, Rechtliche Fragestellungen. Dokumentation der Tagung zum 
10‑jährigen Bestehen des Instituts für Rechtsfragen der Medizin Düsseldorf [Reproduction medicine, 
legal questions. Proceedings of the Conference for the 10 year anniversary of the Düsseldorf institute 
for medical legal issues] (Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf University Press 2010) p. 9 at p. 11 and M. Reinke, 
Fortpflanzungsfreiheit und das Verbot der Fremdeizellspende [Freedom of reproduction and the 
prohibition of egg‑cell donation] (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 2008) p. 190. Reinke refers to R. Badinter, 
`Menschenrechte gegenüber de Fortschritten in der Medizin, der Biologie und der Biochemie – Wie 
soll sich die Rechtspolitik gegenüber der Humangenetik verhalten?’, RuP 1985, p. 196; to T. Ramm, 
`Die Fortpflanzung – ein Freiheitsrecht?’, JZ 1989, p. 866 and to H. Kliemt, `Normative Probleme der 
künstlichen Geschlechtsbestimmung und des Klonens’, ZRP 1979, pp. 165 and 168.
22 Reinke 2008, supra n. 21, at p. 190, footnote 349.







medical methods to initiate a pregnancy, to the extent to which such measures are 
legal:
‘Das Recht, Kinder zu gebären, gehört bei verheirateten wie bei unverheirateten Frauen 
zwar zum Kernbereich des Grundrechts auf freie Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit […] und 
schließt das Recht ein, ärztliche Maßnahmen zur Herbeiführung einer Schwangerschaft 
vornehmen zu lassen, soweit diese rechtlich erlaubt sind.’23
Others base a right to procreate on the (right to) special protection of the family 
of Article 6(1) Basic Law.24 Müller‑Terpitz, for instance, argues that Article 6(1) 
protects a right to personal development within the family. This right, the author 
holds, necessarily also includes the foundation of such a family and thus the right to 
procreate.25 A third view sees Article 6(1) Basic Law as a reinforcement of the right 
to free development of the personality.26
The right to procreate is not absolute and various German regulations concerning 
reproductive matters – as discussed more extensively in section 4.3 – have been 
regarded as (justified) interferences with the right to procreate.27 Here, one may think 
of the prohibition on egg cell donation (see section 4.3.4.1 below) and the (former) 
prohibition on preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD, see 4.3.6 below).28
4.1.4.	 The	status	of	the	unborn	under	German	law
The question as from what stage of development the (constitutional) protection 
of unborn life begins is subject to debate in German legal scholarship.29 Views 
differ from a strict negation of any protection of unborn life, to a multistage ascent 
protection whereby the intensity of the protection is made dependent on the stage of 
development of the unborn life, to a full protection of all forms of human life.30 In 
its abortion judgment of 1975 (see section 4.2.2 below) the Constitutional Court held 
that the right to life ex Article 2(2) Basic Law extends to the unborn life from the 
23 The Court held: ‘The right to bear children forms part of the core essence of the right to free development 
of the personality of both unmarried and married women […] and includes the right to undergo medical 
treatment to procure a pregnancy, to the extent that such treatment is lawful.’ BFH 28 July 2005, 
Az. III R 30/03, NJW 2005 p. 3517, para. 47. The BFH also held that no right to state finance or tax 
deduction for the costs of such AHR treatment can be derived from the right to free development of the 
personality.
24 As noted above, this right is discussed in more detail in Ch. 10, section 10.1.2.
25 Müller‑Terpitz 2010, supra n. 21, at p. 12.
26 Reinke 2008, supra n. 21, at p. 190, footnote 350.
27 See Müller‑Terpitz 2010, supra n. 21, at p. 15.
28 Other examples, that are not extensively discussed in this chapter are the limitation of the fertilisation 
of a maximum of three egg‑cells per cycle (Art. 1(1)(4) ESchG) and the limitation of the implantation 
of embryos to a maximum of three per cycle (Art. 1(1)(3) ESchG).
29 M. Herdegen, ‚GG Art. 1 Abs 1’ [‘Art. 1 para. 1 GG’], in: R. Herzorg et al. (eds.), Maunz und Dürig 
Grundgesetz‑Kommentar [Maunz and Dürig Commentary to the Basic Law], 55th ed (München, Verlag 
Beck 2011) Rn. 60.
30 Herdegen 2011, supra n. 29, Rn. 60.







moment of nidation, i.e., from the 14th day after conception.31 The starting point of 
an entitlement to the constitutional right to life, is not, however, necessarily the same 
point in time, as the starting point of the protection of other constitutional rights. The 
more broadly defined right to human dignity may for instance extend to life before 
nidation, a view that is widely supported in legal scholarship.32 In its 1975 judgment 
the Court left this question open,33 and the BVerfG has never conclusively ruled on 
the matter. In legal scholarship, it has been argued that even if it is accepted that 
human dignity extends to the pre‑nidative life, it cannot automatically be said that all 
biotechnological practices are in violation of Article 1(1) Basic Law.34
The question whether the embryo in vitro (i.e., outside the woman’s body) also enjoys 
subjective rights to human dignity, life and physical integrity, has been subject of 
debate in legal scholarship.35 In this respect again a distinction has been made between 
different stages of development of the in vitro unborn life, whereby the constitutional 
protection increases in force in accordance with its stage of development.36 When 
drafting the Embryo Protection Act (Embryoschutzgesetz, ESchG) by the end of the 
1980s (see 4.3.1 below), the German legislature took as a starting point that human 
life begins with ‘Kernverschmelzung’, i.e., with the fertilisation of a human egg 
cell.37 Accordingly, any processing of human embryos, even in the earliest cell stage, 
must be in conformity with the protection of human dignity ex Article 1(1) Basic 
Law, the legislature held.38
4.1.5.	 The	best	interests	of	the	child
Even though the German Basic Law contains no specific Article on the rights of the 
child in general,39 the best interests of the child (‘Kindeswohl’), is also under German 
law an important notion. It has been held to find its constitutional foundation in 
31 BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74, NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 136.
32 Compare Herdegen 2011, supra n. 29, Rn. 61 and Dreier 2004, supra n. 3, at pp. 173 and 181.
33 The Court held that where human life exists, it is entitled to human dignity.
34 Dreier 2004, supra n. 3, at p. 186.
35 See Müller‑Terpitz 2010, supra n. 21, at pp. 16 and 18.
36 Herdegen 2011, supra n. 29, Rn. 60 and 68. In 2014 the Administrative Court of Appeal of Münster 
ruled that the protection of children under Art. 42 of the Social Act, Book VIII did not apply to a 
cryopreserved embryo, but only applied to children from the moment of birth. OVG Münster 15 January 
2014 (dec.), Az. 12 A 2078/13, paras. 12–18.
37 BT‑Drs. XI/5460, p. 6. See also the Explanatory memorandum to the ESchG Bill, as printed 
in M. Lanz‑Zumstein (ed.), Embryonenschutz und Befruchtungstechnik, Seminarbericht und 
Stellungnahmen aus der Arbeitsgruppe “Gentechnologie” des deutschen Juristinnenbundes 
[Protection of embryos and fertilisation techniques, Seminar report and statements of the working 
group “Genetic Engineering“ of the German Women Lawyers’ Association], (München, J. Schweitzer 
Verlag 1986) Annex 1, p. 155.
38 Lanz‑Zumstein 1986, supra n. 37, at p. 156. The legislature typified the protection of human dignity as 
one of the primary aims pursued with the introduction of the Embryoschutzgezetz (EschG) [Embryo 
Protection Act] and the later Stamzellgesetz (StZG) [Stemm Cell Act]. BT‑Drs. 11/5460, p. 6 and Art. 1 
StZG, BGBl. I, p. 2277, last amended by BGBl. I, p. 1708.
39 Art. 6 Basic Law contains three paragraphs that concern rights of children in particular, namely 
paras. 2, 3 and 5.







a combination of rights, namely the right to free development of the personality 
(Article 2(1) in combination with Article 1(1)) as well as the parental responsibility 
of Article 6(2) Basic Law.40
4.1.6. The right to know one’s genetic origins
In 1988 the BVerfG ruled for the first time that a child has a right to know about its 
lineage or genetic origins (‘Recht auf Kenntnis der Abstammung’).41 In the relevant 
case, which concerned a child conceived in an extramarital affair, the Court based 
its finding on Article 6(5) (equal treatment of children born outside marriage)42 
in combination with Article 2(1) Basic Law (the general right to personality).43 
Shortly thereafter the Court grounded a right to know about one’s genetic origins on 
Article 2(1) in connection with Article 1(1) Basic Law (the right to human dignity).44
In 2008 a new Article 1598a was included in the Civil Code, on the basis of which 
father, mother and child may each bring proceedings to claim consent to a genetic 
examination to clarify natural parentage.45 If one of the family members refuses to 
give such consent, the family court can substitute that consent and order acquiescence 
40 Müller‑Terpitz 2010, supra n. 21, at p. 19 and R. Müller‑Terpitz, ‘GG Art. 6 [Ehe, Familie, nicht eheliche 
Kinder]’ [‘Marriage, family, children born out of wedlock’], in: A. Spickhoff, Medizinrecht [Medical 
Law], 2nd edn. (München, Verlag Beck 2014) Rn. 12.
41 BVerfG 18 January 1988 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 1589/87, NJW 1988 p. 3010. See also R. Ratzel ‚Beschränkung 
des Rechts auf Fortpflanzung durch das ärztliche Berufsrecht’ [‘Limitation of the right to procreate by 
means of the law on the medical profession’], in: H. Frister and D. Olzen (eds.), Reproduktionsmedizin, 
Rechtliche Fragestellungen. Dokumentation der Tagung zum 10‑jährigen Bestehen des Instituts für 
Rechtsfragen der Medizin Düsseldorf [Reproduction medicine, legal questions. Proceedings of the 
Conference for the 10 year anniversary of the Düsseldorf institute for medical legal issues] (Düsseldorf, 
Düsseldorf University Press 2010) p. 43 at pp. 51–52.
42 Art. 6(5) Basic Law reads: ‘Children born outside of marriage shall be provided by legislation with 
the same opportunities for physical and mental development and for their position in society as are 
enjoyed by those born within marriage.’ Translation from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_gg, 
visited June 2014.
43 Art. 2(1) Basic Law reads: ‘Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality 
insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral 
law.’ Translation from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_gg, visited June 2014.
44 BVerfG 31 January 1989, Az. 1 BvL 17/87, NJW 1989 p. 891 and BVerfG 13 February 2007, Az. 1 
BvR 421/05, NJW 2007 p. 753. See also J. Young Lee, Unterhaltsverpflichtungen bei Leihmutterschaft 
[Maintenance obligations in the case of surrogacy] (Baden‑Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1996) 
pp. 91–108.
45 Art. 1598a (1) BGB. This provision was inserted in the Civil Code following a 2007 BVerfG judgment 
in which the Constitutional Court found that a secret paternity test could not be used in court 
proceedings and commissioned the legislature to provide for proceedings in which paternity could 
be established. BVerfG 13 February 2007, Az. 1 BvR 421/05, NJW 2007 p. 753. See F. Klinkhammer, 
‘Der Scheinvater und sein Kind – Das Urteil des BVerfG vom 13.2.2007 und seine gesetzlichen 
Folgen’ [‘The ostensible father and his child – The judgment of the German Constitutional Court of 
12 February 2007 and its legal consequences’], Forum Familienrecht 4/2007, pp. 128–131, online 
available at www.forum‑familienrecht.de/neu/dateien/0407/128–131.pdf, visited March 2011. See also 
BGH 25 June 2008 (dec.), Az. XII ZB 163/06, NJW 2008 p. 3429 and BVerfG 13 October 2008 (dec.), 
Az. 1 BvR 1548/03, NJW 2009 p. 423.







in the taking of a sample.46 The court has to suspend the proceedings ‘[…] if and 
as long as the clarification of the natural parentage would result in a considerable 
adverse effect on the best interests of the minor child which would be unreasonable 
for the child even taking into account the concerns of the person entitled to clarify.’47
The first case on the implications of the right to know one’s genetic origins in the 
context of heterologous insemination was decided in 2013 by the Court of Appeal 
(Oberlandesgericht, OLG) of Hamm.48 This Court ruled that the interests of a 
child conceived with donated sperm, to get information about its genetic origins 
had precedence over the rights of the sperm donor and the doctor involved to keep 
such information confidential. This implied an obligation for the doctor involved to 
provide information about the donor to the child.49 The Court held that knowledge 
about ‘constitutive factors’ such as descent was important for the free development 
of the personality. It gave important information about one’s genes, formed the 
personality and was a key factor in the development of the personal identity. The 
Court acknowledged that personal freedoms of the donor were also concerned, but 
ruled that the rights of the donor‑conceived child were to be given more and decisive 
weight.50 A year later another OLG ruled, that sperm donors in turn have a right to 
be informed about the birth of children following their donation.51
4.2. germAn AbortIon legIslAtIon
While nowadays abortion is no longer a hot topic in Germany,52 it was definitely so 
in the 1970s and 1980s. In the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, ‘West 
Germany’) in particular, abortion was a highly controversial topic. While in the 
former German Democratic Republic (GDR, ‘East Germany’) rather liberal abortion 
laws were adopted and enacted, the FRG chose a considerably more restrictive path. 
These FRG abortion laws were, to a large extent, the result of an ongoing dialogue 
between the legislature and the Federal Constitutional Court. This also goes for 
the German abortion laws as currently in force in the unified Germany. The latest 
46 Art. 1598a (2) BGB.
47 Art. 1598a (3) BGB. Translation taken from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.
html#p5357, visited June 2014.
48 OLG Hamm 6 February 2013, Az. I‑14 U 7/12, NJW 2013 p. 1167.
49 See also M. Wellenhoffer, ‘Die Samenspende und ihre (späten) Rechtsfolgen’ [‘Sperm donation 
and its (late) legal consequences’], Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht, FamRZ (2013) p. 825 
and A. Jorzig, ‘Anspruch auf Kenntnis der genetischen Abstammung eines durch eine heterologe 
Insemination gezeugten Kindes’ [‘The right to information on the genetic descent of a child born 
through heterologous insemination’], jurisPR‑MedizinR (2013) Anm. 1.
50 OLG Hamm 6 February 2013, Az. I‑14 U 7/12, NJW 2013 p. 1167, para. 52.
51 OLG Karlsruhe 7 February 2014 (dec.), Az. 16 UF 274/13, NJW 2014 p. 2050.
52 Ulsenheimer observes that since the year 2000 the discussions about abortions have diminished 
considerably. Further, in legal praxis, the criminal prohibition of abortion plays at present a marginal 
role, with less and less, to almost no criminal convictions on the basis of this provision. K. Ulsenheimer, 
‘Schwangerschaftsabbruch’ [‘Termination of pregnancy’], in: A. Laufs and B.R. Kern (eds.), Handbuch 
des Arztrechts [Handbook of medical law], 4th edn. (München, Verlag Beck 2010) Rn. 6.







substantial amendment to the present German abortion laws dates back to 2009 and 
concerned so‑called late abortions (see 4.2.6 below).
This section gives a – mainly chronological – overview of the coming into existence 
of the various abortion regimes in former West Germany, former East Germany, as 
well as present (unified) Germany. To the extent that these are available, relevant 
statistics concerning criminal prosecutions and convictions on the basis of these 
laws are provided.53 This sketch of the different German abortion regimes gives an 
insight in the possible causes for cross‑border movement for abortions from (as well 
as within) Germany, a topic that will be discussed in section 4.4 below.
4.2.1.	 Early	German	abortion	legislation
The Prussian Criminal Code of 185154 and the subsequent Criminal Code of 1871 
(Reichsstrafgesetzbuch) fully criminalised abortion.55 A pregnant woman who 
wilfully terminated her pregnancy risked a penalty of a minimum of six months and 
a maximum of five years imprisonment.56 These provisions remained in force for 
approximately 50 years. From the first decade of the 20th century onwards, several 
proposals for legalisation of abortion were introduced,57 but none was followed‑up 
by actual legislation. Only the penalties to be imposed in case of abortion were 
made less severe in 1926.58 Further, in 1927, the Reichsgericht – at that time the 
highest German court – ruled that abortion in cases of grave danger to the life and 
health of the mother was an ‘extra‑statutory necessity’ and accordingly could not be 
considered a crime.59
Under the national‑socialist regime, abortions were regarded as ‘attacks on the life 
force of the nation’ and laws regulating the matter were held to serve the ‘protection 
of the nation’s strength’.60 Penalties for abortions were seriously augmented and 
53 Other than in Ch. 5 and Ch. 6, these statistics on prosecutions are not discussed in a separate subsection, 
but are integrated in the main text. This choice has been made deliberately, because the German legal 
situation has been more complex, particularly because of the two separate and simultaneous regimes 
before the 1990 reunification.
54 Arts. 181 and 182 Strafgesetzbuch für die Preußischen Staaten [Criminal Code for the Prusian State] 
of 14 April 1851, as referred to in BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, 
para. 32.
55 Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich [Criminal Code for the German Reich] of 15 May 1871, RGBl. 
p. 127, as referred to BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 32.
56 Art. 218 StGB (old). See BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, paras. 33–35.
57 See BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 32, where the Court referred 
to ‘Gustav Radbruchs Entwurf eines Allgemeinen Deutschen Strafgesetzbuches (1922), Tübingen 
1952, p. 28, § 225’ and ‘Grotjahn‑Radbruch, Die Abtreibung der Leibesfrucht, 1921’.
58 Gesetz zur Abänderung des Strafgesetzbuchs [Act on the Amendment of the Criminal Code] of 18 May 
1926, RGBl. I p. 239 as cited in BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 7.
59 Reichsgericht 11 March 1927, 61 RGst 242 (1937), as cited in BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 
a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 6.
60 BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 9.







included even the death penalty.61 At the same time a policy was adopted whereby 
‘unworthy lives’ were aborted for eugenic reasons.62
After World War II the abortion laws of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, 
‘West Germany’) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, ‘East Germany’) 
developed in different directions. The FRG re‑enacted the general prohibition 
on abortion of the pre Nazi era laws. Further, the Basic Law was adopted which 
included the rights to human dignity, the right to life and the right to bodily integrity, 
of which, in any case, the right to life would later be held applicable to unborn life 
by the Constitutional Court (see 4.2.2). In the GDR, instead, the emancipation and 
self‑determination of the woman were central and accordingly more liberal abortion 
laws were enacted.63 Initially the different states (Länder) of the GDR had different 
abortion laws, all allowing for abortion on the basis of a criminological or medical 
indication and some additionally allowing for abortion on social, medical‑social or 
eugenetic grounds.64 In 1950 an abortion regime for the entire GDR was adopted, 
following which abortion was allowed if a special Committee had judged that the 
life or the health of the pregnant women was seriously endangered.65 As Lammich 
explained, some of these Committees included social grounds in their judgments. 
This was reason for the Minister of Health to issue an instruction in 1965, following 
which a serious deterioration of the woman’s physical or mental health constituted 
legitimate ground for an abortion.66
In West Germany, in the 1960s, various bills seeing at the liberalisation of the abortion 
laws were tabled in the FRG Parliament.67 While none of the proposals to legalise 
abortion under certain conditions was adopted, the sentences to be imposed were 
again lowered in 1969.68 Further, a considerable decline is visible in prosecutions 
61 Verordnung zur Durchführung der Verordnung zum Schutz von Ehe, Familie und Mutterschaft 
[Regulation on the Introduction oft he Regulation on the Protection of Marriage, Family and Maternity] 
of 18 March 1943, RGBl. I p. 169.
62 A. Eser, ‘Reform of German abortion law: first experiences’, 34 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law (1986) p. 369 at p. 371, footnote 13, referring to 1935 RGBl. I p. 773.
63 See also A. Laufs, ‘Schwangerschaftsabbruch’ [‘Termination of pregnancy’], in A. Laufs et al., 
Arztrecht [Medical law] 6th edn. (München, Verlag Beck 2009) Rn. 27–58. In Rn. 45, footnote 77 the 
author refers to Arts. 153–155 StGB‑DDR, Act of 12 January 1968, revised version of 14 December 
1988, GBl. I 1989, No. 3, p. 33 with the amendment of 29 June 1990, GBl. I, No. 39, p. 526; Art. 1(2) and 
Art. 3(1) Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft [Act on the Termination of Pregnancy] of 
9 March 1972, GBl. I, No. 5, p. 89. Laufs explains that after 12 weeks of pregnancy an indication model 
applied.
64 See S. Lammich, ‘Landesbericht Deutsche Demokratische Republik’ [‘National report German 
Democratic Republic’], in A. Eser and H.‑G. Koch, Schwangerschaftsabbruch im internationalen 
Vergleich, Rechtlichen Regelungen – Soziale Rahmenbedingungen – Empirische Grunddaten, Teil 1: 
Europa [Abortion in international comparison, legal regulation – social framework – empirial basic 
data, part 1: Europe] (Baden‑Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1988) p. 326 at pp. 337–338.
65 Gesetz über den Mutter‑ und Kinderschutz und die Rechte der Frau [Act on the protection of Mother 
and child and the rights of the woman] of 27 September 1950, GBl. der DDR 1950, p. 1037.
66 Instruction of the Minister of Health of 15 March 1965, as referred to by Lammich 1988, supra n. 64, 
at p. 339, footnote 29.
67 BR‑Drs. 270/60, pp. 38 and 278; BR‑Drs. 200/62, pp. 35–36 and 38 and BT‑Drs. V/32.
68 Erste Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (1. StrRG) [First Act on the Reform of the Criminal Law] Act 
of 25 June 1969, BGBl. I p. 645.







based on the abortion laws in force at that time: between 1960 and 1969 the number of 
registered cases dropped with approximately 75 per cent from 4,195 in 1960 to 1,150 
in 1969.69 In that same period the number of convictions dropped from 1,809 to 596. 
There are no reliable numbers of abortions carried out in the FRG in the 1960s, but 
estimates lie between 400,000 and one million abortions a year in the mid‑1960s.70 
An increasing number of women in the FRG went abroad for an abortion (relevant 
statistics are discussed in greater detail in section 4.4 below). Under influence of 
the liberalisation of the abortion legislation of various West European countries, 
campaigns aimed at the legalisation of abortion intensified in the FRG. At the time, 
a group of German and Swiss professors made suggestions for improvements to the 
then existing Criminal Code.71 The group agreed that some relaxation of the criminal 
prohibition on abortion was desirable. The group was, however, divided in respect 
of how to achieve this; while the majority proposed a so‑called ‘periodic model’ or 
‘stipulation model’72 (whereby the stage of the pregnancy is primarily decisive for the 
question whether abortion is permitted or not), a minority favoured an ‘indications 
model’ (whereby the penalisation depends on the ground (‘indication’) for the 
intended abortion).
In the meantime, in East Germany, the Pregnancy Termination Act (Gesetz über 
die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft) entered into force in 1972.73 This act 
implemented a periodic model: women in the GDR had the right to have an abortion 
in an obstetric/gynaecological institution within 12 weeks from the beginning of the 
pregnancy.74 At a later stage of the pregnancy an abortion could be performed only 
if an expert medical commission estimated that continuation of the pregnancy would 
endanger the life of the woman or if there were other grave reasons.75 Abortions 
were prohibited where they could lead to gravely injurious or life‑threatening 
69 H.‑G. Koch, ‘Bundersrepublik Deutschland’ [‘Federal Republic of Germany’], in: A. Eser and 
H.‑G. Koch, Schwangerschaftsabbruch im internationalen Vergleich, Rechtlichen Regelungen – Soziale 
Rahmenbedingungen – Empirische Grunddaten, Teil 1: Europa [Abortion in international comparison, 
legal regulation – social framework – empirial basic data, Part 1: Europe] (Baden‑Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 1988) p. 17 at p. 249.
70 Koch 1988, supra n. 69, at p. 234.
71 J.J. Darby, Alternative Draft of a Penal Code for The Federal Republic of Germany (New York, South 
Hackensack 1977).
72 K.L. Belew, ‘Stem Cell Division: Abortion Law and Its Influence on the Adoption of Radically 
Different Embryonic Stem Cell Legislation in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany’, 
39 Texas international Law Journal (2003–2004) p. 479 at p. 508.
73 Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft [Act on the Termination of Pregnancy] of 9 March 
1972, GBl. I, No. 5, p. 89 and the related implementing regulations of the same date (GBl. II, p. 149). See 
BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751 and S. Halliday, ‘A comparative analysis 
of some of the legal parameters of the right to life and the right to privacy in the regulation of abortion’, 
in: J. MacEldowney and G. Weick, Human rights in transition (Frankfurt am Main, Lang 2003) p. 85 
at p. 93.
74 Art. 1(2) Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft 1972 [Pregnancy Termination Act 1972] 
(old).
75 Art. 2 Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft 1972 [Pregnancy Termination Act 1972] 
(old).







complications76 or if less than six months had elapsed since the last pregnancy 
termination.77
Two years later, in 1974, after intense debate, the Parliament of the FRG finally 
passed the Abortion Reform Act.78 Similar to the abortion laws of the GDR, this 
Act introduced a periodic model (the so‑called ‘Fristenregelung’). Abortion was not 
liable to punishment if it was performed in a medical clinic within the first 12 weeks 
of pregnancy and after the woman underwent counselling.79 Between the 12th and the 
22nd week, abortion was not punishable if the woman’s life or health was seriously 
endangered by the pregnancy or if there was a substantial ground to believe that 
the child would be born with such a serious birth defect that the woman could not 
be expected to carry the pregnancy to full term.80 After the 22nd week, abortion 
would only be permitted if the pregnancy constituted a danger to the life of the 
pregnant woman.81 Further, the State was under a duty to keep statistics of abortions 
carried out.82 The Act never entered into force, however, as the Christian Democrats 
in Parliament, together with various States,83 successfully lodged a complaint with 
the Federal Constitutional Court.
4.2.2.	 The	first	BVerfG	abortion	judgment	and	subsequent	legislation
By judgment of 25 February 1975, the First Senate of the Constitutional Court 
by a majority84 declared the 1974 Abortion Reform Act partly unconstitutional.85 
Using historical, systematic and textual interpretation,86 the Court considered that 
the right to life ex. Article 2(2) Basic Law extended to the unborn life from the 
moment of nidation, i.e., from the 14th day after conception.87 The BVerfG held that 
76 Art. 3(1) Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft 1972 [Pregnancy Termination Act 1972] 
(old).
77 Art. 3(2) Gesetz über die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft 1972 [Pregnancy Termination Act 1972] 
(old).
78 Fünftes Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (5. StrGZ) [Fifth Act on the Reform of the Criminal law], 
1974 BGBl. I, No. 63, p. 1297.
79 Arts. 218 and 218a StGB.
80 Art. 218b StGB.
81 Art. 218b (1) StGB.
82 Art. 4 5. StrGZ, 1974 BGBl. I, pp. 1298–1299.
83 Namely the Länder Baden‑Württemberg, Bavaria, Rheinland‑Pfalz, Saarland and Schleswig‑Holstein. 
BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 18.
84 The exact voting rate falls under the secrecy of the chambers of the Court. In literature it has been 
presumed that the judgment was passed with a five to three vote. Koch 1988, supra n. 69, at p. 82, 
footnote 415.
85 BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573. For a critical case note to this judgment 
see W. Brugger, ‘Abtreibung – ein Grundrecht oder ein Verbrechen? Ein Vergleich der Urteile des 
United States Supreme Court und des BVerfG’ [‘Abortion – a fundamental right or a criminal act? A 
comparison of the case law of the United States Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court’], 
NJW (1986) p. 896. See also M.A. Case 2009, ‘Perfectionism and Fundamentalism in the Application of 
the German Abortion Laws’, in S.H. Williams, Constituting equality: gender equality and comparative 
constitutional rights (New York, Cambridge University Press 2009) p. 93 at p. 95.
86 See Brugger 1986, supra n. 85, at p. 898.
87 BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 136.







the constitutional right to life entailed not only a duty for the State to refrain from 
direct interference in the life of the unborn, but also a State obligation to protect 
and support such life, by guarding it against illegal interference by third parties, 
including the mother. The Court considered that from the Basic Law it followed 
that the law had to express a clear disapproval of abortion. Although the legislature 
was free to express such disapproval by other means than by the threat of criminal 
punishment, the total sum of relevant legal norms had to protect the right to life of 
the unborn sufficiently.88 The Court held that the periodic model as proposed by 
the 1974 Act did not meet that requirement, inasmuch as it exempted pregnancy 
termination from punishment ‘[…] even if there were no grounds that were of lasting 
duration in the face of the order of values of the Basic Law’.89 As Eser observed, with 
this ‘somewhat sibylline expression’ the Court in fact held that the unborn life could 
only be adequately protected on the basis of an indications model.90
The BVerfG considered that the legislature was entitled to leave abortion free 
of punishment in those exceptional situations where the woman was subject to 
burdens which demanded such a degree of sacrifice of her own existential values 
that one could no longer expect her to carry the pregnancy to full term. The Court 
mentioned four indications that could, in principle, justify an abortion: a medical 
indication (i.e., when the life and/or the health of the mother is endangered by the 
pregnancy); a criminological indication (i.e., if the pregnancy has been brought about 
by means of a criminal offence); an embryopathic indication (i.e., in the case that a 
non‑curable genetic abnormality of the embryo is suspected so that a continuation 
of the pregnancy cannot be expected from the mother) and ‘other situations of 
general necessity’ (i.e., social reasons). While the Court did not give any further 
interpretation of these indications, for all of them it applied that there was an interest 
equally worthy of protection, which was so pressing that it could not be required 
under all circumstances that precedence was given to the rights of the unborn.
The Constitutional Court left it to the legislature to lay down in law the exact 
boundaries between indicated and non‑indicated abortions. The argument in defence 
of the 1974 Act that other Western democratic States had recently adopted even 
more liberalised or ‘modern’ abortion laws than foreseen by the challenged Act, 
was rejected by the Court.91 Not only did the Court find those laws to be ‘highly 
controversial’, but it also held that the FRG legislature was bound by fundamentally 
different standards than the foreign legislatures. As a response to the National 
Socialistic laws, the German Basic Law constituted a legal order whereby human 
88 See Eser 1986, supra n. 62, at pp. 373–374.
89 BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 68 and para. 21 of the English 
translation of this judgment as online available at www.bverfg.de, visited 23 June 2014. The original 
formulation in German was: ‘Es ist mit der dem Gesetzgeber obliegenden Lebensschutzpflicht 
unvereinbar, daß Schwangerschaftsabbrüche auch dann rechtlich nicht mißbilligt und nicht unter 
Strafe gestellt werden, wenn sie aus Gründen erfolgen, die vor der Wertordnung des Grundgesetzes 
keinen Bestand haben.’ Compare Eser 1986, supra n. 62, at p. 374.
90 Eser 1986, supra n. 62, at p. 374.
91 BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573, para. 206.







dignity was the central value reference point for all legislation to be enacted by the 
legislature.
To the judgment a joint dissenting opinion by judges Rupp‑von Brünneck and 
Simon was attached, who held that the Court should have displayed more judicial 
self‑restraint.92 They disagreed with the majority’s ‘rigorism’93 that under the Basic 
Law the legislature was obliged to protect constitutional rights, like the unborn’s right 
to life, by means of penalisation. The dissenting judges maintained that – despite 
certain deficiencies – the regulation of abortion by means of social regulations, as 
introduced by the challenged Act, was more in line with the spirit of the Basic Law 
than the model based on penalisation as advocated by the majority of the Court.94
The judgment, eagerly awaited by legal scholars, was received as a rejection of the 
‘Fristenlösung’ (the periodic model), requiring the legislature to undertake further 
action.95 The FRG legislature indeed developed an indications model, which was 
enacted by law of 1976.96 The new Act was intended to take sufficient account of 
the emergencies in which a pregnant woman may find herself as well as to prevent 
illegal abortions. It was further intended ‘to ensure that, “in cases where the law 
guarantees exemption from punishment”, pregnant women would not be placed at a 
disadvantage because of their financial situations’.97 Abortion was criminalised, but 
an abortion carried out within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy was not punishable 
in case an indication justifying the abortion existed. Two doctors needed to certify 
that according to medical knowledge either a medical,98 an embryopathic,99 a 
criminological100 or a ‘general crisis’101 indication existed. While the medical 
indication could exempt an abortion from penalisation throughout the entire duration 
of the pregnancy, for the embryopathic indication a time limit was set at 22 weeks, 
and for the criminological and the general crisis indications this time limit was set 
at 12 weeks. It was, furthermore, required that the abortion was carried out in a 
hospital or expressly authorised facility; that the pregnant woman had undergone 
counselling; that she consented to the abortion and that she had observed a three‑day 
92 Idem, para. 222.
93 Idem, para. 260.
94 Idem, para. 269.
95 Koch 1988, supra n. 69, at p. 82, with useful references in footnote 417. For a critical reflection upon the 
1975 abortion judgment, see Brugger 1986, supra n. 85, at pp. 896–901.
96 Fünfzehnte Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz [Fifteenth Act on Amendment of the Criminal Law] Act of 
18 May 1976, 1976 BGBl. I, p. 1213. Compare Case 2009, supra n. 85, at p. 95 and Halliday 2003, supra 
n. 73, at p. 94.
97 As quoted by the German Constitutional Court in BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 
p. 1751, para. 20.
98 The medical indication concerned both the physical and mental health of the pregnant woman. Art. 218a 
(1) StGB (old).
99 Art. 218a (2) I StGB (old).
100 Art. 218a (2) II StGB (old).
101 The German term is ‘algemeine Notlagenindikation’. Art. 218a (2) III StGB (old).







reflection period.102 Doctors were not required to assist an abortion, except in case of 
a life‑threatening or serious health‑threatening situation.103
Statistics show that in the period 1975–1985 the number of registered prosecutions on 
the basis of Article 218 StGB declined from 639 to 92 per year, while the number of 
criminal convictions on grounds of this provision dropped from 87 to 10 per year.104 
The total number of officially registered abortions for these years rose from 19,076 
in the year 1975 to 91,064 in the year 1982, and subsequently went down to 83,538 
for the year 1985. It is widely accepted that due to a registration deficit, the actual 
abortions numbers exceed these official numbers.105
4.2.3.	 German	reunification	and	abortion	controversy
When East and West Germany reunited to form one sovereign state in 1990, the 
reconciliation of the two former countries’ abortion laws proved to be one of the 
most difficult and controversial issues. For a while the abortion discussion even 
jeopardised the signing of the Reunification Treaty.106 Ultimately, a compromise was 
reached, whereby – for a period of two years – the abortion laws of both regimes 
remained in effect simultaneously.107 Hence, in the two years between reunification 
and the entry into force of new legislation, women from the former FRG were able 
to have an abortion in the former GDR without fear of criminal prosecution or 
punishment (see also section 4.4.1.1 below). The legislature of reunified Germany 
was called upon to enact, at the latest by December 31 1992, laws which ensured 
better protection of unborn life and provided a better solution in conformity with the 
Basic Law for conflict situations faced by pregnant women, than was at the time the 
case in both parts of Germany.108 After two years of heated and emotional debates, 
this objective was fulfilled by virtue of the adoption of a compromise regime in the 
shape of the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act of 1992.109
102 Art. 218b StGB (old).
103 Art. 2 5. StrGZ.
104 Koch 1988, supra n. 69, at p. 249.
105 Idem, at p. 235, footnote 6.
106 M.G. Mattern, ‘German Abortion Law: The Unwanted Child of Reunification’, 13 Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review (1990–1991) p. 643 at p. 651.
107 Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990 in conjunction with the Act on the Unification Treaty of 
23 September 1990, BGBl. II, p. 885; cf. Appendix II, Chapter III, Subject Area C, Section I, No. 1.
108 Art. 31(4) of the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990, as referred to in BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 
BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751. See also the English translation of the text as provided on the website 
of the German History Institute germanhistorydocs.ghi‑dc.org/pdf/eng/Unification_Treaty.pdf, visited 
24 June 2014.
109 Gesetz zum Schutz des vorgeburtlichen/werdenden Lebens, zur Förderung einer kinderfreundlicheren 
Gesellschaft, für Hilfen im Schwangerschaftskonflikt und zur Regelung des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs 
(Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfegesetz) [Act to Protect Unborn/Gestating Life, Promote a Society 
More Hospitable Toward Children, Provide Assistance in Pregnancy Conflicts and Regulate Pregnancy 
Termination (Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act)] Act of 27 July 1992, BGBl. I, p. 1398.








The Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act of 1992 consisted of a package of acts, 
including the Pregnancy Conflict Act (Schwangerschaftskonfliktgesetz, SchKG),110 
which related to the counselling procedure to be followed in case an abortion was 
desired. The unified legislature took as a starting point that, ‘[…] in light of the 
significance of the gestating life as a legal value and the constitutional guarantee of 
it, penal protection [was] indispensable.’111 Accordingly, abortion was criminalised 
and punishable with imprisonment of up to three years or a fine.112 Acts of which 
the effects occurred before completion of the nidation of the fertilised egg in the 
uterus were not considered to be pregnancy terminations within the meaning of the 
Criminal Code. Under certain conditions abortion would be not illegal or would 
be exempted from punishment. Within 12 weeks of conception, an abortion was 
not illegal if performed by a physician with the consent of the pregnant woman 
and if the woman received counselling at least three days prior to the carrying out 
of the abortion.113 Abortion was also not illegal if the existence of certain legal 
indications was ascertained. The new system differed from the old FRG regime, to 
the extent that the previous statutory definitions of the criminological indication and 
the general emergency indication were abolished. Only medical and embryopathic 
indications could constitute grounds for justification of a pregnancy termination. 
The first required that according to medical knowledge the abortion was necessary 
to remove a threat to the life of the pregnant woman or a threat of grave physical 
or mental distress on the part of the woman, inasmuch as this threat could not be 
removed in another way which could be exacted of the woman, the abortion was not 
illegal.114 The embryopathic indication required the existence of compelling grounds 
for assuming that, due to heredity or detrimental influences, the child would suffer 
from irreversible injury to its health so grave that a continuation of the pregnancy 
could not be exacted of the woman.115
These exemptions to the criminal prohibition on abortion were based on the idea 
that only the pregnant woman herself could assess the conflict situation in which 
she found herself. The Act was considered a compromise solution taking ‘both the 
high value of unborn life and the self‑determination of the woman into account’.116 
The degree in which the Criminal Code was to be used to protect unborn life 
was made dependent on the existence of other provisions offering true effective 
110 Gesetz zur Vermeidung und Bewältigung von Schwangerschaftskonflikten (Schwanger‑
schaftskonfliktgesetz – SchKG) [Act on prevention of and the overcoming of pregnancy conflicts, 
Pregnancy Conflict Act] of 27 July 1992, BGBl. I, p. 1398.
111 BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751, para. 38 (in the English translation of the 
judgment this is para. 37).
112 In aggravated cases the term of imprisonment could be increased to a maximum of five years (Art. 218(2) 
StGB). In case the pregnant woman committed the offence herself, she was liable to punishment up to 
one year or a fine.
113 Art. 218a (1) StGB.
114 Art. 218a (2) StGB.
115 Art. 218a (3) StGB.
116 BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751, para. 38 (in the English translation this 
is para. 37).







protection of gestating life. The law therefore provided for various socio‑political 
measures to protect unborn life, such as sex education; a legal right to counselling 
through licensed counselling centres;117 reimbursement for the costs of (advice 
about) contraceptives;118 as well as state‑funded assistance in the care for children.119 
Compulsory counselling for women considering an abortion was introduced to 
ensure that the woman would not make ‘[…] her responsible decision of conscience 
regarding a pregnancy termination in isolation from the fundamental decision for 
the protection of the gestating life that is prescribed by the Basic Law.’120 During the 
counselling the woman was offered ‘[…] advice and assistance in her conflict as well 
as sufficient information about governmental assistance as the basis for thorough 
reflection on her situation’.121 It was thought that ‘[…] preparedness to decide in 
favour of gestating life [was] greatest when the woman [did] not have the feeling 
that she [had to] subjugate herself to the verdict of others, but rather [was] able, after 
receiving qualified counselling and carefully considering the situation, to decide for 
herself whether to continue the pregnancy.’122
The 1992 Act did not contain an obligation on the State to keep federal statistics on 
abortions, as had been required until the old FRG regime.123 It further provided for a 
right to benefits for insured persons in the event of a legal abortion performed by a 
physician in a hospital or in another institution recognised by the law.124
The State of Bavaria and the Christian Democrats in the German Federal Parliament, 
petitioned to the Federal Constitutional Court to challenge the 1992 Pregnancy and 
Family Assistance Act. By judgment of 4 August 1992, the Federal Constitutional 
Court temporarily enjoined125 the coming into force of the substantial provisions 
117 Gesetz über Aufklärung, Verhütung, Familienplanung und Beratung (BeratungsG) [Act on sex 
education, contraception, family planning and counselling] as introduced by Art. 1 Schwangeren‑ und 
Familienhilfegesetz. The information that the state is required to provide under this Act includes sex 
education, information about contraception and family planning, benefits for promoting families and 
assistance to children and families, social and economic assistance for pregnant women, pregnancy 
termination methods and the related risks as well as possible solutions for psycho‑social conflicts in 
connection with pregnancy.
118 Art. 2 Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act].
119 Art. 5 Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act].




123 Art. 4 5. StrGZ. In the GDR under the Anweisung sur Erfassung der vorzeitigen Schwanger‑
schaftbeendigung [Instruction registration of premature pregnancy termination] of 21 March 1972 
there was a duty to report legally carried out abortions, but not many statistics are available. See 
Lammich 1988, supra n. 64, at pp. 358 and 369–370.
124 Art. 2 Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act], introducing the 
new Arts. 24a, 24b of the Sozialgesetzbuch Fünftes Buch (SGB V) [Fifth Volume of the Code of Social 
Security Law].
125 Inter alia, Art. 32 BVerfGG [Federal Constitutional Court Act].







(Articles 13(1)126 and 16127) of the Act.128 Subsequently, the State of Bavaria and 
the Christian Democrats petitioned the Constitutional Court for abstract judicial 
review129 of the provisions on the consultation and indication ascertainment 
procedure and health insurance benefits in the event of pregnancy terminations on 
the basis of the general emergency indication.130 Consequently, on 28 May 1993 the 
BVerfG delivered its second abortion judgment.131
4.2.5.	 The	second	BVerfG	abortion	judgment	(1993)
By judgment of 28 May 1993, the second Senate of the BVerfG held that the concept 
of counselling during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy was in itself not in violation 
of the Basic Law, but that the counselling regulation, as foreseen by the challenged 
Act, did not fulfil the State’s duty to effectively protect unborn life (Article 1(1) read 
together with Article 2(2) Basic Law). By reference to its first abortion judgment of 
1974, the Court reiterated that unborn human life was accorded human dignity and 
that Articles 1(1) and 2(2) of the Basic Law required that the State protects human 
life, including that of the unborn. It held the obligation to protect unborn human 
life to be related to the individual life and to not human life in general. The BVerfG 
further reiterated that the unborn was entitled to legal protection, even vis‑à‑vis its 
mother.132 Such protection was only possible if the legislature fundamentally forbade 
the mother to terminate her pregnancy and thus imposed on her the fundamental 
126 Art. 13(1) Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act] replaced the 
at that time existing substantial abortion provisions (Arts. 218–219d of the Criminal Code in the version 
promulgated on 10 March 1987, BGBl. I, p. 945 at p. 1160) with new Arts. 218 ‑219b.
127 Art. 16 Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act] revoked the 
provisions of the laws of the GDR that were still in force on the basis of the Unification Treaty.
128 See BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751, para. 98.
129 Art. 93(1)(2) Basic Law and Art. 13(6) BVerfGG.
130 Art. 218b (1) first sentence and (2); Art. 219(1) first sentence StGB in the version of the Fifteenth Act 
on Amendment of the Criminal Law and Arts. 200f, and 200g of the Reichsversicherungsordnung 
(RVO) [Reich Insurance Code]. The petitioners argued that the proposed abortion provisions providing 
for benefits from the statutory health insurance in the event of abortions, on the basis of a general 
emergency indication, contravened the State’s obligation to protect unborn life. The State of Bavaria 
held for the same reason that the obligation on States to provide for abortion facilities (Art. 15(2) 
Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act] and the provision 
in Art. 24b SGB V in the version of Art. 2 Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and 
Family Assistance Act]) was unconstitutional. Moreover, the State of Bavaria argued that the Federal 
government had no legislative authority in such matters as the regulation of abortion.
131 BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751. See G. Hermes and S. Walther, 
‘Schwangerschaftsabbruch zwischen Recht und Unrecht – Das zweite Abtreibungsurteil des 
BVerfG und seine Folge‘ [‘Pregnancy termination between right and wrong – The second judgment 
on abortion of the German Constitutional Court and its consequences’], NJW (1993) p. 2337; 
A. Zimmerman, ‘Verbreitung von Informationen über Schwangerschaftsunterbrechungen und 
Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention’ [‘Dissemination of information on the termination of 
pregnancies and the European Convention on Human Rights’], NJW 1993, p. 2966 and E. Deutsch, 
‘Neues Verfassungszivilrecht: Rechtswidriger Abtreibungsvertrag gültig – Unterhaltspflicht aber 
kein Schaden’ [‘New Constitutional civil law: unlawful abortion convention in force – Maintenance 
obligation but no damages’], NJW (1993) p. 2361.
132 The Court referred to BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573.







legal obligation to carry the child to term.133 The Court emphasised that the 
fundamental prohibition on pregnancy termination and the fundamental obligation 
to carry the child to term were two integrally connected elements of the protection 
mandated by the Basic Law. The extent of the obligation to protect unborn life had 
to be determined with a view to competing legal values, including the right to life 
and physical inviolability of the pregnant woman (Article 2(2) of the Basic Law) 
and her right to personal development (Article 2(1) of the Basic Law). The State 
had to undertake sufficient normative and practical measures to the attainment 
of appropriate and, as such, effective protection, thereby combining elements of 
preventative and repressive protection.134
The BVerfG accepted that in exceptional situations it would be permissible, ‘perhaps 
even mandatory’, not to impose upon a pregnant woman a legal obligation to carry 
the child to term.
The Court left it up to the legislature to determine in detail on the basis of the 
criterion of ‘non‑exactability’ what constituted an exceptional situation. This 
criterion meant that the woman had to be subject to burdens which demanded such 
a degree of sacrifice of her own existential values that one could no longer expect 
her to go through with the pregnancy.135 Abortions performed without ascertainment 
of the existence of an indication pursuant to the counselling regulation, could not 
be declared to be justified (‘not illegal’). The Court held that a justification for 
abortion could only be considered where there was an emergency situation, which 
had to be ascertained and clearly defined. Because under the challenged Act no such 
emergency situation was required for the justification of an abortion during the first 
12 weeks of pregnancy abortion, the Court declared the relevant provision of the Act 
(the new Article 218a (1) Criminal Code) unconstitutional and thus invalid. It held 
that this provision contravened Article 1(1) in conjunction with Article 2(2) of the 
Basic Law, inasmuch as the provision declared an abortion under the preconditions 
set forth in the respective provision to not be illegal.
The Court further ruled that the regulation of counselling for a pregnant woman in 
an emergency and conflict situation, as foreseen by the challenged Act,136 failed to 
satisfy the constitutional requirements of Article 1(1) in conjunction with Article 2(2) 
Basic Law. The goal of counselling in pregnancy conflict situations had to be the 
protection of the unborn child and the counsellors had to try to encourage the woman 
133 Idem.
134 This has also been referred to as the Untermaßverbot [‘prohibition on too little protection’]. See 
BVerfG 1993, para. 166 (English translation, para. 154), referring to ‘Isensee in: Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, Volume V, 1992, § 111 marginal note No. 165 et seq’. The important finding of the Court 
in this case (in para. 258) that characterisation in law of the existence of a child as a source of injury is 
excluded on constitutional grounds (Art. 1(1) Basic Law), will not be discussed in further detail here. 
For discussion of that matter, see inter alia E. Deutsch, ‘Neues Verfassungszivilrecht: Rechtswidriger 
Abtreibungsvertrag gültig – Unterhaltspflicht aber kein Schaden’, NJW 1993 pp. 2361–2363 and Der 
Spiegel, ‚Drama in der Kantine‘, 52/1997, pp. 22–25.
135 The Court referred to BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573.
136 The new Art. 219 StGB.







to continue her pregnancy and show her opportunities for a life with the child.137 
In the Court’s opinion, this goal and content of counselling did not find sufficiently 
clear expression in the new Article 219 Criminal Code. Further, there were not 
enough state powers and duties to guarantee the organisation and supervision of the 
counselling institutions. The legislature had failed to lay down, to a sufficient extent, 
the special duties of the physician whom the woman asked to perform a termination, 
and the special duties of the people in the pregnant woman’s circle. Further, it had not 
made certain breaches of duty punishable.138 The Court employed its competence to 
specify the method of execution of its decisions139 and dictated alternative provisions 
in respect of the counselling procedure, that were to supplement the relevant 
provisions of the challenged Act.140 These supplementary provisions underlined that 
counselling was to be ‘[…] guided by the effort to encourage the woman to continue 
the pregnancy’ and had to make the woman aware of the fact that abortion could only 
be considered in exceptional circumstances ‘[…] where bearing the child to term 
would place the woman under a burden which […] [was] so severe and exceptional 
that it exceed[ed] the limits of exactable sacrifice.’ The supplementary provisions 
further, inter alia, provided for more detailed regulations concerning the setting up 
of counselling centres and the keeping of records by counsellors.141
The Court further held that the legislature was under an obligation to ascertain at 
reasonable intervals whether the law really was having the protective effect that 
could be expected on the basis of its duty to protect unborn human life.142 The Court 
therefore considered it essential to have reliable abortion statistics with sufficient 
information.143 Accordingly, the Court declared the respective provision of the new 
Act, removing the obligation to keep federal abortion statistics,144 irreconcilable with 
Article 1(1) read together with Article 2(2) of the Basic Law.
In respect of reimbursement for abortions, the Court held that the Basic Law did 
not permit the granting of a right to benefits from the statutory health insurance for 
an abortion whose legality had not been established according to the constitutional 
standards, i.e., abortions carried out without having followed the statutory counselling 
137 BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751, para. 228 (in the English translation this 
is para. 217).
138 Idem, para. 305 (English translation, para. 294).
139 Art. 35 BVerfGG (Federal Constitutional Court Act) reads: ‘In its decision the Federal Constitutional 
Court may state by whom it is to be executed; in individual instances it may also specify the method of 
execution.’
140 See BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751, under II.
141 Idem.
142 Idem, para. 308 (in the English translation this is para. 298b).
143 The Court considered it essential to have statistics ‘[…] on the total number of pregnancy terminations, 
on the number of pregnancy terminations as compared to the whole population, on the total number of 
pregnancy terminations as compared to the number of women of childbearing age, on the total number 
of pregnancy terminations as compared to the number of pregnancies, on the total number of pregnancy 
terminations as compared to the total number of live or dead births, and finally on the total number of 
pregnancy terminations as compared to the number of terminations not subject to punishment because 
of extenuating legal reasons.’ BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751, para. 310 
(in the English translation this is para. 299c).
144 Art. 15(2) Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfegesetz [Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act].







procedure. In other words, the abortion had to be indicated and the counselling 
process that had been followed had to be in conformity with the constitutional 
requirements as set out by the Court.145
Three judges dissented. Judge Böckenforde concurred with the essential points in 
the majority judgment, but disagreed with the majority’s ruling that ruled out social 
security benefits for abortions for non‑indicated abortions during the first 12 weeks 
of pregnancy. The Judge held it to be for the legislature to decide on that point.146 In 
their joint opinion, Judges Mahrenholz and Sommer claimed that the new Article 218a 
(1) was constitutional. In their opinion the majority judgment had failed to achieve a 
balance between the human dignity of the unborn on the one hand, and the dignity 
of the pregnant woman on the other. They felt that from a constitutional perspective 
the unique comparative problem raised by the ‘joined twosomeness’ of the pregnant 
woman and the unborn child could not be dealt with ‘by simply juxtaposing the 
two’.147 The judges were of the opinion that the developmental process of pregnancy 
implied a developmental element in the pregnant woman’s constitutional status and 
required the legislature to provide different kinds of State protection during the 
early and late phases of pregnancy. They agreed with the majority judgment that the 
regulation of counselling as provided by the challenged Act contained deficiencies 
and was therefore unconstitutional. Lastly, they did not hold the payment of social 
insurance benefits for pregnancy terminations carried out by a physician during the 
first 12 weeks following conception, to contravene the Basic Law.
In legal scholarship, the judgment met with considerable critique. Many authors 
pointed out that the Court’s reasoning was not entirely consistent and contained 
various value contradictions.148 Tröndle argued that the protection concept, as 
developed by the BVerfG, contained a serious contradiction, as it on the one hand put 
the State under obligation to protect unborn life, but, on the other hand, left only the 
counselled pregnant woman answerable to the question of whether an abortion was 
to take place or not.149 The author was further critical of the fact that the BVerfG had 
taken up the role of quasi‑legislature and had exempted abortion from the criminal law 
domain under certain circumstances.150 Hermes and Walther have shown themselves 
to be critical of the ‘judicial activism’ of the BVerfG, and contended that the Court’s 
attempt to find a compromise solution for the abortion controversy had failed. The 
authors claimed that the legislature had yet found the necessary compromise with 
145 On the other hand, the Court considered the granting of social assistance benefits in cases of economic 
hardship for pregnancy terminations which are not punishable by law according to the counseling 
regulation, ‘just as unobjectionable from a constitutional point of view as continued payment of salary 
or wages is.’
146 Dissenting opinion of Judge Böckenforde to BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 
p. 1751.
147 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Mahrenholz and Sommer to BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 
a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751, para. I. 1.
148 See Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 5.
149 H. Tröndle, ‘Das Schwangeren‑ und Familienhilfeänderungsgesetz’ [The Pregnancy and Family 
Assistance Revision Act’], NJW (1995) p. 3009 at p. 3010.
150 Idem, at p. 3011.







exceptional thoroughness and conscious of the competing constitutional values and 
moral views, after which the Court had set foot on the – avoidable – path to the 
‘verfassungsgerichtlichen Juridiktionsstaat’ (‘a Constitutional order ruled by the 
judiciary’).151
The 1993 BVerfG judgment put the difficult task before the German legislature 
of drafting new abortion legislation.152 New heated parliamentary debates were 
the result,153 and various bills were drafted.154 This finally resulted in the adoption 
of the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Revision Act (Schwangeren‑ und 
Familienhilfeänderungsgesetz, SFHÄndG) in August 1995.155 This compromise Act 
not only responded to the BVerfG judgment, but also finally brought an end to the 
discrepancies between Eastern and West German abortion laws.156
4.2.6.	 The	Pregnancy	and	Family	Assistance	Revision	Act	(1995)	and	
subsequent	amendments
The entry into force of the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Revision Act at 
1 October 1995 introduced the abortion regime that is still in force today in 
Germany. Basic principle of this regime is – following the 1993 BVerfG abortion 
decision – the criminal prohibition of abortion (Article 218 Criminal Code). Acts, 
the effects of which occur before the conclusion of the nidation, are not deemed to 
be an abortion within the meaning of the Criminal Code. Advertising for abortion157 
151 Hermes and Walther 1993, supra n. 131, at p. 2346.
152 Tröndle claimed that the judgment was of little assistance and its content unfit to offer the legislature 
any normative guidance in this process. Tröndle 1995, supra n. 149, at p. 3012. Eser spoke of the 
BVerfG as having left behind a ‘Torso mit Reparaturvorgaben’. A Eser, ‘Schwangerschaftsabbruch: 
Reformversuche im Umsetzung des BVerfG‑Urteils’, JZ (1994) p. 503.
153 Tröndle 1995, supra n. 149, at pp. 3009–3010.
154 BT‑Drs. 12/6643; BT‑Drs. 12/6669 and BT‑Drs. 12/6944. A. Eser, ‘Schwangerschaftsabbruch: 
Reformversuche im Umsetzung des BVErfG‑Urteils’ [‘Termination of pregnancy: reform efforts in 
the implementation of the judgment of the German Constitutional Court’], JZ (1994) pp. 503–510 at 
p. 504; Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 5 and Tröndle 1995, supra n. 149, at pp. 3012–3013.
155 Act of 28 August 1995 BGBl. I p. 1050.
156 Art. 16 of the 1992 Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act foresaw in the revocation of the provisions of 
the laws of the GDR that were still in force on the basis of the Unification Treaty. However, by judgment 
of 4 August 1992, the Federal Constitutional Court temporarily enjoined the coming into force of this 
provision of the Act and by judgment of 28 May 1993 the Court declared the Act invalid, for being 
irreconcilable with the Basic Law. The result was that until the entering into force of the 1995 Act, the 
former FRG and GDR abortion regimes were still in force. BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., 
NJW 1993 p. 1751. See also above. 
157 Art. 219a Criminal Code reads:
 ‘(1) Whosoever publicly, in a meeting or through dissemination of written materials (section 11(3)), for 
material gain or in a grossly inappropriate manner, offers, announces or commends
1. his own services for performing terminations of pregnancy or for supporting them, or the services 
of another; or
2. means, objects or procedures capable of terminating a pregnancy with reference to this capacity,or 
makes declarations of such a nature shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than two years or 
a fine.







and for bringing abortion means into circulation is also prohibited.158 Nobody can be 
forced to assist in an abortion, except for in cases of acute and serious danger to the 
life or health of the pregnant woman.159
Following Article 218 ‘[w]hosoever terminates a pregnancy is liable to imprisonment 
of not more than three years or a fine’.160 If the abortion is committed by the pregnant 
woman herself, the maximum penalty is imprisonment of one year or a fine.161 There 
are, however, exceptions to liability for abortion. Under certain circumstances, the 
defining elements of the offence of abortion under Article 218 are considered not 
to be fulfilled and the abortion is accordingly not punishable (‘nicht rechtswidrig’, 
Article 218a Criminal Code).162 This is the case if, during the first 12 weeks of 
pregnancy, an abortion is performed by a physician at the request of a pregnant woman 
who can show to the physician a certificate that she had counselling at least three 
days before the operation.163 Further, if the requirements for a medical‑social164 or a 
criminological indication165 have been fulfilled and the woman has given informed 
consent, an abortion may also be exempted from punishment. The medical‑social 
indication is present if, ‘[…] considering the present and future living conditions 
of the pregnant woman, the termination of the pregnancy is medically necessary to 
avert a danger to the life or the danger of grave injury to the physical or mental health 
of the pregnant woman and if the danger cannot reasonably be averted in another 
(2) Subsection (1) No 1 above shall not apply when physicians or statutorily recognised counselling 
agencies provide information about which physicians, hospitals or institutions are prepared to 
perform a termination of pregnancy under the conditions of section 218a (1) to (3).
(3) Subsection (1) No 2 above shall not apply if the offence was committed with respect to physicians 
or persons who are authorised to trade in the means or objects mentioned in subsection (1) No 2 or 
through a publication in professional medical or pharmaceutical journals.’
 Translation taken from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#StG 
Bengl_000P219b, visited June 2014. See, inter alia, Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 62–65.
158 Art. 219b Criminal Code reads:
‘(1) Whosoever with intent to encourage unlawful acts under section 218 distributes means or objects 
which are capable of terminating a pregnancy shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than two 
years or a fine.
(2) The secondary participation by a woman preparing the termination of her own pregnancy shall not 
be punishable under subsection (1) above.
(3) Means or objects to which the offence relates may be subject to a deprivation order.’
 Translation taken from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#StGBengl 
_000P219b, visited June 2014.
159 Art. 12 SchKG. See also Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 53–54.
160 In especially serious cases – e.g. if the offender acts against the will of the pregnant woman; or if the 
offender through gross negligence causes a risk of death or serious injury to the pregnant woman – the 
penalty may be increased to five years’ imprisonment (Art. 218(2) StGB).
161 Art. 218(3) StGB.
162 Note the difference in formulation when compared to the 1992 version of the Act which spoke of 
abortions being ‘not illegal’ (nicht rechtswidrig’) if certain conditions were met. This formulation was 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., 
NJW 1993 p. 1751.
163 Art. 218a (1) StGB.
164 Art. 218a (2) StGB.
165 Art. 218a (3) StGB.







way from her point of view.’166 While an abortion on the basis of the criminological 
indication can only be exempted from punishment if the abortion is performed 
within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, the medical‑social indication is not subject 
to a time limitation.
Within the first 22 weeks of pregnancy the pregnant woman is, furthermore, exempted 
from punishment if the abortion was performed by a physician after counselling in 
an emergency or conflict situation. This exception to liability does not hold for the 
physician or any other person committing the offence of abortion.167 If the pregnant 
woman was in exceptional distress, the court may also dispense with punishment 
under the general abortion prohibition of Article 218 Criminal Code.168 In addition, 
the pregnant woman is not liable for attempt to terminate her pregnancy.169
The requirements for a counselling procedure for women in an emergency or 
conflict situation have been laid down in Articles 219ff Criminal Code, whereby the 
legislature aimed to put the 1993 BVerfG abortion judgment into effect. The first 
paragraph of Article 219 provides that:
‘The counselling serves to protect unborn life. It should be guided by efforts to encourage 
the woman to continue the pregnancy and to open her to the prospects of a life with the 
child; it should help her to make a responsible and conscientious decision. The woman 
must thereby be aware, that the unborn child has its own right to life with respect to her 
at every stage of the pregnancy and that a termination of pregnancy can therefore only 
be considered under the legal order in exceptional situations, when carrying the child to 
term would give rise to a burden for the woman which is so serious and extraordinary that 
it exceeds the reasonable limits of sacrifice. The counselling should, through advice and 
assistance, contribute to overcoming the conflict situation which exists in connection with 
the pregnancy and remedying an emergency situation. […].’170
Hence, the primary object of counselling is the protection of unborn life and 
counselling must contribute to overcoming the conflict situation. The counselling 
must take place through a recognised pregnancy conflict counselling agency.171 After 
conclusion of the counselling on the subject, the counselling agency must issue the 
pregnant woman a certificate. The physician who intends to perform the termination 
of the pregnancy is excluded from being a counsellor.172 This counselling regulation 
has been criticised for being practically unusable for the attainment of the goal 
166 Art. 218a (2) StGB. Translation taken from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.
html#StGBengl_000P218a, visited June 2014. This has been held to cover also those situations that 
were covered by the previously existing ‘general crisis’ indication of Art. 218a (2) III StGB (old). See 
Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 37 and Laufs 2009, supra n. 63, Rn. 40.
167 Art. 218a (4) StGB.
168 Idem.
169 Art. 218(4) StGB.
170 Art. 219(1) StGB. Translation taken from www.iuscomp.org/gla, visited June 2014.
171 Art. 219(2) StGB.
172 Idem.







of effective protection of the unborn life,173 as well as dogmatically unfortunate 
fashioned and not providing sufficient legal clarity.174
The present German abortion law no longer provides for a separate embryopathic 
indication. Even though such an indication was not considered unconstitutional – in 
fact it was even expressly suggested – by the BVerfG,175 the legislature wanted to 
express in the law of 1995 that also the disabled life is worthy of constitutional 
protection. At the same time, the legislature accepted that this indication was in 
fact covered by the medical‑social indication.176 It is now required that the (future) 
disability of the unborn constitutes a burden which demands such a degree of sacrifice 
of the pregnant woman’s own existential values that one could no longer expect her 
to go through with the pregnancy.177 While the exemption of punishment from an 
abortion on the basis of a criminological indication was made subject to a time limit 
set at 12 weeks after conception, the medical‑social indication of Article 218a (2) 
was not subjected to any time limit in the 1995 Act. This implied that the previously 
existing time limit of 22 weeks for abortions on embryopathic grounds178 had been 
lifted. Further, it implied that for abortions on embryopathic grounds no longer a 
counselling obligation existed; abortions on grounds on a medical indication after 
12 weeks of pregnancy were left to the appraisal of the medical expert.179 Both these 
implications of the new regulation have been criticised in legal scholarship180 and 
politics. The call for an amendment of the law on this point grew particularly after 
reports of allegedly increasing numbers of late abortions (i.e., after the 23rd week of 
173 Tröndle 1995, supra n. 149, at p. 3009.
174 R. Eschelbach, ‘BeckOK StGB § 218’ [‘Beck online Commentary to StGB § 218’], in: B. von 
Heintschel‑Heinegg (ed.), Beck’scher Online‑Kommentar StGB [Beck Online Commentary to the 
StGB], 15th ed (München, Beck Verlag 2011) Rn. 24.
175 BVerfG 25 February 1975, Az. 1 BvF 2/74 a.o., NJW 1975 p. 573 and BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 
2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751.
176 BT‑Drs. 13/1850, p 26. See also Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 37; Eschelbach 2011, supra n. 174, 
Rn.1 and Laufs 2009, supra n. 63, Rn. 51.
177 W. Gropp, ‘StGB § 218 Schwangerschaftsabbruch’ [‘§ 218 StGB Termination of pregnancy’], in 
W. Joeks and K. Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum StGB [Münchener Commentary to the 
StGB], 2nd edn. (München, Verlag C.H. Beck 2012), Rn. 61. See also Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, 
Rn. 39.
178 See 4.2.2 above. See also Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 38.
179 BT‑Drs. 16/12970, p. 5.
180 R. Beckmann, ‘Der „Wegfall“ der embryopathischen Indikation’ [‘The „abolition“ of de embryopatic 
indication’], MedR (1998) p. 155; E. Deutsch, ‘Die Spätabtreibung als juristisches Problem’ [‘Late 
abortions as a legal problem’], ZRP (2003) p. 332 and F. Czerner, ‚Reform der Reform: Wiedereinführung 
der embryopathischen Indikation bei Spätabtreibungen?’ [‘Reform of the reform: reintroduction of the 
embryopathic indication for late abortions?’], ZRP (2009) p. 233. Czerner argues for the re‑introduction 
of a separate embryopathic indication.







pregnancy) on embryopathic grounds.181 After long discussions,182 by Act of 2009183 
an extra counselling obligation was introduced for abortions on the basis of the 
social‑medical indication.184 Under the current law, the physician who has diagnosed 
an abnormality (‘Behinderung’) with the foetus is obliged to offer the pregnant 
woman counselling, which includes, inter alia, the dissemination of information 
about life with a disabled child. Further, a reflection period of three days after the 
diagnosis has to be observed, before an abortion can be performed.185
Since the year 2001 the annual abortion numbers in Germany have decreased every 
year, in total with more than 20 per cent, to an annual number of 102,802 in 2013.186 
The number of criminal convictions for illegal abortions has for a long time been and 
still is very low.187
4.2.7.	 Abortion	and	public	funding
On the basis of Article 24b (1) and (2) SGB V,188 women who are insured under the 
statutory health insurance, the so‑called Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung (GKV), 
have a right to reimbursement of the costs of an abortion if this abortion is not against 
the law (‘nicht rechtswidrig’),189 and if it is performed by a physician in an institution 
that meets the requirements of Article 13(1) SchKG. Aims of this regulation are to 
181 See, inter alia, BT‑Drs. 16/12664; BT‑Drs. 16/11330; BT‑Drs. 16/11106; BT‑Drs. 16/11347; BT‑Drs. 
16/11377 and BT‑Drs. 16/11342. The official numbers of the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 
[German Statistics] give a multifaceted picture. While in the period 1997–2009 the number of abortions 
carried out after the 23rd week of pregnancy had risen from 190 to 237 (with a lowest point in the year 
2000 with 154 abortions), the percentage of abortions carried out on grounds of the medical indication 
had dropped from 3.5 in 1997 to 2.9 in the year 2009 (with a lowest percentage of 2.5 per cent in the 
year 2002). Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, Schwangerschaftsabbrüche – FS12 R. 3 2010, online 
available at www.destatis.de, visited June 2011.
182 See supra n. 181. See also Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 40 and Czerner 2009, supra n. 180, at 
p. 233.
183 Gesetz zur Änderung des Schwangerschaftskonfliktgesetzes (SchKGÄndG) [Act on the Amendment 
of the Pregnancy Conflict Act] of 26 August 2009, BGBl. I, No. 58, p. 2990. The Act entered into force 
on 1 January 2010.
184 Art. 2 SchKG. See critical C. von Dewitz, ‘Diskriminierung ungeborener Kinder mit Behinderungen 
durch die gesetzliche Regelung zum Schwangerschaftsabbruch’ [‘Discrimination of unborn children 
with disabilities by way of the regulation on termination of pregnancy’], Zfl (2009) p. 74.
185 In case of non‑observance of the reflection period, a fine of maximum €5,000‑ can be imposed. See 
Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 40.
186 Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 6, footnote 18, referring to ‘DÄBl 2001, A 2065’. The exact figures 
per year are: 1996: 130,889; 1997: 130,890; 1998: 131,795; 1999: 130,471; 2000: 134,609; 2001: 134,964; 
2002: 130,387; 2003: 128,030; 2004: 129,650; 2005: 124,023; 2006: 119,710; 2007: 116,781; 2008: 
114,484; 2009: 110,694; 2010: 110,431, 2011: 108,867; 2012: 106,815 and 2013: 102,802. Statistisches 
Bundesamt Deutschland, Schwangerschaftsabbrüche – FS12 R. 3 2010, online available at www.
destatis.de, visited June 2011.
187 For the years 1960–1985 statistics on prosecutions and criminal convictions are available. See Koch 
1988, supra n. 69, at p. 249. For the period after 1985, the present author is only aware of a few incidental 
statistics, such as eight convictions in 1990 and ten in 1991. Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 6, 
footnote 18, referring to ‘DÄBl 2001, A 2065’.
188 Previously Art. 200 f Reichsversicherungsordnung (RVO) [Reich Insurance Code].
189 See also BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751, as discussed above.







prevent illegal abortions with their inherent risks for the health and the life of the 
pregnant woman, to protect pregnant women from social disadvantage and to ensure 
their sustenance.190 The constitutionality of this regulation and its predecessors have 
been questioned,191 but the regulation has been upheld by the Constitutional Court.192 
It is safe to say that abortions on the basis of a medical or a criminological indication 
are not against the law and thus qualify for statutory reimbursement.193 Whether 
this also counts for abortions on the basis of an embryopathic indication (that is 
held to be covered by the medical‑social indication of Article 218a (2), see above), is 
more controversial.194 Abortions that are exempted from punishment on the basis of 
Article 218a (1) qualify for recovery from the statutory scheme to a limited extent 
only.195
4.3. germAn legIslAtIon on AssIsted humAn reproductIon And 
surrogAcy
The German legal framework concerning AHR is somewhat fragmented. It consists 
of both the Federal Embryo Protection Act (Embryoschutzgesetz, ESchG),196 as well 
as regulations of the German Medical Association (‘Bundesärztekammer’). Further, 
for certain matters, for instance concerning public funding, provisions of the 
German Social Code are relevant too. Germany is no party to the CoE Biomedicine 
Convention.197 Allegedly, the main reason for this is that Germany regarded the 
Biomedicine Convention’s regulation of research on persons who cannot give consent 
(i.e., embryos), for the benefit of others, as ethically problematic.198
190 K. Höfler, ‚SGB V § 24b Schwangerschaftsabbruch und Sterilisation’ [§ 24b SGB V Pregnancy 
Termination and Sterilisation’], in: S. Leitherer (ed.), Kasseler Kommentar, Sozialversicherungsrecht 
[Kasseler Commentary social insurance law], 69th ed (München, Verlag Beck 2011).
191 For example J. Isensee, ‚Abtreibung als Leistungstatbestand der Sozialversicherung und der 
grundgesetzliche Schutz des ungeborenen Lebens‘ [‘Abortion as an element of offence under social 
insurance law and the constitutional protection of the life of the unborn child’], NJW (1986) p. 1645 and 
F. Hoffmann‑Klein, ‘Zur Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Abtreibungsfinanzierung’, ZfL (2010) p. 82.
192 BVerfG 18 April 1984 (dec.), Az. 1 BvL 43/81, NJW 1984 p. 1805 and BVerfG 28 May 1993, Az. 2 BvF 
2/90 a.o., NJW 1993 p. 1751, See also W. Esser, ‘Die Rechtswidrigkeit des Aborts’ [‘The unlawfulness 
of abortions’], MedR (1983) p. 57.
193 See Höfler 2011, supra n. 190, Rn. 15b‑c.
194 Generally it is accepted that such is the case if the genetic abnormality of the embryo can be expected 
to constitute a danger to a grave impairment of the physical or emotional state of health of the pregnant 
woman. See Höfler 2011, supra n. 190, Rn. 15 d.
195 Art. 24b (3) and (4) SGB V.
196 Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz – ESchG) [Act on the Protection of 
Embryos (Embryo Protection Act)] of 13 December 1990, BGBl. I p. 2746, amended by Art. 22 Act of 
23 October 2001, BGBl. I p. 2702.
197 Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, CETS No. 164 
(entry into force 1 December 1999). Germany has signed nor ratified this Convention (state of affairs 
31 July 2014).
198 Dreier 2004, supra n. 3, at p. 157.







Hereafter first a brief outline of the coming into force of the Embryo Protection Act 
is given, after which the relevant substantive legal norms concerning AHR treatment 
are discussed thematically in greater detail.
4.3.1.	 Early	(legislative)	developments
Rapid technical developments in the field of biomedicine in the 1970s and 1980s199 
intensified public and political debate about AHR. At the time an embryo created 
outside the body of the woman enjoyed no legal protection: Article 218 ff StGB 
(concerning abortion, see 4.1.4 above) only protected embryos that were already 
transferred into the woman’s body.200 In the beginning of the 1980s various 
advisory committees from the legal profession, such as the German Women 
Lawyers Association (‘Deutscher Juristinnenbund’) and the German (‘Deutscher 
Richterbund’), issued studies and statements on assisted human reproduction.201 In 
1985, the so‑called ‘Benda Commission’202 – a working party on genome analysis 
and gene therapy appointed by the Federal Minister of Justice and the Federal 
Minister of Research and Technology jointly – made recommendations to the 
legislature on AHR issues.203 The Commission, inter alia, recommended prohibiting 
the anonymous donation of gametes and sterilising the donors of gametes after ten 
199 For example the birth of the first IVF baby, Louise Brown in England in 1978.
200 Art. 218 StGB reads: ‘Acts, the effects of which occur before the conclusion of the nesting of the 
fertilised egg in the uterus, shall not qualify as termination of pregnancy within the meaning of this 
law.’ See R. Keller et al., Embryonenschutsgesetz, Kommentar zum Embryonenschutzgesetz [Embryo 
Protection Act, Commentary to the Embryo Protection Act] (Stuttgart, W. Kolhammer GmbH 1992) 
p. 57. See also Lanz‑Zumstein 1986, supra n. 37.
201 E.g. ‘Thesen einer Arbeitsgruppe des Deutschen Juristinnenbundes zu künstlichen Befruchtungen’ 
[Statements of a working group of the German Women Lawyers Association on artificial insemination] 
and ‘Thesen des Deutschen Richtersbundes zur Fortpflanzungsmedizin und zur Humangenetik’ 
[Statements of the German Judges Association on reproductive medicine and on human genetics], as 
published in Lanz‑Zumstein 1986, supra n. 37.
202 The Commission was named after its chair, Professor Ernst Benda. As Fuchs explains, its 
composition was ‘[…] based on the principle of interdisciplinarity, with certain important 
organisations and associations also being represented: it included scientists and medical 
experts from various learned societies and research foundations, representatives of the major 
churches, a philosopher, representatives of a variety of legal disciplines of the German Medical 
Association, the Federal Employers’ Association and the German Trades Union Congress.’ 
M. Fuchs, National ethics councils. Their backgrounds, functions and modes of operation compared 
(Berlin, German National Ethics Council 2005) p. 41, online available at: www.ethikratorg/_english/
publications/Fuchs_International_Ethics_Councils.pdf, visited March 2011. See also E. Deutsch, 
‘Des Menschen Vater und Mutter. Die künstliche Befruchtung beim Menschen – Zulässigkeit 
und zivilrechtliche Folgen’ [‘A man’s father and mother. Artificial insemination with human 
beings – Permissibility and civil law effects’], NJW (1986) p. 1971.
203 Bundesminister für Forschung und Technologie (ed.) [Federal Minister for Research and Technology], 
In‑vitro‑Fertilisation, Genomanalyse und Gentherapie, Bericht der gemeinsamen Arbeitsgruppe des 
Bundesministers für Forschung und Technologie und des Bundesministers für Justiz (‘Benda‑Bericht’) 
[In vitro fertilisation, genome anlysis and gene therapy, report of the joint working group of the 
Federal Minister for Research and Technology and the Federal Minister of Justice] No. 6 in the series 
Gentechnologie – Chancen und Risiken [Gene technology – Opportunities and Risks] (München, 
Schweitzer 1985). See also Deutsch 1986, supra n. 202, at p. 1972 and Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, 
at pp. 67–68.







successful AHR treatments; prohibiting surrogacy and the donation of embryos; and 
prohibiting in vitro fertilisation for unmarried couples and single persons. That same 
year, the German Medical Association adopted a regulation on the matter,204 which 
for years was the only existing regulatory measure in the field of reproductive care. 
In the meantime, various German States (‘Länder’), drafted their own legislation 
concerning AHR issues.205 All together the need for federal legislation on the matter 
was felt even more strongly.
Following the recommendations of the aforementioned ‘Benda‑Commission’, the 
Minister of Justice tabled a ‘discussion bill’ (‘Diskussionsentwurf’) for an act on 
the protection of embryos in 1986.206 After relevant advisory bodies had given their 
reaction to this discussion bill,207 the Federal Minister for Finance issued a so‑called 
‘work bill’ (‘Arbeitsentwurf’)208 in 1988. In the mean time, some – impatient209 – states 
(‘Länder and political parties’) and political parties also tabled bills.210 It was, however, 
the government bill that finally made it into law: in 1990 the Embryo Protection Act 
(Embryoschutzgesetz, ESchG) was adopted by the Bundestag.211 It entered into force 
on 1 January 1991.212
4.3.2.	 The	Embryo	Protection	Act	(1991)
The Embryo Protection Act is first of all a penal act.213 This has to do with the 
division of Federal and State competences in Germany. At the time of its coming 
into force there was no explicit federal competence for AHR issues. Instead, the 
federal legislature could only enact federal law in the field of civil and criminal 
law (Article 75(1) Basic Law) or with respect to diseases which posed a danger 
to the public or were communicable (Article 74(19) Basic Law).214 Regulations 
concerning the professional medical practice fell – and still fall – within exclusive 
204 Richtlinien zur Durchführung von In‑vitro Fertilisation (IVF) und Embryotransfer (ET) als 
Behandlungsmethode der menschlichen Sterilität [Guidelines on implementation of in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF) and Embryo transfer (ET) as treatment for human infertility] of 1985 as printed in Keller et al. 
1992, supra n. 200, at pp. 273–282.
205 See Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at pp. 73–76.
206 BT‑Drs. 11/5460. For a critique on this bill see inter alia Deutsch 1986, supra n. 202, at p. 1971.
207 See Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at pp. 69–71.
208 See Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at pp. 76–77.
209 Idem, at pp. 77.
210 See Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at pp. 77–80.
211 BR‑Drs. 745/90.
212 Art. 13 ESchG.
213 For a discussion of the pro and cons concerning the use of penal law for the regulation of reproductive 
matters, see Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at pp. 81–97.
214 See also H. Seibert, ‘Gesetzgebungskompetenz und Regelungsbefugnis im Bereich der 
Befruchtungstechniken’ [‘Legislative power and regulatory power in the area of fertilization 
techniques’], in: M. Lanz‑Zumstein, Embryonenschutz und Befruchtungstechnik, Seminarbericht 
und Stellungnahmen aus der Arbeitsgruppe “Gentechnologie” des deutschen Juristinnenbundes 
[Protection of embryos and fertilisation techniques, seminar report and statements from the working 
group “Genetic Engineering“ of the German Women Lawyers Association] (München, J Schweitzer 
Verlag 1986) p. 142.







State competence.215 Since 1994 a (concurrent) competence for issues concerning 
human artificial insemination exists,216 although thus far this competence has not 
been used by the federal legislature.217 Consequently there is no coherent legal 
framework concerning AHR in German law: relevant provisions can be found in the 
Criminal Code, in the Civil Code as well as in Regulations drawn up by the German 
Medical Association (see below). This fragmentary character of the ESchG and of 
the regulation of AHR in general has been criticised repeatedly.218
The ESchG aims to prevent possible abuse of new reproduction techniques and 
resorts to penal law only where it is considered essential for the protection of 
particularly fundamental rights. According to its Explanatory Memorandum, the Act 
aimed to protect the constitutional values of human dignity and human life and the 
best interests of the child in particular.219 The ESchG, therefore, inter alia, prohibits 
gender selection in the course of AHR (section 4.3.5 below);220 in vitro fertilisation 
of more egg cells than can be transferred into the woman’s body within one cycle;221 
as well as any processing of human embryos that does not serve the purpose of the 
preservation (‘Erhaltung’) of the embryo.222
The Act was further intended to prevent ‘divided motherhood’, a term which refers 
to the situation whereby the woman giving birth to the child is different from the 
woman genetically related to the child. For that reason, the Act further prohibits egg 
cell donation (see section 4.3.4.1 below);223 the fertilisation of human egg cells with 
a view to embryo donation or for the purpose of the transferral of the embryo to a 
surrogate mother (‘Ersatzmutter’);224 and the fertilisation of the egg cells of a woman 
who has declared her intention to place her child into the care of third parties after 
birth (see section 4.3.9 below).225
215 Ratzel 2010, supra n. 41, at p. 43 under reference to BVerfG 16 February 2000, Az. 1 BvR 420/97, NJW 
2000 p. 857.
216 Art. 74 (26) Basic Law. BT‑Drs. 16/813, p. 14, BGBl. I p. 3146. See also the textual amendment of this 
provision of 28 August 2006 (BGBl. I p. 2034), whereby ‘künstliche Befruchtung beim Menschen’ 
[‘artificial insemination of human beings’] was replaced by ‘medizinisch unterstützte Erzeugung 
menschlichen Lebens’ [‘medically assisted reproduction of human life’].
217 See Ratzel 2010, supra n. 41, at p. 43.
218 For example Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at p. 89.
219 BT‑Drs. 11/5460, p. 6. See also the previous Explanatory memorandum to the ESchG Bill, as printed in 
Lanz‑Zumstein 1986, supra n. 37, Annex 1, pp. 153–164.
220 Art. 3 ESchG.
221 Art. 1(1)(3) ESchG. This was later set at a maximum of three egg cells.
222 Art. 2 ESchG. Other practices that are prohibited are: the creation of human embryos for research 
purposes (Art. 1(2) ESchG); gen transfers in human ‘Keimbahnzellen’; the splitting of totipotent cells 
of a human embryo; human cloning (the purposefully creation of genetically identical human beings) 
(Art. 6 ESchG); any purposefully creation of hybrids (‘Chimaren und Hybridwesen’) of human beings 
and animals (Art. 7 ESchG).
223 Art. 1(1)(1) ESchG.
224 Art. 1(1)(2) ESchG.
225 Art. 1(1)(5) ESchG.







The Embryo Protection Act was not intended to concern the protection of the 
embryo from the moment of nidation, as from that point in time the provisions of 
Article 218ff of the Criminal Code (concerning abortion) apply.226
To date, only a few prosecutions have been instituted on the basis of the ESchG.227 
Nevertheless, the fairly rigid regulations of the Act and its chilling effect228 have 
been prominent in the societal and political debate, for instance in respect of the 
(longtime) highly controversial topic of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD, 
see 4.3.6 below).229 The most substantive amendment to the Embryo Protection 
Act was adopted in 2011, when the prohibition on PGD was indeed mitigated (see 
4.3.6 below).230 As will become clear throughout this chapter, in respect of the 
controversial and sensitive AHR matters, it has often been case law that gave the 
impetus for further development of the law. In this regard, often a consistency of 
law argument – i.e., a claim that the AHR legislation was inconsistent with abortion 
legislation – has been made and accepted.231
4.3.3. Access to AHR treatment
Under German law access to AHR is regulated in professional codes and regulations, 
both at federal and at state level. The Medical Associations of most States follow 
the regulations of the Federal German Medical Association, following which the 
actual access to AHR treatment is limited to specific groups in society. Para. 3.1.1 
of the Regulations of the German Medical Association concerning assisted human 
reproduction (‘(Muster‑)Richtlinie zur Durchführung der assistierten Reproduktion’) 
restricts access to heterologous insemination,232 to married women or women in a 
stable partnership with a man who has declared himself willing to accept parental 
responsibility for the child conceived through the AHR procedure.233 It has been 
concluded that single women and women with a same‑sex partner are thus excluded 
226 BT‑Drs. 11/5460, p. 7. On the scope of the Act, see also R. Neidert, ‘Das überschätzte Embryonen‑
schutzgesetz – was es verbietet und nicht verbietet’ [‘The overestimated law Embryo Protection 
Act – what it prohibits and does not prohibit’], ZRP (2002) p. 467.
227 R. Müller‑Terpitz, ‘Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz – ESchG)’ [Act on 
the protection of embryos (Embryo Protection Act – ESchG)’], in: A. Spickhoff, Medizinrecht [Medical 
Law], 1st edn. (München, Verlag Beck 2011), no. 190, Rn. 1(4).
228 Idem.
229 Idem.
230 Art. 1 Gesetz zur Regelung der Präimplantationsdiagnostik (Präimplantationsdiagnostik‑
gesetz – PräimpG) [Act on the Regulation of preimplantation genetic diagnosis] Act of 21 November 
2011, BGBl. I, p. 2228. Earlier amendments were not substantive.
231 As will be explained in the various sections below, considerable critique has been issued on the alleged 
inconsistency between the ESchG and the German abortion laws. See for instance Keller et al. 1992, 
supra n. 200 and Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, Rn. 8.
232 The term ‘heterologous insemination’ refers to insemination with donated sperm.
233 (Muster‑)Richtlinie zur Durchführung der assistierten Reproduktion [(Model) Regulations on the 
implementation of medically assisted reproduction] as published in Deutsches Ärzteblatt 103 (2006), 
no. 20, 19 May 2006, pp. A1392–1403, online available at www.bundesaerztekammer.de/downloads/
Kuenstbefrucht_pdf.pdf, visited June 2011.







from access to such AHR treatment.234 These restrictions have been criticised; some 
have pointed out that by virtue of the general right to the free development of the 
personality (Article 2 Basic Law) persons in a same‑sex partnership also enjoy 
protection of their desire to have children. Since this right is an individual right, so 
it has been argued, its protection or implementation cannot be made dependent on 
the actual partnership nor the sexual orientation of the individual concerned.235 The 
Lesben‑ und Schwulenverbands in Deutschland (the Gay Federation in Germany 
(LSVB)) has taken the viewpoint that the fact that the Regulations do not provide 
for access to AHR for women in a civil partnership, does not mean that access for 
this group is prohibited.236 However, only the Medical Associations of the States of 
Berlin and Hamburg allow for access to assisted human reproduction for women in 
civil partnerships.237
4.3.4.	 Donation	of	gametes	and	embryos
The German law on donation of gametes and embryos is mixed. Firstly, 
heterologous sperm donation is not prohibited,238 but not extensively regulated either. 
Article 1600(5) of the German Civil Code provides that if a child is conceived with 
donated sperm and the male partner of the mother has agreed to this, the mother and 
the man cannot challenge the man’s paternity. Further, as explained in section 4.1.6 
above, the OLG of Hamm ruled in 2013 that a child that has been conceived with 
sperm from a donor has a right to know about its genetic origins. It has been noted 
that sperm donation therefore implies considerable financial risks for the sperm 
donor, as a child conceived with his sperm and raised by a single mother or by 
two women in a registered partnership can in theory make a claim for maintenance 
and inheritance rights.239 On the other hand, these groups are often excluded from 
234 Idem. See also the Commentary to this Regulation as published in 103 Deutsches Ärzteblatt (2006) 
p. A 1400. In the latest version of the Regulation this limitation is no longer included in the text itself, 
but is still foreseen for in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Regulation.
235 Ratzel 2010, supra n. 41, at pp. 54–55, footnote 43.
236 See www.lsvd.de/newsletters/newsletter‑2011/insemination‑ist‑nicht‑verboten/index.html and www.
lsvd.de/recht/andere‑rechtsgebiete/kuenstliche‑befruchtung/index.html, both visited June 2013.
237 See www.lsvd.de/recht/andere‑rechtsgebiete/kuenstliche‑befruchtung.html#c7732, visited June 2014. 
In Hamburg these women first have to consult a special committee. Richtlinien zur assistierten 
Reproduktion der Ärztekammer Hamburg [Guidelines on assisted reproduction of the Medical Council 
of Hamburg], Annex to Art.13(2) of the Berufsordnung [Professional Code], under 3.2.3, online 
available at www.aerztekammer‑hamburg.de/berufsrecht/richtlinien_zur_assistierten_reproduktion.
pdf, visited June 2014.
238 Yet in 1908 there was a case of sperm insemination before the highest Federal Court at that time, 
the Reichsgericht. A woman hat inseminated herself with the sperm of her husband, without his 
knowledge. The Court rejected the husband’s claim that he could not be the father because of the 
self‑insemination. RG JW 1908, p. 485f. See also W. Küppers, Die zivilrechtlichen Folgen der 
entgeltlichen Tragemutterschaft [The civil consequences of commercial surrogacy] (Frankfurt am 
Main, Peter Lang 1988) p. 8.
239 H. Kreß. ‘Samenspende und Leihmutterschaft – Problemstand, Rechtsunsicherheiten, Regelungsansätze’ 
[‘Sperm donation and surrogacy – Problems, legal uncertainty, regulatory approaches’], FPR (2013), 
supra n. 49.







AHR treatment on the basis of the (non‑binding) Regulations of the German Medical 
Association concerning assisted human reproduction (see above).
While sperm donation is thus allowed for under German law, egg cell donation is 
prohibited. This also holds for post‑mortem fertilisation of an egg cell, as explained 
in more detail in section 4.3.4.2 below. Embryo donation is not explicitly provided 
for under German law. It has been held that it is therefore not outlawed, apart from 
in surrogacy situations (see 4.3.9 below).240
4.3.4.1. Prohibition on egg cell donation
By virtue of Article 1(1) ESchG the transplant of an unfertilised egg cell of another 
woman (in other words: heterologous donation of egg cells) is prohibited.241 It is the 
act of transplantation that is punishable: the woman from whom the donated egg 
cell originates, and the woman into whom the donated egg cell is implanted, are 
explicitly exempted from punishment.242
The prohibition on egg cell donation first of all aims to protect the child’s best 
interests243 by preventing the division of motherhood between a biological and a 
genetic mother.244 Pursuant to Article 1591 Civil Code, the woman who gives birth 
to the child, is the mother. Divided motherhood and the inherent uncertainty about 
the motherhood were considered by the legislature to endanger the development of 
the child into a responsible personality.245 Account was also taken of the risk that the 
biological mother would distance herself from the child should the child be disabled 
or suffer from a serious hereditary disease, for which she would hold the donating 
woman responsible.246 Other arguments put forward to justify the prohibition on egg 
cell donation were the possible commercial exploitation of women and health risks 
for women. In a 2010 third party intervention by the German government in an 
Austrian case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning the 
donation of gametes, the German position on egg cell donation was summarised as 
follows:
‘The prohibition [on egg cell donation] was supposed to protect the child’s welfare by 
ensuring the unambiguous identity of the mother. Biologically, only women were capable 
of carrying a child to term. Splitting motherhood into a genetic and a biological mother 
240 Müller‑Terpitz 2011, supra n. 227, ‘§ 1 Mißbräuchliche Anwendung von Fortpflanzungs techniken’, 
Rn. 8.
241 This prohibition is further laid down in a Regulation of the German Medical Association (Muster‑)
Berufsordnung für die deutschen Ärztinnen und Ärzte [(Model) regulations for German medical 
practitioners] (MBO‑Ä 1997), Part D. IV. No. 15I2. See Müller‑Terpitz 2011, supra n. 227, Rn. 5.
242 Art. 1(3)(1) ESchG.
243 Art. 2(1) in combination with Art. 1(1) Basic Law as well as Art. 6(2) Basic Law.
244 Abschlußbericht der Bund/Länder‑Arbeitsgruppe ‘Fortpflanzungsmedizin’ [Final report of the 
Federal/State working group reproductive medicine] published in the Bundesanzeiger [Government 
Gazette] of 6 January 1989. See Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at p. 147.
245 BT‑Drs. 11/1856, p. 9 and BT‑Drs. 11/5460, pp. 6–7. See also Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at pp. 121–
122 and Reinke 2008, supra n. 21, at pp. 151–152.
246 See Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at p. 149.







would result in two women having a part in the creation of a child. This would be an 
absolute novelty in nature and in the history of mankind. In legal, historical and cultural 
terms, the unambiguousness of motherhood represented a fundamental and basic social 
consensus and, for this reason alone, was considered indispensable by German legislators. 
In addition, the relationship with the mother was assumed to be important for the child’s 
discovery of identity. As a result, the child would have extreme difficulties in coping 
with the fact that in biological terms two women had a part in his or her existence. Split 
motherhood and the resulting ambiguousness of the mother’s identity might jeopardise 
the development of the child’s personality and lead to considerable problems in his or her 
discovery of identity. It was therefore contrary to the child’s welfare. Another danger was 
that the biological mother, being aware of the genetic background, might hold the egg 
donor responsible for any illness or handicap of the child and reject him or her. A conflict 
of interests between the genetic and biological mother could unfold to the detriment of 
the child. For the donor, making ova available was a complicated and invasive procedure 
which might result in a physical and psychological burden and a medical risk for the 
donor. Another conflict which might arise and strain the genetic and biological mothers’ 
relationships with the child was that a donated egg might result in the recipient getting 
pregnant while the donor herself failed to get pregnant by means of in vitro fertilisation. 
For the aforementioned reasons, split motherhood was considered to be a serious threat 
to the welfare of the child which justified the existing prohibitions under the Embryo 
Protection Act.’247
The prohibition on heterologous egg cell donation has often received considerable 
criticism in German legal scholarship. The provision has been considered an 
unjustified interference with the constitutional right to procreate.248 Further, the 
child’s best interests argument has been questioned, as it is in this context in fact 
used as an argument for not at all letting a child come into existence.249 It was further 
held that the risk of exploitation of women could be reduced by a prohibition on 
remuneration for egg cell donation and through the monitoring of AHR clinics.250 
Besides, it has been argued that the health risks involved in egg cell donation are not 
considerably greater than when artificial insemination with the use of the woman’s 
own egg cell is employed.251
The fact that, on the contrary, heterologous sperm donation is not illegal has increased 
the criticism of the egg cell donation prohibition. This discrepancy has been held to 
be in violation of the prohibition on discrimination (Article 3 Basic Law).252 Others, 
247 ECtHR 4 April 2010, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, paras. 52–55. A shorter – and therefore less 
insightful – summary can be found in paras. 70–71 of the Grand Chamber judgment in this case, dating 
from 3 November 2011.
248 Art. 2 in combination with Art. 6(1) Basic Law. See also Reinke 2008, supra n. 21.
249 Müller‑Terpitz 2011, supra n. 227, Rn. 7.
250 Idem.
251 Idem.
252 Idem. Compare the claim made by the applicants before the ECtHR in the case of S.H. a.o. v. Austria 
ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, no. 57813/00. See Ch. 2, section 2.3.3.







however, have seen relevant biological differences between divided motherhood and 
fatherhood that justify the difference made.253
4.3.4.2. Post‑mortem reproduction
Following Article 5(1)(3) of the Embryo Protection Act, it is prohibited to intentionally 
fertilise an egg cell with the sperm of a man who has passed away. While the 
person carrying out the fertilisation risks a maximum punishment of three years’ 
imprisonment or a fine, the woman who is involved in the insemination, will not be 
subject to punishment.254 The Article aims both to protect the man’s right to personal 
autonomy, including his right to procreate, as well as to serve the best interests of 
the child.255 Post‑mortem fertilisation of an egg cell is prohibited under Article 1(1)
(2) ESchG for similar reasons. It is thus the act of post‑mortem fertilisation that is 
outlawed. The implantation of an embryo that was created with the gametes of a man 
before he passed away is not prohibited under the ESchG.256 In a case where a woman 
wished to have her cryopreserved egg cells implanted, the OLG Rostock held such 
implantation of those egg cells that had been fertilised with the semen (sperm) of her 
late husband before his death, not to be against the best interests of the child, because 
the husband had expressly informed his wife of his child wish before he died.257
4.3.5. Gender selection
Article 3 ESchG prohibits the artificial fertilisation of an egg cell with a sperm cell 
after selection of the gender chromosomes.258 With this prohibition the legislature 
intended to refrain from entering into the ethically and legally unjustifiable area of 
positive eugenics.259 The prohibition was held to comply with the State’s positive 
obligation to protect human dignity (Article 1 Basic Law).260
The selection of gender chromosomes by a physician is exempted from punishment 
if it serves to prevent the child from suffering from Duchenne muscular dystrophy or 
253 D. Prütting and W. Höfling, Fachanwaltskommentar Medizinrecht [Lawyers’ commentary to medical 
law], 1st edn. 2010, Rn. 10.
254 Art. 4(2) EschG.
255 R. Müller‑Terpitz, ‘Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz – ESchG).  § 4 
Eigenmächtige Befruchtung, eigenmächtige Embryoübertragung und künstliche Befruchtung nach 
dem Tode’ [Act on the protection of embryos (Embryo Protection Act – ESchG) § 4 Self‑insemination, 
embryo transfer and artificial insemination after decease’], in: A. Spickhoff, Medizinrecht [Medical 
Law], 2nd edn. (München, Verlag Beck 2014) Rn. 1.
256 OLG Rostock 7 May 2010, Az. 7 U 67/09 and Müller‑Terpitz 2014, supra n. 255.
257 OLG Rostock 7 May 2010, Az. 7 U 67/09. See also M. Schafhausen, ‘Herausgabe von imprägnierten 
Eizellen nach dem Tode des Mannes’ [‘Release of fertilised egg cells after decease of the man’], 
jurisPR‑MedizinR (9/2010) Anm. 1 and A. Prehn, ‘Die Strafbarkeit der post‑mortem‑Befruchtung 
nach dem Embryonenschutzgesetz’ [‘The punishability of post‑mortem fertilisation under the Embryo 
Protection Act’], MedR (2011) p. 559.
258 The penalty that may be imposed is imprisonment for the maximum duration of one year or a fine.
259 BT‑Drs. 11/5460, p. 10. See also Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at p. 215 and Müller‑Terpitz 2011, supra 
n. 227, Rn. 3(1).
260 Müller‑Terpitz 2011, supra n. 227, Rn. (3)(1).







a similar serious gender related hereditary disease.261 With this exception, account is 
taken of the difficult conflict situation in which parents involved may find themselves 
and the exception aims to prevent the developing embryo from suffering from a 
serious hereditary disease.262
4.3.6.	 Preimplantation	genetic	diagnosis	(PGD)
While prenatal genetic diagnosis is allowed under German law and can in serious 
cases even justify an abortion on the basis of a medical‑social indication (see 4.2.6 
above), preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)263 has been controversial for a long 
time. Only in July 2011, the Bundestag adopted a law allowing for PGD under strict 
conditions.
At the time of the entering into force of the ESchG, PGD was not yet practiced in 
Germany, but only abroad. It is probably for that reason that PGD was not explicitly 
prohibited by nor provided for in the ESchG. Consequently, from the moment PGD 
became technically possible, it has been heavily debated whether it was prohibited 
under German law.264 Those who argued it was relied primarily on Article 2(1) ESchG 
(prohibition on abusive use of extra corporal embryos)265 and – sometimes – on 
Article 1(1)(2) (prohibition on abusive use of AHR techniques). Article 2(1) ESchG 
prohibits the abusive use of and sale (‘Veraußerung’266) of human embryos267 that 
have been created outside the human body, or that have been taken from the woman’s 
body before the moment of nidation. Abusive use is described as the sale (‘Abgabe’),268 
261 Art. 3, second sentence ESchG.
262 Müller‑Terpitz 2011, supra n. 227, Rn. (3)(1), referring to BT‑Drs. 11/8057, p. 15.
263 A possible source of confusion is the fact that in the German language this practice is known under the 
abbreviation ‘PID’.
264 See for example E. Giwer, Rechtsfragen der Präimplantationsdiagnostik: eine Studie zum rechtlichen 
Schutz des Embryos im Zusammenhang mit der Präimplantationsdiagnostik unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung grundrechtlicher Schutzpflichten [Legal questions on preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis: a study into the protection of embryos in relation to preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
taking particular account of constitutional obligations to protect] (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 2001); 
P. Ferdinand, Pränatal‑ und Präimplantationsdiagnistik aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht [Prenatal 
and preimplantation genetic diagnosis from a constitutional perspective] (Frankfurt am Main, Peter 
Lang 2010) and Neidert 2002, supra n. 226.
265 Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at pp. 208–209.
266 For an explanation of this term, see G. Pelchen and P. Häberle, ‘E 100. Gesetz zum Schutz von 
Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz – ESchG) – § 2 Missbräuchliche Verwendung menschlicher 
Embryonen’ [E.100. Act on the protection of embryos (Embryo Protection Act) – § 2 Abusive use of 
human embryos], in: G. Erbs and M. Kohlhaas, Strafrechtliche Nebengesetze [Ancillary criminal laws] 
(München: Verlag C.H. Beck 2011) Rn. 3. The autors refer to BR‑Drs. 417/89.
267 Human embryos are defined in Art. 8(1) ESchG as: ‚[…] die befruchtete, entwicklungsfähige menschliche 
Eizelle vom Zeitpunkt der Kernverschmelzung an, ferner jede einem Embryo entnommene totipotente 
Zelle, die sich bei Vorliegen der dafür erforderlichen weiteren Voraussetzungen zu teilen und zu einem 
Individuum zu entwickeln vermag.’ ‘[…] the fertilised human ovum which is capable of development 
after the nuclei have merged, also any totipotent cell extracted from an embryo capable – under the 
right circumstances – of dividing and developing into an individual.’].
268 See also Pelchen and Häberle 2011, supra n. 266, Rn. 4.







purchase (‘Erwerb’)269 or use (‘Verwendung’),270 for a purpose that does not serve 
the preservation (‘Erhaltung’) of the embryo. This means, inter alia, that acts that 
deteriorate the embryo’s chances of survival are prohibited.271 Some qualified PGD 
as such abusive use of the embryo within the meaning of Article 2 ESchG.272
This discussion and legal uncertainty, in combination with the perceived prohibition 
on PGD, caused German women and couples to go abroad to obtain such testing (see 
also 4.4.2 below, for (limited) statistics). This cross‑border practice in itself fuelled 
the discussion in Germany even more.273 The prohibition on PGD was considered to 
imply a conflict of values (‘Wertungswiderspruch’) within the German legal order 
in various respects. In other words, the law was held to be internally inconsistent.274 
Firstly, many argued that a prohibition on PGD was inconsistent with German 
abortion laws: contraceptive measures before nidation were not prohibited, as a result 
of which the embryo in vitro – while at the same stage of development – enjoyed 
stronger protection than the embryo in vivo. The fact, in particular, that German 
law was permissive in respect of prenatal genetic diagnosis, which could, in serious 
cases, even justify an abortion, while PGD was prohibited, received heavy criticism 
in (international) legal scholarship.275 It was claimed that access to PGD could in 
certain situations contribute to the prevention of abortions at a later stage of the 
pregnancy. Further, it was argued that the prohibition of PGD was at variance with 
the fact that a physician was exempted from punishment if he carried out gender 
269 Idem, Rn. 5.
270 Idem, Rn. 6.
271 Keller et al. 1992, supra n. 200, at p. 206.
272 Idem, at pp. 208–209. This line of reasoning was initially also accepted by the KG which ruled by 
judgment of 2008 that the provision of PGD to three couples constituted an offence in violation of 
Art. 1(1)(2) ESchG. KG 9 October 2008 (dec.), Az. 3 Ws 139/08. This judgment was however later 
overruled (see below). Pelchen and Häberle also considered it controversial whether the actual 
diagnostic measures involved in PGD could be qualified as abusive use of the embryo. They identified 
two other possible ways in which PGD could be held to be in violation of Art. 2(1) ESchG. Firstly, they 
pointed out that if a physician wants to eliminate ‘unsuitable’ embryos after PGD, the question is raised 
whether these embryos were created for another purpose than their preservation within the meaning 
of Art. 2(1) ESchG. They further raised the question if the destruction of ‘unsuitable’ embryos after a 
preimplantation genetic test gave a negative result, is a punishable abuse of the embryo. Pelchen and 
Häberle 2011, supra n. 266, Rn. 6.
273 See for example S. Kunz‑Schmidt, ‘Präimplantationsdiagnostik (PID) – der Stand des 
Gesetzgebungsverfahrens und der aktuellen Diskussion’ [‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) – the current legislative procedure and debate’], NJ (2011) p. 231 at p. 235 and Deutsche Akademie 
der Naturforscher Leopoldina et al., Ad‑hoc statement Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). The 
effects of limited approval in Germany, January 2011, p. 4, online available at: www.leopoldina.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/Politik/Empfehlungen/Nationale_Empfehlungen/stellungnahme_PID_2011_
final_a4ansicht_EN.pdf visited June 2011.
274 See T. Henking, Wertungswidersprüche zwischen Embryonenschutzgesetz und den Regelungen des 
Schwangerschaftsabbruchs? Am Beispiel des Verbots der Präimplantationsdiagnostik [Contradictory 
values between the Emrbyo Protection Act and the Regulations on termination of pregnancy. 
The prohibition on preimplantation genetic diagnosis as an example] (Baden‑Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 2010).
275 E.g. A. Coverleyn et al., Pre‑implantation Genetic Diagnosis in Europe’ (Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission, January 2007) p. 80, online available at www.ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/eur22764en.
pdf, visited July 2014.







selection in order to prevent that the future child would suffer from Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy or a similar serious gender related hereditary disease (see above).
Based on such criticism, ever more voices advocated a (limited) legalisation of PGD. 
In 2000, the German Medical Association framed a discussion paper that took the 
lawfulness of PGD as a starting point, but also proposed to subject access to PGD 
to strict conditions.276 This view was supported by a majority of the German Ethics 
Council.277 Nevertheless, a bill to this effect did not meet the required majority in 
Parliament.278 Finally, it was case law that gave the decisive impetus for legislative 
change in the field of PGD.
In May 2009 the District Court (Landesgericht) of Berlin acquitted a gynaecologist 
who stood trial for having provided PGD to three couples with a child wish, while 
tests had established that of each couple, one of the parents had a serious hereditary 
defect.279 The Court held that PGD with the aim of discovering serious genetic 
deficiencies was not criminal. The Public Prosecutor appealed the case to the German 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), which confirmed by judgment of 6 July 
2010 that PGD with the aim of discovering serious genetic deficiencies was not 
illegal.280 The BGH held that from Article 1(1)(2) ESchG (prohibition on abusive use 
of AHR techniques) and Article 2(1) ESchG (prohibition on abusive use of human 
embryos) no prohibition on PGD could be deduced that would be in conformity with 
Article 103(2) Basic Law. According to the latter constitutional provision an act may 
be punished only if it has been defined by a law as a criminal offence before the act 
was committed. Basing itself on the wording as well as the objective of the ESchG 
(namely the protection of the embryo against abuse), the BGH held that the acts 
of the accused did not constitute criminal offence. The Court considered that the 
ESchG did not expressly prohibit PGD and that it was not evident that the legislature 
would have prohibited PGD had it been yet available at the time of the drafting of the 
ESchG. This was, furthermore, held to be in line with the value judgment contained 
276 Bundesärztekammer [German Medical Association], ‘Diskussionsentwurf zu einer Richtlinie zur 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik of 3 March 2000, Dtsch. Ärztebl. (DA) 97 (2000), p. A525‑A528.
277 Nationalen Ethikrat (German Ethics Council), Stellungnahme Genetische Diagnostik vor und 
während der Schwangerschaft [Position paper genetic diagnosis before and during pregnancy] 
(Nationaler Ethikrat, Berlin 2003) online available at www.ethikrat.org/dateien/pdf/Stellungnahme_
Genetische‑Diagnostik.pdf, visited June 2011. See also BT‑Drs. 14/9020, p. 86.
278 BT‑Drs. 15/1234.
279 In the indictment this conduct was qualified as abusive use of reproduction techniques (Art. 1(1)(2) 
ESchG) and abusive use of human embryos (Art. 2(1) ESchG). LG Berlin 14 May 2009, Az. (512) 1 
Kap Js 1424–06 KLs (26/08), NJW 2010 p. 2672. See R. Beckman ‘Präimplantationsdiagnostik und 
Embryonenschutzgesetz, Zugleich Besprechung von LG Berlin’ [‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
and the Embryo Protection Act, as well as case‑note to LG Berlin’], ZfL (2009) p. 125.
280 BGH 6 July 2010, Az. 5 StR 386/09, NJW 2010 p. 2672 and H.‑G Dederer,’ Zur Straflosigkeit der 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik, Anmerkungen zu BGH, Urt. v. 6.7.2010 – 5 StR 386/09’ [‘To the 
impunity of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, Commentary to the BGH judgment of 6.7.2010 – 5 
StR 386/09’], MedR (2010) p. 819. See also ‘PID Grundsatzurteil. Koalition streitet um Gentests 
an Embryonen’, Spiegel online 11 July 2010, online available at: www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/
medizin/0,1518,705898,00.html, visited September 2011 and U. Bahnsen, ‘Um Leid zu verhindern; 
Gentests an Embryonen: Die Abwehrfront im Parlament beginnt zu bröckeln’, Die Zeit 21 October 
2010, p. 37.







in Article 3 ESchG, which provided that in case of serious hereditary diseases, an 
exception to the prohibition on gender selection could be made. The Court pointed 
at the considerable risks involved in the criminalisation of the transferral of embryos 
into a woman’s body without diagnostic testing, even in cases where the parents 
carried a hereditary effect. In particular in a later stage of the pregnancy, permissive 
prenatal diagnostic testing could lead to results that constituted grounds for an 
abortion. The Court again made a comparison with the exception on the prohibition 
of gender selection, which also aimed to prevent abortions in a later phase of the 
pregnancy. The press release issued by the BGH on this judgment underlined that 
only PGD with the aim of discovering serious genetic deficiencies was not prohibited 
and that the judgment had not opened the way to an unlimited selection of embryos 
on the basis of genetic characteristics.281
The BGH judgment – which to some came as a surprise282 – evoked a heated debate 
in legal scholarship, politics and society in general on the question how this ruling 
was to be implemented in law.283 Numerous non‑governmental actors issued opinions 
and statements on the matter. The German Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, for 
example, recommended that PGD be permitted by law under restricted and defined 
conditions,284 which would have the same implications for the embryo as prenatal 
genetic diagnosis and abortion.285 Leopoldina judged positively the potential 
contribution of limited legalisation of PGD to the avoidance of abortions286 and 
281 Press release Bundesgerichtshof of 6 July 2010, no 137/2010, online available at www.juris.
bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi‑bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2010&Se
ite=3&nr=52539&pos=112&anz=249, visited September 2011.
282 U. Schroth, ‘Präimplantationsdiagnostik zur Feststellung genetischer Schäden eines extrakorporal 
erzeugten Embryos’ [‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis to determine genetic disorders of in vitro 
embryos’], NJW (2010) p. 2676–2677.
283 E.g. Beckmann 2009 supra n. 279; Dederer 2010, supra n. 280; B. Ruso and M. Thöni, ‘Quo vadis 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik?’ [‘Quo vadis preimplantation genetic diagnosis?’], MedR (2010) p. 74; 
H. Kreß, ‘Präimplantationsdiagnostik und Fortpflanzungsmedizin angesichts des ethischen Pluralismus. 
Rechtspolitische Gesichtspunkte nach dem Urteil des BGH’ [‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis in the 
light of ethical pluralism. Legal political considerations after the judgment of the German Federal 
Court of Justice’], ZRP (2010) p. 201 and A.B. Lungstras, ‘Die Präimplantationsdiagnostik verbieten 
oder erlauben?‘ [‘To allow or to prohibit preimplantation genetic diagnosis’], NJ (2010) p. 485.
284 Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina et al. 2011, supra n. 273 at p. 2. The report held that 
the stance that PGD was prohibited under the ESchG warranted review. The authors pointed at ‘new 
research findings and the availability of modified examination techniques’ that had been developed 
to remove non‑totipotent cells beyond the fourth day of gestation, without exposing the embryo to 
an increased risk of injury or a reduction in implantation frequency. The authors were further of the 
opinion that ‘the issue of selection decision by women with in the context of PGD has not yet received 
the necessary legal recognition in Germany.’
285 The report held that this equalisation should be restricted to limited PGD approval for non‑toti potent 
in vitro embryonic cells. ‘The investigation should […] only be carried out for couples whose future 
children have, from an objective medical view‑point, a high risk of a known and serious mo nogenic 
disease, or a hereditary chromosomal aberration, or in cases where death or miscar riage is expected. 
No age limit for disease‑onset should be specified in determining the legiti macy of PGD. PGD must not 
be used for legally or socially defined goals which do not directly concern the welfare of the affected 
couple.’
286 Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina et al. 2011, supra n. 273, at p. 3.







the death of unaffected embryos287 as well as cross‑border medical tourism.288 The 
German Medical Association pleaded for the drafting of a comprehensive act on 
assisted reproduction in which the regulation of PGD would be provided for.289 The 
Association set itself the task of drafting a guideline on PGD (‘(Muster‑)Richtlinie 
zur Durchführung der Präimplantationsdiagnostik’), allowing for PGD only in 
cases in which the couple involved in the AHR ran an increased risk of passing 
on certain hereditary diseases and under strict conditions such as counselling and 
approval by an ethics committee.290 The German Bar Association, on the contrary, 
saw no need for such a separate examination by a committee.291 The German Ethics 
Council (‘Deutscher Ethikrat’) was strongly divided on the topic;292 only a small 
majority of 13 out of 24 Council members pleaded for restricted legalisation of PGD. 
Some saw this division in the scholarly and professional world as a reflection of 
opinions in society.293
Within Parliament, various bills were tabled, of which three were debated. In line 
with the public debate, the proposed regulations varied from a strict prohibition on 
PGD294 to legalisation of PGD under certain (limited) circumstances.295 During the 
first reading in April 2011, none of the bills received the necessary majority vote 
in Parliament.296 A middle‑ground solution, providing for PGD only under very 
restrictively defined conditions,297 stalled during the second reading.298 As a result, 
during the final vote two completely opposite solutions were on the table in July 
2011, when a final decision by Parliament was expected. Opponents of legalisation 
of PGD in fact wanted to undo the effects of the BGH judgment. They argued that it 
would be difficult to define the circumstances under which PGD would be allowed 
and warned that the creation of exceptions carried the risk that other illnesses or 
genetic features would also be accepted as grounds for the selection of future life.299 
While this approach received considerable support in Parliament, the possibility of 
287 Idem, at p. 4.
288 Idem.
289 Bundesärztekamme [German Medical Association], Memorandum of 17 February 2011, online 
available at www.bundesaerztekammer.de, visited September 2011.
290 Idem.
291 Stellungnahme des Deutschen Anwaltvereins durch den Medizinrechtsausschuss zu den 
Gesetzentwürfen zur Präimplantationsdiagsnostik [Position paper of the working group on medical 
law of the German bar association on the draft bill on preimplantation genetic diagnosis], no. 12/2011, 
March 2011, online available at www.anwaltverein.de, visited September 2011.
292 Deutscher Ethikrat [German Ethics Council], Präimplantationsdiagnostik Stellungnahme [Position on 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis], Berlin 8 March 2011, online available at www.ethikrat.org/dateien/
pdf/stellungnahme‑praeimplantationsdiagnostik.pdf, visited September 2011.
293 See also Redaktion beck‑aktuell, ‘Hauchdünne Mehrheit im Ethikrat für Embryonentests‘, 
Becklink 1011054 (Verlag C.H. Beck 2011).
294 BT‑Drs. 17/5440.
295 BT‑Drs. 17/5451.
296 Redaktion beck‑aktuell, ‘Anhörung zur Präimplantationsdiagnostik: Befürworter und Gegner 
des PID‑Verbots untermauern ihre Ansicht jeweils unter Verweis auf Grundrechte’, 26 May 2011, 
Becklink 1013490.
297 BT‑Drs. 17/5452.
298 Redaktion beck‑aktuell, ‘Bundestag stimmt für begrenzte Zulassung der Präimplantations diagnostik’, 
Becklink 1014650 (Verlag C.H. Beck 2011).
299 Idem.







resorting to PGD only in exceptionally serious cases received even more support. 
Therefore, but only after lengthy and emotive debates,300 the Bill legalising PGD 
under limited conditions finally gained the required majority vote in Parliament 
in July 2011.301 Subsequently, in September 2011, the Senate (Bundesrat) approved 
the Act on preimplantation genetic diagnosis (Präimplantationsdiagnostikgesetz 
(PräimpG)).302, 303
According to the new legislation, PGD is punishable with imprisonment of up to one 
year or a fine of a maximum of 50,000 euros.304 PGD is only allowed if there is a high 
risk that a genetic disorder on the side of the parents will cause the embryo to suffer 
from a defect from which a miscarriage will follow or that implies that the future 
child will suffer from a serious hereditary disease.305 Access to such lawful PGD is 
subject to conditions. Written consent of the woman whose egg cell is being used, 
medical and psychosocial counselling, as well as approval of use of the diagnosis 
by an interdisciplinary ethics committee, are all mandatory. Further, only licensed 
institutions can carry out PGD.306
4.3.7.	 Vitrification	of	egg	cells
The Embryo Protection Act does not prohibit vitrification of gametes and embryos 
(‘Kryokonserviering’). This practice has nonetheless been held to be controversial 
from a legal‑political perspective, because it may negatively impact the quality 
of the egg cells or embryos and may therefore raise questions as to the rights of 
the unborn – in vitro – life.307 Vitrification of gametes is not reimbursed under the 
300 Idem.
301 The Bill received a ‘suprisingly clear’ majority of 326 votes. The Bill providing for a full prohibition 
obtained 260 votes. Redaktion beck‑aktuell, ‘Bundestag stimmt für begrenzte Zulassung der 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik’, Becklink 1014650 (Verlag C.H. Beck 2011).
302 Gesetz zur Regelung der Präimplantationsdiagnostik (Präimplantationsdiagnostik gesetz – PräimpG) 
[Act on the Regulation of preimplantation genetic diagnosis], Art. 1 of Act of 21 November 2011, 
BGBl. I, p. 2228. The Act is complemented by a Decree of 2013, Verordnung zur Regelung der 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik (Präimplantationsdiagnostikverordnung – PIDV) of 21 February 2013, 
BGBl. I p. 323, which entered into force on 1 February 2014. For a critical note, see C. Pestalozza, ‘Eine 
späte und mißliche Geburt: Die Verordnung zur Regelung der Präimplantationsdiagnostik’, MedR 2013 
pp. 343–250.
303 BR‑Drs. 480/11. See also www.bundesrat.de/cln_171/nn_6898/DE/presse/pm/2011/132‑2011.html?__
nnn=true, visited September 2012.
304 The new Art. 3a (1) ESchG.
305 The new Art. 3a (2) ESchG. A high risk is defined as a 25 to 50 per cent probability. BT‑Drs. 17/5451, 
p. 10.
306 The new Art. 3a (3) ESchG.
307 A. Laufs, ‘§ 129 Fortpflanzungs‑ und Genmedizin’ [‘§ 129 Reproduction and gene medicine’] 
in: A. Laufs and B.R. Kern (eds.), Handbuch des Arztrechts [Handbook of Medical Law], 4th edn. 
(München, Verlag C.H. Beck 2010) Rn. 26–27 and M. Quaas et al., ‘§ 68 Einzelfelder der Biomedizin, 
b) Kryokonservierung’ [‘§ 68 Individual areas of Biomedicine, b) cryopreservation’], in: M. Quaas et 
al., Medizinrecht [Medical law] 2nd edn. (München, Verlag C.H. Beck 2008) Rn. 67.







statutory health insurance (see also 4.3.8 below),308 but it qualifies for certain tax 
deductions.309
4.3.8.	 AHR	treatment	and	public	funding
Since 1990, Article 27a of the German Social Act (Socialgesetzbuch, SGB) sets 
certain conditions for AHR treatment310 to qualify for reimbursement from the 
statutory health insurance (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, GKV).311 Firstly, 
an entitlement to reimbursement only exists for AHR treatment that is deemed 
medically necessary.312 This means that the couple’s desire to have children must 
be unfulfilled and that the cause for the infertility of the couple together cannot 
be cured by medical treatment.313 A further condition is set in respect of age: only 
insured women between 25 and 40 years old and insured men between 25 and 
50 years old may claim reimbursement for the costs of AHR treatment on the basis 
of the statutory insurance scheme.314 Also, only three treatment cycles are eligible for 
reimbursement315; any further attempts to initiate a pregnancy will have to be paid 
for by the insured couple themselves.316
Further and importantly, only homologous insemination, whereby the gametes of the 
couple involved are used, is reimbursed.317 The couple must, moreover, be married. 
308 BSG 22 March 2005, Az. B 1 KR 11/03 R, NJW 2005 p. 2476.
309 FG Niedersachsen 14 March 2013, Az. 5 K 9/11.
310 Apart from IVF treatment this may also concern other types of treatment, such as vitrification of tissue 
of the ovaries (BSG 17 February 2010, Az. B 1 KR 10/09 R), provided the criteria of the Article are met.
311 Art. 2(2) Act of 26 June 1990, BGBl. I, p. 1211. This provision was amended by Article 1 (14) Gesetz 
zur Modernisierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (GKV‑Modernisierungs gesetz – GMG) 
[Act on the modernisation of the National Health Scheme] Act of 14 November 2003, BGBl. I p. 2190. 
See also Richtlinien des Bundesausschusses der Ärzte und Krankenkassen über ärztliche Maßnahmen 
zur künstlichen Befruchtung (‘Richtlinien über künstliche Befruchtung‘) [Guidelines of the Federal 
Commission of Doctors and Health Insurance on medically assisted reproduction] of 14 August 
1990, Bundesarbeitsblatt 1990, No. 12, and Bundesanzeiger 2010; No. 182, p. 4003, online available 
at www.kbv.de/39321.html, visited August 2011. See also B. Schmeilzl and M. Krüger, `Künstliche 
Befruchtung: Wer trägt die Kosten? Eine Übersicht nach Fallgruppen‘ [‘Artificial insemination: who 
bears the costs? An overview according to categories of cases’], NZS (2006) p. 630.
312 Art. 27a (1) SGB.
313 BSG 22 March 2005, Az. B 1 KR 11/03 R, NJW 2005 p. 2476. See also Ulsenheimer 2010, supra n. 52, 
Rn. 63.
314 Art. 27a (3) SGB. See BSG 19 September 2007, Az. B 1 KR 6/07 R and BSG 3 March 2009, Az. 
B 1 KR 7/08 R, in which the Federal Social Court held these age restrictions to be legitimate. 
Critical were H. Kentenich and K. Pietzer, ‘Überlegungen zur gesetzlichen Nachbesserung in der 
Reproduktionsmedizin’ [‘Thoughts on legislative improvements in the field of reproduction medicine’], 
in: H. Frister and D. Olzen, Reproduktionsmedizin, Rechtliche Fragestellungen. Dokumentation der 
Tagung zum 10‑jährigen Bestehen des Instituts für Rechtsfragen der Medizin Düsseldorf [Reproduction 
medicine, legal questions. Proceedings of the Conference for the 10 year anniversary of the Düsseldorf 
institute for medical legal issues] (Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf University Press 2010) p. 59 at p. 70.
315 Before the amendments of the year 2004 (BGBl. I, p. 2190), this number was set at four.
316 Art. 27b (1)(2) SGB.
317 See section 4.3.4 above and BSG 9 October 2001, Az. B 1 KR 33/00 R, NJW 2002 p. 1517. This is 
different in respect of tax deduction. Since 2010 also heterologous insemination qualifies for tax 
deduction. BFH 16 December 2010, Az. VI R 43/10 NJW 2011 p. 2077.







The latter limitation has been set from the very beginning.318 The legislature justified 
this limitation on grounds of its obligation to give special protection to marriage and 
the family under Article 6(1) Basic Law.319 In February 2007, the Constitutional Court 
ruled that this limitation of reimbursement for AHR treatment to married couples 
was not unconstitutional.320 The Court held that the general principle of equality of 
Article 3(1) Basic Law would have been violated if AHR treatment were considered 
to serve the purpose of curing a disease. The legislature had not, however, assigned 
medical treatment with the purpose of causing a pregnancy as ‘treatment of a disease’ 
(‘Krankenbehandlung’), but as so‑called ‘performance’ (‘Leistung’).321 The Court 
considered this choice to fall within the legislature’s freedom to set conditions for 
reimbursement on the basis of the statutory health insurance regulations, particularly 
in the grey area between diseases and those physical and mental affections of a 
person that cannot necessarily be dispelled or cured by means of medical services 
on the basis of the statutory health insurance.322 The Court considered that the 
legislature had sufficient objective grounds to relate the reimbursement for AHR 
treatment to marriage, particularly as this served the child’s best interests. Further, 
Article 6(1) was not violated: from the special protection of marriage and the family, 
no claim on the State could be derived to enable the creation of a family by means 
of State‑funded AHR treatment. Although the Court saw no constitutional objection 
against the reimbursement of AHR treatment for unmarried couples, it saw no 
constitutional obligation to that effect either. Kentenich and Pietzer questioned, in 
2010, whether this fixation on the marital status still would be tenable, given that in 
2005 one third of all children born in Germany were born out of wedlock.323 While 
unmarried women cannot have their AHR treatment reimbursed under the statutory 
health insurance, they may claim tax deduction.324 Tax deduction is also available 
318 Art. 27a (1)(3) SGB. As noted above (in section 4.3.3), the Regulations of the German Medical 
Association also provide for access to AHR for women in a stable partnership with a man who has 
declared to accept parental responsibility for the child conceived through the AHR procedure.
319 RegE KOV‑AnpG 1990, BR‑Drs. 65/90, p. 35. See also R. Brandts, ‘Artikel 27a SGB V’ [‘Article 27a 
Social Law Act part V’] in: S. Leitherer, Kasseler Kommentar zum Socialversicherungsrecht [Kasseler 
Commentary to Social security law], 69st edn. (München Verlag H.C. Beck 2011), Rn. 27. Müller‑Terpitz 
has argued that from Art. 6(1) Basic Law no entitlement to claim financial support for reproductive 
treatment follows; instead the State has a protective and stimulating role. Müller‑Terpitz 2010, supra 
n. 21, at p. 13.
320 BVerfG 28 February 2007, Az. 1 BvL 5/03, NJW 2007 p. 1343. The judgment was adopted with a seven 
to one vote. The dissenting judge did however not write a dissenting opinion. This judgment is also 
referred to in BVerfG 21 July 2010 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 2464/07, NJW 2010 p. 2783.
321 In 2009 the Constitutional Court held that the term ‚illness‘ did not cover the desire for successful 
family planning within marriage (`Vor allem kann der Begriff der Krankheit, der grundsätzlich 
die Leistungen der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung auslöst, nicht durch Auslegung dahingehend 
erweitert werden, dass er auch den Wunsch nach einer erfolgreichen Familienplanung in einer Ehe 
umfasst.’) BVerfG 27 February 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 2982/07, NJW 2009 p. 1733, para. 10. See also 
BSG 3 April 2001, Az. B 1 KR 40/00 R, NJW 2002 p. 1598. Critical on this point is S. Huster, `Die 
Leistungspflicht der GKV für Maßnahmen der künstlichen Befruchtung und der Krankheitsbegriff’ 
[‘The obligation of the GKV to reimburse artificial insemination and the definition of illness’], NJW 
(2009) p. 1713.
322 See also Huster 2009, supra n. 321, at p. 1713.
323 Kentenich and Pietzer 2010, supra n. 314, at p. 70.
324 BFH 10 May 2007, Az. III R 47/05, NJW 2007 p. 3596. See F. Grube, ‘Aufwendungen einer 
unverheirateten Frau für künstliche Befruchtung als außergewöhnliche Belastung’ [‘Expenses of an 







to certain other groups of recipients of AHR treatment.325 For instance, since 2010, 
heterologous insemination also qualifies for tax deduction.326
In 2004, the full reimbursement for AHR treatment was subjected to a 50 per cent 
cut.327 The legislature did not explain this reduction, but most likely it was introduced 
in order to cut expenses.328 It has been reported that since this change in the law 
the number of AHR treatments in Germany has dropped considerably.329 Two 
individuals lodged a constitutional complaint against this new rule, alleging, inter 
alia, that the 50 per cent cut violated the general principle of equality (Article 3(1) 
Basic Law) and the Social State principle (Article 20(1) Basic Law).330 They were, 
however, unsuccessful, as the Constitutional Court in 2009 refused to accept their 
complaint.331 Referring to its aforementioned 2007 ruling concerning the limitation 
of reimbursement for AHR treatment to married couples, the Court repeated that 
there was no obligation on the legislature to fund the creation of a family by means 
of statutory health insurance. The Court considered that reimbursement for AHR 
treatment concerned a ‘performance’ (‘Leistung’) that fell within the legislature’s 
discretionary freedom. AHR treatment, the Court held, concerned no therapeutically 
necessary medical treatment, but merely the desire of the insured to live the life he 
or she wished to live.332
4.3.9. Surrogacy
German law shows – and has always shown – a clear disapproval of both commercial 
and altruistic surrogacy and provides for its penalisation under certain circumstances. 
Surrogacy is held to be against the values of the Basic Law and it is considered to 
unmarried woman for artificial insemination as extraordinary financial burden’], juris Praxis Report 
SteuerRecht 45 (2007) Anm. 5.
325 There is also tax deduction for the vitrification of egg cells when after a successful first pregnancy, 
these are maintained for further pregnancies (FG Niedersachsen 14 March 2013, Az. 5 K 9/11). The 
question of whether tax deduction also applies when no fertility treatment is taking place or is actually 
planned, was pending before the Federal Financial Court (Az. XI R 23/13) by the time this research was 
concluded (i.e. 31 July 2014).
326 BFH 16 December 2010, Az. VI R 43/10, NJW 2011 p. 2077. In 1999 this court had ruled to the contrary 
( BFH 18 May 1999, Az. III R 46/97, NJW 1999 p. 2767).
327 Art. 1 (14) GKV‑Modernisierungsgesetz – GMG. See also BT‑Drs. 15/1525 S 83.
328 Brandts 2011, supra n. 319, Rn. 27.
329 Huster 2009, supra n. 321, p. 1713, footnote 3, under reference to ‘Wilke et al., Gesundheitsökonomie 
und Qualitätsmanagement, 2008, p. 149’. See also Kentenich and Pietzer 2010, supra n. 314, 
at p. 69, footnote 18, under reference to ‘Deutsches IVF‑Register, DIR‑Jahrbuch Ärztekammer 
Schleswig‑Holstein, 2007’.
330 The complainants also (unsuccesfully) relied on Arts. 1(1); 2(1) and 6(1) Basic Law.
331 The BVerfG may refuse complaints on the basis of Art. 93b BVerfGG. BVerfG 27 February 2009 (dec.), 
Az. 1 BvR 2982/07, NJW 2009 p. 1733.
332 The Court spoke of ‘die Wünsche eines Versicherten für seine individuelle Lebensgestaltung’ [‘the desire 
of an insured person for his individual way of living’]. See also E. Beckhove‚’Die Kostenübernahme 
für künstliche Befruchtungen – Fallgruppen’ [‘Reimbursement of artificial insemination – categories 
of cases’], NJOZ (2009) p. 1465.







result in difficult psychological and social conflicts for all parties involved.333 As for 
the prohibition on heterologous egg cell donation, the legislature wanted to prevent 
situations of divided motherhood. Further, it is considered unethical to make a child 
the object of a legal act.334 By prohibiting surrogacy the legislature aimed to protect 
the human dignity of both surrogate mothers and children.335
In respect of surrogacy, German law makes a distinction between ‘Ersatzmutterschaft’ 
(the situation where the surrogate mother gives birth to a genetically related child) 
and ‘Leihmutterschaft’ (the situation where the surrogate mother is not genetically 
related to the child).336 In this research both situations are referred to with the 
English term ‘surrogacy’. The difference in terminology can be explained by the 
fact that different regimes each with a somewhat different focus apply to surrogacy 
situations.337
Surrogacy was first prohibited in the framework of adoption legislation. This was 
initially the result of court rulings to that effect.338 Later, by amendment of 1989, a 
prohibition on surrogacy mediation was included in the Adoption Mediation Act (1976) 
(Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetz, AdVermiG).339 Surrogacy mediation with financial 
333 V. Wache, ‘§ 13a AdVermiG nr. 1’ [‘§ 13a AdVermiG no. 1’], in: G. Erbs and M. Kohlhaas (eds.), 
Strafrechtliche Nebengesetze [Ancillary criminal laws] (München, Verlag C.H. Beck 2011) and 
K. Boele‑Woelki et al., Draagmoederschap en illegale opneming van kinderen [Surrogacy and 
unlawful placement of children] (Utrecht, Utrecht Centre for European research into Family Law 2011) 
pp. 224–225, Annex to Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32500‑VI no. 83 and online available at www.wodc.
nl/onderzoeksdatabase/draagmoederschap.aspx?cp=44&cs=6837, visited June 2014.
334 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 333, at p. 224.
335 KG 1 August 2013, Az. 1 W 413/12, NJW 2015 p. 479, referring to BT‑Drs. 11/4154, p. 6 and BT‑Drs. 
11/5460, p. 6.
336 See Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 333, at p. 225. The terminoglogy is not entirely consistently applied. 
Other terms used are: ‘Mietmutterschaft’, ‘Tragemutterschaft’ and ‘übernommene Mutterschaft’. 
See T. Rauscher, ‘§ 1591 Mutterschaft’ [‘§ 1591 Maternity’] in: J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum 
Bürgerlichen Gezetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen. Buch 4. Familienrecht, §§ 1589, 
1600d (Abstammung) [J. von Staudinger’s Commentary to the Civil Code, with the Introductory Act 
and anciliary acts, Volume 4, Family law, §§ 1589, 1600d (descent)] Rn. 6. For a general overview of 
German legislation concerning surrogacy, see V. Bokelmann and M. Bokelmann, Zur Lage der für 
andere übernommen Mutterschaft in Deutschland, Rechtsvergleich mit Reformvorschlägen [On the 
situation of surrogate motherhood in Germany, Comparitive legal research with proposals for reform] 
(Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang 2003).
337 For a discussion of the difference in terminology, see Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 333, at 
pp. 225 and 227–228, footnote 49, referring inter alia to S. Liermann, ‘Der Begriff ‚Ersatzmutter’ im 
Embryonenschutzgesetz’ [‘The notion of ‘surrogate mother‘ in the Embryo Protecion Act’], Zeitschrift 
für das gesamte Familienrecht, FamRZ (1991) p. 1403.
338 E.g. OLG Hamm 7 April 1983 (dec.), Az. 3 Ss OWi 2007/82, NJW 1985 p. 2205; OLG Hamm 2 December 
1985 (dec.), Az. 11 W 18/85, NJW 1986 p. 781; AG Gütersloh 17 December 1985, Az. 5 XVI 7/85 and LG 
Freiburg 25 March 1987, Az. 8 O 556/86, NJW 1987 p. 1486.
339 Since that date the Adoption Mediation Act has been called Gesetz über die Vermittlung 
der Annahme als Kind und über das Verbot der Vermittlung von Ersatzmüttern 
(Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetz – AdVermiG) [Act on adoption mediation and on the prohibition oof 
surrocay mediation (Adoption Mediation Act)]. See A A. Lüderitz, ‚Verbot von Kinderhandel und 
Ersatzmuttervermittlung durch Änderung des Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetzes’ [‘Prohibition of child 
trafficking and of surrogacy mediation by means of amendment of the German adoption Act’], NJW 
(1990) p. 1633.







gain is punishable by two years’ imprisonment or a fine.340 The intended parents 
and the surrogate mother are exempted from punishment.341 Further, Articles 1(1)(6) 
and (7) of the subsequent Embryo Protection Act (ESchG) prohibit the use of AHR 
techniques with the aim of providing for a surrogacy agreement. Punishable with 
imprisonment up to three years or a fine is anyone who removes an embryo from a 
woman before the completion of implantation in the uterus, in order to transfer it to 
another woman or to use it for another purpose not serving its preservation.342 This 
also goes for anyone who attempts to carry out an artificial insemination of a woman 
who is prepared to give up her child permanently after birth (surrogate mother).343 
The woman from whom the egg cell or embryo originated and the surrogate mother 
are exempted from punishment.344 This also holds for the person who wishes to take 
long‑term care of the child (the intended parent).345
In 1998 a new Article 1591 was included in the Civil Code that also contributes to the 
prevention of surrogacy.346 It provides that the mother of a child is the woman who 
gave birth to them. Hence, even if a woman gives birth to a child that is not genetically 
related to her, she, as the birth mother, is considered the mother in terms of the law. 
This is based on the mater semper certa est principle. Motherhood cannot even be 
challenged by the child if it claims to be genetically related to another woman (i.e., 
an egg cell donor).347 Intended parents – including the woman who donated an egg 
cell – can only become the legal parents of the child if they adopt the child.348 In that 
case, the surrogate mother and the legal father349 must consent to the adoption. Such 
adoption furthermore requires court approval and may only be approved if it is in 
the best interests of the child.350 Whether surrogacy automatically stands in the way 
of a lawful adoption is controversial.351 In general, both commercial and altruistic 
surrogacy agreements are held to be void for violating a statutory prohibition 
(Article 134 BGB) and/or for being contrary to public policy (Article 138(1) BGB).352
There have been several international surrogacy cases before the German courts in 
which the Courts confirmed the German prohibition on surrogacy. The relevant case 
340 Art. 14b (2)(1) AdVermiG. If no financial gain is involved in the surrogacy mediation, the maximum 
penalty is one year imprisonment or a fine (Art. 14b (1) AdVermiG. If the mediator acts by virtue of his 
or her profession, the imprisonment may be three years, maximum.
341 Art. 14b (3) AdVermiG.
342 Art. 1(1)(6) ESchG.
343 Art. 1(1)(7) ESchG.
344 Art. 1(3)(1) ESchG.
345 Art. 1(3)(2) ESchG.
346 BT‑Drs. 13/4899, p. 51 f. See Rauscher 2011, supra n. 336, Rn. 10 and Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra 
n. 333, at p. 225.
347 Rauscher 2011, supra n. 336, Rn. 16.
348 See, inter alia, Rauscher 2011, supra n. 336, Rn. 7 and 17.
349 If the surrogate mother was married at the time the child was born, her husband is automatically 
the legal father (Art. 1592(1) BGB). The husband may, however, contest his paternity on the basis of 
Art. 1600 ff BGB.
350 Art. 1741(1)(1) BGB.
351 See the judgment AG Hamm 19 March 2007 (dec.), Az. XVI 23/06, as discussed in section 4.5.3 below 
and Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 333, at p. 229.
352 For a critical discussion of this matter, see Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 333, at pp. 226 and 229–231.







law concerning the implications of such cross‑border surrogacy agreements – inter 
alia, the question of the civil registration of children concerned – is discussed below, 
in section 4.5.3.
4.4. stAtIstIcs on cross‑border movement
4.4.1.	 Statistics	on	cross‑border	abortions
4.4.1.1. Cross‑border movement from Germany
The restrictive abortion laws of the FRG and the liberalisation of abortion laws in 
other Western European States caused West German women to go abroad for an 
abortion in large numbers.353 Not surprisingly, no official statistics have been kept 
by the German authorities of the total number of German women who had abortions 
abroad. There are only limited statistics available which show the total numbers of 
registered abortions per year within (former West, former East and unified) Germany.
For an idea of the total number of German women who have had an abortion abroad 
in recent decades, one must resort to and add up the official statistics from other 
European States, where the State of origin of the women undergoing an abortion is 
registered. Not all European States keep statistics and even less break the numbers 
down on the basis of the country of residence of the woman. It is therefore impossible 
to set an exact number of abortions undergone by German women abroad. From 
the UK Health Department and the Dutch Health Inspection (‘Inspectie voor de 
Gezondheidszorg’) some statistics in this respect are available, however, giving at 
least some impression of the scale of cross‑border movement in this respect.
For the year 1971 (i.e., at a time when in the FRG very restrictive abortion laws were 
in force), statistics kept by the UK Health Department show that of the total number 
of 126,777 abortions performed in England and Wales, 32,207 were performed 
on women not residing in England and Wales, with 13,560 abortions performed 
on women residing in (West) Germany, hence more than 10 per cent of the total 
abortions carried out in England and Wales in 1971.354 The total number of abortions 
performed within West Germany itself in that year was 7,043. For the year 1971, 
there are no statistics available for the Netherlands, nor for East Germany.355
353 See, inter alia, Eser 1986, supra n. 62, at p. 377. The author was critical of the fact that the law tolerated 
such abortion tourism ‘[…] which benefits only those who can afford it’.
354 The report notes: ‘For the period 1971–90, figures for East Germany, West Germany and Germany 
NOS have been combined to produce totals for unified Germany.’ Office of population censuses and 
surveys, Abortion Statistics, Legal abortions carried out under the 1967 Abortion Act in England and 
Wales, 1991, Series AB, no. 18 (London, HMSO 1993) p. 8, online available at www.statistics.gov.uk/
downloads/theme_health/AB18_1991/ab18_1991.pdf, visited 1 April 2011.
355 For 1972, however, a total number of 114,000 is reported for the GDR. Lammich 1988, supra n. 64, at 
p. 369, footnote 93 under reference to ‘Wolff, DÄBl. 1981, 1055’.







Not surprisingly, the more the German abortion laws were liberalised, the numbers 
of women in the FRG going abroad for abortions declined. Also, the figures indicate 
that women went to neighbouring countries more often than to other (European) 
countries. It was, for instance, estimated that in the 1980s annually approximately 
5,000 women from South Germany had an abortion in neighbouring Austria.356 Up 
until 1977, the number of women from the FRG having abortions in England and 
Wales and in the Netherlands exceeded the officially registered numbers of abortions 
within the FRG itself.357 In 1975, for example, 19,076 abortions were registered in the 
FRG, while 3,404 women from the FRG had abortions in England and Wales and 
no less than 61,000 women from the FRG were registered as having abortions in the 
Netherlands. The abortion statistics for the FRG show a clear rise in the total number 
of abortions registered within the FRG for the following years: 21,371 for 1976; 
54,309 for 1977; 73,548 for 1978; and up to 91,064 for 1982.358 In the subsequent 
years this number slowly declined to an annual number of 84,274 in 1986. In the 
meantime, the numbers of abortions that women from the FRG had in England and 
Wales and the Netherlands, gradually decreased.359 This may have been linked to the 
entering into force of the more liberal FRG abortions laws of 1976.360
The number of German women having abortions in the Netherlands decreased even 
further when more permissive abortion laws were adopted after reunification. In the 
period after reunification of East and West Germany, but before the entering into 
force of the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Revision Act of 1995, still considerable 
cross‑border movement took place. For the year 1990, for example, Dutch statistics 
give a number of 6,517 women residing in Germany who underwent abortions in 
the Netherlands.361 It must be noted that at that time West German women also had 
356 Koch 1988, supra n. 69, at p. 237, footnote 16, referring to E. Ketting and P. van Praag, 
Schwangerschaftsabbruch, Gesetz und Praxis im internationalen Vergleich [Termination of pregnancy, 
law and practice in international comparison] (Tübingen, DGVT 1985) p. 80, at. pp. 134 f. As Koch 
explains, exact numbers are not available as in Austria no official abortion statistics are kept.
357 It must be noted, however, that for 1973 and 1974 this cannot be concluded with certainty, as no official 
numbers from the Netherlands for those years are known.
358 Koch 1988, supra n. 69, at p. 235. For the period 1970–1986, the exact numbers are: 1970: 4,882; 1971: 
7,043; 1972: 9,829; 1973:13,021; 1974: 17,814; 1975: 19,076; 1976: 21,371; 1977: 54,309; 1978: 73,548; 
1979: 82,788; 1980: 87,702; 1981: 87,535; 1982: 91,064; 1983: 86,529; 1984: 86,298; 1985: 83,538; 1986: 
84,274.
359 Idem. For England and Wales the exact numbers of abortions performed on women from the FRG 
are: 1970: 3,621; 1971: 13,560; 1972: 17,531; 1973: 11,326; 1974: 5,991; 1975: 3,404; 1976: 2,384; 1977: 
1,705; 1978: 1,171; 1979: 722; 1980: 584; 1981: 514; 1982: 365; 1983: 298; 1984: 250. For the Netherlands 
statistics are available from the year 1975. According to these statistics the number of women from the 
FRG having an abortion in the Netherlands per year was: 1975: 61,000; 1976: 60,000; 1977: 56,500; 1978: 
42,000; 1979: 32,000; 1980: 26,200; 1981: 20,900; 1982: 17,800; 1983: 14,600; 1984: 11,300 and 1985: 
8,297. The number for the year 1985 comes from: Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg, Ministerie van 
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport [The Dutch Health Care Inspectorate], Jaarrapportage 2009 van de 
Wet afbreking zwangerschap [Annual Report under the Pregnancy Termination Act 2010], December 
2010, Annex 2, online available at www.igz.nl/Images/2010‑12percent20Jaarrapportage%20WAZ%20
2009_tcm294‑292695.pdf visited June 2011.
360 Fünfzehnte Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz [Fifteenth Act on Amendment of the Criminal Law] Act of 
18 May 1976, 1976 BGBl. I, p. 1213.
361 Inspectie voor Gezondheidszorg [The Dutch Health Care Inspectorate], Jaarrapportage 2008 van de 
Wet afbreking zwangerschap [Annual Report under the Pregnancy Termination Act 2008], The Hague 







the opportunity to go to East Germany for an abortion. The present author is not, 
however, aware of any statistics in this respect.
In 1991 it was reported that the German Federal Frontier Police (Bundes grenzschutz) 
obliged German women to undergo gynaecological examinations.362 The European 
Parliament (EP) adopted a Resolution on the matter,363 in which reference was made to 
its own Resolution on abortion of 12 March 1990 (see Chapter 3, section 3.6.1).364 The 
EP shared ‘the concern reportedly already expressed in German Parliament’ about 
the behaviour of the German Federal Frontier Police365 and called on the German 
authorities to cease the practice concerned. It believed that the internal borders of 
the (then) Community were not to be used ‘[…] to threaten citizens with prosecution 
for activities that are perfectly legal in some Member States but not in others’. The 
European Parliament condemned the ‘humiliating practice’ of the German Federal 
Frontier Police, which it held to be ‘contrary to the aim of free movement of persons 
between the Member States of the Community’ and a ‘violation of the fundamental 
right of every individual to physical integrity’.366 Later the edges were taken off 
these reports,367 but it remains unclear if any criminal prosecutions were initiated 
following the searches.368
After the entry into force of the Pregnancy and Family Assistance Revision Act in 
1995 for the unified Germany, the statistics kept in the Netherlands and England and 
December 2009, Annex 2, p. 29, online available at www.igz.nl, visited June 2011.
362 S.F. Kreimer, ‘But Whoever Treasures Freedom…: The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions’, 
91 Michigan Law Review (1993) p. 907 at p. 908, referring (in footnote 5) to ‘EUR. PARL. DEB. 
(3–403) 202–05 (Mar. 14, 1991) (debate on resolutions condemning compulsory gynaecological 
examinations by German officials of returning German women at the Dutch‑German border); id. at 203 
(statement of Rep. Van Den Brink) (stating that over 6000 German women have had abortions in the 
Netherlands); id. at 204 (statement of Rep. Keppelhoff‑ Wiechert) (defending searches on the ground 
that officials ‘are required by the code of criminal procedure to investigate illegal abortions of this kind 
carried out abroad’); Nina Bernstein, Germany Still Divided on Abortion, NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1991, 
at 5, 13 (reporting an account of a German woman returning from the Netherlands who was forced to 
submit to a vaginal examination at a Catholic hospital near the border and was charged with having 
an illegal abortion; noting that German Interior Ministry acknowledges the practice; citing a study by 
the Max Planck Institute in Freiburg that found such ‘inquisition[s]’ to be ‘standard practice’); Karen 
Y. Crabbs, The German Abortion Debate: Stumbling Block to Unity, 6 FLA. J. INTL. L. 213, 222–23 
(1991) (describing prosecutions and searches).’ See also J.M. Bik, ‘Duitse vrouwen na abortus verplicht 
tot onderzoek’, NRC Handelsblad 4 maart 1991, p. 11 and Case 2009, supra n. 85, at p. 96 referring 
to T. Jones. ‘Social Policy; Wall still divides Germany on the Abortion Question’, Los Angeles Times 
19 October 1991, p. A4.
363 Resolution of the European Parliament of 12 March 1990 on reports of gynaecological examinations by 
the German Federal Frontier Police [1991] OJ C106/102, pp. 103, 113 and 135.
364 Resolution of the European Parliament on artificial insemination in vivo and in vitro of 16 March 1989, 
[1989] OJ C96/127.
365 Para. 5 of the 1990 Resolution, supra n. 363. The EP Resolution does not refer to any parliamentary 
documents of the German Bundestag.
366 The present author is not aware of any follow‑up of this EP Resolution in German Parliament.
367 ‘Duitsers doen geen abortus‑onderzoek’, NRC Handelsblad 20 March 1991, p. 7.
368 A Dutch newspaper reported that the one of the German Max Planck Institutes had statistics showing 
that approximately 60 per cent of the German women who had an abortion in the Netherlands was 
prosecuted. ‘Europarlement veroordeelt ‘abortuscontrole’ aan grens’, NRC Handelsblad 15 March 
1991, p. 3. It has proven impossible for the present author however, to verify this report.







Wales of abortions undergone by women residing in Germany, show a considerable 
decrease in numbers. For instance, for 1995 a total number of 2,982 abortions 
performed on women residing in Germany were registered by the Dutch Health 
Inspection, compared to 6,517 abortions five years earlier, in 1990. Of the total 
number of 179,522 abortions performed in England and Wales in 1991, only 109 
involved women residing in Germany.369
Since the year 2000, the registered number of German women having abortions 
abroad stabilised around an annual figure of approximately 1,100 for the Netherlands370 
and less than 20 in England and Wales.371 In 2008, 79 per cent of those women 
residing in Germany who had abortions in the Netherlands were more than 12 weeks 
pregnant.372 After 12 weeks of pregnancy, German law subjects access to abortion 
to stricter conditions (see 4.2.6 above). The introduction of an extra counselling 
obligation for abortions on the basis of the social‑medical indication in 2009373 may 
have triggered women in Germany to have abortions abroad, but the present author 
is not aware of any research studies or statistics in this respect.374
369 Office of population censuses and surveys, Abortion Statistics, Legal abortions carried out under the 
1967 Abortion Act in England and Wales 1991, Series AB, no. 18 (London, HMSO 1993) p. 8, online 
available at www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_health/AB18_1991/ab18_1991.pdf, visited April 
2011. The British perspective has been described as follows by the British Medical Association: ‘In 
the early 1970s a large number of abortions were carried out for non‑residents of England and Wales 
reaching a peak of 56,581 in 1973 representing a third of all abortions carried out in that year. In the 
early 1980s the number was around 34,000 (20 per cent of the total) and from 1995 the number has been 
around 9,500 representing 5 per cent of the total number of abortions.’ British Medical Association, 
Abortion statistics and trends, a briefing paper from the BMA, 17 June 2005, p. 5, online available at 
www.bma.org.uk/images/Abortiontimelimits_tcm41‑20443.pdf, visited 30 March 2011.
370 The exact figures were as follows: 2000: 1,603; 2005: 1,148; 2006: 1,092; 2007: 1,193; 2008: 1,171; 2009: 
1,123. Annex 2 to Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg, Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en 
Sport [The Dutch Health Care Inspectorate], Jaarrapportage 2009 van de Wet afbreking zwangerschap 
[Annual Report under the Pregnancy Termination Act 2010] December 2010, online available at www.
igz.nl/Images/2010‑12%20Jaarrapportage%20WAZ%202009_tcm294‑292695.pdf, visited 30 March 
2011.
371 The exact numbers for England and Wales are 2002: 46; 2003: 25; 2004: 16; 2005: 19; 2006: 18; 2007: 
12; 2008: 16; 2009: 17 and 2010: 12. The annual abortion statistics for England and Wales are available 
at the website of the UK Department of Health. For instance, the statistics for 2010 can be found in 
Table 12a to UK Department of Health, Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2010, May 2011, 
online available at www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsStatistics/
DH_126769, visited 19 July 2011.
372 See www.rutgersnissogroep.nl/productenendiensten/onderzoekspublicaties/onderzoekspublicaties‑1/
downloadbare‑publicaties‑in‑pdf/rapport‑lar‑2008.pdf, visited 30 March 2011, p. 35.
373 Gesetz zur Änderung des Schwangerschaftskonfliktgesetzes (SchKGÄndG) [Act on the Amendment 
of the Pregnancy Conflict Act] of 26 August 2009, BGBl. I, No. 58, p. 2990. See section 4.2.6 above.
374 The number of women from Germany going to the Netherlands has not changed significantly in the 
subsequent years. For example in 2010, 1,112 women of the total number of 30,577 women having an 
abortion in the Netherlands was resident in Germany. Inspectie voor Gezondheidszorg, Jaarrapportage 
2012 van de Wet afbreking zwangerschap, Utrecht December 2013, Annex 2, p. 37, online available at: 
www.igz.nl, visited June 2014.







4.4.1.2. Cross‑border movement to Germany
The statistics kept on the basis of Article 15 Pregnancy Conflict Act (see 2.4.2 
above)375 show that abortions undergone by foreign women in Germany make up 
only a very small portion of the total number of abortions carried out in Germany. 
It is interesting to note, however, that while the total number of abortions performed 
in Germany on an annual basis dropped from 134,964 in 2001 to 102,802 in 2013, 
the number of abortions undergone by women residing abroad rose considerably 
from 501 in 2001, to 1,092 in 2013.376 These German statistics are not, however, 
accompanied by any interpretation, rendering it impossible to identify any cause for 
this change in numbers.
4.4.2.	 Statistics	and	reported	cases	on	cross‑border	reproductive	care
As has been stressed repeatedly throughout this study, no reliable and exhaustive 
overview exists of the actual prevalence of cross‑border reproductive care in Europe 
(see also Chapter 3, section 3.4). Nevertheless, there are strong indications that such 
cross‑border movement takes place, also to and from Germany, as various (European) 
research studies and court proceedings prove.
The prohibition on PGD, which was only partly lifted in 2011, has for many years 
been reason for women and couples from Germany with a child wish to go abroad 
to have such genetic tests carried out. The 2007 study into preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) across Europe of the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission reported that for German residents the main reason for going abroad for 
treatment was that PGD was not permitted in Germany.377 In various news reports 
estimates have been reported of approximately 100 German women undergoing PGD 
abroad, predominantly in Belgium, Spain and the Czech Republic.378 It is thus widely 
375 On the basis of Art. 15 SchKG the German State has an obligation to keep statistics in respect of 
abortions carried out in Germany.
376 The exact number of abortions undergone in Germany by women residing in a foreign country, 
compared to the total number of abortions undergone in Germany per year (between brackets), for the 
period 2001–2013 is as follows: 2013: 1,092 (102,802); 2012: 1,088 (106,815); 2011: 1,006 (108,867); 
2010: 925 (110,431); 2009: 657 (110,694); 2008 720 (114,484); 2007: 556 (116,871); 2006: 509 (119,710); 
2005: 517 (124 023); 2004: 483 (129 650); 2003: 531 (128,030); 2002: 462 (130,387) and 2001: 501 
(134,964). Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, Schwangerschaftsabbrüche – FS12 R. 3 2008 and 
FS12 R. 3 2013, online available at www.destatis.de, visited June 2014. See also K. Zabrzynski, ‘Zur 
Abtreibung über die Grenze, Immer mehr Polinnen lassen einen Schwangerschaftsabbruch in Berlin, 
Prenzlau oder Schwedt vornehmen‘, Berliner Zeitung 30 October 2010, p. 24.
377 PGD is neither allowed in Switzerland and Italy. Also for residents of these countries the main reason to 
go abroad for this type of treatment is the non‑availability of it in the home country. Additional reasons 
for travelling that this research has revealed include the quality of the treatment, test availability, 
financial resources and manpower. Coverleyn et al. 2007, supra n. 275, at p. 79.
378 W.‑M. Catenhusen, ‘POSITION; Mit Embryonen verantwortlich umgehen Der Gesetzgeber muss der 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik klare Grenzen setzen’, Der Tagesspiegel 9 July 2010, p. 17; ‘PID‑Tourismus; 
Wenn Eltern ihre schlechten Gene fürchten müssen’, Berliner Morgenpost Online 19 October 2010, www.
morgenpost.de/web‑wissen/article1426581/Wenn‑Eltern‑ihre‑schlechten‑Gene‑fuerchten‑muessen.
htm; K. Elger and V. Hackenbroch, ‘Schwere Schäden’, Der Spiegel 25 October 2010, p. 180 and 







acknowledged that this cross‑border movement takes place – a phenomenon that has 
been referred to as ‘PID‑Tourismus’ (‘PGD tourism’).379, 380 The 2011 PGD regulation 
will presumably have reduced the number of Germans going abroad for PGD. There 
is, however, also a possibility that because of the great stigma that surrounded the 
matter for many years, some couples and individuals still prefer to go abroad for 
PGD.
Another issue in respect of which German laws are more restrictive than the laws of 
certain other European states, concerns egg cell donation. A research study published 
in 2010 concerning six European countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland), showed that 14.4 per cent of the cross‑border 
‘patients’ participating in the study, came from Germany. For these German patients 
‘legal reasons’ were the predominant reasons for travelling (80.2 per cent)381 and 
almost half of the German women concerned (44.6 per cent) travelled abroad to 
obtain egg cell donation.382 The study also showed that most of the German patients 
travelled to the Czech Republic (67.2 per cent).
4.4.3.	 Statistics	on	cross‑border	surrogacy
The case law concerning cross‑border surrogacy, as discussed in section 4.5.3 below, 
shows that there have been – particularly over the past five years – growing numbers 
of cases in which couples or individuals from Germany have gone abroad with 
the aim of arranging a surrogacy agreement under a more permissive jurisdiction, 
mainly non‑EU Member States, such as India, Ukraine and the USA. While such 
cross‑border movement is thus certainly taking place, there is too little data available 
to draw any conclusions in respect of the actual scale of this cross‑border movement.
4.5. germAn AbortIon And Ahr legIslAtIon And cross‑border 
movement
This section discusses the implications of German law for those who go abroad for 
an abortion, AHR treatment or surrogacy. Contrary to the other chapters in this case 
study, information about foreign treatment and follow‑up care after treatment abroad 
A Müller‑Lissner, ‘Eingeschränkt erlauben; Deutsche Wissenschaftsakademien befürworten 
Präimplantationsdiagnostik’, Der Tagesspiegel 19 January 2011, p. 39. See, as an illustration, also the 
below discussed case concerning a claim for reimbursement for preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) treatment obtained in Belgium (see section 4.5.2 below). SG Berlin 23 March 2007, Az. S 86 KR 
660/04.
379 Inter alia, E. Schwinger, ‘Ende einer Farce. Der Embryonenschutz soll Leben schützen, aber er kann 
Menschen schaden’, Der Spiegel 12 July 2010, p. 116; Berliner Morgenpost Online 2010, supra n. 378; 
Elger and Hackenbroch, supra n. 378, at p. 180 and Kunz‑Schmidt 2011, supra n. 273, at p. 235.
380 Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina et al. 2011, supra n. 273, at p. 23. See also Deutscher 
Ethikrat 2011, supra n. 292 at pp. 93–95.
381 F. Shenfield et al., ‘Cross border reproductive care in six European countries’, 25 Human Reproduction 
(2010) p. 1361.
382 Idem, at p. 1365.







are not discussed separately here. As far as the present author is aware, German law 
does not provide for any particular rules in this regard, nor have these topics been the 
subject of extensive debate in Germany.
4.5.1.	 Criminal	liability	for	abortions	and	AHR	treatment	obtained	abroad
Under GDR law, the territoriality and the personality principle applied in respect of 
the scope of applicability of the Criminal Code. In exceptionally serious cases and 
only after permission had been granted by the Public Prosecutor, could proceedings 
be brought for illegal abortions performed abroad.383 Besides, special internal 
regulations existed concerning abortions performed on foreign women on GDR 
territory.384
In the FRG the territoriality principle applied to all offences, including that of 
Article 218ff Criminal Code.385 On the basis of Article 5(9) Criminal Code, an 
abortion performed abroad could be prosecuted in the FRG, irrespective of the 
law of the country in which the abortion was performed, if the perpetrator was 
FRG national (‘Deutscher’) at the time of the offence and if his/her livelihood fell 
within the scope of the FRG law. Further, Article 7(1) Criminal Code provided that 
crimes committed against a FRG national in a foreign state could be prosecuted in 
the FRG if the abortion laws of that foreign state were similar to, or stricter than, 
that of the FRG. The unborn life was considered to be a ‘FRG national’ within the 
meaning of this law. As Koch has explained, this meant that all pregnant women 
with FRG nationality who went abroad for abortions that were not allowed for 
under FRG law, were just as punishable abroad under FRG law, as they would have 
been if the abortions had taken place on FRG territory.386 Doctors domiciled in the 
FRG who performed abortions that were illegal under FRG law, were punishable 
irrespective of the nationality of the pregnant women or the laws of the States 
where the abortions were performed. Further, aiding or abetting the performance 
of an illegal abortion – through mediation by agencies or by the financing of travel 
expenses – constituted an independent crime under Article 9(2) Criminal Code.
Article 5(9) Criminal Code, as currently in force in the unified Germany, still 
provides that abortions undergone abroad can be prosecuted in Germany, if the 
victim (the unborn child) is a German citizen or if the offender (the pregnant woman 
or the doctor involved) at the time of the abortion is German and has her or his 
main livelihood in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.387 Hence, the 
383 Lammich 1988, supra n. 64, at p. 347, referring to Art. 80 of the 1968 StGB. The present author is not 
aware of any statistics in respect of proceedings brought on the basis of this provision.
384 As Lammich explains, prosecution was possible if the woman worked in the GDR or followed education 
there and if diplomatic relations existed between her country of nationality and the GDR. Lammich 
1988, supra n. 64, at pp. 352–353.
385 Koch 1988, supra n. 69, at pp. 108–109.
386 Compare Idem, at p. 109.
387 Art. 7 I StGB and Art. 5(9) StGB. See also Laufs 2009, supra n. 63, Rn. 30. Art. 5(9) only sees at 
Art. 218 StGB, Art. 218b and 219 a and b are not covered. H. Satzger et al. (eds.), StGB, Strafgesetzbuch 







regulation is based on the passive personality principle (protection of unborn life) 
that is complemented with, as well as delimited by, the active personality principle 
and the principle of domicile.388 This provision was included in the Criminal Code by 
law of 1995, as a direct response to the cross‑border movement for abortions which 
existed at the time.389 Two aims were to be achieved by the provision: (1) to prevent 
German medical practitioners living close to the border from performing abortions 
abroad; and (2) to prevent pregnant German women from having abortions abroad 
free from punishment.390 Some argued that this provision furthermore contributed 
to the preservation of the German people,391 but this idea has been strongly rejected 
by others.392
No particular arrangements were made in respect of cross‑border AHR treatment. 
Consequently, the general principles concerning punishability of cross‑border 
offences and crimes under Article 7 of the German Criminal Code apply. This 
means, inter alia, that a requirement of double criminality applies and that either the 
offender or the victim or both of them must be German nationals. The present author 
is not aware of cases in which prosecutions were initiated in cross‑border cases on 
grounds of criminal prohibitions of any of the types of AHR treatment as discussed 
in this chapter.393
4.5.2.	 Public	funding	for	treatment	obtained	abroad
Insured persons are in principle entitled to reimbursement for medical treatment 
received abroad, to the extent that the treatment also qualifies for reimbursement on 
the basis of the German statutory health insurance (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, 
GKV) if it would have been received in Germany.394 The fact that the treatment is 
legal in the country where it is carried out is not relevant in this regard.395 Accordingly, 
in 2007 the District Court Berlin rejected a woman’s claim for reimbursement 
for preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) treatment obtained in Belgium, on 
Kommentar [StGB, Commentary to the Criminal Code] (Köln, Heymann 2009) Rn. 21 and Laufs 2009, 
supra n. 63, Rn. 21.
388 M. Böse ‘StGB § 5 Auslandstaten gegen inländische Rechtsgüter’ [‘Criminal Code § 5 Acts 
committed abroad against domestic legal interests’] in: U. Kindhauser, Strafgesetzbuch: Lehr‑ und 
Praxiskommentar [Criminal Code: Commentary for studies and legal practice] (Baden‑Baden, Nomos 
2010) p. 332.
389 Idem, at p. 332 and Müller‑Terpitz 2011, supra n. 227, Rn. 40.
390 See G. Werle and F. Jeßberger, ‘Rn 132’ [‘Rn. 132’], in: H.W. Laufhütte et al., Leipziger Kommentar, 
Großkommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch [Leipziger Commentary, Commentary to the Criminal Code] 
(Berlin, De Gruyter Recht 2007) under reference to BR‑Drs. 200/62, p. 111 and BT‑Drs. V/4095, p. 5.
391 Böse 2010, supra 388, at p. 332, referring to ‘M.K.‑Ambos, Rn. 29’.
392 Werle and Jeßberger 2007, supra n. 390, Rn. 137.
393 See also G. von Dannecker, ‘Können europäische Vorgaben ein Tätigwerden des nationalen 
Strafgesetzgebers auf dem Gebiet des Biostrafrechts erzwingen?’ [‘Can European guidelines exact 
action of national criminal law legislatures in the area of bio criminal law?’], in: E. Hilgendorf and 
S. Beck, Biomedizinische Forschung in Europa [Biomedical research in Europe], IUS Europaeum 49 
(Baden‑Baden, Nomos 2010) p. 161.
394 Art. 13(4) SGB V.
395 See BSG 9 October 2001, Az. B 1 KR 33/00 R, NJW 2002 p. 1517, para. 12.







the ground that no entitlement to reimbursement for such treatment existed under 
German law at the time.396 Tax deduction for treatment obtained abroad, that is not 
legally available in Germany, may also be problematic.397
4.5.3.	 Cross‑border	surrogacy	under	German	law
German couples or individuals who have made surrogacy arrangements in foreign 
countries may encounter considerable difficulties in establishing their legal 
parenthood of the child in Germany. They may also encounter difficulties in obtaining 
travel documents for the child. The case law on the matter is, however, diverse, and it 
may also depend on the specific legal documents on which the intended parents rely.
As explained above in section 4.4.8, a foreign surrogacy agreement is considered 
void under German law because it violates a statutory prohibition and is against 
public policy, within the meaning of Articles 134 and 138 of the German Civil 
Code.398 The fact that surrogacy is not prohibited in the country where the surrogacy 
agreement is concluded has no bearing on this finding.399 Intended parents can thus 
not rely directly on a foreign surrogacy agreement, but they may instead apply for 
recognition of a foreign judgment recognising them as the child’s legal parents or on 
a foreign birth certificate on which they are stated as the child’s legal parents.
Foreign judgments in family matters are in principle recognised under German law,400 
unless such recognition is considered manifestly incompatible with fundamental 
principles of German law, in particular when it is incompatible with fundamental 
rights.401 In a case of 2007 a German couple that had arranged a surrogacy agreement 
with a Turkish family, was for this reason faced with a refusal by the German Court 
to enforce the judgment of a Turkish court awarding the adoption rights over the 
child to the German intended parents. The German Court held this Turkish judgment 
to be against the child’s best interests, as the child had only been given birth to with 
the aim of handing it over to the German intended parents.402 Another example dates 
from 2013,403 when the Appeals Court of Berlin refused to recognise a judgment by 
a Californian judge which recognised the legal parenthood of an intended co‑father 
in a surrogacy situation, because surrogacy was considered incommensurable with 
396 SG Berlin 23 March 2007, Az. S 86 KR 660/04, p. 54.
397 In respect of treatment in the course of a surrogacy arrangement in California, see FG München 
21 February 2000 (dec.), Az. 16 V 5568/99 and FG Düsseldorf 9 May 2003, Az. 18 K 7931/00 E.
398 AG Hamm 22 February 2011 (dec.), Az. XVI 192/08, para. 15.
399 Idem, para. 20.
400 Art. 108 Gesetz über das Verfahren in Familiensachen und in den Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen 
Gerichtsbarkeit (FamFG) [Act on the Procedure in Family Matters and in Matters of Non‑contentious 
Jurisdiction], Act of 7 December 2008, BGBl. I p. 2586.
401 Art. 109(4) FamFG. See also B. Heiderhoff, ‘Rechtliche Abstammung im Ausland geborener 
Leihmutterkinder’ [‘The legal descent of surrogate children born abroad’], NJW (2014) p. 2673 at 
p. 2674.
402 AG Hamm 19 March 2007 (dec.), Az. XVI 23/06. See also LG Dortmund 13 August 2007 (dec.), Az. 15 
T 87/07.
403 KG 1 August 2013, Az. 1 W 413/12, NJW 2015 p. 479.







the German legal order, in particular with the human dignity of surrogate mother 
and child.404
By contrast, there also have been German courts that have held that recognition of a 
foreign judgment recognising the intended parents as legal parents of the child was 
required with a view to the best interests of the child. In 2013 the Administrative 
Court of Friedberg ruled that the best interests of the child required the recognition 
of such a foreign judgment, where the child would otherwise become stateless and 
the care for the child would not be guaranteed, because the surrogate mother and 
her husband refused to take the child into care.405 There have been more cases where 
Administrative Courts have held the recognition of a foreign judgment granting legal 
parenthood to an intended father in a surrogacy situation to be compatible with the 
fundamental principles of German law and fundamental rights in particular.406 Also, 
various academic authors have held that the rights and interests of the child had to 
be given priority, which in most international surrogacy cases entailed that the legal 
parenthood of the intended parents had to be recognised.407
It has generally been even more difficult for intended parents to rely directly on the 
birth certificate of the child as proof of its descent. In this situation German Private 
International Law applies, as laid down in the Second Chapter of the Introductory 
Act to the Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche, EGBGB). 
The Third Section of this Chapter concerns Family Law and its Article 19 focuses on 
descent. The EGBGB also contains a general public order provision, namely Article 6, 
which provides that ‘[a] provision of the law of another country shall not be applied 
where its application would lead to a result which is manifestly incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of German law.’ The Article adds to this that inapplicability 
ensues, in particular, if the application of foreign law ‘would be incompatible with 
civil rights.’408
Incompatibility with German public order has been a ground for some German 
Courts to refuse to issue a passport to a child born to a surrogate mother in a foreign 
country.409 In a case of 2012 concerning the Ukraine, the Administrative Court of 
Berlin ruled that the relevant provision in Ukrainian family law that provided that in 
404 The Court noted that the situation would be different if the intended father had recognised the child with 
the consent of the surrogate mother. See C. Benicke, ‘Kollisionsrechtliche Fragen der Leihmutterschaft’ 
[‘Conflict‑of‑laws questions in respect of surrogacy’], StAZ (2013) p. 101 at p. 111.
405 AG Friedberg 1 March 2013, Az. 700 F 1142/12, para. 32, as subsequently confirmed in AG Gießen 
7 November 2013, Az. 22 III 9/13. See also B. Heiderhoff, ‘Der gewöhnliche Aufenthalt von Säuglingen’, 
IPRax (2012) p. 523 at p. 526.
406 AG Frankfurt 7 May 2013 (dec.), Az. 464 F 10402/12 (concerning intended fathers in a registered 
partnership) and AG Neuss 13 May 2013 (dec.), Az. 45 F 74/13 (concerning a single father). 
407 Heiderhoff 2014A, supra n. 401, at p. 2674 and D. Baetge, ‘Art. 6 EGBGB, Öffentliche Ordnung (ordre 
public)’, in: M. Herberger et al., Juris Praxis Kommentar BGB, 7th edn. (Saarbrücken, juris GmbH 
2014), Rn. 112. For a different point of view see Benicke 2013, supra n. 404, at p. 111.
408 Translation taken from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_bgbeg/index.html, visited June 2014.
409 VG Berlin 5 September 2012 (dec.), Az. 23 L 283/12. Yet in 2009 had this Court refused to issue a 
visum for family reunification for a child that was born abroad with a surrogate mother. See VG Berlin 
26 November 2009 (dec.), Az. VG 11 L 396.09.







surrogacy cases the genetic parents were considered as the legal parents of the child, 
was manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of German law within 
the meaning of Article 6 EGBGB.410
Secondly, once arrived in Germany, intended parents who engaged in international 
surrogacy may encounter difficulties in establishing legal parent hood of the child. 
Following Article 36(1) PStG, only children with German nationality can be 
registered in the Register of Births. Article 19 EGBGB provides that the descent of 
a child is governed by the law of the place where the child has his or her habitual 
residence.411 If the child has his or her habitual residence in Germany, German law 
thus applies. Under German law, a child may acquire German nationality if one or 
both of the parents have German nationality. This often does not hold, however, for a 
child born to a foreign surrogate mother, because, as explained above in section 4.3.9, 
under German law the birth mother is recognised as the legal mother (Article 1591 
BGB). If she is married, her husband is the legal father of the child (Article 1592(1) 
BGB), and not the intended father, even if he is the child’s genetic father. This may 
thus stand in the way of registration of a child born to a foreign surrogate mother in 
the German Register of Births.412
There are two possible courses that can be taken, nonetheless, to establish legal 
parenthood in cross‑border surrogacy cases. The first is recognition of paternity by 
the intended father (‘Anerkennung’ within the meaning of Article 1592(2) BGB). 
Such recognition is only possible if the surrogate mother consents and if she is 
unmarried.413 If the surrogate mother is married, her husband first has to contest his 
paternity, before the intended father can have his paternity of the child recognised. 
This approach has indeed been approved of by some German Courts in international 
surrogacy cases. For instance, in a case of 2009 the District Court of Nürnberg 
held the recognition of paternity by a German man in respect of a child born to 
a Russian citizen not to be against German public order, even while there was a 
suspicion of surrogacy involved in the case.414 Heiderhoff has nonetheless called 
410 VG Berlin 5 September 2012 (dec.), Az. 23 L 283/12, para. 10. See also C. Mayer, ‘Sachwidrige 
Differenzierungen in internationalen Leihmutterschaftsfällen’ [‘Improper differentiations in 
international surrogacy cases’], IPRax (2014) p. 57. In an earlier Indian case where there was a suspicion 
of surrogacy, this same Court had held it not for the Court to decide on the child’s citizenship in the 
course of an application for a passport. VG Berlin 15 April 2011 (dec.), Az. 23 L 79/11.
411 This Article, furthermore, provides that in relation to each parent the descent can also be determined by 
the law of the country of this parent’s nationality. This has not, however, been applied by any German 
court in an international surrogacy case. For a critical note in this respect, see M. Steinbeis, ‘Mater 
überhaupt nicht semper certa est’ [‘Mater semper certa est does not hold at all’], blog of 2 November 
2012, online available at: www.verfassungsblog.de/mater‑uberhaupt‑nicht‑semper‑certa‑est/#.
VGDYgxYeDCF, visited 10 November 2014.
412 OLG Stuttgart 7 February 2012 (dec.), Az. 8 W 46/12, NJW‑RR 2012 p. 389. See also J. Rieck, 
‘Nachbeurkunding einer Auslandsgeburt bei Leihmutterschaft’, Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Familienrecht, FamFR 2012 p. 166. This case was referred to the BVerfG but refused by this Court (see 
below).
413 VG Berlin 26 November 2009 (dec.), Az. 11 L 396/09; VG Berlin 15 April 2011 (dec.), Az. 23 L 79/11 
and VG Köln 13 November 2013, Az. 10 K 2043/12.
414 AG Nürnberg 14 December 2009 (dec.), Az. UR III 0264/09. For another, more recent example, see 
OLG Düsseldorf 26 April 2013 (dec.), Az. I‑3 Wx 211/12. See also Mayer 2014, supra n. 410.







such ‘Anerkennung’ by the intended father an unsatisfactory solution, as it does not 
provide sufficient legal certainty for the intended parent(s). She has furthermore 
pointed out that this course cannot be taken by single women or women in a civil 
partnership.415
Intended parents can also become legal parents by adopting the child. Some German 
courts have made very explicit that adoption is the only possible way for intended 
parents in international surrogacy situations to be registered as the legal parents of 
the child under German law.416 Article 22 EGBGB provides that the adoption of a 
child is governed by the law of the country of which the adopter is a national at the 
time of the adoption.417 In most cases originating from Germany, this is thus German 
law. Further, as Heiderhoff has explained, for adoption it is required that the child 
is resident/present in Germany, a requirement which may not always be easily met 
in international surrogacy cases.418 Further, and importantly, any adoption order can 
only be granted if such adoption is considered to be in the interests of the child.
There have been German courts that refused to grant an adoption order for an 
intended parent in a cross‑border surrogacy situation, because the foreign surrogacy 
agreement was void (see above).419 There have, however, also been courts that 
held the granting of an adoption order in international surrogacy situations to be 
in the interests of the child. In a case of 2012, the Frankfurt District Court held, 
in this regard, that considerations aiming at the general prevention of surrogacy 
could not outweigh the individual interests of the child, including its right not to be 
discriminated against.420
The German case law in respect of cross‑border surrogacy cases is thus somewhat 
ambiguous, and there are still various open questions. This is particularly so now 
that all relevant judgments are issued by lower or regional courts; the matter has not 
been decided by for example the Federal Administrative Court or the Constitutional 
Court. In 2012 the latter Court refused to accept a constitutional complaint about 
a refusal to register intended (and genetic) parents who had gotten twins after 
entering into a surrogacy agreement under Californian law, for lack of fundamental 
constitutional significance (Article 93a (2)(a) BVerfGG).421 The Constitutional Court 
found that the complainants should have provided the Court with more factual and 
415 Heiderhoff 2014A, supra n. 401, at p 2676.
416 OLG Stuttgart 7 February 2012, Az. 8 W 46/12, NJW‑RR 2012 p. 389, para. 12.
417 Art. 23 EGBGB further provides that ‘[t]he necessity and the granting of the consent of the child, and of 
a person who is related to the child under family law, to a declaration of descent, to conferring a name, 
or to an adoption are additionally governed by the law of the country of which the child is a national.’ 
However, where the best interest of the child so requires, German law is applied instead.
418 Heiderhoff 2014A, supra n. 401, at p. 2675. As Heiderhoff explains adoption in the country where 
the child was born is often impossible, because under the law of that country the intended are yet 
automatically recognised as parents.
419 AG Hamm 22 February 2011 (dec.), Az. XVI 192/08, paras. 20 and 26. Critical in this respect: 
P. Friederici, ‘Unzulässigkeit der Adoption auf Grund eines Leimuttervertrags’ [‘Inadmissibility of 
adoption on the basis of a surrogacy agreement’], FamFR (2011) p. 551.
420 LG Frankfurt a.M. 3 August 2012 (dec.), Az. 2–09 T 51/11.
421 BVerfG 22 August 2012 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 573/12, NJW‑RR 2013 p.1. See Steinbeis 2012, supra n. 411.







legally relevant information, such as the nationality of the surrogate mother, her civil 
status and whether the intended father had yet recognised the child.422
The existing legal uncertainty and the implications of some of the less permissive 
rulings for the intended parents and children concerned, have been reason for some 
to call for a change of German family law on the matter.423 So far, however, no action 
has been taken by the German legislature in this respect. The German government 
has, furthermore, been hesitant in respect of any regulation of the matter at European 
or international level.424
4.6. conclusIons
The German legislature has been very careful in respect of the drafting of legislation 
concerning abortion and AHR treatment. Fear for eugenetics has been a compelling 
argument for the initial absolute prohibition on Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) 
and for the still existing prohibition on gender selection. The protection of human 
dignity that extends to the unborn has also constituted a compelling argument 
against such practices. At the same time, the right to free development of the 
personality of Article 2(1) enjoys strong protection under the German Basic Law, 
too. From this right, a right to self‑determination for the pregnant woman follows 
(see section 4.1.2 above). Consequently, the German legislature has constantly had 
to search for a careful balance between all rights and values at stake. In respect of 
AHR, human dignity arguments on behalf of the (future) child have often been read 
into the principle of the best interests of the child. The best interests of the child 
have, for instance, been accepted as a justification for the prohibitions on surrogacy 
and egg cell donation (see 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.9 above). All in all, in making decisions 
in this sensitive area of law, the German legislature and courts are bound by the 
value system of the German Basic Law, to which great significance is attached. The 
general reluctance to legislate on AHR matters of the German legislature can also 
be explained by (uncertainty over the effects of) fast‑moving medical developments. 
For example, long lasting uncertainty about legality of PGD followed from the fact 
that at the time of the drafting of the Embryo Protection Act, PGD was not yet 
practiced in Germany.
422 Idem, para. 15.
423 Heiderhoff 2014A, supra n. 401, at p. 2677.
424 In the Public Consultation on the EU Green Paper on the recognition of the effects of civil status 
records (see more elaborately Ch. 3, section 3.6.3.1) the German Federal Government put forward 
that in respect of the filiation of a child in the case of a surrogate mother, the EU could not require 
a Member State’s legislature ‘to place its family law at the disposal of the […] other Member States 
without restriction, allowing the persons concerned to have a family law relationship that exists under 
the law of another Member State to be registered in that State even though they have no close ties with 
that state’s legal order.’ Federal Government observations on COM (2010) 747 final, pp. 12–13, online 
available at www.ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/110510/public_authorities/
germany_minjust_en.pdf, visited June 2014.







Legislative change has often been instigated by federal courts’ judgments. This goes 
for the amendment of the abortion regimes of 1975 (in respect of the former FRG) 
and 1992 (in respect of the unified Germany), as well as for the lifting of the absolute 
prohibition on PGD in 2011. The courts have at the same time shown deference to 
political and societal sensitivities and have given the legislature discretion to regulate 
matters, for instance in respect of reimbursement for AHR treatment.
Clearly, Germany’s (fairly) restrictive laws have been – and to a limited extent still 
are – cause for cross‑border movement in respect of abortion and AHR treatment. 
This was certainly the case in respect of the former FRG’s abortion laws, as the 
statistics show. For some years in the beginning of the 1970s the number of women 
from the FRG having abortions abroad exceeded the number of FRG resident women 
who had abortions in their home country. When the German abortion laws gradually 
became more liberal, less cross‑border movement from Germany took place. 
German residents, furthermore, actively sought, and seek, AHR treatment abroad. 
The lack of exhaustive statistics in this respect makes it impossible to draw any firm 
conclusions, but all reports show that restrictive German legislation, for instance on 
PGD, has been one of the – if not the main – reason(s) for couples from Germany 
searching for foreign alternatives. This has been certainly the case in respect of 
surrogacy, as that is outlawed under German law.
For sure, this cross‑border activity has fuelled the debates at the national level, to 
which the German legislature has responded in various ways. In some cases the 
debate resulted in the relaxation of national law. This was undoubtedly the case 
in respect of abortion in the 1970s and in respect of the more recent phenomenon 
of ‘PGD‑Tourismus’. At the same time, German standards have also been firmly 
upheld cross‑border situations. The unique Criminal Code Article providing for 
the punishability of abortions performed abroad is a clear example, although the 
present author is not aware of any statistics concerning prosecution on the basis of 
this provision. Despite the penal law character of the ESchG, there is no equivalent 
to Article 5(9) Criminal Code in respect of AHR treatment and surrogacy. In regard 
of the latter, however, German Private International Law may discourage German 
residents from engaging in international surrogacy agreements. The much diversified 
approaches of the various German courts that have ruled in such cases render it 
difficult to draw firm conclusions on the state of the law in this respect. There is, 
however, an emerging trend visible in favour of recognising yet established parental 
links or enabling intended parents to establish parental links with the child, because 
the best interests of the child are held to require this.
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Articles 40–44 of the Irish Constitution see at fundamental rights. Its Article 40 
lays down a number of personal rights, ranging from freedom of expression to 
inviolability of dwellings and from liberty of the person to equal treatment before 
the law. No express provision is made for the right to respect for private life, but 
this right is covered by Article 40.3.1°, which protects more generally the ‘personal 
rights’. Article 40.3.1° provides:
‘The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend 
and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.’
As explained hereafter, this right includes a marital right to procreate. The third 
paragraph of Article 40.3 has been even more prominent in the Irish debate on 
reproductive matters, as it provides for a right to life for the unborn. An introduction 
to this right is given in section 5.1.2 below. Subsequently, the rights of the (future) 
child and the right to know one’s genetic origins are discussed.
5.1.1. The marital right to procreate
Neither the Irish Constitution, nor any other Irish statutory act contains an explicit 
right to procreate. Such a right was however recognised by the Irish courts as an 
element of the right to marital privacy. The foundation for the recognition of this 
right was laid in McGee v. Attorney General (1973) concerning contraceptives.1 In 
this case the Supreme Court recognised that the personal rights of Article 40.3.1° 
of the Irish Constitution implied a right to marital privacy. The Court held that 
therefore those provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1935, which 
prohibited the sale or import of contraceptives2 constituted an unjustified invasion 
of the woman’s personal right to privacy in her marital affairs. The majority of the 
Court concluded that the impugned provisions were inconsistent with Article 40.3.1° 
of the Constitution and were therefore no longer in force.3
1 McGee v. Attorney General & Anor [1973] IESC 2; [1974] IR 284.
2 Section 17(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1935.
3 The majority consisted of Judges Budd, Henchy and Griffin. Justice Walsh agreed that the relevant 
section of the Act was inconsistent with the Constitution, but he relied primarily on Art. 41 (on family 
rights) of the Constitution. Chief Justice Fitzgerald acknowledged that if the Act prohibited the use 
of contraceptives, it could have reasonably been held to contravene Art. 40 of the Constitution. As 
the contested section of the Criminal Law Amendment Act only concerned the sale and import of 
contraceptives, he did not find any unconstitutionality and proposed to dismiss the appeal. See also 







In Murray v. Ireland (1991) – a case about imprisoned convicted criminals who 
were deprived of the ability to exercise their conjugal rights – Chief Justice Finlay 
confirmed the approach adopted by the majority in McGee and considered ‘the right 
to beget children or further children of the marriage’ a marital right.4 The fact that 
a right to procreate has thus been expressly recognised for married couples,5 does 
not necessarily a contrario mean that unmarried persons would not enjoy any such 
right. Until today, this has, however, simply not been expressly confirmed by any 
Irish court, nor in any piece of Irish legislation.6
5.1.2.	 The	status	of	the	unborn	under	Irish	law
The unborn life enjoys distinct protection in the Irish Constitution. Following 
Article 40.3.3° ‘[t]he State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and […] 
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend 
and vindicate that right.’7 When this right was included in the Irish Constitution 
in 1983 (see section 5.2 below), the term ‘unborn’8 was not defined, rendering its 
meaning uncertain.9 It was correspondingly insufficiently clear from which moment 
in time unborn life begins; conception, implantation in the womb or some other 
point.10 Leitmotiv in both the Irish abortion law history and the long existing – and 
at the moment of writing still existing – legal vacuum surrounding assisted human 
reproduction has been exactly this uncertainty as to the exact protection the 
Constitution offers to the unborn.
The Irish Constitution Review Group held in 1996 that a definition was needed as 
to when the ‘unborn’ acquires the protection of the law. ‘Philosophers and scientists 
may continue to debate when human life begins but the law must define what it 
intends to protect’, the Group’s report read.11 It added that ‘unborn’ seemed to imply 
‘on the way to being born’ or ‘capable of being born’’.12 This made some conclude 
R. O’Connell, ‘Natural Law: Alive and Kicking?: a Look at the Constitutional Morality of Sexual 
Privacy in Ireland’, in: L. May, and J. Brown (eds), Philosophy of law: classic and contemporary 
readings (Chichester, Wiley‑Blackwell 2010) p. 585 at p. 588.
4 Murray v. Ireland [1991] ILRM 465, Finlay CJ at 471–473.
5 See also Ch. 11, section 11.1.2.
6 See also section 5.3.3 below on access to AHR treatment under Irish law.
7 Eight Amendment of the Constitution Act, No. 8 (7 October 1983). This self‑executing provision of the 
Constitution does not require legislation to give it effect.
8 ‘Beo gan breith’ in the Irish version.
9 Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction, Report of the Commission on Assisted Human 
Reproduction (April 2005) Appendix III, p. 96, online available at www.dohc.ie/publications/pdf/cahr.
pdf?direct=1, visited June 2014.
10 See, inter alia, A. Sherlock, ‘The Right to life of the unborn and the Irish Constitution’, 24 Irish 
Jurist (1989) p. 13 at p. 13; G. Whyte, ‘The Moral Status of the Embryo’, 12 Medico‑Legal Journal of 
Ireland (2006), p. 72 at p. 82 and A. McMahon, ‘The Legal Status of Embryos In Vitro in Ireland – A 
“Precarious” Position’, 17 Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland (2011) p. 33.
11 The Constitution Review Group (Stationery Office, Dublin 1996), p. 252. The report is online available 
at www.archive.constitution.ie/publications/default.asp?UserLang=EN, visited 26 May 2014.
12 Idem, at p. 275.







that the embryo in vitro was not covered by Article 40.3.3°,13 a reasoning that was 
later confirmed by the Irish Supreme Court.14
For a long time the legislature left the interpretation of the term ‘unborn’ to the 
courts.15 While they gave some initial impetus to this exercise,16 in respect of the 
fundamental question as to when life begins, the courts, however, turned the tables 
on the legislature. In a 2009 ruling the Supreme Court held:
‘[…] there is uncertainty or no consensus as to when human life begins. The choice as 
to how life before birth can be best protected, and therefore the point which in law that 
protection should be deemed to commence, is a policy choice for the Oireachtas.’17
The legislature eventually gave some further guidance on the matter in the 2013 
Protection of life during pregnancy Act (as discussed in section 5.2.8 below). Under 
this act the term ‘unborn’ was held to mean ‘[…] following implantation until such 
time as it has completely proceeded in a living state from the body of the woman.’18 
Implantation was thus considered the decisive point in time at which the protection 
of Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution commenced. Whether this protection extends 
to other rights than the right to life only, such as the right to bodily integrity, is still 
an undecided matter.19
5.1.3.	 The	rights	of	the	(future)	child
The rights of the child are not enumerated in the Irish Constitution, but several Articles 
refer to children. For example, Article 42.5, which permits the State to intervene in 
the family in certain circumstances, acknowledges the natural and imprescriptible 
rights of the child. In their case law, the Courts have recognised that children enjoy 
13 D. Madden, ‘In Vitro Fertilisation: The Moral and Legal Status of the Human Pre‑Embryo’, 3 
Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland (1997) p. 12.
14 Roche v. Roche & ors [2009] IESC 82, Murray CJ. See also section 5.3.1 below.
15 See C.M. Colvin, ‘Society for the Protection of unborn children (Ireland) Ltd v Grogan: Irish abortion 
law and the free movement of services in the European Community’, 15 Fordham International Law 
Journal (1992) p. 476 at pp. 496–497 and S. Koegler, ‘Ireland’s Abortion Information Act of 1995’, 29 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (1996) p. 1117 at p. 1126.
16 In a 1987 ruling, Chief Justice Hamilton held that the right to life of the unborn is afforded statutory 
protection from the date of its conception. The Attorney General (Society for the Protection of the 
Unborn Children (Ireland Ltd) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd [1988] IR 593, 598, [1987] ILRM 477, 
480. Dissenting Judge Hederman held in Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1 at 12; [1992] ILRM 401 at 
442: ‘The right of life is guaranteed to every life born or unborn. One cannot make distinctions between 
individual phases of the unborn life before birth, or between unborn and born life.’
17 Roche v. Roche & ors [2009] IESC 82, Murray CJ. This judgment is discussed in further detail in 
section 5.3.1 below.
18 Section 2(1) Protection of life during pregnancy Act 2013.
19 In a ruling of 2009, the High Court suggested that the right to life of the unborn, as laid down in 
Art. 40.3.3° of the Irish Constitution, could in the future be held to include the inherent right to bodily 
integrity. Ugbelese & Ors v. The Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform [2009] IEHC 598, 
paras. 65 and 74. See also I. Clissmann and J. Barrett, ‘The Embryo in vitro after Roche v Roche: What 
Protection is Now Offered?’, 18 Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland (2012) p. 13.







the protection provided by various Articles of the Constitution.20 In G. v. An Bord 
Uchtála (1980)21 the Supreme Court ruled that children have the right to be fed, to 
live, to be reared and educated, to have the opportunity of working and realising 
their full personality and dignity as a human being, and to have their welfare and 
health guarded and to be guarded against threats directed to their existence.22 While 
some judges based the recognition of these rights on the personal rights as protected 
under Article 40.3.1° of the Constitution, others relied on Article 42.5.23
Over the years various calls for greater protection of children’s rights in the 
Constitution were made.24 In 2007 a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional 
Amendment on Children was established. In 2010 this Committee recommended 
amending the Constitution ‘[…] to enshrine and enhance the protection of the rights 
of children’.25 This was followed up26 and by referendum of November 2012 the 
Thirty‑first Amendment to the Constitution was put before the people. It proposed to 
include a new Article 42A.1 in the Constitution, reading:
‘The State recognises and affirms the natural and imprescriptible rights of all children and 
shall, as far as practicable, by its laws protect and vindicate those rights.’
The amendment was adopted by a 58 per cent majority; however, the referendum 
result became the subject of a legal challenge. This challenge was dismissed by the 
High Court,27 but subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. As the appeal was 
still pending, the envisaged amendment had not yet been implemented by the time 
this research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014).
While the amendment refers to ‘all children’, some concerns were expressed that 
by leaving Article 41 of the Constitution intact, ‘the robust protection afforded to 
the marital family unit’ would often ‘tilt the balance away from the vindication of 
the individual children’s rights.’28 Such concerns were largely overcome by the 2014 
20 UCD Constitutional Studies Group, A Guide to the referendum on the 31st Amendment to the 
Constitution, online available at www.ucd.ie/t4cms/Guide_to_the_31st_amendment.pdf, visited 9 July 
2014.
21 G. v. An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32.
22 Joint Committee on the Constitutional Amendment on Children, Third Report. Twenty‑eighth 
Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2007 Proposal for a constitutional amendment to 
strengthen children’s rights. Final Report, February 2010, p. 35, online available at: 
www.oi reachtas.ie/parl iament /media /housesof theoi reachtas/contentassets /documents/
JC‑Constitutional‑Amendment‑on‑Children‑Final‑Report.pdf, visited October 2011.
23 Idem, at p. 39.
24 As O’Shea has noted ‘[t]he need to amend the Constitution to provide greater protection for children 
was first highlighted in 1993 and since then numerous calls for constitutional reform from both the 
domestic and international levels have fallen on deaf ears.’ O’Shea 2012, supra n. 11, at p. 87.
25 Joint Committee on the Constitutional Amendment on Children 2010, supra n. 22, at p. 14.
26 In September 2012 the Thirty‑First Amendment of the Constitution (Children) Bill 2012 was presented.
27 ‘Challenge to Children’s Referendum dismissed by High Court. A Dublin woman had taken a petition 
with an aim to quash the result in the November 2012 vote’, thejournal.ie 18 October 2013, www.
thejournal.ie/childrens‑referendum‑challenge‑rejected‑1135966‑Oct2013, visited November 2013.
28 O’Shea 2012, supra n. 24, at pp. 92–93. The author observed: ‘While the referendum’s positive result 
may have symbolic value for the rights of the Irish child, any practical changes brought about by the 







Children and Family Relationships Bill, as introduced in more detail in section 5.3.2 
below. In this Bill the best interests of the child were a central focus. They were 
defined as follows:
‘[…] “best interests”, in relation to a child, includes the physical, emotional, psychological, 
educational and social needs of the child including the child’s need for stability having 
regard to the child’s age and stage of development […].’29
5.1.3. The right to know one’s genetic origins
The right to know one’s genetic origins is recognised under Irish law, but it does 
not enjoy very strong protection. The Supreme Court ruled in I.O’T. v. B (1998) that 
a child has an unenumerated constitutional right to know the identity of his or her 
natural parents.30 It added, however, that this right is neither absolute nor unqualified; 
it must be balanced with the parent’s constitutional right to privacy. I.O’T. v. B 
concerned an adoption case and the ruling was subsequently codified in adoption 
legislation.31 As discussed more elaborately in section 5.3.4 below, there was, on 
the contrary, at the time of conclusion of this research32 no specific legislation (yet) 
that regulated under what circumstances children born from a pregnancy involving 
gamete donation could have access to information about their genetic parents.
5.2. IrIsh AbortIon legIslAtIon
Abortion is not allowed under Irish law, safe for the exceptional situation that an 
abortion may save the life of the mother. Under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861, which was in force until 2014, both the attempt of a 
pregnant woman to procure a miscarriage and the supply of any poison or instrument 
to any woman with the intent to procure a miscarriage, were criminalised.33 The 
referendum are likely to be minimal, particularly as Art. 41 remains unchanged.’
29 Children and Family Relationships Bill, Revised version 26 September 2014, online available at: www.
justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PB14000256, visited October 2014.
30 I.O‘T. v. B., The Rotunda Girls Aid Society & Father Doyle, and M. H. v. Father Doyle and The Rotunda 
Girls Aid Society [1998] 2 IR 321. See M. Blair, ‘Unveiling Our Heritage: A Comparative Examination 
of Access by Adopted Persons and Their Families to Identifying and Non–identifying Information’, 3 
Irish Journal of Family Law (2000) p. 10.
31 E.g. Art. 86 Adoption Act 2010 provides that the Civil Registry keeps an index ‘[t]o make traceable the 
connection between each entry in the Adopted Children Register and the corresponding entry in the 
register of births’. Information from this index can only be obtained by court order. The Court may not 
give access if it is not in best interests of any child concerned (Art. 88 Adoption Act 2010).
32 That is 31 July 2014.
33 The Irish Constitution of 1937 incorporated the common law prohibition on abortion and left the 
Offences Against the Persons Act intact. Both Section 58 and Section 59 of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 were furthermore expressly upheld in Section 10 of the Health (Family Planning) Act 
1979, No. 20/1979. See also Colvin 1992, supra n. 15, at pp. 491–92.







woman could in principle even face life imprisonment for an abortion attempt.34 As 
explained below (in section 5.2.8), the maximum penalty was considerably lowered 
when new abortion legislation was adopted in 2013. Nonetheless, today a risk to the 
life of the mother is still the only ground for a lawful abortion in Ireland.
While the Irish Constitution of 1937 left the Offences Against the Persons Act 
intact,35 developments in England and Wales and other Western countries influenced 
the Irish public debate on abortion. In R. v. Bourne (1939) the English Crown Court 
ruled that abortion to preserve the life of a pregnant woman was not unlawful and 
held that where a doctor was of the opinion that the probable consequence of a 
pregnancy was to render a woman a mental and physical wreck, he could properly 
be said to be operating for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother.36 As a 
result of this judgment the Abortion Act 1967 was adopted in England and Wales 
permitting abortion, inter alia, to ‘prevent grave permanent injury to the physical 
or mental health of the pregnant woman’.37 Although Irish Courts held that the 
R. v. Bourne approach could not be adopted in the Irish jurisdiction,38 these and 
similar developments in the United States of America39 and in continental Europe40 
caused considerable concern in Ireland about the adequacy of existing provisions 
concerning abortion and the possibility of abortion being deemed lawful by judicial 
interpretation.41 The Supreme Court decision in McGee (1973),42 holding that the use 
of contraceptives fell within scope of the mother’s private life, further fuelled the 
fear that abortion would also be legalised in Ireland.43 Apparently this fear could not 
34 Before 1861 the UK Statute 43 Geo 3, ch 58 (1803) imposed the death penalty on anyone who 
administered poison with the intent to induce the miscarriage of a pregnant woman. In the 1861 Act 
this was changed to life imprisonment.
35 J.A. Weinstein, ‘“An Irish solution to an Irish problem”: Ireland’s struggle with abortion law’, 10 
Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law (1993) p. 165 at p. 170 and N. Klashtorny, 
‘Ireland’s abortion law: an abuse of international law’, 10 Temple International & Comparative Law 
Journal (1996) p. 419 at p. 421.
36 R. v. Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687, [1938] 3 All ER 615. See also D. Curtin, ‘Case note to ECJ C‑159/90’, 29 
CML Rev (1992) p. 585 at pp. 585–586.
37 Section 1(1)(b) Abortion Act 1967.
38 Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child v. Grogan and Others (Unreported judgment of 6 March 
1997) Keane J.
39 Roe v. Wade 410 US 113 (1973), which had been preceded by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 
(1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US 438 (1972), were two cases similar to McGee v. Attorney 
General & Anor [1973] IESC 2; [1974] IR 284.
40 See Colvin 1992, supra n. 15, at pp. 493–494 and Weinstein 1993, supra n. 35, at p. 171.
41 See, inter alia, Colvin 1992, supra n. 15, at pp. 492–493; Koegler 1996, supra n. 15, at p. 422; L. Hamilton, 
‘Matters of life and death’, 65 Fordham Law Review (1996) p. 543 at p. 548; A.‑M.E.W. Sterling, ‘The 
European Union and Abortion Tourism: Liberalizing Ireland’s Abortion Law’, 20 Boston College 
International & Comparative Law Review (1997) p. 385 at p. 388 and A.M. Buckley, ‘The primacy 
of democracy over natural law in Irish abortion law: an examination of the C case’ 9 Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International law (1998) p. 275 at p. 281.
42 McGee v. Attorney General & Anor [1973] IESC 2; [1974] IR 284. See inter alia B. Mercurio, ‘Abortion 
in Ireland: An Analysis of the Legal Transformation Resulting from Membership in the European 
Union’, 11 Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative Law (2003) p. 141 at pp. 145–146.
43 See, inter alia, Colvin 1992, supra n. 15, at p. 495; A. Thompson, ‘International protection of women’s 
rights: an analysis of Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well woman Centre v Ireland’,12 Boston 
University International Law Journal (1994) p. 371 at p. 374; P. Ward, ‘Ireland: Abortion: X + Y = 
?!’, 33 University of Louisville Journal of Family Law (1994) p.385 at p. 389; Koegler 1996, supra 







be remedied by the Court’s explicit statement that the recognition of a marital right 
to privacy did not alter the prohibition on abortion,44 as anti‑abortion campaigners 
started a lobby to incorporate the right to life of the unborn in the Constitution.45 
This lobby resulted in a referendum held in September 1983 during which the Eighth 
Amendment of the Constitution was adopted.46 Justice Finlay later referred to this 
referendum as ‘[…] a decision by the people to insert into the Constitution a specific 
guarantee and protection for a fundamental rights perceived to be threatened by 
developments in the societies of countries outside Ireland’.47 The third subsection of 
Article 40.3, that was at the time newly introduced, is still in force, and reads:
‘The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal 
right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by 
its laws to defend and vindicate that right.’48
Since the inclusion of this Article in the Constitution there have been many calls for 
the adoption of regulatory legislation. For instance in the X Case, which is discussed 
below in section 5.2.2, Supreme Court Justice McCarthy held that:
‘The people, when enacting the Eighth Amendment, were entitled to believe that legislation 
would be introduced to regulate the manner in which the right to life of the unborn and the 
right to life of the mother could be reconciled.’49
n. 15, at pp. 1122–1123; D.A. MacLean, ‘Can the EC kill the Irish unborn?; An investigation of the 
European Community’s ability to impinge on the moral sovereignty of Member States’, 28 Hofstra Law 
Review (1999) p. 527 at p. 552; J. Schweppe, ‘Mothers, Fathers, Children and the Unborn – Abortion 
and the Twenty‑Fifth Amendment to the Constitution Bill’, 9 Irish Student Law Review (2001) p. 136 
at pp. 138–139; M.C. McBrien, ‘Ireland: balancing traditional domestic abortion law with modern 
reality and international influence’, 26 Suffolk Transnational Law Review (2002) p. 195 at p. 204 and 
A.M. Clifford, ‘Abortion in International waters off the coast of Ireland: avoiding a collision between 
Irish moral sovereignty and the European Community’, 14 Pace International Law Review (2002) 
p. 385 at pp. 396–397. As Koegler pointed out, the Irish Court expressly relied on the U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions Griswold and Eisenstadt (see supra n.39).
44 McGee v. Attorney General & Anor [1973] IESC 2; [1974] IR 284 at. 335. As Hamilton observes, such 
observations were repeated in G. v. An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32 and Norris v. Attorney General 
[1983] IESC 3; [1984] IR 36. Hamilton 1996, supra n. 41, at p. 548.
45 In 1981 umbrella organisation Pro Life Amendment Committee was founded, which considered a 
constitutional amendment the best way to prevent the legalisation of abortion in Ireland. See Colvin 
1992, supra n. 15, at pp. 495–496 and Koegler 1996, supra n. 15, at p. 1125.
46 53.67 per cent of the electorate voted with 841,233 votes in favour and 416,136 against.
47 T.A. Finlay, ‘The Constitution of Ireland in a Changing Society’, in: D. Curtin and D. O’Keeffe (eds.), 
Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law – Essays for the Hon. Mr. 
Justice T.F. O’Higgin (Dublin, Butterworth 1992) p. 140. See also R.A. Lawson, ‘The Irish Abortion 
Cases: European Limits to National Sovereignty?’, 1 European Journal of Health Law (1994) p. 167 at 
p. 167.
48 Eight Amendment of the Constitution Act, No. 8 (7 October 1983). This self‑executing provision of the 
Constitution does not require legislation to give it effect.
49 Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1; [1992] ILRM 401 at 451.







The Justice at the time called the legislature’s failure to legislate ‘inexcusable’.50 
Even though a call for legislation was repeated at many points in time since,51 it 
was not until 2013, however, that any implementing legislation was adopted (see 
section 5.2.8 below).
Because of the strict Irish abortion laws, women and girls from Ireland have been, 
and are, travelling abroad for abortions (for statistics, see section 5.4 below). This 
cross‑border movement has proven so deeply entrenched in the Irish abortion debate 
and has been so fundamental for the (development of) standard‑setting in this area, 
that the present section 5.2 in setting out the Irish abortion legislation also addresses 
some cross‑border elements. Section 5.5 below will subsequently single out a number 
of relevant cross‑border issues, such as criminal liability for, public funding for and 
information about abortions obtained abroad.
5.2.1.	 The	success	of	pro‑life	campaigners
After the successful 1983 referendum, the Irish pro‑life (and thus anti‑abortion) 
campaigners of the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Children (SPUC)52 
sought to stop women in Ireland from travelling abroad for abortions, and initiated a 
series of proceedings against the Irish counselling agencies Open Door Counselling 
and Dublin Well Woman Centre, who provided non‑directive counselling about legal 
abortion services abroad.53 The Irish Supreme Court granted an injunction restraining 
the two counselling agencies from assisting pregnant women ‘[…] to travel abroad to 
obtain abortions by referral to a clinic, by the making for them of travel arrangements, 
or by informing them of the identity and location and method of communication 
with a specified clinic or clinics or otherwise.’54 The Supreme Court held that the 
agencies had no constitutional right to exercise their freedom of expression, as they 
were ‘assisting in the ultimate destruction of the life of the unborn’, whose right 
to life was expressly guaranteed by the Constitution.55 The President of the Court, 
Chief Justice Finlay, held that ‘[…] no right could constitutionally arise to obtain 
information the purpose of […] which was to defeat the constitutional right to life of 
50 Compare Roche v. Roche as discussed in section 5.3.1 below.
51 See, inter alia, I. Bacik, ‘Guest Editorial’, 11 Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland 1997, p. 1.
52 In the below discussed Grogan case, the CJEU described SPUC as ‘a company incorporated under Irish 
law whose purpose is to prevent the decriminalization of abortion and to affirm, defend and promote 
human life from the moment of conception.’
53 As Sherlock has explained, under the Censorship of Publications Act 1929 (Section 16), the printing, 
publishing, sell or distribution any book or periodical which advocated abortion was prohibited. 
Sherlock 1989, supra n. 10.
54 The Attorney General (Society for the Protection of the Unborn Children (Ireland Ltd) v. Open Door 
Counselling Ltd [1988] IR 593 at 598, [1987] ILRM 477 at 480. In Ireland injunctions apply to all 
those who have notice of them. Sterling therefore concludes that this ruling effectively forced abortion 
counselling to go  underground. Sterling 1997, supra n. 41, at p. 390 referring to A.M. Hilbert, ‘Notes, 
The Irish Abortion Debate: Substantive Rights and Affecting Commerce Jurisprudential Models’, 26 
VanderBilt Journal of Transnational Law (1994) p. 1117 at p. 1135.
55 Idem, at 624–625.







the unborn child’.56 The counselling agencies, Open Door Counselling and Dublin 
Well Woman Centre, subsequently lodged a complaint with the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). Before this Court would issue its judgment in the case, 
the other European Court, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (now 
CJEU), gave a judgment in another case initiated by the Irish pro‑life campaigners.
5.2.1.1. The Grogan case (1991) and its aftermath
SPUC also brought a suit against representatives of three Irish student associations 
who distributed free handbooks containing information about abortion services 
available in England. Referring to Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty (now 56 
and 57 TFEU), the student associations – represented by one of their officers, Stephen 
Grogan – contended that Irish citizens had a right to receive and impart information 
about services lawfully available in other Member States. The High Court made a 
reference to the Court of Justice of the European Communities (now CJEU) for a 
preliminary ruling on three questions: (a) whether abortion was a ‘service’ within the 
meaning of the EEC Treaty; (b) if so, whether the prohibition on the distribution of 
information regarding those services constituted a restriction within the meaning of 
the Treaty; and (c) if so, whether such a restriction could be justified.57 As discussed 
more elaborately in Chapter 3,58 the Court held in its preliminary ruling that the 
links between the activities of the student associations and the providers of abortion 
services in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, were ‘too tenuous’, for the prohibition 
on the distribution of information to be regarded as a restriction within the meaning 
of the Treaty.59 Accordingly, in August 1992 the High Court granted a permanent 
injunction.60
The Irish government was worried about the effect of the ruling of the Court of 
Justice in Grogan, as it implied that Irish abortion law could potentially conflict with 
56 Idem, at 625. For critique of this ruling see also Hilbert 1994, supra n. 54, at p. 1134 and Thompson 
1994, supra n. 43, at p. 382.
57 From Campus Oil v. Minister for Industry [1983] IESC 2; [1983] IR 82 it follows that under Irish law 
there is no appeal against a decision to refer a case to the CJEU. When the High Court did not grant an 
interlocutory injunction against the student associations while the CJEU’s opinion was awaited, SPUC 
appealed to the Supreme Court against this inactivity. The Supreme Court unanimously granted the 
injunction, asserting that no Community law regarding services could outweigh the right to life of the 
unborn, as guaranteed by Ireland’s Constitution. The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children 
(Ireland) Ltd v. Grogan [1989] IR 753 at 765; [1990] ILRM 350. According to Colvin this reflected a 
view contrary to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice regarding the supremacy of Community law. 
Colvin 1992, supra n. 15, at p. 502. Cf. Case 11–70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 
1125, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114.
58 Ch. 3, section 3.5.2.1.
59 Case C‑159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v. Stephen Grogan and 
others [1991] ECR I‑4685, ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, paras. 24–27.
60 SPUC v. Grogan and others [1993] l CMLR 197. Fletcher has explained that ‘[t]he Court’s finding that 
the students’ unions were not protected under EC law in their distribution of abortion information 
effectively meant that the injunction against their doing so continued to operate until it was lifted in 
March 1997, after the Abortion Information Act 1995 came into effect.’ R. Fletcher, ‘National crisis, 
supranational opportunity: the Irish construction of abortion as a European service’, 8 Reproductive 
Health Matters (2000) p. 35 at p. 37.







Community law.61 If a direct link with the abortion providers could be established 
in a different case, Community law could potentially override Article 40.3.3° of 
the Irish Constitution.62 To avoid that possibility, the Irish government lobbied for a 
Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty.63 This resulted in the adoption of Protocol 17 to the 
Treaty on European Union, which provided:
‘Nothing in the Treaty on the European Union or in the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties shall 
affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3º of the Constitution of Ireland.’64
While the Maastricht Treaty was signed by the Irish government on 7 February 
1992, its ratification was subject to a referendum by the Irish electorate, which was 
due to take place in June 1992. This referendum would turn out to be significantly 
influenced by yet another stage in the Irish abortion debate, initiated by the highly 
controversial landmark case Attorney General v. X.65
5.2.2. The X Case	(1992)	and	its	aftermath
Ten days after the signing of the Treaty on European Union, the Irish Court had to 
interpret the Eighth Amendment in a case involving a 14‑year‑old girl – referred to as 
‘X’ – who was pregnant as a result of multiple rape and wished to travel to the United 
Kingdom (UK) with her parents to have an abortion. The girl claimed that she was 
suicidal at the thought of carrying her pregnancy to term. Prior to their leaving, 
the parents of the girl contacted the Irish police to inquire if DNA tests could be 
carried out on the foetus, in order to provide proof of paternity. The police contacted 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), who declared on 5 February 1992 that 
such evidence would be inadmissible.66 The following day the family travelled to 
England to procure an abortion. The DPP in turn contacted the Attorney General 
who subsequently sought an injunction order seeking the immediate return of the 
girl and her parents to Ireland. The family returned and put evidence before the High 
Court that X would commit suicide if she were forced to carry her pregnancy to full 
term. The High Court held that an abortion could only be contemplated if it were 
established that an inevitable or immediate risk to the life of the mother existed. It 
balanced the right to life of the girl against that of her unborn child and concluded 
61 Mercurio 2003, supra n. 42, at pp. 163 and 174. See also Hamilton 1996, supra n. 41, at p. 553.
62 See Sterling 1997, supra n. 41, at p. 392 and B. Moriarty and A.‑M. Mooney Cotter (eds.), Human rights 
law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) p. 18.
63 Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992 [1992] OJ C191/1.
64 Protocol Annexed to Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/1, p. 94. As will be discussed below, 
the Protocol would later be partly revoked by the Irish government, under influence of domestic 
developments.
65 Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1; [1992] ILRM 401. Hogan and Whyte describe it as ‘[…] what 
must surely qualify as the most controversial case ever to come before an Irish court’. G. Hogan and 
G. Whyte, J.M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution (Dublin, LexisNexis Butterworths 2003) p. 1503. See also 
Buckley 1998, supra n. 41, at p. 285 and Mercurio 2003, supra n. 42, at p. 160.
66 See Ward 1994, supra n. 43, at p. 402.







that the risk that X would take her own life if an order would be made was ‘much less’ 
and ‘of a different order of magnitude’ than the certainty that the life of the unborn 
would be terminated if the order was not made.67 Furthermore, the constitutional 
right to travel abroad68 could not be invoked where the purpose of the travelling was 
to have an abortion.69 The High Court accordingly granted an injunction preventing 
the girl from leaving Ireland for a period of nine months.
This judgment provoked unprecedented public reaction.70 On the strong advice 
and with the financial support of the government, the family appealed the case to 
the Supreme Court.71 In an ex tempore ruling of 26 February 1992, a four to one 
majority of the Supreme Court held that the injunction had to be lifted. Ten days 
later, on 5 March, the full judgments of the Court were handed down.72 The majority 
of the Supreme Court held that the Constitution envisaged abortion being lawful 
in limited circumstances. Citing McGee (1973) Chief Justice Finlay noted that no 
interpretation of the Constitution was intended to be final for all time. He held this 
statement to be ‘peculiarly appropriate and illuminating’ in the interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment, which dealt ‘with the intimate human problem of the right of the 
unborn to life and its relationship to the right of the mother of an unborn child to her 
life.’73 He recalled that by virtue of the amendment the State had a duty to have ‘due 
regard’ for the life of the mother. Chief Justice Finlay decided that the two rights at 
stake had to be interpreted harmoniously.74 In Finlay’s opinion the proper test to be 
applied in this case was:
‘[…] if it is established as a matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk 
to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the 
termination of her pregnancy, such termination is permissible, having regard to the true 
interpretation of Article 40, s.3, sub‑s. 3 of the Constitution.’75
67 Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1, at 12; [1992] ILRM 401, at 410.
68 This unenumerated right was recognised for the first time in State (KM) v. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
[1979] IR 73, 80–81.
69 Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1, at 6–7; [1992] ILRM 401. See also Koegler 1996, supra n. 15, at 
p. 1126.
70 In the Netherlands, for example, parliamentary questions were posed about the X Case. Kamerstukken II 
1991/92, no 398. See furthermore inter alia Weinstein 1993, supra n. 35, at p. 165 at p. 191; 
Klashtorny 1996, supra n. 35, at p. 419 at p. 428; Hamilton 1996, supra n. 41, at p. 554 and Buckley 
1998, supra n. 41, at p. 286.
71 Sterling 1997, supra n. 41, at p. 393; Schweppe 2001, supra n. 43, at p. 141; S. Mullally, ‘Debating 
Reproductive Rights in Ireland’, in: B. Lockwood (ed.), Women’s Rights, A Human Rights Quarterly 
Reader (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press 2006) p. 613 at p. 626.
72 Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1; [1992] ILRM 401.
73 Idem.
74 Hogan and Whyte have defined the doctrine of harmonious interpretation as ‘the principle that 
constitutional provisions should not be construed in isolation from all the other parts of the Constitution 
among which they are embedded but should be so construed as to harmonise with the other parts’. 
The authors held that this doctrine was ‘no more than a presumption that the people who enacted the 
Constitution had a single scale of values, and wished those values to permeate their charter evenly and 
without internal discordance’. Hogan and Whyte 2003, supra n. 65, at p. 8.
75 Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1 at 53, [1992] ILRM 401 at 425.







The majority concluded that in casu this test was satisfied as it was established, 
as a matter of probability, that there was a real and substantial risk to the life of 
the mother by self‑destruction which could only be avoided by termination of her 
pregnancy.76 The exact standard of proof and the requirements needed to establish a 
sufficient risk were not, however, clarified in the majority judgment.77 According to 
Hamilton no party foresaw the manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted the 
words of the Eight Amendment in the X Case.78 Dissenting Judge Hederman deemed 
it possible to guard the mother against self‑destruction and preserve the life of the 
unborn child at the same time. He held that
‘[…] no recognition of a mother’s right of self determination can be given priority over the 
protection of the unborn life. The creation of a new life, involving as it does pregnancy, 
birth and raising the child, necessarily involves some restriction of a mother’s freedom but 
the alternative is the destruction of the unborn life.’79
As Ward indicated, ‘the most ironic consequence of the X Case’ was that the 
judgment furthermore created an exception providing for lawful abortion to save 
the life of the mother within the Irish jurisdiction.80 Because three out of five judges 
held that in this conflict of fundamental rights, the right to life of the unborn trumped 
the right to travel of the mother,81 the case was decided on the theoretical basis of 
whether X would be allowed to have an abortion in Ireland, because if not, she did 
not have the right to travel to obtain one.82 Thereby the Court’s decision suggested 
that in other circumstances than a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother, 
76 This same conclusion was later reached in the similar case of A. and B. v. Eastern Health Board 
& C. [1997] IEHC 176; [1998] 1 IR 464; [1998] 1 ILRM 460, often referred to as the C case. See 
also D.A. Cusack, ‘Abortion – Conflicting Rights, Duties and Arguments’, 3 Medico‑Legal Journal of 
Ireland (1997) p. 82. Buckley observed that in the latter case the Court went further by permitting a 
state agency to fund and facilitate the young girl’s abortion. According to the author as a result of this 
case it was unclear who had a right to an abortion in Ireland and who was able to receive government 
funding for such an abortion. Mercurio agreed with Buckley that Irish abortion law still failed to 
address the question of whether a woman who demonstrated a real and substantial risk to her life 
that qualified for an abortion was eligible to receive state‑funded medical treatment. Both authors, 
furthermore, pointed out that the C case suggested that ‘very little evidence [was] needed to prove a 
real and substantial risk of suicide’. Buckley 1998, supra n. 41, at pp. 302 and 304–305 and Mercurio 
2003, supra n. 42, at p. 169.
77 Weinstein 1993, supra n. 35, at p. 193; Koegler 1996, supra n. 15, at pp. 1133–1134 and Klashtorny 1996, 
supra n. 35, at p. 429.
78 Hamilton 1996, supra n. 41, at p. 551.
79 Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1, at 72.
80 Ward 1994, supra n. 43, at p. 406. See also D. Cole, ‘“Going to England”: Irish Abortion Law and 
the European Community’, 17 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. (1993–1994) p. 113 at p. 133; Hilbert 
1994, supra n. 54, at p. 1141; Koegler 1996, supra n. 15, at p. 1133; Sterling 1997, supra n. 41, at p. 393; 
Buckley 1998, supra n. 41, at pp. 287–288; McBrien 2002, supra n. 43, at p. 211; Clifford 2002, supra 
n. 43, at p. 408; S.J. Johansen, ‘Clearly Ambiguous: A Visitor’s View of the Irish Abortion Referendum 
of 2002’, 25 Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review (2003) p. 205 at p. 212 
and Mercurio 2003, supra n. 42, at pp. 162–163.
81 Chief Justice Finlay, Justice Egan and Justice Hederman. Justice O’Flaherty and McCarthy disagreed. 
Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1 [1992] ILRM 401 at 453 and 456. See Hilbert 1994, supra n. 54, at 
p. 1142.
82 Buckley 1998, supra n. 41, at pp. 287–288, referring to Cole 1993–1994, supra n. 80, at p. 133; Hogan 
and Whyte 2003, supra n. 65, at p. 803 and Koegler 1996, supra n. 15, at p. 1134.







women could be restrained from travelling outside Ireland to procure an abortion.83 
This issue was later solved by the Thirteenth Amendment, that will be discussed in 
section 5.2.3 below.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the Supreme Court decided the case – including 
its travel aspect – on the basis of national law only, thereby avoiding issues of 
European law.84 Hilbert thinks that the fact that the Court in X characterised the 
issues raised on appeal as concerning Irish Constitutional law only, and no European 
Community law, revealed the Irish judiciary’s ‘overriding concern with defining 
domestic constitutional rights’.85
After the X Case, the Irish government feared that Irish voters disagreeing with 
the X Case, also disagreed with Protocol 17 and would therefore reject ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum which was scheduled for 12 June 1992.86 
The government therefore sought an amendment to Protocol 17, but the other EC 
Member States refused to reopen the debate on the Protocol. The Irish government 
subsequently settled for a Solemn Declaration to the effect that Protocol 17 would not 
‘[…] limit freedom either to travel between Member States or […] to obtain or make 
available in Ireland information relating to services lawfully available in Member 
States’.87 In addition to the Declaration, the government promised that a separate 
referendum would be held regarding the right to travel abroad for an abortion and the 
right to receive information about foreign abortion clinics.88 It seems that this promise 
had the desired effect; in June 1992 the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was 
approved by the Irish people. Before the announced new abortion referendum would 
take place, the ECtHR delivered its judgment in Open Door Dublin Well Woman v. 
Ireland.89 As discussed more in depth in Chapter 2,90 the ECtHR found a violation of 
Article 10 in this case. Despite according a wide margin of appreciation in matters 
of morals ‘[…] particularly in an area such as the [one at stake] which touche[d] on 
matters of belief concerning the nature of human life’,91 the ECtHR considered the 
83 Cole 1993–1994, supra n. 80, at p. 133. See also Koegler 1996, supra n. 15, at p. 1134 and Mercurio 
2003, supra n. 42, at p. 166.
84 Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 IR 1, at 305–307. See also P. Fitzmaurice, ‘Attorney General v X: A lost 
opportunity to examine the limits of European integration’, 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
(2001) p. 1723 at p. 1750 and Lawson 1994, supra n. 47, at p. 175.
85 Hilbert 1994, supra n. 54, at p. 1143.
86 The Maastricht Treaty was signed by the Irish government on 7 February 1992. See Sterling 1997, 
supra n. 41, at pp. 394–95; Lawson 1994, supra n. 47, at p. 176; Klashtorny 1996, supra n. 35, at 
pp. 429–30 and Buckley 1998, supra n. 41, at p. 288. See F. Murphy, ‘Maastricht: implementation in 
Ireland’, 19 European Law Review (1994) p. 94.
87 Declaration of the High Contracting Parties to the Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/1, p. 109. 
See also ch. 3, section 3.5.2.1, footnote 219.
88 See, inter alia, Klashtorny 1996, supra n. 35, at p. 430; P. Manners, ‘Can governmental policy trump 
the freedom of speech? Access to information about abortion services in Ireland and the United States’, 
20 Suffolk Transnational Law Review (1996) p. 289 at p 295; Sterling 1997, supra n. 41, at p. 396 and 
Buckley 1998, supra n. 41, at p. 289.
89 ECtHR 29 October 1992, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88.
90 Ch. 2, section 2.4.1.
91 ECtHR 29 October 1992, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88, 
para. 68.







restriction to be disproportionate to the aims pursued. After the judgment from the 
ECtHR, Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman applied to the Supreme 
Court to have the injunction restraining their activities lifted. This Court rejected 
their appeal,92 as at the time Ireland was not required to follow the judgment, because 
rulings of the ECtHR did not override conflicting decisions of the Irish Court.93
5.2.3.	 The	1992	abortion	referendum	and	the	1995	Abortion	Information	Act
A month after the ECtHR Open Door judgment, on 25 November 1992, the next 
abortion referendum was called. Three constitutional amendments were put 
before the electorate. The first proposal related to what has been described as the 
‘substantive’ issue of the circumstances in which an abortion would be permissible 
within Ireland. By means of this proposal, the government tried to limit the effects 
of the X Case.94 Abortion would be permitted where such was necessary to save the 
life, as distinct from the health of the mother, where such risk arose from an illness 
or disorder of the mother, other than a risk of suicide.95 This proposal (the Twelfth 
Amendment) was defeated by both sides of the abortion debate and thus rejected 
in the vote.96 The other two proposals concerning the freedom to travel abroad 
to obtain an abortion (the Thirteenth Amendment) and the provision of abortion 
information (the Fourteenth Amendment) were both adopted.97 Although the Twelfth 
Amendment had been primarily intended as a correction of the X Case, the adoption 
of the Thirteenth Amendment also influenced the interpretation of that ruling. Any 
uncertainty as to whether women were only allowed to travel abroad where the 
92 Attorney General ex rel Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door 
Counselling & Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd. [1994] 1 ILRM 256. See also Ward 1994, supra n. 43, 
at pp. 396–397.
93 Sterling 1997, supra n. 41, at p. 398. More elaborately on the incorporation of the ECHR in the Irish 
jurisdiction, see D. O’Connell, ‘Ireland’, in: R. Blackburn and J. Polakiewicz (eds.), Fundamental 
Rights in Europe. The ECHR and its Member States 1950–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2001) pp. 423–474.
94 See, inter alia, A. Eggert and B. Rolston, ‘Ireland’, in: B. Rolston and A. Eggert (eds.), Abortion in the 
new Europe, A comparative handbook, Westport (etc.): Greenwood Press 1994, pp. 157–172 at p. 169 
and Ward 1994, supra n. 43, at p. 406. At the same time, as Eggert and Rolston observed, a vote in 
favour of this proposal would have allowed for therapeutic abortions, even within the confines of the 
Irish State.
95 The proposal read: ‘It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such termination is 
necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother where there is an illness or disorder 
of the mother giving rise to a real and substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self‑destruction.’
96 The proposal was rejected with 1,079, 297 votes to 572,177. See also Buckley 1998, supra n. 41, at 
p. 290.
97 Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland, Act (23 December 1992) and Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland, Act (23 December 1992). The Thirteenth Amendment was 
adopted with 1,035,308 votes to 624,059. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted with 992,833 votes 
to 665,106.







pregnancy posed a substantial risk to the life of the mother (see 5.2.2 above), was 
now removed.98 The two new paragraphs to Article 40.3.3º provided:
‘This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and another state.
This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject 
to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully 
available in another state.’99
For several years the government failed to adopt legislation clarifying the conditions 
under which information on foreign abortion services could be disseminated.100 In 
1995 the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of 
Pregnancies) Bill was enacted.101 The Act has been referred to as ‘the culmination 
of years of litigation and controversy over abortion rights under Irish and EU law’.102 
It delineates how, and under what circumstances, publishers, organisations offering 
pregnancy counselling and the like can disseminate information concerning abortion. 
By virtue of this Act women in Ireland are entitled to receive information about 
abortion services, provided that such information does not advocate or promote the 
termination of a pregnancy.103 Doctors and counsellors who make an appointment 
or any other arrangement for or on behalf of, a woman with a person who provides 
services outside Ireland for the termination of pregnancies, are guilty of an offence 
and can be convicted to a fairly moderate fine.104
The 1995 Act was referred by the President to the Supreme Court,105 which held 
that the Bill did not constitute an unjust attack on the constitutional rights of the 
unborn or on the constitutional rights of the mother or any other person or persons, 
and concluded that a fair and reasonable balance between the various constitutional 
rights in question had been struck by the legislature.106 The Supreme Court, inter 
98 See Koegler 1996, supra n. 15, at p. 1136.
99 These amendments have been referred to as ‘badly thought out and badly worded’. See B. McCracken, 
‘The Irish Constitution – an overview’, in: J. Sarkin and W. Binchy (eds.), Human Rights, the Citizen 
and the State. South African and Irish Approaches (Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell 2001) p. 52 
at p. 60.
100 See Ward 1994, supra n. 43, at p. 407; Koegler 1996, supra n. 15, at p. 1136; Sterling 1997, supra n. 41, 
at p. 385; Buckley 1998, supra n. 41, at p. 290; Mercurio 2003, supra n. 42, at p. 166 and Mullally 2006, 
supra n. 71, at p. 629.
101 See Schweppe 2001, supra n. 43, at p. 145 and D. O’Connor, ‘Limiting “public morality” exceptions 
to free movement in Europe: Ireland’s role in a changing European Union’, 22 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law (1997) p. 695 at p. 708.
102 Sterling 1997, supra n. 41, at p. 386.
103 Sections 3 and 5 Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) 
Act. See Schweppe 2001, supra n. 43, at p. 145 and Johansen 2003, supra n. 80, at p. 215.
104 Section 8 and 10 Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) 
Act.
105 Pursuant to Art. 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may refer any bill to the Supreme Court for 
a determination of whether the bill is repugnant to any provision of the Constitution.
106 Article 26 and the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of 
Pregnancies) Bill (1995) 2 ILRM 81, 107, [1995] 1 IR 1. See Schweppe 2001, supra n. 43, at p. 146. As 
various commentators have observed, this decision is significant, as for the first time the Court held 







alia, held that once a woman had made an appointment with a foreign abortion 
clinic, the Act did not preclude Irish doctors and counsellors from communicating 
‘in the normal way’ with the doctors from the foreign clinics with regard to the 
condition of their patients. Also, Irish doctors were free to give ‘full information to a 
woman with regard to her state of health, the effect of the pregnancy thereon and the 
consequences to her health and life if the pregnancy continues’, so as to enable her to 
make an informed decision about a pregnancy termination.
Following this ruling the 1995 Act became immune from future constitutional 
challenge.107 A later challenge of (certain sections of) the Act before the ECtHR 
would prove unsuccessful (see section 5.2.6 below).
5.2.4.	 (Towards)	the	2002	abortion	referendum
In April 1995 a Constitution Review Group was established, with the task of 
establishing those areas where constitutional change could be necessary with a view 
to assisting the governmental committees in their constitutional review work. In its 
report of 1996 the Group considered that as a result of the X Case and the rejection 
of the Twelfth Amendment during the 1992 Referendum, the law on abortion in 
Ireland was unclear.108 It therefore recommended the introduction of legislation to 
regulate the application of Article 40.3.3° within the terms of the X Case.109 The 
report was followed‑up by a Green Paper on Abortion (1999)110 which gave seven 
possible constitutional and legislative solutions: (1) an absolute constitutional ban on 
abortion; (2) an amendment of the Constitution so as to restrict the application of the 
X Case; (3) the retention of the position applicable at the time; (4) the retention of the 
constitutional status quo with a legislative restatement of the prohibition of abortion; 
(5) legislation to regulate abortion as defined in the X Case; (6) a reversion to the 
pre‑1983 position; and (7) permitting abortion beyond the grounds specified in the 
X Case. The Green Paper was referred to the all‑party Oireachtas (Parliamentary) 
Committee on the Constitution. Despite a detailed process of consultation, this 
committee was unable to achieve consensus on any of the options set out in the 
paper.111 In the meantime, the Supreme Court confirmed its ruling in the X Case in a 
very similar case, the so‑called C Case.112
that amendments to the Constitution that violate natural law are acceptable. The Court considered 
that natural law was not antecedent and superior to the Constitution. O’Connor 1997, supra n. 101, 
at pp. 708–710; Buckley 1998, supra n. 41, at p. 291; Mullally 2006, supra n. 71, at p. 630 and 
A. O’Sullivan, ‘Same‑sex marriage and the Irish Constitution’, 13 The International Journal of Human 
Rights (2009) p. 477 at p. 479.
107 Art. 34.3.3º of the Irish Constitution.
108 Report of the Constitution Review Group (1996, Pn 2632), p. 273–279.
109 Idem.
110 Office of the Taoiseach, Green Paper on Abortion (1999 Pn 7596), online available at www.taoiseach.
gov.ie/upload/publications/251.rtf.
111 All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Fifth Report, Abortion (2000) online available at 
www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/upload/publications/1434.pdf, visited 14 September 2010.
112 A. and B. v. Eastern Health Board & C. [1997] IEHC 176; [1998] 1 IR 464; [1998] 1 ILRM 460. See 
supra n. 76. See also Bacik 1997, supra n. 51.







The Government finally opted for amendment of the Constitution by taking away 
the threat of suicide as a ground for lawful abortion. It introduced the Protection of 
Human Life in Pregnancy Bill, which would from then on be the law on abortion 
in the State.113 The proposed Bill provided for a definition of abortion,114 and 
self‑destruction was excluded as a ground for lawful abortion. If accepted, the new 
Act would thus overturn the X Case. As adoption of the Act required an amendment 
of the Constitution, the electorate was invited to a new Referendum, this time on 
the Twenty‑Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. On 6 March 2002, a narrow 
majority – consisting of both pro‑life and pro‑choice supporters115 – defeated the 
amendment.116 Consequently the X Case remained the applicable abortion law.117 
Before this ruling could be codified in abortion legislation in 2013 (see section 5.2.8 
below), its implications were challenged by new applications lodged with the ECtHR, 
as well as by a domestic procedure.
5.2.5.	 Abortion	in	case	of	lethal	foetal	abnormality?	The	cases	of	D. v. Ireland 
and Miss D.
In 2002 an application against Ireland was lodged with the ECtHR by a woman 
referred to as ‘D.’ (see also Chapter 2, section 2.2.1). In late 2001 D. had become 
pregnant with twins. In early 2002 it became clear that one foetus had died in the 
womb and that the second foetus had a lethal abnormality. D. therefore decided that 
she could not carry the pregnancy to term. As she was informed in an Irish hospital 
that she had no right to an abortion in Ireland, she went to the United Kingdom 
for an abortion. She subsequently did not undertake any legal action in Ireland but 
immediately filed a complaint with the ECtHR.
Invoking Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, D. complained before the ECtHR about the need 
to travel abroad to have an abortion in the case of a lethal foetal abnormality. She 
held that the overall ban on abortion put an unduly harsh burden on women in her 
situation. She furthermore submitted that her right to receive information under 
113 Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Twenty‑fifth Amendment of the Constitution (Protection 
of Human Life in Pregnancy Act 2002), Bill Number 48 of 2001. See also Schweppe 2001, supra n. 43, 
at pp. 136–162.
114 Section 1 of the Bill defined abortion as ‘the intentional destruction by any means of unborn human life 
after implantation in the womb of a woman’.
115 Mercurio 2003, supra n. 42, at pp. 172–173. See also Johansen 2003, supra n. 80, at pp. 216–234, who 
explains that the wording of the Referendum was fraught with ambiguities.
116 50.42 per cent of those who voted, voted against the amendment, 49.58 per cent voted in favour of the 
amendment. As Mullally observes this proposal differed from the similar 1992 proposal, ‘[…] in that 
it protected the fetus’ right to life only following implantation in the womb, thereby allowing for the 
use of contraceptives such as the morning‑after pill.’ Mullally 2006, supra n. 71, at p. 633. See also 
Johansen 2003, supra n. 80, at pp. 216 and 232–234. Schweppe criticised that ‘[…] putting a piece of 
technical legislation tot the people for approval [was] confusing’. Schweppe 2001, supra n. 43, at p. 156.
117 As confirmed in Baby O. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] IESC 44; [2002] 2 IR 
169. The possibility of termination of pregnancy when there is real and substantial risk to the life of the 
mother, was also explicitly recognised in Section 24.6 of the 2004 Medical Council’s Guide to Ethical 
Conduct and Behaviour.







Article 10 ECHR had been violated in that the 1995 Abortion Information Act ‘[…] 
imposed unnecessary restraints on what a doctor could tell her and prohibited that 
doctor making proper arrangements, or a full referral, for an abortion abroad’.118
As also discussed in Chapter 2, in June 2006 the ECtHR declared the case 
inadmissible for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies. The government had asserted 
that a constitutional action had been available to the applicant and claimed that ‘[in] 
the absence of a domestic decision, it was impossible to foresee that Article 40.3.3° 
clearly excluded an abortion in the applicant’s situation in Ireland.’ They further 
argued that
‘[…] [if] it had been established that there was no realistic prospect of the foetus being born 
alive, then there was “at least a tenable” argument which would be seriously considered by 
the domestic courts to the effect that the foetus was not an “unborn” for the purposes of 
Article 40.3.3 or that, even if it was an “unborn”, its right to life was not actually engaged 
as it had no prospect of life outside the womb.’
The Court indeed considered it arguable that an exception to the prohibition 
of abortion in Ireland could be made in cases of fatal foetal abnormality. In the 
Court’s view there was ‘[…] a feasible argument to be made that the constitutionally 
enshrined balance between the right to life of the mother and of the foetus could have 
shifted in favour of the mother when the “unborn” suffered from an abnormality 
incompatible with life.’ The Court accordingly found that at the time when D. lodged 
an application with the ECtHR, a legal constitutional remedy had in principle been 
available to her to obtain declaratory and mandatory orders with a view to obtaining 
a lawful abortion in Ireland.119
Soon after the ECtHR’s inadmissibility decision – which inherently had no 
consequences for the Irish abortion legislation – a national case put the question of 
abortion in the case of lethal foetal abnormality back on the agenda.120 The so‑called 
‘Miss D. case’ concerned a 17‑year‑old pregnant girl in the care of the Health Service 
Executive (HSE), who wished to have an abortion after she discovered that her foetus 
suffered from a lethal abnormality. When the HSE prevented her from travelling to 
the UK to obtain an abortion, the girl appealed to the High Court.121 This Court 
did not decide the question of whether in situations of fatal foetal abnormality 
there was a right to abortion in Ireland, but simply ruled that there was no stay or 
118 ECtHR 27 June 2006 (dec.), D. v. Ireland, no. 26499/02, para. 59.
119 Idem, para. 92.
120 As Donoghue and Smyth put it, the ‘confidence of the European Court in the Irish judicial system […] 
was soon dashed’ by a subsequent national court case. S. Donoghue and C.‑M. Smyth, ‘Abortion for 
Foetal Abnormalities in Ireland; The Limited Scope of the Irish Government’s Response to the A, B 
and C Judgment’, 20 European Journal of Health Law (2013) p. 117 at p. 125.
121 D (A Minor) v. District Judge Brennan, the Health Services Executive, Ireland and the Attorney 
General, unreported judgment of the High Court of 9 May 2007. See inter alia www.ifpa.ie/node/396, 
visited June 2014 and B. Hewson, ‘Ireland’s Miss D: a ‘bizarre dispute’’, Bpas Reproductive Review 
(2007), online available at www.reproductivereview.org/index.php/rr/article/186, visited June 2014.







constitutional impediment which served to prevent Miss D. from travelling to the 
UK for terminating her pregnancy if she so wished.122
Late 2010, the ECtHR decided another Irish abortion case, a judgment which was 
highly relevant for cases like those of Miss D. In A, B and C v. Ireland, the Strasbourg 
Court addressed exactly the question whether the restrictive Irish abortion laws, 
implying that pregnant women have to go abroad for abortions on medical and social 
grounds, violated the Convention.
5.2.6.	 The	ECtHR	judgment	in	A, B and C v. Ireland (2010)	and	its	follow‑up	
in Ireland
As discussed more elaborately in Chapter 2, the ECtHR ruled in A, B and C v. Ireland 
that the Irish prohibition of abortion for health and well‑being reasons ‘[…] based as 
it [was] on the profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life and 
as to the consequent protection to be accorded to the right to life of the unborn’, did 
not exceed the wide margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to Ireland.123 The 
Court thereby had regard to ‘the right to travel abroad lawfully for an abortion with 
access to appropriate information and medical care in Ireland’.124 In respect of the 
complaint of the third applicant, who claimed that she did not have effective access 
to abortion in Ireland even though her pregnancy had posed a risk to her life, the 
Court instead found a violation of Article 8 ECHR. It held that Ireland had failed to 
provide for effective and accessible procedures which allowed her to establish her 
right to a lawful abortion in Ireland. It noted expressly that – as repeatedly pointed 
out at national level – the Irish government had failed to implement Article 40.3.3° 
and had not given any convincing explanations for this failure.125
Some called it ‘bizarre’ that until this ruling ‘[…] by refusing to enact any legislation 
concerning abortion successive Irish governments had managed to avoid the gaze 
of the European Court for a substantial period of time.’126 Concretely the A, B 
and C judgment implicated that Ireland had to introduce legislation clarifying the 
circrumstances under which a pregnancy posing a substantial risk to the life of the 
pregnant woman, could be terminated.127 This has been qualified as ‘more of a subtle 
change as opposed to a radical overhaul of the status quo.’128 While it was argued by 
122 O. Bowcott, ‘Irish judge stirs up abortion debate by ruling 17‑year‑old can travel to UK for termination’, 
The Guardian 10 May 2007, online available at www.theguardian.com/society/2007/may/10/health.
frontpagenews, visited 29 April 2014.
123 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 226.
124 Idem, para. 241.
125 Idem, para. 265.
126 Donoghue and Smyth 2013, supra n. 120, at p. 140.
127 S. McGuinness, ‘Commentary. A, B, and C leads to D (for Delegation!)’, 19 Medical Law Review (2011) 
p. 476 at p. 476.
128 See, inter alia, J. Schweppe, ‘Taking Responsibility for the “Abortion Issue”: Some Thoughts on 
Legislative Reform in the Aftermath of A, B and C’, 14 Irish Journal of Family Law (2011) p. 50 and 
B. Daly, ‘“Braxton Hick’s” or the Birth of a New Era? Tracing the Development of Ireland’s Abortion 
Laws in Respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence’, European Journal of Health 







some that there was no need at all to legislate and that the Irish people were entitled 
to determine future abortion policy,129 it was widely acknowledged that as a result 
of the A, B and C ruling, the government could no longer refuse to legislate on the 
matter. However, some warned that, because of its ‘long history of fudging the issue 
of abortion’ no quick or direct response to the ruling could be expected from the 
Irish government.130
The government confirmed that it would study the ruling,131 but did not act very 
speedily. Some politicians indicated that other political concerns, such as ‘restoring 
sound political finances’ had to be given priority and that a re‑run of the abortion 
debates was not what the country needed at that point in time.132 Nonetheless, in 
June 2011 the government submitted an action plan of the implementation of the 
A, B and C judgment to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The 
action plan included the establishment of an expert group by November 2011 to 
make recommendations on such implementation.133 There were, moreover, other 
international bodies at the time calling on Ireland to undertake action. The UN 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders recommended to 
implement the X Case and the A, B and C judgment by introducing the necessary 
legislation and medical guidelines regarding access to legal abortion.134 Further, in 
its report on Ireland of September 2011 the Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe noted with concern that there was still no legislation in place to 
set a framework allowing for abortion in limited circumstances where a woman’s 
life was deemed to be in danger because of pregnancy and expressed his hope that 
a ‘coherent legal framework including adequate services’ would be put in place 
without delay. The Commissioner reiterated his position that the lack of legislation 
adversely affected women who did not have the financial means to seek medical 
services outside the country and were therefore ‘particularly vulnerable.’135
Law 18 (2011) pp. 375–395 at p. 394. See also S. Donnelly, ‘A, B and C v Ireland: A Commentary’, 17 
Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland (2011) p. 43.
129 Opening statement by William Binchy to the Joint Committee on Health and Children, online available 
at www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/healthandchildren/William‑Binchy.pdf, visited 
June 2014.
130 McGuinness 2011, supra n. 127, at p. 488.
131 Irish Times 21 December 2010, www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2010/1221/12242 
85993635.html, visited 21 January 2011.
132 Irish Times 28 December 2010, www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2010/1228/12242 
86367982.html, visited 21 January 2011.
133 ACTION Plan. A, B, and C v. Ireland, Application no 25579/2005, Grand Chamber judgment 16 December 
2010, Information submitted by the Government of Ireland on 30 November 2012, online available 
at www.health.gov.ie/wp‑content/uploads/2014/03/Action_Plan_ABCvIreland_Nov2012.pdf, visited 
2 March 2014.
134 Human Rights Council Twenty‑second session Agenda item 3 Promotion and protection of all human 
rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, Addendum, 
Mission to Ireland (19–23 November 2012), p. 21.
135 Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his visit to 
Ireland 1‑ 2 June 2011, CommDH(2011)27, Strasbourg, 15 September 2011, p. 7. See also Report by 
the Commissioner for Human Rights on his visit to Ireland 26–30 November 2007, CommDH(2008)9, 
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In January 2012, the government submitted an Action Report to the Committee of 
Ministers in which it indicated that the expert group would complete its report within 
six months.136 While in March the Committee of Ministers expressed its concerns and 
strongly encouraged the Irish authorities to ensure that the expert group completed 
its work as quickly as possible,137 the report only came out in November 2012. Its 
completion may well have been prompted by the controversial death of a pregnant 
woman in a Galway hospital in October 2012.138
5.2.7.	 Towards	abortion	legislation
In November 2012 Irish (and subsequently international) media reported about the 
death of Savita Halappanavar.139 This 31‑year‑old woman had been hospitalised 
in Galway in late October, where she was soon found to be miscarrying. During 
her hospitalisation Halappanavar repeatedly asked for an abortion, but the doctors 
refused to terminate the pregnancy as long as the foetus had a heartbeat. After three 
days in hospital, during which Halappanavar’s condition had seriously deteriorated, 
the foetus’ heartbeat stopped. A couple of days later Halappanavar passed away. 
Her death sparked public protests140 and refuelled the Irish abortion debate.141 An 
investigation into the case by the Health Service Executive revealed that ‘[t]he 
interpretation of the law related to lawful termination in Ireland, and particularly 
the lack of clear clinical guidelines and training [was] considered to have been a 
material contributory factor’ to the death of Halappanavar.142 The doctors had felt 
136 DH‑DD (2012)66, online available at www.wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command 
=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2016427&SecMode=1&DocId=1848792&Usage=2, 
visited 15 May 2014.
137 DH‑DD(2011)480, DH‑DD(2012)66E, DH‑DD(2011)645 and DH‑DD(2011)628E, online available at 
www.wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Del/Dec%282012%291136/12&Language=lanEnglish&Ver
=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged
=F5D383, visited 15 May 2014.
138 M.A. Rhinehart, ‘Abortions in Ireland: Reconciling a History of Restrictive Abortion Practices with 
the European Court of Human Rights’ Ruling in A., B. & C. v. Ireland’, 117 Penn State Law Review 
(2012–2013) p. 959 at p. 973.
139 E.g. K. Holland, ‘Woman ‘denied a termination’ dies in hospital’, The Irish Times 14 November 2012, 
www.irishtimes.com/news/woman‑denied‑a‑termination‑dies‑in‑hospital‑1.551412, visited 15 May 
2014 and ‘Woman dies after abortion request ‘refused’ at Galway hospital’, BBC News 14 November 
2012, online available at www.bbc.com/news/uk‑northern‑ireland‑20321741, visited 15 May 2014.
140 ‘Ireland: Savita Halappanavar tragedy sparks public protests’, Bpas reproductive review 19 November 
2012, www.abortionreview.org/index.php/rr/article/1258, visited 15 May 2014.
141 See also A.A. Sheikh, ‘Medico‑Legal Aspects of the Savita Halappanavar Case’, 18 Medico‑Legal 
Journal of Ireland (2012) p. 58; M. Berer, ‘Termination of pregnancy as emergency obstetric care: the 
interpretation of Catholic health policy and the consequences for pregnant women. An analysis of the 
death of Savita Halappanavar in Ireland and similar cases’, 41 Reproductive Health Matters (2013) p. 9 
and C. O’Sullivan et al., ‘Article 40.3.3 and the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Bill 2013: The 
Impetus for, and Process of, Legislative Change’, 3 Irish Journal of Legal Studies (2013) p. 1.
142 Health Service Executive of Ireland, Investigation of Incident 50278 from time of patient’s self referral 
to hospital on the 21st of October 2012 to the patient’s death on the 28th of October, 2012, Final report, 
June 2013, p. 73, online available at www.hse.ie/eng/services/news/nimtreport50278.pdf, visited 
15 May 2014.







that under Irish law their hands were tied so long as there was a foetal heartbeat.143 
The investigation team was ‘[…] satisfied that concerns about the law, whether clear 
or not, impacted on the exercise of clinical professional judgement’, and noted that 
there was ‘[…] an immediate and urgent requirement for a clear statement of the legal 
context in which clinical professional judgement [could] be exercised in the best 
medical welfare interests of patients’.144
The report on the implementation of A, B and C by the government appointed expert 
group, came out just after the Halappanavar case had become publicly known, which 
had refuelled the abortion debate.145 The expert group had explored four options 
for implementation of the A, B and C judgment: (clinical) guidelines; statutory 
regulations; legislation alone; and legislation in combination with regulation. It was 
held that the adoption of non‑statutory guidelines only, would not be sufficient.146 
After the CoE’s Committee of Ministers had once again urged the Irish authorities 
to expedite the implementation of the A, B and C judgment,147 the government 
announced in December 2012 the introduction of a combination of legislation and 
guidelines.148
Subsequently a Parliamentary Committee on Health and Children held public 
hearings with stakeholders on the matter.149 This resulted in the publication of 
the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Bill 2013 in early May 2013.150 The Bill 
prompted a divided response; while the Irish Prime Minister held that the Bill did not 
amount to a change in the law,151 the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland reportedly 
called the legislation ‘a dramatically and morally unacceptable change to Irish 
law’.152 Some authors were very critical of the floodgate arguments that were voiced 
in the debates over the Bill, ‘[…] suggesting (either implicitly or expressly) that the 
introduction of abortion legislation within [the existing] constitutional boundaries 
143 Idem, p. 33.
144 Health Service Executive of Ireland, Investigation of Incident 50278 from time of patient’s self referral 
to hospital on the 21st of October 2012 to the patient’s death on the 28th of October, 2012, Final report, 
June 2013, p. 73, online available at www.hse.ie/eng/services/news/nimtreport50278.pdf, visited 
15 May 2014, pp. 69 and 74.
145 S. Ryan et al., Report of the expert group on the judgment in A, B and C v Ireland, Department of Health 
and Children, 2012, November 2012. The report is online available at www.ifpa.ie/sites/default/files/
judgment_abc.pdf, visited 15 May 2014.
146 Idem, p. 45.
147 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 1157th CDDH meeting, 6 December 2012, case No. 12, Case 
against Ireland, DH‑DD(2011)480 a.o., www.wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2010979&Site=CM&Bac
kColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383, visited 2 May 
2014.
148 See www.ifpa.ie/Hot‑Topics/Abortion/Abortion‑in‑Ireland‑Timeline, visited 15 May 2014.
149 See also O’Sullivan et al. 2013, supra n. 141.
150 Bill no. 66 of 2013. By that time two Private Members Bills to implement the X Case had been rejected in 
the Parliament. See the IFPA website www.ifpa.ie/Hot‑Topics/Abortion/Abortion‑in‑Ireland‑Timeline, 
visited 15 May 2014.
151 ‘Abortion bill ‘does not change’ Irish law, says Kenny’, BBC News 1 May 2013, www.bbc.com/news/
world‑europe‑22363459, visited 15 May 2014.
152 D. Dalby, ‘Irish Catholic Church Condemns Abortion Legislation’, The New York Times 3 May 2013, 
www.nytimes.com/2013/05/04/world/europe/irish‑catholic‑church‑condemns‑abortion‑legislation.
html?_r=1&, visited 15 May 2014.







would only be a starting point, following which so‑called “abortion on demand” 
would flow.’153 They warned that the legislative process was in any case bound by 
the existing constitutional position.154 As it was standing law since the X Case that a 
risk to the life of the mother could also consist of a suicide risk, ‘[…] much concern 
focused on the provision for pregnant women who [were] suicidal.’155
After an injunction aimed at preventing the Bill from being voted into law was 
refused,156 it was adopted in Parliament (‘Dáil’) by a clear majority mid‑July 2013.157 
During the day‑long debates, the government had defeated 166 amendments.158 On 
30 July, a few days after the Senate (‘Seanad’) had passed the Bill, President Higgins 
signed off on the Act, without referring it to the Supreme Court.159 The first Irish 
abortion act was thus enacted without a Court ruling and also without the Irish 
people having had a vote in a referendum.
5.2.8.	 The	Protection	of	Life	during	Pregnancy	Act	(2014)
The Protection of life during Pregnancy Act entered into force 1 January 2014.160 
Following its Explanatory Memorandum, the main purpose of the Act is ‘[…] to 
restate the general prohibition on abortion in Ireland while regulating access to 
lawful termination of pregnancy in accordance with the X Case and the judgment 
of the European Court of Human rights in the A, B and C v. Ireland case.’161 It is, 
furthermore, clarified that its purpose is ‘[…] to confer procedural rights on a woman 
who believes she has a life‑threatening condition, so that she can have certainty as to 
whether she requires this treatment or not.’162
The Act repealed Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.163 
Instead, the new Section 22 makes the intentional destruction of unborn human life 
an offence, liable on indictment to an unlimited fine or imprisonment for a term of 
153 F. de Londras and L. Graham, ‘Impossible Floodgates and Unworkable Analogies in the Irish Abortion 
Debate’, 3 Irish Journal of Legal Studies (2013), p. 54.
154 Idem, at p. 59.
155 L. Smith‑Spark and P. Taggart, ’Ireland’s government puts forward draft abortion bill’, CNN 1 May 
2013, www.edition.cnn.com/2013/05/01/world/europe/ireland‑abortion, visited 15 May 2014. On this 
issue, see F. de Londras, ‘Suicide and Abortion: Analysing the Legislative Options in Ireland’, 19 
Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland 2013, p. 4.
156 ‘President of the High Court refuses abortion bill challenge’, RTÉ news 17 July 2013, www.rte.ie/
news/2013/0711/461938‑abortion‑court, visited 15 May 2014.
157 ‘Dáil votes in favour of abortion legislation’, RTÉ News 12 July 2013, www.rte.ie/news/2013/0712/462013‑
abortion‑law, visited 16 May 2014.
158 Idem.
159 M. O’Halloran, ‘Seanad passes abortion legislation by 39 votes to 14’, Irish Times 23 July 2013, 
www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/oireachtas/seanad‑passes‑abortion‑legislation‑by‑39‑votes‑ 
to‑14‑1.1472840 and ‘President Higgins signs abortion Bill into law’, Irish Times 30 July 2013, www.
irishtimes.com/news/politics/president‑higgins‑signs‑abortion‑bill‑into‑law‑1.1479519.
160 Protection of life during Pregnancy Act, No. 35/ 2013.
161 Explanatory Memorandum to the Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2013, pp. 1–2.
162 Idem, p. 2.
163 Section 5 Protection of life during Pregnancy Act.







14 years at maximum, or both.164 This implies that also the woman concerned may 
herself be prosecuted for having an abortion. Even though it was recognised that the 
potential criminalisation of a pregnant woman was ‘a very difficult and sensitive 
matter’, this provision was held to reflect ‘the State’s constitutional obligation arising 
from Article 40.3.3’.165 The offence also applies to a body corporate.166
Interestingly and unprecedented in Ireland, the Act provides for a definition of the 
term ‘unborn’ within the meaning of the Act. It is clarified that:
‘[…] “unborn”, in relation to a human life, is a reference to such a life during the period of 
time commencing after implantation in the womb of a woman and ending on the complete 
emergence of the life from the body of the woman’.167
This definition confirms and reflects the Roche v. Roche judgment of 2006, as 
discussed below in section 5.3.1, following which the protection of the unborn life is 
dependent on its presence in the woman’s body. Also, this definition clearly excludes 
the preimplantation phase, implying that the prohibition on the destruction of unborn 
life does not cover medication like the morning after pill.168
The Act strictly defines the circumstances under which an abortion in Ireland may 
be lawful. Following Section 7 of the Act, this is so when
‘[…] two medical practitioners, having examined the pregnant woman, have jointly 
certified in good faith that (i) there is a real and substantial risk of loss of the woman’s life 
from a physical illness, and (ii) in their reasonable opinion (being an opinion formed in 
good faith which has regard to the need to preserve unborn human life as far as practicable) 
that risk can only be averted by carrying out the medical procedure’.
The abortion must be carried out by an obstetrician at an appropriate institution.169 
In emergency situations a medical practitioner may carry out an abortion without 
involvement of another practitioner if he or she (1) believes in good faith that there 
is an immediate risk of loss of the woman’s life from a physical illness; and (2) 
considers the abortion, in his or her ‘reasonable opinion’,170 immediately necessary in 
order to save the life of the woman. In situations where there is a real and substantial 
risk of loss of the woman’s life by way of suicide, three medical practitioners 
(two psychiatrists and one obstetrician) must give approval. Their decision can be 
164 Section 22 Protection of life during Pregnancy Act. See De Londras and Graham 2013, supra n. 153, at 
p. 72.
165 General Scheme of the Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2013, p. 31.
166 Section 23 Protection of life during Pregnancy Act.
167 Section 2(1) Protection of life during Pregnancy Act.
168 See also Schweppe 2001, supra n. 43, at p. 154.
169 Section 7(1)(b) Protection of life during Pregnancy Act. A list of ‘appropriate institutions’ is annexed 
to the Act.
170 This is described in Section 7(1)(a)(ii) Protection of life during Pregnancy Act as ‘an opinion formed in 
good faith which has regard to the need to preserve unborn human life as far as practicable’.







appealed through a committee which must meet within seven days and give notice 
of its determination in writing to the woman and the Executive.171
Given that the Act only provides for situations where the life of the pregnant woman 
is at risk, no time limits are laid down in the Act.172 The protection of medical 
practitioners, nurses and midwives with conscientious objections is provided for, 
save in emergency situations.173 It is, furthermore, once again affirmed ‘for the 
avoidance of doubt’174 that the Act does not limit the freedom to travel to other 
States for an abortion and to obtain or make available in Ireland, ‘in accordance with 
conditions for the time being laid down by law’, information relating to abortion 
services lawfully available in another state.175
Following the entry into force of the Act, the Medical Council published an 
updated version of its Guidelines,176 which, inter alia, provide that in exceptional 
circumstances a therapeutic intervention may be required during pregnancy, ‘[…] 
which may result in there being little or no hope of the baby surviving’.177 Whether 
there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the pregnant woman which cannot 
be averted by other means, must be assessed ‘in light of current evidence based best 
practice’.178
The new legislation has been criticised by Members of Parliament and campaigners 
from both sides in the abortion debate.179
5.2.9.	 Criminal	prosecutions	for	abortions	in	Ireland
There have in the past ‘[…] been a number of prosecutions in Ireland under the 
provisions of the 1861 Act’.180 However, statistics of Ireland’s National Police 
171 Section 13 Protection of life during Pregnancy Act.
172 See De Londras and Graham 2013, supra n. 153, at p. 61.
173 Section 17 Protection of life during Pregnancy Act.
174 General scheme of the Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2013 (30 April 2013), p. 25, online 
available at www.static.rasset.ie/documents/news/protection‑of‑life‑during‑pregancy‑bill.pdf, visited 
16 May 2014.
175 Section 18 Protection of life during Pregnancy Act.
176 See www.medicalcouncil.ie/News‑and‑Publications/Publications/Information‑for‑Doctors/Medical‑ 
Council‑Guide.html, visited 15 May 2014. The Guidelines are online available at www./bit.ly/RMPGuide. 
See also F. Gartland, ‘Medical Council to bring out new guidelines following commencement of abortion 
law, The Irish Times 1 January 2014, online available at www.irishtimes.com/news/crime‑and‑law/
medical‑council‑to‑bring‑out‑new‑guidelines‑following‑commencement‑of‑abortion‑law‑1.1641663, 
visited 15 May 2014 and M. Brennan, ‘Delay in abortion guidelines not our fault, say 
medical professionals’, Independente.ie 2 January 2014, www.independent.ie/irish‑news/
delay‑in‑abortion‑guidelines‑not‑our‑fault‑say‑medical‑professionals‑29882036.html, visited 16 May 
2014.
177 Idem, Principle 21.2.
178 Idem, Principle 21.3.
179 ‘New abortion guidelines spark condemnation on all sides’, thejournal.ie 4 July 2014, www.thejournal.
ie/abortion‑guidelines‑ireland‑1554267‑Jul2014, visited 28 May 2014.
180 Sherlock 1989, supra n. 10.







Service show that prosecution practice has historically been very limited, in any 
case between the late 1940s and the early 1990s.181 The annual reports that the 
National Police Service has published on its website for the years since then, only 
occasionally include statistics. The reports that do, namely those for the years 1998, 
2000, 2003 and 2004, show that in those respective years no proceedings for the 
offence of procuring an abortion were commenced.182 Further, only four abortion 
offences were reported to the Police in 2004, but these did not (in that year) result 
in the commencement of criminal proceedings.183 Statistics in the annual reports of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for the past decade,184 do not expressly 
provide for the offence of procuring a miscarriage, rendering it difficult to draw 
conclusions in this respect.185 All in all, nonetheless, it seems safe to conclude that 
prosecution practice for abortion has been limited in Ireland. This is confirmed by 
the submission of the Irish government before the ECtHR in the A, B and C case that 
in respect of abortion ‘[t]here had been no criminal prosecution of a doctor in living 
memory’.186
5.2.10.	 Public	funding	for	abortions	in	Ireland
Because abortion is only legally accessible in Ireland to save the life of the mother, 
it logically follows that this treatment is also covered by the national statutory health 
scheme. Abortions on any other ground are not legal in Ireland and are therefore also 
not reimbursed for under the Public Health Insurance.
181 The statistics on the website of Ireland’s National Police Service go back to 1947. See www.garda.ie/
Controller.aspx?Page=8824&Lang=1, visited 28 May 2014. As these statistics show, during the years 
1947–1991 no reports of abortion offences were made to the police, with the exception of the years 
1949–1951, 1958–1959, 1964 and 1968–1969. The number for these years are as follows: in 1949 two 
cases were reported and acquitted; in 1950 proceedings were commenced in two cases and in 1951 two 
cases were reported. In 1958 proceedings were commenced in one case, which resulted in an acquittal 
in 1958. In 1964 three cases were reported, resulting in one acquittal and two convictions. In 1968 
in one reported case proceedings were commenced, which were still pending in 1969. The statistics 
for the subsequent years show no reports at all for the offence of procuring an abortion, rendering it 
unclear what the final outcome of the 1968 case was. Further, in 1948 and 1956 respectively a case 
was reported of a woman who died as the result of an abortion. In those cases charges were brought 
for murder. Report of the Commissioner of the Gárda Síochána on crime for the year 1948, p. 5, online 
available at www.garda.ie/Documents/User/2%201948%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, visited 
28 May 2014, and Report of the Commissioner of the Gárda Síochána on crime for the year 1956, p. 6, 
online available at www.garda.ie/Documents/User/3%201956%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, 
visited 28 May 2014.
182 The respective reports are online available at www.garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=90&Lang=1, visited 
28 May 2014.
183 See ‘Year 2004 crime statistics, An Garda Síochána Annual Report 2004, p. 28, online availbale at 
www.garda.ie/Documents/User/Annual%20Report%202004%20‑%20Stats.pdf, visited 28 May 2014.
184 Online available at www.dppireland.ie/publications/category/7/annual‑reports/archive, visited 16 May 
2014.
185 This also holds for statistics from the Central Statistics Office, as online available at www.cso.ie/
Quicktables/GetQuickTables.aspx?FileName=cja01c1.asp&TableName=Homicide+Offences&Statisti
calProduct=DB_CJ, visited 2 June 2014.
186 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 189.







5.3. (the Absence of) IrIsh legIslAtIon on AssIsted humAn 
reproductIon And surrogAcy
While assisted reproductive technologies have existed in Ireland since the 1980s,187 
there is no specific legal framework in Ireland that regulates assisted human 
reproduction.188 Consequently, procedures like IVF treatment involving gamete 
donation and surrogacy are not prohibited in Ireland, but are veiled in considerable 
legal uncertainty. This also holds for the family law implications of such treatment.189
The only form of regulation of the area has consisted of regulations transposing 
the EU Tissue and Cells Directives190 and of guidelines by the medical profession, 
such as the Institute of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (IOG) of the Royal College 
of Physicians of Ireland,191 and more profoundly, the Irish Medical Council.192 The 
latter’s Guide to professional conduct and ethics for registered medical practitioners 
holds that ‘[…] assisted human reproduction treatments, such as In Vitro Fertilisation 
(IVF), should only be used after thorough investigation has shown that no other 
treatment is likely to be effective.’193 Medical practitioners ‘[…] should ensure that 
appropriate counselling has been offered to the patient and that the patient has given 
informed consent before receiving any treatment.’ The principles, furthermore, state 
that ‘[…] assisted reproduction services should only be provided by suitably qualified 
professionals, in appropriate facilities, and according to international best practice.’ 
Thereby ‘regular clinical audit and follow‑up of outcomes should be the norm.’194 No 
further guidance on AHR treatment is given in the guidelines.195
187 H. Coveney, ‘Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Status of the Embryo’, 13 Medico‑Legal 
Journal of Ireland (2007) p. 14 at p. 14. See also McMahon 2011, supra n. 10, at p. 33.
188 State of affairs on 31 July 2014.
189 In 2001 Madden observed the following: ‘The vast array of permutations and combinations now 
possible in the creation of a child makes it extremely difficult to draw any broad principles as to legal 
parenthood. In Ireland these difficulties are exacerbated by the lack of legislation setting out parental 
rights and responsibilities in cases where sperm or egg donation is used or where a surrogate mother 
gives birth to another couple’s genetic child.’ D. Madden, ‘Recent Developments in Assisted Human 
Reproduction: Legal and Ethical Issues’, 7 Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland (2001) pp. 53–62.
190 European Communities (Quality and Safety of Human Tissues and Cells) Regulations, Statutory 
Instrument No. 158 of 2006. See also D. Madden, ‘Guest Editorial: Assisted Reproduction in 
Ireland – Time to Legislate’, 17 Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland (2011) p. 3. These Regulations are 
further discussed in section 5.3.4 below. On the Tissue and Cells Directives, see ch. 3, section 3.3.2.
191 See www.rcpi.ie, visited 28 May 2014. See also D. Dooley, ‘Assisted Reproduction: the pursuit of 
consensus?’, 5 Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland (1999) p. 65. In respect of research the Opinions of the 
Irish Council for Bioethics are authorative. See also Clissmann and Barrett 2012, supra n. 19.
192 By virtue of Section 7(2)(i) of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 a task of the Medical Council is 
to give guidance on all matters related to professional conduct and ethics for registered medical 
practitioners. See www.citizensinformation.ie/categories/health/women‑s‑health/fertility_treatment, 
visited 28 May 2014.
193 Irish Medical Council, Guide to professional conduct and ethics for registered medical practitioners, 
7th edition 2009, principle 20.1, p. 20.
194 Idem, Principle 20.2, p. 20.
195 Reportedly in 2011, Guidelines were drawn up in 2011 by the Irish Fertility Society. These Guidelines, 
which are not publicly available on the website of this Society, reportedly ‘mirror most of the guidelines 
in the […] 2005 Report [of the AHR Commission]’. Submission by Dr. Wingfield to the High Court in 
M.R. & Another v. An t Ard Chláraitheoir [2013] IEHC 91. On the report of the AHR Commission, see 
below.







AHR services are not provided by the public health services, but by private specialists 
and clinics only.196 Because not all providers are registered medical practitioners, 
some ‘[…] fall outside of the remit of the Medical Council.’197 In view of the existing 
legal vacuum, some private clinics set up their own rules. The Human Assisted 
Reproduction Ireland (HARI),198 for example, provided on its website for ‘rules and 
regulations’, which included criteria that couples had to meet to qualify for an IVF 
treatment (see also the discussion on eligibility criteria below in section 5.3.3).199 
Other clinics expressly informed their clients about the persistent legal limbo and 
advised clients to obtain legal advice.200
As the (previous editions of the) Medical Council’s guidelines were held to be ‘[…] 
insufficient because they [did] not have legal standing and many people involved 
in assisted human reproduction [were] not medical practitioners’,201 Senator Henry 
initiated a Bill in 1999 that provided for the regulation of providers of assisted 
human reproduction.202 For unclear reasons, this Bill was, however, defeated and 
never made it into law. Soon thereafter, in March 2000, the Minister for Health and 
Children established a Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction (hereafter 
‘AHR Commission’ or ‘Commission’), with the following terms of reference:
‘[…] to prepare a report on the possible approaches to the regulation of all aspects of 
assisted human reproduction and the social, ethical and legal factors to be taken into 
account in determining public policy in the area.’203
One of the questions put before the Commission was whether legislation was 
necessary to regulate AHR or whether society had to continue to rely on voluntary 
regulation by the Irish Medical Council. In March 2005 the Commission published 
a report in which it made 40 recommendations.204 The principal recommendation 
of the Commission was the drafting of a new Act to establish a regulatory body 
to regulate AHR services in Ireland.205 ‘In view of the major social, ethical and 
legal implications of assisted human reproduction for society in general as well as 
for the providers and users of services […]’, the AHR Commission believed that 
196 See the website of the Health Service Executive www.hse.ie/eng/health/az/I/IVF, visited 16 May 2014.
197 B. Scannell, ‘Brave New World? The Ethics of Pre‑implantation Genetic Diagnosis in Ireland’, 13 
Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland (2007) pp. 27–35.
198 Human Assisted Reproduction Ireland (HARI) is based at the Rotunda Hospital campus in Dublin and 
is one of the largest centres for Assisted Reproductive Technology in Ireland.
199 Such couples are defined by HARI in its online rules and regulations as: ‘A couple, aged 18 years 
and upwards who have been cohabiting on a permanent basis for a minimum of 2 years and who 
are committed to a long term relationship in which they can raise a child.’ See www.hari.ie/index.
php?section=hari&page=rules_and_regulations, visited September 2010.
200 See, for example, the website of the Irish Sims IVF clinic www.eggdonation.ie/, visited September 
2010.
201 Dr Henry, Seanad Éireann – Volume 160 – 07 July, 1999. Regulation of Assisted Human Reproduction 
Bill, 1999: Second Stage. See also the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, p. 1.
202 Regulation of Assisted Human Reproduction Bill, Bill No. 7 of 1999. p. 1.
203 The Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction 2005, supra n. 9, pp. 32–33.
204 Idem.
205 Idem, p XV, Recommendation 1.







the guidelines from the Irish Medical Council on their own did not constitute a 
sufficient form of regulation.206 Following the Commission’s proposal the regulatory 
body had to be independent and publicly accountable to the government through 
the Department of Health and Children. It was to have: (1) the function of advising 
the government on all matters relating to AHR and associated procedures including 
research; (2) the authority to issue guidelines in relation to the provision of AHR 
services and associated procedures including research within the jurisdiction; (3) be 
authorised to issue licences for AHR procedures; and (4) have power to suspend or 
revoke a licence for stated reasons.207
In May 2005 the Minister for Health and Children referred the AHR Report to the 
Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health and Children for consideration. In November 
2009 the Irish Minister for Health and Children informed the Oireachtas that her 
department was developing proposals for an appropriate regulatory framework, 
including legislation, in respect of AHR.208 Thereto the approaches to regulation 
of AHR in other jurisdictions were examined and arising ‘complex and profound’ 
ethical, social and legal issues were considered. According to the Minister areas such 
as legal parentage; access to treatment services; donation of sperm, ova and embryos; 
and arrangements for consent, were explored and examined.209 Only in 2014 did all 
this result in the initiation of a Bill dealing with certain issues pertaining to AHR, 
such as the establishment of paternity in donation cases (see 5.3.2 below). Until 
that time, the persisting lack of legislation inevitably resulted in issues concerning 
AHR being put before the judiciary. The courts, however, turned the tables on the 
legislature and held in the Roche v. Roche case that the Oireachtas had to be the first 
to act.210
5.3.1. The Roche v. Roche	case	(2006	and	2009)
The case of Roche v. Roche is the Irish equivalent of the Evans case which was 
decided by the ECtHR.211 In 1994 Mrs. Roche underwent surgery for an ovarian cyst 
and she lost two thirds of her right ovary. In 2001 she and her husband commenced 
IVF treatment, which resulted in the creation of six viable embryos. Three were 
inserted into Mrs. Roche’s uterus and the remaining three were frozen. Consequently 
Mrs. Roche became pregnant and in October 2002 she gave birth to a daughter. 
Towards the end of her pregnancy, marital difficulties arose between Mr. and Mrs. 
Roche. An attempt at reconciliation failed and the parties eventually entered into 
a judicial separation. Subsequently, Mrs. Roche wished to have the three frozen 
embryos implanted into her uterus, but Mr. Roche opposed. Mrs. Roche claimed to 
206 Idem, at p.67. The Commission relied on a background research paper prepared by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs on relevant legislation in other countries of December 2001.
207 Idem, at p. 70.
208 Dáil Debate Vol. 693 No. 2 (4 November 2009) Answer of the Minister for Health and Children to 
question by deputy Liz McManus, question no. 86 [39291/09].
209 Idem.
210 M. R. v. T. R. & Ors [2006] IEHC 359, McGovern J.
211 See ch. 2, section 2.3.2.







be entitled to have the frozen embryos implanted into her womb against the wishes of 
her estranged husband. She asserted before the High Court that the embryos enjoyed 
the protection of Article 40.3.3° of the Irish constitution and that this provision 
required that their right to life would be vindicated by permitting her to have them 
implanted into her womb.
The High Court first dealt with the private law aspect of the case. In July 2006 
Justice McGovern held that there was no agreement, either expressed or implied, as 
to what was to be done with the frozen embryos in the circumstances that had arisen. 
Accordingly, Mr. Roche had not entered into an agreement which required him to 
give his consent to the implantation of the three frozen embryos into Mrs. Roche’s 
uterus.212 Subsequently, in November 2006, Justice McGovern dealt with the question 
of whether the frozen embryos were ‘unborn’ for the purposes of Article 40.3.3° 
of the Irish Constitution. He held that it was not for the Courts to decide whether 
the word ‘unborn’ included embryos in vitro; holding it to be ‘[…] a matter for the 
Oireachtas, or for the people, in the event that a Constitutional Amendment [was] put 
before them’. Justice McGovern referred to the findings of the AHR Commission (see 
above) which had recommended that the embryo formed by IVF was not to attract 
legal protection until placed in the human body, at which stage it was to attract the 
same level of protection as the embryo formed in vivo.213 McGovern came to the 
conclusion that the three frozen embryos were not ‘unborn’ within the meaning of 
Article 40.3.3° and were accordingly not given protection by the Irish Constitution. 
The Justice held it to be a matter for the Oireachtas ‘to decide what steps should be 
taken to establish the legal status of embryos in vitro.’214
Mrs. Roche’s appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed in December 2009 as the 
highest judicial body in Ireland also deferred to the legislature. Chief Justice Murray 
held that the embryo had ‘a moral status’ and found that the creation and use of the 
human embryo could not be ‘divorced from our concepts of human dignity’.215 The 
Chief Justice held the point at which legal protection of the unborn life had to be 
deemed to commence, to be a policy choice for the Oireachtas:
‘I do not consider that it is for a court of law, faced with the most divergent if most learned 
views in the discourses available to it from the disciplines referred to, to pronounce on the 
truth of when precisely human life begins. Absent a broad consensus or understanding on 
that truth, it is for legislatures in the exercise of their dispositive powers to resolve such 
issues on the basis of policy choices.’216
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Justice Fennelly found it ‘disturbing’ that ‘no legislative proposal had even been 
formulated’, some four years after the report of the AHR Commission.217
The judgment evoked concerns about the status and legal protection of the embryo 
in vitro.218 It was held ‘[…] quite unusual for a constitution to give such strong 
protection to the in utero embryo while simultaneously giving none to the in vitro 
embryo’.219 Many authors underlined that the case demonstrated (once more) the 
need for legislation in the area and were critical of the persisting legal limbo.220
5.3.2. Developments since Roche v. Roche
After the Roche v. Roche judgment, the Minister for Health reportedly ‘[…] accepted 
that it had a responsibility to introduce legislation in relation to AHR and that a 
legislative proposal would be brought before the Cabinet as soon as possible.’221 
Even though ‘Legal Aspects of Human Reproduction’ was one of the 37 projects of 
the Irish Law Reform Commission for the period 2008–2014,222 this promise to act 
without further ado, was not kept. In 2011 Madden observed the following in respect 
of the Irish situation:
‘Despite the availability of IVF and associated procedures in Ireland for many years, the 
clear need for legislative safeguards and oversight has not found its way into the statute 
books to date. This lacuna leaves Irish families and children, as well as clinicians working 
in this area, in a position fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. Lack of clarity about 
issues such as access to treatments, the status and parentage of children, the rights and 
responsibilities of genetic and birth parents, the legitimacy of payment for reproductive 
services, and the use of embryos for research purposes has left us in a complicated web of 
potential legal pitfalls which is the responsibility of Government to untangle.’223
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Some legislative action was finally taken in January 2014 with the publication of 
the Children and Family Relationship Bill (hereafter referred to as the ’2014 Bill’) 
by the then Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence. The Bill aimed to put in 
place a legal architecture which was intended to offer ‘recognition and support to 
a wide range of different family structures.’ The reforms envisaged focused ‘more 
than ever before on the child at the centre of the family’.224 The Bill – which has been 
referred to as ‘truly historic’225 and ‘the most radical reform of Irish children’s law in 
a century’226 – was expected to be passed by the end of 2014.227 For the present case 
study its parts 3 and 5 are of particular interest as they deal with parentage in cases 
of assisted reproduction and surrogacy arrangements respectively.
The following subsections of this section on Irish regulation in the field of AHR, 
discuss the existing (absence of) standard‑setting for various types of AHR treatment. 
Thereby reference is made to both the recommendations of the AHR Commission on 
the specific matter, as well as (where applicable) to the relevant provisions of the 2014 
Bill. First the issue of access to AHR treatment is discussed.
5.3.3. Access to AHR treatment
Access to AHR treatment has not been regulated at State level in Ireland. Certain 
requirements regarding civil status were, however, set by the medical profession, 
as well as by individual fertility clinics. Over the years they have softened their 
initially very strict conditions. For example, the 1994 edition of the Medical Council 
Guidelines limited the availability of AHR to married couples,228 but subsequent 
editions of the Guidelines no longer included this condition.229 Human Assisted 
Reproduction Ireland (HARI) made clear that it only provided IVF treatment to 
couples who were married or in a ‘deemed stable relationship’.230 Couples had to be 
able to demonstrate that ‘an appropriate stable infrastructure’ was in place which 
would ‘maximise efficacy of therapy and safeguard the bringing up of a child.’231 
The Citizens’ Information Board confirmed on its website that fertility services 
224 Speech by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence, Alan Shatter TD, at the Children’s Rights 
Alliance’s Information Seminar on the Children and Family Relationships Bill, 10 April 2014, online 
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were generally available to applicants who were in a ‘stable relationship’, which was 
understood as to mean married and cohabiting opposite‑sex couples. It was added 
that ‘[i]n practice, Irish clinics generally refuse[d] to make assisted reproduction 
available to cohabiting same‑sex couples’, while it had not yet been decided by an 
Irish court whether such a refusal amounted to discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation under the Equal Status Act 2000 or the Equality Act 2004.232
Access to AHR was also discussed by the AHR Commission in its 2005 report. It 
was observed that practice was diverse. In general, obstetricians and gynaecologists 
did not discriminate between different‑sex married couples and different‑sex 
unmarried couples in a long‑term relationship. They were, nevertheless, divided in 
their approach to single people, as only 53 per cent of the respondents to the survey 
conducted by the AHR Commission was prepared to offer AHR services to single 
people and relatively few (one in seven) were prepared to offer AHR services to 
same‑sex couples.233 The AHR Commission recommended that AHR services had 
to be available without discrimination on the grounds of gender, marital status or 
sexual orientation, ‘subject to consideration of the best interests of any children that 
[were] born’.234 This was ‘[…] generally viewed as taking a progressive step towards 
a socially diverse Ireland.’235
Requirements in respect of age have generally also been left to the medical 
profession. Madden observed in 1995 that ‘40 years would probably be the limit’ 
for IVF treatment. She added that because practices like egg cell donation were 
not practised in Ireland, the limitations in this respect were primarily biological in 
character.’236 As discussed below (see 5.3.9), the 2014 Bill initially set certain age 
limits for engaging in surrogacy.
5.3.4.	 Donation	of	gametes	and	embryos
Donation of gametes and embryos in the course of AHR treatment has long been, 
and is still today, mostly unregulated in Irish statutory legislation.237 The Medical 
Guidelines are brief as regards the use of donor gametes from third parties in 
AHR treatment; those who offer donor programmes to patients, must consider 
the biological difficulties involved and pay particular attention to the source of 
the donated material. Such donations must be altruistic and non‑commercial, and 
232 Www.citizensinformation.ie/en/birth_family_relationships/cohabiting_couples/fertility_services_
and_unmarried_couples.html, visited September 2010.
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practitioners must keep accurate records for future reference.238 The anonymous 
donation of gametes in the course of AHR treatment is at present legal in Ireland 
and it is taking place,239 rendering it potentially difficult for a child born after such 
treatment to trace its genetic parents.240
The AHR Commission in principle had no objections to the use of donor gametes or 
embryos in AHR treatment to assist infertile people to conceive, but it recommended 
that such donation of sperm, ova and embryos was to be subject to regulation by 
the – to be established – regulatory body.241 Furthermore, appropriate counselling 
to all donors of gametes and embryos by suitably qualified professionals was to be 
a pre‑condition for informed consent by donors.242 The Commission recommended 
in 2005 that appropriate guidelines were put in place ‘[…] to govern the selection of 
donors; to screen for genetic disorders and infectious disease; to set age limits for 
donors and to set an appropriate limit on the number of children to be born by the use 
of sperm or ova from a single donor.’243
Commercialisation and anonymity of donations were widely discussed within 
the AHR Commission. The Commission held financial inducements in AHR to 
be unacceptable. The regulatory body, as proposed by the Commission should 
therefore have power to prohibit any practice that could be deemed to constitute 
commercialisation of AHR.244 It was recommended that donors were not to be 
paid nor were recipients to be charged for donations per se. Payment of reasonable 
expenses and payment for AHR services was not, however, precluded.245
As regards anonymity, the AHR Commission was receptive to the argument that 
‘having access to genetic origins is potentially of profound importance for people’s 
understanding of their identity in a psychological, genetic and historical context.’246 
Avoidance of identity confusion could also be an argument in favour of disclosing 
the identity of the donor. The Commission concluded that the safeguarding of the 
best interests of the child born through AHR necessitated access for all children to 
information that would enable them to identify their genetic origins.247 It recommended 
that ‘[…] any child born through use of donated gametes or embryos [had to], on 
maturity, be able to identify the donor(s) involved in his/her conception,248 while 
donors were not be able to access the identity of children born through use of their 
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7th edition 2009, Principle 20, p. 20. See also Clissmann and Barrett 2012, supra n. 19.
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gametes or embryos.’249 The AHR Commission held that the main argument against 
the lifting of anonymity in donation centred on the fear that there would be no supply 
of sperm donors. According to the AHR Commission, however, countries where 
donor identification was permitted had found that reduced supply did not continue 
beyond a relatively brief period.250
In 2006 Regulations were adopted with a view to implementing the European Tissues 
and Cells Directives.251 The Regulations, inter alia, set quality and safety standards 
for clinics who carry out AHR treatment involving the donation of gametes. Gamete 
donors must undergo certain medical tests and must give their informed consent to 
the donation.252 While the Regulations endorse non‑commercial donation, they are 
not very firmly phrased on this point. Following Article 13(1) of the Regulations, the 
Minister for Health and Children was to draw up national guidelines that would ‘[…] 
endeavour to ensure that the procurement of [gametes] is carried out on a non‑profit 
basis’, while AHR clinics for their part, must ‘make every effort to ensure voluntary 
and unpaid donations’ of gametes. The present author is not aware of the existence 
of any such guidelines.
AHR clinics must also ensure that all gametes ‘[…] can be fully identified and traced 
from donor to end user, or disposal, and vice versa’.253 It is noted in Article 18(6) of 
the Regulations that the clinic must ‘[…] ensure that the identity of the recipient is not 
disclosed to the donor or his family and vice versa, without prejudice to any national 
law which may come into force on the conditions for disclosure, notably in the case 
of gametes donation’. Only in September 2014 such legislation was introduced (see 
below). Until that time there was only one relevant court case, dealing with the rights 
of a sperm donor.
In December 2009 in the case of McD. v. L. & Anor, the Supreme Court granted a 
sperm donor, who was the genetic father of a child born into a relationship between 
two women a right of access to his child.254 The man and the lesbian couple had 
initially agreed that he would be a ‘favourite uncle’ in the life of the child, with 
access to the child at the couple’s discretion. But when the child was born he sought 
a bigger role, including structured access. The lesbian couple refused. The dispute 
between the parties came to a head in 2007, when the couple wished to relocate to 
Australia with the child. The sperm donor and thus father requested guardianship 
249 Idem, at p. 47, Recommendation no. 27.
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and joint custody255 of his child, as well as an order regulating his access to the child. 
His claims were initially refused by the High Court after a 14‑day long hearing.256 
On appeal he was, however, allowed access.257 The Supreme Court considered the 
welfare of the child to be paramount; Justice Denham, inter alia, based her ruling on 
the ‘benefit to a child, in general, to have the society of his father’. Contrary to the 
High Court’s ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no institution of a de 
facto family in Ireland. This Court thus held that the respondents were not a family 
under the Irish Constitution.258 While the genetic mother of the child, had a natural 
right guaranteed by the Constitution to his custody and to look after his general care, 
his nurture, his physical and moral wellbeing and his education, in every respect, her 
lesbian partner had no legally or constitutionally recognisable family relationship 
with the child.259
The Supreme Court referred the case back to the High Court to determine how the 
father’s access had to be exercised. In April 2010, this Court ruled that there was 
to be (direct) access, meaning that the father was to have personal contact with the 
child and the child was to have the society of the father.260 Because the couple had 
in the meantime relocated to Australia, such access was to be established during 
trips of the father to Australia and during trips of the couple to Europe. The couple 
were, when appropriate, to encourage the child to communicate with his father and 
to establish friendly relations with him. The Court also ordered the opening up of 
e‑mail contact between the father and the couple. The Court left it to the couple to 
reveal to the child, when it was age appropriate, that the father was his biological 
father. These orders were made conditional on the father to play the role of ‘favourite 
uncle’, not revealing his biological paternity, seeking no parental role in the child’s 
upbringing and acknowledging and accepting the familial integrity of the couple and 
the child.
It was observed that the case exposed ‘[…] the pressing need for legislation to help 
provide some certainty for the adults and children involved.’261 The 2014 Children 
and Family Relationship Bill initially did not provide for any right for the child to 
know its genetic origins.262 Inter alia, the Irish Ombudsman for Children has been 
critical in this regard, and recommended in 2014 that provision was made ‘[…] for the 
gathering, retention and disclosure of information to people born through assisted 
reproduction and surrogacy regarding their birth and origins.’263 This concern was 
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256 McD. v. L. & Anor [2008] IEHC 96.
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addressed in the revised general scheme of the Children and Family Relationships 
Bill 2014 that the Minister for Justice and Equality published on 26 September 
2014.264 In the Revised Scheme a new Part was included to preserve a child’s right 
to know its identity.265 It provided for the creation of a national donor‑conceived 
person register into which hospitals, clinics and medical services would be obliged 
to provide information. Future use of anonymous donor egg cells or sperm would be 
prohibited.266
The Bill further provided that donating gametes or an embryo, without the intention 
of using the material or the embryo for one’s own reproductive use, would not confer 
parenthood on the donor.267 Also, as noted below (see section 5.3.9), the mater 
semper certa est maxim was a basic principle of the Bill. It also applied when the 
birth mother was not genetically related to the child, for example when the embryo 
was created using a donor egg cell.268 The husband, civil partner or cohabitant of 
the mother would be considered to be the other parent of the child ‘[…] if he or 
she had given a consent which remained valid at the time the procedure leading to 
implantation took place’.269
5.3.4.1. Post‑mortem reproduction
Post‑mortem reproduction is veiled in uncertainty in Ireland. In 1996 Madden 
observed that while there was ‘[…] no legislative prohibition in Ireland on a widow 
gaining access to her deceased husband’s frozen sperm in an attempt to become 
pregnant’, the legal status of a child born in such circumstances was uncertain.270 
While the 2014 Bill could have been a good occasion for the legislature to address the 
matter, it was expressly held not to provide for ‘posthumous conception’.271
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Under Irish law nothing is provided in respect of gender selection in the course of 
AHR treatment. While it is correspondingly insufficiently clear if gender selection 
has taken or takes place in Ireland, there have been incidental reports of Irish 
couples going abroad for this purpose.272 The AHR Commission at the time noted 
that ‘public anxieties regarding slippery slopes towards the creation of children ‘to 
order’’ indicated ‘a general disapproval of such techniques’.273 The Commission felt 
that pre‑conception sex selection had to be permitted ‘only for the reliable prevention 
of serious sex linked genetic disorders but not for social reasons.’274 This was not, 
however, followed‑up by the legislature, also not when preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) was introduced in Ireland.
5.3.6.	 Preimplantation	genetic	diagnosis	(PGD)
Prenatal screening takes place in Ireland, be it unregulated.275 Gestational age 
scans at around 18 weeks of pregnancy usually include screening for structural 
anomalies,276 but genetic tests are not routinely offered and there is no national 
screening programme.277 More importantly, termination of pregnancy for foetal 
anomaly is not permissible (see also section 5.2 above on Irish abortion laws).
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) has long not been available in Ireland, 
because of the uncertain constitutional status of the embryo (see 5.1.2 above).278 The 
question when life begins was qualified as ‘[…] the most astute ethical dilemma that 
PGD face[d] in Ireland […].’279
The AHR Commission also addressed the issue of PGD in its 2005 report. 
A principled argument against it was voiced in the following terms:
‘It could be argued that the application of PGD departs from the goals of preventive 
medicine and marks the start of the “slippery slope” to more eugenic objectives. There is 
272 See, for example, ‘Jeff Steinberg: Irish Couples using Gender Selection’, RTÉ.ie 3 March 2010, www.
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275 A. Coverleyn et al., Pre‑implantation Genetic Diagnosis in Europe’ (Joint Research Centre of 
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eur22764en.pdf, visited 24 July 2014.
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a concern that therapeutic PGD that selects for “clinically” healthy embryos (disease free) 
may lead to enhancement PGD that selects for “socially” healthy embryos.’280
At the same time the AHR Commission was convinced that PGD could reduce 
the risk of serious genetic disorders. It therefore recommended, with one member 
dissenting, that PGD had to be allowed in Ireland, if regulated and monitored by the 
regulatory body.281 This recommendation was not followed up by the Irish legislature; 
until today the issue has not been regulated for in law.
Despite the absence of statutory regulation in the field, in 2012, the Irish Medical 
Board licensed two Irish AHR clinics to offer PGD services.282 The pro‑life campaign 
qualified this as ‘exploiting a gap in Irish laws’283 and called for ‘a detailed ethical 
debate on the issue of genetic screening’.284 Such a debate has so far not taken place 
in Irish Parliament. Further, while clinics also provide for testing for gender related 
disorders, no express regulation seems to be in place for gender selection in case 
such a test is positive (see 5.3.5 above).285
5.3.7.	 Vitrification	of	egg	cells
Vitrification of egg cells has not been debated Ireland to the same extent as it has 
been in the Netherlands, for example (see Chapter 5). The technique is offered by 
some of the Irish clinics,286 but there are no particular statutory regulations in place.
280 The Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction 2005, supra n. 9, at p. 65.
281 Idem, at p. 73, Recommendation no. 40.
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clinics cooperate with a specialist genetics laboratory in the UK. See B. Roche, ‘Two clinics to 
offer embryo screening’, Irishtimes.com 13 November 2012, www.irishtimes.com/news/health/
two‑clinics‑to‑offer‑embryo‑screening‑1.551312, visited May 2014 and B. Roche, ‘First pregnancy in 
Ireland using new screening technique’, Irishtimes.com 3 November 2013, www.irishtimes.com/news/
ireland/irish‑news/first‑pregnancy‑in‑ireland‑using‑new‑screening‑technique‑1.1582427, visited May 
2014.
283 ‘IVF Clinics Exploit Gap in Irish Law’, www.prolife.ie/prolife/ivf‑clinics‑exploit‑gap‑irish‑law, visited 
15 May 2013.
284 R. Riegel, ‘First ‘gene screened’ Irish baby due in July’, Irish Independent 4 November 2013, www.
independent.ie/irish‑news/first‑gene‑screened‑irish‑baby‑due‑in‑july‑29723997.html, visited 15 May 
2014.
285 According to its website the Cork Fertility Centre offers PGD to couples at high risk of producing a child 
with a genetic disorder. The clinic carries out PGD for single gene disorders including; cystic fibrosis, 
fragile X syndrome, Duchenne muscular dystrophy and myotonic dystrophy, Tay‑Sachs disease, 
beta‑thalassemia, hemophilia A, and sickle cell disease. See www.corkfertilitycentre.com/Treatments, 
visited 22 May 2014. The list of disorders on the website of the Beacon CARE Fertility clinic is even longer. 
See www.carefertility.com/genetics‑programme‑sc2/what‑is‑pgd‑what‑is‑genetic‑diagnosis‑sj1/, 
visited 22 May 2014.
286 See for example www.merrionfertility.ie/embryology/vitrification‑.231.html, visited May 2014.








As a general rule AHR services are not provided by public health services and their 
funding therefore primarily has to be carried for privately. For medical expenses, 
including IVF treatment, income tax relief may be claimed.287 The Drugs Payment 
Scheme furthermore covers drugs used as part of fertility treatment.288
5.3.9. Surrogacy
Surrogacy is, like many other AHR issues, completely unregulated in the Irish 
jurisdiction. The matter has never been acknowledged by the Irish Medical Council 
in its guidelines289 and statutory legislation was only proposed in 2014 by means 
of the Children and Family Relationship Bill (see below). However, this part of the 
Bill was taken out before the Bill could be tabled in Parliament. As a result, there 
remains today great legal uncertainty regarding surrogacy, particularly regarding 
the determination of legal parentage in situations involving surrogacy arrangements.
The absence of regulation, and for many years also of any case law on the matter, 
has left many questions unanswered. Some guidance has been given by the Citizen 
Information Board, which explained on its official website that ‘[…] traditionally, the 
surrogate mother is considered the legal mother of the child and the child’s guardian, 
because she has given birth to the child.’290 It was explained that if the surrogate 
mother was married her husband would be presumed by law to be the father of the 
child, unless the contrary was proven.291 The intended parents – even if they were the 
genetic parents – would need to adopt the child in order to establish parental links 
with the child.292 However, private adoptions are not allowed in Ireland and if the 
surrogate mother was married, it would not be possible for her to give up the child for 
adoption. Also there was no guarantee that the Irish Adoption Authority would place 
the child of a surrogate mother with the intended parent(s).293 Further, because it is 
a criminal offence under Irish law to make or receive any payment or other reward 
287 Between 2006 and 2009, tax relief for IVF treatment was provided for at the highest rate which was 
set at 41 per cent. As of 2009, this was reduced to 20 per cent. If the person or family concerned has 
taken out private health insurance cover, the insurance will take care of the expenses for AHR services, 
in which case the question of tax relief does not arise. See www.citizensinformation.ie/categories/
money‑and‑tax/tax/income‑tax‑credits‑and‑reliefs/taxation_and_medical_expenses, visited 22 May 
2014 and www.revenue.ie/en/tax/it/leaflets/it6.html, visited 22 May 2014.
288 See www.citizensinformation.ie/categories/health/women‑s‑health/fertility_treatment?printpreview= 
1, visited 22 May 2014. This webpage was last updated on 11 January 2012.
289 Sills and Healy 2008, supra n. 228.
290 See www.citizensinformation.ie/en/birth_family_relationships/adoption_and_fostering/surrogacy.
html, visited 22 May 2014. It is thereby explained that ‘[l]egal maternity is important for birth 
registration, domicile and citizenship provisions, succession, childcare provisions, adoption, social 
welfare and educational provisions as many of these services and rights depend on the consent of the 
legal mother.’
291 Section 46 of the Status of Children Act 1987.
292 C. Palmer, ‘Irish couples face an uphill struggle with surrogacy laws’, Independent.ie 11 May 2009.
293 See www.citizensinformation.ie/en/birth_family_relationships/adoption_and_fostering/surrogacy.
html, visited 22 May 2014.







in consideration of an adoption,294 remuneration in a surrogacy arrangement could 
also be considered illegal.295 An intended father who was genetically related to the 
child could alternatively apply for guardianship of the child under the Guardianship 
of Infants Act,296 but his partner would not have such a right.297
Because of this lack of legal certainty in Ireland, it was also unclear if, and if so, 
at what scale, surrogacy took place within Ireland.298 Reports were made that Irish 
couples engaged in surrogacy agreements abroad (see also 5.4.3 below).299 In 2012, 
the then Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence therefore published a guidance 
document entitled ‘Citizenship, parentage, guardianship and travel document issues 
in relation to children born as a result of surrogacy arrangements entered into outside 
the State’.300 The document gave further guidance on the family law implications of 
surrogacy under Irish law. It was made clear that under Irish law the woman who 
gave birth to the child was the legal mother of the child, even if she was not herself 
the genetic mother of the child. It was furthermore explained that:
‘Under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, the mother of a child born outside marriage 
is the child’s sole guardian. Under Irish law, family relationships and the rights and 
responsibilities that flow from them cannot be subjected to the ordinary law of contract and 
cannot, in particular, be transferred to another person, bought, or sold. This means that, 
under Irish law, the surrogate mother and the child will have a life‑long legal relationship 
with one another. […] If the surrogate mother is married, then under section 46 of the 
Status of Children Act 1987, the surrogate mother’s husband is presumed by law to be 
the father of the child, unless the contrary is proved on the balance of probabilities. The 
husband will also, along with the surrogate mother, be the joint guardian of the child. If 
the commissioning father is the genetic father of the child, it is possible to overcome the 
presumption of paternity in favour of the surrogate mother’s husband, so as to allow the 
294 Section 41(1) of the Adoption Act 1952. See also ‘You’ll have a baby in your arms within a year, NO 
questions asked.’, Daily Mirror 16 January 2006 and C. O’Sullivan, ‘More couples seeking British 
surrogate births’, The Irish Examiner 9 August 2005.
295 Dr. D. Madden in Parliamentary debates Vol. no. 61, 15 September 2005. The Commission on Assisted 
Human Reproduction 2005, supra n. 9, at p. 51. See also Sills and Healy 2008, supra n. 228.
296 The AHR Commission pointed out in this respect that, ‘[…] alternatively, a commissioning man may 
apply for guardianship of the child under the Status of Children Act 1987 if he is the biological father 
of the child, but his partner would not have any right to make such an application.’ The Commission 
on Assisted Human Reproduction 2005, supra n. 9, at p .51. See also Dr. D. Madden in Parliamentary 
debates Vol. no. 61, 15 September 2005.
297 See www.citizensinformation.ie/en/birth_family_relationships/adoption_and_fostering/surrogacy.
html, visited September 2011.
298 R. de Brun, ‘I’ve had eight babies for other people’, Independent.ie 4 February 2008. See also ‘You’ll 
have a baby in your arms within a year, NO questions asked’, Daily Mirror 16 January 2006 and 
C. Palmer, ‘Irish couples face an uphill struggle with surrogacy laws’, Independent.ie 11 May 2009.
299 See the submission of Dr. Wingfield to the High Court in M.R. & Another v. An t Ard Chláraitheoir 
[2013] IEHC 91 at 28.
300 ‘The Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence announces the publication of guidance for Irish 
couples on surrogacy arrangements made abroad’, Press release on the website of the Department for 
Justice and Equality of 21 February 2012, www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR12000035, visited 23 May 
2014. The guidance document is online available at www.justice.ie, visited 23 May 2014, and is also 
published on the websites of each relevant Department. See also section 5.5.4 below.







commissioning father to be recognised as the legal parent of the child. A guardianship 
order may also be sought by the commissioning father. […] If the surrogate mother is not 
married, and the commissioning father is the genetic father of the child, then the Irish 
authorities may recognise his paternity of the child on receipt of reliable DNA evidence.’301
Surrogacy was also addressed by the AHR Commission in its 2005 report. The 
majority of the Commission recommended at the time that surrogacy and all issues 
pertaining thereto had to be permitted and had to be made subject to regulation 
by the regulatory body the Commission recommended to be established.302 The 
Commission also recommended extending the remit of the Adoption Board to 
include surrogacy.303 Acknowledging that both genetics and gestation played ‘a 
necessary and equally important role in bringing the child into existence’,304 it further 
advised that the child born through surrogacy had to be presumed to be that of the 
commissioning couple.305 The AHR Commission was of the view that payment of 
reasonable and legitimate expenses to the surrogate mother was not to be seen as 
contravening the Adoption Act.306 In line with its recommendations as regards the 
use of donors in AHR procedures, it furthermore recommended that any child born 
through surrogacy, on reaching maturity, had to be entitled to access the identity of 
the surrogate mother and, where relevant, the genetic parents.307
None of the Commission’s recommendations were followed up at the time, leaving 
the matter completely unregulated. It was therefore observed that:
‘Until the Oireachtas passes a law specifically addressing surrogacy, Ireland will remain a 
blank slate leaving it to the judiciary to determine what rights either party in a surrogacy 
arrangement may have.’308
The judiciary indeed turned out to be the first needing to address the issue. The 
unprecedented, and for many, surprising, ruling of the High Court in M R & Another 
v. An t Ard Chláraitheoir (2013)309 inevitably prompted the legislature to speed up the 
introduction of legislation, which it finally did in 2014.310
Applicants in M R & Another v. An t Ard Chláraitheoir were a married couple, 
referred to as ‘OR’ and ‘CR’. Because CR was unable to give birth the natural way, the 
couple searched for alternative ways of having a child. The sister of CR volunteered 
301 It was, furthermore, explained in the guidance document that in addition to such a declaration of 
parentage, a guardianship order was required for the genetic father to become also the guardian of the 
child.
302 The Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction 2005, supra n. 9, at p. 50, Recommendation No. 30.
303 Sills and Healy 2008, supra n. 228.
304 The Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction 2005, supra n. 9, at p. 51.
305 Idem, at p. 53, Recommendation No. 33.
306 Idem, at p. 50, Recommendation No. 31.
307 Idem, at p. 51, Recommendation No. 32.
308 Sills and Healy 2008, supra n. 228.
309 M.R. & Another v. An t Ard Chláraitheoir [2013] IEHC 91.
310 As explained below, the relevant part of the relevant Bill was, however, removed from the Bill that very 
same year.







to participate in a surrogacy arrangement, which progressed throughout ‘in a very 
cooperative atmosphere’.311 The ovum of CR was fertilised in vitro by the sperm of 
OR and implanted in the womb of the sister, who became pregnant of twins. After 
their birth, CR’s sister and OR attended the Registrar’s office and were registered 
in the birth certificates as the parents of the children. CR and OR subsequently 
requested to have the Register corrected, holding that CR, being the genetic mother, 
should be registered as the mother.312 They accompanied their request with DNA 
evidence. After this request was refused, the couple applied to the High Court, 
seeking a declaration that CR was the mother of the twins, that she was entitled to 
be registered as their mother, as well as a declaration that the continued failure to 
recognise CR and OR as the parents of the children was unlawful.
Referring to the mater semper certa est principle, the Respondents in this case, An 
t Ard‑Chláraitheoir (the Chief Officer of the system of civil registration in Ireland) 
and the Attorney General, submitted that in Irish law, the mother of a child was 
the birth mother. The respondents claimed this to be a constitutional norm and ‘an 
inherent and fundamental principle’ of Irish law that was affirmed by Article 40.3.3° 
of the Irish Constitution. They further held it possible that the State would at some 
stage ‘legislate to allow surrogacy’, but stressed that this engaged ‘a whole range 
of social and political issues’, which were matters for the legislature.313 It was 
furthermore submitted that if the Court were to accept the applicants’ claims and 
make a declaration of parentage based on, inter alia, the DNA testing, it would bring 
about ‘a seismic shift’ in the manner in which the issue of motherhood was dealt 
with in the Irish jurisdiction.314 Parenthood could not be a matter of intention, it was 
claimed. In the words of the Respondents:
‘If we are to begin to look at genetics and not the birth then that raises a complex set of 
issues that is properly a matter for the legislature to deal with and is not something capable 
of being dealt with by the Court for the simple complexity of all that is involved.’315
High Court Judge Abbott was not convinced by these submissions. He observed that 
the central legal issue to be addressed in this case was who, in law, was entitled to 
be treated as the parents of the twins, in particular, who, in law, was to be treated 
as their mother.316 Given that positive legislation on surrogacy was ‘totally absent’ 
in the Irish jurisdiction, the surrogacy contract in the case under examination was 
not illegal, it was just not enforceable.317 Having heard a number of expert witnesses 
on the science of genetics versus the science of epigenetics, Judge Abbott held it 
to be ‘most unlikely that epigenetics [would] ever trump the deterministic quality 
of chromosomal DNA’.318 He was further of the opinion that the word ‘mother’ in 
311 M.R. & Another v. An t Ard Chláraitheoir [2013] IEHC 91, at 96.
312 The applicants relied on Section 63 of the Civil Registration Act 2004.
313 M.R. & Another v. An t Ard Chláraitheoir [2013] IEHC 91, at 71.
314 Idem, at 91.
315 Idem, at 93.
316 Idem, at 2.
317 Idem, at 105.
318 Idem, at 98.







Article 40.3.3° had a meaning specific to the Article itself and that there was nothing 
in the Irish legislative context that positively affirmed the maxim of mater semper 
certa est. Judge Abbott held that this presumption had not survived the enactment 
of the Constitution insofar as it applied to the situation post IVF and considered that 
any alleged historic and European consensus on the mater semper certa principle 
was not to restrain the Court from making conclusions.319 He accordingly held:
‘To achieve fairness and constitutional and natural justice, for both the paternal and 
maternal genetic parents, the feasible inquiry in relation to maternity ought to be made 
by on a genetic basis and on being proven, the genetic mother should be registered as the 
mother under the [Civil Registration Act 2004].’320
The High Court accordingly granted the declarations sought by the applicants, 
holding that CR was the mother of the twins and that the continued failure to 
recognise OR and CR as their parents was unlawful.
As pointed out by many, this case highlighted the urgency with which legislation was 
required in this area.321 Because the government was by that time eventually indeed 
in the process of preparing legislation on the issue, it subsequently appealed the case 
to the Supreme Court. It wished to ensure that the legislature’s scope to legislate was 
‘absolutely clear’ and wished to have ‘a number of points of law of exceptional public 
importance’ clarified.322 After a four‑day hearing in February 2014, the Supreme 
Court reserved judgment in the case.323
In the meantime the 2014 Children and Family Relationship Bill (see 5.3.2 above) 
was introduced. It initially also provided for a section on surrogacy. Had this not 
been taken out of the Bill at a later stage, it could have resulted in the introduction of 
the first statutory instrument in Ireland addressing the issue of surrogacy expressly. 
Even though the relevant provisions have thus not made it into law, they may still 
be indicative for possible future legislation in this area and that warrants a brief 
discussion of the relevant parts of the Bill here.
The Bill only focused on so‑called gestational surrogacy involving AHR treatment 
as opposed to ‘traditional surrogacy’ whereby the surrogate mother is the genetic 
mother of the child she is carrying.324 The making or receiving of payments in 
319 Idem, at 105.
320 Idem, at 104.
321 E.g. A. Caffrey, ‘Surrogacy – Genetics v Gestation: The Determination of “Mother” in Irish Law’, 
19 Medico‑Legal Journal of Ireland (2013) p. 34 and A. Mulligan, ‘Surrogacy in the Courts: The 
Definition of Motherhood’, guest post at humanrights.ie of 30 January 2013, www.humanrights.ie/
index.php/2013/01/30/surrogacy‑in‑the‑courts‑the‑definition‑of‑motherhood, visited 21 May 2014.
322 Department of Social Protection, Statement in relation to High Court judgment in the case of MR, DR, 
OR and CR v An tÁrd Chlaraitheoir [Registrar General], Ireland & the Attorney General, 6 June 2013 
online available at www.welfare.ie/en/pressoffice/Pages/pr060613a.aspx, visited 20 May 2014.
323 M. Carolan, ‘Supreme Court reserves judgment in surrogacy case’, Irishtimes.com 6 February 2014, www.
irishtimes.com/news/crime‑and‑law/supreme‑court‑reserves‑judgment‑in‑surrogacy‑case‑1.1682158, 
visited 22 May 2014.
324 General Scheme of the Children and Family Relationship Bill (version January 2014), p. 10.







relation to a surrogacy arrangement and advertisements for entering into a surrogacy 
arrangement were prohibited under the Bill. Those who engaged in commercial 
surrogacy could face a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, 
or both.325 Payment for the birth mother’s reasonable costs, for legal advice and for 
AHR procedures involved in surrogacy agreements were not precluded. The Bill 
also set certain age requirements: the surrogate mother had to have attained the age 
of 24 years and had to have at least one child of her own, while the intended parents 
had to be between 21 and 45 years of age.326
The Bill set out the rule that the birth mother was always considered the mother 
whether or not she had a genetic connection to the child.327 In respect of surrogacy in 
particular it was explained:
‘The policy intention is that in a surrogacy case, the birth mother will be recorded as the 
child’s mother. No surrogacy arrangement will be enforceable against her. However, on 
application to the court by the birth mother or the commissioning parents, or all of them, 
the court may legally assign parentage to the intending parents. The court may assign 
parentage on the basis of genetic connection to one of the intending parents and to the 
spouse, civil partner or cohabiting partner of that person. The consent of any surrogate is 
essential and she will be the legal mother of the child if she does not consent.’328
The Bill thus made it possible for the intending parents to establish parental links 
with the child, but at the same time reserved a decisive say for the surrogate mother. 
This was also reflected in the rule that an application to the court could be made no 
earlier than 30 days after the child’s birth.329 No presumptions as to parenthood in 
relation to the partner of a surrogate mother applied.330 Lastly, the condition was set 
that before entering the arrangement the surrogate mother and the intended parents 
were to obtain legal advice from separate and independent legal practitioners.331
After the Bill had been published, the Children’s Ombudsman was critical in respect 
of some of the proposed provisions on surrogacy. She, inter alia, held that provision 
had to be made for situations in which a surrogate consented to the assignment 
of legal parentage to the intended mother, but the latter refused to accept legal 
parentage.332 The Children’s Ombudsman in particular made recommendations in 
respect of cross‑border surrogacy cases (see section 5.5.4 below). As noted above, 
325 Proposed Section 23(1) and (2) in combination with Sections 18 and 19 of the Bill in its version of 
January 2014.
326 Sections 20 and 21 of the Bill in its version of January 2014. The Government special rapporteur on 
child protection considered the latter maximum age limit to amount to age discrimination. F. Gartland, 
‘Parental age limit in surrogacy law could be discrimination’, Irishtimes.com 19 May 2014, www.
irishtimes.com/news/crime‑and‑law/parental‑age‑limit‑in‑surrogacy‑law‑could‑be‑discrimi 
nation‑1.1800599, visited 21 May 2014.
327 General Scheme of the Children and Family Relationship Bill (version January 2014), at p. 22.
328 Idem, at p. 31.
329 Art. 13(5) of the Children and Family Relationship Bill.
330 Art. 8(3) Children and Family Relationship Bill.
331 Art. 22(1) and (2) Children and Family Relationship Bill.
332 General Scheme of the Children and Family Relationship Bill (version January 2014), at p. 20.







the revised general scheme of the Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014, as 
published on 26 September 2014, no longer contained any provisions in relation to 
surrogacy. The following explanation was given in an accompanying summary of 
the Revised Bill:
‘It was considered particularly problematic to finalise provisions on surrogacy in advance 
of the Supreme Court’s ruling on the MR & Ors – v‑ An tArd‑Chláraitheoir case given the 
uncertainty on the balance of constitutional rights between a birth mother and a genetic 
mother and because there are very critical issues needing to be resolved, relating for 
example to how the law deals with commercial surrogacies and to the rights of children 
born through surrogacies.’333
5.4. stAtIstIcs on cross‑border movement
5.4.1.	 Statistics	on	cross‑border	abortions
Traditionally most women in Ireland who wish to have an abortion on medical or 
social grounds go to the United Kingdom. The UK Department of Health annually 
releases statistics on abortions carried out in England and Wales. These statistics 
also show how many women and girls gave addresses in Ireland to these abortion 
clinics.334 On the basis of these statistics the Irish Family Planning Association 
(IFPA) has held that between January 1980 and December 2012, at least 156,076 
women travelled from Ireland for abortion services in England and Wales.335 The 
IFPA underlined that these numbers are an underestimation ‘[…] as not all women 
resident in the Republic of Ireland will provide their Irish addresses for reasons of 
confidentiality. Furthermore, some Irish women will give addresses in the UK at 
which they are not resident in order to obtain abortion care paid for by the [National 
Health Service].’336
The number of women giving Irish addresses to UK abortion clinics has been 
decreasing every year since 2001, from 6,673 to 3,982 in 2012.337 Still, in 2013 it 





334 These statistics are online available at the website of the UK Department of Health www.dh.gov.uk/en/
Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsStatistics/DH_099285, visited 22 March 2010.
335 Website of the Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA), www.ifpa.ie/eng/Hot‑Topics/Abortion/
Statistics, visited 26 May 2014.
336 Idem. See also Human Rights Watch, A State of Isolation, Access to Abortion for Women in Ireland 
(New York, Human Rights Watch 2010), www.hrw.org/node/87910, visited 3 June 2010, at p. 14.
337 ‘Number of Women Giving Irish Addresses at UK Abortion Clinics Decreases for Eleventh Year in a 
Row According to UK Department of Health’, press release of the HSE Crisis Pregnancy Programme 
of 11 July 2013, www.crisispregnancy.ie/news/number‑of‑women‑giving‑irish‑addresses‑at‑uk‑abortio
n‑clinics‑decreases‑for‑eleventh‑year‑in‑a‑row‑according‑to‑uk‑department‑of‑health, visited 26 May 
2014.







was held that at least 11 women left the Irish Republic every day for an abortion in 
Britain.338 Also, in 2014, a steady rise was reported in the number of women from 
Ireland seeking abortion on medical grounds in UK hospitals.339
Women from Ireland have also been – and are – accessing safe and legal abortion 
services in other EU countries, principally the Netherlands,340 allegedly due to the 
rise of low budget airline connections. These numbers have also been dropping every 
year. Statistics from the Dutch Expert Centre on Sexuality, Rutgers Nisso Group 
(now Rutgers WPF), for example, show that in 2007 the share of Irish women in the 
group of non‑Dutch resident women obtaining abortions in Dutch clinics was 10 per 
cent (450 out of 4,469 abortions) in 2007, compared to 4 per cent (177 out of 4,436 
abortions) in 2008.341
The so‑called ‘Abortion boat’ of the Dutch NGO Women on Waves set sail to Ireland 
in 2001. Reportedly some 300 women from Ireland contacted the ship’s hotline at the 
time, including ‘[…] women who had been raped, schoolgirls who could not find a 
feasible excuse to go to England for a couple of days, mothers who could not pay for 
childcare during their journeys to England, and political refugees who did not have 
the papers to travel’.342
5.4.2.	 (Insufficient)	statistics	on	cross‑border	reproductive	care
As far as the present author is aware, no governmental body in Ireland keeps any 
official statistics as regards CBRC. Various news reports and surveys, as well as 
statistics drawn up by private clinics may, however, give some picture of the actual 
scale of this phenomenon.
338 ‘Ireland: Government publishes draft legislation’, Reproductive Review 3 May 2013, www.
reproductivereview.org/index.php/rr/article/1404, visited 22 May 2014.
339 K. Holland, ‘Concern voiced over UK hospital restrictions’, Irishtimes.com 16 April 2014, www.
irishtimes.com/news/social‑affairs/concern‑voiced‑over‑uk‑hospital‑restrictions‑1.1764419, visited 
26 May 2014.
340 Supra n. 337. Human Rights Watch also interviewed Irish women who had had abortions in Italy and 
France. Human Rights Watch 2010, supra n. 336, at p. 10.
341 L. van Lee and C. Wijsen, Landelijke abortusregistratie 2007 [National abortion registration 
2007] (Utrecht, Rutgers Nisso Groep 2008) pp. 47–48, online available at www.rng.nl/producten 
endiensten/onderzoekspublicaties/downloadbare‑publicaties‑in‑pdf, visited 2 June 2010 and H. Kruijer 
et al., Landelijke abortusregistratie 2008 [National abortion registration 2008] (Utrecht, Rutgers 
Nisso Groep 2010) p. 33, online available at www.rng.nl/productenendiensten/onderzoekspublicaties/
downloadbare‑publicaties‑in‑pdf, visited 2 June 2010. The Irish Crisis Pregnancy Agency has held 
that the number of women travelling from Ireland to clinics in the Netherlands was 461 in 2006, 451 in 
2007, 351 in 2008, 134 in 2009, 31 in 2010 and 33 in 2011.‘Number of Women Giving Irish Addresses 
at UK Abortion Clinics Decreases for Eleventh Year in a Row According to UK Department of Health’, 
press release of the HSE Crisis Pregnancy Programme of 11 July 2013, www.crisispregnancy.ie/news/
number‑of‑women‑giving‑irish‑addresses‑at‑uk‑abortion‑clinics‑decreases‑for‑eleventh‑year‑in‑a‑
row‑according‑to‑uk‑department‑of‑health, visited 26 May 2014. The latter figures are, however, not 
verifiable as in the reports of the Rutgers WPF for those years, women from Ireland are covered by the 
more general category ‘other’ (‘overig’).
342 R. Gomperts, ‘Women on Waves: Where Next for the Abortion Boat?’, 19 Reproductive Health Matters 
(2002) p. 180 at p. 181. See also Ch. 6, section 6.4.1.3.







Many reports are made of Irish women and couples travelling to other jurisdictions 
for AHR treatment including gamete donation. Some news reports speak of ‘many 
women’ travelling to Spain and other European countries for ovum donation,343 
others speak of ‘hundreds of Irish couples’ heading to other European countries 
for that same purpose344 and of ‘hundreds of children born in Ireland every year’ 
who are conceived using eggs or sperm sourced from Spain and other countries.345 
Certain individual clinics keep their own statistics. It was, for instance, reported that 
the Instituto Marques clinic in Barcelona, treated 50 Irish women in 2007 and had 
by August 2008 yet treated 70 that year.346 Reprofit, a fertility clinic in the Czech 
city of Brno, was reported to have treated about six Irish couples a month and the 
Mediterranean Fertility Centre in Chania, Crete, claimed to have treated about 50 
Irish women in 2008.347
The Irish private fertility clinic Sims IVF Clinic has, furthermore, set up the so‑called 
‘European egg donation programme’. According to the clinic, the number of recipients 
of egg donation far exceeds the number of donors in Ireland. Because the converse 
allegedly applies in Eastern Europe, the Irish clinic has developed a partnership 
with a Ukrainian clinic. The Irish clinic transports frozen sperm to the Ukrainian 
clinic, where the in vitro fertilisation is carried out. The resulting fertilised eggs are 
then returned to Ireland for couples to proceed with embryo transfer.348 A doctor of 
the Sims clinic estimated in 2005 that over half of the couples wishing to engage in 
AHR travelled to Spain and Eastern Europe.349 In 2004, the clinic completed 120 
treatments involving eggs donated from Middle or Eastern Europe, compared with 
24 Irish donations.350
It has been submitted that particularly the existing non‑commercial nature of the 
donation of gametes caused a shortage in available donor eggs in Ireland. With no 
financial incentive, Irish women have apparently been reluctant to donate their eggs 
out of altruism.351 It has been reported that consequently ‘[…] hundreds of Irish 
343 ‘We’re having an IVF baby’, Sunday Business Post 19 September 2004.
344 T. McTague, ‘Costa del IVF’, Daily Mirror, 11 August 2008 and G. Monaghan, ‘Irish head to Europe for 
egg donation. More women are turning to fertility clinics abroad’, The Sunday Times 10 August 2008.
345 C. O’Brien, ‘The identity issue: how donated eggs and sperm are redefining parenthood’, 
Irishtimes.com 21 November 2011, www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/features/2011/1121/122 
4307905627.html?via=rel, visited 15 May 2014.
346 T. McTague, ‘Costa del IVF’, Daily Mirror, 11 August 2008 and G. Monaghan, ‘Irish head to Europe for 
egg donation. More women are turning to fertility clinics abroad’, The Sunday Times 10 August 2008.
347 M. Tsouroupaki, embryologist and laboratory director of the Mediterranean Fertility Centre in Chania, 
Crete as quoted in G. Monaghan, ‘Irish head to Europe for egg donation. More women are turning to 
fertility clinics abroad’, The Sunday Times 10 August 2008.
348 Www.eggdonation.ie/Information_about_Donors/Information_about_Donors.710.html, visited 
15 May 2014.
349 Dr Walsh of SIMS Clinic in Dublin as quoted in ‘Reproduction becomes a (baby) booming industry’, 
The Irish Examiner 28 July 2005. According to the news report, Irish women no longer travel to Britain 
as there is also a severe shortage in the UK after the lifting of anonymity for donors.
350 ‘Infertile women buy donor eggs abroad for €10k’, Irish Independent 25 June 2007.
351 As submitted by Dr Aonghus Nolan of the Galway Fertility Clinic as quoted in G. Monaghan, ‘Irish 
head to Europe for egg donation. More women are turning to fertility clinics abroad’, The Sunday 
Times 10 August 2008.







women are travelling to clinics across the continent to receive IVF treatment using 
eggs donated from young European women.’352 It has, furthermore, been reported 
that Irish clinics import sperm from a Danish sperm bank.353
Further, cross‑border movement has been taking place for the purpose of having 
PGD. The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission held in a report of 2007 
that all patients who requested PGD in Ireland were referred to clinics outside Irish 
jurisdiction, inter alia, Belgium and the UK.354 While the total number of referrals 
made within Ireland was not known, the number of referrals for PGD made by the 
National Centre for Medical Genetics was known to be approximately 20 cases in the 
period 2005–2006, the report stated. Apart from formal referrals, patients could also 
inform themselves about PGD facilities abroad via the internet.
5.4.3.	 Statistics	on	cross‑border	surrogacy
While no official statistics are available, there is ample incidental evidence showing 
that individuals and couples in Ireland have entered into surrogacy agreements in 
other jurisdictions. Outside the EU these mainly concern the USA, Ukraine and 
India. Inside the EU, the UK has long been a preferred destination.
British surrogacy organisations like Cots (Childlessness Overcome Through 
Surrogacy)355 have in the past helped various Irish couples in giving babies through 
surrogacy.356 It was reported that a 2008 change in UK legislation regarding 
adoption prevented non‑UK residents from adopting a child born in the UK through 
surrogacy.357 Consequently, Irish couples had to set up permanent residency in the 
UK in order to qualify for a surrogacy treatment.358 Perhaps partly due to this change 
in the UK law, Irish couples increasingly turned to the USA for surrogacy.359 In 2006 
the Daily Mirror reported that three US organisations had arranged babies for 30 
Irish couples.360
352 Idem.
353 D. O’Donovan, ‘UK trade in sperm and eggs’, The Sunday Mirror 6 May 2007 and G. Pennings, ‘The 
rough guide to insemination: cross‑border travelling for donor semen due to different regulations’, 
Facts, Views and Vision in ObGyn, Monograph (2010) p. 55, online available at www.fvvo.eu/
assets/103/21‑Pennings.pdf, visited 15 May 2014. Pennings referred to, inter alia, W. Pavia, ‘How 
Danish sperm is conquering the world’, The Times 27 November 2006.
354 Coverleyn et al. 2007, supra n. 275, at p. 41.
355 See www.surrogacy.org.uk/About_COTS.htm, visited 26 May 2014.
356 Cots has held to have helped on average five Irish couples a year. ‘You’ll have a baby in your arms 
within a year, NO questions asked.’, Daily Mirror 16 January 2006 and C. O’Sullivan, ‘More couples 
seeking British surrogate births’, The Irish Examiner 9 August 2005. See also Sills and Healy 2008, 
supra n. 228.
357 See inter alia the submission by Dr Wingfield in M. R. & Another v. An t Ard Chláraitheoir [2013] IEHC 
91, para. 28 and the UK Border Agency leaflet on inter‑country surrogacy and the immigration rules, 
online available at www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/261435/
Intercountry‑surrogacy‑leaflet.pdf, visited 15 May 2014.
358 C. Palmer, ‘Irish couples face an uphill struggle with surrogacy laws’, Independent.ie 11 May 2009.
359 R. de Brun, ‘I’ve had eight babies for other people’, Independent.ie 4 February 2008.
360 ‘You’ll have a baby in your arms within a year, NO questions asked.’, Daily Mirror 16 January 2006.







5.5. IrIsh AbortIon And Ahr legIslAtIon And cross‑border 
movement
5.5.1.	 Criminal	liability	for	abortions	and	AHR	treatment	abroad?
In 1980 Findlay held it inconceivable that Irish courts would punish arrangements 
for an abortion in another State that was lawful under the law of that State.361 This 
observation seems confirmed by prosecution practice. There have, of course, in the 
past been cases where injunctions were sought and granted to prevent girls from 
travelling to another jurisdiction to have an abortion.362 Other than that, the present 
author is not aware of any reports of any criminal prosecution in Ireland for abortions 
obtained abroad.
The present author is further not aware of any prosecutions in Ireland for involvement 
in prohibited treatment abroad. This may also have to do with the fact that AHR 
was for so long unregulated and thus also not expressly criminalised. There have, 
nonetheless, been reports of fear for prosecutions. For example, in 2007 it was 
reported that Irish doctors feared potential prosecution for referring patients to PGD 
clinics in other countries.363
5.5.2.	 Public	funding	for	treatment	obtained	abroad
Most women who travel from Ireland to another State for an abortion, do so because 
the abortion is not legally available in Ireland. That implies that these women also 
have to cover the costs of their abortion themselves.364
In respect of AHR treatment, reimbursement depends on the terms of the private 
health insurer (see 5.5.9 above). The tax relief described in section 5.3.8 above, is also 
available if the treatment has been obtained abroad.
361 M.J. Findlay, ‘Criminal Liability For Complicity In Abortions Committed Outside Ireland’, 15 The 
Irish Jurist (1980) p. 88.
362 See section 5.5.2 above.
363 J. Lawford Davies as quoted in ‘IVF test for deformities raises legal concerns’, The Irish Examiner 
10 December 2007.
364 Upon inquiry with the Dublin Well Woman Centre in 2006 it appeared that incidentally Irish authorities 
had reimbursed abortions for minors. The Dublin Well Woman Centre furthermore expected that 
abortions performed on women in state custody would also be paid for by the State, but it underlined 
that it did not have any statistics to that effect. Women in small communities could sometimes rely 
on private funding within that community. Other women had to finance their abortions themselves. 
Statement by Alison Begas, Chief Executive of Dublin Well Woman (Personal email correspondence 
13 November 2006).








As explained in section 5.2.3 above, the right to information about foreign abortion 
facilities has been guaranteed under Irish law since 1992. It is laid down in various 
sources of law such as the Constitution, statutory law and the Guidelines of the 
Medical Council. In its judgment in the A, B and C case of 2010, the ECtHR implicitly 
approved of these regulations as sufficient to meet the ECHR standards.365
There have (in the past) been reports of Irish women who had difficulties in obtaining 
follow‑up care in Ireland after they had abortions abroad.366 The Guidelines on Crisis 
Pregnancy of 2004, as developed by the Crisis Pregnancy Agency in association with 
the Irish College of General Practitioners, have underlined that women are entitled 
to follow‑up care.367 As summarised in the A, B and C judgment, the guidelines note 
that:
‘[…] “[i]rrespective of what decision a woman makes in the crisis pregnancy situation, 
follow‑up care will be important. This may include antenatal care, counselling, future 
contraception or medical care after abortion. The […] response [of the General Practitioner 
(GP)] to the initial consultation will have a profound influence on her willingness to 
attend for further care.” If a woman decides to proceed with an abortion, it is the GP’s 
main concern to ensure that she does so safely, receives proper medical care, and returns 
for appropriate follow‑up. GPs are advised to supplement verbal advice with a written 
handout. […] A Patient Information Leaflet is attached to the Guidelines. It informs 
women that, should they choose an abortion, they should plan to visit their GP at least 
three weeks after the termination to allow the GP to carry out a full check‑up and allow 
the woman to express any questions or concerns she may have.’368
Since 2009 the guidelines of the Medical Council recognise the medical profession’s 
responsibility to provide aftercare for women who decide to leave the State for 
termination of pregnancy.369 Also, the HSE Crisis Pregnancy Programme370 
365 The Court considered in respect of the first and second applicants’ submissions that there was a lack 
of information on the options available to them and that this added to the burden of the impugned 
restrictions on abortion in Ireland, ‘general and unsubstantiated’. In this regard, the Court referred 
to 1995 Abortion Information Act; the establishment of the Crisis Pregnancy Agency (CPA) in 2001 
and ‘the Government’s clarifications as regards care and counselling provided or facilitated by the 
CPA’, as well as the adoption of the CPA Guidelines and Medical Council Guidelines. ECtHR [GC] 
16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 130.
366 See, for example, the submissions of the three applicants in ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and 
C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05.
367 Primary Care Guidelines for the Prevention and Management of Crisis Pregnancy (“CPA 
Guidelines”), online available at www.crisispregnancy.ie/wp‑content/uploads/2012/05/
primary‑care‑guidelines‑preventing‑crisis‑pregnancy.pdf, visited 15 May 2014.
368 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 80.
369 See also A.A. Sheikh, ‘The Latest Medical Council Guidelines: New and Improved’, 16 Medico‑Legal 
Journal of Ireland (2010) p. 62.
370 In 2010 the former functions of the Crisis Pregnancy Agency were transferred to Ireland’s Health 
Service (HSE) under the Health (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2009 (Act Number 25 of 2009). See 
www.crisispregnancy.ie/about‑us/overview, visited 15 May 2014.







launched a special campaign to raise awareness about these free services in 2008.371 
The programme since then, inter alia, funds ‘[…] free post‑abortion counselling and 
medical checkups to any woman that is in need of these services’.372
Despite these regulations, the applicants in the A, B and C case complained about 
insufficient follow‑up care in Ireland after they had had abortions abroad. Doctors for 
Choice Ireland and the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS), who intervened 
as third parties in this case, also ‘[…] suggested that vital post‑abortion medical care 
and counselling in Ireland were randomly available and of poor quality due to a 
lack of training and the reluctance of women to seek care.’373 The Irish government 
disputed these submissions and submitted, inter alia, that the Irish College of GPs 
had reported that 95 per cent of doctors provided medical care after abortion.374 The 
ECtHR found no violation of the Convention in respect of follow‑up care after an 
abortion abroad.375
In respect of AHR treatment no such provision in respect of information or follow‑up 
care is made. Under the 2014 Bill advertisement for surrogacy was prohibited, 
however, such a prohibition does not necessarily exclude the provision of neutral 
information about foreign treatment options. In respect of follow‑up treatment for 
AHR treatment equally no specific provision is made in Irish law, nor in guidelines 
by the medical profession.
5.5.4.	 Cross‑border	surrogacy	under	Irish	law
Irish law does not provide for specific conflict‑of‑laws rules for cross‑border 
surrogacy cases. Further, although there have been reports of such cases being 
initiated,376 there have been very few published court judgments on the matter, as 
the Circuit Court, generally does not give written judgments. There are reportedly 
371 See www.abortionaftercare.ie, visited 22 May 2014.
372 Www.crisispregnancy.ie/about‑us/crisis‑pregnancy‑services, visited 23 May 2014. See also www.
abortionaftercare.ie, visited 22 May 2014.
373 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, paras. 121 and 207. Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) held in respect of the Irish situation in a 2010 report: ‘[…] many women struggle to 
access timely, accurate, and complete information about legal abortion services abroad. As a result, 
they experience delays in accessing care, which heightens the possibility of health complications from 
the intervention. The delays also contribute to the emotional distress that many women experience.’ 
Human Rights Watch 2010, supra n. 336, at p. 22. The report refers to ‘F. Gary Cunningham, Kenneth 
L Leveno, Williams Obstetrics (2005) Ch 9’, where it is reportedly held that ‘Abortion is generally a 
safe medical procedure if carried out under proper conditions. It is safest when provided within the 
first eight weeks of the pregnancy. As the pregnancy progresses, “[t]he relative risk of dying as the 
consequence of abortion approximately doubles for each 2 weeks after 8 weeks’ gestation”.’
374 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 122.
375 See more elaborately Ch. 2, section 2.2.3.
376 For example, it was reported in 2011 that High Court proceedings were brought by an Irishman and his 
wife, who was an EU citizen, in an effort to secure an Irish passport for their child who was born as a result 
of a surrogacy arrangement with a woman in Ukraine. Y. Daly, ‘Surrogacy difficulties’, humanrights.ie 
1 March 2011, www.humanrights.ie/children‑and‑the‑law/surrogacy‑difficulties/#more‑12454, visited 
15 May 2014.







numerous Orders of Declaration of Parentage and Guardianship orders but these are 
not accessible to the public.
Since 2012, some guidance for international surrogacy cases can be found, in the 
guidance document on cross‑border surrogacy cases that the Irish Department for 
Justice and Equality published in 2012 (see section 5.3.9 above).377 This document 
was intended to provide guidance as to the principles that will be applied by the Irish 
authorities in examining applications for a travel document on behalf of children 
born outside Ireland as a result of surrogacy arrangements. It was made clear that 
Irish authorities take a child‑centred approach to decision‑making in this area. The 
view was expressed that ‘[…] best interests and welfare of children [could] most 
effectively be secured when they [were] in the care of a guardian who [had] legal 
authority to take decisions, including medical decisions, on their behalf.’
The rule that ‘[g]enerally speaking, only a parent or guardian of a child may apply 
for a passport on his or her behalf’, can pose serious obstacles for intended parents 
who wish to acquire an Irish passport for their child if it was born to a foreign 
surrogate mother. As explained above (see section 5.3.9 above), under Irish law the 
birth mother – whether she is also the genetic mother or not – is considered the legal 
mother of the child. As explained in the guidance document:
‘Under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, the mother of a child born outside marriage 
is the child’s sole guardian. Under Irish law, family relationships and the rights and 
responsibilities that flow from them cannot be subjected to the ordinary law of contract and 
cannot, in particular, be transferred to another person, bought, or sold. This means that, 
under Irish law, the surrogate mother and the child will have a life‑long legal relationship 
with one another.’378
If the surrogate mother is married, her husband is presumed, by law, to be the father 
of the child,379 ‘unless the contrary is proved on the balance of probabilities.’380 The 
surrogate mother and the father will have joint guardianship over the child.
An intended father who is the genetic father of the child, can be recognised as the 
legal parent of the child, also if the surrogate mother is married. As explained in the 
guidance document:
‘Under domestic Irish law, this requires an application for a declaration of parentage 
to be made to the Circuit Court under Part VI of the Status of Children Act 1987. The 
Attorney General must be put on notice of any such application if it is to be binding 
upon State authorities. Application should also be made by the commissioning father for a 
guardianship order. The commissioning father will need to provide evidence of paternity 
377 Guidance document on cross‑border surrogacy cases (version November 2014). The guidance document 
was published online at www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/Surrogacy, visited 15 May 2014.
378 Idem, at p. 2.
379 Art. 46 of the Status of Children Act 1987.
380 Guidance document on cross‑border surrogacy cases (version November 2014), p. 2.







in support of this application. As a rule, the Irish authorities will require DNA evidence 
from a reliable source […] to support a claim by a commissioning parent that he is a 
father of a child. Steps will have to be taken to serve any court proceedings issued on the 
surrogate mother and on her husband.’381
If the surrogate mother is unmarried the legal parenthood of the intended father who 
is also the genetic father of the child, can be recognised by the Irish authorities on 
the basis of DNA evidence.
The next step for intended parents, is the obtaining of travel documents for the child. 
In this regard it was noted in the Guidance document:
‘In the best interests of the child and as a matter of best practice, a passport will be issued 
only where guardianship has been established but the Irish authorities may issue an 
Emergency Travel Certificate […] to enable the child to enter the State.’382
An application for an Emergency Travel Certificate (ETC) must be made by a parent 
or guardian on the child’s behalf. Only a genetic intended father can do so, after 
he has proven his genetic paternity on the basis of DNA evidence. The surrogate 
mother must consent to the granting of the travel document and if she is married, her 
husband’s consent is also required.
The same principles apply to an application for an Irish passport for a child born 
outside Ireland, whereby, moreover, it must be established that one of the parents (the 
surrogate mother or the genetic intended father) has Irish nationality.383 Hence, for 
non‑Irish intended fathers resident in Ireland, it impossible to get an Irish passport 
for the child. Also, these rules render it impossible for same‑sex couples consisting 
of two women, to obtain legal parenthood over a child born to a surrogate mother in 
another country, even if one of these women is the genetic mother of the child.
It was stressed in the guidance document that the Irish authorities could give 
no guarantees, before the birth of any particular child, that the child would be 
automatically regarded as an Irish citizen, that the intended parents would be 
regarded as parents or guardians of that child, and therefore that a passport or other 
travel document could be provided for that child. The document concluded with 
the strong advice that anybody considering becoming involved in an international 
surrogacy arrangement had to seek expert legal advice from a lawyer qualified in 
Ireland. Also, it was noted that the process could ‘[…] take some time and involve 
one or more applications to an Irish court.’
381 Idem, p. 3.
382 Idem, at p. 4.
383 As provided under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 as amended, and the Passports Act 
2008.







The only written judgment in an international surrogacy case was issued by the 
High Court in March 2013.384 In this case an Irish couple had concluded a surrogacy 
agreement in India. It concerned gestational surrogacy; an embryo had been created 
with the egg cell of an anonymous donor and the sperm of the intended father and 
had been implanted into the womb of the surrogate mother. Consequently a child 
was born in September 2010. It becomes clear from the judgment that an Emergency 
Travel Certificate had been issued in this case, but the subsequent application for an 
Irish passport for the child had been refused, because the intended father was not 
guardian over the child. The High Court was satisfied that the genetic paternity of 
the intended father had been established and that the child had been at all times in 
the care of both intended parents, who had occupied the role of holders of parental 
responsibility. The Court also considered it extremely unlikely that the surrogate 
mother would seek to play any role in relation to parental responsibility in the future. 
It was therefore ‘a matter of considerable urgency and in the best interests of the 
child’ that the child would obtain an Irish passport. The High Court appointed the 
intended father as guardian over the child and ordered that he be given the liberty to 
apply in the Circuit Court for a declaration of parentage.
After the family Relationships Bill had been published in January 2014, the 
Children’s Ombudsman warned that by ‘categorically ruling out the possibility of 
granting a declaration of parentage’ where intended parents had illegally entered 
into a commercial surrogacy agreement, the children concerned risked being left 
stateless.385 She held:
‘With regard to non‑commercial surrogacy, the proposed legislation does not address the 
recognition or otherwise of foreign surrogacy arrangements and/or court orders and the 
consequent parental status conferred on parties. Equally, the legislation does not address 
parental status under other types of assisted reproduction entered into abroad. These 
issues raise questions of European Union law and private international law which cannot 
be ignored. It may be that the legislature could enact regulations in a similar manner to 
statutory instruments that address the recognition of foreign same‑sex relationships. There 
have been numerous statutory instruments which have recognised that certain classes of 
foreign relationships are entitled to be recognised in the State as a civil partnership.’386
The Children’s Ombudsman accordingly recommended that a power was conferred 
on the Minister for Justice and Equality ‘[…] to recognise court orders relating to 
assisted reproduction or surrogacy from other jurisdictions that are compatible with 
384 High Court 5 March 2013, 2011 No. 68 CAF, unreported.
385 R. Mac Cormaic, ‘Ombudsman warns surrogacy law could leave children stateless’, 
theirishtimes.com 24 June 2014, www.irishtimes.com/news/crime‑and‑law/
ombudsman‑warns‑surrogacy‑law‑could‑leave‑children‑stateless‑1.1843869, visited 5 July 2014.
386 Advice of the Ombudsman for Children on the General Scheme of the Children and Family 
Relationships Bill 2014, May 2014, pp. 20–21, www.oco.ie/wp‑content/uploads/2014/06/OCO 
AdviceonChildandFamilyRelBill2014.pdf, visited June 2014. In respect of the statutory instruments 
that address the recognition of foreign same‑sex relationships, to which the Ombudsman refers, see 
ch. 11, section 11.4.4.







Irish law and public policy.’387 Also, children should not be the victim of any decisions 
made by the parents in this regard, the Ombudsman held. She recommended:
‘The General Scheme should retain a criminal sanction for those who engage in 
commercial surrogacy arrangements. The General Scheme should also provide for the 
legal consequences that arise for children born as a result of such arrangements; however, 
the Ombudsman for Children’s Office does not believe that declarations of parentage 
should be denied where this would leave the child born as a result of a commercial 
surrogacy arrangement in a vulnerable legal position.’388
As noted above at various occasions, the Revised Family Relationships Bill of 
September 2014, no longer made any provision for (cross‑border) surrogacy. As a 
result, couples and individuals who wish to engage in a surrogacy agreement in 
another country, have to resort to the guidance document referred to above, for any 
official guidance in this unregulated area.
5.6. conclusIons
While liberalising movements have taken place in most European States – including 
in the neighbouring UK – in recent decades, Ireland still firmly holds on to its 
restrictive abortion laws. The ban on abortion on medical and social grounds has 
not, however, remained unchallenged since its introduction. Pro‑choice campaigners 
and individuals affected by the ban have tried to obtain a lifting or at least relaxation 
of the Irish abortion laws both at national and European levels. They have had some 
success, but the effects have been limited. The procedures that have taken place 
before the ECtHR have led to amendments to the Irish abortion laws to the effect that 
the necessary preconditions for obtaining an abortion abroad have been enshrined 
in national law. At the same time, the Irish government has sought further exclusion 
from the influence of European law on domestic policy decisions in this field, through 
the adoption of Protocols to various EU Treaties.
The ECtHR’s judgment in the case of A, B and C v. Ireland (2010), prompted the 
adoption of legislation clarifying the existing restrictive abortion laws. Further 
action was taken after the tragic case of Mrs. Halappanavar, who died in a Galway 
hospital after having been refused an abortion. The Protection of Life During 
Pregnancy Act (2014) aimed to improve the procedural rights of women and has 
provided for more clarity for medical practitioners, but it has not brought about any 
material change. An abortion is still only allowed in Ireland if the life of the pregnant 
woman is endangered by the pregnancy. The ECtHR’s finding in the A, B and C 
case that Ireland’s ban on abortion for medical and social grounds did not violate the 
Convention, in combination with the awarding of a very wide margin of appreciation 
387 Idem, p. 21.
388 Idem, p. 25.







to Ireland in this case, render it most likely that the Court would also hold the latest 
Irish abortion laws to be in conformity with the ECHR.
The Irish abortion laws have been subject to strong criticism. It has been held 
that the Irish government had regulated abortion services through ‘delegation and 
doubt’.389 Some observed that the Irish restrictive abortion laws ‘merely exported 
the problem’390 and that Ireland has taken a ‘“not in our own back yard” attitude to 
abortion’.391 Wicks has spoken of ‘the blatant hypocrisy of the Irish solution’. She 
wondered how the right to travel abroad for an abortion could be tolerated, if the 
views of the Irish people, and the Irish state, were so profound and fundamental to 
the continuation of its democratic society.392 The Irish abortion policy has indeed 
often been referred to as an Irish solution to an Irish problem. This has annoyed 
others, who have pointed out that ‘if it [was] to be called a problem […] it [was] a 
world‑wide problem’.393 On the other hand, the Irish legislature has clearly proven 
itself not ready for any substantive liberalisation of the Irish abortion laws, and the 
pro‑life movement is, next to the pro‑choice movement, still very present in the 
public debate on the issue.394
The picture in respect of AHR treatment and surrogacy is somewhat different. 
Although AHR is a practical reality in Ireland – as is the case in many European 
States – it was long – and is mostly still – submerged in legal uncertainty. The Irish 
Courts unequivocally did not consider it the task of the judiciary to resolve this 
uncertainty (see section 5.3.1 above). It was therefore up to the Irish legislature to fill 
in the legal vacuum that continued to exist in Ireland as regards AHR and surrogacy. 
While the AHR Commission identified a need for such action as early as 2005, it was 
only in 2014 that first steps in this regard were taken.
In the meantime the demand for AHR treatment had not diminished – quite the 
contrary. AHR services are provided by private specialists and clinics only, and these 
services must be privately funded, apart from the fact that income tax relief applies. 
Because Irish fertility clinics and counsellors operated within a legal limbo and 
acted according to what they considered to be the boundaries of national law, they 
often referred patients to foreign clinics in jurisdictions where AHR was regulated 
more clearly, or where waiting lists were simply shorter, treatments were cheaper 
and/or more donors were available (see section 5.4).
The 2014 Children and Family Relations Bill provided for regulation of a number 
of AHR related issues. While initially not foreseen, its revised version provided 
389 M. Fox and T. Murphy, ‘Irish Abortion: Seeking Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt and Delegation’, 
19 Journal of Law and Society (1992) p. 454. See also McGuinness 2011, supra n. 127, at p. 476.
390 Sherlock 1989, supra n. 10.
391 Schweppe 2001, supra n. 43, at p. 155.
392 E. Wicks, ‘A, B, C v Ireland: Abortion Law under the European Convention on Human Rights‘, 11 
HRLR (2011) p. 556 at p. 563.
393 Fox and Murphy 1992, supra n. 389, at p. 456.
394 ‘Thousands turn out for Pro‑Life vigil in Dublin’, 8 June 2014, thejournal.ie, www.thejournal.ie/
pro‑life‑vigil‑for‑life‑dublin‑942833‑Jun2013, visited 24 June 2014.







for a right to know one’s genetic origins in gametes donation cases. The proposed 
surrogacy legislation, on the contrary, was removed from the revised version of the 
Bill. Other matters, such as PGD, are still unregulated in the Irish jurisdiction.
Couples from Ireland that engage in cross‑border surrogacy may encounter serious 
difficulties in establishing parental links with the child. Some guidance has been 
given by the Irish Department for Justice and Equality as to the principles that will 
be applied by the Irish authorities in examining applications for travel documents 
on behalf of children born outside Ireland as a result of surrogacy arrangements. It 
is however, uncertain as to how these principles apply if commercial surrogacy is 
concerned. Moreover, the policy is only helpful in cases where the intended father is 
the genetic father of the child (see section 5.5.4 above).
The importance that has been attached to genetic parenthood under Irish law has 
varied. It was because of his genetic parenthood, and the interests of the child in 
establishing contact with his genetic father, that a sperm donor was granted access 
to his child in McD v. L & Anor. In surrogacy cases the genetic parenthood of the 
intended father may be ground for recognising him as the legal father of the child. 
The genetic parenthood of an intended mother, on the other hand, does not have any 
effect in law.
All in all, an interesting picture has emerged from this chapter. While the protection 
of the unborn life under the Irish Constitution (which commences from the moment 
of implantation) has been the rationale behind very restrictive abortion laws, the 
rights of the child, on the other hand, have mainly been ground for regulating certain 
AHR practices and for the granting of travel documents in cross‑border surrogacy 
cases. Generally, however, a legal limbo regarding AHR and surrogacy still exists.









At the outset it must be noted that the Dutch Constitution is not a very ‘strong’ 
Constitution1 and as a result its prominence in respect of Dutch standard‑setting 
in reproductive matters has been fairly modest. Hereafter first two Articles of the 
Constitution that are of relevance for reproductive matters are discussed, after which 
the rights of the (future) child; the status of the unborn under Dutch law and the right 
to know one’s genetic parents are discussed.
6.1.1.	 The	right	to	respect	for	private	life	(Article	10)	and	the	right	to	
inviolability	of	the	person	(Article	11)
Two Articles in the Dutch Constitution are particularly relevant for reproductive 
matters. Article 10(1) of the Dutch Constitution provides that everyone has a right 
to respect for his private life (‘eerbiediging van zijn persoonlijke levenssfeer’), 
without prejudice to restrictions laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament. 
The Constitutional legislature explained that this right aimed to guarantee personal 
freedom, without interference by others.2 The subsequent Article 11 (the right to 
inviolability of the person) is generally perceived as the lex specialis of Article 10.3 
Article 11 reads:
‘Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of his person, without prejudice to 
restrictions laid down by or pursuant to Act of Parliament.’4
This right has been primarily perceived as a negative right. It grants two sub‑rights: 
everyone has a right to be protected from interferences with his physical integrity 
and everyone has the right to freely decide upon his own body (the right to 
1 See also ch. 1, section 1.4.
2 Kamerstukken II 1975/76, no. 13872, nos. 1–5, p. 41.
3 J. Gerards et al., ‘Zelfbeschikking in de Nederlandse Grondwet’ [‘Personal autonomy in the Dutch 
Constitution’], in: Achtergrondstudies Zelfbeschikking in de zorg [Backgroundstudies on Personal 
autonomy in health care], Reeks evaluatie regelgeving: deel 35 (Den Haag, ZonMw 2013) p. 88, 
referring (in footnote 260) to B.C. van Beers, Persoon en lichaam in het recht. Menselijke waardigheid 
en zelfbeschikking in het tijdperk van biotechnologie [Person and body under the law. Human dignity 
and personal autonomy in the era of biotechnology] (Den Haag, Boom 2009) p. 126.
4 Translations of the Constitution by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, online available at 
www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten‑en‑publicaties/brochures/2008/10/20/the‑constitution‑of‑the‑ 
kingdom‑of‑the‑netherlands‑2008.html, visited June 2014.







self‑determination).5 From this a requirement of informed consent follows, which 
has been very important in Dutch medical/ethical standard‑setting.6
The Constitutional legislature expressly left it to the legislature and the courts to 
give (more) concrete interpretation to these rights.7 These rights consequently do not 
play a very prominent role in Dutch debate and law on reproductive matters. This 
is reinforced by the fact that self‑executing International Law standards have direct 
effect in the Dutch legal order,8 while Courts cannot review the constitutionality of 
acts of parliaments.9 In practice, Dutch courts tend to examine the compatibility of 
statutory law with International Treaty law, with the general effect that the ECHR has 
come to serve as a kind of shadow constitution.10 Consequently, when in Dutch case 
law and academic literature the question is discussed whether a right to procreate 
exists, reference is generally made to Articles 8 and 12 ECHR and the nuanced 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR on this issue, as set out in Chapter 2.11
6.1.2.	 The	rights	of	the	(future)	child
The Dutch Constitution does not contain a specific provision – comparable to 
Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) – that establishes the 
principle of best interests of the child as a primary consideration in all actions and 
decisions affecting children.12 However, as goes for many fundamental rights issues, 
the relevant international standards have played and continue to play a prominent 
role in the Dutch legal order. In 1997 a Dutch District Court ruled for the first time 
that Article 3 CRC has direct effect in the Dutch legal order and can thus be invoked 
in proceedings before the Dutch courts.13 This means that Dutch authorities have 
to put the best interests of the child first in any law‑making, policy decisions and 
judicial decisions. Children’s rights have received increasingly more attention in 
Dutch politics and academia over the past decades, partly thanks to the lobby and 
5 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 463, nos. 1–2, p. 5.
6 Gerards et al. 2013, supra n. 3, at p. 86, referring to Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 16086, no. 3, p. 7.
7 Idem, at p. 93.
8 Art. 93 of the Dutch Constitution.
9 Art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution reads: ‘Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be 
applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or of resolutions by international 
institutions that are binding on all persons.’
10 J.H. Gerards & M. Claes, ‘National report – The Netherlands’, in: J. Laffranque (ed.), The Protection 
of Fundamental Rights Post‑Lisbon: The Interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutions, Reports of 
the XXV FIDE Congress Tallinn, Vol. 1 (Tartu, Tartu University Press 2012) pp. 613–677.
11 See, for example, M. Eijkholt, ‘Het recht op procreatie: voldragen of in statu nascendi?’ [‘The right to 
procreate: carried to term or in statu nascendi?’], 31 Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht (2007) p. 2 and 
A.C. Hendriks, ‘Het recht op voortplanting en zijn grenzen. Redactioneel’ [‘The right to procreate and 
its limitations. Editorial’], 36 Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht (2012) p. 279.
12 This matter was also not discussed by the State Commission on the Constitution [Staatscommissie 
Grondwet] in its report of November 2010. Staatscommissie Grondwet, Rapport Staatscommissie 
Grondwet, Annex to Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 31570 no. 17.
13 Rb. Utrecht 26 March 1997 and 10 December 1997, NJ 1999 No. 462, ECLI:NL: 
RBUTR:1997:AC1768.







work of NGOs specialised in the area, such as Defence for Children and Unicef 
Nederland.14
6.1.3.	 The	status	of	the	unborn	under	Dutch	law
Under Dutch law, the unborn does not individually bear rights; only as of birth is 
a child a bearer of rights. The Dutch Constitution does not contain any provision 
which explicitly sees at the unborn. In fact, it does not even contain a specific Article 
on the right to life.15 This does not mean, however, that the unborn does not enjoy 
protection under Dutch law. The protection of human life is an important principle 
in medical‑ethical decision‑making.16 It is considered to be always at stake if unborn 
life is concerned. From the moment of nidation,17 the foetus enjoys a special status, 
the so‑called ‘status nascendi’.18 In medical‑legal doctrine, the theory of ‘groeiende 
beschermenswaardigheid’ – the idea that the more the unborn develops, the more 
worthy of protection it is – finds general support.19 Article 1:2 Civil Code (Burgerlijk 
Wetboek, BW) provides that ‘[a] child of which a woman is pregnant, is regarded to 
have been born already as often as its interests require so.’ This entails, inter alia, 
that an unborn child can be placed under guardianship (‘voogdij’)20 or temporary 
supervision (‘voorlopige ondertoezichtstelling’),21 if the responsible authorities fear 
for the development and health of the unborn.22
14 Since 1995 these NGOs are united in the Kinderrechtencollectief [Children’s rights Collective]. See 
www.kinderrechten.nl, visited 15 September 2014.
15 This right is protected by Arts. 2 ECHR, 2 CFR and 6 ICCPR, which have direct effect in the Dutch 
legal order. Further, Art. 114 of the Dutch Constitution provides that ‘[c]apital punishment may not be 
imposed.’ Five out of ten members of the Dutch State Commission for the Review of the Constitution 
recommended that the right to life were included in the Dutch Constitution. This recommendation was, 
however, not followed‑up by the legislature. State Commission for the Review of the Constitution 2010, 
supra n. 12, at p. 65.
16 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30 800 XVI, no. 183 and Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 29323, no. 46.
17 The status of conception before nidation (by Leenen referred to as ‘status potentialis’) is not regulated 
under Dutch law. See H.J.J. Leenen, ‘De gezondheidsrechtelijke status van het embryo’ [‘The status of 
the embryo in medical law’], in J.K.M. Gevers and H.J.J. Leenen (eds.), Rechtsvragen rond voortplanting 
en erfelijkheid [Legal questions surrounding human reproduction and heredity] (Deventer, Kluwer 
1986) p. 14.
18 Idem, at pp. 13–14.
19 Inter alia H.J.J. Leenen, Handboek Gezondheidsrecht [Handbook Medical Law], 2nd edn. (Alphen aan 
de Rijn, Samson 1988) p. 128; D.M. Fernhout, Rechtsvragen rond in vitro fertilisatie en embryo‑transfer 
[Questions of law on in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer] (Arnhem, Gouda Quint 1992) p. 5 and 
Th.A.M. te Braake, ‘De juridische status van het embryo: een stevig aangemeerde leer’ [‘The legal 
status of the embryo, a firmly anchored doctrine’], 19 Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht (1995) p. 32. 
Critical was, however, W. van der Burg, ‘De juridische ‘status’ van het embryo: een op drift geraakte 
fictie’ [‘The legal ‘status’ of the embryo: a drifting fiction’], 18 Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 
(1994) p. 129. The theory of the ‘groeiende beschermenswaardigheid’ of the unborn is clearly reflected 
in the Dutch abortion legislation, as set out in section 6.2 below.
20 E.g. Rb. Roermond 26 June 2009, ECLI:NL:RBROE:2009:BJ0644 and Rb. Rotterdam 9 May 2006, 
ECLI:NL:RBROT:2006:AX2185.
21 E.g. Rb. Groningen 27 April 2010, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2010:BM3904; Rb. Dordrecht, 
7 February 2012, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:2012:BV6246 and Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage 7 October 2008, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG0849.
22 A still‑born child is deemed to have never existed. Art. 1:2 (second sentence) BW.







Like in all medical‑ethical issues the legislature’s decision‑making in respect of 
abortion and AHR treatment is furthermore guided by the principles of human dignity, 
personal autonomy of the patient and good health care (‘goede zorg’).23 Particularly 
in AHR cases, the best interests of the future child are, furthermore, an important 
guiding principle, as will be set out in section 6.3. Again, these principles are not 
included in the Dutch Constitution,24 but are considered general medical ethical 
principles and general principles of law, which are furthermore (partly) codified in 
International Treaties, such as the ECHR and the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.25
6.1.4. The right to know one’s genetic parents
In 1994, in the Valkenhorst case,26 the Dutch Supreme Court for the first time defined 
a right to know one’s genetic parents (‘het recht om te weten van welke ouders men 
afstamt’). The case concerned a woman who wished to know more about her genetic 
father, while her mother did not want to reveal his identity. The institution that had 
provided care to the mother right after she gave birth, did have more information 
about the father though, but refused to give the woman access to it as it relied on 
its duty of confidentiality towards its client, the mother. The Supreme Court ruled 
in this case that the plaintiff had a right to be informed by the institution about her 
genetic father, on the basis of the right to know one’s genetic parents.
The Court derived the right to know one’s genetic parents from the general 
personality right that was underlying the right to respect for private life; the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the freedom of speech, which are all 
included in both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Dutch 
Constitution.27 The Court thereby referred to both Article 7 of the International 
Convention for the Rights of the Child28 and to case law of the ECtHR, namely the 
Gaskin case.29
23 Kamerstukken II 2006/07 30 800 XVI, no. 183; Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 29323 no. 46 and 
Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no. 3, p. 5.
24 The State Commission for the Review of the Constitution [‘Staatscommissie Grondwet’] recommended 
in 2010 to include a general clause in the Dutch Constitution, one paragraph of which would read: 
‘The State respects and guarantees human dignity, fundamental rights and fundamental principles’. 
Untill the day this research was concluded (31 July 2014), this recommendation had however not been 
followed up by the Dutch constitutional legislature. Staatscommissie Grondwet, supra n. 12, at p. 40.
25 Following Arts. 93 and 94 of the Constitution provisions of Internation Treaties which are binding on 
all persons by virtue of their contents have direct effect and take precedence over conflicting statutory 
regulations.
26 HR 15 April 1994, NJ 1994 No. 608, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC1337 with case‑note by 
W.C.E. Hammerstein‑Schoonderwoerd.
27 Idem, para. 3.2.
28 Art. 7(1) CRC provides: ‘The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right 
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be 
cared for by his or her parents.’
29 ECtHR [GC] 7 July 1989, Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, no. 10454/83, as discussed in ch. 2 section 2.1.4.







The Court acknowledged that the right to know one’s genetic parents was not absolute 
and had to be balanced with the rights and freedoms of others. The Court was also 
quite firm, however, that the right of the child had to prevail over the right of the 
mother to keep that information disclosed from her child, a right that was covered 
by the right to respect for private life. The Court stressed the ‘vital importance’ of 
this right for the child and held that its precedence was justified by the fact that the 
mother was partly responsible for the existence of the child. The Court remarked in 
this context that it was important to note that the case at hand did not concern donor 
insemination.
Since the year 2004 there is legislation in place that provides for protection of the 
right to know one’s genetic parents in the context of gamete donation. The exact 
conditions under which this right can be effectuated are extensively discussed in 
section 6.3.2 below.
6.2. dutch AbortIon legIslAtIon
The Dutch abortion legislation takes a primarily procedural approach. Under the 
Dutch law as currently in force, abortion is in principle lawful until the 24th week 
of pregnancy. The interests of the unborn child are in practice protected through a 
set of procedural requirements, which provide the decision‑making procedure with 
the necessary guarantees.30 The Dutch abortion legislation is aimed at ensuring that 
every decision to terminate a pregnancy is taken carefully and is only carried out 
if the emergency situation of the woman renders such termination inescapable.31 
Further, the treatment must be given by a medical practitioner in a hospital or clinic 
which is licensed to provide such treatment under the Termination of Pregnancy 
Act (Wet afbreking zwangerschap, Waz).32 Abortion in a later stadium of pregnancy 
is criminalised,33 but may exceptionally be exempted from punishment (see 6.2.2 
below).
30 Commissie evaluatie regelgeving, Evaluatie Wet afbreking zwangerschap [Evaluation Termination of 
Pregnancy Act] (Enschede 2005) pp. 12 en 36, online available at www.ngva.net/downloads/WAZ_
evaluatie_Definitieve_webversie_b.pdf, visited June 2014.
31 See inter alia Art. 5(1) Waz.
32 Act of 1 May 1981, Stb. 1981, 257, entry into force per 1 November 1984. Hence, this fifth paragraph 
functions as a statutory defence (ground for exemption from criminal liability). Paras. 2–4 of this 
Article provide for aggravating circumstances.
33 Art. 296(1) Sr provides: ‘Any person who provides treatment which he knows, or could reasonably 
suspect, might terminate a pregnancy is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding four years and 
six months or a fourth category fine.’







6.2.1. Early legislative developments
The Criminal Code of 1881 penalised abortion.34 Both the pregnant woman who 
carried out an abortion or who gave permission for having an abortion carried out, and 
the person carrying out an abortion (the abortionist) were liable to punishment. The 
maximum penalty to be imposed was dependent on whether the woman had given 
her consent to the termination, whether the abortionist was a medical practitioner 
and whether the termination resulted in the woman’s death.35 In a judgment of 1897 
the Supreme Court had ruled that there was only criminal liability if the termination 
of a pregnancy concerned a foetus which was alive at the moment of termination.36 
Because this was practically impossible to prove, there were hardly any criminal 
convictions on the basis of these provisions.37
Following an amendment of the Criminal Code of 1911, it was no longer necessary 
to prove that the foetus was still alive at the time of the pregnancy termination.38 
This resulted in a certain increase in the number of prosecutions for abortions.39 
Nevertheless, a termination of pregnancy was permitted only in case a so‑called 
‘medical indication’ (‘medische indicatie’) was present.40 According to the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the 1881 Penal Code, this requirement was met if the 
life of the woman was endangered by the pregnancy.41
From the mid‑20th century onwards, fundamental societal changes took place, as 
a result of which abortion became the subject of public debate. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, opinions on issues like sexuality, marriage, pregnancy, preconception 
and family building changed.42 In the words of the Dutch government:
‘Abortion became the subject of public debate in the second half of the 1960s in the context 
of several far wider issues. The availability of oral contraceptives and sterilisation had 
34 Arts. 295 to 298 Sr (old), Act of 3 March 1881, entry into force 1 September 1886, Stb. 1886, 64. 
Before 1881 the Code Pénal contained provisions concerning abortion. See Commissie evaluatie 
regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, at p. 23.
35 Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, at pp. 23–24.
36 HR 24 May 1897, W 6978, as referred to in P.F. van der Heijden, ‘Juridisch voorspel tot de abortus 
ontwerpen’ [‘Legal prelude to the abortion plans’], 13 Nederlands jurstenblad (1976) p. 425 at p. 426.
37 Heijden, van der 1976, supra n. 36, at p. 426 and Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, at 
p. 24.
38 Art. 251bis Sr (old), Stb. 1911, 130.
39 Before 1911 there were only a couple of prosecutions per year, whereas after 1911 the number of 
convictions on the ground of Art. 251 bis Sr (old) slowly increased (with some fluctuations), starting 
with 24 in the year 1912, to 79 in the year 1920. See J. Outshoorn, De politieke strijd rondom de 
abortuswetgeving in Nederland 1964–1984 [The political fight surrounding abortion legislation in 
the Netherlands 1964–1984] (’s‑Gravenhage, VUGA 1986), pp. 84 and 330. For more statistics, see 
section 6.2.4 below.
40 See inter alia Ch.J. Enschedé, ‘Abortus op medische indicatie en strafrecht’ [‘Abortion on the basis of 
a medical indication and criminal law’], 41 Nederlands juristenblad, Njb (1966) p. 1109 at p. 1114 and 
Heijden, van der 1976, supra n. 36, at p. 427 who refers to the Parliamentary discussions about abortion 
before the 1911 amendment.
41 See Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, at p. 27.
42 See Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 11.







paved the way for family planning, people’s attitudes to sex were changing, the influence 
of the church had declined and abortion had been legalised in Great Britain. At the same 
time, economic growth in the Netherlands had raised the standard of living, and the 
population as a whole was more highly educated.’43
The possible harmful effects of an unintended pregnancy on the social well‑being 
and personal development of the woman were recognised and the view that – within 
certain limits – abortion was a right of the woman, received increasing support.44 
Accordingly, from the beginning of the seventies, voices were raised to amend the 
existing restrictive abortion legislation.45
The call for a change of legislation was also produced by developments in the case 
law. The Dutch courts brought an increasing number of situations under the notion 
‘medical indication’ and by doing so they gave a wider meaning to this notion than 
a danger to the woman’s life only, as originally foreseen by the legislature. The first 
step in this direction was taken in 1942 when District Court Amsterdam ruled that a 
risk of suicide constituted a medical indication justifying an abortion.46 Soon after, 
the physical and mental condition of the woman in a broader sense were accepted as 
medical indications.47 It took until the 1970s, though, before also social factors were 
accepted as grounds for abortion.48
Because of these developments in the case law and the fact that medical profession 
was divided over the definition of the notion ‘medical indication’,49 the monitoring and 
enforcement of the Dutch abortion legislation had become practically impossible.50 
Enforcement of the legislation was furthermore complicated by medical practitioners 
who refused to provide details on their professional activities to the health inspection 
43 Communications Department, Corporate Communications and Public Diplomacy Division of the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A Abortion in The Netherlands (August 2011), online available 
at www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/minbuza/en/import/en/you_and_the_netherlands/about_
the_netherlands/ethical_issues/qa‑abortus‑en‑2011.pdf, visited April 2013.
44 J. de Bruijn, Geschiedenis van de abortus in Nederland: een analyse van opvattingen en discussies 
1600–1979 [History of abortion in the Netherlands; an analysis of views and debates 1600–1979] 
(Amsterdam, Van Gennep 1979) pp. 185–187, as referred to by Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, 
supra n. 30, at p. 25 (footnote 15).
45 Outshoorn 1986, supra n. 39, at p. 13.
46 Rb. Amsterdam 5 February 1942, NJ 1942 No. 244.
47 Rb. Amsterdam 20 January 1949, NJ 1949 No. 586. See Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra 
n. 30, at p. 27. See also the report of the so‑called Commission ‘Abortion question’ (‘Commissie 
Abortusvraagstuk’) Kamerstukken II, 1971, 11321, no. 2, p. 3, which explains that while the notion 
‘medical indication’ was first considered to refer to a somatic indication only, later also psychological 
factors were accepted as medical indication.
48 Rb. Amsterdam 8 July 1976, NJ 1977 No. 477, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:1976:AC0431. See the report of the 
Commission ‘Abortion question’ 1971, supra n. 47, at p. 3. The Court ruled that it was for the medical 
practitioner to judge ‘on good grounds’(‘op goede gronden’) if a medical indication was present. In 
1953 the Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam rejected a social indication as justification for an 
abortion. Rb. Amsterdam 26 March 1953, NJ 1953 No. 377. See also Heijden, van der 1976, supra n. 36, 
at p. 427.
49 Outshoorn 1986, supra n. 39, at p. 292.
50 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 9 and Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra 
n. 30, p. 27.







by referring to the legal duty of confidentiality.51 The resulting mismatch between 
legislation and practice created legal uncertainty. Nevertheless, as a result of the 
enforcement difficulties, a rather large‑scale abortion practice had developed in the 
Netherlands.52 In the year 1970, the national Stimezo Foundation (the foundation 
for medically safe pregnancy terminations, Stichting medisch verantwoorde 
zwangerschapsonderbreking) established its first abortion clinic.53 Many clinics were 
opened in the following years. The abortions provided by these clinics were, strictly 
speaking, illegal, but were tolerated by the authorities as long as certain quality 
standards were met. The Dutch abortion clinics treated a considerable number of 
women, amongst whom were many from neighbouring countries. For example, it 
was reported that in the year 1977 approximately 65,000 women were treated in 
Dutch abortion clinics, of whom about two thirds were women from the German 
Federal Republic (see also section 6.4.1.1 below).54
As a result of all these developments, revision of the abortion legislation was 
considered inevitable; it was held, even by governing parties, to be the only possible 
answer to the existing mismatch between legislation and practice and the resulting 
legal uncertainty and enforcement difficulties.55 The first bills to the effect of an 
amendment of the existing abortion legislation were tabled in the early 1970s.56 
Serious controversy in Parliament, however, meant that it took another decade before 
any new abortion legislation was adopted. Abortion was considered ‘extremely 
controversial’, evoking ‘deep emotions’.57 There were confessional parties who held 
that human life was always to be protected, no matter its stage of development, while 
other parties felt that abortion was first of all a matter that fell within the woman’s 
right to self‑determination.58 Not only was there serious controversy whether the 
abortion ban had to at all be levied, there was also no consensus on the content of 
any new abortion regulation. It was, for instance, debated whether legislation had to 
define the indications for abortion and there was debate about the role of doctors in 
abortion cases.59 Because there were so many different approaches proposed, it was 
feared that none of the tabled bills would reach the required majority in Parliament, 
51 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 9.
52 Outshoorn 1986, supra n. 39, at p. 14.
53 See www.mildred‑rutgershuis.nl/historie.htm, visited April 2013. On this website it is explained that 
Stimezo was founded by a group of general practitioners who felt that it was not right that women had 
to go to England for the termination of a pregnancy. The clinic was financed with funds raised during 
a campaign on national television.
54 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 14, referring to ‘E. Ketting and P. Schnabel, De 
abortus‑hulpverlening in 1977’. For more statistics, reference is made to section 6.4.1.1 below.
55 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, pp. 9 and 15.
56 Kamerstukken II 1969/70, 10719, no. 1; Kamerstukken II 1971/72, 11890, no. 1; Kamerstukken II 
1974/75, 11890, no. 6; Kamerstukken II 1974/75, 13253, no. 1; Kamerstukken II 1974/75, 13302, no. 1 
and Kamerstukken II 1975/76, 13 909, no. 1, as referred to in Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, 
pp. 11–12. See also the report of the so‑called Commission ‘Abortion question’ (supra n. 47), which 
concluded yet in 1971 that the existing legislation had to be amended.
57 Handelingen I 1976/77, 14 December 1976, p. 136.
58 E.g. Kamerstukken II 1975/76, 13909, no. 5. For a profound study of the relevant Dutch debate, see 
Outshoorn 1986, supra n. 39. It must be noted, that there was also clear disagreement on the matter 
within (confessional) political parties. See Handelingen I 1976/77, 14 December 1976, p. 135.
59 E.g. Kamerstukken II, 1975/76, 13909, no. 5, pp. 3 and 11.







as a result of which the existing impasse would not be lifted.60 After a ‘compromise 
bill’ was outvoted by the Senate in the year 1976,61 a new government tabled a bill 
in the Parliamentary year 1978–1979. The initiating Ministers of Justice and Health 
held that abortion practice and abortion legislation had completely drifted apart and 
that the controversy around abortion formed a ‘continuing burden for the Dutch 
political and mental climate’.62 The Ministers considered that the changed views 
in society in respect to pregnancy termination rendered an amendment of the law 
inescapable.63 In 1981 the Pregnancy Termination Act (Wet afbreking Zwangerschap 
(Waz))64 was adopted with the smallest possible majority.65 Under strong influence 
of the anti‑abortion campaign, there was disagreement about the implementation 
of the Act, as a result of which it entered into force only more than three years 
later, in November 1984.66 The Act was accompanied by an Implementing Order 
on Pregnancy Termination (Besluit Afbreking Zwangerschap).67 The Pregnancy 
Termination Act was officially evaluated for the first time in the year 2005.68 On the 
basis of that evaluation report, the at the time responsible Ministers saw no reason 
for amendment of the Act.69
6.2.2.	 The	Pregnancy	Termination	Act	(1981)
The 1981 Pregnancy Termination Act amended various existing laws, including the 
Criminal Code. The legislature attached value to maintaining abortus provocatus 
as separate criminal offence under the Criminal Code, as it gave expression to 
the protection offered to the unborn human life.70 Since the entry into force of the 
Pregnancy Termination Act, paragraph 1 of Article 296 of the Dutch Criminal Code 
reads:
‘A person who subjects a woman to treatment, where he knows or should reasonably 
suspect that by doing so pregnancy may be terminated, is liable to a term of imprisonment 
of not more than four years and six months or a fine of the fourth category.’71
60 Kamerstukken II 1975/76, 13 909, nos. 1–3, pp. 11–12.
61 Handelingen I 1976/77, 14 December 1976, p. 194.
62 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, pp. 13 and 15.
63 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 24.
64 Act of 1 May 1981, Stb. 1981, 257, entry into force per 1 November 1984.
65 Parliament (Tweede Kamer) adopted the bill with 76 against 74 votes, the Senate (Eerste Kamer) 
with 38 to 37 votes. See Handelingen II 1980/81, p. 2316 and Handelingen I 1980/81, p. 82. See also 
Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, at p. 28 and Outshoorn 1986, supra n. 39, at pp. 13 
and 272.
66 Outshoorn 1986, supra n. 39, at pp. 277–289.
67 Order of 17 May 1984, Stb. 1984, 356.
68 Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30.
69 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 371, no. 2, p. 4.
70 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 21.
71 Translation by L. Rayar and S. Wadsworth, The Dutch Penal Code (Colorado, Fred B. Rothman 
&Co Littleton 1997) p. 201. The Pregnancy Termination Act ended the criminal punishability of the 
woman, under the until that time existing Art. 295 Criminal Code. Since that time, the woman is only 
punishable if the child may reasonably be presumed capable of surviving independently of the mother. 







Paragraph 5 of this Article provides that the act referred to in the first paragraph 
is not an offence if the treatment is given by a medical practitioner in a hospital or 
clinic which is licensed to provide such treatment under the Pregnancy Termination 
Act.72 This statutory defence (‘strafuitsluitingsgrond’) does not apply in situations 
where an aggravating circumstance applies73 or in case the pregnancy has yet lasted 
more than 24 weeks.74 The latter is so, because Article 82a of the Criminal Code 
clarifies that the killing of a foetus which may reasonably be presumed capable of 
surviving independently of the mother, amounts to the criminal offence of taking 
of the life of another person or of a child during or shortly after birth.75 Hence, the 
killing of a viable foetus is qualified as homicide.76 Expert opinion considers a foetus 
to be viable at 24 weeks and consequently 24 weeks is the absolute limit for the 
termination of a pregnancy.77 Termination of pregnancy after 24 weeks of pregnancy 
(a so‑called ‘late abortion’) is exempted from punishment only in cases of force 
majeure (‘overmacht’). Such force majeure is considered to exist if there are reasons 
to believe that – despite the duration of the pregnancy – the foetus is not yet viable; in 
case the emergency situation of the woman has a medical cause; or in case the foetus 
has been diagnosed with abnormalities which would result in a life with serious and 
incurable suffering.78
This was established by the inclusion of a new Article (Art. 82 Sr) in the Criminal Code (See Art. II (A) 
and (D) of the Bill Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, pp. 22 and 32–34).
72 Any doctor who refers a pregnant woman to an illegal abortion clinic is accessory to the act criminalised 
in Art. 296 Sr. See C. van Oort, Commentaar op Wetboek van Strafrecht, art. 296 [Commentary to the 
Criminal Code, Article 296] (OpMaat Sdu 2012).
73 Art. 296(2), (3) and (4) Sr.
74 See Van Oort 2012, supra n. 72.
75 Art. 82a Sr reads: ‘‘Taking a person’s life or the life of an infant at birth or shortly afterwards’ includes 
the destruction of a fetus which might be reasonably presumed to have a viable chance of existence 
independent of the mother’s body.’ Translation by Rayar and Wadsworth 1997, supra n. 71, at p. 107.
76 HR 29 May 1990, NJ 1991 No. 217, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:ZC8539 para. 5.3.2 and Commissie evaluatie 
regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, p. 31.
77 Yet at the time of the drafting of the Pregnancy Termination Act, viability of the foetus was presumed 
from the 24th week of pregnancy. See Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 33. See also HR 
29 May 1990, NJ 1991 No. 217, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:ZC8539. In 2010 discussion arose in media and 
parliament on the question whether the time limit had to be brought back to, for example, 22 weeks 
of pregnancy. This debate arose after the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Kindergeneeskunde (NVK) 
[Dutch Association for Paediatrics] and the Nederlandse Vereniging voor Obstetrie en Gynaecologie 
(NVOG) [Dutch Association for Obstetrics and Gynaecology] published new professional guidelines to 
the effect that premature born between 24 and 25 weeks of pregnancy were actively kept alive and were 
treated. Richtlijn Perinataal Beleid bij Extreme Vroeggeboorte [Guideline perinatal policy in case of 
extreme premature birth], online available at www.nvk.nl/Nieuws/Dossiers/DossierRichtlijn24weken.
aspx, visited June 2014. The NVK and the NVOG denounced the allegations that these guidelines 
implicated a lowering of the viability time limit of the foetus. See ‘Reactie NVK op geluiden in de 
politiek om de abortusgrens te verlagen n.a.v. de richtlijn extreme vroeggeboorte’ [‘Reaction NVK 
to abortion discussion following the Guideline extreme premature birth’] of 21 February 2011, online 
available at www.nvk.nl/Nieuws/Dossiers/DossierRichtlijn24weken.aspx, visited May 2011. In 2011 
the Minister of Health informed Parliament that following consultations with medical experts she saw 
no reason to amend the existing legislation and policy. Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 30 371, no. 21.
78 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 717, no. 1 and Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, pp. 21–22. 
See also J.W. Wladimiroff and G.C.M.L. Christiaens, ‘Het rapport ‘Late zwangerschapsafbreking: 
zorgvuldigheid en toetsing’ van de overleggroep Late Zwangerschapsafbreking’ [‘The Report ‘Late 
pregnancy termination: care and examination’ of the consultation group Late pregnancy termination’], 
142 Nederlands Tijdschrijft voor Geneeskunde (1998) p. 2627.







The aim of the Pregnancy Termination Act is ‘[…] to balance two potentially 
conflicting interests: on the one hand protecting the life of the unborn child, and on 
the other helping women who are in a difficult position as a result of an unwanted 
pregnancy.’79 Abortion is seen as a measure that can only be justified by an 
emergency situation for the woman.80 Further, the decision to terminate a pregnancy 
must be taken with due regard for the individual circumstances of each case.81 The 
legislature considered it impossible to set a general norm defining when abortion 
would be lawful or unlawful, as it considered the emergency and distress situations 
in which an abortion could be considered to be very diverse.82 Instead, the legislature 
chose to set standards ‘[…] in the form of a set of requirements designed to guarantee 
that the decision to terminate is taken with all due care.’83 The legislature considered 
it the State’s responsibility to provide for such guarantees, while the woman and the 
medical practitioner involved in the procedure each have their own responsibility 
for the actual decision to terminate a pregnancy. According to the legislature the 
responsibility of the woman and the medical practitioner for such decision could 
only be done justice if the public authorities ensured that certain conditions were 
met. Therefore, abortions may only be carried out in licensed clinics and hospitals, a 
reflection period must be observed84 and medical after care must be provided.85 The 
various relevant conditions are explained in further detail in the subsections below. 
First, however, the scope of the Act is further clarified.
6.2.2.1. The scope of the Pregnancy Termination Act
The Termination of Pregnancy Act does not define any statutory time limit 
for pregnancy termination, but – as explained above – the absolute limit for the 
termination of a pregnancy is set at the point in time where the foetus may reasonably 
be presumed capable of surviving independently of the mother.86 While expert opinion 
thus considers a foetus to be viable at 24 weeks,87 in practice, ‘[…] most doctors will 
perform the procedure no later than 22 weeks into the pregnancy, because of the 
margin of error of ultrasound scans and to be sure they remain within the statutory 
time limit’.88 Late abortions in situations in which the foetus is in principle viable, 
79 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 17 and www.english.minvws.nl/en/themes/abortion/
default.asp, visited April 2012. See also Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, at p. 11. 
This Commission concluded in 2005 that this aim was generally realised in practice.
80 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 15 and Art. 5(1) Waz.
81 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, supra n. 43 and Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, no. 3, 
p. 15–16.
82 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, pp. 10 and 15–16.
83 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, supra n. 43.
84 Art. 3(1) Waz.
85 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 17. Art. 3(1) and Art. 5(2)(d) Waz. The after care includes 
a medical check‑up and – if necessary – psychosocial care. If the woman consents, this care may be 
extended to her relatives. See Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, p. 39.
86 Art. 82a Sr.
87 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 33.
88 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, supra n. 43. See also ‘Verlagen abortusgrens 
ontneemt vrouwen kans op zorgvuldige afweging’, press release of 12 November 2010 at the 
webiste of the KNMG www.knmg.artsennet.nl/Nieuws/Nieuwsarchief/Nieuwsbericht‑1/







are excluded from the scope of the Pregnancy Termination Act. Such cases must be 
reported to a special expert committee, which examines if the medical practitioner 
in attendance has acted with due care.89
Pregnancy is assumed from the moment of nidation of the fertilised egg cell in the 
uterus. The admission of a drug to prevent nidation (e.g. the ‘morning after pill’) is 
excluded from the scope of the Termination of Pregnancy Act.90 Initially this also 
held for so‑called ‘overtijdbehandeling’, i.e., pregnancy termination within 16 days 
of the expected menstruation failing to occur. At the time of the drafting of the 
Pregnancy Termination Act it was considered that within that 16‑day period it could 
not be established with sufficient certainty whether the woman was pregnant or 
not.91 Hence, the treatment – in practice often curettage – could not automatically 
be qualified as pregnancy termination.92 In 2005 the Evaluation Commission 
recommended to bring the ‘overtijdbehandeling’ within the scope of the Pregnancy 
Termination Act, as advanced medical techniques enabled to determine a pregnancy 
in a very early stage. The legislature agreed, but he also held that the existing 
practice had shown that no legislative amendment was necessary in this regard.93 
Hence, ‘overtijdbehandeling’ is now considered to be covered by the Act.94 As soon 
as a pregnancy is determined, any termination thereof must be in accordance with 
the criteria set in the Pregnancy Termination Act.95 Administration of the ‘abortion 
pill’ – a combination of two medications (Mifepristone and Misoprostol (also 
Verlagen‑abortusgrens‑ontneemt‑vrouwen‑kans‑op‑zorgvuldige‑afweging.htm, visited April 2011 
and www.english.minvws.nl/en/themes/abortion/default.asp, visited April 2012.
89 The Centrale deskundigencommissie late zwangerschapsafbreking en levensbeëindiging bij 
pasgeborenen [Central expert Commission late pregnancy termination and termination of life of neonates] 
was established in September 2006 to advise the Public Prosecutor. See www.lza‑lp.nl, visited January 
2010. See also the Protocol of the NVOG, as online available on www.nvog‑documenten.nl/index.
php?pagina=/richtlijn/item/pagina.php&richtlijn_id=756, visited 2 May 2010 and the instruction for the 
Public Prosecutor in cases concerning late pregnancy termination (Aanwijzing vervolgingsbeslissing 
levensbeëindiging niet op verzoek en late zwangerschapsafbreking), online available at www.om.nl/
algemene_onderdelen/uitgebreid_zoeken/@151404/aanwijzing_0/, visited June 2010. See furthermore 
Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, pp. 32–33 G.G. Zeeman et al., ‘Toetsing van late 
zwangerschapsafbreking, 2004–2007’ [‘Review of late pregnancy terminations, 2004–2007’], 152 
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde (2008) p. 2632.
90 Art. 1(2) Waz.
91 Kamerstukken II 1978/1979, 15 475, no. 6, pp. 42 and 61 and HR 29 May 1990, NJ 1991 No. 217, 
ECLI:NL:HR:1990:ZC8539, para. 3.10.
92 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 123 XVI, no. 111, p. 3.
93 See Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 371, no. 8 and (later) Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 123 XVI, no. 111, 
pp. 1 and 3. In 2009 a proposal for an amendment to the Implementing Order was published, which 
would have the effect that licensed clinics and hospitals would be obliged to determine the duration of 
the pregnancy in every individual case (See Staatsblad 2009, 230). This amendment has, however, not 
(yet) entered into force. See also Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 30 371, no. 20, p. 5 (answer to question 19).
94 Kamerstukken II, 2005/06, 30 371, no. 3 and Kamerstukken II, 2006/07, 30 371, no. 8.
95 As Art. 296 Sr applies to the situation of ‘overtijdbehandeling’, in any case the treatment must be 
performed by a medical practitioner in a licensed clinic or hospital. The requirement of a five‑day 
reflection period is in practice often applied in a flexible way. The legislature considered it unnecessary 
and undesirable to make special provisions for the reflection period in cases of ‘overtijdbehandeling’. 
See Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 123 XVI, no. 111, p. 3.







know as RU846)) that can cause an abortion until the 9th week of pregnancy – is 
unquestionably covered by the Pregnancy Termination Act.96
6.2.2.2. Emergency situation
The termination of a pregnancy may only be justified if the pregnant woman finds 
herself in an emergency situation.97 The notion ‘emergency situation’ has not been 
defined by the legislature. Such definition was considered impossible as situations 
too diverse in nature could be covered by the notion (see also above).98 The 2005 
Commission evaluating the Act, did not see any reason to change this. The legislature 
also rejected a situation in which the medical practitioner in attendance would 
impose his or her judgment regarding the existence of an emergency situation on the 
woman.99 As a result, it is actually the woman who decides if an emergency situation 
is present.100 The medical practitioner has, however, the duty to inform the woman 
during the decision making process about alternative options and solutions.101 At the 
same time, no‑one can be obliged to carry out an abortion, or to participate in it.102
6.2.2.3. Five‑day reflection period
To give a woman time for reflection, a five‑day consideration period must be 
observed.103 Article 3 of the Pregnancy Termination Act provides that an abortion 
cannot be carried out any sooner than on the 6th day after the woman has first consulted 
a doctor with whom she discussed her intention to have an abortion.104 This reflection 
period – reportedly one of the most debated elements of the Pregnancy Termination 
Act105 – is considered a means to protect the interests of the unborn and must 
96 See Aanhangsel Handelingen II 1997/98, 1593 and Aanhangsel Handelingen II 1998/99, 1851.
97 See, inter alia, Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 15.
98 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4.
99 Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, p. 37, under reference to Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 
15 475, no. 6, pp. 9–10.
100 Idem, pp. 114 en 122.
101 Art. 5(2)(a) Waz.
102 Art. 20 Waz. If the doctor has (conscientious) objections against the abortion, he must inform the woman 
about it. If so requested and with the consent of the woman, the doctor has to give information to other 
doctors about the medical condition of the woman. The scope of this provision extends to non‑medical 
staff members of clinics and hospitals, but the tax payer in general is not covered by it. Kamerstukken 
II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 22; HR 29 May 1990, NJ 1991 No. 217, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:ZC8539, 
para. 3.9 and Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, p. 39.
103 Art. 3(1) Waz. See also www.english.minvws.nl/en/themes/abortion/default.asp, visited April 2012 
and Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, p. 41.
104 Under the Dutch health system it is usually the general practitioner with whom the woman first 
discusses her intention to have an abortion. The carrying out of an abortion before this reflection 
period has lapsed, is liable to punishment on the basis of Art. 16(1) Waz. The Act provides for a few 
exceptions to this rule, such as the situation where the health or the life of the woman is endangered by 
the pregnancy (Art. 16(2) Waz). See also Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15 475, no. 6, pp. 40–41.
105 Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, p. 40. As the Evaluation Comission explains, it was 
initially debated whether the reflection period would commence at the moment the woman contacted a 
licensed abortion clinic or hospital or yet when she discussed her intention to have an abortion with her 
general practitioner. The latter was in the end decided.







therefore be strictly applied.106 The medical practitioner in attendance must ascertain 
that the woman has maintained her intention for an abortion in full awareness of her 
responsibility for the unborn life and the consequences of the abortion for herself and 
others involved.107 The legislature did not wish to formalise this issue any further.108
The 2005 Evaluation Committee recommended dropping the fixed term for the 
reflection period and instead to provide by law that in each individual case where 
a woman considered having an abortion, a reflection period was to be observed 
that would enable those involved to come to a well‑considered decision.109 This 
recommendation was not however followed‑up by the legislature, as it held that 
observation of the minimum reflection period had not proven problematic in 
practice.110
6.2.2.4. Licensing and registration
The licensing system as introduced by the Pregnancy Termination Act aims to 
guarantee high quality of medical care.111 In 2012 there were 16 licensed abortion 
clinics and 92 hospitals in the Netherlands who were licensed to carry out abortions.112 
The Health Inspectorate is responsible for monitoring their compliance with the 
Pregnancy Termination Act.113 Licensed clinics and hospitals must submit quarterly 
reports to the Healthcare Inspectorate. These, inter alia, include information about 
the number of patients treated, their country of residence and age and the duration of 
the pregnancy at the time it was terminated.114
6.2.3.	 Reception	of	the	Pregnancy	Termination	Act
The entry into force of the Pregnancy Termination Act did not take away all abortion 
controversy. From the moment of its adoption, the anti‑abortion campaign continued 
its activities.115 The legality of the Act has been (indirectly) challenged by lawyers’ 
association Pro Vita who claimed that by financing the termination of pregnancies, 
the State and the National Medical Insurance Board (Ziekenfondsraad), inter 
alia, violated the rights of the unborn. In 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed their 
claims, ruling, amongst other things, that Article 2 ECHR did not preclude national 
legislation under which abortion was legalised under certain circumstances.116 Since 
106 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 18.
107 Art. 5(2) Waz.
108 Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, at p. 38.
109 Idem, at p. 13.
110 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 371, no. 2, pp. 3–4.
111 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, no. 6, p. 31 and Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, 
at pp. 28–29.
112 See www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/abortus, visited 17 October 2012.
113 Art. 14a Waz.
114 Art. 11 Waz. See also the statistics as discussed in section 6.4.1 below.
115 See Outshoorn 1986, supra n. 39, at p. 282.
116 HR 16 June 1995, NJ 1997 No. 131, ECLI:NL:HR:1995:ZC1757.







that time, the anti‑abortion campaign has become less prominent in Dutch society 
and politics.
6.2.4.	 Criminal	prosecutions	for	abortions	in	the	Netherlands
Before the 1911 amendment of the Criminal Code, there were hardly any criminal 
convictions on the basis of Article 295 et seq. Criminal Code (see 6.2.1 above).117 
After 1911, the number of convictions on the basis of the new Article 251bis, apart 
from some fluctuations from year to year, generally increased until the late 1940s.118 
From that time the number of convictions slowly decreased. In the 1960s the number 
of criminal convictions dropped considerably119 and in the 1970s, there were even 
years without any convictions (see also section 6.2.1 above).120 The present author is 
not aware of any specific prosecution statistics since the 1970s.121
6.2.5.	 Abortion	and	public	funding
Since the entry into force of the Pregnancy Termination Act, women resident in 
the Netherlands who have their pregnancy terminated, do not have to pay for the 
abortion. The costs of a termination performed by a licensed clinic are covered 
by the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten 
(AWBZ)), while abortions carried out in a licensed hospital are covered by the health 
117 In 1911 a Member of Parliament maintained that there were no more than one to two criminal 
prosecutions or convictions per year. Handelingen II 1910/11, 2 March 1911, p. 1584. Enschedé 1966, 
supra n. 40, at p. 1111. See also Heijden, van der 1976, supra n. 36, at p. 426 Outshoorn 1986, supra 
n. 39, at p. 84.
118 The number of convictions on the basis of Art. 251 bis Sr (old) (following which treating a woman 
or subjecting a woman to treatment while indicating or arousing the expectation that the treatment 
could interrupt her pregnancy, was criminalised (‘[…] opzettelijk een vrouw in behandeling nemen of 
een behandeling doen ondergaan, te kennen geven of de verwachting opwekkende dat daardoor de 
zwangerschap kan worden verstoord.’)) during the years 1911–1978 were as follows: 1911: 3; 1912: 24; 
1913: 34; 1914: 23; 1915:27; 1916: 44; 1917: 43; 1918:47; 1919: 32; 1920: 79: 1921: 69; 1922: 50; 1923: 55; 
1924: 50; 1925: 72; 1926: 70; 1927: 98; 1928: 97; 1929: 53; 1930: 44; 1931: 75; 1932: 48; 1933: 97; 1934: 
95; 1935:98; 1936: 112; 1937: 92; 1938: 119; 1939: 125; 1940: 74; 1941: 100; 1942: 96; 1943: 138; 1944: no 
statistics available; 1945: no statistics available; 1946: 235; 1947: 233; 1948: 237; 1949: 177; 1950: 201; 
1951:183; 1952: 180; 1953: 136; 1954: 120; 1955: 120; 1956: 113: 1957: 95; 1958: 105; 1959: 81; 1960: 83; 
1961: 82; 1962: 71; 1963: 48; 1964: 38; 1965: 38; 1966: 29; 1967: 33; 1968: 32; 1969: 23; 1970: 14; 1971: 
6; 1972: 1; 1973: 3; 1974: 0; 1975: 0; 1976: 0; 1977: 0; 1978: 0. Bruijn, de 1979, supra n. 44, at p. 239. See 
Heijden, van der 1976, supra n. 36, at pp. 429–430 and Outshoorn 1986, supra n. 39, at p. 330.
119 The 2005 Evaluation Commission pointed out that in the 1960s, there was no systematic practice of 
prosecution of medical practitioners. Commissie evaluatie regelgeving 2005, supra n. 30, at pp. 25–26. 
When the Amsterdam District Court ruled in 1976 that social factors could justify an abortion, it 
took into account that in the preceding two decades the Public Prosecutor had only exceptionally 
initiated prosecution in abortion cases, whereas it was common knowledge that in hospitals and – since 
1971 – abortion clinics ten thousands of women, had had an abortion. Rb. Amsterdam 8 July 1976, NJ 
1977 No. 477, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:1976:AC0431.
120 See also Kamerstukken II 1974/75, 13 161, no. 1.
121 Only incidental and controversial cross‑border cases have been reported in the media (see section 6.4 
below).







insurer.122 Women from abroad who have a pregnancy terminated in the Netherlands 
have to bear the expenses themselves.123
6.3. dutch legIslAtIon on AssIsted humAn reproductIon And 
surrogAcy
While the first child was born through IVF treatment in the Netherlands in 1983,124 
the general legislative framework for assisted human reproduction (AHR) was set 
and is set by the Embryo Act of 2002.125 This Act sets limits to the handling and 
use of human gametes and embryos126 in fertility treatment and scientific research, 
‘by prohibiting what is deemed impermissible and attaching conditions to other 
procedures’.127 The following section sketches the parliamentary history and the main 
features of the Embryo Act. The subsequent subsections discuss various elements of 
the Act and related acts thematically. It will become clear that the introduction and 
regulation of each new AHR technique was accompanied by elaborate public and 
political debate.
6.3.1.	 The	Embryo	Act	(2002)
When the first in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatments took place in the Netherlands 
in the 1980s, the debate on reproductive medicine and the use of embryos was 
triggered.128 It was clear that very diverse views existed in society in respect of 
these sensitive issues129 and that these views changed as medical science advanced 
continuously.130 From the outset, the Dutch government developed a (provisional) 
policy in the field,131 as it felt that certain interests at stake in matters of assisted 
122 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, supra n. 43.
123 Idem.
124 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 400 XVI, no. 155.
125 Wet van 20 juni 2002, houdende regels inzake handelingen met geslachtscellen en embryo’s (Embryowet) 
[Act of 20 June 2002, containing rules relating to the use of human gametes and embryos], Stb. 2002, 
338.
126 Under this Act the term ‘gametes’ is defined as: ‘human spermatozoa and oocytes’ and ‘embryo’ is 
defined as: ‘a cell or a complex of cells with the capacity to develop into a human being’. Art. 1(a) and 
(b) Embryowet.
127 E.T.M. Olsthoorn‑Heim et al., Evaluatie Embryowet [Evaluation Embryo Act], Reeks evaluatie 
regelgeving deel 20, Den Haag: ZonMw 2006, Annex to Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30486 no. 1, pp. 9 
and 17. Those provisions that govern the use of embryos in research are not discussed in this chapter.
128 Artificial insemination has been applied in the Netherlands since the 1950’s. Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 
20 706, no. 2, p. 8 and 13.
129 Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no. 3, p. 2.
130 Idem, p. 5.
131 The first step towards this policy was the government’s request to the Health Council in July 1982 for an 
advice on the medical, ethical, financial and legal implications of in vitro fertilisation. This was followed 
by a Besluit tijdelijke regeling ivf ex artikel 18 lid 3 van de WZV [Decree temporary regulation of IVF 
under Article 18(3) WVZ]] of 18 July 1985. Further, IVF treatment was (provisionally) excluded from 
the national health insurance by means of the Besluit niet‑klinische buitenlichamelijke bevruchting 
ziekenfondsverzekering (Stcrt. 1985, 113). See Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 20 706, no. 2, pp. 13–14.







human reproduction needed protection by the State. It held this to be the case in 
particular for the interests of the unborn and the child. Additionally, the quality and 
financing of health care were considered grounds for government intervention.132 
Since 1988 a licensing system has been in force, on the basis of which IVF treatment 
can only be carried out in a limited number of licensed hospitals.133
The drafting of a special legislative act on the matter took considerably longer;134 
it was only in 2002 that the Act containing rules relating to the use of gametes and 
embryos (Embryo Act) (‘Wet houdende regels inzake handelingen met geslachtscellen 
en embryo’s’ (‘Embryowet’)) was adopted. This was partly due to the fact that the 
legislature felt that most groups in society had to agree with the decisions that were 
made in this field and that the choices were to retain some degree of validity in the 
face of advances in medicine.135
It has been held that the drafting of the Embryo Act must also be seen against the 
background of the Biomedicine Convention of the Council of Europe of 1997.136 Until 
today, however, this Convention has been signed, but not ratified by the Netherlands.137 
Should the Netherlands proceed to ratification, a few reservations must be made in 
respect of points on which the Embryo Act conflicts with the Convention.138
Taking human dignity and respect for human life in general as basic point of 
departure,139 the Embryo Act imposes conditions and limitations on the use of gametes 
132 Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 20 706, no. 2, pp. 6 and 10.
133 Koninklijk besluit [Royal Decree] of 11 August 1988, Stb. 379. This was later replaced by the 
Planningsbesluit in‑vitrofertilisatie [Planning decree on in vitro fertilisation], Stcrt. 1998, 95 in 
conjunction with Art. 1 (i) Besluit aanwijzing bijzondere medische verrichtingen [Exceptional Medical 
Expenses Order], Stb. 2007, 238 and Art. 2 Wet op de Bijzondere Medische Verrichtingen (WMBV) 
[Exceptional Medical Expenses Act], Stb. 1997, 515. See als Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 20 706, no. 2, 
pp. 14 and 16; Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 27 423, no. 3, p. 3 and L.E. Kalkman‑Bogerd, ‘Het nieuwe 
Planningsbesluit in‑vitrofertilisatie. Enkele kanttekeningen’ [‘The new planning decree in vitro 
fertilisation. Some comments’], 23 Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht (1999) p. 56.
134 See also T.A.M. te Braake, ‘The Dutch 2002 Embryos Act and the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine: Some Issues’, 11 European Journal of Health Law (2004) p. 139 at p. 148. The 2006 
Evaluation Commission spoke of a ‘carefull manoeuvring’ legislature in the various periods of 
government, on a ethically and emotionally charged terrain, about which the views in society widely 
differed, and in respect of which medical science developed at a high pace. Olsthoorn‑Heim et al. 2006, 
supra n. 127, at p. 35.
135 Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no. 3, p. 6. For the English translation, see Olsthoorn‑Heim et al. 
2006, supra n. 127, at p. 17.
136 B. Winter et al., Evaluatie Embryowet en Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting [Evaluation of 
the Embryo Act and the Donor Information Act on Artificial Insemination] (Den Haag, ZonMw 2012), 
Annex to Kamerstukken II 2012–2013, 30486 no. 4, at p. 256.
137 State of affairs on 31 July 2014.
138 According to the authors of 2012 Evaluation of the Embryo Act this would in any case concern Art. 13 
(concerning interventions on the human genome) and Art. 18 (concerning research on embryos in vitro) 
of the Convention. Were the legal exceptions on the prohibition on gender selection to be broadened, 
possibly a reservation had to be made in resepct of Art. 14 of the Convention. Winter et al. 2012, supra 
n. 136, at p. 256.
139 Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no. 3, p. 5. For the English translation, see Olsthoorn‑Heim et al. 
2006, supra n. 127, at p. 17.







and embryos and limits the purposes for which these may be used.140 The legislature 
has strived to find a balance between the principles of respect for human dignity and 
human life, and various other interests and values such as the advancement of the 
quality and safety of reproductive medicine, the best interests of the future child, the 
cure of illnesses and the interests of infertile couples.141
The Embryo Act is based on a system of standard‑setting, formulating rights and 
defining responsibilities, whilst also drafting protocols and providing for reporting 
obligations.142 Certain practices – namely the creation of chimeras (human‑animal 
hybrids); cloning and gender selection (see section 6.3.4 below) – are explicitly 
prohibited under the Act.
The Embryo Act entered into force on 1 September 2002. It has since been evaluated 
twice, in 2006 and 2012.143 The Act is supplemented by the Model Regulations 
Embryo Act (‘Modelreglement Embryowet’).144
6.3.2. Access to AHR treatment
In the Netherlands, the standard applied in decision‑making around reproduction is 
the reasonable well‑being of the child (‘het redelijk welzijn van het kind’): doctors 
must refrain from providing assistance in reproduction if they are of the opinion 
that the future child runs a real risk of serious psychosocial or physical harm.145 Any 
decision must be made on the basis of an individual assessment of the case at hand; 
the categorical exclusion of certain groups in society is not allowed.146
140 Idem, at p. 6. The Preamble to the Act reads: ‘We have considered that it is desirable out of respect 
for human life to prohibit certain uses of human gametes and embryos, to regulate the conditions 
under which other uses of human gametes and embryos with a view to improving medical care may be 
permitted, and to lay down rules regarding control over gametes and embryos […].’
141 Idem, at pp. 3 and 5.
142 Idem, at p. 7.
143 Olsthoorn‑Heim et al. 2006, supra n. 127 and Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136. By Act of 10 July 
2013 the Embryo Act was amended as a follow‑up to the 2006 evaluation. Wet van 10 juli 2013 tot 
wijziging van de Embryowet in verband met de evaluatie van deze wet [Act of 10 July 2013 amending 
the Embryos Act with a view to the evaluation of this Act], Stb. 2013, 306. The amendment that is most 
relevant for the present research concerns counselling for egg cell donors.
144 Following Art. 2 Embryowet the establishments where embryos are created outside the human body, 
or other procedures involving embryos are carried out, must draw up a protocol regarding the use of 
gametes and embryos. The establishments draw up their protocol on the basis of the Modelreglement 
Embryowet [Model Regulations Embryo Act], which is online available at the website of the Centrale 
Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek (CCMO) [The Central Committee on Research Involving 
Human Subjects], www.ccmo‑online.nl/hipe/uploads/downloads/Modelreglement‑Embryowet(1).pdf, 
visited April 2013.
145 NVOG, Modelprotocol Mogelijke morele contra‑indicaties bij vruchtbaarheidsbehandelingen [Model 
Protocol concerning possible moral counter‑indications for fertility treatment] pp. 2–3, online available 
at www.nvog.nl/Sites/Files/0000000935_NVOG%20Modelprotocol%20Mogelijke%20Morele%20
Contraindicaties%20Vruchtbaarheidsbehandelingen%202010.pdf, visited June 2014.
146 Idem, p. 3.







IVF treatment is only provided if there is a medical indication for the treatment.147 
Further, IVF clinics have a certain discretion when it comes to access to treatment.148 
For example, Dutch legislation does not oblige IVF clinics to offer treatment to 
single women.149 The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission (now the Human Rights 
Institute) held in 2000 that a refusal to offer IVF treatment to singles could be justified 
on grounds of the best interests of the child.150 IVF clinics are also in principle free 
to decide if they wish to cooperate with a sperm bank. This has as a result that the 
access to IVF treatment may be more limited for same‑sex couples when compared 
to different‑sex couples, but the Dutch government has held this to be acceptable.151
Different age limits apply for different kinds of AHR treatment. Generally the limits 
range between 40 and 45 years.152 For example, in respect of egg cell donation, it has 
been specified in the Model Regulation Embryo Act that the donor must be between 
18 and 40 years old, while the maximum age of the acceptor is 45 years.153 Age is also 
a relevant factor for reimbursement of the costs of AHR treatment under the Health 
Insurance Act (see 6.3.7 below).
6.3.3.	 Donation	of	gametes	and	embryos
Insemination with donated sperm (semen) has been practice in the Netherlands 
for a long time and artificial insemination has been made possible through the 
establishment of sperm banks, in the late 1980s. Egg cell (oocyte or ovum) donation 
147 The relevant principles are laid down in the Richtlijn Indicaties voor ivf [Guideline indications for 
IVF] as drafted by the the Dutch Association for Obstetrics and Gynaecology (Nederlandse Vereniging 
voor Obstetrie en Gynaecologie (NVOG)) in the year 1998, online available at www.nvog‑documenten.
nl/uploaded/docs/09_indicaties_ivf.pdf, visited February 2010. Medical practitioners can find 
further guidance in the NVOG’s Model Protocol concerning possible moral counter‑indications 
for fertility treatment, supra n. 145 and the Landelijke Netwerkrichtlijn Subfertiliteit [National 
guideline subfertility], online available at www.nhg.artsennet.nl/kenniscentrum/k_richtlijnen/k_
nhgstandaarden.htm, visited April 2012.
148 See also Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage (pres.) 17 July 1990, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:1990:AD1197.
149 See on this question also T. Veerman and A. Hendriks, ‘Recht op toegang tot IVF. IVF bij alleenstaande, 
lesbische en oudere vrouwen’ [‘A right to access to IVF treatment. IVF treatment for single, lesbian 
and women of age’], 12 Nemesis (1996) p. 136 and College voor zorgverzekeringen 27 April 2000, 
BZ‑00‑1103.
150 Dutch Equal Treatment Commission, Decision 2000‑4, online available at www.mensenrechten.nl/
publicaties/oordelen, visited June 2014.
151 Kamerstukken II 32 500 XVI, no. 112, p. 3. See also Dutch Equal Treatment Commission, Decision 
2009‑31 online available at www.mensenrechten.nl/publicaties/oordelen, visited June 2014.
152 J.T.M. Derksen and P.C. Staal, Rapport Een leeftijdsgrens voor vruchtbaarheidsbehandelingen [Report 
an age limit for fertility treatment] (Diemen, CVZ 2012) p. 8, Annex to Kamerstukken II 33000‑XVI, 
no. 188. For an example see www.umcutrecht.nl/zorg/patienten/poliklinieken/V/vruchtbaarheid/
Veel‑gestelde‑vragen.htm, visited January 2013.
153 Modelreglement Embryowet, paras. 3.2.2, 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, online available at www.ccmo‑online.nl/hipe/
uploads/downloads/Modelreglement‑Embryowet(1).pdf, visited April 2013. The Model Regulation 
reccomends caution with donors under the age of 30 years (para. 3.3.2). In 2007 the government saw no 
reason to codify the age limit of 45 for acceptors of donor gametes in legislation, as they held that the 
age limit was widely supported in medical profession. Kamerstukken II 2007/08, Aanhangsel No. 113, 
p. 242.







became technically possible only much later. For many years egg cell donation was 
hardly practiced in the Netherlands, as the technique for vitrification of egg cells had 
not yet been developed.154 This only changed in the last decade and in 2012 the first 
egg cell donation bank opened its doors in the Netherlands.155 Perhaps for reasons of 
its limited practical relevance, egg cell donation has never been criminalised under 
Dutch law. This is different, however, for egg cell donation in combination with 
surrogacy (see section 6.3.8 below).156
The Embryo Act sets conditions for the donation of gametes and embryos.157 It is 
based on two central principles namely: (1) consent for donation must be given freely; 
and (2) payment for gametes (as goes for organs and human tissue) is considered 
incommensurable with human dignity.158
Adults who are capable of making a reasonable assessment of their interests in this 
regard may make their gametes available in order to induce pregnancy in another 
person or for research purposes.159 Donating ‘surplus’ embryos which have been 
created in the course of an IVF treatment, for the purpose of inducing a pregnancy 
in another person, is also permitted.160
Gametes and embryos may be made available only by means of a written donation 
and without consideration, and only after the donor has been informed by the person 
storing the gametes or embryos regarding the nature and the purpose thereof.161 The 
donor may revoke his or her decision at any time before the gametes or embryos are 
used, without giving reasons.162 If an invasive procedure is required in order to obtain 
gametes from the donor, the consent must be given in writing and the donor must 
be informed by the person who performs the procedure of the attendant risks and 
154 Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 207, no. 6, p. 1.
155 ‘Eicelbank op zoek naar vrouwen die doneren’, Algemeen Dagblad 2 April 2012, p. 4.
156 Annex to Planningsbesluit in vitro fertilisatie 1989, Stcrt. 31 July 1989 and Handelingen II 1998/99, 
818.
157 Arts. 5, 6 and 8 Embryowet.
158 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 400 XVI, no. 155, p. 2.
159 Art. 5(1) Embryowet. With the sperm of one donor a maximum of 25 children may be conceived. J.K. 
de Bruyn, Advies medisch‑technische aspecten van kunstmatige donorinseminatie (Utrecht: Centraal 
Begeleiding Orgaan voor de intercollegiale toetsing 1992). The Guideline was drafted in consultation 
with the Dutch‑Belgian Association for Artificial Insemination (Nederlands‑Belgische Vereniging 
voor Kunstmatige Inseminatie), the Dutch Association for Obstetrics and Gynaecology (Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor Obstetrie en Gynaecologie (NVOG)) and the Dutch Association on Clinical genetics 
(de Vereniging voor Klinische Genetica Nederland).
160 Art. 8(1)(a) Embryowet provides that adults who are capable of making a reasonable assessment of 
their interests in this regard may make available embryos which have been created outside the body for 
their own pregnancy, but which will no longer be used for this purpose, to induce pregnancy in another 
person. Embryos may also be donated to culture embryonic cells for medical purposes, medical and 
biological research and medical and biological education or to carry out research that is permissible 
under the Embryo Act using those embryos. Art. 8(1)(b) and (c) Embryowet.
161 Arts. 5(2) and 8(2) Embryowet. By Act of 21 December 2006 (Stb. 2007, 58), two new paragraphs were 
included in Art. 5 Embryowet, in order to implement the rules of Directive 2004/23/EC in respect of 
the information that must be provided to the donor.
162 Arts. 5(2) and 8(2) Embryowet.







draw‑backs.163 The donor must be given sufficient time for reflection to allow him or 
her to make a carefully considered decision on the basis of the information provided 
about making his or her gametes available.164 If gametes are made available in order 
to induce pregnancy in another person, the donor must be given the opportunity to 
stipulate that his or her consent is required for the use of embryos created using his 
or her gametes for any other purposes.165
By providing that the provision of gametes and embryos should not be remunerated, 
the legislature ‘[…] wanted to ensure that the pursuit of profit [did] not play a role 
in donation’.166 The legislature felt that to value gametes and embryos in terms of 
money was in violation with human dignity and endangered the special protection 
the embryo enjoys.167 Reimbursement of expenses directly incurred as a result of 
treatment in which the said gametes and embryos are used is, however, lawful.168 
Further, mediation in the demand and supply of egg cell and sperm donors is not 
prohibited under Dutch law, as long as no profit is pursued.169
Until the year 2004, when the Donor Information Act on Artificial Insemination 
(Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting, hereafter ‘Donor Information Act’) 
entered into force, a gamete donor could remain anonymous permanently.170 The 
first initiatives to change this date back to the late 1980s.171 In 1992 a bill on donor 
163 Arts. 5(3) and 6(1) Embryowet. See also Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 27 423, no. 3, p. 17. In 2013 the 
Act was amended so as too rescind the mandatory assessment by the Medicial‑ethical examination 
Committee (medisch‑ethische toetsingscommissie (METC)) in cases of egg‑cell donation. Wet van 10 
juli 2013 tot wijziging van de Embryowet in verband met de evaluatie van deze wet [Act of 10 July 2013 
amending the Embryo Act with a view to its evaluation], Stb. 2013, 206.
164 Art. 6(2) Embryowet.
165 Art. 6(4) Embryowet.
166 Olsthoorn‑Heim et al. 2006, supra n. 127, at p. 19.
167 Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no. 3, p. 16.
168 Art. 27 Embryowet provides: ‘It is prohibited to charge a fee for providing gametes and embryos made 
available pursuant to Sections 5, 8 and 9 of this Act to third parties if the said fee exceeds the costs 
directly incurred as a result of procedures carried out using the said gametes and embryos.’ In the 2006 
Evaluation Report it was noted that ‘[i]n practice reimbursement of expenses is evidently accepted.’ 
Olsthoorn‑Heim et al. 2006, supra n. 127, at pp. 11 and 19. In 2012 the Minister of Health informed 
Parliament that medical profession, even though it had not yet issued a formal opinion on the matter, 
considered an amount between 500 and 1,000 euros reasonable. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2011/12, 
1162, pp. 1–2. The authors of the 2012 Evaluation went even a bit further; it was held that it was 
acceptable if the reimbursement of expenses to some extent encouraged women to donate, as long as it 
did not lead to a financially motivated donation. The report invited the government to reconsider how 
the reimbursement for costs related to the prohibition to charge a fee. Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136, 
at pp. 252–253.
169 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2011/12, 792, pp. 1–2. Trade in gametes has always been prohibited under 
Dutch law. Annex to Planningsbesluit in vitro fertilisatie 1989, Stcrt. 31 July 1989 and Handelingen II 
1998/99, 818.
170 Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting [Donor Information Act on Artificial Insemination] Act 
of 25 April 2002, Stb. 2002, 240, entry into force per 1 January 2004. The Act is accompanied by 
an Implementing order (Besluit donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting, Stb. 2003, 320). The first 
Evaluation of this act was published in 2012. Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136.
171 The 2012 Evaluation report noted that in 1988 there had yet been a bill tabled for the amendment of 
the parentage laws (‘herziening van het afstammingsrecht’). Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136, at p. 50. 
The bill was revoked five years later. The coalition agreement of 1989 provided that a survey would be 







information in cases of artificial insemination was drafted and sent to various interest 
groups for feedback.172 Its drafters considered knowledge about one’s genetic origins 
a fundamental foundation for a deeper understanding of one’s self.173 Extensive 
political debate delayed the adoption of the Donor Information Act with another 
eight years. There was disagreement about the question of whether the long‑term 
psychosocial effects for children conceived through anonymous donation had to be 
researched, before the law was amended. Furthermore, concerns were expressed that 
lifting of the anonymity would lead to a serious reduction of the number of donors 
and to a ‘black market’ in gametes and that people would have their recourse to 
other countries, where anonymous donation was legal.174 The government, however, 
felt and maintained that these concerns were outweighed by the right of the child to 
know about its genetic origins.175 In this reasoning the government was supported by 
a ruling of the Supreme Court of 1994, where it was held that the right to know one’s 
genetic origins prevailed over the right to privacy of the (living) genetic parent.176
The Donor Information Act (2004) regulates the storing, administration and provision 
of the data of donors involved in artificial insemination.177 Following its Article 2(1), 
all establishments that offer AHR treatment with the use of donated gametes have to 
provide data about these treatments and the donors involved to the Donor Information 
Registration Foundation (Stichting Donorgegevens Kunstmatige Bevruchting).178 
Apart from the personal data of the woman involved in the artificial insemination 
with the use of donor gametes, information about the donor must be registered.179 In 
this regard a distinction is made between the donor’s medical information; physical 
information (such as weight and colour of the hair and eyes); information about the 
donor’s education; social information (such as the social situation and civil status) 
and personal (identifying) information (such as family name, name, date of birth and 
address) of the donor. While all these data are recorded by the Donor Information 
Registration Foundation and saved for at least 80 years,180 the passing on of such 
information to third parties is subject to certain limitations.
conducted into the possible effects on children of not having access to information about their genetic 
links. Kamerstukken II 1989/90, 21 132 no. 8, p. 33.
172 Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 23 207, no. 3, p. 3. It was feared that an immediate lifting of the exisiting 
permanent donor anonymity would result in a strong decline in the number of donors and in an increase 
in what was called ‘KID‑toerisme’ (i.e. resorting to artificial insemination with the use of donated 
sperm in foreign countries).
173 Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 23 207, no. 3, p. 1.
174 See Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 30 486, no. 5, p. 17.
175 Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 23 207, no. 10, p. 8. For an adequate description of the legislative history of 
the Donor Information Act, see Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136, at pp. 50–59. See also G.T. Oudhof, 
‘Het wetsvoorstel ‘Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige inseminatie’ en de (tegengestelde) belangen van 
het kind’ [The Bill ‘Act Donor Information Artificial Insemination’ and the (conflicting) interests of 
the child’] Tijdschrift voor Familie en Jeugdrecht (2000) p. 229.
176 HR 15 April 1994, NJ 1994 No. 608, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC1337.
177 Preamble to the Donor Information Act (Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting), Act of 25 April 
2002, Stb. 2002, 240 and Stb. 2003, 510.
178 Art. 2(1) Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting.
179 Art. 3(2) Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting. These personal data concern the woman’s 
surname, given names, date of birth and address.
180 Art. 8 Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting.







Medical information may be important for the health of the child conceived with 
gametes of a donor, and must therefore always be passed on to the child’s general 
practitioner.181 As of the age of 12, any child who reasonably suspects to have been 
conceived by artificial insemination with donated gametes can request information 
about his or her donor from the Donor Information Registration Foundation. The 
donor’s medical, physical and social information, as well as information about the 
donor’s education must be provided, if so requested by the child.182 If the child has 
not yet reached the age of 12, any request of the child’s parents for such information 
must be complied with.183 Donors cannot object to and are not informed about the 
passing on of this information to the child or their parents by the Foundation.184
If the child has reached the age of 16, he or she may, furthermore, submit a request to 
obtain the donor’s personal (identifying) information. This information is provided 
if the donor has given written permission for the passing on of this information to the 
child.185 If the donor does not consent to the revelation of his personal data, only very 
weighty reasons may justify a refusal of the child’s request for personal information.186 
In its assessment of the donor’s refusal, the Donor Information Registration 
Foundation takes the interests of the child as a point of departure. Information about 
the donor may thus only be provided if the child (or exceptionally his or her parents 
or medical practitioner) so requests. The child must furthermore reasonably suspect 
to have been conceived by artificial insemination with donated gametes.187 If no 
initiative is taken by the child, a gametes donor can remain anonymous.188 Donors 
cannot themselves trace children conceived with their gametes.189
181 Art. 3(1)(a) Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting. See also Art. 2 Besluit donorgegevens 
kunstmatige bevruchting [Donor Information Order] for a definition of the term ‘medical information’ 
in this context.
182 Art. 3(1)(b) Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting. See also Art. 3 Besluit donorgegevens 
kunstmatige bevruchting for a specification of physical and social information of the donor.
183 Art. 3(1)(c) Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting.
184 See www.donorgegevens.nl/informatievoordonoren, visited January 2013.
185 Art. 3(2) Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting. If a child is conceived – whether before or 
after the entry into force of the Act – with the gametes of a donor who has declared in writing before 
June 2004 that he or she wishes to remain anonymous, no personal (identifying) information will be 
given to the child. If the donor has not made any such written statement, his or her consent will be 
sought by the Donor Information Registration Foundation. Only if the donor gives his or her permission, 
such personal data may be passed on to the child. See www.donorgegevens.nl/informatievoordonoren, 
visited January 2013.
186 Art. 3(2) Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting. Boele‑Woelki et al. give as an example of such 
a very weighty reason the situation in which the donor has founded his own family. K. Boele‑Woelki 
et al., Draagmoederschap en illegale opneming van kinderen [Surrogacy and unlawful placement 
of children] (Utrecht, Utrecht Centre for European research into Family Law 2011) p. 54, Annex to 
Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32500‑VI. no. 83 and online available at www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/
draagmoederschap.aspx?cp=44&cs=6837, visited June 2014.
187 Some have held it to be a bottleneck that a child does not by definition know that its legal parents are 
not its genetic parents. Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at p. 54.
188 P.M.W. Janssens et al., ‘Wet Donorgegevens Kunstmatige Bevruchting: inhoud en gevolgen’ [‘Act 
Donor Information Artificial Reproduction: content and consequences’], 149 Nederlands Tijdschrift 
voor Geneeskunde (2005) p. 1412 at p. 1416.
189 Idem, at p. 1412.







Donors of gametes or embryos do not, furthermore, establish any de lege family 
ties with a child born after donation.190 The mater semper certa est principle implies 
that the woman who gave birth to a child after gamete or embryo donation is the 
legal mother of the child.191 If she is married and her husband has consented to an 
act capable of resulting in conception – e.g. IVF treatment with the use of donated 
gametes – he is by law the legal father.192 If the woman who gives birth is not married, 
her partner may acknowledge the child.193 Hence, no adoption procedure is required 
for the acceptor parents to establish parental links.194
6.3.3.1. Post‑mortem reproduction
Post‑mortem reproduction was initially expressly rejected by the Dutch legislature.195 
As of the 1980s, however, the views in legal doctrine on this matter gradually changed, 
which development was reflected in the Embryo Act.196 Its Article 7 provides that 
stored gametes are destroyed if the establishment responsible for their storage is 
informed that the donor has deceased, unless the donor has explicitly consented to 
the use of his gametes after his death.197 In situations where such consent has been 
given and a request for use of the deceased’s gametes has been made, the medical 
professionals involved in the AHR treatment must assess whether the interests of the 
future parent and child are sufficiently protected.198 AHR establishments are under 
no obligation to assist in post‑mortem reproduction199 and some indeed refuse to do 
so.200
At the time when the Embryo Act was adopted, vitrification of egg cells was not 
yet common practice. When this method became lawful in the Netherlands in 2011, 
the legality of post‑mortem reproduction through egg cell donation was debated by 
190 Such family ties are established neither before nor after the birth of the child. Aanhangsel Handelingen 
II 2007/08, 1061, p. 2262.
191 Art. 1:198 BW.
192 Art. 1:200(3) BW. Paternity cannot be denied in this situation. See also Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 
649, n. 3, p. 7.
193 Art. 1:199(c) BW.
194 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2007/08, 1061, p. 2262.
195 Regeringsnota (Notitie) “Kunstmatige bevruchting en draagmoederschap” [Memorandum of the 
Dutch government on artificial insemination and surrogacy], Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 20706, no. 2, 
pp. 27 and 30.
196 For an overview of the relevant literature, see para. 3.4 of Hof Arnhem 16 April 2002, 
ECLI:NL:GHARN:2002:AE1479. See also Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage (pres.) 9 March 1989, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:1989:AH2615.
197 See also Hof Arnhem 16 April 2002, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2002:AE1479.
198 Kamerstukken II 2001/01, 27 423, no. 3, p. 19. See also T. Oudhof, ‘Het belang van het kind bij 
kunstmatige voortplanting na overlijden: What’s in the name’, Tijdschrift voor Familie‑ en Jeugdrecht 
(2002) p. 288.
199 Modelreglement Embryowet [Model Regulations Embryo Act], pp. 25 and 39–44, online available 
at www.ccmo‑online.nl/hipe/uploads/downloads/Modelreglement‑Embryowet(1).pdf, visited April 
2013.
200 W.J. Dondorp and G.M.W.R. de Wert, ‘Postmortale eiceldonatie: wat is er tegen?’ [‘Postmortal egg‑cell 
donation; what to object against it?’], 156 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde (2012) p. 564 at 
p. 565.







some, but the relevant laws do not make a distinction between different types of 
gametes.201
6.3.4. Gender selection
In the mid‑1990s, an initiative to open a so‑called ‘gender clinic’ in the city of 
Utrecht where gender selection would be practised, attracted wide attention in media 
and politics.202 Even though the Minister of Health denounced the clinic’s practice 
immediately, it took until 1 October 1998 before a Ministerial Order prohibiting 
gender selection entered into force.203 The clinic was ordered to close its doors as of 
the same date.204
The legislature considered gender selection to reduce children to the mere object of 
the wishes and desires of their parents and to give reproduction a purely instrumental 
character.205 For that reason, a prohibition on gender selection was included in 
the Embryo Act. Its Article 26(1) prohibits gender selection in the course of the 
handling and use of gametes and embryos,206 subject to a maximum penalty of one 
year imprisonment or a fine of the fourth category.207 So‑called ‘additional’ gender 
selection in the course of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (see 6.3.5 hereafter), is 
also prohibited.208 The gender of the unborn in itself can never constitute a lawful 
201 Idem. The authors of the 2012 Evaluation of the Embryo Act held, however, that from an ethical point 
of view, there was no fundamental difference between post‑mortem reproduction with donated sperm 
and post‑mortem reproduction with donated egg cells. They therefore held that the latter also had to 
be considered lawful and ethically acceptable. Winter et al 2012, supra n. 136, at p. 231. The Minster 
of Health, Welfare and Sports seemed to endorse this approach, as she did not make any distinction 
between the two types of gametes in her official reaction to the Evaulation. Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 
30 486, no. 5.
202 Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 238, nos. 1 and 2. See also ‘Er is ook veel te zeggen voor sekse‑selectie’, 
de Volkskrant 17 June 1995.
203 Besluit verbod geslachtskeuze om niet‑medische redenen [Ministerial Order gender selection on 
non‑medical grounds] of 16 June 1998, Stb. 1998, 336 and Stb. 1998, 567.
204 Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 26 083, nos. 362 and 1. Criminal charges were brought, but later dropped 
against the founder of the clinic. See Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2004/05, 825 and 1797. The founder 
unsuccesfully tried to re‑open his clinic in 2002. Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 600 XVI, no. 4. In 2010 
new controversy arose when it was – inaccurately – reported that the genderclinic had re‑opened its 
doors. Inter alia, Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2009/10, 2408 and 2409.
205 Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no. 3, p. 48.
206 With the entry into force of the Embryo Act in September 2002, the existing Ministerial Order of 1998 
(supra n. 203) was repealed.
207 Art. 28 Embryowet.
208 ‘Additional selection’ may occur ‘[…] when the sex is known as a result of the PGD or PGS procedure 
(which was carried out for a medical reason) and a choice is possible without further interventions 
being required.’ The Health Council of the Netherlands held for the first time in 1995 that there was 
little objection in that situation to respecting the parents’ wishes, provided that indeed no further 
interventions were carried out. It reiterated its opinion of 2006. See Gezondheidsraad, Advies 
Preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek en screening [Advice preimplantation genetic diagnosis and 
screening], Advice no. 2006/1, pp. 19 and 22, online available at www.gezondheidsraad.nl/sites/
default/files/06@01N3.pdf, visited June 2014. The legislature, however, disagreed and considered that 
also in this situation reproduction would have a purely instrumental character. Additional sex selection 
is therefore prohibited in Annex 2 to Regeling preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek [Regulation 







ground for abortion.209 However, the second paragraph of Article 26 provides 
for an exception to this prohibition if there is a risk that the child suffers from a 
serious gender‑linked hereditary disorder, such as Duchenne muscular dystrophy.210 
Recommendations by the relevant Evaluation Committees in 2006 and 2012 to 
reconsider this strict prohibition on gender selection, were only partly followed up 
by the legislature.211
6.3.5.	 Preimplantation	genetic	diagnosis	(PGD)
Prenatal screening – blood tests, echoes and/or (non‑)invasive diagnoses – forms 
part of the medical screening of the population and is therefore covered from public 
funds.212 Such screening is not obligatory, but available to pregnant women in the 
Netherlands if they so desire.213
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) has been subject to much debate since 
it was first practiced in the Netherlands in 1995.214 The Dutch government’s 
decision‑making in medical‑ethical matters, including PGD, is based on the 
principles of personal autonomy, protection of human life and good care.215 While 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis] Stcrt. 2009, 42. See also Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 300 XVI, 
no. 136, pp. 8–9.
209 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2003/04,1914, p. 4049 and Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2006/07, 2267, 
p. 4804.
210 See also www.pgdnederland.nl/wat‑is‑pgd/wat‑wordt‑onderzocht/geslachtsgebonden‑aan 
doeningen, visited March 2013.
211 The 2006 Evaluation Commission suggested that the prohibition of Art. 26 Embryowet was (possibily) 
too strictly formulated, as selection could also be desired in cases where the child risked to be the 
carrier of a serious gender‑linked hereditary disease. The legislature disagreed and saw no ground 
for amendment of the law on this point. Kamerstukken II, 2006/07, 30 486, no. 3, p. 12. See earlier yet 
Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 300 XVI, no. 136, p. 10. The 2012 Evaluation Report recommended to 
reconsider the prohibition on gender‑selection on non‑medical grounds (Recommendation 4); to clarify 
whether the prohibition in Art. 26(1) Embryowet also saw at additional gender‑slection in the course of 
genetic tests on medical grounds (Recommendation 5); to allow for gender‑selection on grounds of a 
risk for ‘non‑Mendelian’ hereditary disorders with unequal gender incidence (Recommendation 6) and 
to allow for gender selection in cases where the child risked to be the carrier of a serious gender‑linked 
hereditary disease (Recommendation 7). Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136, at p. 238. In respect of 
Recommendation 6, the Minister of Health considered that this matter required further scientific 
research and therefore considered it not (yet) correct to amend the law. The seventh recommendation 
was followed up though. Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 30 486, no. 5, pp. 5–6.
212 The costs of non‑invasive prenatal testing are reimbursed from Public Health Insurance to women up 
to 36 years old. See Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 29 323, no. 90.
213 See the website of the Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondhied en Milieu (RIVM) [National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment] www.rivm.nl/Onderwerpen/B/Bevolkings 
onderzoeken_en_screeningen /Jur idische_informat ie_Screeningen_bij_zwangeren_en_
pasgeborenen, visited 9 September 2014.
214 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 25424 no. 135, p. 1. In the year 1997 the first child was born after PGD 
in the Netherlands. PGD Nederland, Jaarverslag PGD Nederland 2008 en cumulatief overzicht 
1995–2008 [Annual Report PGD the Netherlands and cumulative overview 1995–2008] p. 3, Annex to 
Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 29323, no. 76.
215 Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 29323 no. 46, pp. 5–6. These principles were first set out in the Government 
Position on Medical‑Etchical Policymaking, as laid down in Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 30 800 XVI, 
no. 183.







often these principles complement and strengthen one another, in the case of PGD, 
the legislature considered that personal autonomy of the patient had to be balanced 
against the protection of the (unborn and future) life.216
Under the present state of the law couples only qualify for PGD if they run a high 
individual risk of conceiving a child with a serious, hereditary illness or disorder 
that presents in most cases and which can be detected with PGD.217 Further criteria 
to assess if an individual case qualifies for PGD are: the gravity and nature of 
the illness concerned; the treatment options; complementing medical criteria; 
and physical and moral factors.218 PGD on non‑medical grounds is prohibited.219 
Preimplantation genetic screening (PGS) – automatic screening in the course of 
every IVF treatment – is not regular practice in the Netherlands, but it has been on 
trial.220 Selection on the basis of a child’s human leukocyte antigen system (HLA 
system) with a view to future donorship for the child’s sibling221 is permitted only 
in case the future child itself runs a serious and individual risk of contracting the 
hereditary disease.222
The first initiative of State regulation in respect of PGD was taken in 2003, 
when a planning decree on clinical genetic research and heredity counselling 
(Planningsbesluit klinisch genetisch onderzoek en erfelijkheidsadvisering) was 
issued. Since then it has been provided that PGD may only be carried out in a 
licensed establishment.223 To date, the government has considered one establishment 
sufficient to meet the demand for PGD in the Netherlands and consequently the 
216 Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 29323 no. 46, p. 6. On relevant ethical principles in respect to PGD see also 
Th.A.M. te Braake, ‘Preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek: een stand van zaken’ [‘Preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis: a state of affairs’], 32 Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht (2008) p. 174.
217 Annex 2 to Regeling preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek [Regulation preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis], Stcrt. 2009, 42.
218 Idem.
219 Idem.
220 As the Health Council of the Netherlands explained in its 2006 report on PGD: ‘Pre‑implantation 
genetic screening (PGS) involves in vitro investigation of embryos to detect numerical chromosomal 
abnormalities (aneuploidies).’ The Council, furthermore, explained that the CCMO [Central Committee 
on Research involving Human Subjects] had ‘issued permits for PGS trial protocols to four centres.’ 
Gezondheidsraad 2006, supra n. 208. See also Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 300 XVI, no. 136 10.
221 As the Health Council of the Netherlands explained in its 2006 report on PGD: ‘The question of 
selecting a future child on the basis of its HLA system can arise if a child already born to the couple 
has a life‑threatening condition that needs stem cell therapy, but no suitable donor is available. Stem 
cells are rejected if the HLA systems of the donor and recipient are too different from one another. The 
required stem cells can be obtained from the navel cord blood of a brother or sister with a matching 
HLA system. The conditions for which this treatment is carried out include certain forms of leukemia 
and hereditary anemia that are associated with a severely diminished life expectancy if a transplant is 
not performed.’ Gezondheidsraad 2006, supra n. 208, at, p. 20.
222 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 300 XVI, no. 136, p. 10.
223 Art. 1 Planningsbesluit klinisch genetisch onderzoek en erfelijkheidsadvisering [Planning decree 
clinical genetic research and heridity counselling], Stcrt. 2003, 16 and Art. 1 (h)(fifth dash) Besluit 
aanwijzing bijzondere medische verrichtingen [Order instructions medical performances], Stb. 2007, 
238.







University Hospital, Maastricht224 presently has the monopoly on PGD.225 The 
Centre has concluded partnership agreements with other Academic Medical Centres 
in respect of so‑called ‘transport PGD’.226
After the entry into force of the aforementioned 2003 planning decree, the Minister 
of Health requested the Health Council of the Netherlands (Gezondheidsraad) to 
deliver its opinion on PGD.227 Following this opinion, the Secretary of State for Health 
announced in 2008 that PGD would also be made possible in respect of hereditary 
cancers, such as breast cancer and some forms of intestinal cancer.228 These types 
of cancer are diseases that do not present themselves in all cases, which means that 
‘[…] not all individuals with the mutation contract the disease’.229 The letter by the 
Secretary of State caused political controversy about – what was called – ‘embryo 
selection’.230 Despite the strong opposition of certain confessional political parties, 
the government maintained its position on this point. This position was codified 
in a new Regulation on PGD (Regeling preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek) 
which entered into force in 1999.231 In the same year a national Committee on PGD 
indications (Landelijke Indicatiecommissie PGD) was established, which had the 
task of drafting guidelines and assessing new indications for PGD.232
The new Regulation did not end the debate. Particularly as medical science advanced, 
the debate about possible new indications and grounds for PGD continued.233 In the 
2010, political controversy emerged with regard to PGD for Huntington’s disease 
(HD).234 HD is a ‘dominant genetic neurodegenerative disease, which causes physical 
224 Www.english.azm.nl, visited June 2014.
225 Art. 1 and Annex 1 to Regeling preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek [Regulation preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis], Stcrt. 2009, 42 (earlier Art. 2.3 of Annex to Planningsbesluit klinisch genetisch 
onderzoek en erfelijkheidsadvisering [Planning decree clinical genetic research and heridity 
counselling], Stcrt. 2003, 16). The option is left open that in the future the capacity will be extended to 
two establishments (see Annex 1).
226 The term ‘transport PGD’ sees at the situation where in the course of IVF treatment carried out in a 
partner Medical Centre, certain cells from the embryo created in the course of that IVF treatment are 
transported to the licensed Academic Hospital Maastricht for the actual PGD. Annex 1 to Regeling 
preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek, Stcrt. 2009, 42.
227 Gezondheidsraad 2006, supra n. 208. For the government’s reaction to the Advice, see Kamerstukken 
II 2005/2006, 30 300 XVI, no. 136.
228 Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 31 200 XVI, no. 147. For earlier opinions on the matter see Kamerstukken II 
2005/06 30 300 XVI, no. 136 and Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 31 200 XVI, no. 10.
229 Gezondheidsraad 2006, supra n. 208, at, p. 18.
230 See, inter alia, Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 29 323, nos. 41, 43, 46 and 47 and Aanhangsel Handelingen 
II 2007/08, 6593 no. 93. See also PGD Nederland, Annual Report PGD the Netherlands and cumulative 
overview 1995–2008 (Jaarverslag PGD Nederland 2008 en cumulatief overzicht 1995–2008), p. 4, 
Annex to Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 29323, no. 76.
231 Stcrt. 2009, 42.
232 See www.pgdnederland.nl/pgd‑en‑de‑samenleving/landelijke‑indicatiecommissie, visited January 
2012. The Committee was established at the request of the Secretary of State of Health and consists of 
prominent medical experts, ethicists and a representative of patient interest groups.
233 See, for example, G. de Wert and I. De Beaufort, ‘Sta nú ook andere varianten van PGD toe’, NRC 
1 July 2008, online available at www.nrc.nl/article1933210, visited August 2010.
234 Kamerstukken II, 2010/11, 25 424, no. 117.







and cognitive deterioration.’235 All carriers of the HD gene contract the disease at 
some point in life, usually between the ages of 35 and 45. Each child of a parent 
with HD carries a 50 per cent risk of inheriting the HD gene. Persons with a family 
history of HD may prefer not to know their carrier status. They may, however, still 
wish to prevent the birth of a carrier child. With the combination of IVF treatment 
and PGD it is possible to select embryos without the HD gene. This is can be done 
without informing the person at risk and his or her partner whether any embryos 
were found to have the HD gene. This so‑called ‘non‑disclosing PGD’, where the 
person at risk is thus not informed if he or she carries the HD gene was explicitly 
ruled out in the Netherlands, as the 2009 PGD Regulation provided that in order to 
qualify for preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), prospective parents had to be 
willing to find out their own genetic status.236
An alternative method is ‘exclusion PGD’. Because in this method DNA linkage 
testing is utilised, the screening does not reveal if the person at risk in fact carries 
the HD gene.237 For a long time this method was prohibited under Dutch law and as 
a consequence various couples in which one partner was at 50 per cent risk, went to 
Belgium for exclusion PGD.238 In January 2011 the Committee on PGD indications 
recommended lifting the prohibition on exclusion PGD.239 The Secretary of State for 
Health agreed with the Committee that the parent’s right not to know had not been 
taken into consideration sufficiently in the debate on exclusion PGD.240 He therefore 
announced that an amendment of the PGD‑regulation would legalise exclusion PGD 
for HD and similar diseases.241
The PGD regulation was evaluated in 2012.242 The authors of the report, inter alia, 
identified a couple of moral matters involved in PGD which needed further research, 
235 E. Asscher and B.‑J. Koops, ‘The right not to know and preimplantation genetic diagnosis for 
Huntington’s disease’, 36 J Med Ethics (2010) p. 30.
236 See Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 300 XVI, no. 136, p. 10.
237 As explained in an article by Van Rij et al.: ‘The exclusion test is based on identifying the grandparental 
origin of the two HTT alleles. If one of the two alleles from the affected grandparent is found in the 
fetus after exclusion PND, a termination of pregnancy […] is offered, although the fetus only has a 
50 per cent risk of being a carrier of the CAG expansion. In exclusion PGD, only embryos with one 
of the two HTT alleles from the non‑affected grandparent are transferred. Both the availability and 
cooperation of family members in providing a sample for PGD workup is necessary for exclusion 
testing.’ M.C. Van Rij et al., ‘Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for Huntington’s disease: the 
experience of three European centres’, 20 European Journal of Human Genetics (2012) p. 368. For 
another explanation of the method, see www.pgd.org.uk/resources/tests/huntingdon_exclusion.pdf, 
visited November 2012.
238 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 25 424, no. 135, p. 3.
239 Www.pgdnederland.nl/pgd‑en‑de‑samenleving/standpunt‑werkgroep‑PGD‑HD, visited July 2011.
240 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 25 424, no. 135, p. 4. On ‘the right not to know’, see also Asscher and 
Koops 2010, supra n. 235.
241 Idem.
242 N. Steinkamp et al., Evaluatie Regeling Preïmplantatie Genetische Diagnostiek (PGD). 
Besliskader – behoefteraming – ethisch debat [Evaluation of the Regulation preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD). Framework for decision‑making – assessment of needs – ethical debate] 
(Nijmegen, IQ healthcare 2012), online available at www.zonmw.nl/nl/projecten/project‑detail/
evaluatie‑van‑het‑beslissingskader‑pgd‑ervaringen‑van‑professionals‑en‑paren‑met‑kinderwens/
rapport, visited June 2014.







such as a further broadening of the indications for PGD (e.g. hereditary cancers) and 
the concept of ‘desire health care’ (‘wensgeneeskunde’) which could lead to ‘designer 
babies’.
6.3.6.	 Vitrification	of	egg	cells
Vitrification of egg cells (oocyte vitrification or freezing) and subsequent 
cryopreservation have been lawful in the Netherlands since 2011. When the Medical 
Centre of the Free University of Amsterdam announced in 2009 that it intended to 
start offering this treatment, including on non‑medical grounds, this attracted media 
attention243 and various parliamentary questions were asked.244 These prompted the 
Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports to ask the Amsterdam Medical Centre to 
postpone the actual carrying out of the treatment until political agreement upon 
the matter was reached.245 The most controversial was cryopreservation of egg 
cells on non‑medical grounds.246 Some (confessional) political parties claimed, 
inter alia, that vitrification of egg cells was a form of ‘desire health care’, that it 
encouraged the postponement of family planning and that the method unacceptably 
stretched the moratorium on embryo research, as in force at the time.247 Various 
other parties did not object to the method as such, but felt that vitrification was not 
to be covered by the Health Insurance Act, as they considered it ‘a luxurious type of 
care’.248 In 2011 a majority in Parliament agreed that vitrification of egg cells, both on 
medical and non‑medical grounds, was lawful under the existing Dutch legislation, 
provided some conditions were met.249 The reimbursement question was postponed. 
In 2012 the Health Care Insurance Board (College voor zorgverzekeringen (CVZ) 
243 Inter alia, J. Koelewijn, ‘AMC vriest eicellen in voor de 35‑plus wensmoeder’, NRC Handelsblad 
3 October 2009 and p. 1; ‘AMC biedt eicelbewaarservice’, De Telegraaf 5 October 2009, p. 5.
244 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2009/10, 255–257. See also W. Dondorp and G. de Wert, Reageerbuisdebat. 
Over de maakbaarheid van de voortplanting [Test tube debate. On the manipulability of human 
reproduction] (Den Haag, ZonMw 2012) pp. 15–16, online available at www.zonmw.nl/uploads/tx_
vipublicaties/ZonMw_E_G_Reageerbuisdebat170x240.pdf, visited June 2014.
245 ‘Kamer staat vitrificatie toe’, Trouw 15 April 2011, p. 10 and P. Herderscheê, ‘AMC zet gezinspolitiek 
op de agenda; Eicellen invriezen om zwangerschap tot het 50ste jaar mogelijk te maken is volgens CU 
en CDA een brug te ver’, de Volkskrant 16 July 2009, p. 3.
246 Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136, at pp. 177–178. See also J. Nekkebroeck et al., ‘A preliminary profile of 
women opting for oocyte cryopreservation for non‑medical reasons’, 25 Human Reproduction (2010) 
p. i15. See furthermore W. Dondorp et al., ‘Oocyte cryopreservation for age‑related fertility loss’, 27 
Human Reproduction (2012) p. 1231 and H. Mertes et al., ‘Implications of oocyte cryostorage for the 
practice of oocyte donation’, 27 Human Reproduction (2012) pp. 2886–2893.
247 P. Herderscheê, ‘AMC zet gezinspolitiek op de agenda; Eicellen invriezen om zwangerschap tot het 
50ste jaar mogelijk te maken is volgens CU en CDA een brug te ver’, de Volkskrant 16 July 2009, p. 3.
248 A. Reerink, ‘Alleen rijke vrouwen zullen zwangerschap kunnen uitstellen; Politieke partijen voelen 
in periode van bezuinigen weinig voor vergoeden van invriezen eicellen via verzekering’, NRC 
Handelsblad 31 August 2010, p. 3; A. Reerink, ‘Alleen voor rijke vrouwen; Politiek: invriezen eicellen 
voor later gebruik is luxezorg’, NRC Next 1 September 2010 and ‘Eicellen invriezen mag, maar wel op 
eigen kosten’, Nederlands Dagblad 7 April 2011.
249 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 500 XVI, no. 141 and ‘Kamer staat vitrificatie toe’, Trouw 15 April 2011, 
p. 10. The conditions are, inter alia, that women are well informed about the chances of reproduction 
after vitrification and that they are informed that little is as yet known regarding the long‑term effects 
for children born through this technique. Another condition is that the women who make use of 







now Zorginstituut Nederland (the National Health Care Institute)) recommended 
reimbursing vitrification only in cases where certain medical indications were 
present,250 advice which the Minister for Health, Welfare and Sports followed on.251
6.3.7.	 AHR	treatment	and	public	funding
Reimbursement for AHR treatment under the Health Insurance Scheme, which is 
based on the principle of solidarity, has always been a much debated issue in the 
Netherlands. Debates have focused on the ethical acceptability and the medical 
necessity of (certain types of) AHR treatment, as well as on questions of cost 
efficiency.
In 1985 the Central Appeals Court for Public Service and Social Security Matters 
(‘Centrale Raad van Beroep’) ruled that IVF treatment had belonged to standard 
medical practice in the Netherlands since the year 1983.252 This ruling was, however, 
no ground for the legislature to include IVF treatment in the cover under the Health 
Insurance Act (‘Ziekenfondswet’).253 Instead, the Health Care Insurance Board (at 
that time named the ‘Ziekenfondsraad’)254 decided to include IVF treatment in its 
subsidy scheme (‘subsidieregeling’) on the basis of which experimental care was 
financed.255 At maximum three cycles were reimbursed.256 This situation lasted for 
many years.257
cryopreserved egg cells, may not be older than 45 years old. See Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136, at 
p. 178.
250 CVZ, ‘Vitrificatie van eigen eicellen’, report of 3 April 2012, Annex to Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 
000 XVI, no. 190, online available at www.cvz.nl, visited June 2014. See also Dondorp and De Wert 
2012B, supra n. 200, at p. 62.
251 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 XVI, no. 190.
252 CRvB 19 November 1985, ECLI:NL:CRVB:1985:AK2681.
253 See also. G. van Malestein, ‘In vitro fertilisatie in het ziekenfondspakket! Afwijzend besluit Van der 
Reijden juridisch niet meer houdbaar’ [‘In vitro fertilisation in the National Health Scheme! Refusal 
Van der Reijden no longer legally tenable’], 41 Medisch Contact (1986) p. 722. Van Malenstein notes, 
however, that many private insurers nevertheless provided for reimbursement for IVF treatment.
254 Until 1999 the relevant body was called Ziekenfondsraad. From 1999 to 2014 it was named College voor 
zorgverzekeringen (CVZ) and since 1 April 2014 it carries the name Zorginstituut Nederland [National 
Health Care Institute]. See www.zorginstituutnederland.nl/organisatie/historie, visited June 2014.
255 This decision had retrospective effect untill the year 1983. Van Malestein 1986, supra n. 253, at p. 41.
256 Yet in 1993 critique was issued by medical profession on this limitation to three cycles. It was held 
that because of this limitation doctors felt under pressure to make the IVF treatment successful and 
therefore often implanted too many embryos in one cycle, thereby increasing the chances of multiply 
births (and accompanying costs). ‘‘IVF vaker vergoeden’ Grens dwingt artsen tot verhoging’, Trouw 
9 August 1993.
257 See ‘Simons wil subsidie IVF voorlopig handhaven’, Trouw 5 November 1993, p. 5. As of 1998 de 
Ziekenfondsraad even reimbursed IVF treatment carried out in a private (initially non‑licensed) 
clinic. ‘Ziekenfonds gaat IVF vergoeden in prive‑kliniek’, de Volkskrant 25 March 1998, p. 7 and 
‘Ook vergoeding IVF‑behandeling in kliniek Leiden’, NRC Handelsblad 25 March 1998, p. 3. The 
Regeling subsidiëring ziekenfondsraad IVF [Regulation public financing IVF] of 23 November 1989, 
Stcrt. 1990, 20 expired per 1 January 2001.







In 2002 the Health Care Insurance Board held that IVF treatment could no longer 
be considered ‘experimental’ and proposed including it amongst the benefits under 
the Health Insurance Act.258 This recommendation was not fully followed up by the 
legislature; as of 2004 only the second and third IVF cycles were reimbursed under 
the Health Insurance Act.259 The first IVF cycle (including all medicine involved) 
was at the patient’s own cost.260 From the beginning this measure was criticised in 
politics261 and in medical professional circles262 as well by patient interest groups.263 
Inter alia, the argument was made that infertility was an illness and that this 
plan involved serious medical risks, for instance because patients would seek less 
expensive, but risky alternatives. The Netherlands Organisation for Health Research 
and Development furthermore endorsed the widely supported finding that it was 
possible to organise fertility treatment in a more efficient manner (‘doelmatiger zorg’), 
for instance by setting a limit on the number of embryos that could be implanted in 
one IVF cycle.264 At the same time there were (confessional) political parties who 
felt that imposed solidarity by means of the Health Insurance Act was undesirable 
for ‘ideologically highly controversial’ types of treatment like IVF treatment, 
abortion and euthanasia.265 After lengthy discussions,266 the government decided to 
reverse the measure from 2007; the first three IVF/ICSI cycles – including necessary 
medicine and including situations where gametes were donated – were reimbursed 
under the Health Insurance Act. The treatment had to be carried out in a licensed 
establishment; a female insured was entitled to reimbursement up the age of 40 only 
and patients had to pay a fixed amount of 500 euros per IVF cycle.267
This legislation soon again came under pressure as part of the government’s general 
austerity policy. The coalition agreement of 2010 provided that as of January 2013 
258 CVZ, IVF/ICSI: aanbevelingen voor wijziging van de regeling op basis van de resultaten van effect‑ en 
evaluatieonderzoek [IVF/ICSI: recommendations for amendment of the regulation on the basis of the 
results of effects and evaluation research] (Diemen, CVZ 2002).
259 See Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 300 XVI, no. 9.
260 This austerity measure was expected to bring in 25 million euros, but in fact brought in 20 million. 
Stichting Farmaceutische Kengetallen, ‘IVF‑maatregel bespaarde € 20 miljoen’, Pharmaceutisch 
Weekblad (2007) p. 13.
261 Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 200 XVI, no. 143.
262 F. Santing, ‘Meer meerlingen als patient betaalt; Deskundigen vrezen onbedoeld effect van schrappen 
IVF‑vergoeding’, NRC Handelsblad 28 August 2003, p. 2. The Nederlandse Vereniging voor Obstetrie 
en Gynaecologie (NVOG) [Dutch Association for Obstetrics and Gynaecology] even called the 
austerity measures ‘inhuman’. ‘Bezuinigingen op ivf zijn onmenselijk’, de Volkskrant 13 November 
2003, p. 3.
263 E. Bor, ‘Harde streep door kinderwens’, Algemeen Dagblad 2 December 2003, p. 9.
264 ZonMw [The Netherlands Organisation for Health Research and Development], 
Vruchtbaarheidsstoornissen. Kansen voor doelmatiger zorg [Fertility problems. Opportunities for 
more efficient care], report of June 2005, p. 12, Annex to Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29800 XVI, no. 191. 
See also ‘IVF kan twaalf miljoen euro goedkoper; Onderzoek voor ministerie’, NRC Handelsblad 
28 June 2005, p. 3.
265 Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 763, nos. 23 and 57.
266 Inter alia ‘Kamer wil IVF in basisverzekering’, Algemeen Dagblad 6 October 2005, p. 5; ‘Politiek 
kibbelt nog over vergoeding ivf’, Het Financieele Dagblad 19 October 2005, p. 5; ‘Hoogervorst en 
Kamer botsen over vergoeding ivf’, Trouw 14 October 2005, p. 218.
267 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 300 XVI, no. 142, p. 3 and Art. 2.5(1)(3) in conjunction with Art. 1(e) 
Besluit Zorgverzekering [Health Insurance Order], Stb. 2005, 389.







only the first IVF cycle would be reimbursed.268 This plan met with criticism 
from Members of Parliament269 and medical professionals270 and discussions arose 
which were similar to those held in 2004. Once again, more efficient and more 
patient‑friendly alternatives were sought.271 Following a report of the Health Care 
Insurance Board on the matter of 2012,272 a more diversified approach was taken, 
whereby the entitlement to reimbursement was, inter alia, made dependent on the 
woman’s age.273
Since 2013, reimbursement under the Health Insurance Act is provided for the first 
two IVF cycles for female insured patients until the age of 38, provided only one 
embryo is implanted in the woman’s body.274 If the woman is between 38 and 43 
years old, the first three cycles are reimbursed, provided no more than two embryos 
are implanted during the treatment. If the woman has reached the age of 43, IVF 
treatment and other fertility treatment is reimbursed under the Health Insurance Act 
in exceptional circumstances only.275 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) – if 
carried out in conformity with the relevant regulations (see 6.3.5 above) – is also 
covered by the Health Insurance Act.276 Treatment to obtain gametes from a 
268 ‘Vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid’ [‘Freedom and Responsibility’], Regeerakkoord [Coaltion 
Agreement] VVD‑CDA, 30 September 2010, p. 18, online available at www.rijksoverheid.nl/ 
documenten‑en‑publicaties/rapporten/2010/09/30/regeerakkoord‑vvd‑cda.html, visited February 
2011. See also Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 XVI, no. 24. This austerity measure brought in 30 
million euros. Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 300 XVI, no. 142, p. 1.
269 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 500 XVI, no. 46. See also F. Weeda, ‘Ivf bij 41‑plus, dat zijn meestal hoger 
opgeleiden; Vier vragen over bezuinigingen op ivf‑behandelingen’, NRC Handelsblad 15 May 2012.
270 See C. Vos, ‘Bezuinigen op ivf jaagt de kosten op’, de Volkskrant 6 November 2010.
271 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 XVI, no. 24.
272 CVZ, Rapport Uitvoeringstoets alternatieven IVF‑pakketmaatregel [Report examining alternatives to 
the regulation in relation to reimbursement for IVF treatment under the Health Insurance], June 2012, 
Annex to Kamerstukken II 33000 XVI, no. 188, online available at www.cvz.nl/binaries/live/
cvzinternet/hst_content/nl/documenten/rapporten/2012/rpt1206‑uitvoeringstoets‑alt.‑ivf‑maatregel.
pdf, visited October 2012.
273 See Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 XVI, no. 188 and CVZ, Een leeftijdsgrens voor 
vruchtbaarheidsbehandelingen [An age limit for fertility treatment], Annex to Kamerstukken II 
2011/12, 33000‑XVI no. 188.
274 Exceptionally the implantation of two embryos is reimbursed under the Health Insurance Act.
275 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 XVI, no. 188, p. 2. See also www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/
zorgverzekering/basisverzekering, visited January 2013.
276 See CVZ, Preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek (PGD) bij erfelijke borst/ovariumkanker is een te 
verzekeren prestatie [Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in case of hereditary breast or ovary 
cancer is a performance that qualifies for insurance under the Health Insurance Act], standpunt 
Zvw [Opinion Health Insurance Act] of 30 June 2008, online available at www.cvz.nl/binaries/live/
cvzinternet/hst_content/nl/documenten/standpunten/2008/sp0806+pgd+bij+borst‑ovariumkanker.
pdf, visited June 2011 and CVZ, Preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek (PGD) in combinatie met 
HLA‑typering van IVF‑embryo’s ten behoeve van eventuele stamceltransplantatie is verzekerde 
prestatie [Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in combination with HLA typification of IVF 
embryos with a view to a possible stem cell transplantation is a performance that qualifies for insurance 
under the Health Insurance Act], adviesaanvraag Zvw [request for advice under the Health Insurance 
Act] of 24 September 2007, online available at www.cvz.nl/binaries/live/cvzinternet/hst_content/nl/
documenten/standpunten/2007/sp0709+typering+ivf‑embryo‑s.pdf, visited June 2011. It is noteworhty 
that the CVZ had held yet in 2010 (thus before the treatment was legally available in the Netherlands) 
that exclusion‑PGD for HD was covered by the Health Insurance Act. CVZ, Preïmplantatie genetische 
diagnostiek (PGD) met exclusietest bij de ziekte van Huntington [Preimplantation genetic diagnosis 







donor,277 high‑technological surrogacy278 and egg cell vitrification on other grounds 
than medical grounds (see above) are not covered.
Certain costs made in the course of AHR treatment may furthermore qualify for tax 
deductions, so long as these costs are directly related to illness, invalidity or child 
delivery.279
6.3.8. Surrogacy
Dutch legislation and policy takes the discouragement of commercial surrogacy as a 
starting point. With a view to protecting both the interests of the child and the interests 
of the surrogate mother, the relevant legislation has since the late 1980s aimed to 
prevent commercial surrogacy from developing as a phenomenon in society.280 The 
legislature at the time pointed at the risk of emotional problems for the surrogate 
mother in the long run; increased identity problems for any child born through 
surrogacy; the possibility that the natural process of bonding between mother and 
child after birth would be distorted; and the risk that the expectations of the intended 
parents (also referred to as commissioning parents) would not be met, even risking 
their rejection of the child.281 Further grounds for this approach of discouragement 
that have been put forward also more recently are the complex ethical and legal 
questions involved in surrogacy; the view that this practice degrades a surrogate 
mother to a mere ‘means of reproduction’; risks of exploitation of generally less 
wealthy and less educated surrogate mothers; and risks of trade in babies.282
With the inclusion of Articles 151b and 151c in the Criminal Code in the 1993,283 all 
conduct that may advance the supply and demand of surrogacy – such as mediation 
by means of a professional practice or company and advertisements for surrogacy – is 
(PGD) with exclusion test for Huntington’s disease], Standpunt Zvw [Opinion Health Insurance 
Act] of 30 August 2010, online available at www.cvz.nl/binaries/live/cvzinternet/hst_content/nl/
documenten/standpunten/2010/sp1008+pgd+bij+ziekte+van+huntington.pdf, visited July 2011. See 
also Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 25 424, no. 135, p. 5.
277 College voor zorgverzekeringen [Health Care Insurance Board] Opinion of 24 October 2006, 
no. 26084415.
278 College voor zorgverzekeringen [Health Care Insurance Board] Opinion of 20 November 2006, 
no. 26080732.
279 Art. 6.17 Wet Inkomstenbelasting 2001 [Income Tax Act 2001]. Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage 8 January 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:18948, referring (in para. 11) to HR 22 April 2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AT4486.
280 Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 20 706, no. 2, p. 30 et seq; Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 21 968, no. 3, p. 3 and 
Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 2.
281 Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 21 968, no. 3, pp. 1–2.
282 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 123 XVI, no. 30, p. 2.
283 Act of 16 September 1993, Stb. 1993, 486. The Act entered into force on 1 November 1993. Its Art. 151b 
Sr reads:
‘1. A person, who, in the practice of a profession or in carrying on a business, intentionally brings about 
or encourages either direct or indirect negotiations between a surrogate mother or a woman who 
wishes to be a surrogate mother and another person or arranges an appointment in order to carry out 
the intention specified in section 3, is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year or 
a fine of the fourth category.







punishable.284 In practice hardly any prosecutions have been brought on the basis of 
these provisions.285 This has been held to be due to a lack of clarity of the rules and 
difficulties in meeting the burden of proof.286
Altruistic surrogate motherhood or the conclusion of a surrogacy contract as such 
are not punishable, but any such contract cannot be legally enforced in practice.287 
It is not lawful for Dutch clinics to assist in low‑technological surrogacy, but people 
can establish this without medical assistance. As further explained hereafter, the 
2. The punishment in section 1 is also applicable to a person who:
a. publicly offers services consisting of bringing about or promoting negotiations or an appointment 
as specified in setion 1;
b. discloses that a woman wishes to be surrogate mother or is available as such, or thath a woman is 
being sought who wishes to be a surrogate mother or is available as such.
3. The term ‘surrogate mother’ is to be taken to mean a woman who has become pregnant with the 
intention of bearing a child for another who wishes to acquire parental authority over the child or 
otherwise wishes on a permanent basis to care for the child and bring it up.
 Art. 151c Sr reads:
‘1. A person, who, in the practice of a profession or in carrying on a business, intentionally brings about 
or encourages either direct or indirect negotiations between a woman and another person or arranges 
an appointment with respect to her wish on a permanent basis to leave the care for and the upbringing 
of her child to another person, is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than six months or a 
fine of the third category.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions in Art. 151b, section 1, section 1 of this Article is not applicable:
a. where the bringing about or promotion specified in that section is by the Child Care and Protection 
Board or by a juristic person so designated by this Board;
b. where the bringing about or promoting specified in that section consists in a referaal to an 
organization as specified under a.’
 Translations by Rayar and Wadsworth 1997, supra n. 71, at pp. 142–143. Other relevant provisions 
of the Criminal Code are Art. 225 Sr (forgery); Art. 236 Sr (embezzlement of civil status); Art. 442a 
Sr (placement of a child younger than six months old, without permission of the Dutch Children 
Protection Board). Another relevant provision concerns the penalisation of placement of a foreign child 
for adoption without permission of the Central Authority for International Adoption under Art. 28 Wet 
opneming buitenlandse kinderen ter adoptie (Wobka) [Act on the fostering of children from foreign 
countries with the purpose of adoption]. See also Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 3.
284 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 2. For an overview of the legal situation in respect of 
surrogacy until the 1993 legislation, see inter alia A.M.L. Broekhuijsen‑Molenaar, Civielrechtelijke 
aspecten van kunstmatige inseminatie en draagmoederschap [Civil law aspects of artificial 
insemination and surrogacy] (Deventer, Kluwer 1991) pp. 151–177.
285 Boele Woelki et al. point out: ‘An analysis of the legal databases in the field does […] indicate that there 
are very few actual prosecutions. However, it is extremely difficult to obtain a clear impression of why 
few of the cases reported ultimately lead to charges being brought or penalties levied. Nevertheless, no 
real conclusion can be attached to this factual situation, as the causes for the low number of prosecutions 
are diverse and have not been able to be identified.’ Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at p. 305. For 
cases brought on the basis of related provisions of the Criminal Code, see also pp. 44–48 of the report. 
In 1997 report was made of two criminal convictions for mediation in commercial surrogcay by the 
District Court Zutphen. See ‘Vrouw veroordeeld voor advertentie draagmoeder’, de Volkskrant 3 April 
1997. For a published case in which the Dutch State put forward that an international commercial 
surrogacy agreement was against Art. 151b (2)(b) Sr, see Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage (vrzr.) 9 November 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2010:BP3764.
286 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 3.
287 Idem, p. 2 and Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at pp. 36 and 59. The authors conclude (on p. 61 
of the report) that on the one hand a surrogacy agreement has limited effects, but on the other hand, it 
is not entirely without importance. For instance, a contractual agreement is a prerequisite for acces to 
supervised high‑technological surrogacy in the VU Medical Centre (see below).







establishment of parental links between the intended parents and the child may, 
however, be difficult. The Dutch medical profession may only lawfully assist in 
so‑called high‑technological surrogacy and this is subject to strict conditions.288 In 
1998 the Dutch Association for Obstetrics and Gynaecology (Nederlandse Vereniging 
voor Obstetrie en Gynaecologie (NVOG)) drafted a guideline on high‑technological 
surrogacy (Richtlijn Hoogtechnologisch draagmoederschap)289 which, inter alia, 
set medical indications for access to this treatment and conditions for the intended 
parents and the surrogate mother. Also, it provided that counselling must always 
be provided in surrogacy situations. In the Dutch context only the gametes of the 
intended parents may be used in high‑technological surrogacy,290 which implies that 
same‑sex couples are excluded from this treatment. Since 2006 the Medical Centre 
of the Free University of Amsterdam has been exclusively licensed to carry out this 
kind of treatment291 and access to it is subject to strict conditions.292 For instance, 
there must be a medical reason for the surrogacy and the surrogate mother must have 
at least one child of her own. Further, the surrogacy must be altruistic in character, 
although the reimbursement of certain expenses is accepted.293 The Medical Centre 
of the Free University of Amsterdam itself has furthermore set the conditions that 
both the intended parents and the surrogate mother must have Dutch nationality, must 
speak the Dutch language and must be resident in the Netherlands.294 The Minister 
of Health, Welfare and Sports announced in 2012 that she intended to critically 
review the conditions set by the medical profession,295 but, as far as the present 
288 High‑technological surrogacy was introduced in the Netherlands in 1997. See also M.F.M. van den 
Berg and C. Buijssen, ‘Hoogtechnologisch draagmoederschap’ [‘High‑technological surrogacy’], 79 
Nederlands Juristenblad (2004) p. 724 and S.M. Dermout, De eerste logeerpartij, hoogtechnologisch 
draagmoederschap in Nederland [The first time staying over, hightechnological surrogacy in the 
Netherlands] (Groningen, s.n. 2001).
289 Nederlandse Vereniging voor Obstetrie en Gynaecologie (NVOG) [Dutch Association for Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology], Richtlijn Hoogtechnologisch draagmoederschap ]Guideline on high‑technological 
surrogcay] (Utrecht 1999), online available at www.nvog‑documenten.nl/uploaded/docs/richtlijnen_
pdf/18_hoog_draagmoeder.pdf, visited June 2010.
290 Other forms of high‑technological surrogacy – e.g. with the use of donated gametes – are not lawful in 
the Netherlands. See, however, Rb. ‘s‑Hertogenbosch 18 August 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSHE:2011:BR5334. 
In this surrogacy case the Court entrusted the guardianship to the commissioning parents, while the 
child had been conceived during an IVF treatment, whereby use had been made of an egg cell donated 
by a third party (neither the commissioning mother, nor the surrogate mother).
291 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 2. From 1997 to 2004 high‑technological surrogacy 
was provided in the Dutch Centre for non‑commercial IVF Surrogacy in Zaandam. Due to financial 
problems, this centre closed its doors in 2004. In 2006, the Medical Centre of the Free University of 
Amsterdam initiated the second Dutch centre. See S. Dermout et al., ‘Non‑commercial surrogacy: 
an account of patient management in the first Dutch Centre for IVF Surrogacy, from 1997 to 2004’, 
25 Human Reproduction (2010) p. 449. The Amsterdam centre ‘[…] receives on average 20 requests 
annually from those wishing to conceive a child using a surrogate’, of which ‘approximately 10 cases 
annually actually lead to a course of treatment.’ Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at p. 305.
292 Art. 2(4) of Annex to Planningsbesluit in‑vitrofertilisatie, Stcrt. 1998, 95 and the (outdated) guideline 
on high‑technological surrogcay by the Dutch Association for Obstetrics and Gynaecology of 1999, 
supra n. 289.
293 E.g. Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage 11 December 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BB9844.
294 See www.vumc.nl/afdelingen/patientenfolders‑brochures/zoeken‑alfabet/D/hoog_technologisch_
draagmoe1.pdf, visited October 2012.
295 As indicated by the Secretary of State of Justice in his letter to Parliament on surrogate motherhood of 
16 December 2011, Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69.







author is aware, this has as yet not resulted in any changes. Also, the aforementioned 
guidelines on high‑technological surrogacy from 1998 have been outdated since 
2003,296 but have not yet been renewed.297
Dutch civil law does not contain any specific provision on surrogacy.298 Hence, ‘the 
regular rules in the field of parentage, parental responsibility and child protection’ 
apply in surrogacy situations.299 A 2011 research report on surrogacy and unlawful 
placement of children in the Netherlands, concluded that ‘[…] the position of a 
child born by means of surrogacy [was] legally unclear, and uncertainty exist[ed] 
with respect to the legal position of the commissioning parents and the surrogate 
parents.’300 The fact that it is so difficult to establish parental links in surrogacy 
cases, fits in with the policy of discouragement of this phenomenon.301
Following the mater semper certa est rule, the surrogate mother is automatically 
regarded as the legal mother of the child, even if the intended mother is in fact 
genetically related to the child.302 In the case that the surrogate mother is married or 
has a registered partner, her spouse or registered partner is, by operation of the law, 
the second legal parent.303 The establishment of parental links between the intended 
parents and the child requires a (court) procedure.304 While surrogacy agreements 
are non‑enforceable under Dutch law, parties are nonetheless advised to draft an 
agreement, because the Child Welfare Council and the courts may take this into 
account in their assessments related to the establishment of parental links.305
296 Supra n. 286. At p. 6 of the Guideline it is indicated that it ceases to be valid five years after their 
publication.
297 See also Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 400 XVI, no. 155, p. 7.
298 See Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at p. 310.
299 Idem, at pp. 306–307.
300 Idem, at p. 310. At pp. 306–307 of the report, the authors explain in more detail: ‘Dutch law does not 
specifically regulate the consequences of surrogacy in the field of parentage. Accordingly, the regular 
rules in the field of parentage, parental responsibility and child protection apply in these cases. The legal 
position of a child born as a result of surrogacy is uncertain and dependent upon a significant number 
of factors that in and of themselves have little relevance to the surrogacy arrangement. The surrogate is 
always regarded as the legal mother of the child, regardless of whether she has also provided the genetic 
material for the birth. If the surrogate is married, then her husband is also automatically the child’s legal 
father. The transfer of parental rights to the commissioning parents is difficult and the result dependent 
upon a variety of different circumstances. Adoption by at least one of the commissioning parents will 
also be necessary prior to the final transfer of parental rights to both commissioning parents. […] The 
law with respect to the legal transfer of parental rights from the surrogate family to the commissioning 
family is also not catered specifically, meaning that the normal rules of parentage law will apply in 
these cases too.’
301 Idem, at p. 52.
302 Art. 1:198 BW. See also Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 2.
303 Arts. 1:199(a) and 1:198(2) BW. When the surrogate mother is not married, the intended father may 
legally recognise the child before it is born (Art. 1:230 BW).
304 Boele‑Woelki et al. noted in 2011 that in case of supervised high‑technological surrogacy, the procedure 
may be accelerated. In that case the intended parents may be awarded parental rights within one year 
after the child’s birth. Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at p. 52.
305 See www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/erkenning‑kind/vraag‑en‑antwoord/wat‑is‑een‑draagmoeder.
html, visited September 2012.







To establish parental links, first the parental rights of the surrogate mother (and her 
spouse or registered partner) must be removed. This is a child protection measure, 
which requires the involvement of the Child Welfare Council.306 While the intended 
father can recognise the child before birth, joint parental authority with the surrogate 
mother thus must be removed, and the father must be exclusively entrusted with 
parental authority over the child.307
The intended mother – even if she is the genetic mother of the child – or the same‑sex 
partner of the intended father, must subsequently start an adoption procedure.308 The 
couple can ask the Child Welfare Council in advance for permission to foster the 
child (be guardian of the child, ‘voogdij’) until the other intended parent adopts it.309 
Initially it was provided that the other intended parent could request from the Court 
the authorisation of such adoption only if (s)he and the intended father had lived 
together uninterruptedly for a period of at least three years and had jointly cared for 
the child for a period of at least one uninterrupted year immediately preceding the 
adoption request.310 The latter requirement was, however, successfully challenged 
in 2013. On 11 September 2013, the District Court of Northern Netherlands ruled 
that the requirement of Article 1:228(1)(f) that intended parents could adopt a child 
in surrogacy cases only after foster care of one year, constituted an unjustified 
difference in treatment under Article 8 and 14 ECHR.311 Since the year 2009, 
Article 1:228(3) provides for an exception to this rule where a child was born ‘within 
the relationship’ of the birth mother and her same‑sex life partner (the so‑called 
social mother; see Chapter 12, section 12.3.6.4). The Court ruled that in the case at 
hand, the child was not born within the relationship of the intended parents, since 
a third person (the surrogate mother) was involved. Still, the Court compared the 
situation of the intended mother with that of a social mother and concluded that the 
possibilities to establish legally recognised parental links with the child were more 
limited for the intended mother when compared to a social mother. The Court found 
this difference in legal position incompatible with Article 8 (the right to respect for 
family life) in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition on discrimination) ECHR. It 
held the relevant Article 1:228(1) Civil Code not applicable in this case312 and granted 
the adoption order.313
306 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 2.
307 Art. 1:253c (1) and (3) BW.
308 See, inter alia, Hof ’s‑Gravenhage 21 August 1998, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:1998:AD2927; 
Rb. Arnhem 20 February 2008, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2008:BC8012; Hof ’s‑Gravenhage 
10 February 2010, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BL8563 and Hof ’s‑Gravenhage 1 December 2010, 
ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2010:BO7387. See also Rb. Noord‑Holland 20 November 2013, ECLI:NL: 
RBNHO:2013:11109, where in a case concerning low‑technological surrogacy, an adoption order was 
granted to the unmarried, cohabiting intended mother of the intended (and genetic) father.
309 Art. 1:241(3) BW.
310 Art. 1:227(3) and Art. 1:228(1)(f) BW.
311 Rb. Noord‑Nederland 11 September 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2013:5503.
312 Following Art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution, statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom are not 
applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or of resolutions by international 
institutions that are binding on all person.
313 The Court found it established in this case that the surrogate mother had, after the birth of the child, 
confirmed her decision to give up the child and that she had not developed any emotional parental 







The scale on which surrogacy takes place in the Netherlands seems to be fairly 
limited, although exhaustive statistics are lacking. In 2012 the Secretary of State for 
Security and Justice informed Parliament that ‘over the past years’ 10 children had 
been born following high‑technological surrogacy in the Amsterdam VU Medical 
Centre.314 He also mentioned that the Child Welfare Council had come across about 
ten cases of unlawful placement of children (following surrogacy).315 The need for 
a better insight in the scale of the phenomenon has been recognised at government 
level.316
The Dutch government has put an effort in providing clear and accessible information 
about the legal situation concerning surrogacy in the Netherlands, for instance, 
through the websites of the Dutch Ministries of Justice and Security and of Foreign 
Affairs.317 In 2014 it was decided to establish a State Commission on Parenthood 
(‘Staatscommissie Herijking Ouderschap’), which, inter alia, was given the task to 
examine whether there is a need for providing for particular regulation of surrogacy 
in the Dutch Civil Code.318 The Commission will have to issue a report before May 
2016.
6.4. stAtIstIcs on cross‑border movement
6.4.1.	 Statistics	on	cross‑border	abortions
6.4.1.1. Cross‑border movement towards the Netherlands
The Netherlands has been a ‘destination’ country in respect of abortion since the 
first moment abortion practice was liberalised in the 1970s. Cross‑border movement 
took place on a great scale, even though at the time abortions were, strictly speaking, 
illegal (see 6.2.1 above). Because the Pregnancy Termination Act does not set any 
domicile requirement, women from abroad can legally have an abortion in the 
Netherlands.319 Non‑resident women remain anonymous. They have to bear their 
own costs (see 6.2.5 above) and are responsible for obtaining medical aftercare upon 
return to the country of origin.320
relationship with the child. This constituted a sufficient ground for removing her parental authority. 
Also, the best interests of the child did not stand in the way of such removing of her parental authority, 
now that it had been established that the intended parents were the genetic parents of the child.
314 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2012/13, 646.
315 Idem, under reference to Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 500 VI, no.83.
316 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, pp. 4–5.
317 E.g. www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/erkenning‑kind/vraag‑en‑antwoord/wat‑is‑een‑draagmoeder 
.html, visited July 2013. See also Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, pp. 4–5.
318 Regeling van 28 april 2014, no. 512296, houdende instelling van een Staatscommissie Herijking 
Ouderschap [Regulation of 28 April 2014, no. 512296, concerning the installation of a State Commission 
on Parenthood], Stcrt. 2014, 12556.
319 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 30 371, no. 20, p. 8.
320 Idem, at p. 3.







The Healthcare Inspectorate has been reporting on recorded abortion data since 1985. 
Earlier statistics are based on estimates. For a long time registration on the basis 
of the Pregnancy Termination Act provided a specification for four countries only: 
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain. In 1984, when the relevant registration 
forms were drafted, most foreign women who had an abortion in the Netherlands 
came from these four countries.321 Other countries of origin were not explicitly 
specified in the registration. Since 1 January 2011 a new registration form has been 
in use, in which Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland and Poland are included. The 
duration of the pregnancy of women who are not resident in the Netherlands is not 
separately registered.322
It was estimated that in 1975 approximately 80,000 non‑resident women were treated 
in Dutch abortion clinics,323 compared to 15,000 women resident in the Netherlands. 
Most of the foreign women were resident in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Belgium and Luxembourg.324 For the 1977 it was reported that approximately 65,000 
women were treated in Dutch abortion clinics, of whom about two thirds were women 
from the Federal Republic of Germany.325 Only since 1986 has the number of women 
residing in the Netherlands, outweighed the number of non‑resident women.326 Since 
that time the number of non‑resident women who had their pregnancies terminated 
in the Netherlands has gradually declined.327 In 2010 approximately one out of eight 
abortions involved a woman who was resident outside the Netherlands.328
321 Jaarrapportage 2010 van de Wet afbreking zwangerschap [Annual Report under the Pregnancy 
Termination Act 2010] Utrecht, December 2011, Annex 2, table A, online available at www.rijksoverheid.
nl/onderwerpen/abortus/documenten‑en‑publicaties/rapporten/2011/12/14/igz‑jaarrapportage‑2010‑
wet‑afbreking‑zwangerschap.html, visited March 2012.
322 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 30 371, no. 20, pp. 7–8. See also Appendix B to Besluit vaststelling model 
formulieren Besluit afbreking zwangerschap [Decree on model forms for Decree termination 
pregnancy], Stcrt. 2010, no. 20555.
323 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 14.
324 J. Rademakers, Abortus in Nederland 1993–2000. Jaarverslag van de landelijke abortusregistratie 
[Abortion in the Netherlands 1993–2000. Annual report of the national abortion registration] 
(Heemstede, StiSAN 2002) p. 37.
325 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, nos. 1–4, p. 14, referring to ‘E. Ketting and P. Schnabel, De 
abortus‑hulpverlening in 1977’. See also Rademakers 2002, supra n. 324, at p. 37.
326 Rademakers 2002, supra n. 324, at p. 37.
327 The exact numbers of pregnancy termination with non‑resident women, when compared to the total 
number of pregnancy terminations in the Netherlands are as follows: 1980: 36,700 out of 56,400 (65.07 
per cent); 1985: 20,721 of 37,900 (54.57 per cent); 1995: 7,753 of 28,685 (27.02 per cent); 2000: 6,130 of 
33,335 (18.39 per cent); 2005: 4,244 of 28,738 (14.77 per cent); 2006: 5,251 of 32,992 (15.92 per cent); 
2007: 4,818 of 33,148 (14.53 per cent); 2008: 4,513 of 32,983 (13.38 per cent); 2009: 4,108 of 32,427 (12.67 
per cent); 2010: 4,260 of 30,984 (13.75 per cent). The figures in respect of the year 2010 were estimated. 
Jaarrapportage 2010 van de Wet afbreking zwangerschap, December 2011, p. 14, online available 
at www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/abortus/documenten‑en‑publicaties/rapporten/2011/12/14/
igz‑jaarrapportage‑2010‑wet‑afbreking‑zwangerschap.html, visited March 2012.
328 Jaarrapportage 2010 van de Wet afbreking zwangerschap, December 2011, p. 7, online available 
at www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/abortus/documenten‑en‑publicaties/rapporten/2011/12/14/
igz‑jaarrapportage‑2010‑wet‑afbreking‑zwangerschap.html, visited 30 March 2012.







6.4.1.2. Cross‑border movement from the Netherlands
Halfway through the first decade of the new millennium, some media reports were 
made of women having abortions in countries where the statutory limit for a lawful 
abortion was set later than the 24‑week limit of the Netherlands. Consequently 
parliamentary questions were asked.329 The Dutch Secretary of State for Health, 
Welfare and Sports responded that this occurred only incidentally and that a Dutch 
doctor who referred a woman to a foreign clinic was not liable to punishment.330 
Soon, a new controversy arose in respect of a particular abortion clinic in Barcelona 
(Spain), where – so it was reported – women who were seven months pregnant could 
have their pregnancies terminated.331 In one case charges were brought against a 
Dutch woman who had an abortion in the Spanish clinic after 28 weeks of pregnancy, 
but later these were dropped, on grounds of the special circumstances of the case.
6.4.1.3. Women on Waves
The Dutch NGO Women on Waves (WoW) has played its own particular role in 
respect of cross‑border abortions. WoW ‘aims to prevent unsafe abortions and 
empower women to exercise their human rights to physical and mental autonomy.’332 
With its ship that sails under the Dutch flag, WoW regularly sets sail to countries 
with restrictive abortion regimes. Just outside the territorial waters – where the local 
laws do not apply – the organisation provides ‘contraceptives, information, training, 
workshops, and safe and legal abortion services’.333 Since 2008, the organisation has 
been licensed to carry out first trimester abortions in a mobile clinic aboard the 
ship.334 Various court proceedings preceded the award of this license, as the Minister 
of Health, Welfare and Sports first refused to award any license and later subjected the 
license to the condition that pregnancy termination could only be carried out within 
a radius of 25 kilometres from the Slotervaart hospital in Amsterdam, with which 
WoW had concluded a cooperation‑agreement.335 This requirement was, however, 
nullified by the highest administrative court, after which the Minister awarded the 
license without the radius condition.336 Before the license was awarded, Women on 
Waves was active in respect of the so‑called ‘overtijdbehandeling’, as this treatment 
was, at the time, held to fall outside the scope of the Pregnancy Termination Act (see 
329 Handelingen II 2004/05, 71, pp. 4362–4364.
330 Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 800 XVI, no. 211, pp. 1–2.
331 See ‘Spaanse kliniek aborteert foetussen van zeven maanden’, de Volkskrant 31 October 
2006, online available at www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2668/Buitenland/article/detail/788533 
/2006/10/31/Spaanse‑kliniek‑aborteert‑foetussen‑van‑zeven‑maanden.dhtml, visited June 2010. See 
also www.eenvandaag.nl/buitenland/31272/abortus_na_zwangerschap_van_7_maanden, visited 
June 2010; www.netwerk.tv/node/1696, visited June 2010 and www.nos.nl/artikel/58692‑abortusklinie
k‑spanje‑opnieuw‑in‑opspraak.html, visited June 2010. See also Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2006/07, 
987.
332 Www.womenonwaves.org/en/page/650/who‑are‑we, visited June 2014.
333 Idem.
334 The license has been awared on the basis of Art. 2 Waz.
335 Rb. Amsterdam 1 June 2004, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2004:AP1251 and Rb. Amsterdam 28 February 2005, 
AWB 04/3469, unpublished. See also Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2003/04, 1895.
336 ABRvS 3 May 2006, ECLI:NL:RVS:2006:AW7365.







6.2.2.1 above).337 Within Europe WoW has visited Ireland (2001),338 Poland (2003), 
Portugal (2004) and Spain (2008)339 and by doing so it has facilitated cross‑border 
movement for abortions in its own and unique way.
6.4.2.	 Statistics	on	cross‑border	reproductive	care
Cross‑border reproductive care (CBRC) is a hot topic in Dutch media, academia 
and politics.340 The incidence of CBRC is generally acknowledged by the Dutch 
government, and has in some cases formed part of the grounds on which policy 
choices were based. As is the case for many more countries, the Dutch authorities 
do not keep statistics on CBRC on a structural basis. For example, unlike abortion 
clinics, AHR clinics are not under a legal obligation to register the country of 
residence of their patients, the services recipients. This is different, however, when 
it comes to donation of gametes, as the Donor Information Act requires clinics to 
register all personal information of the donor, as well as of the woman receiving the 
donor material (see 6.3.3 above).
In general it is estimated that annually 9,000 IVF treatments are carried out in the 
Netherlands. In addition, on an annual basis approximately 1,000 women from the 
Netherlands have IVF treatment in a foreign country.341 The Dutch authorities are 
not aware how many of them are reimbursed for the costs under the Health Insurance 
Act.342 The estimates for the wider Europe are between 10,000 and 15,000 patients 
involved in CBRC every year.343
The following subsections discuss statistics (to the extent that these are available) as 
well as estimates of the scale on which cross‑border movement takes place in respect 
of particular kinds of treatment. Discussed are, inter alia, cross‑border donation of 
gametes and the import of gametes, PGD and surrogacy.
337 Www.womenonwaves.org/en/page/611/legal‑position‑of‑women‑on‑waves, visited June 2014. See also 
‘Abortusboot mag de overtijdpil geven’, Het Parool 1 July 2002, p. 6.
338 According to CNN about 80 Irish women had contacted Women on Waves. ‘Crossing the sea for an 
abortion’, cnn.com 4 March 2002. The Lancet even spoke of more than 300 women. K. Birchard, 
‘Abortion boat faces legal complications’, The Lancet 23 June 2001. See also ‘Irish should not have to 
travel for abortion – poll’, The Irish Times 1 June 2001, p. 5 and ‘Abortusboot vaart volgende week uit; 
Women on Waves verwacht geen juridische problemen in Ierland’, de Volkskrant 7 June 2001, p. 38.
339 See www.womenonwaves.org/en/page/2582/ship‑campaigns, visited June 2014. On its visit to Portugal, 
see also ch. 2, section 2.4.1.
340 E.g. ‘600 paren jaarlijks naar België voor ivf’, Algemeen Dagblad 30 June 2009, p. 11; ‘Vergoeding 
Ivf‑behandeling leent zich niet voor ‘u vraagt, wij draaien’ Nadya wilde groot gezin’, Nederlands 
Dagblad 11 February 2009, p. 12.; J. Kremer et al., ‘Zorg over de grens. Geen grip op kwaliteit van 
buitenlandse fertiliteitsbehandelingen’ [‘Care across the border. No grip on the quality of foreign 
fertily treatment’], 62 Medisch Contact (2007) p. 1343 and Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 238.
341 Derksen and Staal 2012, supra n. 152, at p. 19 and ‘Uw lichaam is geld waard’, Trouw 4 March 2011.
342 Derksen and Staal 2012, supra n. 152, at p. 19.
343 Idem, at p. 6.







6.4.2.1. Cross‑border donation of gametes and import of gametes
Dutch media regularly report on Dutch women and couples going abroad – many 
to Belgium or Spain – for IVF treatment with the use of (anonymously and/or 
commercially) donated gametes.344 The strict Dutch legislation in respect of the 
donation of gametes and embryos is often held to be a cause for the shortage of 
gametes in the Netherlands and therefore a ground for going abroad. Some Dutch 
couples find donor identifiability simply not desirable.345 The Dutch age limits for 
access to IVF treatment are another often reported reason.346 It has been reported 
that in addition to the 100 to 150 women who have IVF treatment with the use of 
donated gametes in the Netherlands, every year another 1,000 women go to Spain 
and Belgium for such treatment.347 According to Pennings, the entry into force of the 
Donor Information Act in 2004 led to a ‘steep increase in patients going to Belgium 
where anonymity [was] maintained’. He reported that ‘[…] between 2004 and 2005, 
the number of Dutch patients going to Belgium for donor insemination almost 
doubled from 57 to 99 patients’.348
In 2010 a team of researchers from various Dutch universities carried out a survey 
on egg cell donation amongst gynaecologists registered with the Dutch Society of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology (NVOG). The following results were reported:
‘Of 94 out 101 Dutch fertility units at least one gynaecologist answered the questionnaire 
(response 93.1%). Gynaecologists in 47 hospitals supported patients who participated in 
commercial egg donation programmes in a foreign country. The same number provided 
no support for these patients. Compared to the interval 2000–2004 in the interval 2005–
2008 requests for participation increased from 62 to 179 (increase 288%). We also found 
a three fold increase of patients who actually went abroad to participate in a commercial 
egg donation program (45 versus 149, increase 331%) and a similar increase in care for 
pregnancies originating from commercial egg donation (32 versus 98, increase 306%). 
344 E.g. E. van Zalinge, ‘In Nederland bijna geen eiceldonor beschikbaar Buitenland kan oudere vrouw 
uitkomst bieden’, Het Parool 25 August 1994, p. 5; ‘Uw lichaam is geld waard’, Trouw 4 March 2011; 
C. Houtekamer, ‘Het lichaam is geld waard, maar niet bij ons; Daarom wijken sommige kopers voor 
een nier, bot of een eicel uit naar het buitenland’, NRC Handelsblad 4 March 2011, p. 5. The CVZ 
reported that many Dutch women go to Spain and Russia, where young women donate egg‑cells 
in return for high sums of money. CVZ, In‑vitrofertilisatiebehandelingen. Een verkenning [IVF 
treatment. An exploration] Report of 10 April 2010, pp. 11–12, online available at www.cvz.nl/binaries/
live/cvzinternet/hst_content/nl/documenten/rapporten/2010/rpt1004+pakketadvies+2010+‑+ivf.pdf, 
visited October 2010. See also Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 238 and I. Geesink and C. Steegers, 
Nier te koop, baarmoeder te huur: wereldwijde handel in lichaamsmateriaal [Kidney for sale, uterus 
to let: worldwide trade in human body material] (Amsterdam, Bakker 2011).
345 G. Pennings, ‘The rough guide to insemination: cross‑border travelling for donor semen due to different 
regulations’, Facts, Views and Vision in ObGyn, Monograph (2010) pp. 56–57, online available at www.
fvvo.eu/assets/103/21‑Pennings.pdf, visited May 2014. See also Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 30 486, 
no. 5, p. 18.
346 ‘Uw lichaam is geld waard’, Trouw 4 March 2011.
347 C. Houtekamer, ‘Het lichaam is geld waard, maar niet bij ons; Daarom wijken sommige kopers voor 
een nier, bot of een eicel uit naar het buitenland’, NRC Handelsblad 4 March 2011, p. 5.
348 Pennings 2010, supra n. 345, at pp. 56–57, referring to G. Pennings et al., ‘Cross‑border reproductive 
care in Belgium’, 24 Human Reproduction (2009) p. 3108.







The large majority of patients took their own initiative to find an institution to help them 
with their aim to achieve a pregnancy. […] Only in about 10% gynaecologists referred 
patients to an acquainted clinic abroad or recommended such a clinic. Most Dutch couples 
visit Spain (n = 109) for commercial‑egg donation, followed by Belgium (n = 32), Eastern 
Europe (15) and the United States of America (11). Most women who travel abroad for 
a commercial egg donation program are 41 years or older. […] The estimated price per 
treatment cycle lies between 3,000 and 10,000 euro’s. Especially in the United States 
couples paid up till more than 30,000 euro’s per treatment.’349
The Dutch Minister of Health, when referring to this research, underlined that these 
only concerned cases in which Dutch gynaecologists were involved. The Minister 
therefore assumed that the actual numbers were higher. Still, the Minister considered 
this to be a small portion of the 9,000 IVF treatments carried out in the Netherlands 
annually. She maintained that a (possible) shortage in donated egg cells was not an 
automatic consequence of the Dutch prohibitions on anonymous and commercial 
egg cell donation.350
The aforementioned researchers furthermore concluded that 34 per cent of the 
Dutch gynaecologists who participated in their research, considered commercial egg 
donation unethical, while 56 per cent were willing to provide support for those who 
seek help for commercial egg donation abroad. It was reported that 36 per cent of the 
responding Dutch gynaecologists were of the opinion that commercial egg donation 
should be legalised in the Netherlands.351
Cross‑border movement may also take more implicit forms, for instance when 
gametes originating of foreign donors are used in the course of IVF treatment in 
Dutch clinics. Statistics of the Dutch Donor Information Registration Foundation 
(Stichting Donorgegevens Kunstmatige Bevruchting)352 paint the following 
picture.353 In the period May 2006 – the date when the central digital registration 
system of the Foundation came into operation – up until 2012, 320 egg cell donors 
349 M.H. Van Hooff et al., ‘O‑199 Cross‑border reproductive care for egg‑donation in Dutch women’, 25 
Human Reproduction (2010) p. i79, online available at www.humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/25/
suppl_1/i77.abstract3, visited May 2014. The authors explicitly stated that ‘[t]he incidence of cross 
border reproductive care for commercial egg‑donation between 2000–2008 was estimated.’ See also 
Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 2303, p. 2, where reference to this research is made. The same 
research was also discussed in I. van der Meer‑Noort et al., ‘Cross border reproductive care; gebruik 
van eiceldonatie in het buitenland door Nederlandse vrouwen’ [‘Cross‑border reproductive care; use of 
egg cell donation by Dutch women in foreign countries’], 128 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Obstetrie & 
Gynaecologie (2011) p. 98.
350 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 2303, p. 2. See also Derksen and Staal 2012, supra n. 152, at p. 6, 
where – so it seems‑ reference is made to the same survey.
351 Van Hooff et al. 2010, supra n. 349, at p. i79.
352 Following Art. 2(1) Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting, all establishments who offer AHR 
treatment with the use of donated gametes have to provide data about these treatments and donors 
involved to the Stichting Donorgegevens Kunstmatige Bevruchting [Donor Information Registration 
Foundation].
353 Stichting Donorgegevens Kunstmatige Bevruchting, Jaarverslag 2012 [Annual report 2012], Annex to 
Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33750‑XVI‑76.







where registered, of which 4 donors were resident abroad.354 This resulted in 289 
successful treatments including donated egg cells, 4 of which involved acceptors 
resident abroad.355 The Foundation registered 1,224 sperm donors, of whom 157 were 
resident abroad.356 A total number of 4,381 successful treatments with donated sperm 
were registered, of which 146 concerned situations were the acceptors (the women) 
were resident abroad.357 Particularly since the 2010 a clear increase in cross‑border 
cases is visible.358
6.4.2.2. Cross‑border movement for PGD
When it comes to PGD, little is known in respect of cross‑border movement to and from 
the Netherlands. There are no official statistics kept in this respect. The Maastricht 
Medical Centre only registers the number of official references to their Brussels 
based partner clinic.359 For example, in the period 1995–2010 – before exclusion PGD 
for HD was lawful in the Netherlands (see 6.3.5 above) – the Maastricht Medical 
Centre referred 22 couples to the Brussels clinic.360
6.4.2.3. Miscellaneous
In addition to cross‑border movement related to IVF, gamete donation and PGD, 
other types of CBRC involves movement from (and possibly to) the Netherlands. 
In the past, there have been various reports of cross‑border movement in respect of 
treatment which at the time was still considered ‘experimental’ and thus not offered 
in the Netherlands, such as ICSI,361 TESA and MESA.362 Further, there have been 
354 One egg cell donor was resident in Belgium, one in France and two others in Germany.
355 One acceptor was resident in France, the other three in Germany.
356 The breakdown of these numbers is as follows: 1 in Australia; 4 in Belgium; 101 in Germany; 2 in 
Canada; 1 in Costa Rica; 32 in Denmark; 1 in France; 1 in Greece; 1 in Indonesia; 1 in Latvia; 1 in New 
Zealand; 1 in Portugal; 1 in Surinam and 2 in Switzerland; and 7 in the United States of America.
357 The breakdown of these numbers is as follows: 1 in Australia; three in Belgium; 92 in Germany; 38 in 
France; 7 in Italy; 1 in Luxembourg; 1 in Austria; 1 in Spain; and 1 in Switzerland.
358 In the period May 2006 up until 2010, 152 egg cell donors were registered, of which three were resident 
abroad. This resulted in 152 successful treatments including donated egg cells, two of which involved 
acceptors resident abroad. The Foundation registered 696 sperm donors, of whom 54 were resident 
abroad. A total number of 2,798 successful treatments with donated sperm were registered, of which 79 
concerned situations were the acceptors (the women) were resident abroad. Stichting Donorgegevens 
Kunstmatige Bevruchting, Jaarverslag 2010 [Annual report 2010], Annex to Kamerstukken II 32500‑
XVI, no. 154, pp. 8–9.
359 See www.brusselsivf.be/default.aspx?lang=EN, visited July 2013 and Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 32279, 
no. 24, p. 7.
360 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 25 424, no. 135, p. 4, specifiying (in footnote 9) the following numbers for the 
following years: 2010: 3 referrals; 2009: 7 referrals; 1995–2008: 12 referrals.
361 Inter alia, V. Cotterell, ‘Supermethode in buurlanden’, Het Parool 24 March 1997, p. 1 and 
Ziekenfondsraad (Commissie beroepszaken) [Health Care Insurance Board (Appeals Commission)] 
24 November 1994, case 260‑4451.
362 See ‘Zorgverzekeraars: reageerbuisbaby hoort thuis in ziekenfondspakket’, de Volkskrant 27 March 
2002, p. 1, where it was reported that annually ‘hundreds of Dutch people’ went to Belgian and German 
hospitals for PESA, MESA and TESE techniques. See also Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ) 
19 December 2006, case GS/26100379.







reports of couples or women going abroad for so‑called ‘assisted hatching’363 and for 
egg cell vitrification on social grounds at a time when it was not yet practiced in the 
Netherlands.364 Also, in early 2011, it was reported that a Dutch IVF clinic referred 
clients to a clinic in Belgium, where – allegedly – gender selection was carried out.365 
Indirect forms of cross‑border movement concern situations in which certain aspects 
of AHR treatment are outsourced to foreign clinics.366
6.4.3.	 Cross‑border	surrogacy
There are no official or exhaustive statistics in respect of the number of Dutch couples 
and individuals who conclude surrogacy agreements in foreign countries. There is 
only incidental evidence from case law or cases that are reported to authorities in any 
other way. As Boele‑Woelki et al. explain:
‘[…], it is […] difficult to determine the scope of occurrence of surrogacy and any connected 
unlawful placements of children in The Netherlands. The Child Protection Board and the 
Central Authority for Adoption probably only receive a section of the surrogacy cases that 
occur in The Netherlands or abroad.’367
That some cross‑border movement takes place, is not, however, in question.368 
Particularly in the past decade, various cross‑border surrogacy cases have come 
before the Dutch courts, some of which attracted wide media coverage and political 
attention.369 Greece is the most often mentioned destination country within the EU, 
363 The American Society for Reproductive Medicine defines assisted hatching as ‘a procedure in which 
the zona pellucida (outer covering) of the embryo is partially opened, usually by application of an 
acid or laser, to facilitate embryo implantation and pregnancy.’ See www.asrm.org/topics/detail.
aspx?id=374, visited June 2014.
364 Van der Meer‑Noort et al. 2011, supra n. 349, at p. 100.
365 The report was made in the TV programme Uitgesproken EO (broadcast of 27 January 2011), online 
available at www.eo.nl/tv/devijfdedag/aflevering‑detail/uitgesproken‑94, visited April 2011. As is the 
case under Dutch law, gender selection is prohibited under Belgian law. The Minister of Health, Welfare 
and Sports informed Parliament that the Belgian Health Inspectorate had referred the case to the police 
and that the Dutch Public Prosecutor saw no reason to prosecute the case. Possible grounds for criminal 
liability were Art. 26(2) Embryowet; Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg (Wet BIG) 
[Act on professions in individual health care] and Art. 326 Sr (the relevant provision of the Criminal 
Code on fraud). Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 2019–2020.
366 For example the Dutch Geertgen clinic, a non‑licensed IVF clinic which operates the only egg cell 
donation programme in the Netherlands, outsources the actual in vitro fertilisation of embryos to 
an IVF‑clinic in Düsseldorf (Germany). The Dutch Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports held this 
to be not against the relevant Dutch legislation, such as the WMBV and the IVF planningsbesluit. 
Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2011/12, 761, p. 3 and Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2011/12, 819, p. 2.
367 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at p. 310.
368 Idem, at p. 303.
369 A case which attracted an extraordinary amount of media and political attention concerned the case of 
‘baby Donna’, concerning a Belgian woman who had concluded a surrogacy agreement with a Belgian 
couple. She became pregnant after insemination with the sperm of the intended father. Halfway 
the pregnancy she falsely informed the intended parents that she had had a miscarriage. After the 
child was born, a Dutch couple adopted the child, paying the surrogate mother an amount of – so 
it was reported – 12,000 euro. When the Belgian couple found out about the deceit, they intiated 







but there have also been reports from couples who went to Belgium,370 the United 
Kingdom371 and France372 for surrogacy purposes. Most other reported cases concern 
countries outside the EU, such as Ukraine, India and the United States of America.373
Given the strict Dutch legislation in respect of surrogacy, it is not very likely that 
the Netherlands functions as a destination country in respect of surrogacy. In fact, 
the (debatable) rules set by the Medical Centre of the Free University of Amsterdam 
(see 6.3.8 above) – the only licensed centre in the Netherlands for high‑technology 
surrogacy – explicitly exclude foreigners, whether intended parents, or surrogate 
mothers.




The Dutch Criminal Code applies to anyone who commits a crime on Dutch 
territory.374 The Dutch Criminal Code may also apply to certain crimes committed 
outside Dutch territory, but its provisions on abortion and surrogacy are not amongst 
the provisions of the Criminal Code in respect of which this is made possible.375 The 
same holds for the penal provisions of the Embryo Act.
court proceedings against the surrogate mother and the Dutch adoptive parents. The Dutch Court of 
Appeal ruled in 2008 that it was in the child’s best interests if she stayed with the Dutch couple who 
had adopted her. In 2012, the Belgian judge imposed (modest) fines on all persons involved in the 
illegal adoption of the child. See, inter alia, J. van Poppel, ‘Draagmoederdrama verscheurt Vlaams 
gezin; Baby Donna’, Algemeen Dagblad 24 May 2005, p. 3; D. de Gruijl, ‘Kinderdroom gezin uit 
Leusden loopt uit op nachtmerrie, draagmoeder van Donna opgepakt; Jansen: ‘het is mijn kind. 
we zijn een gelukkig gezin’’, Het Parool 25 May 2005, p. 99; ‘Baby Donna blijft na kort geding 
voorlopig in Nederland’, Trouw 6 July 2005, p. 6 and ‘Rechter geeft boetes voor babyverkoop’, AD/
Algemeen Dagblad 13 October 2012, p. 10. For the Dutch court judgments in this case, see Rb. 
Utrecht 24 October 2007, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2007:BB6360 and Hof Amsterdam 25 November 2008, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BG5157. For other examples see Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 31 200 XVI, 
no. 154 and Kamerstukken II 2008/09, Aanhangsel, nos. 1225, 1226 and 1227.
370 Although from the Dutch perspective it was strictly speaking an interstate adoption case, 
the Baby Donna case (see above), was an example of cross‑border movement from the 
Netherlands to Belgium in which surrogacy was involved. Rb. Utrecht 24 October 2007, 
ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2007:BB6360 and Hof Amsterdam 25 November 2008, ECLI:NL: 
GHAMS:2008:BG5157. Another Belgian surrogacy case was reported in E. Winkel et al., 
‘Draagmoederschap na ivf in het buitenland. Dilemma’s bij de begeleiding’, 154 Nederlands Tijdschrijft 
voor Geneeskunde (2010) p. A1777.
371 Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage 11 December 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BB9844.
372 Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage 14 September 2009, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BK1197.
373 E.g. Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage (vrzr.) 9 November 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2010:BP3764; Rb.’s‑Gravenhage 
24 October 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BU3627 and Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage 18 January 2012, 
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV2597.
374 Art. 2 Sr.
375 Art. 4 Sr.







Article 5(1) of the Criminal Code provides that the Criminal Code may also 
be applicable in situations where a Dutchman has committed a crime in another 
country, but a requirement of double criminality applies in these cases.376 This 
condition renders criminal prosecution for abortions, AHR treatment or surrogacy 
on the basis of this Article uncommon. A rare example where criminal investigations 
were initiated (but later dropped) against a Dutch woman who had had an abortion 
in Spain, has been referred to above (section 6.2.4).
6.5.2.	 Public	funding	for	treatment	obtained	abroad
Dutch legislation does not make special provision for the reimbursement for abortions 
obtained abroad under the statutory health scheme, but there is no reason to assume 
that this would not be remunerated if the general conditions for reimbursement for 
medical treatment obtained abroad have been met.377
Reimbursement for AHR treatment obtained abroad, however, has been and is much 
debated and has resulted in various legal disputes.378 The CJEU’s case law in respect 
of cross‑border health care (see chapter 3) has had a clear impact on the relevant 
rulings of the Dutch Courts.
Until 2004, AHR treatment, including IVF treatment, was not covered by the 
Dutch Health Insurance Act (Ziekenfondswet), but only financed on the basis of the 
subsidy scheme (Subsidieregeling; see 6.3.7 above). This had as a consequence that 
in cross‑border situations, Dutch courts initially ruled that the reciprocity rule did 
not apply and hence that a refusal to reimburse AHR treatment obtained in another 
EU Member State constituted no violation of free movement rules.379 Later, various 
courts accepted that a refusal to reimburse IVF treatment obtained in another EU 
Member State under the subsidy scheme constituted a restriction of free movement, 
but held that this restriction could be justified, for instance, as some Dutch courts 
held, for reasons of complexity of the treatment and quality of the care as well as on 
ethical grounds.380
376 See Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at pp. 40–41, under reference (in footnote 49) to: ‘Noyon 
Langemeyer Remmelink, Het wetboek van strafrecht, Artikel 5, J.W. Fokkens, aantek. 9.’
377 See Ch. 3, section 3.5 for the relevant standards in the EU context. As noted above in section 6.2.5 
women from abroad who have a pregnancy terminated in the Netherlands have to bear the expenses 
themselves.
378 Derksen and Staal 2012, supra n. 152, at p. 6. See also inter alia Rb. Utrecht 24 May 2002, 
ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2002:AE3518; and CRvB 31 January 2007, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2007:AZ8510.
379 In the year 2000 – when IVF treatment was not yet covered by the Health Insurance Act – the 
Central Appeals Court for Public Service and Social Security Matters ruled that an insured was 
not entitled to reimbursement for IVF treatment obtained in a Belgian clinic. CRvB 11 July 2000, 
ECLI:NL:CRVB:2000:ZB8921.
380 For example, in 2002 the District Court of Utrecht ruled that a refusal by a health insurer to reimburse 
the costs of treatment carried out in a Belgian IVF clinic constituted a restriction of the freedom to 
receive services, which could be justified on grounds of the CJEU judgments in the cases Decker and 
Kohll and Smits and Peerbooms (see Ch. 3). Rb. Utrecht 24 May 2002, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2002:AE3518. 
See also Rb. Almelo 13 November 2003, ECLI:NL:RBALM:2003:BM5834. The Court ruled first of all 







As the case law of the CJEU on cross‑border health care evolved,381 Dutch courts 
increasingly often ruled that a refusal to reimburse IVF treatment obtained in a clinic 
in another EU Member State on the ground that this clinic was not licensed under 
Dutch law, constituted an unjustified restriction of free movement.382 Of particular 
importance was a ruling of the Central Appeals Court for Public Service and Social 
Security Matters of 2007.383 This Court accepted that the Dutch rule that treatment 
was only reimbursed if obtained in a licensed establishment, constituted a restriction 
of the freedom to receive services. In its assessment of the possible justifications 
for this restriction, the Court held that purely financial reasons were insufficient. It 
was not convinced that without the licensing requirement, it would be impossible 
to control expenditure without adversely affecting the overall level of public health 
protection. The Court furthermore rejected the argument put forward by the health 
insurer that an efficient organisation of the supervision of the quality of care could 
only be guaranteed if AHR treatment was only reimbursed when obtained in a clinic 
licensed under Dutch law. The Central Appeals Court did not exclude that ethical 
reasons could constitute an imperative requirement under rule of reason exception, 
but held that these ethical objectives could be attained by a less restrictive measure, 
namely by the relevant Planning Order for in vitro fertilisation (Planningsbesluit in 
vitro fertilisatie).384 With this ruling, many of the previously accepted justifications 
were no longer valid.
In line with the case law of the CJEU, it is now well‑established case law that all 
medical care – including AHR treatment – that is covered by the Dutch Health 
Insurance Act, is also reimbursed if obtained in another EU Member State.385 Further, 
also in line with CJEU case law, various Dutch Health Insurers require a referral from 
the general practitioner and set a prior authorisation requirement for IVF treatment 
in a foreign country.386 More controversial are those situations where the treatment 
ruled that IVF treatment was not amongst the benefits provided for under the Health Insurance Act, and 
that therefore Art. 22 of Regulation 1408/71 did not apply to a case where IVF treatment was obtained 
in a German clinic. It furthermore ruled that the Subsidieregeling did not apply to the case at hand as 
the German clinic was no licensed establishment within the meaning of the Subsidieregeling. See also 
Rb. Maastricht 28 June 2004, ECLI:NL:RBMAA:2004:AP8808.
381 Most importantly Case C‑385/99 Müller‑Fauré and van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C: 
2003:270. See ch. 3 section 3.5.2.1.
382 E.g. Rb. Amsterdam 7 October 2003, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2003:AN9606 and Rb. Utrecht 13 July 2004, 
case no. SBR03/1073, unpublished. For a ruling to a contrary effect, see Rb. Maastricht 28 June 2004, 
ECLI:NL:RBMAA:2004:AP8808.
383 CRvB 31 January 2007, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2007:AZ8510.
384 Idem.
385 See Ch. 3, section 3.5.2.4. In some cases, the Dutch Courts found no violation of the free movement 
rules, because a particular type of AHR treatment that was available abroad, was (still) considered 
experimental in the Netherlands, and therefore excluded from cover under the Health Insurance Act. 
For example, in 2007 the Central Appeals Court ruled that the at the time of treatment still experimental 
ICSI MESA treatment, was not covered under the Dutch Health Insurance Act, and that there was 
accordingly no entitlement to reimbursement for such treatment obtained abroad. CRvB 14 February 
2007, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2007:AZ9694. This ruling confirmed the judgment of Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage 
12 February 2004, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2004:AO3791. See also College voor zorgverzekeringen 27 April 
2000, case no. BZ‑00‑1156 and CRvB 13 July 2005, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2005:AT9545.
386 See inter alia www.zilverenkruis.nl/consumenten/vergoedingen/Pages/ivf.aspx, visited June 
2013; www.menzis.nl/web/Consumenten/VergoedingZorgverzekering/VergoedingenAZ/Invitrofertili 







is carried out in a manner that is not in compliance with Dutch medical and ethical 
standards, for instance if gametes have been used which were donated anonymously 
and/or on a commercial basis, or if more than two embryos have been implanted in 
the course of one IVF cycle.387 The Health Care Insurance Board (‘CVZ’, now the 
National Health Care Institute388) and the Dutch government have taken the position 
that it is irrelevant for the entitlement to reimbursement of the costs whether AHR 
treatment is obtained within the Netherlands or abroad, as long as the conditions of 
the Health Insurance Act and the Health Insurance Order are met.389 Accordingly, 
age limits apply also in respect of foreign treatment.390 Medical and ethical standards 
in Dutch legislation concerning the carrying out of AHR treatment, such as those 
laid down in the Embryo Act, are directed to health care providers within the Dutch 
jurisdiction, not to the persons insured under the Health Insurance Act.391 These 
conditions therefore do not have automatic effect in respect of the Health Insurance 
Act and thus, do not affect the insurance coverage.392 This also holds for the licensing 
obligation under the Dutch Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (Wet bijzondere 
medische verrichtingen (WBMV))393 and the Dutch rules concerning donation of 
gametes and embryos, as provided for in the Donor Information Act.394 This means 
that, for example, where anonymously donated gametes are used in the course of 
IVF treatment, this treatment nevertheless belongs to the entitlements under the 
satieIVFInHetBuitenland.htm, visited June 2013; www.cz.nl/ivf‑icsi‑fertiliteitsbehandeling‑buitenland.
pdf, visited June 2013 and www.anderzorg.nl/web/Vergoedingen/Vergoeding/
IVFBehandelingInHetBuitenland.htm, visited June 2013.
387 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 238.
388 See supra n. 354.
389 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 238, pp. 1–2. See also CVZ, IVF behandelingen uit 2005 tellen 
mee voor de zorgverzekeringswet [IVF treatment obtained in 2005 counts for the Health Insurance 
Act], adviesaanvraag Zvw [Request for advice under the Health Insurance Act] of 23 May 2006, online 
available at www.cvz.nl/binaries/live/cvzinternet/hst_content/nl/documenten/standpunten/2006/
sp0606+ivf‑behandelingen+2005.pdf, visited June 2013.
390 CVZ Report Een leeftijdsgrens voor vruchtbaarheidsbehandelingen [An age limit for fertility 
treatment], Annex to Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33000‑XVI no. 188, p. 17. This is in line with a 
judgment by the District Court Amsterdam of 2003. Under reference to Case C‑157/99 Geraets‑Smits 
and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I‑5473, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404 and Case C‑385/99 Müller‑Fauré and 
van Riet [2003] ECR I‑4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, this Court ruled that a refusal to reimburse IVF 
treatment obtained by a woman over 45 years of age in a Belgian clinic, constituted no violation of the 
free movement rules, as this treatment was not amongst the benefits provided for under Dutch law, 
given that under Dutch law a age limit of 40 was set (while one licensed hospital by way of experiment 
treated women until the age of 45). Rb. Amsterdam 7 October 2003, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2003:AN9605. 
See also College voor zorgverzekeringen, Opinion of 25 May 2010, LJN BN1229.
391 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 238, pp. 1–2.
392 Derksen and Staal 2012, supra n. 152, at p. 5.
393 Inter alia, Geschillencommissie Zorgverzekeringen [Conciliation Board Health Insurance], Opinion of 
8 August 2007, case no. ANO07.155 and the following Opinions of the College voor zorgverzekeringen 
[Health Care Insurance Board]: no. 26026338 of 23 May 2005; no. 26035826 of 19 June 2006 and 
no. 27028502 of 24 September 2007.
394 CVZ, IVF met gebruik van anonieme eiceldonatie (in het buitenland) in beginsel een te verzekeren 
prestatie [IVF with the use of anonymous egg‑cell donation (in a foreign country) is in principle a 
performance within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act], adviesaanvraag Zvw Zvw [Request for 
advice under the Health Insurance Act] of 24 October 2006, online available at: www.cvz.nl/binaries/
live/cvzinternet/hst_content/nl/documenten/standpunten/2006/sp0606+ivf+met+eiceldonatie.pdf, 
visited June 2013.







Health Insurance Act.395 Under the Health Insurance Act only high‑quality health 
care is reimbursed, however, as the Dutch government is aware –  on the basis of 
CJEU case law (inter alia, Decker and Kohl and Smits‑Peerbooms) – the relevant 
standard is whether the care has been sufficiently tried and tested by international 
medical science. In other words, States must trust each other’s health care standards. 
In the words of the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports: no matter how important 
the Dutch society may find it that a child can learn about his or her genetic origins, 
the fact that use is made of an anonymous donor, does not affect the quality of the 
care provided.396
The Central Appeals Court for Public Service and Social Security Matters has 
taken a different approach. This Court ruled in 2007 that IVF treatment with the 
use of anonymously donated egg cells was not amongst the benefits provided for 
under the Dutch Health Insurance Act and that therefore the refusal to reimburse for 
such treatment obtained abroad, constituted no obstacle of the freedom to receive 
services.397
Although not uncontroversial, it is generally accepted that the Dutch Health 
Insurance bears the costs that occur when insured persons return to the Netherlands 
after having obtained treatment abroad, even if that treatment itself would not be 
reimbursed under the Health Insurance Act. For example, the implantation of two or 
more embryos in the course of one IVF cycle frequently results in multiple births, 
which often involve premature births and an increased risk of complications during 
the pregnancy and thus extra costs.398
Tax deductions have generally been held to apply also in cross‑border cases, so long 
as the relevant criteria are met that would apply if the costs had been made in the 
Netherlands.399
6.5.3.	 Information	about	treatment	abroad	and	follow‑up	treatment
Dutch legislation or policy does not provide anything particular in respect of access 
to information about foreign abortion services or AHR treatment. The Dutch 
government has, however, considered it its task to inform the Dutch public about the 
legal complexities that may be involved when entering into surrogacy agreements 
395 Derksen and Staal 2012, supra n. 152, at p. 6, Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 238, pp. 1–2 and 
College voor zorgverzekeringen [Health Care Insurance Board] Opinion no. 26084415 of 24 October 
2006.
396 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 238, pp. 1–2.
397 CRvB 31 January 2007, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2007:AZ8510. See also CRvB 14 February 2007, 
ECLI:NL:CRVB:2007:AZ9700.
398 CVZ 2010, supra n. 344, at pp. 11–12.
399 See Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage 8 January 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:18948, where various non‑medical 
costst in the course of an international surrogacy agreement (such as hotel costs, the reimbursement of 
the surrogate mother and the egg‑cell donor and the costs of counselling) were not held to qualify for 
tax deduction.







abroad.400 In particular, the government has provided information about the legal 
situation upon return to the Netherlands on relevant Ministerial websites (see 6.3.8 
above).
As goes for any other medical treatment legally obtained abroad, people who had 
an abortion or AHR treatment abroad, are entitled to medical follow‑up treatment 
upon return to the Netherlands. In practice, they may, however, encounter objections 
of medical practitioners. For example, in 2010 it was reported that 50 per cent of 
the Dutch gynaecologists refused to provide treatment to women who had AHR 
treatment with the use of commercially and anonymously donated egg cells in 
Spain.401 Apart from such incidental reports, is the present author not aware of any 
established practice of refusing follow‑up treatment, safe of any official policy in 
this respect.
6.5.4.	 Access	to	abortion	for	foreign	women
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Pregnancy Termination Act (1981) it was 
acknowledged that the requirement of a five‑day reflection period (see 6.2.2.3 
above) could imply for non‑resident women that they had to extend their stay in the 
Netherlands before they could have an abortion. This could be held to constitute an 
obstacle to the free movement of these women. The legislature submitted, however, 
that this was the inescapable consequence of the fact that the abortion legislation 
of the (then) EEC Member States varied considerably. It held that the requirement 
aimed to guarantee that any decision to terminate a pregnancy was taken carefully 
and well‑considered, so it was justified and proportionate and therefore raised no 
issue under EEC free movement law.402
6.5.5.	 (Non‑)applicability	of	the	Dutch	Donor	Information	Act	
in	cross‑border	situations
It has been reported that ‘[d]uring the period preceding and immediately following 
the enactment of the Donor Information Act law, the number of semen (sperm) donors 
400 In 2012 the Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings also advised the government 
to inform the public that surrogacy in foreign countries may involve human trafficking. National 
Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings, Human trafficking for the purpose of the removal of 
organs and forced commercial surrogacy (The Hague, BNRM 2012), online available at www.bnrm.
nl/publicaties/orgaanverwijdering‑draagmoederschap/index.aspx, visited June 2014.
401 As stated by the spokesman of the Dutch Association for Gynaeclogists during an interview for 
the Dutch tv programme Nieuwsuur, broadcasted on Dutch television on 9 September 2010, www.
nieuwsuur.nl/onderwerp/183384‑spanje‑is‑hoop‑voor‑onvruchtbare‑vrouwen.html, visited March 
2014. The spokesman held that 50 per cent of the genealogists in the Netherlands refused to provide 
treatment to women who had AHR treatment with the use of commercially and anonymously donated 
egg cells in Spain. Their reasons to refuse treatment were twofold: (1) because commercial and 
anonymous egg cell donation was illegal under Dutch law and (2) because they were concerned about 
quality and safety of the treatment in Spain.
402 Kamerstukken II 1978/79, 15 475, no. 3, pp. 25–26.







and semen banks dropped drastically and there was a change in the type of donor.’403 
Waiting lists were the result.404 In addition, there was a clear deficit in donated egg 
cells in the Netherlands.405 Presumably as a consequence, there have been reports 
of women and couples resident in the Netherlands who resorted to foreign donation 
options (see also 6.4.2.1 above).406 Although the reasons for going abroad were often 
not made explicit, these women and couples regularly travelled to countries which 
provided for permanent anonymity of gamete donors.407
When a child is born or raised in the Netherlands that was conceived in another 
country with the use of (anonymously) donated gametes, the Dutch Donor 
Information Act does not apply. It only imposes an obligation on AHR clinics 
established under Dutch law to register the details of gamete donors. In cross‑border 
situations, children depend on their parents if they wish to be informed about their 
genetic origins.408 The Dutch government has called this an ‘undesirable’ situation 
but felt that it could, nonetheless, not be prevented from occurring.409 Nevertheless, 
concerns have been expressed that this involved medical risks for children conceived 
through IVF treatment with the use of anonymously donated gametes in a foreign 
country, as the hereditary family history may be unknown.410
Gametes which have been donated in a foreign country may only be used in IVF 
treatment in a Dutch establishment if all requirements of the Donor Information 
Act – including those regarding the information about the donor – have been met.411
403 Janssens et al. 2005, supra n. 188, at p. 1416. See also Pennings 2010, supra n. 345, at pp. 56–57; ‘Dutch 
sperm laws threaten donations’, BBC 12 August 2004, www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3555202.stml, 
visited 30 March 2014 and Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136, at p. 248.
404 Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136, at p. 114.
405 As the 2012 Evaluation Report explains, this has to do with the burdens involved in the procedure of 
egg cell donation and with the fact that donation has to be altruistic under Dutch Law. Apart from 
women who donate in the course of the (much debated) ‘cooperative reciprocity’ (‘coöperatieve 
wederkerigheid’) programme of one Dutch AHR‑clinic (the Geertgen clinic, see www.geertgen.nl/
onze‑werkwijze/coorperatieve‑wederkerigheid, visited July 2013), there are hardly any egg cell donors 
in the Netherlands. This cooperative reciprocity programme (also referred to as ‘mirror‑donation’ 
(‘spiegeldonatie’)) implies that people who receive donated gametes, also (indirectly) provide gametes 
for donation. Winter et al. 2012, supra n. 136, at pp. 223 and 252. See also Aanhangsel Handelingen 
II 2011/12, 761 and Nederlandse Vereniging voor Obstetrie en Gynaecologie (NVOG) [Dutch 
Association for Obstetrics and Gynaecology], Standpunt Gameetdonatie in een systeem van faire 
wederkerigheid [Opinion on gamete donation in a system of fair reciprocity], online available at www.
nvog‑documenten.nl/richtlijn/item/pagina.php?richtlijn_id=900, visited July 2013.
406 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 238, p. 1.
407 Idem.
408 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 30 486, no. 5, p. 18.
409 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2007/08, 113, p. 242 and Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2013/14, 702.
410 CVZ 2010, supra n. 344, at pp. 11–12.
411 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2007/08, 113, p. 242.








The strict conditions for surrogacy in the Netherlands, and the legal uncertainty 
surrounding it, have been reason for some Dutch couples to engage in surrogacy 
agreements abroad.412 Couples or individuals from the Netherlands who entered into 
surrogacy agreements abroad may encounter problems in establishing parental links 
with the child upon return to the Netherlands. Different situations are conceivable, 
and accordingly, different rules of Dutch Private International Law may apply.
As Boele‑Woelki et al. have made clear, the intended parents may rely on different 
grounds for their claim that parentage has been created; they may refer to a decision 
of a foreign judge; or they may rely on legal fact or act.413 Consequently, different 
regimes may apply.
Article 9 of the Parentage (Conflicts of Laws) Act (Wet conflictenrecht afstamming 
(Wca))414 provides for the recognition of foreign judgments in which family ties 
(‘familierechtelijke betrekkingen’) are established. Although this provision foresees 
in a public policy exception, reportedly ‘[…] few problems have arisen thus far 
concerning surrogacy arrangements […]’ in cases where recognition of a foreign 
judgment was sought.415
The intended parent(s) may also rely on a foreign birth certificate on which he/she/
they is or are stated as legal parent(s).416 Under Dutch law this is, however, considered 
to be contrary to public policy.417 Apart from the fact that surrogacy is considered to 
be in violation of the mater semper certa est rule,418 generally the view is taken that 
the rationale lays in the right of the child to know his or her genetic origins (Article 7 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child).419 Where intended 
parents rely on a foreign birth certificate, it may therefore first of all be difficult to 
enter the Netherlands with the child, as Dutch authorities may refuse a Dutch passport 
412 S.C.A. van Vlijmen and J.H. van der Tol, ‘Draagmoederschap in opkomst: specifieke wet‑ en 
regelgeving noodzakelijk?’ [‘Surrogacy booming: specific regulation necessary?’], Tijdschrift voor 
Familie‑ en Jeugdrecht (2012) p. 160. In 2012 the Dutch National Rapporteur on Human trafficking 
concluded that a liberalisation of the strict conditions for supervised high‑technological surrogacy 
could reduce the demand for foreign surrogate mothers, who may be vulnerable to exploitation. See 
National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings 2012, supra n. 400.
413 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at p. 308.
414 Act of 14 March 2002, Stb. 2002, 153. The Act entered into force per 11 April 2003.
415 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at p. 308.
416 This is for example the case in Ukraine.
417 E.g. Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage 24 October 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BU3627.
418 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 26 675, no. 6, p. 19.
419 Van Vlijmen and Van der Tol 2012, supra n. 412. This approach was also taken by Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage 
14 September 2009, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BK1197. The case concerned a Dutch married same‑sex 
couple, who entered into a surrogacy agreement with a Dutch woman. The woman gave birth to the 
child – to whom she and one of the spouses were genetically related – in France, so that she could give 
the child up for adoption anonymously. The genetic father recognised the child and was stated as being 
the father on the French birth certificate. The certificate did not mention the mother. The Court refused 
to recognise the French birth certificate, because it held it to be contrary to Dutch public policy that the 
child would not be able to know who his genetic mother was.







to the child on public order grounds. This implies that the child – who has no other 
passport – cannot leave the country where it was born. In two such cases the Dutch 
judge ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue emergency travel documents, 
as the judge considered this in the best interests of the child.420 The issuance of such 
travel documents neither automatically implies the establishment of parental rights 
for the intended parents, however, nor the awarding of Dutch nationality or residence 
rights to the child.421
If the intended parents subsequently try to establish their parental links by means 
of a court procedure, the foreign birth certificate on which they are stated as legal 
parents, may not – again on public policy grounds – be recognised under Dutch 
law. In that situation, the Dutch court has to establish the necessary data for the 
drawing up of a birth certificate.422 It can only do so if the child has Dutch nationality; 
which may require, first of all, that the paternity of the intended and genetic father is 
determined by the court.423
In all cases the Dutch Courts put the interest of the child first, which may – as time 
elapses – lead to the awarding of parental rights to (at least one of) the intended 
parents.424 As Boele‑Woelki et al. explain:
‘Although up until now it is clear that a birth certificate upon which no mother is recorded 
will be regarded as contrary to Dutch public policy, other cases are far from clear. This 
uncertainty exists with respect to original birth certificates in which the genetic mother is 
recorded instead of the birthmother, or where the non‑genetic commissioning parents are 
recorded on the birth certificate. Nevertheless, children do arrive in The Netherlands with 
such birth certificates. Once these children have remained in The Netherlands for some 
time, it is very difficult for the State to remove the child from the commissioning parents, 
due to the weight given to the best interests of the child and the protection of the family 
life created between the child and the commissioning parents.’425
The Dutch Secretary of State for Security and Justice concluded in 2011 that as a 
result of the approach of the Dutch courts, standing policy was overtaken by practice 
and its enforcement was rendered more difficult.426 He therefore proposed that foreign 
surrogacy agreements would be given legal effect in the Netherlands if at least one of 
the intended parents was genetically related to the child and the other genetic parent 
420 Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage (vrzr.) 9 November 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2010:BP3764 and Rb. Haarlem (vrzr.) 
10 January 2011, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2011:BP0426.
421 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 3.
422 Art. 1:25c BW. See also Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage 24 October 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BU3627 and Van 
Vlijmen and Van der Tol 2012, supra n. 412.
423 E.g. Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage 24 October 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BU3627.
424 E.g. Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage 11 December 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BB9844 and Rb. ’s‑Gravenhage 
18 January 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV2597. For a critical note, see the case note (in Dutch) of 
P. Vlaardingerbroek to the 2007 judgment in JPF 2008/72.
425 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2011, supra n. 186, at p. 308.
426 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 4.







was known.427 In line therewith he proposed that the reimbursement of expenses for 
foreign surrogate mothers would not be taken into account in the examination of the 
public policy exceptions in international surrogacy cases, as – so he alleged – ‘profit’ 
could not be defined unequivocally in the international context. The Secretary of 
State furthermore submitted that on the basis of Article 7 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, any child born through surrogacy – be it 
with the use of donor gametes or not – had the right to know who his or her genetic 
parents were.428 Still, this has proven difficult to enforce in cross‑border situations 
(see 6.6.4 above). The proposed policy for cross‑border surrogacy cases has been 
endorsed by the authorities,429 but the present author is not aware of any published 
policy documents in which the policy has been laid down.
The Dutch government at the same time saw no need to amend Dutch law 
fundamentally so as to ensure that people would no longer feel a need to go 
abroad for surrogacy. They acknowledged that the Netherlands could not take an 
isolated position on this matter, but they also held it to be impossible to rule out any 
cross‑border movement for this purpose.430 The Dutch government has furthermore 
seemed somewhat sceptical about the feasibility of the adoption of international 
instruments in respect of surrogacy. For example, they felt that the development of an 
International Treaty on surrogacy by the Hague Conference for Private International 
Law could not be awaited, as the occurring questions were too pressing.431
The courts have, since then, continued to decide international surrogacy cases on 
the basis of the best interests of the child. In most – if not all – cases, the genetic 
parenthood of the intended father played an important role.432 A case of 2013 
427 This has been charactarised as a ‘defeatist and pragmatic’ stance. B. van Beers, Case‑note to ECtHR 
[GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o v. Austria, no. 57813/00, 13 European Human Rights Cases 2012/38 
(in Dutch).
428 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 4.
429 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 31 265, no. 42.
430 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 400 XVI, no. 155, pp. 7–8.
431 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 000 VI, no. 69, p. 4. See also Hague Conference of Private international 
law, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (17–20 April 2012), Conclusions and 
Recommendations adopted by the Council, 2012, www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2012concl_en.pdf, 
visited June 2014.
432 For example, in a case of 2012, the District Court of Haarlem entrusted an intended father exclusive 
parental authority over his genetic child that was born to an Indian surrogate mother who was married. 
The intended father, who had recognised the child before the Dutch Registry and was subsequently 
appointed as the child’s guardian, requested the Court to entrust him with parental authority under 
Art. 1:253 c (1) BW. The man had concluded a surrogacy agreement in India with a surrogate mother 
who was married. From the judgment it does not become clear whether she was also the genetic mother 
of the child, but the court found it established that the intended father was the genetic father of the child. 
The judgment also gives no information about the birth certificate. However, the surrogate mother had 
waived all her rights and obligations towards the child, by means of an affidavit. The Court ruled that 
the it was in the interests of the child concerned, that the intended father, who had cared for the child 
from the moment of its birth, could make parental decisions, without needing to acquire the consent of 
the Indian surrogate mother, who was difficult to reach as she lived in India and who had never intended 
to care for the child. The Court accordingly entrusted the intended father (exclusively) with authority 
over the child. It is stated in the case that the intended father had a partner, but the case did not deal with 
the question of the legal recognition of her or his relationship to the child. Rb. Haarlem 6 November 







concerned a same‑sex couple.433 The child in this case had been born to an Indian 
surrogate mother who was married, with the use of an anonymously donated egg cell 
and sperm of the Dutch intended father who was in a same‑sex relationship.434 The 
District Court of Haarlem held that by way of recognition before the Dutch Registry, 
the legal paternity of the intended father of his genetic child had been established. 
The Court subsequently granted an adoption order for the same‑sex partner of the 
intended father, because such adoption was in the best interest of the child, and 
because the child could not – as could be reasonably foreseen – expect anything from 
the surrogate mother in her capacity as mother.435
6.6. conclusIons
Both abortion and AHR treatment have been the subject of heated discussions 
in Dutch society and politics. In respect of both these sensitive issues it took the 
legislature considerable time to draft and adopt legislation and in most cases this 
regulation followed an already existing practice. For instance, the Pregnancy 
Termination Act was only adopted after abortion clinics had been in operation 
for almost a decade, and until the entry into of the Embryo Act in 2002, assisted 
human reproduction (AHR) was only marginally regulated. Further, in both areas 
of law, criminal law sets the very boundaries of what is (ethically) acceptable. In 
practice, criminal law is, however, enforced to a very limited extent only. The 
relevant legislation primarily aims to provide for the necessary safeguards in respect 
of quality and safety of the treatment. Particularly in respect of abortion a rather 
procedural approach has been taken by the legislature; the Pregnancy Termination 
Act serves to guarantee a careful decision‑making around abortion.
In a way the abortion debate paved the way for the introduction of AHR, as some form 
of human interference with the natural process of procreation was thereby accepted. 
Nevertheless, each new technological development in the field of AHR has stirred 
2012, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2012:5285. In another case, concerning the Philippenes, the judgment did 
not state explicitly who the genetic parents of the child were, but the impression is conveyed that these 
were the surrogate mother and the intended father, because they were stated as the parents of the child 
on the Philippene birth certificate. The Court determined that the intended father had established his 
legal paternity under Philippene law, by means of signing an affidavit of acknowledgment – admission 
of paternity. Because a close personal relationship existed between the intended father and child, 
this recognition of paternity was recognised under Dutch law on the basis of Art. 10:101 BW. The 
Court accordingly ordered the entry of the birth certificate in the Dutch Register. Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage 
13 August 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:12313.
433 Rb. Noord‑Holland 18 December 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2013:12578.
434 The Indian birth certificate – which had stated that the surrogate mother was the mother and the 
intended father was the father of the child – could not be entered in the Dutch registry on public 
order grounds, because this was a surrogacy case. As the husband of the Indian surrogate mother 
(whom under Dutch law would be presumed the father of the child, due to the fact that the child was 
born within his marriage to the surrogate mother) had expressly denied paternity of the child, the 
Court established that the child would have no legal father under Dutch law, had the intended (and 
genetic) father not recognised the child. The Court declared for law that with this recognition the legal 
parenthood of the father had been established.
435 Art. 1:227(2) and (3) and Art. 1:227(3) BW.







a new and often heated debate about the acceptability of the new technique from 
an ethical viewpoint. Dondorp and De Wert have characterised the structure of the 
Dutch debate on AHR as a ‘repeating break’ (‘de repeterende breuk’).436 According 
to the authors the debate repeatedly follows the same pattern: each time there is a 
new medical technological development, the argument is put forward that this new 
development crosses the line of ethical acceptability. However, these objections of 
principle soon prove to enjoy too little support to stop the development. No matter 
how heated the debate has been, the outcome is the same each and every time: 
subject to certain conditions, the new medical technology can be employed.437 This 
chapter has shown that in this regard the argument that people will otherwise resort 
to foreign treatment options, is frequently heard.
Through licensing systems and by requesting the medical profession to draft 
guidelines, the legislature has aimed to regulate these sensitive areas of laws. 
Prominent guiding principles for the legislature’s decision‑making in respect of 
abortion and AHR are the protection of human life, the personal autonomy of the 
patient, the principle of good medical care and the best interests of the (future) child 
(see section 6.1.2). These principles are not embedded in the Dutch Constitution 
but follow from general principles of medical ethics and from International Treaty 
instruments. In all situations the legislature has aimed to strike a balance between 
these (competing) interests. In some cases greater weight has been attached to one of 
these interests. While the personal autonomy of the woman was in the end the most 
dominant principle on which the abortion legislation was based, the right of the child 
to know ones genetic origin was a decisive consideration for the legislature to set 
limits to the donation of gametes.
Cross‑border movement has been taking place in respect of both abortion and AHR 
treatment. In respect of abortion, movement to the Netherlands was particularly 
large in scale in the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, the number of abortions carried 
out in Dutch clinics involving non‑resident women still makes up a non‑negligible 
percentage of the total number of abortions carried out in the Netherlands. There 
have been only incidental reports of Dutch women going to other EU Member States 
for abortions. In respect of AHR treatment, most reports of cross‑border movement 
concern couples and individuals from the Netherlands who go abroad for AHR 
treatment, for instance for IVF treatment with the use of anonymously donated egg 
cells. Cross‑border movement to the Netherlands for reproductive care has also been 
reported, but no official statistics are available.
The existence of CBRC is expressly acknowledged by the Dutch authorities. Although 
(medical) risks may be involved, it is felt that such cross‑border movement cannot 
be prevented from occurring. In fact, a certain form of resignation on the side of the 
government can be noticed. For example, in response to parliamentary questions, the 
436 Dondorp and De Wert 2012B, supra n. 200, at pp. 7–12.
437 Idem, at pp. 5–6. The present chapter has shown that the only exception to this ‘ritual dance’ is the case 
of gender selection, which has been probihited soon after it was introduced and still is prohibited under 
Dutch law.







Minister of Health held in 2011 that she had no means to stop women from turning 
to foreign clinics for anonymous egg cell donation. According to the Minister this 
very fact rendered the question of whether this development was desirable or not, 
out of order.438 It is furthermore generally accepted that the Dutch Health Insurance 
system has to carry the costs of foreign treatments, even if they are not in conformity 
with the Dutch professional standards or laws.439 Some difference of opinion on this 
issue between the government and the Health Care Insurance Board on the one side, 
and the Central Appeals Court for Public Service and Social Security Matters on the 
other, has been, however, visible (see section 6.5.2 above).
Cross‑border movement and related quality and safety concerns have in some cases 
been an express ground for the Dutch legislature to regulate certain issues. The 
fact that couples from the Netherlands went abroad for PGD, for instance, was one 
of the reasons for the Dutch legislature to legalise and regulate this diagnosis and 
surrogacy agreements concluded in other countries, made the Dutch government 
feel that the Private International Law rules on the establishment of parental links 
had to be amended (see sections 6.4.3 and 6.5.6 above).
438 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 2303, p. 2.
439 CVZ 2010, supra n. 344, at pp. 11–12.
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conclusIons cAse study I
7.1. the InternAl pIcture – how Are reproductIve mAtters deAlt 
wIth In the vArIous jurIsdIctIons?
7.1.1.	 Balancing;	the	same	interests	but	different	weights
The present case study has confirmed that the regulation of reproductive matters 
involves a careful balancing of various individual and general interests. As such, 
there is not much difference between the kind of interests and considerations that 
have been addressed in legislative debates and included in decision‑making in 
the various jurisdictions studied. It is the weight that has been accorded to these 
interests and correspondingly the balancing of the various interests involved that 
has differed. Some States accord particularly strong protection to a specific interest. 
The Irish protection of the unborn and the German protection of human dignity, 
which are included in the Constitutions of these countries, are two examples that 
stand out in this regard. This is not to say that the other States studied do not protect 
these interests at all, but they do so less prominently, have interpreted these notions 
differently and/or have accepted that in certain circumstances counter‑values may 
outbalance these interests.
At the European level, States are left ample room to undertake balancing exercises 
in reproductive matters, and consequently, to make principled choices in this area. 
Chapter 3 has shown that EU law basically does not reduce this national freedom, 
apart from by setting certain safety and quality requirements for the placing in the 
market of in vitro diagnostic medical devices. The ECtHR also generally leaves 
States a wide margin of appreciation in the area, which extends both to the States’ 
decision to intervene in the area and, once they have intervened, to the detailed 
rules they set down in order to achieve a balance between the competing public and 
private interests. As explained in Chapter 2, the margin is wide because morally 
and ethically sensitive issues are concerned, which involve a complex balancing of 
various individual interests and upon which generally no European consensus exists. 
Another reason is that the Strasbourg Court respects the democratic processes at the 
national level. Especially where a certain national ‘choice’ emerged from a ‘lengthy, 
complex and sensitive debate’ at the domestic level,1 or where it was the ‘culmination 
of an exceptionally detailed examination of the social, ethical and legal implications 
of developments in the field […] and the fruit of much reflection, consultation and 
1 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05.







debate’,2 has the ECtHR granted the States much leeway to make their own decisions 
and set their own rules and procedures. The Strasbourg Court has at the same time 
stressed that the margin of appreciation is not unlimited and that national ‘solutions’ are 
not beyond the scrutiny of this Court.3 The ECtHR supervises whether interferences 
constitute a proportionate balancing of the competing interests involved.4 At times 
such examination has resulted in the finding of a violation. Further, the margin of 
appreciation has not been wide in all situations covered by this case study.5
So what are the various individual and general interests that have been included in 
balancing exercises at the national level and (approved of at) European level? In all 
three States, it appears that values like human dignity and non‑commercialisation 
of (parts of) the human body have played a prominent role in (legislative) debates 
on and standard‑setting in reproductive matters.6 Another such value is personal 
autonomy, in respect of which it can be noted – in any case in the abortion context 
that – that it has generally been granted more protection in Germany and the 
Netherlands, when compared to Ireland. All three States have furthermore protected 
interests of individuals who cannot easily claim protection of their own rights. These 
concern the (unborn or future) child and vulnerable parties (indirectly) involved in 
reproductive matters, such as gamete donors and surrogate mothers.
The unborn is protected to some extent in all three States studied in this research, as 
well as by the ECtHR, but to differing degrees. The ECtHR has not taken a strong 
stance on the status of the unborn life, but, leaving a wide margin of appreciation 
in this particularly sensitive area, it has upheld systems like the Irish that grant 
the unborn almost absolute protection against abortion. Also in Germany and the 
Netherlands the principled choice has been made to criminalise abortion in order 
to give expression to the protection of the unborn life, but both regimes provide 
for important exceptions to this rule. The Dutch legislature chose to protect the 
interests of the unborn child through a set of procedural requirements which provide 
the decision‑making procedure with the necessary guarantees (see also section 7.4 
2 ECtHR [GC] 10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 86.
3 ECtHR 28 August 2012, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, no. 54270/10 and ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, 
S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00.
4 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 238 under reference to 
ECtHR 29 October 1992, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88, 
para. 68. In S.H. and Others – a case on gamete donation – the Court held that it fell to it to carefully 
examine the arguments which had been taken into consideration during the legislative process and 
which had led to the choices that had been made by the legislature and to determine whether a fair 
balance had been struck between the competing interests of the State and those directly affected by 
those legislative choices. While the Court held expressly that a wide margin of appreciation applied in 
that case, this formulation in fact directs at a stricter scrutiny. ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. 
v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 97.
5 One concrete issue in respect of which the margin of appreciation has narrowed over the years, concerns 
the right to know one’s genetic origins. See Ch. 2, section 2.1.4.
6 Non‑commercialisation of (parts of the) human body, is in fact one of the few principled standpoints that 
the EU legislature has taken in this area, as confirmed in Case C‑34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV 
[2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669. See ch. 3, section 3.1.1.
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below).7 In Germany a similar approach was chosen, albeit that the State’s duty to 
protect unborn life has resulted in stricter time limits and more instructive positive 
obligations for the authorities in abortion procedures.8
Both in the States studied in this research and under the ECHR as well as the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is provided that the best interests of the child 
must be an important, if not the primordial consideration in any law‑making, policy 
decisions and judicial decisions concerning children. This ‘best interests of the child’ 
principle both sees at protection of the child in a more abstract sense, including 
before it has actually come into being, and at concrete rights that any child bears 
once it is born and that may extend into adulthood.
It the context of the present case study, protection of the future child, or ‘the child’ 
in general, has at times in fact been an argument for not letting a child come into 
existence in the first place.9 It has, for example, been put forward – and at times 
accepted – as (one of the) argument(s) against surrogacy or against certain forms 
of AHR treatment, such as post‑mortem fertilisation or preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD). Arguments against surrogacy have been that it was considered 
unethical to make a child the object of a legal act and that this affected the human 
dignity of children. Also, divided motherhood has been held not to be in the child’s 
interest.10 Other concerns have been identity problems for any child born through 
surrogacy; the possibility that the natural process of bonding between mother and 
child after birth would be distorted and the risk that the child could be rejected if the 
expectations of the intended parents were not met. When it comes to PGD, a fear for 
eugenics and ‘designer babies’ has been a concern in all three States. On the other 
hand, there has been the desire to protect the future child’s physical integrity, by 
protecting it against suffering from a serious genetic disorder.
The rights of the child have, furthermore, been put forward by various AHR 
clinics as an argument for excluding single women as well as same‑sex couples 
from access to AHR. Reimbursement for AHR treatment has in some States been 
confined to certain groups on similar grounds has. For example, in Germany the 
fact that only married couples qualify for such reimbursement under the public 
health insurance, was held to serve best interests of the child and approved of by 
the German Constitutional Court.11 Clear bottom lines that have emerged from 
the present case study are reproduction for profit and gender selection. It has been 
7 A reflection period, as in place in the Netherlands, is a clear example of such a procedural guarantee. 
See Ch. 6, section 6.2.2.3.
8 For example, because the goal of counselling in pregnancy conflict situations must be the protection of 
the unborn child, counsellors must to try to encourage the woman to continue her pregnancy and show 
her opportunities for a life with the child.
9 In the Netherlands, for example, doctors must refrain from providing assistance to reproduction if they 
are of the opinion that the future child runs a real risk of serious psychosocial or physical harm. See 
Ch. 6, section 6.3.2.
10 In the case of Germany this consideration has also been one of the grounds for the German prohibition 
on egg cell donation. See Ch. 4, section 4.3.4.1.
11 See Ch. 4, section 4.3.8.







considered incommensurable with human dignity to value children, human embryos 
and gametes in terms of money and thus as objects or trade, or to give reproduction 
a purely instrumental character.
When it comes to more concrete rights children have once they are born, the right to 
personal identity and development of the child has proven to be particularly relevant 
in the present case study. It has been on the basis of this right that a right to know 
one’s genetic origins has been recognised in the States studied for this research, as 
well as under the ECHR.12 The level of its protection has varied, however. In the 
Netherlands, the right of the child to know about its genetic origins has enjoyed 
protection since 1994 and has been strongly protected through detailed legislation 
since 2004. In Germany this right has been recognised in case law and in Ireland 
legislation preserving a child’s right to know its identity in the context of gamete 
donation is in the making. Further, as explained in Chapter 2, under the ECHR a 
development towards stronger protection of this right has been visible.
Related thereto is the importance that has been attached to genetic lineage in 
all jurisdictions studied. This is illustrated, for example, by the fact that in the 
Netherlands only high‑technological surrogacy is legalised under certain strict 
conditions. Another example is the Irish McD v. L & Anor case (2010), where a 
sperm donor was granted access to his child, because it was held to be in the interests 
of the child to establish contact with its genetic father. At the same time, the mater 
semper certa est principle – following which the birth mother is the legal mother of a 
child whether she is also the genetic mother or not – is adhered to by all three States 
studied in this research. This principle is closely related to the general principle of 
legal certainty, which has been another motive for standard‑setting in the area.
The present case study has furthermore made clear that States have wished to protect 
other vulnerable parties involved in abortion, AHR treatment and surrogacy. For 
example, Germany and the Netherlands have regulated for abortions, inter alia, in 
order to protect women against the health risks involved in illegal abortions.13 The 
need has also been felt to protect gamete donors and surrogate mothers against health 
risks, commodification and commercial exploitation and against psychological 
or emotional problems in the long run. Further, a prohibition on post‑mortem 
fertilisation without explicit consent, as in place in Germany and the Netherlands, 
aims to protect the deceased’s personal autonomy.
Lastly, quality and safety concerns have been ground for regulating in this area. 
This certainly also holds for the relevant standard‑setting in the area as adopted at 
EU level, albeit that such requirements also – or primarily – aim to serve the internal 
market. At national level, quality and safety concerns have been grounds for setting 
12 Protection of the child’s personal identity was also the primordial consideration of the ECtHR in the 
cross‑border surrogacy cases Mennesson and Labassee (see ch. 2, section 2.4.2). Because these rulings 
related to cross‑border situations only, they are left out of the equation in the present section that is 
concerned with the internal picture. See, however, section 7.2 below.
13 Ch. 4, section 4.2.2 and Ch. 6, section 6.2.2.
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up licensing systems and for requesting that the medical profession draft guidelines, 
as has been, for example, the case in the Netherlands.
Thus, there is a wide spectrum of individual and general interests included in the 
balancing exercises in reproductive matters in the various jurisdictions. As noted 
above, European regulation and case law leaves the States much room to balance 
those interests, so long as they ensure that the general legal framework allows the 
different legitimate interests involved to be adequately taken into account.
7.1.2.	 Room	for	bright	line	rules
Because of the complex balancing exercises involved in reproductive matters, 
States have at times adopted ‘bright line rules’, which by nature exclude detailed 
examinations of individual cases. Examples are complete prohibitions on certain 
practices, such as the German prohibition on egg cell donation, or principles like the 
mater semper certa est rule – entailing that when a child is born its mother is the 
woman who gave birth to it – that is upheld in all three States studied.
From the ECtHR’s case law it follows that bright line rules in the area of reproductive 
matters may be acceptable under the Convention. As explained in Chapter 2, this 
Court has made clear that it is not necessary that legislation governing important 
aspects of private life provides for the weighing of competing interests in the 
circumstances of each individual case. Where such important aspects are at stake, 
so the Court has held, it is not inconsistent with Article 8 ECHR that the legislature 
adopts rules of an absolute nature which serve to promote legal certainty.14 It 
has thereby underlined that concerns based on moral considerations or on social 
acceptability were not in themselves sufficient reasons for a complete ban on a 
specific AHR technique.15 At the same time, the Court has held that the Irish ban on 
abortion on health and social grounds, could indeed be justified on moral grounds. It 
accepted that the Irish prohibition of abortion for reasons of health and/or well‑being 
served the legitimate aim of protection of morals, of which the protection in Ireland 
of the right to life of the unborn was ‘one aspect’.16
Initially a similar approach was taken by the Strasbourg Court in respect of the 
question of knowledge about one’s genetic origins, as domestic legislation that 
protected the parent’s right to remain anonymous in all situations was upheld by 
the ECtHR. Over time such bright line rules have become more problematic as 
increasingly more weight has been attached to the rights of the child in the relevant 
case law.17 A similar development has taken place at the national level in the States 
studied in this research. For example, in the Netherlands initially sperm donors could 
14 ECtHR [GC] 10 April 2007, Evans v. the United Kingdom, no. 6339/05, para. 74 and ECtHR [GC] 
3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 110.
15 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 100.
16 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 222. See Ch. 2, section 2.2.3.
17 See Ch. 2, section 2.1.4.







remain anonymous indefinitely, but this rule was lifted in 2004 and replaced by a 
system that provided for rules that differentiate between types of donor information 
and the age of the child concerned. These developments in respect of the question 
of knowledge about one’s genetic origins fit in with a broader development that once 
an actual child is concerned, it is important to carry out a concrete examination of 
each case.18
The foregoing confirms that it is thus well possible that the more (regulation in 
respect of) a certain reproductive matter becomes ‘commonplace’, the more a desire 
emerges to provide for differentiation in regulation and for possibilities to pay due 
regard to the individual circumstances of each case.
7.1.3.	 Consistency	of	laws	required
Another comparable feature that has come to light as a result of the present case 
study, is that at times a ‘consistency of laws’ reasoning has come up in some of 
the jurisdictions studied in this case study. (Parts of) proposed AHR regulation 
have been considered inconsistent with existing laws, such as abortion laws. Where 
existing regulation witnessed that a certain principled choice had been made in the 
respective jurisdiction, it undermined arguments against the introduction of a new 
type of treatment which raised similar concerns. For example, in Germany, such a 
consistency of laws argument has been put forward both in respect to the Embryo 
Protection Act in general, and in respect to PGD in particular, and it has been one 
of the grounds for lifting the prohibition on PGD. The ECtHR has employed similar 
reasoning, and on that basis held Italian legislation prohibiting PGD on grounds 
for which abortion was allowed for, to be in violation of Article 8 ECHR.19 Hence, 
under the ECHR, it can be seen that if States regulate in the area of reproductive 
matters, they must guarantee that the relevant legislative framework is coherent and 
consistent. This may be particularly challenging now that the relevant legislative 
framework is generally fragmented (see below).
7.1.4.	 Importance	of	procedures	allowing	for	careful	decision‑making
What furthermore comes to the fore if one compares how reproductive matters 
have been dealt with in the various jurisdictions studied, is the importance that has 
been attached – particularly in the context of abortion – to procedures that allow 
for careful decision‑making. This can of course be explained by the fact that, as 
discussed above, these matters involve a balancing of various interests and such 
procedures are aimed to enable balancing exercises with due regard for the individual 
circumstances of each case.
18 As also stressed in the cross‑border surrogacy cases decided by the ECtHR (see Ch. 2, section 2.4.2, as 
well as section 7.2 below).
19 See Ch. 2, section 2.3.4.
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This attention to procedural guarantees allowing for careful decision‑making has 
been particularly visible in respect of abortion. The Dutch Pregnancy Termination 
Act, for example, serves first and foremost to guarantee a careful decision‑making 
around abortion. As explained in Chapter 6, the Dutch legislature considered it 
impossible to set a general norm defining when abortion would be lawful or unlawful, 
as it considered the emergency and distress situations in which an abortion could be 
considered to be very diverse.
As discussed in Chapter 2, an obligation to provide for certain procedural rights 
in respect of abortion also follows from the ECHR, where the Court has based this 
obligation on the doctrine that Convention rights must be safeguarded in a practical 
and effective manner. In other words, once the legislature decides to allow abortion, 
it must structure its legal framework in a way which allows for real possibilities 
to obtain it. Hence, while the ECtHR does not rule on the substantive choices of 
principle made by States with regard to abortion, it does require that when there 
is a legal option to have an abortion at the domestic level, the pregnant woman at 
least has a possibility to be heard in person and to have her views considered; that 
the competent body or person issues written grounds for its decision and that the 
pregnant woman has effective access to relevant information on her and the foetus’ 
health. The latter requirement includes access to diagnostic services, decisive for 
the possibility for the pregnant woman of exercising her right to take an informed 
decision as to whether to seek an abortion or not.20
This line of ECtHR case law has had very concrete impact at national level, as is 
particularly visible in respect of Ireland. The Irish abortion procedures were for long 
unclear, but following the ECtHR judgment in the case of A, B and C, the Protection 
of Life During Pregnancy Act (2014) was adopted. This Act improved the procedural 
rights of women and has provided for more clarity for medical practitioners, without 
bringing about any material change.
7.1.5. Fragmented regulation
Apart from differences in the balancing exercises in the various national jurisdictions, 
the ‘level’ at which reproductive matters have been regulated in the States – if there 
is any regulation at all – also appears to differ. In Ireland Article 40.3.3° of the 
Constitution plays a dominant role in the abortion legislation, while in Germany and 
the Netherlands those Constitutional provisions applicable are also important guiding 
principles for standard‑setting in the area – in Germany even more prominently than 
in the Netherlands – but they are less directive in their wording. In Germany and 
the Netherlands the legislature has generally set the relevant legal framework, while 
certain matters are left to the medical profession to regulate. In the Netherlands the 
medical profession is generally given quite substantial leeway, while in Germany 
the legislature has generally laid down more detailed rules in statutory legislation. 
20 See Ch. 2, section.







While both these States have an Embryo Act that deals with various issues related 
to AHR and – in the case of Germany – surrogacy, in Ireland, no such legislative 
framework is in place for AHR treatment and surrogacy.21 Also, until as recently as 
January 2014 there was hardly any legislation on abortion.
The present case study has furthermore made clear that various realms of the law 
may be involved in the relevant legal framework on reproductive matters. In all 
three States criminal law applies in the area, in any case in abortion regulation. The 
maximum penalties for illegal abortions have been most severe in Ireland, with life 
imprisonment until 2014, and imprisonment for a term of 14 years, maximum, since 
that time. In the Netherlands and Germany the maximum terms of imprisonment 
are much lower and many more exemption grounds apply. The latter States have 
also employed criminal law in their regulation in the area of AHR and surrogacy. 
In both the Netherlands and Germany surrogacy mediation and gender selection are 
criminalised, while in Germany by means of the Embryo Protection Act, criminal 
law applies also in respect of matters like post‑mortem fertilisation and PGD. Such 
criminal law provisions were often deliberately chosen to reflect very principled 
approaches (such as protection of the unborn life; see 7.1.1 above), and to set the very 
boundaries of what is (ethically and morally) acceptable. Their actual employment 
has been much more limited; prosecution practice for abortions has decreased 
considerably over the decades in all three States, while prosecutions for surrogacy 
and AHR related matters have been only very incidentally reported.22
Other areas of law that are covered by the relevant legal frameworks of the States 
studied concern social security law for public funding issues and civil law in respect 
of questions of parenthood. Furthermore, in all three States medical profession 
sets certain ethical and quality standards, while access to AHR treatment is often 
regulated by clinics themselves and may thus differ from clinic to clinic.
The various national regimes thus differ not only in respect of substance, but also in 
respect of form and the level at which reproductive matters are regulated for.
7.1.6.	 How	was	change	brought	about?	A	typification	of	(legislative	and	
judicial)	processes
Not only do the balancing exercises in reproductive matters and the level at which 
these matters were regulated differ between the various jurisdictions, but also the 
way in which change has been brought about. For instance, sometimes the legislature 
has proven to be the driving force behind change, while in other situations it has been 
the judiciary. Also, the extent to which European law has been influential in these 
(legislative and judicial) processes differs between the States studied.
21 It is reminded that this research was concluded on 31 July 2014.
22 See Ch. 4, section 4.2; Ch. 5, section 5.2.9 and Ch. 6, section 6.2.4 respectively. See also section 7.2.1.1 
below.
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What the processes in the various jurisdictions have in common is that change has 
never been brought about quickly. In all three States, there has been generally a 
certain or even considerable reluctance on the side of the legislature to regulate this 
area. This can be explained by the sensitivity of the subject‑matter and the diversity 
of interests that need to be balanced in this area, as set out above in section 7.1.1 Also, 
the area concerned is one in respect of which medical and scientific developments are 
moving fast. Legislatures and courts – including those at European level – have been 
uncertain about (the effects of) such developments and have therefore acted with 
caution. In all three States there have been fairly lengthy debates and considerable 
lapses in time before regulation has been introduced, if at all. For example, in 
Germany, adoption of the German Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act of 1992 
was preceded by two years of heated and emotive debates that had even jeopardised 
the signing of the Reunification Treaty. Not uncommonly, practice has outpaced 
regulation. For instance, the Dutch Pregnancy Termination Act was only adopted 
after abortion clinics had been in operation for almost a decade, and the introduction 
of the Embryo Act took until 2002, while IVF treatments had been carried out in the 
Netherlands since the 1980s. The ECtHR, while at times urging the States to keep 
the area under review, has not reproached States for such delays in the adoption of 
legislation on reproductive matters.23
As observed in Chapter 6, the Dutch process in respect of AHR legislation can 
been described as a ritual dance with a ‘repeating break’, entailing that each new 
medical technological development has been met with concerns about its ethical 
acceptability, but has nonetheless been regulated for, by subjecting it to certain 
limitations.24 The German legislature has also taken a careful piecemeal approach 
in the area, but followed a different pattern. From early on it covered many issues in 
the Embryo Protection Act of 1991 and outlawed a considerable number of practices 
such as surrogacy, egg cell donation and PGD. Over time some of these rules have 
been amended and relaxed, for example those in respect of PGD. Also, in Germany 
the Courts have played a more prominent role in this process. At times, they have 
given an extra push for change. The lifting of the absolute prohibition on PGD in 
2011, for instance, has been the result of a judgment of the Constitutional Court. 
In other cases, German courts have shown more deference to political and societal 
sensitivities and have given the legislature discretion to regulate matters, for instance 
in respect of reimbursement for AHR treatment.
In the case of Ireland, the process has been different. The pattern that can be 
discerned is that individual cases have frequently caused considerable public outcry, 
while basically all change – albeit limited in any case – has been triggered or even 
forced upon the legislature by (European) case law. The legislature has often resisted 
giving a follow‑up to these judgments, or has in any case been hesitant to do so. For 
23 Only in the Irish abortion case A, B and C did the ECtHR note that Ireland had failed to implement 
Art. 40.3.3° of the Irish Constitution, and the lack of a regulations on the abortion procedures was 
a ground for the finding of a violation of Art. 8 ECHR in respect of the third applicant. See Ch. 2, 
section 2.2.3.
24 Ch. 6, section 6.6.







instance, it was only in 2014, after the ECtHR’s A, B and C ruling and the public 
debate sparked by the tragic death of a woman who had been refused an abortion in 
a hospital in Galway, that a law was adopted that implemented the X Case of 1992, 
and has regulated access to lawful termination of pregnancy in Ireland. AHR and 
surrogacy have long been, and are mostly still, submerged in legal uncertainty in 
Ireland. The AHR Commission identified a need for action in 2005, but for years 
the Irish legislature did not take any action. After the Irish courts unequivocally 
stated that they did not consider it the task of the judiciary to resolve the existing 
uncertainty, it has been evidently up to the Irish legislature to fill in the legal vacuum 
that has continued to exist in Ireland as regards AHR and surrogacy. It was (again) 
only in 2014 that first steps in this regard were taken, although some initiatives – most 
prominently the proposed surrogacy legislation – were withdrawn before they were 
even debated in Parliament.
To remain in the metaphor of dance, other processes can be best described as two 
steps forward, one step back, resembling the dancing procession of Echternach.25 
Sometimes courts have blown the whistle on excessively proactive legislatures, as 
was, for example, the case in the German abortion judgment of 1975, in which the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the Abortion Reform Act as passed by the German 
legislature insufficiently protected the unborn.26 On other occasions higher Courts 
have overruled judgments of lower Courts for being overly progressive. For example, 
the Irish Supreme Court blew the whistle on the High Court which had, in the of 
McD v. L & Anor case, recognised de facto family life of a same‑sex couple and 
had accordingly denied a sperm donor access to his biological child.27 Another such 
example concerns the ECtHR, where the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR overruled 
the Chamber in the S.H. and Others case, and so upheld the Austrian prohibition on 
ovum donation, that the Chamber had previously found discriminatory.28
7.1.7. Resumé and outlook
In sum, it can be derived from this case study that the balancing of interests 
related to reproductive matters has resulted different outcomes in the three States 
studied and the legislative and judicial processes in the States have taken different 
shapes. European law explicitly allows for such diversity between legal regimes 
on reproductive matters. States are left room to make their own principled choices 
in these moral and ethical issues and they are free to prohibit practices, as long 
as the relevant interests have been balanced in the decision‑making and as long as 
their principled choices are consistent. However, once they decide to regulate in the 
area, they must also provide for the effective enjoyment of rights and entitlements, 
which entails that they must ensure that the applicable procedures enable careful 
decision‑making.
25 The original dancing procession of Eternach consisted of three steps forward, two steps back.
26 See Ch. 4, section 4.2.2.
27 See Ch. 5, section 5.3.4.
28 See Ch. 2, section 2.3.3.
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The present case study has furthermore shown that there are not only differences, 
but also similarities in the ways in which reproductive matters have been dealt with 
in the various jurisdictions. Generally, over time more reproductive practices have 
been legalised and regulated for, or at least initiatives to that effect have been taken. 
Also, a gradual development towards a central role for the best interests of the child 
is clearly visible, although the views on what these require exactly have in some cases 
changed over time. Furthermore, blanket rules have been adopted and approved of at 
the European level, while at the same time a development towards the assessment of 
reproductive matters with due regard to the individual circumstances of the case has 
been visible. Both at European and national levels, there has been increased attention 
focused on the introduction of procedures allowing for careful decision‑making in 
reproductive matters.
Given that AHR is an area with particularly fast‑moving medical and scientific 
developments, it is in this area that there is most potential for new questions being 
raised by new medical possibilities. It is also possible that the case law of the ECtHR 
will in the future have a more substantive impact on standard‑setting in the area of 
reproductive matters, particularly if more European consensus would develop on 
certain issues.
7.2. the cross‑border pIcture – legAl responses to cross‑border 
movement
As set out in the various chapters of this case study, cross‑border movement in 
reproductive matters has taken and is taking place from and to the three States studied 
in this research and within the European Union as such, and in some cases the scale 
of this mobility has been considerable. The present case study has shown that the 
three States studied – functioning as countries of origin or countries of destination 
or both – have dealt in different manners with such cross‑border movement. Firstly, 
forms of resignation have been identified. For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
Dutch authorities acknowledged that there were no means to stop cross‑border 
reproductive care (CBRC) and concluded that this very fact rendered the question 
of whether this development was desirable or not, out of order. Secondly, there 
have been more (pro)active responses to (the effects of) cross‑border movement 
in reproductive matters. This section identifies and categorises various such legal 
responses on the basis of the present case study. The extent to which European law 
(both EU law and the ECHR) leaves room for these legal responses at national level, 
or in fact even encourages or dictates them, is thereby examined.
A first category of legal responses to cross‑border movement in reproductive matters 
that can be distinguished based on the findings of this case study consists of warding 
off such cross‑border movement: States may try to deter people from going to other 
States or from coming to their State for reproductive matters. As further explained 
in section 7.2.1, such warding off may take different shapes, ranging from travel 
bans to non‑recognition of legal parenthood established in another State. Secondly, 







as a mirror to the ‘warding off’ approach, States may choose to accommodate 
(the effects of) cross‑border movement in reproductive matters, as is discussed in 
section 7.2.2. A third type of response is adaptation, which means the adjustment of 
national standard‑setting in the area to that of another State or other States to which 
cross‑border movement takes place (section 7.2.3). Lastly, cross‑border movement 
has in some situations enabled States to outsource the protection of certain interests 
in these sensitive matters to other States (section 7. 2.4).
Importantly, these responses are generally not mutually exclusive; it has turned 
out that States often combine various categories of responses in their dealing with 
cross‑border movement in reproductive matters. Nevertheless, for each of these four 
categories what interests, considerations, perspectives or values have inspired or 
dictated these legal responses can be examined. Of course, one thereby needs to 
take care not to ascribe more intentions or underlying motives to the various State 
measures discussed than can be derived from the type of legal research conducted in 
this case study. What can be assessed here, however, is what the implications of each 
respective category of legal responses are, or may be, for the States concerned, as 
well as for the individuals involved in the cross‑border movement. Each subsection 
therefore finishes with observations about such implications for these actors, whereby 
reference is also made – where relevant – to sociological research in the area. In 
the final subsection (section 7.2.5) it is assessed how the various legal responses to 
cross‑border movement relate to one another.
7.2.1.	 Warding	off
Legal responses that ward off (the effects of) cross‑border movement in reproductive 
matters may take different shapes. The most far‑reaching response consists in trying 
to prevent cross‑border movement in reproductive matters from taking place in the 
first place, for instance by imposing a travel ban or by criminally prosecuting people 
for obtaining treatment abroad (section 7.2.1.1).29 Other – less drastic – forms of 
deterring people from crossing borders for reproductive reasons that can be identified 
on the basis of the present case study are bans on information about such foreign 
options (section 7.2.1.2), refusals to provide follow‑up care (section 7.2.1.3) and 
refusals to reimburse treatment obtained abroad (section 7.2.1.4). Furthermore, in 
cross‑border surrogacy cases, recognition of legal parenthood established in another 
State has been refused (section 7.2.1.5). While these measures all concern States that 
function as countries of origin in cross‑border situations, also States that function as 
countries of destination – States to which cross‑border movement takes place – may 
ward off cross‑border movement (section 7.2.1.6).
29 See also R.F. Storrow, ‘Assisted Reproduction on treacherous terrain: the legal hazards of cross‑border 
reproductive travel’, 23 Reproductive BioMedicine Online (2011) pp. 538–545 and W. van Hoof and 
G. Pennings, ‘Extraterritoriality for cross‑border reproductive care; should states act against citizens 
travelling abroad for illegal infertility treatment?’, 23 Reproductive BioMedicine Online (2011) 
pp. 546–554.
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7.2.1.1. Travel bans and criminal prosecution upon return
Incidentally, there have been reports of such drastic measures as travel bans being 
taken by one of the States studied in this research. The Irish X and C cases of the 
early 1990s stand out in this regard. As discussed in Chapter 5, these cases where 
solved at the national level, as the Supreme Court held that there was in the particular 
circumstance of the cases at hand, where there was a real and substantial risk of loss 
of the woman’s life by way of suicide, a right to an abortion within Ireland. This 
approach could in fact be perceived as a certain form of adaptation (see 7.2.3 below) 
as it rendered any cross‑border movement redundant in such exceptional situations. 
The X Case was, however, also the trigger for the 1992 amendment of Article 40.3.3° 
of the Irish Constitution, which expressly provides that the freedom to travel between 
Ireland and other States for the purpose of an abortion will not be limited. The initial 
warding off that was at stake in the X Case and C Case thus consequently resulted 
in an express form of accommodation of cross‑border movement for abortions (see 
also 7.2.2.2 below).30
Criminal prosecutions for having obtained reproductive treatment abroad have not 
been identified in the present case study.31 They are, however, not illusory. German 
law, for example, provides expressly for a possibility to criminally prosecute for 
abortions obtained abroad. At the same time, as noted in Chapter 3, such criminal 
prosecutions – as for travel bans – seem hard to justify under EU free movement law. 
Moreover, there may be difficulties in enforcing such prosecutions in cross‑border 
cases.32
7.2.1.2. Bans on information about foreign services
Cross‑border movement in reproductive matters may also be warded off by means 
of bans or limitations on information provision about foreign treatment options. As 
explained in Chapters 2 and 5, Ireland adopted such a policy in respect of information 
about foreign abortion services in the 1990s, which subsequently proved problematic 
under the ECHR.33 The ECtHR’s ruling in Open Door prompted the adoption of 
the Abortion Information Act in Ireland, as a result of which, again, the challenge 
in court of a warding off measure resulted in an accommodation obligation for the 
30 This was confirmed by the 2007 ruling of the Irish High Court in the case of Miss D., where the Court 
ruled that the Health Service Executive could not prevent a 17‑year‑old pregnant girl from travelling 
to the UK to obtain an abortion, as there was no stay or constitutional impediment which served to 
prevent her from travelling to the UK to terminate her pregnancy if she so wished. See Ch. 5, section 
5.2.5.
31 As discussed in Ch. 6, in the Netherlands in one case prosecution was initiated for late abortion in 
Spain, but the charges were later dropped.
32 Van Hoof and Pennings 2011, supra n. 29, at p. 551. As also discussed in Ch. 3, section 3.6.4, there are 
still various open questions as to the application of the European Arrest Warrant in this context.
33 As discussed in Ch. 2, section 2.4.1, in ECtHR 29 October 1992, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman 
v. Ireland, nos. 14234/88 and 14235/88, the ECtHR held an injunction restraining Irish counselling 
agencies from assisting pregnant women in seeking legal abortion services abroad, to violate the 
freedom to impart and receive information (Art. 10 ECHR).







State.34 The ECtHR later held the new abortion information legislation acceptable, 
and considered it one of the elements that justified the restrictive Irish abortion 
laws (see more elaborately section 7.2.4 below).35 Given the specific context of the 
Irish abortion cases, one may need to be careful in applying the ECtHR’s findings 
analogously to situations concerning AHR or surrogacy, but the ECtHR’s reasoning 
concerning effectiveness36 and the implications of the Irish abortion information ban 
on the individuals concerned,37 may very well apply also in such cases.
Moreover, the EU Patient Mobility Directive has introduced considerable rights 
to information for patients involved in cross‑border care (see also section 7.2.2.3 
below), rendering bans on information about abortion and AHR treatment options in 
other EU Member States unacceptable under EU law.
7.2.1.3. Refusals to provide follow‑up care
At a more practical level warding off may consist of refusals to providing aftercare. 
Not many such examples have been found in the present case study.38 There have 
been incidental reports from the Netherlands of gynaecologists refusing to treat 
women who had been to Spain for AHR treatment with the use of commercially 
and anonymously donated egg cells.39 Refusals to provide follow‑up care have, 
furthermore, been claimed to have occurred in Ireland in respect of abortion, but in 
2010 the ECtHR found the provision of medical care in Ireland for women who had 
had abortions in other countries to be sufficient.40
As discussed in Chapter 3, it remains an open question whether European law leaves 
room for refusals to provide aftercare.41 A refusal to provide follow‑up care after 
abortion may furthermore contribute to a violation of the ECHR, as follows from the 
A, B and C case, where the Court considered access to medical care in Ireland after 
an abortion abroad a precondition for the justification of the very restrictive Irish 
34 The first two applicants in the A, B and C case (2010), who sought an abortion for reasons of health and/
or well‑being, maintained that there was a lack of information on the options available to them and that 
this added to the burden of the impugned restrictions on abortion in Ireland, but the ECtHR found these 
submissions to be overly general and unsubstantiated. ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. 
Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 130.
35 Idem, para. 241.
36 The Court noted that the an injunction restraining Irish counselling agencies from assisting pregnant 
women in seeking legal abortion services abroad was ineffective, as it did not prevent large numbers of 
Irish women from continuing to obtain abortions in the UK.
37 The Court noted that the injunction created a risk to the health of women seeking abortions at a later 
stage in their pregnancies due to the lack of proper counselling, and it had adverse effects on women 
who were not sufficiently resourceful or did not have the necessary level of education to have access to 
alternative sources of information. Idem, paras. 73–77.
38 It must be noted that the present research is confined to legal research, while a complete picture of 
whether such refusals occur and if so at what extent, requires sociological research.
39 Ch. 6, section 6.5.3.
40 See Ch. 2, section 2.4.1.
41 Ch. 3, section 3.6.2.3.
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abortion laws (see also 7.2.4 below).42 Again, while there is no case law on this point 
yet, it is well possible that such reasoning would also apply in CBRC cases.
7.2.1.4. Refusals to reimburse treatment and prior authorisation requirements
Another way in which countries of origin may ward off cross‑border movement in the 
context of the present case study, is through refusing reimbursement to individuals 
or couples who availed themselves of foreign treatment options, or by setting prior 
authorisation requirements.
The present case study has shown several examples where courts in Germany and 
the Netherlands rejected claims for reimbursement for treatment obtained abroad. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the basic rule under EU free movement law is that States 
do not have to reimburse treatment obtained abroad, if such treatment is prohibited 
under the domestic law, or if its national scheme does not provide for reimbursement 
for that kind of treatment.43 Hence, if a State prohibits certain reproductive 
treatment, it may also refuse to reimburse the costs if such treatment is obtained 
abroad. However, as also discussed in Chapter 3, in practice, this rule may prove 
problematic in the context of reproductive treatment, as it may be debated if medical 
and ethical standards may be taken into account in this assessment. Also, there are 
various questions as to whether EU law allows for the setting of prior authorisation 
requirements for pregnancy terminations and AHR treatment (either or not involving 
surrogacy).
7.2.1.5. Non‑recognition of legal effects
Cross‑border movement in reproductive matters may also be warded off by way of 
refusing to give recognition to the legal effects of such cross‑border movement. In 
the present case study this has been particularly visible in the context of cross‑border 
surrogacy cases. In various such cases States have refused to recognise the legal 
parenthood of intended parents as established abroad. Intended parents have in some 
cases met with refusals by authorities in their home country to issue a passport 
to a child that was born to a surrogate mother in a foreign country. And even if 
the intended parents were able to enter their State with the child, they often still 
encountered problems in establishing parental links with the child. Various national 
courts have, on public policy grounds, refused recognition of foreign birth certificates 
on which intended parents were stated as legal parents, or refused to enforce a foreign 
judgment declaring the intended parents the legal parents of the child. There have 
even been examples where the child was subsequently put up for adoption44 and the 
concern has been expressed that children risked being left stateless.45
42 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 241.
43 Ch. 3, section 3.6.2.1.
44 E.g. Paradiso and Campanelli, Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, no. 25358/12, which case was pending 
before the ECtHR at the time this research was concluded.
45 See Ch. 5, section 5.5.4; and Ch. 6, section 6.5.6.







The public policy grounds relied on in these cross‑border surrogacy cases reflect 
national standard‑setting in the area and are consequently often grounded in the 
same interests, such as human dignity, the interests of the child and protection of 
the surrogate mother (see 7.1.1 above). For example, as discussed in Chapter 4, in a 
German case of 2007, a court held a Turkish judgment awarding adoption rights of 
a child to a German couple who had arranged a surrogacy agreement with a Turkish 
family, to be against the child’s best interests, as the child had only been given birth 
with the aim of being handed over to the German intended parents.46
The ECtHR has shown understanding for States’ wishes to deter their nationals from 
having recourse to methods of assisted reproduction outside the national territory 
that are prohibited on their own territory. It has accepted that this may, in accordance 
with their perception of the issue, aim to protect children and surrogate mothers. 
The Court has furthermore acknowledged that the community has an interest ‘[…] 
in ensuring that its members conform to the choice made democratically within that 
community.’47 Still, the Strasbourg Court has also found that in cross‑border surrogacy 
cases a fair balance has to be struck between these interests and the interests of the 
individuals concerned, the children’s best interests being paramount.48 As further 
explained in section 7.2.2.1 below, the interests of the child have consequently led 
to exactly opposite conclusions in other – generally more recent – cross‑border 
surrogacy cases.
7.2.1.6. Warding off by countries of destination
The present case study has made clear that States may also wish to ward off 
cross‑border movement to their countries in reproductive matters. The readiest, 
but also most far‑reaching way of doing so is by imposing restrictions on access 
to services for people from abroad. A unique explicit example of such a measure 
is the restrictions on access to high‑technological surrogacy as they apply in the 
Netherlands. As explained in Chapter 3, the hospital that is exclusively licensed to 
carry out high‑technological surrogacy has set the conditions that both the intended 
parents and the surrogate mother must have Dutch nationality, must speak the 
Dutch language and must be resident in the Netherlands. These requirements render 
it absolutely impossible for intended parents from abroad to engage in surrogacy 
in the Netherlands. While the rationale of these rules has not been made explicit, 
the commensurability of these rules with EU free movement law may be seriously 
questioned.
7.2.1.7. Observations
The warding off of cross‑border movement to other States may enable States to 
uphold and protect – as much as possible – certain national standards in respect of 
46 AG Hamm 19 March 2007 (dec.), Az. XVI 23/06. See also LG Dortmund 13 August 2007 (dec.), Az. 15 
T 87/07.
47 ECtHR 26 June 2014, Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11, para. 84.
48 Idem.
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their citizens and residents. For example, unborn life may be protected from being 
terminated on social grounds and the coming into being of a human being by means 
that are considered to violate human dignity may be prevented. Warding off can 
thus be seen as a principled and ‘protectionist’ response of States. Where warding 
off may aim to protect the interests of legal subjects outside the States’ jurisdiction, 
such as surrogate mothers in other countries, it can also be perceived as an effort to 
have such national standards apply extra‑territorially.49 Concerns of a less principled 
nature may further be grounds for States to ward off cross‑border movement in 
reproductive matters. For instance, although not identified as such in the present 
case study, it is conceivable that States that function as a country of destination 
wish to ward off cross‑border movement to prevent the overburdening of their health 
systems.
The present case study has shown that it is very difficult, nigh impossible, for States 
to literally withhold people from actually going to another State for reproductive 
purposes. In other words, cross‑border movement in reproductive matters cannot 
be ruled out; bans on access to medical services in other Member States, including 
abortion and AHR treatment, that are not available or even prohibited in their home 
country, are not easily justified under EU free movement law. Still the warding off 
measures as described in sections 7.2.1.2 to 7.2.1.5 may deter people from going 
abroad and States may thus employ these to minimise cross‑border movement to the 
greatest extent possible.
Where warding off measures indeed successfully deter individuals from going to 
another country for an abortion, AHR treatment or surrogacy, this implies for these 
individuals that their treatment options are restricted. This can be said to affect their 
reproductive autonomy. Also, there is a risk that these individuals will instead resort 
to illegal treatment options within their country, which inevitably carries health 
risks. This concern has been expressed particularly in respect of illegal abortions.50
Where individuals are not deterred from going abroad for reproductive services, 
they have a broader range of choices when it comes to reproductive treatment. They 
can access treatment that is not available in the home country.51 At the same time, 
these individuals may bear burdens that occur particularly, or may gain particular 
weight, in cross‑border cases and that may consist of physical burdens and health 
risks, financial burdens, legal uncertainty, legal complications and emotional 
49 According to Storrow ‘[…] cross‑border reproductive care has been shown to have deleterious 
extraterritorial effects that violate the spirit behind restrictive reproductive laws.’ With warding off, 
such spill‑over effects can be reduced or prevented. R. Storrow, ‘The pluralism problem in cross‑border 
reproductive care’, 25 Human Reproduction (2010) p. 2939.
50 E.g. Human Rights Watch, A State of Isolation, Access to Abortion for Women in Ireland (New York, 
Human Rights Watch 2010), online available at www.hrw.org/node/87910, visited June 2010.
51 Sociological research has shown that there are various reasons why people engage in cross‑border 
reproductive care, namely, treatment costs, treatment quality and treatment availability. See 
G. Pennings and M. Heidi, ‘The state and the infertile patient looking for treatment abroad: a difficult 
relationship’, in: A. Tupasela (ed.), Consumer Medicine (TemaNord 2010, no. 530) p. 99 at p. 100.







burdens.52 Treatment is in many instances only available to those with the financial 
means of travelling53 and there may be medical risks involved, particularly if there 
is insufficient information about foreign treatment options. Also, families that were 
formed in the course of cross‑border surrogacy may meet serious difficulties in 
being legally recognised as families in their home countries.54 Warding off measures 
like the ones described in this section may aggravate or even cause such individual 
burdens. Accommodation measures may, on the other hand, (partly) alleviate them. 
The discussion of such measures in the following section will make clear, however, 
that they cannot take away all individual burdens involved in cross‑border movement 
in reproductive matters.
7.2.2. Accommodation
Instead of warding them off, States may also opt for an entirely different approach 
towards (the effects of) cross‑border movement, which is to accommodate them. 
Because the accommodating responses discussed below form a mirror image to the 
warding off responses extensively discussed in the previous section, their discussion 
in the present section is more concise and, in some cases, clustered.
7.2.2.1. Recognition of legal parenthood in cross‑border surrogacy cases
A highly visible and concrete way of accommodating the effects of cross‑border 
movement reproductive matters is by recognising the legal effects of foreign 
treatment options. Such recognition may be inspired or even dictated by overriding 
interests, such as the rights of the child.
As discussed in Chapter 3, it remains an open question whether EU (free movement) 
law actually obliges the Member States to adopt such an accommodation approach 
in cross‑border surrogacy situations. In most situations where EU Member States 
refused recognition in cross‑border surrogacy cases, the reproductive treatment 
52 In a 2010 survey into experiences of past services recipients of cross‑border reproductive care, the 
following ‘negative experiences’ were reported: ‘difficulty in finding a clinic in the home country 
to undertake tests and scans’; ‘travel difficulties’; ‘higher costs than expected’; ‘language problems’; 
‘lack of regulation in destination country’ and ‘legal/liability issues’. E. Blyth, ‘Fertility patients’ 
experiences of cross‑border reproductive care’, 94 Fertility and Sterility (2010) p. e11 at p. e13.
53 ESHRE, Comparative Analysis of Medically Assisted Reproduction in the EU: Regulation and 
Technologies (SANCO/2008/C6/051), p. 86, online available at www.ec.europa.eu/health/blood_
tissues_organs/docs/study_eshre_en.pdf, visited June 2014. Ferraretti et al. have observed that his may 
promote ‘economically based discrimination […] since only services recipients with adequate financial 
resources can afford treatments abroad.’ A.P. Ferraretti et al., ‘Cross‑border reproductive care: a 
phenomenon expressing the controversial aspects of reproductive technologies’, 20 Reproductive 
BioMedicine Online (2010) pp. 261–266 at p. 264. See also T.K. Hervey and J. V. McHale, Health Law 
and the European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004) p. 142. The authors have 
furthermore pointed out that even if a service recipient is entitled to reimbursement, the practical 
reality may still be that only services‑recipients with sufficient independent means to pay up‑front may 
have access to cross‑border health care services.
54 Individual burdens that may be involved in cross‑border movement in reproductive matters are set out 
more extensively in section 7. 2.4.1 below.
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involving the surrogacy agreement had taken place in a third country.55 Such 
situations fall outside the scope of EU law and there is thus no obligation under EU 
law on Member States to recognise court judgments or birth certificates from these 
countries. This could be different, however, if another EU Member State is involved, 
but as discussed in Chapter 3, the present state of EU law gives little guidance in this 
regard.
The ECtHR, for its part, however, has ruled that in cross‑border surrogacy cases 
States must recognise legal parenthood established in another country, regardless 
of whether the case concerns two EU Member States or at least one non‑EU State. 
Decisive in the relevant Mennesson and Labassee rulings was the right to personal 
identity of the child concerned. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the accommodation 
obligations imposed on States under the ECHR in this context have been thus far 
restricted to the situation where the intended father is the genetic father of the child. 
Future case law will have to show whether this obligation also applies in cases 
where neither of the intended parents is the genetic parent of the child concerned. 
The ECtHR has furthermore made clear that States may subject accommodation to 
certain (procedural) conditions. In D. and Others (2014) the Court held that States 
were under no obligation under the Convention to authorise the entry of a child born 
to a foreign surrogate mother, without first subjecting the case to some form of legal 
examination.56
In various cross‑border surrogacy cases national courts have indeed taken such an 
accommodating approach. Even before the ECtHR issued its important Mennesson 
and Labassee rulings, in all three States in recent years a trend has emerged in favour 
of recognising parental links established in another country or of enabling intended 
parents to establish parental links with the child under domestic law, because the best 
interests of the child were held to require this.57 In the various national jurisdictions, 
the precondition that at least one of the intended parents is the genetic parent of the 
child concerned has been set as well.58
7.2.2.2. Information, reimbursement and follow‑up care
States may also accommodate cross‑border movement by providing independent 
information about foreign treatment options, by reimbursing treatment obtained 
abroad or by providing follow‑up care.
As noted above (in section 7.2.1.2), bans on information about foreign abortion 
services have proven incommensurable with the ECHR. In fact, from A, B and C 
it can be inferred that States have an obligation under the Convention to provide 
55 This, for instance, holds for all relevant surrogacy cases decided by the ECtHR and those currently 
pending before this Court. See Ch. 2, sections 2.3.5 and 2.4.2.
56 ECtHR 8 July 2014 (dec.), D. a.o. v. Belgium, no. 29176/13, para. 59.
57 See Ch. 4, section 4.5.3, Ch. 5, section 5.5.4 and Ch. 6, section 6.5.6.
58 Idem.







for access to ‘appropriate’ information about abortion services in other countries.59 
Further, as discussed in Chapter 3, by introducing considerable rights to information 
for patients involved in cross‑border care, the EU Patient Mobility Directive of 2011 
has imposed certain accommodation obligations on the Member States. National 
contact points in each Member State – both States of affiliation and States where 
the treatment takes place – must deliver information (in their official languages) to 
patients involved in cross‑border care on matters like the applicable standards and 
guidelines, healthcare providers and patients’ rights.
As surrogacy does not qualify as health care under the Patient Mobility Directive, 
such accommodation obligations by means of information provision do not hold for 
surrogacy.60 Some State authorities, like the Irish and the Dutch, have, however, 
considered it their task to provide clear guidance on the principles they apply in 
examining applications for a travel document on behalf of children born outside the 
State as a result of surrogacy arrangements, as well as about the (im)possibilities 
under their national law to have legal parenthood recognised or established in 
such surrogacy cases. Here, too, a trend towards accommodation therefore can be 
discerned.
States may also accommodate cross‑border movement in reproductive matters by 
providing for reimbursement for treatment obtained abroad, even if the treatment 
is not available domestically. For example, in the Netherlands it is generally 
accepted that the Dutch Health Insurance bears the costs that occur when insured 
persons return to the Netherlands after having obtained treatment abroad, even if 
that treatment itself would not be reimbursed under the Health Insurance Act.61 As 
explained in Chapter 3, under EU law states are free to offer such reimbursement, 
although as yet there is no conclusive decision as to the matter of whether they may, 
in certain circumstances, also be under an obligation to accommodate cross‑border 
movement in reproductive matters in this way.62 There are in any case presently no 
indications in the ECtHR case law that hint at any such accommodation obligation.
Another way of accommodating cross‑border movement is by means of the provision 
of follow‑up care upon return to the home country. As discussed in Chapter 3 it is 
insufficiently clear whether under EU law States are under an obligation to provide 
such aftercare. Under the ECHR access to appropriate follow‑up care has in any case 
been set as a minimum accommodation obligation in cross‑border abortion cases.63 
It is very possible that in future case law the Court will define a similar obligation in 
situations involving CBRC.
59 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 241.
60 See Ch. 3, section 3.6.2.
61 See Ch. 6, section 6.5.2.
62 See Ch. 3, section 3.6.2.1.
63 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 241.
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The discussion above has shown that accommodation may be required by interests 
and perspectives that must be taken into account in all reproductive matters, but 
which may gain particular importance in cross‑border situations. Clear examples are 
the rights of the child and the possibility of making an informed decision on the basis 
of appropriate information. In respect of the rights of the child, views have changed 
over time as to what the best interests of the child require exactly.
States may perceive accommodation, if imposed on them by means of EU 
legislation or ECtHR judgments, as a thwarting of their national standards, even if 
accommodation does not require them to amend their internal standard‑setting in 
the area and they remain free to decide what treatment they wish to regulate or to 
prohibit within their own jurisdictions. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that certain 
accommodation measures, like recognition of legal parenthood established abroad, 
put pressure on States to change their national standards, and may thus force them to 
adaptation (see below). However, the opposite is also possible. Accommodation may 
in some cases in effect be seen as another means of protecting national standards, 
albeit in a more pragmatic way. For example, where States provide information about 
the legal implications of cross‑border surrogacy, they may do so in order to protect 
the interests of the child. They may want to discourage people from engaging in 
international surrogacy agreements and minimise or reduce possible harm involved 
if such movement is taking place after all. Consequently, as further explained 
below (section 7.2.2.3), accommodation of cross‑border movement may sometimes 
contribute to the maintaining of less permissive national standards.
Accommodation measures as here discussed may alleviate individual burdens, 
for instance by providing for recognition of legal parenthood established abroad, 
but they may not take away all burdens. Even if cross‑border movement is fully 
accommodated, there are still – physical, emotional and financial – burdens involved 
in the travelling itself, as set out more extensively in section 7.2.4 below. The only 
way to fully take those burdens away as well is by means of adaptation, which, 
however, may raise other objections.
7.2.3. Adaptation
States may also respond to cross‑border movement by removing the need for it, 
which they can do by adapting their national standards to equalise them to those of 
the States to which cross‑border movement is taking place. In the three jurisdictions 
studied, the existence of foreign options has never been put forward as the only 
reason for amending national laws, or for interpreting existing standards differently, 
but certainly some hints can be found in the present case study that foreign treatment 
options have played a role in national standard‑setting in reproductive matters. 
For example, as noted above, the judgment of the Irish Supreme Court in the X 
Case could be perceived as such. Further, as observed in Chapter 4, the German 







debates about cross‑border movement for abortion and PGD have contributed to the 
relaxation of the relevant national law. The fact that couples from the Netherlands 
went abroad for PGD, was also for the Dutch legislature one of the reasons to legalise 
and regulate this method, inter alia, because of quality and safety concerns involved 
in the cross‑border movement. Cross‑border movement for surrogacy to other 
States further was one of the reasons for the Dutch government to install a State 
Commission on Parenthood in 2014, that was, inter alia, given the task to reconsider 
the national surrogacy legislation.
Depending on how one approaches the matter, adaptation either can be regarded as 
the ultimate form of accommodation, since it can be perceived as ‘giving in’, or it 
can be looked at as a variant of warding off, since it makes cross‑border movement 
redundant. Evidently, for individuals who wish to have access to treatment provided 
abroad, adaptation can be perceived as the most beneficial response of States to 
cross‑border movement. Particularly where it is combined with accommodation of 
cross‑border movement they can be said to have the best of two worlds.
7.2.4. Outsourcing
The last category of legal responses is best described by the term ‘outsourcing’. 
It is not so much expressly voiced at national level, but it is an implication of an 
approach taken by the ECtHR in certain cross‑border cases concerning reproductive 
matters. The discussion of the ECtHR’s case law in Chapter 2 has made clear that in 
some of those cases the Court accepted the existence of foreign treatment options as 
an element relevant to the justification of prohibitive domestic laws in reproductive 
matters. This was especially held in the Irish abortion case of A, B and C v. Ireland 
(2010), where the Court concluded that ‘[…] having regard to the right to lawfully 
travel abroad for an abortion with access to appropriate information and medical 
care in Ireland’, the prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well‑being 
reasons did not exceed the margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to Ireland. 
The fact that women from Ireland could lawfully travel abroad for an abortion with 
access to appropriate information and medical care in Ireland, was thus considered 
sufficient by the ECtHR as minimum level of protection under the Convention.64
With this line of reasoning, the Strasbourg Court has thus authorised, if not 
encouraged, States to outsource their accountability under the ECHR by referring 
to other States’ legal regimes. This approach raises a number of questions that have 
yet to be addressed by the Court. For example, it is unclear whether distance or the 
64 Another example is S. H. and Others (2011) – the Austrian case on gamete donation – where the Court 
noted that there was ‘[…] no prohibition under Austrian law on going abroad to seek treatment of 
infertility that use[d] artificial procreation techniques not allowed in Austria and that in the event of a 
successful treatment the Civil Code [contained] clear rules on paternity and maternity that respect[ed] 
the wishes of the parents.’ ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 114.
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costs of travelling to the foreign country make a difference in this regard.65 Also, 
the question has been raised whether the State is under an obligation to guarantee 
that the foreign treatment option is actually an option that can be used effectively. 
For example, it has been questioned whether States must also support the costs of 
the travelling for such foreign services or allow individuals who are in (aliens’) 
detention to go abroad for an abortion or reproductive treatment if they so desire.66 
In other words, it is as yet unclear to what extent outsourcing must be combined with 
accommodation. In A, B and C, certain accommodation obligations were indeed 
set as preconditions for outsourcing in the Court’s reasoning, as the Court took into 
account that there was access to abortion information and follow‑up care in Ireland. 
In this case the Court simply took into account what was already provided for under 
the national law of Ireland. Future case law will therefore have to make clear whether 
any further such accommodation obligations will be defined as preconditions for 
outsourcing.
So far, the outsourcing approach has not always been applied by the ECtHR, not 
even in cases before it where it easily could have done so, such as the Costa and 
Pavan case, concerning PGD. It remains to be seen whether it will also be applied 
in potential future complaints about restrictive domestic laws on surrogacy. If the 
Court would indeed hold such a situation to come within the scope of the right to 
private life under Article 8 ECHR, it cannot be ruled out that in its assessment of 
the justification for the interference with this right, the Court would take account of 
the fact that there is a realistic option to engage in a surrogacy agreement in another 
country. Especially now that the Court, in Mennesson and Labassee, has formulated 
certain accommodation obligations for such cross‑border surrogacy cases, it is not 
wholly illusory that such a minimum guarantee contributes to the justification of, or 
even constitutes the justification of, a restrictive regime at the national level.
Outsourcing allows States to refer people within their jurisdictions to other States 
for the protection of rights that come within the scope of the ECHR. This way 
cross‑border movement in reproductive matters becomes a ‘safety valve’,67 a means 
to ‘hide behind’ the more permissive regimes of other States. The existence of foreign 
options may thus enable States to maintain their own deviating (and generally less 
permissive) standards. The choice for outsourcing is understandable mainly from 
a more ‘political’ perspective. It is a pragmatic approach of the Strasbourg Court, 
65 A.C. Hendriks ‘Case note to ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05’, 12 
European Human Rights Cases 2011/40 (in Dutch) and N.R. Koffeman, ‘Het Ierse abortusverbod en 
het EVRM; is uitbesteding de nieuwe norm?’ [‘The Irish abortion ban and the ECHR: is outsourcing 
the new standard?’], 36 NTM/NJCM‑Bulletin (2011) p. 372. As noted by these authors, the bigger the 
distance, the bigger certain individual burdens may be (see 7.2.4.1 below).
66 Koffeman 2011B, supra n. 65, at p. 372.
67 For the use of this term in the context of CBRC, see inter alia Hervey and McHale 2004, supra n. 53, 
at p. 157; G. Pennings et al., ‘Cross‑border reproductive care’, 23 Human Reproduction (2008) p. 2183 
and Ferraretti et al. 2010, supra n. 53, at p. 264.







that underlines the subsidiary role of this Court in these morally sensitive cases.68 
Nevertheless, this approach generally can be assessed negatively. First of all, it may 
take away internal pressure for change and may in fact result in inactivity by the 
legislature.69 Gilmartin and White have opined in this regard in 2011, for example, 
that because women in Ireland have ‘[…] “won” the right to travel, the Irish state has 
been excused from any responsibility to provide safe, legal, and affordable abortion 
services in the years since 1992.’70
Moreover, as also noted by the dissenters in S.H. and Others, it really is a pragmatic, 
rather than a principled, approach. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why certain 
interests that were grounds for restrictive laws on reproductive matters at domestic 
level – such as the protection of human dignity or the unborn – would no longer hold 
in cross‑border situations.71 In fact, precisely in cross‑border situations may such 
interests require even more protection. It has been observed in respect of the A, B 
and C case that ‘hypocrisy’ at national level ‘[…] should not have been so keenly 
approved by a Court whose task is to uphold human rights across a region in which 
it recognised a consensus to prioritise the rights of pregnant women over those of 
the foetus.’72
Outsourcing does not, furthermore, fit in well with the foundations and objectives 
of the ECHR, following which each State is responsible for securing the Convention 
rights to everyone within their jurisdiction (the principle of State accountability as 
laid down in Article 1 ECHR).73 The Court’s reasoning in the relevant cases gives the 
impression that it is sufficient if the High Contracting Parties at least jointly (rather 
than separately) provide for a certain minimum level of protection.
The implications for individuals of this outsourcing approach, particularly if not 
sufficiently combined with accommodation obligations, cannot be overlooked either. 
In particular, much has been reported in respect of women from Ireland who need 
to go abroad if they wish to have an abortion on medical and social grounds. It has 
been claimed that these women bear unduly harsh emotional, medical and financial 
burdens.74 The abortion procedures of these women are alleged to be expensive, 
68 The approach is pragmatic particularly in respect of abortion, as that is legalised in almost all Council 
of Europe Member States. See ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, as 
discussed in ch. 2, sections 2.2.3 and 2.4.1.
69 In fact, resignation (see 7.2 above) can be a hidden form of outsourcing.
70 M. Gilmartin and A. White, ‘Comparative Perspectives Symposium: Gender and Medical Tourism. 
Interrogating Medical Tourism: Ireland, Abortion, and Mobility Rights’, 36 Signs (2011) p. 275 at 
p. 277.
71 See the Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria to 
ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00. See also R.F. Storrow, ‘Judicial 
review of restrictions on gamete donation in Europe’, 25 Reproductive BioMedicine Online (2012) 
p. 655 at p. 657 and I.G. Cohen, ‘S.H. and Others v. Austria and circumvention tourism’, 25 Reproductive 
BioMedicine Online (2012) p. 660 at p. 662.
72 E. Wicks, ‘A, B, C v Ireland: Abortion Law under the European Convention on Human Rights‘, 11 
HRLR (2011) p. 556 at p. 563.
73 See Art. 1 ECHR.
74 See, for instance, ECtHR 27 June 2006 (dec.), D. v. Ireland, no. 26499/02.
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complicated and traumatic.75 Although perhaps difficult to establish and measure 
in an objective manner,76 their emotional burdens may consist of great distress and 
anguish and the feeling of being stigmatised.77 Even medical risks may be entailed 
in cross‑border abortions. Such risks may be either directly caused by the travelling 
itself, or by the inherent delay in the carrying out of an abortion that is to take place 
abroad.78 A related difficulty is that not all women can stay in the destination country 
as long as would be desirable with regard to the necessary post‑abortion counselling 
and care.79 Language barriers that may occur when women go to other countries, may 
also have health implications.80 The costs of travelling abroad for an abortion may 
furthermore constitute ‘a significant financial burden’ for the women concerned.81 
The financial burden of having an abortion abroad, may also be the cause of delays 
in the carrying out of the abortion, which – as yet clarified above – may have 
75 See the complaints of the applicants in ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, 
no. 25579/05, para. 173.
76 Understandably, the ECtHR held in the case of A, B and C v. Ireland (in para. 126) that the psychological 
impact of such travelling on the applicants, was ‘[…] by its nature subjective, personal and not 
susceptible to clear documentary or objective proof.’ The Court nonetheless considered it reasonable 
to find that ‘[…] each applicant felt the weight of a considerable stigma prior to, during and after their 
abortions: they travelled abroad to do something which, on the Government’s own submissions, went 
against the profound moral values of the majority of the Irish people […] and which was, or (in the case 
of the third applicant) could have been, a serious criminal offence in their own country punishable by 
penal servitude for life […]. Moreover, obtaining an abortion abroad, rather than in the security of their 
own country and medical system, undoubtedly constituted a significant source of added anxiety.’
77 Compare the complaints of all three applicants in ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. 
Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 119 (‘All felt stigmatised as they were going abroad to do something that 
was a criminal offence in their own country’) and the assessment of their complaints by the Court in 
para. 127. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has observed that ‘[…] having to travel abroad for a procedure 
at a time when many women are already in distress because of an unwanted or unhealthy pregnancy’ 
may constitute ‘a major source of anxiety’. Human Rights Watch 2010, supra n. 50, p. 35, online 
available at www.hrw.org/node/87910, visited 3 June 2010. Wicks has held: ‘Having already recognised 
the “significant psychological burden” faced by the applicants in being required to leave their home 
country to seek medical treatment prohibited there, the Court should have been more reluctant to 
present that psychological burden as the very guarantee of respect for the women’s private life.’ Wicks 
2011, supra n. 72, at p. 563.
78 In general it goes that the later an abortion is carried out, the more physically arduous the procedure is, 
as a late abortion often means a surgical abortion, instead of a medical one. Compare the complaints of 
the applicants in ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 173.
79 The applicant in ECtHR 27 June 2006 (dec.), D v. Ireland, no. 26499/02, for example, claimed that with 
two children in Ireland, she could not remain in the UK for counselling after her abortion.
80 Hendriks has also pointed at the risk of such language barriers occurring. Hendriks 2011, supra n. 65 .
81 ECtHR [GC] 16 December 2010, A, B and C v. Ireland, no. 25579/05, para. 128. In its report A State of 
Isolation, Access to Abortion for Women in Ireland of 2010, Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded 
that ‘[…] for someone living under the poverty line, the cost of an abortion could easily represent 
more than a monthly salary’. HRW referred to Irish service providers estimating the total costs to be 
between € 800 and € 1,000. By comparison, HRW noted that the average salary in Ireland fluctuated 
around € 30,000 per year. HRW furthermore claimed that for women who were in the asylum seeking 
process in Ireland, the travelling abroad to obtain an abortion was ‘plainly out of reach’ from a financial 
perspective. The HRW report furthermore outlined that ‘service providers interviewed by Human 
Rights Watch confirmed how difficult it is for many women to raise the money to travel and the lengths 
that some must go to to ensure their access to safe and legal abortions’. Human Rights Watch 2010, 
supra n. 50, at pp. 31–32.







implications for the woman’s health.82 Moreover, in certain cases it is practically 
impossible for women to travel to another state for an abortion.83 Particular concerns 
have been expressed about the vulnerable status of asylum seekers in this regard.84
Many of the above described individual burdens may, mutatus mutandis also hold 
in CBRC cases and cross‑border surrogacy. Individuals and couples that go abroad 
for AHR treatment or surrogacy may also carry physical, emotional, financial 
and medical burdens,85 or may not be practically in the position to travel abroad. 
AHR treatment may involve various appointments at different points in time, 
which may be particularly burdensome if the travel distance to the foreign clinic 
is considerable.86 CBRC services recipients returning home without adequate 
information about their prior treatment, may also run substantial health risks.87 If 
services recipients have been self‑referred, their prior treatment may go unnoticed. 
In particular in cases where the foreign treatment is prohibited in their home country, 
proper monitoring and follow‑up may be hindered.88 This may also be the case if the 
relevant treatment is not prohibited as such, but still not common practice amongst 
medical practitioners in the home country. In cross‑border surrogacy cases, intended 
parents may come across legal obstacles with potentially serious implications for 
their chances of building and enjoying family life with the child concerned. While 
82 There are even reports that ‘[…] many women see through crisis pregnancies “because they can’t afford 
the abortion’”. Human Rights Watch 2010, supra n. 50, at p. 36, referring to an interview with Juliet 
Bressan, Doctors for Choice, Dublin, 25 August 2008.
83 Some cannot travel because of their immigration status, because they are in state custody, because 
they are in mandatory daily treatment for drugs addiction or because of an illness or disability. Human 
Rights Watch 2010, supra n. 50, at pp. 16 and 36–37. See also K.J. Johnson, ‘“New thinking about an 
old issue;” the abortion controversy continues in Russia and Ireland – Could Roe v. Wade have been the 
better solution?’, 15 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review (2004) p. 183 at p. 201 and 
J. Burns, ‘Laying down the law’ Sunday Times 31 October 2004, p. 14. See also C. Staunton, ‘As Easy 
as A, B and C: Will A, B and C v. Ireland Be Ireland’s Wake‑up Call for Abortion Rights?’, 18 European 
Journal of Health Law (2011) p. 205 at p. 218. Gilmartin and White 2011, supra n. 70, at p. 278.
84 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on the second and third 
periodic reports of Ireland (CEDAW/C/IRL/2‑3) at its 440th and 441st meetings on 21 June 1999 (see 
CEDAW/C/SR.440 and 441), para 185, online available at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/
docs/IrelandCO21st_en.pdf, visited 15 February 2015. Human Rights Watch 2010, supra n. 50, at pp. 5 
and 32–33. In August 2003, the Irish newspaper The Times reported that 20 asylum seekers in Ireland 
were granted a temporary permit and visa to leave Ireland to travel to the UK for an abortion and to 
return to Ireland afterwards. While granting the visa, the authorities had stressed that these concerned 
highly exceptional measures. Many others had to resort to illegal means. K. Holland, ‘Asylum‑seekers 
granted visas for UK abortions’ The Irish Times 30 August 2003, p. 4.
85 See supra n. 52. Ferraretti et. al have furthermore observed that CBRC ‘[…] is often associated with a 
high risk of health dangers, frustration and disparities.’ Ferraretti et al.2010, supra n. 53, at p. 261.
86 The Californian Centre for Surrogate Parenting Inc. for instance indicates that intended parents will 
need to come to the USA for a minimum of two or three trips. No doubt these overseas trips have 
financial implications as well. See www.creatingfamilies.com/IP/IP_Info.aspx?Type=18, visited 
January 2011.
87 B. Dickens, ‘Cross‑border reproductive services’, 111 International Journal of Gynecology and 
Obstetrics (2010) p. 190 at p. 190.
88 The authors of the report Pre‑implantation Genetic Diagnosis in Europe observe that evidence 
gathered painted ‘a contrasting picture’ on this point. While some clinics were clearly not deterred, 
others did not see it is as their responsibility. A. Coverleyn et al., Pre‑implantation Genetic Diagnosis 
in Europe’ (Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, January 2007) p. 80, online available 
at www.ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/eur22764en.pdf, visited July 2014.
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the relevant ECtHR case law has ruled out various such obstacles, the occurrence of 
such obstacles is still not wholly illusory, for example if the intended parents are not 
the genetic parents of the child.
7.2.5. Resumé and outlook
In the present case study four types of legal responses to cross‑border movement for 
reproductive matters have been identified: warding off, accommodation, adaptation 
and outsourcing. For most of these – warding off, adaptation, and at times also 
accommodation – the initiative was taken at national level, while in respect of 
some others – accommodation and outsourcing – the European level has also been 
influential. The States studied in this research have combined various categories of 
the here described legal responses to cross‑border movement and different responses 
may apply in the same area. Ireland – in any case initially and mainly in the context of 
cross‑border abortions – has resorted more to warding off responses than Germany 
and the Netherlands. But in all three States such measures have – again in any case 
initially – been employed in respect of cross‑border surrogacy.
Warding off (the effects of) cross‑border movement in respect of reproductive 
services by means of non‑recognition of legal effects of foreign options or by 
means of bans on information on foreign treatment options has, however, generally 
proven not easily justified under European law. Refusing follow‑up care may also 
be problematic. While a refusal to reimburse the costs of treatment obtained abroad 
may be acceptable, it is questionable whether prior authorisation requirements can 
be set.
Various warding off responses have, over time, often been converted into 
accommodation. In some cases, this was the direct consequence of European 
law, in others national authorities had decided of their own accord to adopt an 
accommodating approach. Accommodation – for example providing for information 
and follow‑up care in case of abortion and recognising parental links established 
abroad in surrogacy cases – may alleviate the individual burdens involved in 
outsourcing, though the burdens of the actual travelling remain. There is potential 
for the easing of even more of these burdens, for instance by providing for financial 
support for those for whom the costs of travelling are insurmountable.89 The more 
such accommodating measures are taken, the less there seems to be a need for actual 
adaptation. This is all the more true since the ‘outsourcing’ approach of the ECtHR 
clearly allows for the States’ accommodation response and thus does not provide a 
direct incentive for changing the national standards as such.
89 There may be limits to the accommodating role of States, however, and perhaps certain burdens 
involved in travelling abroad will remain the individuals’ own responsibility. For example, in the 
international surrogacy case D. and Others, the ECtHR held that the Belgian State could not be held 
responsible for the fact that the couple had not been granted a visa in the Ukraine for an extended period 
and thus could not have spent more time with their child in that country.







Whether the legal responses identified on the basis of the present case study are 
accommodating, adapting or rather warding off, they are all characterised by 
being mainly unilateral legal responses, even if some responses are imposed or 
inspired by European law. Nevertheless, there is room and potential for bilateral 
or coordinated legal responses to develop. This may be done, for example, by 
means of the harmonisation of Private International Law.90 In addition, States could 
bilaterally regulate certain matters. For example, it has been suggested in respect 
of AHR treatment involving surrogacy arrangements, that countries of origin and 
countries of destination agree that the latter country will not carry out treatment if 
the individual or couple concerned do not meet the conditions for access to treatment 
in the home country.91 Such changes would basically come down to adaptation in 
individual cases by the destination country to the standards of the home country. In 
other words, the standards of the home country are given an extra‑territorial effect 
in individual cases. Such approach could possibly also be taken where people from a 
State where gamete donors must be known have AHR treatment in a country where 
use is made of anonymously donated gametes. In this situation even more would 
be required from the destination country, however, as this State may not even have 
an infrastructure in place to trace the donor. Such coordinated approaches could be 
initiated by (a group of) States or imposed on them at European level, either by the 
EU legislature or judiciary, or by the ECtHR.
90 See, for example, K. Saarloos, European private international law on legal parentage? Thoughts on a 
European instrument implementing the principle of mutual recognition in legal parentage (Maastricht, 
s.n. 2010).
91 E. Winkel et al., ‘Draagmoederschap na ivf in het buitenland. Dilemma’s bij de begeleiding’ [‘Surrogacy 
after IVF treatment in a foreign country. Dillemas in the counselling’], 154 Nederlands Tijdschrijft 
voor Geneeskunde (2010) p. A1777.
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8.1. frAmework of echr rIghts
This first section provides for a brief introduction to a number of ECHR rights that have 
been most important in the case law of the ECtHR on legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships. The first is the right to respect for private life (Article 8 ECHR). It 
has been on the basis of this Article that the Court has ruled that criminalisation 
of homosexual acts was in violation of the Convention (section 8.1.1). The second 
subsection discusses the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 
ECHR), while sections 8.1.3 and 8.1.4 discuss the right to marry (Article 12) and the 
prohibition on discrimination (Article 14 ECHR), which includes a prohibition on 
grounds of sexual orientation. For a discussion of the rights of the child under the 
Convention, reference is made to Chapter 2, section 2.1.3.
8.1.1.	 Sexual	orientation	as	most	intimate	aspect	of	private	life	(Article	8	
ECHR)
The first line of ECtHR judgments which have improved the legal position of persons 
with a homosexual orientation date back to the 1980s and concerned national 
legislation criminalising homosexual conduct or acts. The Court examined these 
complaints on the basis of the right to respect for private life (Article 8 ECHR).
In Dudgeon (1981),1 the applicant complained about the fact that homosexual acts, 
even if committed in private by consenting males over the age of 21, were criminal 
offences under the law of Northern Ireland. The then existing European Commission 
of Human Rights (ECmHR) observed that the applicant’s complaint related only to 
the prohibition of private, consensual acts, and found that the complaint therefore 
fell within the scope of Article 8 ECHR.2 The Court subsequently saw no reason 
to differ from these views and held that the maintenance in force of the impugned 
legislation constituted a continuing interference with the applicant’s right to respect 
for his private life – including his sexual life – within the meaning of Article 8(1).3 
In the personal circumstances of the applicant, the very existence of this legislation 
continuously and directly affected his private life.4
1 ECtHR [GC] 22 October 1981, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, no. 7525/76.
2 ECmHR 13 March 1980 (report), Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, no. 7525/76.
3 ECtHR [GC] 22 October 1981, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, no. 7525/76, para. 41.
4 Idem, para. 41.







In its examination of whether this interference could be justified, the Court accepted 
that the general aim pursued by the legislation was the protection of morals.5 The 
Court furthermore acknowledged that some degree of regulation of male homosexual 
conduct, as indeed of other forms of sexual conduct, by means of the criminal law 
could be justified as ‘necessary in a democratic society’, as the overall function 
served by the criminal law in this field was to preserve public order and decency 
and to protect the citizen from what is offensive or injurious. The Court stressed 
the fact that the case at hand concerned a most intimate aspect of private life,6 and 
that the right affected by the impugned legislation ‘protects an essentially private 
manifestation of the human personality.’7 Accordingly there had to be particularly 
serious reasons before interferences on the part of the public authorities could be 
justified.
The Court found that it could not be maintained that there was a pressing social 
need to make such acts criminal offences, as there was no sufficient justification 
provided by the risk of harm to vulnerable sections of society requiring protection or 
by the effects on the public.8 On the issue of proportionality, the Court considered 
that such justifications as there were for retaining the law in force unamended were 
outweighed by the detrimental effects which the very existence of the legislative 
provisions in question could have on the life of a person of homosexual orientation 
like the applicant.9 The Court concluded that the restriction imposed on the 
applicant under Northern Ireland law was disproportionate by reason of its breadth 
and absolute character.10 As regards the prohibition on conducting homosexual acts 
for males under the age of 21, the Court ruled that it fell in the first instance to the 
national authorities to decide upon the question.11 The ECtHR did not find a violation 
in this respect.
The Court repeated this line of reasoning in two later cases concerning the 
criminalisation of male homosexual conduct by adults.12 It took the Court remarkably 
longer to apply this reasoning also in regard of homosexuality in the military. In 
1983 the Commission was of the opinion that a ban on homosexuality in the military 
could be justified for the protection of morals and for the prevention of disorder, 
as it found that homosexual conduct by members of the armed forces could pose a 
particular risk to order within the forces which would not arise in civilian life. In 
1999 however, the Court ruled in Smith and Grady that there were no convincing 
and weighty reasons that could justify discharging homosexuals from the military 
5 Idem, para. 46.
6 Idem, para. 52.
7 Idem, para. 60.
8 See also ECtHR 19 February 1997, Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, nos. 21627/93 
a.o.
9 ECtHR [GC] 22 October 1981, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, no. 7525/76, para. 60.
10 Idem, para. 61.
11 Idem, para. 62.
12 ECtHR 26 October 1986, Norris v. Ireland, no. 10581/83 and ECtHR 22 April 1993, Modinos v. Cyprus, 
no. 15070/89. For a pending case on this matter see H.Ç. v.Turkey, no. 6428/12, lodged on 30 January 
2012.







because of their homosexuality.13 The Court has furthermore held differing ages of 
consent under criminal law for homosexual relations to be in violation of Article 8 
the Convention.14
By qualifying sexual orientation as a most intimate aspect of private life, and as 
an essentially private manifestation of the human personality, the Court has placed 
sexual orientation at the centre of the right to private life as protected by Article 8. 
This finding has been an important ground for the formulation and application of a 
strict test in cases where a difference in treatment was based on sexual orientation 
(see section 8.1.4 below).
8.1.2.	 Same‑sex	relationships	and	the	right	to	respect	for	private	and	family	
life	(Article	8	ECHR)
After the Court had accepted in Dudgeon that sexual orientation forms part of 
private life and enjoys protection under Article 8 ECHR, the Commission and the 
Court soon thereafter also accepted that relationships between persons of the same 
sex fell within the notion of ‘private life’ under Article 8.15 However, for a long time, 
the Commission – and later the Court – held that stable homosexual relationships did 
not fall within the scope of the right to respect for family life within the meaning 
of that provision.16 This was so despite the fact that the Court had ruled yet in the 
late 1970s that also de facto family relations enjoyed protection under Article 8.17 
Relevant factors to decide whether a relationship [could] be said to amount to ‘family 
life’, included whether the couple lived together, the length of their relationship and 
whether they had demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children 
together or by any other means.18
13 Accordingly, the Court considered that the applicants’ complaints under Art. 14 in conjunction with 
Art. 8 did not give rise to any separate issue. ECtHR 27 September 1999, Smith and Grady v. the United 
Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96.
14 ECtHR 9 January 2003, L. and V. v. Austria, nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98.
15 E.g. ECmHR 3 May 1983 (dec.), X. and Y v. the United Kingdom, no. 9369/81 and ECmHR 9 October 
1989 (dec.), C. and L.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 14753/89. See also Mata Estevez, where the Court 
acknowledged ‘that the applicant’s emotional and sexual relationship [with a same‑sex partner] related 
to his private life within the meaning of Art. 8 para. 1 of the Convention’. ECtHR 10 May 2001 (dec.), 
Mata Estevez v. Spain, no. 56501/00.
16 ECmHR 3 May 1983 (dec.), X. and Y v. the United Kingdom, no. 9369/81; ECmHR 14 May 1986 (dec.), 
S. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11718/85 and ECmHR 19 May 1992 (dec.), Kerkhoven and Hinke v. 
the Netherlands, no. 15666/89. In Mata Estevez (2001), the Court referred to these decisions, while 
reiterating that ‘[…] long‑term homosexual relationships between two men [did] not fall within the 
scope of the right to respect for family life protected by Article 8 of the Convention.’ ECtHR 10 May 
2001 (dec.), Mata Estevez v. Spain, no. 56501/00. Hodson observed that the X. and Y decision ‘set a 
precedent that proved fatal to the family rights claims of all same‑sex couples before the Commission, 
even where they were raising a child together.’ L. Hodson, ‘A Marriage by any other Name? Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria,’ 11 Human Rights Law Review (2011) p. 170 at p. 174.
17 ECtHR 13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, para. 31. See also ch. 2, section 2.1.3.
18 ECtHR 27 October 1994, Kroon a.o. v. the Netherlands, no. 18535/91, para. 30.







The Court held on to this line of reasoning for many years, considering that there 
was too little common ground within the Council of Europe to hold that same‑sex 
relationships constituted ‘family life’.19 Later, the Court explicitly left the issue to 
the Contracting Parties,20 or it left the question open.21 Only in 2010, in the landmark 
case Schalk and Kopf – a judgment that will be discussed in more detail below – the 
Court for the first time ruled that the relationship of a same‑sex couple enjoyed 
protection under the notion of ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR. 
The Court reiterated that the notion of ‘family’ under Article 8 was not confined 
to marriage‑based relationships and could encompass other de facto family ties 
where the parties were living together.22 The Court noted ‘a rapid evolution of social 
attitudes towards same‑sex couples’ since 2001, resulting in a considerable number 
of States having afforded these couples legal recognition. It continued:
‘In view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in 
contrast to a different‑sex couple, a same‑sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the 
purposes of Article 8. Consequently the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting 
same‑sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of “family 
life”, just as the relationship of a different‑sex couple in the same situation would.’23
This ruling has been confirmed in subsequent case law.24 In Vallianatos and Others 
(2013) the Court once again stressed that ‘[…] same‑sex couples sharing their lives 
have the same needs in terms of mutual support and assistance as different‑sex 
couples’.25 The Court held that it was immaterial if the couple was living together, 
since – in any case in the case before it – the fact of not cohabiting did not deprive 
the couples concerned of the stability which brought them within the scope of family 
life within the meaning of Article 8.26
19 ECtHR 10 May 2001 (dec.), Mata Estevez v. Spain, no. 56501/00.
20 Idem. The Court considered ‘that […] despite the growing tendency in a number of European States 
towards the legal and judicial recognition of stable de facto partnerships between homosexuals, this is, 
given the existence of little common ground between the Contracting States, an area in which they still 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.’
21 E. g. ECtHR 24 July 2003, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, para. 33 and ECtHR 28 September 2010, 
J.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 37060/06, para. 50.
22 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 91.
23 Idem, para. 94.
24 The first case after Schalk and Kopf in which the Court repeated this finding was ECtHR 22 July 2010, 
P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, no. 18984/02. Remarkably, in some other rulings delivered soon after Schalk 
and Kopf, such as ECtHR 21 September 2010 (dec.), Manenc v. France, no. 66686/09 and ECtHR 
28 September 2010, J.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 37060/06, the Court did not repeat this finding. In 
later cases, it was confirmed, however.
25 ECtHR [GC] 7 November 2013, Vallianatos a.o. v. Greece, nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, para. 81.
26 Idem, para.73.








Article 12 ECHR protects the right to marry and to found a family.27 The connection 
between these two rights laid down in Article 12 has yet been discussed in Chapter 2.28 
The discussion here accordingly focuses on the first limb of the Article, containing 
the right to marry.
The Court has repeatedly confirmed that ‘notwithstanding social changes’,29 ‘[…] 
marriage remains an institution which is widely accepted as conferring a particular 
status on those who enter it’.30 It has been held to be ‘singled out for special treatment 
under Article 12 of the Convention’.31 States are accordingly free to promote marriage, 
for instance by granting limited benefits to surviving spouses,32 and to strengthen the 
institution of marriage within society.33
The wording of Article 12 makes clear that the exercise of the right to marry is 
governed by the national laws of the Contracting Parties to the ECHR. Even though 
the Article does not contain a justification clause like Articles 8 to 11 do, it is thus 
clear that the right to marry is not absolute, but may be restricted.34 It is the States 
that may introduce limitations since matrimony is ‘[…] closely bound up with the 
cultural and historical traditions of each society and its deep‑rooted ideas about the 
family unit’.35
States may introduce limitations on this right by way of ‘formal rules concerning 
such matters as publicity and the solemnisation of marriage’, as well by ‘[…] 
substantive provisions based on generally recognised considerations of public 
interest, in particular concerning capacity, consent, prohibited degrees of affinity or 
the prevention of bigamy.’36 Any limitation of the right to marry must, however, be 
accessible and foreseeable37 and moreover ‘[…] must not restrict or reduce the right 
27 Art. 12 ECHR reads: ‘Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.’
28 Section 2.1.1.
29 ECtHR 4 November 2008 (dec.), Courten v. the United Kingdom, no. 4479/06.
30 ECtHR 27 April 2000 (dec.), Shackell v. the United Kingdom, no. 45851/99. Confirmed in ECtHR [GC] 
29 April 2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 63. See also section 8.2.3.1 below.
31 E.g. ECtHR 22 May 2008, Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 15197/02, para. 53.
32 ECtHR 27 April 2000 (dec.), Shackell v. the United Kingdom, no. 45851/99.
33 ECtHR [GC] 7 November 2013, Vallianatos a.o. v. Greece, nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, para. 83.
34 See P. van Dijk et al. (eds.), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Antwerpen, Intersentia 2006) p. 842 and Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2009) p. 550.
35 ECtHR 18 December 1987, F. v. Switzerland, no. 11329/85, para. 33.
36 ECtHR 5 January 2010, Frasik v. Poland, no. 22933/02, para. 89. In the context of immigration laws 
and for justified reasons, the States may be entitled to prevent marriages of convenience, entered solely 
for the purpose of securing an immigration advantage.
37 Idem, para. 89, under reference to ECmHR 13 December 1979 (report), Hamer v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 7114/75, para. 55 et seq.; ECmHR 10 July 1980 (report), Draper v. the United Kingdom, no. 8186/78, 
para. 49; ECmHR 16 October 1996 (dec.), Sanders v. France, no. 31401/96; ECtHR 18 December 1987, 
F. v. Switzerland, no. 11329/85 and ECtHR 13 September 2005, B. and L. v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 36536/02, para. 36 et seq.







in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired’.38 
Hence,
‘[…] the matter of conditions for marriage in the national laws is not left entirely to 
Contracting States as being within their margin of appreciation. This would be tantamount 
to finding that the range of options open to a Contracting State included an effective bar on 
any exercise of the right to marry. The margin of appreciation cannot extend so far […]’.39
In Frasik (2010) the Court clarified that national legislation may not deprive a person 
or a category of persons of full legal capacity of the right to marry with the partners 
of their choice. The Court explained the relevant test under Article 12 as follows:
‘In contrast to Article 8 of the Convention, which sets forth the right to respect for private 
and family life, and with which the right “to marry and to found a family” has a close 
affinity, Article 12 does not include any permissible grounds for an interference by the 
State that can be imposed under paragraph 2 of Article 8 “in accordance with the law” 
and as being “necessary in a democratic society”, for such purposes as, for instance, “the 
protection of health or morals” or “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 
Accordingly, in examining a case under Article 12 the Court would not apply the tests of 
“necessity” or “pressing social need” which are used in the context of Article 8 but would 
have to determine whether, regard being had to the State’s margin of appreciation, the 
impugned interference was arbitrary or disproportionate […].’40
The Frasik case concerned a prisoner who was not allowed to marry. The Court 
stressed that there was no place under the Convention for an automatic interference 
with his right to establish a marital relationship with the person of his choice, ‘[…] 
based purely on such arguments as what – in the authorities’ view – might be 
acceptable to or what might offend public opinion.’41 The Court thereby noted that 
tolerance and broadmindedness were the acknowledged hallmarks of a democratic 
society under the Convention system.
The Court has furthermore defined ‘marriage’ under Article 12 ECHR, as ‘traditional 
marriage’, that is as between man and woman only. This line of case law is extensively 
discussed in section 8.2 below.
38 Idem, para. 88, under reference to ECtHR 18 December 1987, F. v. Switzerland, no. 11329/85, para. 32 
and ECtHR [GC] 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, no. 28957/95, para. 29.
39 ECtHR 5 January 2010, Jaremowicz v. Poland, no. 24023/03, para. 48, referring to ECtHR 28 November 
2006 (dec.), R. and F. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35748/05.
40 ECtHR 5 January 2010, Frasik v. Poland, no. 22933/02, para. 89.
41 Idem, para. 93, referring to: mutatis mutandis, ECtHR [GC] 6 October 2005, Hirst (no. 2) v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 74025/01, para. 70; ECtHR [GC] 4 December 2007, Dickson v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 44362/04, paras. 67–68; ECmHR 13 December 1979 (report), Hamer v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 7114/75, para. 67; ECmHR 10 July 1980 (report), Draper v. the United Kingdom, no. 8186/78, 
para. 54; and ECtHR 18 December 1987, F. v. Switzerland, no. 11329/85 43 et seq.








The prohibition on discrimination of Article 14 ECHR has played an important role 
in the Court’s case law on homosexuals’ rights. Article 14 may apply as soon as a 
case comes within the scope of one or more of the substantive Convention rights. In 
cases concerning homosexuals or same‑sex relationships, Article 14 has often been 
invoked and applied in combination with the right to respect for private and family 
life (Article 8 ECHR), the right to property (Article 1 First Protocol to the ECHR) 
and – less relevant for the present research – the right to freedom of association 
(Article 11 ECHR).42 There have also been various cases where the Court considered 
examination of a complaint under Article 14 no longer necessary, as it had already 
found a violation of a material Convention Article.43
When examining discrimination complaints under Article 14, the first matter to be 
assessed is whether there is a difference in treatment of persons in relevantly similar 
situations.44 This entails that the comparability of situations has to be examined in 
relation to a certain matter, for example in relation to a certain entitlement, such as 
a survivor’s pension. As further explained in section 8.2.3 below, in cases involving 
civil status, the Court has taken a rather formalistic approach in respect of this part 
of the Article 14 test.
For a difference in treatment of persons in relevantly similar situations not to 
constitute discrimination under Article 14 ECHR, it must have an objective and 
reasonable justification. This means that the difference in treatment must pursue 
a legitimate aim and that there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. States enjoy a margin 
of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise 
similar situations justify a difference in treatment.45 However, where a difference 
of treatment is based on sexual orientation, the State’s margin of appreciation is 
narrow.46 It has become standing case law that differences in treatment on the basis 
of sexual orientation require ‘convincing and weighty reasons’47 or, ‘particularly 
serious reasons by way of justification’,48 while differences based solely on 
42 Inter alia, ECtHR 3 May 2007, Baczkowski a.o. v. Poland, no. 1543/06; ECtHR 21 October 2010, 
Alekseyev v. Russia, nos. 4916/07 a.o. and ECtHR 12 June 2012, Genderdoc‑M v. Moldova, no. 9106/06.
43 This was, for instance, the case in ECtHR 22 October 1981, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 7525/76.
44 E.g. ECtHR [GC] 29 April 2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 60 and ECtHR 
[GC] 16 July 2014, Hämäläinen v. Finland, no. 37359/09, para. 108.
45 Inter alia ECtHR [GC] 29 April 2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 60.
46 The Court referred to ECtHR 2 March 2010, Kozak v. Poland, no. 13102/02, para. 92 and ECtHR 
24 July 2003, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, para. 41.
47 ECtHR 24 July 2003, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98. See also ECtHR 2 March 2010, Kozak v. Poland, 
no. 13102/02.
48 ECtHR 24 July 2003, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, para. 37, referring to ECtHR 27 September 1999, 
Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, para. 90 and ECtHR 9 January 
2003, S.L. v. Austria, no. 45330/99, para. 37.







considerations of sexual orientation are unacceptable under the Convention.49 The 
Court explained this strict scrutiny test in Karner (2003). In that case the Court did 
not accept that a blanket exclusion of persons living in same‑sex relationships from 
succession to a tenancy was necessary for the protection of the family. In respect of 
the proportionality of the measure, the Court considered:
‘In cases in which the margin of appreciation afforded to States is narrow, as is the 
position where there is a difference in treatment based on sex or sexual orientation, the 
principle of proportionality does not merely require that the measure chosen is in principle 
suited for realising the aim sought. It must also be shown that it was necessary in order to 
achieve that aim to exclude certain categories of people – in this instance persons living 
in a homosexual relationship – from the scope of application of [the relevant provision of 
national law].’50
In Karner, the Court found a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) 
taken in conjunction with Article 8 (right to respect for home).51 Most other cases 
in which application of this ‘very weighty reasons test’ resulted in the finding of 
a violation, concerned matters in the social policy sphere, such as the extension of 
a sickness insurance.52 The Court has furthermore found violations of Article 14 
in conjunction with Article 8 in cases concerning parental issues, as discussed in 
section 8.2.4 below. Section 8.2.3 explains how the Court has dealt with discrimination 
complaints where civil status also played a role.
8.2. legAl recognItIon of sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps And the echr
This section discusses the ECtHR case law on legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships. First, the Court’s case law on the implications of Article 12 ECHR 
in cases involving same‑sex couples is examined. Thereafter, in section 8.2.3, 
a detailed overview is given of the Court’s approach in cases where same‑sex 
couples complained that they did not enjoy the same rights and entitlements as 
different‑sex couples. As will become clear, it has proven decisive what civil status 
was involved in such cases. This has been (partly) confirmed by the Court’s case law 
on parental rights, as discussed in subsection 8.2.4. The availability of alternative 
forms of registration has also played a role in the Court’s case law in respect of legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships (see subsection 8.2.5). All in all, the question 
has come to the fore whether the Convention provides for a right to some form of 
legal recognition of (same‑sex) relationships, as set out in subsection 8.2.6.
49 Inter alia ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, para. 99, under reference to: 
ECtHR [GC] 22 January 2008, E.B. v. France, no. 43546/02, paras. 93 and 96 and ECtHR 21 December 
1999, Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, no. 33290/96, para. 36.
50 ECtHR 24 July 2003, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, para. 41.
51 See also ECtHR 2 March 2010, Kozak v. Poland, no. 13102/02.
52 ECtHR 22 July 2010, P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, no. 18984/02. The Court also found a violation in 
cases concerning differing ages of consent under criminal law for homosexual relations. See ECtHR 
9 January 2003, L. and V. v. Austria, nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98.







The first cases where the Court expressly dealt with the question as to the sex of the 
two persons claiming a right to marry, concerned transsexuals. This case law formed 
a prelude to the landmark case of Schalk and Kopf (2010), as discussed in detail in 
subsection 8.2.2 below. As will become clear, the Court has repeatedly held that 
the right to marry of Article 12 ECHR referred to the traditional marriage between 
persons of different biological sex.
8.2.1. Early case law on transsexuals’ right to marry
In its case law on the recognition of the post‑operative sex of transsexuals, the Court 
also made clear statements about the right to marry of post‑operative transsexuals. 
The legal recognition of the post‑operative sex of transsexuals has for a long time 
been a delicate issue in the Council of Europe Member States. For decades the ECtHR 
was reluctant to find a refusal of state authorities to change the sex of a person in the 
birth register after a change sex operation in violation of the Convention.53
Rees (1986)54 was the first case concerning the legal recognition of the post‑operative 
sex of transsexuals where a complaint under Article 12 ECHR (the right to 
marry) was also assessed. The question arose as to whether a refusal to allow a 
post‑operative transsexual to marry a person of the post‑operative different sex 
violated this Convention Article. The Court was of the opinion that the right to 
marry, as guaranteed by Article 12, referred to the traditional marriage between 
persons of a different biological sex. According to the ECtHR this appeared also 
from the wording of the Article which made it clear that Article 12 was ‘mainly 
concerned to protect marriage as the basis of the family.’55 The Court held that the 
legal impediment in the United Kingdom on the marriage of persons who were of 
the same biological sex could not be said to restrict or reduce the right marry in 
such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right was impaired.56 
Accordingly the Court unanimously held that Article 12 ECHR was not violated.57
53 ECmHR 1 March 1979 (report), Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, no. 7654/76; ECtHR [GC] 6 November 
1980, Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, no. 7654/76; ECtHR [GC] 17 October 1986, Rees v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 9532/81 and ECmHR 15 December 1988 (dec.), Paula James v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 10622/83. To make an such alteration in the birth register possible would require detailed legislation 
from those States where for purposes of social security, national insurance and employment, a 
transsexual was recorded as being of the sex recorded at birth, the Court noted. Having regard to the 
wide margin of appreciation to be afforded to the State in this area and to the relevance of protecting the 
interests of others in striking the requisite balance, the Court ruled that the positive obligations arising 
from Article 8 ECHR could not be held to extend that far. E.g. ECtHR [GC] 17 October 1986, Rees v. 
the United Kingdom, no. 9532/81, paras. 42–47.
54 ECtHR [GC] 17 October 1986, Rees v. the United Kingdom, no. 9532/81.
55 Idem, para. 49.
56 Idem, para. 50.
57 Idem, para. 51.







In the subsequent and comparable W v. the UK (1989),58 Cossey (1990),59 and 
Sheffield and Horsham (1998)60 cases, neither the ECmHR nor the Court found any 
violation of the Convention. It must be noted however that these decisions were no 
longer adopted by unanimity.61 In Cossey, the Court held in favour of the traditional 
concept of marriage and did not see any evidence of ‘any general abandonment’ of 
that traditional concept. It therefore did not consider it ‘[…] open to it to take a new 
approach to the interpretation of Article 12’.62 In the Court’s view, attachment to the 
traditional concept of marriage provided ‘[…] sufficient reason for the continued 
adoption of biological criteria for determining a person’s sex for the purposes of 
marriage, this being a matter encompassed within the power of the Contracting 
States to regulate by national law the exercise of the right to marry.’63
Judge Schermers was the only judge at the time who was of the opinion that ‘[…] the 
fundamental human right underlying Article 12 should also be granted to homosexual 
and lesbian couples’. In his dissent to W v. the United Kingdom (1989), he held that 
denial of this right meant ‘condemnation to solitude and loneliness’ and he therefore 
found that good reasons had to be given for denying these couples the right to found 
a family.64 As Schermers also acknowledged, this question was not, however, at stake 
in the cases of post‑operative transsexuals, as all cases concerned applicants who 
wished to marry a person of a different sex. None of the other dissenting judges 
to the three abovementioned decisions or judgments made a comparable plea. On 
the contrary, some judges explicitly stressed that by speaking of ‘men and women’, 
Article 12 ‘clearly’ indicated that marriage was the union of two persons of different 
sex.65
In Christine Goodwin (2002)66 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR departed from the 
previously followed line of case law and found a violation of both Articles 8 and 12 
ECHR. For 16 years the Court had held that there was no violation of the right to 
respect for private life if a post‑operative transsexual was refused an alteration of 
his or her sex in the birth register. In this case the Court for the first time found that 
the respondent government could no longer claim that the matter fell within their 
margin of appreciation. The Court thereby had regard to the applicants’ personal 
58 ECmHR 17 March 1989 (report), W. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11095/84.
59 ECtHR [GC] 27 September 1990, Cossey v. the United Kingdom, no. 10843/84.
60 ECtHR [GC] 30 July 2007, Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom, nos. 22985/93 and 23390/94, 
para. 66.
61 In Cossey the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held by 10 votes to 8 that there was no violation of Art. 8 
ECHR and by 14 votes to 4, the Court also did not find a violation of Art. 12 ECHR. In Sheffield and 
Horsham 11 judges voted against a violation of Art. 8 ECHR against 9 who did find the situation to be 
in violation of Art. 8; as for Art. 12 ECHR the vote was 18 to 2.
62 ECtHR [GC] 27 September 1990, Cossey v. the United Kingdom, no. 10843/84, para. 46.
63 Idem.
64 Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Schermers to ECmHR 17 March 1989 (report), W. v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 11095/84.
65 Dissenting opinion of Judge Martens to ECtHR [GC] 27 September 1990, Cossey v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 10843/84, para. 4.5.1. See also para. 5 of the the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Palm, 
Foighel and Pekkanen to this judgment.
66 ECtHR [GC] 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, no. 28957/95.







circumstances as a transsexual, to the prevailing medical and scientific considerations 
at the time, to the state of European and international consensus, and to the impact 
on the birth register and social and domestic law developments. As there were no 
significant factors of public interest to weigh against the interests of the individual 
applicant in obtaining legal recognition of her gender re‑assignment, the Court 
reached the conclusion that the fair balance that was inherent in the Convention now 
tilted decisively in favour of the applicant. The Court accordingly found a violation 
of Article 8.
In its examination of the complaint under Article 12 ECHR, the Court considered 
that the fact that fewer countries permitted the marriage of transsexuals in their 
assigned gender than recognised the change of gender itself, could not support an 
argument for leaving the matter entirely to the Contracting States as being within 
their margin of appreciation. The Court held that the margin of appreciation could 
not be extended so far as that ‘[…] would be tantamount to finding that the range of 
options open to a Contracting State included an effective bar on any exercise of the 
right to marry.’67 The ECtHR concluded that the very essence of the applicant’s right 
to marry had been infringed by the allocation of sex in national law to that registered 
at birth, and unanimously found a violation of Article 12 ECHR.
The Court’s finding of a violation of Article 12 in this case in itself had no direct 
implications for the same‑sex marriage discussion, as the applicant wished to marry a 
person of post‑operative different sex, and thus claimed a right that encompassed the 
traditional definition of marriage as between man and woman. The considerations 
of the Court are nevertheless of a certain relevance. The Court held, for instance, 
that ‘[…] the inability of any couple to conceive or parent a child [could not] be 
regarded as per se removing their right to enjoy the first limb of this provision.’68 It 
also observed ‘major social changes in the institution of marriage since the adoption 
of the Convention’.69 The Court furthermore noted that Article 9 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union departed, ‘no doubt deliberately’, from 
the wording of Article 12 of the Convention in removing the reference to men and 
women.70
Later cases on transsexuals’ right to marry concerned the effects of the change of sex 
on pre‑existing marriages.71 Married couples from the UK, consisting of a woman 
and a male‑to‑female post‑operative transsexual, unsuccessfully complained before 
the ECtHR that they were required to end their marriage if the transsexual partner 
wished to obtain full legal recognition of her change of sex, because the domestic 
law did not permit same‑sex marriages. Under reference to Rees the ECtHR held 
67 Idem, para. 103.
68 Idem, para. 98.
69 Idem, para. 100.
70 Idem.
71 ECtHR 28 November 2006 (dec.), Parry v. the United Kingdom, no. 42971/05 and ECtHR 28 November 
2006 (dec.), R. and F. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25748/05.







in Parry that ‘[…] Article 12 of the Convention similarly enshrines the traditional 
concept of marriage as being between a man and a woman.’ The Court continued:
‘While it is true that there are a number of Contracting States which have extended 
marriage to same‑sex partners, this reflects their own vision of the role of marriage in 
their societies and does not, perhaps regrettably to many, flow from an interpretation of 
the fundamental right as laid down by the Contracting States in the Convention in 1950.’72
Accordingly the Court held that the regulation of the effects of the change of sex in 
the context of marriage fell within the appreciation of the Contracting State. States 
could not be required to make allowances for the small number of marriages where 
both partners wished to continue that marriage notwithstanding the change of sex of 
one of them. Interesting to note is that the Court considered it ‘[…] of some relevance 
to the proportionality of the effects of the gender recognition regime that the civil 
partnership provisions allow[ed] such couples to achieve many of the protections and 
benefits of married status’.73 The Court furthermore noted that the applicants had 
referred ‘forcefully’ to the historical and social value of the institution of marriage 
which gave it such emotional importance to them, but also noted, however, that it 
was that value, as at the time recognised in national law which excluded them. In 
conclusion, the ECtHR dismissed the complaints as being manifestly ill‑founded. 
Even more recently, in a judgment of 2014 the Grand Chamber of the Court found no 
violation of Article 8 ECHR in a Finnish case where the full recognition of the new 
sex of a post‑operative was made conditional on the transformation of her marriage 
into a civil partnership.74 This case is discussed in greater detail in section 8.2.5 
below.
In the discussed case law concerning transsexuals as well as in subsequent cases in 
a different context,75 the Court repeatedly held that the right to marry of Article 12 
enshrines ‘the traditional concept of marriage’ as being between a man and a woman. 
It has held the formation of a legal union of a man and a woman to be the essence of 
the right to marry.76 The fact that ‘major social changes in the institution of marriage 
since the adoption of the Convention’77 have taken place, has not to date altered this 
conclusion.78 These rulings laid a basis for case law to follow on the issue of access 
to marriage for same‑sex couples. The complaint of the Austrian same‑sex couple 
Schalk and Kopf, lodged in 2004, was the first to provide the ECtHR with ‘[…] an 
opportunity to examine whether two persons who are of the same sex can claim to 
have a right to marry.’79
72 ECtHR 28 November 2006 (dec.), Parry v. the United Kingdom, no. 42971/05.
73 On this point, see more extensively section 8.2.5 below.
74 ECtHR [GC] 16 July 2014, Hämäläinen v. Finland, no. 37359/09.
75 E.g. ECtHR [GC] 29 April 2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 63.
76 ECtHR 5 January 2010, Jaremowicz v. Poland, no. 24023/03, para. 60.
77 ECtHR [GC] 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, no. 28957/95, para. 100.
78 This research was concluded on 31 July 2014.
79 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 50.







8.2.2.	 The	case	of	Schalk and Kopf v. Austria	(2010)
In 2002 the Austrian cohabiting same‑sex couple Mr. Schalk and Mr. Kopf asked 
the competent authorities to allow them to marry. Their request was refused on 
the grounds that under Austrian law marriage could only be contracted between 
two persons of different sex. The couple subsequently brought their case before 
the Austrian Constitutional Court, but to no avail. In 2004 Schalk and Kopf lodged 
a complaint with the ECtHR. While their application was pending, on 1 January 
2010, the Austrian Registered Partnership Act entered into force, which provided 
for a registered partnership for same‑sex couples. The main differences in rights 
and obligations for spouses and those for registered partners concerned rules on the 
choice of name and parental rights.
Before the ECtHR the couple primarily argued that the authorities’ refusal to 
allow them to marry violated Article 12 ECHR (the right to marry). The applicants 
furthermore invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 complaining that 
they were discriminated against on account of their sexual orientation since they 
were denied the right to marry and did not have any other possibility to have 
their relationship recognised by law before the entry into force of the Registered 
Partnership Act.
8.2.2.1. The Court’s examination of the complaint under Article 12 ECHR
The ECtHR first examined whether the right to marry granted to ‘men and women’ 
in Article 12 could be applied to the applicants’ situation. In that respect the Court 
noted that from its case law relating to transsexuals certain principles could be 
derived. The Court did not spell out what those principles were exactly, but one of 
the findings the Court referred to came from Christine Goodwin, where the Court 
had held, as noted above, that ‘[…] the inability of any couple to conceive or parent a 
child [could not] be regarded as per se removing the right to marry’.80 In Schalk and 
Kopf the Court held – without any further motivation – that ‘[…] this finding [did] not 
allow any conclusion regarding the issue of same‑sex marriage.’81
In order to answer the question of whether the right to marry granted to ‘men and 
women’ in Article 12 of the Convention could be applied to the situation of the 
applicants, the Court next resorted to textual, contextual and historical interpretation 
methods. In principle, the reference to ‘men and women’ in the English version could 
be interpreted as including couples consisting of two ‘men’ and two ‘women’. The 
French version of the Article – to which the Court also referred – was, however, 
phrased in the singular: ‘l’homme et la femme ont le droit de se marier’. The Court 
held that ‘[…] looked at in isolation, the wording of Article 12 might be interpreted 
80 ECtHR [GC] 11 July 2002, Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, no. 28957/95, para. 98 (see 
above).
81 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 56.







so as not to exclude the marriage between two men or two women.’82 However, when 
contrasting the wording of Article 12 ECHR to the other substantive Articles of the 
Convention, the Court observed that the latter all ‘[granted] rights and freedoms 
to “everyone” or [stated] that “no one” [was] to be subjected to certain types of 
prohibited treatment.’83 In the Court’s view this showed that the choice of wording 
in Article 12 had to be regarded as ‘deliberate’. Thirdly, the Court held that regard 
had to be had to the historical context in which the Convention was adopted. As the 
Court noted, ‘[…] in the 1950s marriage was clearly understood in the traditional 
sense of being a union between partners of different sex.’84
On the basis of the ‘living instrument’ doctrine, the Convention is usually 
interpreted in the light of present day conditions.85 In particular the textual and 
historical interpretation methods have often been overruled by this evolutive 
interpretation method. It was therefore not surprising that the applicants in this case 
relied primarily on this doctrine of the Court. They contended that in present day 
conditions Article 12 had to be read as granting same‑sex couples access to marriage 
or, in other words, as obliging Member States to provide for such access in their 
national laws. The Court was not, however, persuaded by this argument. It repeated 
its previous acknowledgement that the institution of marriage had undergone ‘major 
social changes since the adoption of the Convention’,86 but attached decisive value to 
the lack of European consensus on this point. As the Court noted, at that time only 6 
out of 47 Convention States allowed same‑sex marriage.
The Court furthermore referred to the right to marry as provided for in Article 9 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which contains no reference to ‘men 
and women’, and which leaves the decision whether or not to allow same‑sex 
marriage to regulation by Member States’ national law.87 The Court therefore ‘no 
longer’ considered ‘[…] that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 [had to] in 
all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex’ 
and held that it could not be said that Article 12 was inapplicable to the applicants’ 
complaint.88 The applicant’s case did not benefit from this cautiously worded finding 
however, for the Court continued that because marriage had ‘deep‑rooted social 
and cultural connotations differing largely from one society to another’, national 
82 Idem, para. 55. Judges Maliverni and Kovler were unable to share that view. In their concurring opinion 
they held that, ‘“the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty” in the case of Art. 12 
[could not] be anything other than that of recognising that a man and a woman, that is, persons of 
opposite sex, have the right to marry.’
83 Idem.
84 Idem.
85 Inter alia, ECtHR 25 April 1978, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, no. 5856/72, para. 31; ECtHR [GC] 
8 July 2004, Vo v. France, no. 53924/00, para. 82 and ECtHR [GC] 4 February 2005, Mamatkulov and 
Askarov v. Turkey, nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, para. 121.
86 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, paras. 52 and 58 under reference to 
Christine Goodwin.
87 Idem, para. 61.
88 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 61. Two concurring judges did not 
subscribe to this finding. Concurring opinion of Judge Malinverni joined by Judge Kovler to ECtHR 
24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 2.







authorities were best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society in this 
field.89 The Court accordingly concluded that Article 12 ECHR does not impose an 
obligation on States to grant same‑sex couples access to marriage. The Chamber was 
unanimous in its conclusion that there had been no violation of this provision.
Now that the Court declared Article 12 applicable in the present case, some wondered 
if an absolute prohibition on the right to marry for same‑sex couples impaired the 
essence of that right (see 8.1.3 above).90 The Court, however, did not assess this 
question.
8.2.2.2. The Court’s examination of the complaints under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR
As discussed in section 8.1.2 above, in Schalk and Kopf the Court held for the first time 
that the relationship of cohabiting same‑sex couples living in a stable partnership, 
fell within the notion of ‘family life’, within the meaning of Article 8. While a lack 
of consensus was reason for the Court not to find a violation of Article 12, here 
the Court considered there to be sufficient consensus to interpret the notion ‘family 
life’ of Article 8 in the light of present day conditions. Just like the applicability of 
Article 12 did not benefit the applicants’ case under Article 12, also this finding did 
not result in any material consequences to the applicants’ benefit.91
Having found that the case fell within the ambit of Article 8, the Court next examined 
whether a violation had occurred of this Article in conjunction with Article 14 (the 
prohibition of discrimination). The Court held that because ‘same‑sex couples are just 
as capable as different‑sex couples of entering into stable committed relationships’, 
the applicants were in a relevantly similar situation to different‑sex couples as 
regards their need for legal recognition of their relationship.92 The ECtHR made a 
distinction between three limbs of the applicants’ complaint: (1) that they still did 
not have access to marriage; (2) that no alternative means of legal recognition was 
available to them until the entry into force of the Registered Partnership Act; and (3) 
that certain differences existed in rights and obligations for spouses and those for 
registered partners under Austrian law.
As regards the first limb, the Court was brief: now that the Court had concluded 
that Article 12 did not impose an obligation on Contracting States to grant same‑sex 
couples access to marriage, Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 – a provision 
of more general purpose and scope – could not be interpreted as imposing such an 
obligation either. As regards the second limb, the Court considered it not its task to 
89 Idem, para. 62.
90 N.R. Koffeman, ‘Case note to ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04’, 11 
European Human Rights Cases 2010/92 (in Dutch).
91 In this regard Cooper noted that in Schalk and Kopf the Court made ‘a number of major, but seemingly 
contradictory rulings.’ S.L. Cooper, ‘Marriage, Family, Discrimination & Contradiction: An Evaluation 
of the Legacy and Future of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on LGBT Rights’, 
12 German Law Journal (2011) p. 1743 at pp. 1746–1747, online available at: www.germanlawjournal.
com/pdfs/Vol12‑No10/PDF_Vol_12_No_10_1746–1763_Articles_Cooper.pdf, visited June 2014.
92 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 99.







establish whether the lack of any means of legal recognition for same‑sex couples 
would have constituted a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 
if this situation had still persisted at the time, now that the Registered Partnership 
Act had entered into force in Austria. The Court next examined whether Austria 
should have provided the applicants with an alternative means of legal recognition 
of their partnership any earlier than it did. The Court noted an emerging European 
consensus towards legal recognition of same‑sex couples, but concluded that there 
was not yet a majority of States providing for it:
‘The Court cannot but note that there is an emerging European consensus towards legal 
recognition of same‑sex couples. Moreover, this tendency has developed rapidly over 
the past decade. Nevertheless, there is not yet a majority of States providing for legal 
recognition of same‑sex couples. The area in question must therefore still be regarded 
as one of evolving rights with no established consensus, where States must also enjoy a 
margin of appreciation in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes […].’93
The Court concluded that ‘though not in the vanguard’, the Austrian legislature 
could not be reproached ‘for not having introduced the Registered Partnership Act 
any earlier.’ Whether this reasoning implies that States are under an obligation to 
give some form of legal recognition to same‑sex relationships cannot be said with 
certainty (on this point, see more extensively 8.2.6 below). The Court in any case 
avoided the difficult question of the moment from which sufficient consensus existed 
to come to any such conclusion.94
Finally, in its examination of the third limb of the complaint, the Court found that 
it did not have to examine every one of the differences in rights and obligations for 
spouses and those for registered partners in detail, as the applicants had not claimed 
that they were directly affected by any of these differences. The Court observed that, 
following a trend in other Member States, the Austrian Registered Partnership, was 
equal or similar to marriage in many respects, while some substantial differences 
remained in respect of parental rights. The Court was not convinced by the applicants’ 
argument that if a State chooses to provide same‑sex couples with an alternative 
means of recognition, it is obliged to confer a status on them which – though 
carrying a different name – corresponds to marriage in each and every respect. On 
the contrary, it considered that ‘States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation as 
regards the exact status conferred by alternative means of recognition.’95 The Court 
repeated its standing case law that different treatment based on sexual orientation 
93 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 105, referring to ECtHR 
4 November 2008 (dec.), Courten v. the United Kingdom, no. 4479/06. See also ECtHR 23 June 2009 
(dec.), M.W. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11313/02.
94 The difficulty of this question is well illustrated by the case P.B and J.S. v. the United Kingdom. The 
dissenters to this judgment criticised the fact that the majority decided the case on the basis of a then 
existing consensus, which had not yet been visible in 1997 from when the case originated. Joint partly 
dissenting opinion of Judges Vajic and Malinverni to ECtHR 22 July 2010, P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, 
no. 18984/02.
95 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 108.







requires ‘particularly serious reasons’ by way of justification,96 but did not assess 
if there was any justification at all for the difference in treatment here complained 
of.97 Instead, it dealt with the case on the basis of the margin of appreciation to be 
accorded to States in issues where there is no consensus amongst the Contracting 
Parties.98 In this regard it also noted that the margin is usually wide in respect of 
general measures of economic or social strategy.99 ‘On the whole’, the Court did 
not see ‘any indication’ that Austria had exceeded its margin of appreciation in its 
choice of rights and obligations conferred by registered partnership. In conclusion, 
the Court found, by four votes to three, that there had been no violation of Article 14 
in conjunction with Article 8 in this case.
Hence, while on the one hand, the Court was very clear that the Convention did not 
impose any obligation on States to open up marriage to same‑sex couples, on the 
other hand, the Court left clear openings for further development of its case law to at 
least some form of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships.100 The Court stressed 
that there was not yet a majority of States providing for legal recognition of same‑sex 
couples101 and that States were still free to restrict access to marriage to different‑sex 
couples.102 The Court furthermore held that States enjoyed a margin of appreciation 
in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes103 and that they enjoyed ‘a 
certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact status conferred by alternative 
means of recognition’.104 This point is further developed below in subsection 8.2.6 
below.
All in all, in its assessment of the complaint under Article 8 in combination with 
Article 14, the Court attached considerable weight to the lack of common ground 
among the Contracting Parties.105 Consequently the Court did not assess the 
discrimination complaint in substance. This can be held to be somewhat difficult to 
96 Idem, para. 97, referring to ECtHR 24 July 2003, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, para. 37; ECtHR 
9 January 2003, L. and V. v. Austria, nos. 39392/98 and 39829/98, para. 45 and ECtHR 27 September 
1999, Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, para. 90. See also 
section 8.1.4 above.
97 In Karner and Mata Estevez the Court had accepted that ‘protection of the family in the traditional 
sense [was], in principle, a weighty and legitimate reason which might justify a difference in treatment.’ 
In Schalk and Kopf (in para. 108), the Court merely considered that States were ‘[…] still free, under 
Article 12 of the Convention as well as under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, to restrict 
access to marriage to different‑sex couples.’ ECtHR 24 July 2003, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, 
para. 40 and ECtHR 10 May 2001 (dec.), Antonio Mata Estevez v. Spain, no. 56501/00.
98 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 98. The Court referred to ECtHR 
27 March 1998, Petrovic v. Austria, no. 20458/92, para. 38.
99 Idem, para. 97. The Court referred to ECtHR [GC] 12 April 2006, Stec a.o. v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 65731/01, para. 52.
100 See also M. Melcher, ‘Private international law and registered relationships: an EU perspective’, 20 
European Review of Private Law (2012) p. 1075 at pp. 1080–1081.
101 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 105.
102 Idem, para. 108.
103 Idem, para. 105.
104 Idem, para. 108.
105 See also F. Hamilton, ‘Why the margin of appreciation is not the answer to the gay marriage debate’, 13 
European Human Rights Law Review (2013) p. 47.







reconcile with the earlier finding of the Court in this very same judgment that there 
was – by 2010 – a sufficient consensus for extending the protection of the right to 
respect for family life to same‑sex couples.
The three dissenting judges were critical of the fact that the majority did not draw 
inferences from its finding that same‑sex relationships enjoyed a right to respect for 
family life. They claimed:
‘Having decided […] that “the relationship of the applicants falls within the notion of 
‘family life’”, the Court should have drawn inferences from this finding. However, by 
deciding that there has been no violation, the Court at the same time endorses the legal 
vacuum at stake, without imposing on the respondent State any positive obligation to 
provide a satisfactory framework, offering the applicants, at least to a certain extent, the 
protection any family should enjoy.’106
These judges were of the opinion that ‘[a]ny absence of a legal framework offering 
[same‑sex couples in stable relationships], at least to a certain extent, the same 
rights or benefits attached to marriage would need robust justification, especially 
taking into account the growing trend in Europe to offer some means of qualifying 
for such rights or benefits.’107 They concluded that the Court should have found a 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention in this 
case, because the Austrian government had not put forward any cogent reason to 
justify the difference of treatment between same‑sex and different‑sex couples in 
stable committed relationships, as regards legal recognition and protection of their 
relationship.
The four‑to‑three Chamber judgment in Schalk and Kopf became final in November 
2010 after the applicants’ request for referral of the case to the Grand Chamber had 
been rejected.108
8.2.2.3. Affirmation of the special status of traditional marriage in subsequent case 
law
After the landmark Schalk and Kopf judgment, the Court has on various occasions 
repeated that the right to marry ex Article 12 ECHR sees at marriage between man 
and woman only. In Hämäläinen (2014), the Grand Chamber held:
‘While it is true that some Contracting States have extended marriage to same‑sex 
partners, Article 12 cannot be construed as imposing an obligation on the Contracting 
States to grant access to marriage to same‑sex couples […]’109
106 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens to ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 8.
107 Idem, para. 9.
108 ECtHR press release no. 906 of 29 November 2010. Hodson called this ‘surprising and disappointing’. 
Hodson 2011, supra n. 16, at p. 170.
109 ECtHR [GC] 16 July 2014, Hämäläinen v. Finland, no. 37359/09, para. 96. See section 8.2.5 below.







The Court has furthermore – including in cases outside the context of same‑sex 
relationships – reiterated that marriage confers a special status on those who enter 
into it.110 As explained in the following section, the Court has repeatedly accepted 
this special status as justification for a difference in treatment between married and 
unmarried couples, and possibly also between spouses and registered partners.
8.2.3.	 Spouses,	registered	partners	and	stable	partners	compared	under	
Article 14 ECHR
As explained in section 8.1.4 above, for any exanimation of a discrimination complaint 
it must be assessed whether there is a difference in treatment of persons in relevantly 
similar situations, and if so, whether this difference in treatment can be justified. 
The following subsections analyse these questions for four comparative groups that 
have been compared in the relevant Strasbourg case law, namely: (1) spouses and 
unmarried partners, (2) spouses and registered partners, (3) registered partners and 
unmarried partners, and (4) same‑sex unmarried partners compared to different‑sex 
unmarried partners. While this is already apparent from the definition of the latter 
comparative group, in respect of all four groups there have been cases where not 
only the civil status of the partners was at issue, but also their sexual orientation. To 
date there have111 been no cases decided where complaints were brought in respect 
of differences in treatment between different‑sex spouses and same‑sex spouses, or 
different‑sex registered partners and same‑sex registered partners.112
8.2.3.1. Spouses compared to unmarried partners
The Court has held on several occasions that unmarried couples and married 
couples were not in relevantly similar situations. While ‘unmarried’ is, of course, 
a broad term, the focus in this subsection lies on stable partners; the comparability 
of spouses and partners who concluded (some form of) registered partnership is 
assessed in the next subsection. It is understandable that the Court has used the 
broader term ‘unmarried’, because at the time it first decided upon such matters, 
none of the High Contracting Parties had introduced any alternative form of legal 
recognition of relationships.
In Lindsay (1986) the ECmHR found that different‑sex married couples could not 
claim to be in an analogous situation with different‑sex unmarried couples where tax 
allowances were concerned.113 The Commission held that marriage was characterised 
by ‘a corpus of rights and obligations’ which differentiated it ‘markedly’ from the 
110 E.g. ECtHR [GC] 11 November 2010, Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey, no. 3976/05, para. 72 and ECtHR 3 April 
2012, Van der Heijden v. The Netherlands, no. 42857/05, para. 69.
111 This research was concluded on 31 July 2014.
112 See T. Loenen, ‘Gelijk recht op tweede‑ouderadoptie voor ongehuwde homoseksuele en heteroseksuele 
paren. X e.a. tegen Oostenrijk’ [‘Equal right to joint adoption for unmarried homosexual and 
heterosexual couples. X. a.o. v. Austria’], 38 NJCM‑Bull/NTM (2013) p. 627 at p. 643.
113 ECmHR 11 November 1986 (dec.), Lindsay v. the United Kingdom, no. 11089/84.







situation of a man and woman who cohabited. This conclusion was confirmed by the 
Court in various cases where same‑sex stable partners claimed to be in a comparable 
situation to different‑sex married couples. In Courten (2008), upon the death of his 
same‑sex partner with whom he had been cohabiting for over 25 years, a man applied 
for extra‑statutory tax concession equivalent to the exemption from inheritance tax 
which a spouse would have received under the law in force at the time. The Court ruled 
that the applicant could not claim that his situation was analogous to that of married 
couples.114 It reiterated that ‘notwithstanding social changes’, marriage remained an 
institution that was widely accepted as conferring ‘a particular status’ on those who 
entered it and that it was ‘singled out for special treatment’ under Article 12 ECHR. 
The applicant in Courten submitted that the Court had to take into consideration that 
he was unable at the relevant time ‘to enter into a legally‑binding arrangement akin 
to marriage’, because at the time that he applied for the tax exemption UK law did 
not allow same‑sex partners to conclude a civil union, or to marry. The Court did not 
let this fact have a bearing on the finding of a lack of comparability of the situation of 
the applicant and that of spouses. It merely noted in respect of this claim that ‘[…] in 
the area of evolving social rights where there [was] no established consensus’, States 
enjoyed a margin of appreciation in the timing of the introduction of legislative 
changes. The government could therefore not be criticised for not having introduced 
the 2004 registered partnership legislation at an earlier date.115
This finding of non‑comparability has been upheld in cases concerning parental 
matters. In X. and Others v. Austria (2013), the Grand Chamber of the Court held that 
same‑sex stable partners were not in a relevantly similar situation to different‑sex 
married couples in respect of second‑parent adoption.116 By way of justification, the 
Court, inter alia, reiterated that neither Article 12 ECHR nor Article 8 in conjunction 
with Article 14 ECHR imposed an obligation on the Contracting States to grant 
same‑sex couples access to marriage, that marriage conferred a special status on 
those who enter into it, and that the exercise of the right to marry as protected by 
Article 12 of the Convention gave rise to social, personal and legal consequences.117
In other cases where unmarried couples complained about a difference in treatment 
when compared to married couples, the Court did not explicitly assess whether there 
were relevantly similar situations, but implicitly accepted that this was the case and 
114 ECtHR 4 November 2008 (dec.), Courten v. the United Kingdom, no. 4479/06. See also ECtHR 
23 June 2009 (dec.), M.W. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11313/02.
115 See again also ECtHR 23 June 2009 (dec.), M. W. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11313/02.
116 ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, paras. 105–110. The Court, 
however, found the applicants to be in a similar situation with different‑sex unmarried couples (see 
section 8.2.4.1.2 below).
117 Concurring Judge Spielmann was the only judge in the Grand Chamber to believe that the situation of 
the applicants was comparable to that of a married different‑sex couple in which one partner wished to 
adopt the other partner’s child. He held that the fact that the Convention does not require Contracting 
States to make marriage available to same‑sex couples and that marriage confers a special status on 
those who enter into it had no bearing on that finding. Still, he did not vote in favour of finding a 
violation of Art. 14 ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 8 because he believed that it was not 
necessary to examine this issue. Concurring opinion Judge Spielmann to ECtHR [GC] 19 February 
2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, para. 2.







held that the difference in treatment could in any case be justified on the basis of 
the protection of marriage. In Şerife Yiğit (2010), the Grand Chamber noted in this 
regard:
‘The protection of marriage constitutes, in principle, an important and legitimate reason 
which may justify a difference in treatment between married and unmarried couples 
[…]. Marriage is characterised by a corpus of rights and obligations that differentiate 
it markedly from the situation of a man and woman who cohabit […]. Thus, States have 
a certain margin of appreciation to treat differently married and unmarried couples, 
particularly in matters falling within the realm of social and fiscal policy such as taxation, 
pensions and social security […].’118
As noted above, and as confirmed in this ruling, the matter at stake is relevant for 
determining comparability and for the question of whether a difference in treatment 
can be justified. The Court here stressed that ‘[…] particularly in matters falling 
within the realm of social and fiscal policy such as taxation, pensions and social 
security’, States could treat married and unmarried couples differently. These policy 
areas cover many issues, of course, and it has consequently only exceptionally been 
that the Court held a difference in treatment between married and unmarried couples 
not to be justified.119 Such a finding has, moreover, only occurred in cases involving 
different‑sex couples.
Differences in treatment between unmarried and married couples have also been 
upheld in situations where same‑sex couples had no access to marriage. An example is 
Mata Estevez (2001).120 The applicant, who had been in a stable same‑sex relationship 
for more than ten years when his partner deceased, was refused a right to a survivor’s 
pension. Under Spanish law marriage constituted an essential precondition for 
eligibility for such a pension at the time, while same‑sex couples were barred from 
access to marriage. The Court, ‘even supposing’ that this refusal constituted an 
interference with respect for his private life, held that this interference was justified 
under Article 8(2) and that there was no violation of this Article in conjunction with 
Article 14. It accepted that the relevant Spanish legislation pursued the legitimate aim 
of ‘the protection of the family based on marriage bonds’.121 The Court considered 
the difference in treatment to fall within the State’s margin of appreciation and ruled 
that the refusal did not constitute a discriminatory interference with the applicant’s 
right to respect private life contrary to Article 8, taken in conjunction with Article 14 
118 ECtHR [GC] 11 November 2010, Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey, no. 3976/05, para. 72. In the Chamber judgment 
preceding this Grand Chamber judgment, the Court had accepted ‘the protection of the traditional 
family based on the bonds of marriage’ as legitimate aim and objective and reasonable ground. ECtHR 
20 January 2009, Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey, no. 3976/05, para. 30.
119 In Petrov the Court held it ‘not readily apparent’, why different‑sex married and different‑sex 
unmarried partners who have an established family life were to be given disparate treatment as regards 
the possibility to maintain contact by telephone while one of them is in custody. ECtHR 22 May 2008, 
Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 15197/02, para. 55.
120 ECtHR 10 May 2001 (dec.), Antonio Mata Estevez v. Spain, no. 56501/00.
121 The Court referred to mutatis mutandis, ECtHR 13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, para. 40.







ECHR. The Court accordingly declared the application manifestly ill‑founded and 
thus inadmissible.
The discussed case law thus shows that the special status of marriage has been a 
ground for the Court both for not finding comparability of married and unmarried 
couples, and, in those cases where it did (implicitly) find such comparability, for 
justifying the difference in treatment between these groups. In cases involving 
same‑sex couples, the fact that these couples did not at all have access to marriage, 
was considered to have no bearing on these findings.122
8.2.3.2. Spouses compared to registered partners
The Court’s findings in respect of the question of whether (same‑sex) couples in a 
registered partnership or civil union were in a relevantly comparable situation to 
spouses have differed from case to case. In a 2008 ruling, the Grand Chamber of the 
Court implicitly accepted comparability of the situation of different‑sex spouses and 
same‑sex partners in a civil union under UK law. In Burden the Grand Chamber of 
the Court held:
‘As with marriage, the Grand Chamber considers that the legal consequences of civil 
partnership under the 2004 Act, which couples expressly and deliberately decide to incur, 
set these types of relationship apart from other forms of co‑habitation. Rather than the 
length or the supportive nature of the relationship, what is determinative is the existence 
of a public undertaking, carrying with it a body of rights and obligations of a contractual 
nature. Just as there can be no analogy between married and Civil Partnership Act couples, 
on one hand, and heterosexual or homosexual couples who choose to live together but 
not to become husband and wife or civil partners, on the other hand […], the absence 
of such a legally binding agreement between the applicants renders their relationship of 
co‑habitation, despite its long duration, fundamentally different to that of a married or 
civil partnership couple.’123
At first sight, this phrasing still seems to leave some room for doubt as to whether 
the Court indeed considered spouses and civil partners to be in relevantly similar 
situations, as it can be held that the quoted paragraphs only contrasted these two 
groups with stable partners (on this point, see the next subsection), and does not say 
much about the interrelationship between marriage and civil partnership. The Court 
itself has nonetheless made clear how the above quoted paragraph must be read, as in 
Courten (2008) it held that in Burden it had ‘[…] equated civil partnerships between 
homosexual couples with marriage’.124
122 See also section 8.2.3.4 below.
123 ECtHR [GC] 29 April 2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 65, under reference to 
ECtHR 27 April 2000 (dec.), Shackell v. the United Kingdom, no. 45851/99.
124 ECtHR 4 November 2008 (dec.), Courten v. the United Kingdom, no. 4479/06. See also Cooper 2011, 
supra n. 91, at p. 1759.







The finding of this comparability is all the more interesting now that in subsequent 
French cases, the Court by contrast held that partners who had concluded a civil 
partnership agreement under French law (pacte civil de solidarité (PACS)) were not 
in a comparable situation with married partners.
In Manenc (2010),125 the Court held that the applicant’s situation, a surviving partner 
who had concluded a PACS with his same‑sex partner, was not comparable to that 
of a surviving spouse. While the French PACS created certain rights and obligations 
for the partners in respect of taxes, property and social benefits, it was only spouses 
in a civil marriage who were under an obligation to maintain financial solidarity, 
the Court observed. It found the fact that civil marriage was not open to same‑sex 
couples under French law in itself not sufficient to hold that the applicant was in a 
relevantly similar situation to surviving spouses. It considered that the applicant’s 
sexual orientation played no role in the refusal of his request for the award of a 
survivor’s pension, as different‑sex PACS partners were also refused such pensions. 
In this regard the Court noted that the vast majority of PACS partnerships concerned 
different‑sex partners. The Court accepted that the relevant French legislation pursued 
the legitimate aim of the protection of the marriage‑based family (‘protection de la 
famille fondée sur les liens du mariage’) and that it fell within the wide margin 
of appreciation that States enjoyed in this area.126 The Court did not make explicit 
why the margin was wide.127 Without any examination of the proportionality of the 
refusal, the Court declared the complaint manifestly ill‑founded.
The Court applied the same line of reasoning in Gas and Dubois (2012),128 concerning 
second‑parent adoption by same‑sex partners. In the year 2000 Ms. Dubois had given 
birth to a daughter, conceived by means of anonymous donor insemination, and had 
formally recognised her. Her partner, Ms. Gas, had subsequently applied to adopt the 
child, with Dubois’ express consent. They wished to obtain a simple adoption order 
under French law in order to create a parent‑child relationship between the child and 
Ms. Gas with the possibility of sharing parental responsibility. The domestic courts 
had refused the adoption request on the ground that it would transfer parental rights 
from the child’s biological and legal mother, Ms. Dubois, to Ms. Gas, which was 
125 ECtHR 21 September 2010 (dec.), Manenc v. France, no. 66686/09.
126 In legal scholarship it was noted that other case law of the ECtHR gave the impression that civil status 
was in itself a suspect ground, that narrowed the margin of appreciation to be accorded to States in 
these matters. N.R. Koffeman, ‘Case note to ECtHR 21 September 2010 (dec.), Manenc v. France, 
no. 66686/09’, 12 European Human Rights Cases 2011/28 (in Dutch), referring to ECtHR 4 June 2002, 
Wessels‑Bergervoet v. the Netherlands, no. 34462/97, para. 49.
127 In legal scholarship it has been noted that this was presumbably so because a measure of economic 
or social strategy was concerned. Koffeman 2011A, supra n. 126, referring to ECtHR [GC] 16 March 
2010, Carson a.o. v. the United Kingdom, no. 42184/05, para. 61. Koffeman has furthermore noted that 
in Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey (ECtHR [GC] 11 November 2010, no. 3976/05, para. 72) the Court ruled that 
‘[…] States have a certain margin of appreciation to treat differently married and unmarried couples, 
particularly in matters falling within the realm of social and fiscal policy such as taxation, pensions and 
social security.’ On the other hand, so Koffeman has observed, other case law has given the impression 
that in cases concerning civil status, the margin of appreciation must be narrowed. See also ECtHR 
4 June 2002, Wessels‑Bergervoet v. the Netherlands, no. 34462/97.
128 ECtHR 15 March 2012, Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07.







not in the child’s interests. The national law provided for only one exception to this 
rule, namely where the adoptive parent was the spouse of the biological parent. At 
the time same‑sex couples were not allowed to marry under French law, rendering it 
impossible for the applicant couple to qualify for this exception.
Before the ECtHR the applicants complained under Article 14 taken in conjunction 
with Article 8 ECHR about the fact that Ms. Gas could not adopt Ms. Dubois’ child. 
The Court held that for the purposes of second‑parent adoption, the applicants’ legal 
situation could not be said to be comparable to that of a married couple.129 The Court 
reiterated in this regard that no right to same‑sex marriage could be derived from the 
Convention, that marriage conferred a special status on those who enter into it and 
that the exercise of the right to marry was protected by Article 12 of the Convention 
and gave rise to social, personal and legal consequences. The applicants had also 
alleged indirect discrimination because it was impossible for them to marry, but the 
Court’s only answer to this argument was that ‘in that connection’ it could only refer 
to its earlier findings regarding, inter alia, the special status of marriage.130 The Court 
subsequently compared the situation of the applicants with unmarried different‑sex 
couples and concluded that ‘[…] any couple in a comparable legal situation by virtue 
of having entered into a civil partnership would likewise have [had] their application 
for a simple‑adoption order refused’.131 The Court therefore did not observe any 
difference in treatment based on the applicants’ sexual orientation and concluded 
that there had been no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 
ECHR.
Concurring, Judge Costa underlined that the national legislature was better placed 
than the Strasbourg Court ‘[…] to bring about change in institutions concerning the 
family, relations between adults and children, and the concept of marriage’.132 His 
call for the legislature to revisit the issue by bringing the relevant French law into 
line with contemporary social reality, was echoed by concurring Judge Spielmann, 
who was in turn joined by Judge Berro‑Lefèvre. The latter Judges were, furthermore, 
of the opinion that for the purposes of second‑parent adoption the applicants’ legal 
situation was comparable to that of a married couple. They did not find this difference 
in treatment to be contrary to the Convention, however, as it did not appear to them 
to stand in the way of ‘a normal family life’.133
Dissenting Judge Villiger adopted a reasoning that was fundamentally different 
from that of the majority. He argued that in this case it had to be assessed if the child 
concerned was suffering from a difference in treatment. The Judge held:
129 Idem, para. 68.
130 Idem, paras. 70–71.
131 Idem.
132 Concurring opinion of Judge Costa, joined by Judge Spielmann to ECtHR 15 March 2012, Gas and 
Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07.
133 Concurring opinion of Judge Spielmann, joined by Judge Berro‑Lefèvre to ECtHR 15 March 2012, Gas 
and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07.







‘My difficulty lies with the position of the children of the various relationships. The 
children of a heterosexual couple benefit from joint parental responsibility if the couple 
are married; those of a same‑sex couple do not as, in such a case, adoption is excluded. 
Therein lies for me the difference of treatment viewed under Article 14 of the Convention 
taken together with Article 8. At this stage I should add that I firmly believe – and I 
consider this undisputed – that joint parental custody is in the best interests of the child. 
I fail to see a justification for this difference in treatment. In my view, all children should 
be afforded the same treatment. I cannot see why some children, but not others, should be 
deprived of their best interests, namely of joint parental custody. Indeed, how can children 
help it that they were born of a parent of a same‑sex couple rather than of a parent of a 
heterosexual couple? Why should the child have to suffer for the parents’ situation? […] 
To say in the present case that this difference in treatment is justified because marriage 
has a special status in society does not convince me. This reasoning may, possibly, be 
justified from the point of view of the legislator when distinguishing marriage from other 
forms of cohabitation. But this is not the only point of view as regards the balancing of 
the various interests under Articles 14 and 8. Indeed, society’s views should not even be 
the main point of view (let alone, as in the present judgment, the only one). Should not the 
child’s position be equally important? Justifying discrimination in respect of the children 
by pointing out that marriage enjoys a particular status for those adults who engage in it 
is, in my view, insufficient in this balancing exercise.’134
As also discussed below in section 8.2.4 below, the approach as suggested by Judge 
Villiger has – so far – not been adopted by the Court, although the best interests of 
the child have been given increasingly more weight in cases concerning parental 
rights of same‑sex couples.
In Manenc and Gas and Dubois the Court thus found the situations of PACS partners 
and spouses to be not relevantly similar. This stands in clear contrast with the above 
quoted finding of comparability between civil partners and spouses in Burden. It 
must be noted that the French PACS is open to both different‑sex and same‑sex 
couples, and that the rights and obligations that it confers upon the partners are 
more limited than those involved in marriage.135 The UK civil partnership as referred 
to in Burden, on the other hand, was introduced exclusively for same‑sex couples 
and as alternative to marriage, and was thus (generally) equivalent to marriage. 
Therefore it may be presumed that the Court found no comparability in the discussed 
French cases, because of the nature of the French PACS. This reading is furthermore 
confirmed by the fact that the Court itself has in X. and Others (2013) referred to 
Gas and Dubois as a case concerning two women who were ‘living together as a 
same‑sex couple’, without mentioning the fact that the applicants in Gas and Dubois 
had concluded a PACS.136
134 Dissenting opinion of Judge Villiger to ECtHR 15 March 2012, Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07.
135 See the discussion of the Hay case in Ch. 9, section 9.3.3.3.
136 ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, paras. 105–106.







There is on the other hand a German case of a later date, which seems to refute 
this reading of the Court’s case law. In Boeckel and Gessner‑Boeckel (2013)137 the 
Court found two women in a registered civil partnership under German law to be 
not in a relevantly similar situation to a married different‑sex couple when it came 
to the issue of the entries to be made on a child’s birth certificate (see also 8.2.4.2 
below). As extensively discussed in Chapter 10, the German registered partnership 
is almost equivalent to marriage, except for certain parental matters. Also, it is open 
to same‑sex couples only.
The conclusion must therefore be that the Court has thus far only implicitly accepted 
the comparability of the situation of spouses and registered partners. In concrete cases 
it has held that these situations are not comparable and has declared the application 
manifestly ill‑founded or has found no violation of the Convention. In these cases, 
as was the case in Mata Estevez (see above), the Court again did not find indirect 
discrimination, nor did it otherwise take into account that, other than different‑sex 
couples, same‑sex couples had (at the time) no access to marriage under domestic 
law.138 As further explained in section 8.2.5 below, in 2014 the Court found existing 
(small) differences between marriage and registered partnerships not in themselves 
to be sufficient to find a violation of the Convention in a Finnish case where the 
marriage of a post‑operative transsexual had to be converted into a registered 
partnership in order to gain legal recognition as being of the post‑operative sex.
8.2.3.3. Registered partners compared to unmarried partners
In Burden the Court thus made very clear that registered partners and stable partners 
were not in similar situations, as in the latter situation the parties had not undertaken 
public and binding obligations towards each other.139 As noted above, the Court held:
‘Rather than the length or the supportive nature of the relationship, what is determinative 
is the existence of a public undertaking, carrying with it a body of rights and obligations 
of a contractual nature.’140
Because the Burden case concerned two cohabiting sisters who wished to have 
tenancy succession rights on an equal footing with spouses and civil partners, the 
‘purely platonic’ nature of their relationship – ‘a relationship of economic dependency 
137 ECtHR 7 May 2013 (dec.), Boeckel and Gessner‑Boeckel v. Germany, no. 8017/11.
138 See also N.R. Koffeman, ‘Case‑note to ECtHR 15 March 2012, Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07’, 
13 European Human Rights Cases 2012/114.
139 ECtHR [GC] 29 April 2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 65. See also ECtHR 
4 November 2008 (dec.), Courten v. the United Kingdom, no. 4479/06.
140 ECtHR [GC] 29 April 2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 63. This finding was 
later confirmed in ECtHR [GC] 11 November 2010, Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey, no. 3976/05, para. 72, and 
ECtHR [GC] 3 April 2012, Van der Heijden v. the Netherlands, no. 42857/05, para. 69.







rather than a long‑lasting life community’141 – also contributed to the Court’s finding 
of no comparability.142
The Court has in subsequent case law confirmed that it is particularly the legal 
consequences of civil partnerships ‘which couples expressly and deliberately decide 
to incur’143 which set these types of relationship apart ‘from informal personal 
relationships, however permanent and supportive.’144 In a 2012 judgment, the Court 
even spoke of a ‘special status’ that States may confer not only on marriage but 
also on registered partnerships. The Court held that the relationship of cohabiting 
partners differed ‘fundamentally’ from that of married couples or couples in a 
registered partnership. On a more practical note, the Court observed:
‘The Court would add that, were it to hold otherwise, it would create a need either to 
assess the nature of unregistered non‑marital relationships in a multitude of individual 
cases or to define the conditions for assimilating to a formalised union a relationship 
characterised precisely by the absence of formality.’145
A partnership status has thus proven a clear factor for holding situations as being 
dissimilar.
8.2.3.4. Same‑sex unmarried partners compared to different‑sex unmarried partners
In cases where no legally recognised relationships were involved, the Court has had 
less difficulty in establishing relevantly similar situations. In other words, if there is 
no ‘special legal status’ involved, there is no ground for holding same‑sex couples 
and different‑sex couples not to be in a similar situation, as confirmed by the Court 
in X. and Others v. Austria (2013):
‘The Court observes that, in contrast to the comparison with a married couple, it has 
not been argued that a special legal status exists which would distinguish an unmarried 
heterosexual couple from a same‑sex couple.’146
Consequently the Court has also often found differences in treatment between 
same‑sex unmarried partners and different‑sex unmarried partners not to be 
justified. This has not, however, always been the case. During the 1980s and 1990s 
the European Commission of Human Rights accepted in various decisions that 
a difference in treatment between same‑sex couples in stable relationships and 
141 The Court chose this wording in ECtHR 12 May 2009, Korelc v. Slovenia, no. 28456/03, when referring 
to ECtHR [GC] 29 April 2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 65.
142 Cooper rightly observed that ‘[…] by holding that the relationship shared by cohabiting same‑sex 
siblings was not qualitatively the same as that shared by civil partners, the ECtHR [had] not dilute[d] 
the significance of same‑sex relationships in general’. Cooper 2011, supra n. 91, at p. 1759.
143 ECtHR 12 May 2009, Korelc v. Slovenia, no. 28456/03, para. 90, referring to ECtHR [GC] 29 April 
2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 65.
144 ECtHR 23 June 2009 (dec.), M.W. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11313/02.
145 ECtHR [GC] 3 April 2012, Van der Heijden v. the Netherlands, no. 42857/05, para. 69.
146 ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, para. 112.







different‑sex stable partners could be justified on grounds of the protection of the 
family. For instance, in a case concerning succession to the tenancy of a home by the 
cohabiting same‑sex partner of the tenant, the Commission held:
‘The Commission considers that the family (to which the relationship of heterosexual 
unmarried couples living together as husband and wife can be assimilated) merits special 
protection in society and it sees no reason why a High Contracting Party should not afford 
particular assistance to families. The Commission therefore accepts that the difference in 
treatment between the applicant and somebody in the same position whose partner had 
been of the opposite sex can be objectively and reasonably justified.’147
In subsequent cases where a complaint was lodged that the domestic immigration 
policy gave better protection to heterosexual couples than to homosexual couples, 
the Commission adopted the same reasoning. It held that no discrimination existed 
contrary to the Convention where the Immigration Rules gave priority and better 
guarantees ‘to established couples living in a family relationship as opposed to 
other established relationships such as lesbian or homosexual relationships’.148 The 
Commission found that the difference in treatment pursued the legitimate aim of 
‘[…] protecting family based relationships (including relationships existing outside 
marriage) in a manner proportionate to the achievement of that aim.’149
Later – once the Court had established that same‑sex relationships came within the 
scope of the right to respect for private life and particularly once it had held that 
they also enjoyed the right to respect for their family life (see 8.1.2 above) – the 
Court applied its strict scrutiny test in cases where a difference in treatment between 
unmarried partners was based on sexual orientation. It no longer accepted such 
differences in treatment on the ground of protection of the family, or any other 
ground.150 As a result, differences in treatment of unmarried same‑sex couples and 
unmarried different‑sex couples in respect of matters like tenancy,151 the extension 
of insurance cover,152 and also certain parental matters (see 8.3.7 below), have been 
held to constitute discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in violation of 
Article 14 ECHR.
Moreover, in 2013 the Grand Chamber of the Court found in Vallianatos and 
Others153 that States which have introduced a registered partnership in their national 
147 ECmHR 14 May 1986 (dec.), S. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11716/85, para. 7. See also ECmHR 9 October 
1989 (dec.), C. and L.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 14753/89, para. 2 and ECmHR 10 February 1990 
(dec.), B. v. the United Kingdom, no. 16106/90, para. 2.
148 ECmHR 9 October 1989 (dec.), C. and L.M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 14753/89, para. 2.
149 ECmHR 10 February 1990 (dec.), B. v. the United Kingdom, no. 16106/90, para. 2.
150 ECtHR 22 July 2010, P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, no. 18984/02. In some cases (such as Gas and Dubois as 
discussed above), the Court found no difference in treatment as unmarried different‑sex couples and 
unmarried same‑sex couples were treated alike in respect of a certain matter (in Gas and Dubois in 
respect of second‑parent adoption).
151 ECtHR 24 July 2003, Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98. See 8.1.4 above.
152 ECtHR 22 July 2010, P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, no. 18984/02.
153 ECtHR [GC] 7 November 2013, Vallianatos a.o. v. Greece, nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09.







laws may not limit access to that civil status to different‑sex couples only. Greece 
was one of the two Council of Europe Member States that had introduced a civil 
union that was open to different‑sex couples only. The applicants in this case were 
four same‑sex couples and a LGBT interest group, who complained that this law 
was discriminatory. The Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in this case to the Grand 
Chamber.
The Court delimited the scope of the case and explicitly held that the applicants’ 
complaint did not relate ‘[…] in the abstract to a general obligation on the Greek State 
to provide for a form of legal recognition in domestic law for same‑sex relationships.’ 
Their complaint was not ‘[…] that the Greek State failed to comply with any positive 
obligation which might be imposed on it by the Convention’.154 The issue to be 
examined was therefore
‘[…] whether the Greek State was entitled, from the standpoint of Articles 14 and 8 of 
the Convention, to enact a law introducing alongside the institution of marriage a new 
registered partnership scheme for unmarried couples that was limited to different‑sex 
couples and thus excluded same‑sex couples’.155
Under reference to Schalk and Kopf, the Court held that the applicants were in a 
comparable situation to different‑sex couples as regards their need for legal recognition 
and protection of their relationship.156 It also had no difficulty in establishing that 
the relevant Greek law had introduced a difference in treatment based on sexual 
orientation.157 The government had put forward two sets of arguments to justify this 
difference. The first was readily dismissed by the Court. It found the argument that 
the applicants could already provide for the rights and obligations involved in civil 
unions on a contractual basis unconvincing because this argument disregarded that 
the Greek civil partnership ‘[…] as an officially recognised alternative to marriage 
[had] an intrinsic value for the applicants irrespective of the legal effects, however 
narrow or extensive, that they would produce’.158 Also, the option of entering into 
a civil partnership would have been the only opportunity available to same‑sex 
partners under Greek law ‘[…] of formalising their relationship by conferring on 
it a legal status recognised by the State’, which would allow them ‘[…] to regulate 
issues concerning property, maintenance and inheritance not as private individuals 
entering into contracts under the ordinary law but on the basis of the legal rules 
governing civil unions, thus having their relationship officially recognised by the 
State.’159
The government had further alleged that the relevant legislation aimed to protect 
children born out of wedlock, to protect single‑parent families, to respond to the 
154 Idem, para. 75.
155 Idem, para. 75.
156 Idem, para. 78.
157 Idem, para. 79.
158 Idem, para. 81.
159 Idem, para. 81.







wishes of parents to raise their children without being obliged to marry, and, 
ultimately, to strengthen the institutions of marriage and the family in the traditional 
sense.160 In respect of these aims the Court considered the following:
‘The Court considers it legitimate from the standpoint of Article 8 of the Convention 
for the legislature to enact legislation to regulate the situation of children born outside 
marriage and also indirectly strengthen the institution of marriage within Greek society 
by promoting the notion, as explained by the Government, that the decision to marry would 
be taken purely on the basis of a mutual commitment entered into by two individuals, 
independently of outside constraints or of the prospect of having children […]. The Court 
accepts that protection of the family in the traditional sense is, in principle, a weighty and 
legitimate reason which might justify a difference in treatment […]. It goes without saying 
that the protection of the interests of the child is also a legitimate aim […].’161
The Court was not, however, convinced that it was necessary, in pursuit of the 
legitimate aims which the Greek government invoked, to bar same‑sex couples 
from entering into the civil unions. It noted that the Greek civil union had been 
designed ‘first and foremost’ to afford legal recognition to a new form of non‑marital 
partnership, which allowed different‑sex couples, whether or not they had children, 
‘to regulate numerous aspects of their relationship’.162 The Greek government had 
not justified why same‑sex couples without children were treated differently from 
different‑sex couples without children.163 While different‑sex couples had no less 
than three ways to have their relationship legally recognised (marriage, civil union 
or de facto partnerships), same‑sex couples had none. The Court held that:
‘[c]onsequently, same‑sex couples would have a particular interest in entering into a civil 
union since it would afford them, unlike different‑sex couples, the sole basis in Greek law 
on which to have their relationship legally recognised.’164
The Court considered it possible for the legislature ‘[…] to include some provisions 
dealing specifically with children born outside marriage, while at the same time 
extending to same‑sex couples the general possibility of entering into a civil union.’165 
It noted ‘in addition’ that a trend was emerging with regard to the introduction of 
forms of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. Out of the nineteen who opted to 
enact some form of partnership other than marriage, only two States, Lithuania and 
Greece, reserved it exclusively to different‑sex couples.166 The Court concluded that 
the government had not given convincing and weighty reasons capable of justifying 
the exclusion of same‑sex couples from the Greek civil union and found a violation 
of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR.
160 Idem, para. 80.
161 ECtHR [GC] 7 November 2013, Vallianatos a.o. v. Greece, nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, para. 83.
162 Idem, para. 88.
163 Idem, para. 89.
164 Idem, para. 90.
165 Idem, para. 89. The implications of this finding are further discussed below in section 8.2.6.
166 Idem, para. 91.







The judgment gives the impression that there is no room for any conclusion other than 
that also different‑sex couples who wish to have access to a registered partnership 
that is available in their country for same‑sex couples only, can take a successful case 
before the ECtHR.167 Still, it is not entirely ruled out that the Court would in those 
cases accept that the difference in treatment could be justified because different‑sex 
couples have the alternative and ‘real option’168 of concluding a marriage. This point 
is further developed in subsection 8.2.5 below, where the role of existing alternative 
forms of registration in the ECtHR’s case law is discussed.
8.2.4.	 Parental	rights	for	same‑sex	couples
As discussed above in section 8.1.2 above, for a long time the Commission and 
the Court ruled that same‑sex relationships did not enjoy protection of the right to 
respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR. This also had implications for the 
parental rights of persons in same‑sex relationships. For instance, in a case of 1992, 
where a woman wished to get parental rights over the child of her female partner, the 
Commission was of the opinion
‘[…] that the […] positive obligations of a State under Article 8 do not go so far as to 
require that a woman such as the first applicant, living together with the mother of a 
child and the child itself, should be entitled to get parental rights over the child. The 
Commission therefore considers that there has been no interference with the applicants’ 
right to respect for their family life. […] the relationship of a homosexual couple constitutes 
a matter affecting their private life. However, the Commission considers that the statutory 
impossibility for the first applicant to be vested with the parental authority over the third 
applicant does not entail any restriction in the applicants’ enjoyment of their private life.’169
Later, the Court made clear that sexual orientation may not be the decisive factor 
in decisions on parental rights. The applicant in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta (1999)170 
was a homosexual who lived with another man. The national judge had awarded 
parental responsibility for the applicant’s daughter to his ex‑wife rather than to 
himself. In granting the custody to the child’s mother, the national court had stated 
that the child had to live in ‘a traditional Portuguese family’, that homosexuality 
was an abnormality and that children were not to grow up ‘in the shadow of 
abnormal situations’. The ECtHR considered that the judgment of the domestic court 
167 N.R. Koffeman, ‘Case note to ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07’, 14 
European Human Rights Cases 2013/104 (in Dutch).
168 See the Hämäläinen judgment as discussed in section 8.2.5 below.
169 ECmHR 19 May 1992 (dec.), Kerkhoven and Hinke v. the Netherlands, no. 15666/89. See also ECtHR 
[GC] 22 April 1997, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, no. 21830/93. The latter case concerned X, 
a female‑to‑male transsexual who was living in a stable relationship with a woman, Y, and their 
child, Z, born after artificial insemination with donated sperm. The applicants complained that X’s 
role as Z’s father was not recognised and that their situation amounted to discrimination. Noting that 
transsexuality raised complex issues in respect of which there was no generally shared approach in 
Europe, the Court found no violation of the right to respect for family life (Art. 8 ECHR).
170 ECtHR 21 December 1999, Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, no. 33290/96.







constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his family life as 
protected under Article 8 ECHR. It found that the applicant’s homosexuality had 
been a decisive factor in the final decision and ruled that the distinction based on 
considerations regarding the applicant’s sexual orientation constituted a violation of 
Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14.171 In view of that conclusion the Court 
did not consider it necessary to rule on the allegation of a violation of Article 8 taken 
alone.
Yet later the Court brought same‑sex relationships within the scope of the right 
to respect for family life.172 This holds not only for the relationship between the 
partners but also for their relationships with children born and/or raised within those 
relationships.173 The right to respect for family life presupposes the existence of a 
family and does not safeguard the mere desire to found a family.174 Where family life 
has not yet been established, for example in joint adoption cases, the right to respect 
for private life generally applies.
Most complaints lodged with the ECtHR in respect of parental rights of same‑sex 
couples have been phrased as discrimination complaints. Same‑sex couples or 
individuals with a homosexual orientation have claimed entitlement to the same rights 
as different‑sex couples or heterosexual individuals. Parental matters further often 
concern issues which in themselves do not constitute rights under the Convention, 
for example adoption, but which nonetheless come within its scope. As will become 
clear from the discussion below, in those situations where a State has voluntarily 
created a particular right or entitlement at the national level, it is not allowed to take 
discriminatory measures when it comes to applying it.175
The following subsections discuss the Court’s case law on parental rights for same‑sex 
couples and lesbians and gays thematically, addressing matters like adoption 
(subsection 8.2.4.1), legal parenthood by operation of the law (subsection 8.2.4.2) 
and access to AHR treatment (subsection 8.2.4.3). Some of the relevant cases, or 
aspects thereof, have yet been referred to or briefly discussed in section 8.2.3 above. 
Here, the focus lies not so much on the comparability question, but on the material 
findings of the Court.
It is noted that at the time this research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014), there 
were two more French cases pending before the ECtHR which related to parental 
matters. The one application concerned two female PACS partners, who both had a 
child using medically assisted procreation. They complained about the authorities’ 
refusal to grant them parental authority each in respect of the other’s child (see also 
171 Idem, paras. 35–36.
172 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, paras. 91 and 94.
173 Inter alia, ECtHR [GC] 16 July 2014, Hämäläinen v. Finland, no. 37359/09, para. 85 (under reference to 
ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, paras. 91 and 94) and ECtHR 15 March 
2012, Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07. See also ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. 
Austria, no. 19010/07.
174 ECtHR 13 June 1979, Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, para. 31 See also ch. 2, section 2.1.3.
175 ECtHR [GC] 22 January 2008, E.B. v. France, no. 43546/02.







Chapter 2, section 2.3.6).176 In the other case two female PACS partners complained 
about the refusal to grant one of them paternity leave on the occasion of the birth of 
her partner’s child.177
8.2.4.1. Adoption by same‑sex partners or couples
The ECtHR has repeatedly held that ‘[a]doption means “providing a child with a 
family, not a family with a child”’.178 Accordingly, where a family tie is established 
between a parent and a child, ‘[…] particular importance must be attached to the 
best interests of the child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may 
override those of the parent’.179 While the ECtHR has only ruled in cases concerning 
single‑parent adoption and second‑parent adoption, the implications of this case law 
for successive adoption and joint adoption are also discussed.
8.2.4.1.1. Single‑parent adoption
The ECtHR’s case law in respect of single‑parent adoption by homosexuals, has 
evolved over the years. Two French cases are the main authorities in this regard. 
In Fretté (2002),180 a homosexual man complained under Article 14 in combination 
with Article 8 ECHR about the refusal by the French authorities of his request for 
authorisation to adopt a child, on the ground that owing to his ‘choice of lifestyle’ 
the applicant did not provide the requisite safeguards for adopting a child. The Court 
concluded on the basis of the case file that this criterion ‘implicitly yet undeniably 
made the applicant’s homosexuality the decisive factor’ and that the refusal for 
authorisation was thus based on the applicant’s sexual orientation.181 This was ground 
for the Court to hold Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 applicable in the 
case.182
According to the Court there was ‘no doubt’ that this refusal pursued a legitimate 
aim, namely to protect the health and rights of children who could be involved in an 
adoption procedure.183 The Court considered it impossible ‘to find in the legal and 
176 Francine Bonnaud and Patricia Lecoq v. France (no. 6190/11), communicated on 3 February 2012. In 
May 2013 the Court invited the government to submit observations ‘in the light of the judgments in 
Gas and Dubois v. France and X a.o. v. Austria, and the adoption in France of the law of 17 May 2013 
opening marriage to same sex couples.’ See also ch. 2, section 2.3.6.
177 Hallier and Lucas v. France, no. 46386/10, application communicated to the French Government on 
6 April 2011.
178 Inter alia, ECtHR 26 February 2002, Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, para. 42.
179 ECtHR 26 February 2002, Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, para. 42, under reference to ECtHR 
16 November 1999, E.P. v. Italy, no. 31127/96, para 62 and ECtHR 7 August 1996, Johansen v. Norway, 
no. 17383/90, para. 78.
180 ECtHR 26 February 2002, Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97.
181 Idem, para. 32.
182 Idem, paras. 32–33. Judge Costa, joined by Judges Jungwiert and Traja, was very critical of this finding 
in his partly concurring opinion to the judgment. He called the majority’s reasoning on this point 
circular. Partly concurring opinion by Judge Costa, joined by Judges Jungwiert and Traja to ECtHR 
26 February 2002, Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97.
183 Idem, para. 38. The respondent government had asserted that the difference in treatment stemmed 
from the doubts that prevailed, in view of what was at the time known about the subject, about the 







social orders of the Contracting States uniform principles on these social issues’ 
and it observed that ‘generally speaking’, the law appeared to be in a transitional 
stage. For these reasons, the Court left States a wide margin of appreciation to make 
rulings on such matters.184 In respect of the competing interests of the applicant and 
children eligible for adoption, the Court noted that the scientific community was 
divided over the possible consequences of a child being adopted by one or more 
homosexual parents. Also, until that time only a limited number of scientific studies 
had been conducted on the subject and there were wide differences in national and 
international opinion.185 The Court concluded that the refusal to authorise adoption had 
not infringed the principle of proportionality and that, accordingly, the justification 
given by the government appeared objective and reasonable and the difference in 
treatment complained of was not discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 
ECHR.186 Three dissenting Judges noted that the refusal had been based ‘[…] on the 
view that to be brought up by homosexual parents would be harmful to the child at all 
events and under any circumstances’. They pointed out that the domestic authorities 
and courts had failed to explain why and how the child’s interests militated in the 
instant case against the authorisation of the applicant’s adoption request.187
Six years later, in the case of E.B. v. France (2008),188 the Grand Chamber reversed 
this position.189 This time a woman who was living with another woman in a stable 
same‑sex relationship, was refused authorisation to adopt a child. The Court 
explained the subject‑matter of the case and its approach in the case as follows:
‘The present case does not concern adoption by a couple or by the same‑sex partner of a 
biological parent, but solely adoption by a single person. Whilst Article 8 of the Convention 
is silent as to this question, the Court notes that French legislation expressly grants single 
persons the right to apply for authorisation to adopt and establishes a procedure to that 
end. Accordingly, the Court considers that the facts of this case undoubtedly fall within 
the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. Consequently, the State, which has gone beyond 
its obligations under Article 8 in creating such a right – a possibility open to it under 
Article 53 of the Convention – cannot, in the application of that right, take discriminatory 
measures within the meaning of Article 14 […].’190
development of a child brought up by a homosexual and deprived of a dual maternal and paternal 
role model. It held (as quoted in para. 36 of the judgment) that ‘[t] here was no consensus about the 
potential impact of being adopted by an adult who openly affirmed his homosexuality on a child’s 
psychological development and, more generally, his or her future life, and the question divided both 
experts on childhood and democratic societies as a whole.’
184 Idem, para. 41. The Court considered it ‘quite natural’ to leave such a wide margin.
185 ECtHR 26 February 2002, Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97, para. 42.
186 Idem, paras. 42–43.
187 Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Nicolas Bratza and Judges Fuhrmann and Tulkens to 
ECtHR 26 February 2002, Fretté v. France, no. 36515/97.
188 ECtHR [GC] 22 January 2008, E.B. v. France, no. 43546/02.
189 See also K.A. Doty, ‘From Fretté to E.B.: The European Court of Human Rights on Gay and Lesbian 
Adoption’, 18 Law and Sexuality Rev. Lesbian Gay Bisexual & Legal Issues (2009) p. 121.
190 ECtHR [GC] 22 January 2008, E.B. v. France, no. 43546/02, para. 49.







The Court held that although the authorities had based their decision on an overall 
assessment of the applicant’s situation, two grounds played a primordial role in the 
decision‑making, namely the lack of a ‘paternal referent’ in the applicant’s household 
or immediate circle of family and friends and the lack of commitment on the part 
of her declared partner. According to the Court these grounds had to be assessed 
concurrently, implying that the illegitimacy of one ground contaminated the entire 
decision.191 While the second main ground was reasonable and had nothing to do with 
any consideration relating to the applicant’s sexual orientation, the first ground could 
have served as a pretext for rejecting the applicant’s application on grounds of her 
homosexuality.192 The illegitimacy of this ground had ‘the effect of contaminating 
the entire decision’.193 After a detailed examination of the domestic authorities’ 
reasoning, the Court concluded that the applicant’s avowed homosexuality had 
indeed influenced the assessment of her application and had been a determining 
factor in refusing her authorisation to adopt.194 The applicant had therefore suffered 
a difference in treatment, the Grand Chamber held.195
The Court reiterated that a difference in treatment based on sexual orientation could 
only be justified if ‘particularly convincing and weighty reasons’ were present196 and 
that differences in treatment based solely on considerations regarding the applicant’s 
sexual orientation amounted to discrimination in violation of the Convention.197 The 
Grand Chamber pointed out that under French law any unmarried person, man or 
woman, was allowed to adopt and that it was not disputed that this opened up the 
possibility of adoption by a single person with a homosexual orientation. The Court 
considered the reasons put forward by the government198 not particularly convincing 
and weighty such as to justify refusing to grant the applicant authorisation. The 
authorities had made a distinction on the basis of the applicant’s sexual orientation 
which was therefore not acceptable under the Convention.199 With ten votes to seven, 
the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR. 
The dissenting Judges all had difficulties with the ‘contamination theory’ propounded 
by the majority, following which also the second ground for the refusal – the lack 
of commitment on the part of the applicant’s partner – could not in itself justify the 
adoption refusal.200
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198 Para. 37 of the judgment reads: ‘The reason for refusing [the adoption] authorisation had been dictated 
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ambivalence of the applicant’s partner’s commitment to her adoption plans.’
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It is important to note that in these single‑parent adoption cases no ‘special’ civil 
status was involved which could be held to (indirectly) set registered or married 
(different‑sex) partners apart from (same‑sex) stable partners (see 8.2.3.1 above). 
This was different in some cases concerning second‑parent adoption.
8.2.4.1.2. Second‑parent and successive adoption
The ECtHR has decided two cases concerning adoption of a child by the same‑sex 
partner of the child’s legal and genetic parent (second‑parent adoption). In Gas and 
Dubois – as discussed in section 8.2.3.2 above – the Court held that the applicants, 
who were in a stable same‑sex relationship, were not treated differently from 
different‑sex unmarried partners in respect of second‑parent adoption and therefore 
it found no violation of Article 14 ECHR in combination with Article 8. In X. and 
Others v. Austria (2013)201 such a difference in treatment was instead established 
and the Court’s reasoning for holding this treatment unjustified warrants a more 
extensive discussion at this place.
The X. and Others case concerned two women who were living together in a stable 
homosexual relationship. One of them had a son. She had sole custody of the child 
while his father had recognised paternity. The women had been living in a common 
household since the son was about five years old and cared for him jointly. In 2005 the 
women, wishing to obtain legal recognition of their de facto family unit, concluded 
an adoption agreement. The father of the child did not consent to the adoption, but 
the women submitted that it was in the best interests of the child and asked the 
competent district court to override his refusal to consent. The district court refused 
to approve the adoption agreement, because under the applicable provisions of the 
Austrian Civil Code, the child’s adoption by the female partner of the mother would 
sever his relationship with his mother. The appeals court upheld this ruling, taking 
the view that the relevant Austrian law was clearly based on the premise that the term 
‘parents’ necessarily referred to two persons of different sex. It noted furthermore 
that the child had two parents (his mother and father) and held that there was no need 
to replace one of them by an adoptive parent. The applicants appealed on points of 
law to the Supreme Court, holding that the relevant provisions of the Civil Code 
were unconstitutional, but in September 2006, this Court dismissed their appeal. The 
Supreme Court held that:
‘[n]ot least in view of the wide differences in national and international opinion concerning 
the possible consequences of a child being adopted by one or more homosexual parents, 
and bearing in mind the fact that there were not enough children to adopt to satisfy 
demand, States had to be allowed a broad margin of appreciation in this sphere’.202
The applicants had not demonstrated, nor was there any other evidence to suggest, 
that the relevant provisions of the Austrian Civil Code overstepped the margin 
201 ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07.
202 As quoted in ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, para. 20.







of appreciation accorded by the European Court, or that they infringed the 
proportionality principle. In 2010 the Austrian Registered Partnership entered into 
force, which explicitly outlawed second‑parent adoption by same‑sex registered 
partners.
Before the ECtHR the applicants complained that they had been discriminated 
against on grounds of sexual orientation because so‑called second‑parent adoption 
was possible for married or unmarried heterosexual couples but not for same‑sex 
couples. Presumably having studied the ECtHR case law carefully, they focused on the 
unequal treatment between unmarried different‑sex couples and unmarried same‑sex 
couples and held that the gist of their complaint was that they were automatically 
excluded from any chance of adoption.203 The respondent government on the other 
hand submitted that Austrian law gave priority to the biological parents when it 
came to the care of their child. Second‑parent adoption was only to be authorised 
if it was clearly in the child’s interests and if the replaced parent consented. In the 
case at hand there was no difference in treatment on grounds of sexual orientation, 
because decisive for the refusal of the adoption agreement had been that the father 
of the child did not consent to it. They furthermore argued that if the Court was to 
find a difference in treatment, ‘recreating the biological family and securing the 
child’s well‑being’ were legitimate aims.204 The relevant law did not aim to exclude 
same‑sex couples but sought, as a general rule, to avoid situations where a child had 
two mothers or two fathers for legal purposes. The government furthermore put 
forward that States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in the area of adoption 
law, in particular on the issue of second‑parent adoption by same‑sex couples.
The Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber in this case. 
As set out in section 8.2.3.4 above, the Court found that the applicants were not in 
a similar situation to spouses in respect of second‑parent adoption. It did accept, 
however, that their situation was comparable to that of unmarried different‑sex 
couples.
The Court expressly delineated the scope of the case; it was not about the general 
question of same‑sex couples’ access to second‑parent adoption, ‘let alone […] the 
question of adoption by same‑sex couples in general’, but only about the difference in 
treatment between unmarried different‑sex couples and unmarried same‑sex couples 
in respect of this type of adoption.205 Also, it was not about the question of whether 
the adoption request of the applicants had to be granted in this particular case.206 
There was no obligation under Article 8 ECHR to extend the right to second‑parent 
adoption to unmarried couples. Because the Austrian legislature had chosen to allow 
second‑parent adoption by unmarried different‑sex couples, however, the Court had 
to examine whether refusing that right to (unmarried) same‑sex couples served a 
203 Idem, para. 66.
204 Idem, para. 76.
205 Idem, paras. 134 and 149.
206 Idem, para. 152.







legitimate aim and was proportionate to that aim.207 The central question was ‘[…] 
whether the applicants [had been] discriminated against on account of the fact that 
the courts had [had] no opportunity to examine in any meaningful manner whether 
the requested adoption was in the second applicant’s interests, given that it [had] in 
any case [been] legally impossible.’208
The Austrian government had thus argued that the law was aimed at ‘recreating 
the circumstances of a biological family’.209 As the Court noted they ‘[…] relied on 
the protection of the traditional family, based on the tacit assumption that only a 
family with parents of different sex could adequately provide for a child’s needs.’ 
The Court reiterated that ‘the protection of the family in the traditional sense’ 
was, in principle, a weighty and legitimate reason which could potentially justify a 
difference in treatment on grounds of sexual orientation. It added that the protection 
of the interests of the child was indisputably a legitimate aim.210
As the Court thus quite readily accepted that the Austrian adoption law pursued a 
legitimate aim, the proportionality test proved crucial in the X. and Others case. The 
Court first reiterated the following principles:
‘The aim of protecting the family in the traditional sense is rather abstract and a broad 
variety of concrete measures may be used to implement it […]. Also, given that the 
Convention is a living instrument, to be interpreted in present‑day conditions, the State, 
in its choice of means designed to protect the family and secure respect for family life as 
required by Article 8, must necessarily take into account developments in society and 
changes in the perception of social, civil‑status and relational issues, including the fact 
that there is not just one way or one choice when it comes to leading one’s family or private 
life […].’211
The Court noted that where a difference in treatment on grounds of sexual orientation 
was concerned, a strict scrutiny test applied. The government had not adduced any 
evidence showing that it was not in the child’s best interests to be raised by two parents 
of the same sex.212 Quite the contrary, they had conceded that ‘[…] same‑sex couples 
could be as suitable or unsuitable as different‑sex couples when it came to adopting 
children’.213 Also, single‑parent adoption by persons in a same‑sex relationship was 
possible under Austrian law. The Court found the domestic law incoherent; on the 
one hand it accepted that a child grew up with same‑sex parents, ‘thus accepting 
that this [was] not detrimental to the child’, on the other hand it insisted that a child 
was not have two mothers or two fathers. The Court also stressed the importance 
of granting legal recognition to de facto family life and noted that second‑parent 
207 Idem, para. 136.
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209 Idem, para. 137.
210 Idem, para. 138.
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adoption was aimed at doing exactly that, as it served to confer rights vis‑à‑vis the 
child on the partner of one of the child’s parents.214 All in all, there was considerable 
doubt about the proportionality of the relevant Austrian law. The Court held:
‘Unless any other particularly convincing and weighty reasons militate in favour of such 
an absolute prohibition, the considerations adduced so far would seem rather to weigh in 
favour of allowing the courts to carry out an examination of each individual case. This 
would also appear to be more in keeping with the best interests of the child, which is a key 
notion in the relevant international instruments […].’215
While yet the Court had earlier – albeit implicitly – noted that a narrow margin 
applied in this case, and had therefore applied a strict scrutiny test, it nonetheless 
next addressed the argument raised by the government that a wider margin of 
appreciation had to be accorded in the sphere of adoption law, as it involved the 
balancing of different interests, and as there was no European consensus on the 
issue of second‑parent adoption by same‑sex couples. The Court thereby implied 
that this would have been an argument that could justify the difference in treatment 
complained of.216 Still, it was not accepted by the Strasbourg Court. The ECtHR 
reaffirmed that in situations involving a difference in treatment on the basis of sexual 
orientation, a narrow margin applied. In respect of the alleged absence of consensus, 
the Court took an unprecedented approach, which linked in with the way in which it 
had earlier delineated the scope of the case before it (see above). Because the case was 
only about the question of whether a State, once it decided to introduce second‑parent 
adoption for unmarried couples, was allowed to differentiate between different‑sex 
couples and same‑sex couples,217 only those States which allowed for second‑parent 
adoption in unmarried couples could be used for comparison. This concerned a 
group of ten States, of which six allowed both same‑sex and different‑sex partners 
to adopt the child of their partners, while four had excluded same‑sex couples from 
second‑parent adoption. The Court held this sample to be too narrow to draw a 
conclusion as to the existence of a possible European consensus on this issue.218
The Court acknowledged that ‘[…] striking a balance between the protection of the 
family in the traditional sense and the Convention rights of sexual minorities [was] in 
the nature of things a difficult and delicate exercise, which [could] require the State 
to reconcile conflicting views and interests perceived by the parties concerned as 
214 Idem, para. 145, referring to ECtHR 28 June 2007, Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, 
para. 119; ECtHR 25 January 2007, Eski v. Austria, no. 21949/03, para. 39 and ECtHR 13 December 
2007, Emonet a.o. v. Switzerland, no. 39051/03, paras. 63–64.
215 ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, para. 147, referring to ECtHR [GC] 
22 January 2008, E.B. v. France, no. 43546/02, para. 95.
216 The Court held: ‘The Government advanced another argument to justify the difference in treatment 
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being in fundamental opposition […]’.219 It nonetheless found that the government had 
failed to adduce particularly weighty and convincing reasons to show that excluding 
second‑parent adoption in a same‑sex couple, while allowing that possibility in 
an unmarried different‑sex couple, was necessary for the protection of the family 
in the traditional sense or for the protection of the interests of the child. The Court 
accordingly – by ten votes to seven – found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 8 of the Convention.
The seven Judges who wrote a dissenting opinion to this judgment held that the majority 
had gone ‘beyond the usual limits of the evolutive method of interpretation’.220 They 
were particularly critical of the Court’s methodology in determining the relevant 
consensus, which resulted in an ‘unduly technical – and hence reductive – view of 
the situation Europe‑wide’. In their view ‘a clear trend’ was discernible whereby 
the great majority of the States Parties did ‘not authorise second‑parent adoption 
for unmarried couples in general, still less for unmarried same‑sex couples’ and 
held that this trend was reflected in international instruments.221 The dissenters 
furthermore found that the Court should have paid more attention to the particular 
facts of the case, such as the fact that the father of the child objected to the adoption 
by his mother’s female partner. It should also have considered what the best interests 
of the child required in this particular situation.
Both Gas and Dubois and X. and Others concerned second‑parent adoption, whereby 
the legal mother whose same‑sex partner wished to adopt her child, was also the 
biological and genetic mother of the child. The Court has not yet dealt with a case 
involving successive adoption, where a partner adopts the child of an adoptive parent. 
While this matter may be more sensitive for some States,222 the emphasis the Court 
placed on legal recognition of de facto family life in the X. and Others judgment may 
equally apply in a case concerning successive adoption. It is, by contrast, exactly 
for the reason that no family life has yet been established that joint adoption may be 
distinguished from this situation.
8.2.4.1.3. Joint adoption
The Court has so far not dealt with any complaint of same‑sex couples who were 
not allowed to jointly adopt a child.223 The X. and Others case gives ground for 
concluding that where the legislation of a State allows different‑sex unmarried, but 
not same‑sex unmarried couples to jointly adopt, this would constitute discrimination 
contrary to Article 14 ECHR. As noted above, it may also be, however, that the Court 
would attach (decisive) weight to the fact that in that situation no family life has been 
established. Further, if the national law allows only spouses to jointly adopt a child, 
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while marriage is open to different‑sex couples only under the relevant jurisdiction, 
the Court may rule that, because of the special status of marriage, same‑sex couples 
are not in a relevantly similar situation to spouses in respect of the joint adoption of 
a child.
8.2.4.2. Legal parenthood by operation of the law
So far the Court has ruled in only one case concerning legal parenthood for 
same‑sex partners in situations other than adoption. The applicants in Boeckel 
and Gessner‑Boeckel (2013)224 were two German women, Ms. Sabine Boeckel and 
Ms. Anja Gessner‑Boeckel who had entered into a civil partnership (Eingetragenes 
Lebenspartnershaft) in 2001. In 2008 Ms. Anja Gessner‑Boeckel gave birth to a 
son. The birth certificate issued named her as the child’s mother, but left the space 
provided in the form for the father’s name blank. The competent Court subsequently 
granted an adoption order, allowing for the adoption of the child by Ms. Sabine 
Boeckel. The child thereby was legally recognised as a child of both applicants. In 
the meantime the applicants requested the competent District Court to rectify the 
child’s birth certificate, by inserting Ms. Sabine Boeckel as the child’s second parent. 
They put forward that under German law the father was the man who was married to 
the mother of the child at the time of birth, whether he was also the biological father 
of the child or not, and claimed that this presumption had to be applied analogously 
to their situation.
As discussed above in section 8.2.3.2, the Court ruled that the applicants were not in 
a relevantly similar situation to that of a married different‑sex couple in which the 
wife gave birth to a child. The Court accepted that biological differences between 
different‑sex couples and same‑sex couples, which had also been grounds for the 
relevant domestic law, decisively distinguished these groups in this respect. It held:
‘The Court takes note of the domestic courts’ reasoning according to which section 1592 
§ 1 of the Civil Code contained the – rebuttable – presumption that the man who was 
married to the child’s mother at the time of birth was indeed the child’s biological 
father. This principle is not called into question by the fact that this legal presumption 
might not always reflect the true descent. The Court also notes that it is not confronted 
with a case concerning transgender or surrogate parenthood. Accordingly, in case one 
partner of a same‑sex partnership gives birth to a child, it can be ruled out on biological 
grounds that the child descended from the other partner. The Court accepts that, under 
these circumstances, there is no factual foundation for a legal presumption that the child 
descended from the second partner.’225
Because there was thus no appearance of a violation of the Convention, the Court 
declared this complaint manifestly ill‑founded. This decision leaves unanswered the 
question of whether the Court would have come to a different conclusion if same‑sex 
224 ECtHR 7 May 2013 (dec.), Boeckel and Gessner‑Boeckel v. Germany, no. 8017/11.
225 Idem, para. 30.







couples and different‑sex couples who had acquired the same civil status (e.g. both 
spouses), would have been treated differently in this regard.226
8.2.4.3. Access to AHR treatment
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the case S.H. and Others v. Austria (2011),227 the Court 
ruled that ‘[…] the right of a couple to conceive a child and to make use of medically 
assisted procreation for that purpose is also protected by Article 8, as such a choice is 
an expression of private and family life’.228 The Court has not made explicit whether 
the term ‘couple’ in this context includes same‑sex couples.
The question of whether in respect of access to AHR treatment same‑sex couples 
are in a comparable situation to different‑sex couples, was shortly addressed in Gas 
and Dubois (see 8.2.3.2 above).229 In this case, the Court dismissed the applicants’ 
complaint that they were discriminated against on the ground of their sexual 
orientation because under French law IVF treatment with the use of anonymously 
donated gametes was available only to married and cohabiting different‑sex couples 
of reproductive age, and for therapeutic purposes only. The applicants had not 
brought this complaint before the national courts, which in itself was a ground for 
declaring this part of the complaint inadmissible for non‑exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. The ECtHR, however, in addition noted that such treatment was available 
in France only for different‑sex couples and ‘[…] for therapeutic purposes only, with 
a view in particular to remedying clinically diagnosed infertility or preventing the 
transmission of a particularly serious disease’. Without explaining this further, the 
Court considered that this situation was not comparable to that of the applicants and 
held that they were therefore no victim of a difference in treatment.230
In the Gas and Dubois case,231 civil status was not the decisive distinguishing factor 
as under French law cohabiting different‑sex couples could also acquire access to 
AHR treatment. The fact that AHR treatment was furthermore only available for 
specific therapeutic reasons, may thus have been even more important for the Court 
to find that the situations were not comparable. This may prove indicative for future 
cases. On the other hand, as the Court did not explain its finding any further, not 
too many conclusions can be drawn from this case. It is, for instance, insufficiently 
clear if States are allowed to generally limit access to AHR treatment to different‑sex 
couples only.232 The area of AHR treatment is in any case one in which the Court is 
generally reluctant to intervene with State practices. It has left States a wide margin 
of appreciation both in respect of their decision to intervene in the area and, ‘[…] 
226 See Loenen 2013, supra n. 112, at p. 643.
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once having intervened, to the detailed rules it lays down in order to achieve a 
balance between the competing public and private interests’ (see also Chapter 2).233
8.2.5.	 The	role	of	existing	alternative	forms	of	registration	in	the	Court’s	case	
law
The ECtHR case law paints a mixed picture when it comes to how alternative forms 
of recognition of relationships are weighed in the Court’s assessment of a complaint. 
In a judgment of 2007 the Court had held that it was not for the national authorities 
to take the place of those concerned in reaching a decision regarding the form of 
communal life they wished to adopt. The case concerned a man who wished to 
adopt the child of his partner, but under the relevant domestic law this was only 
possible if the parental links between the mother and her daughter were severed. The 
government had asserted that the links would not be severed if the couple married, 
but the Court thus refuted that it was not for the authorities to take the applicants’ 
place in deciding on their ‘form of communal life’.234
In Van der Heijden (2012) a different view was expressed. The applicant had been 
cohabiting with her partner for more than 18 years and wished to be exempted from 
testifying against him in a criminal case, just like spouses and registered partners 
who were entitled to immunity from testifying against their spouses or registered 
partners respectively under Dutch law. The Court held that the applicant had had 
realistic options to have her relationship formally registered and that she therefore 
had to accept the legal consequences of having chosen not take up such options:
‘The applicant has chosen not to register, formally, her union and no criticism can 
be made of her in this regard. However, having made that choice she must accept the 
legal consequence that flows therefrom, namely that she has maintained herself outside 
the scope of the “protected” family relationship to which the “testimonial privilege” 
exception attaches. That being so, the Court does not consider that the alleged interference 
with her family life was so burdensome or disproportionate as to imperil her interests 
unjustifiably.’235
The Court in this case thus held that authorities may legitimately ask from a couple 
to have their relationship formally registered in order to enjoy certain rights.
The argument that an alternative registration option was available has also played a 
role in the ECtHR’s case law on the effects of gender reassignments on pre‑existing 
marriages. As discussed above (see section 8.2.1), in cases pre‑dating Schalk and 
Kopf the Court held the fact that such couples could conclude a civil partnership 
under which they enjoyed ‘many of the protections and benefits of married status’ 
to be of ‘of some relevance to the proportionality of the effects of the gender 
233 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 97.
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recognition regime’.236 A similar issue arose in the more recent case of Hämäläinen 
(2014),237 where a male‑to‑female transsexual complained that the full recognition of 
her post‑operative sex was made conditional on the transformation of her marriage 
into a civil partnership.
In the Hämäläinen case the Chamber in 2012 had found no violation of the 
Convention.238 In its assessment of the complaint under Article 8 ECHR (the right to 
respect for private life) the Chamber had considered that there were two competing 
rights which needed to be balanced against each other, ‘[…] namely the applicant’s 
right to respect for her private life by obtaining a new female identity number and 
the State’s interest to maintain the traditional institution of marriage intact.’ The 
Chamber noted that the applicant had two options: to have her marriage converted 
into a civil partnership, or to divorce.239 It found that civil partnership, which provided 
legal protection for same‑sex couples and which was almost identical to that of 
marriage, was a ‘real option’ for the applicant.240 The Court furthermore noted that 
the applicant’s child, would not be adversely affected if her marriage were turned 
into a civil partnership, as the applicant’s rights and obligations arising either from 
paternity or parenthood would not be altered in such circumstances.241 The Chamber 
concluded that a fair balance had been struck between the competing interests in the 
case before it and that there was therefore no violation of Article 8 ECHR.242 In view 
of those findings, the Chamber found it unnecessary to examine the facts of the case 
separately under Article 12 of the Convention.
At the request of the applicant, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which 
in July 2014 confirmed the Chamber’s finding that the Convention had not been 
violated in this case.243 The Grand Chamber, however, chose a different approach in 
assessing the complaint under Article 8 ECHR, which it found to be applicable under 
both its private‑life and family‑life aspects.244 Instead of examining it as a case in 
which the applicant’s Article 8 rights had been interfered with, the Grand Chamber 
considered it more appropriate to analyse the applicant’s complaint with regard to the 
positive aspect of that Article. It accordingly held that the question to be determined 
by the Court was:
236 In Schalk and Kopf the Court itself explained that in Parry and R.F. it had ‘[…] considered that, should 
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‘[…] whether respect for the applicant’s private and family life entail[ed] a positive 
obligation on the State to provide an effective and accessible procedure allowing the 
applicant to have her new gender legally recognised while remaining married.’245
The three Judges who wrote a joint dissenting opinion to this judgment disagreed in 
doctrinal terms with this approach and held that the granting of a new identity card 
neither required any major steps by the authorities, nor entailed important social or 
economic implications.246
The Court was mindful of the fact that the applicant was not advocating same‑sex 
marriage in general but merely wanted to preserve her own marriage.247 However, 
according to the Court accepting the applicant’s claim ‘would in practice lead to a 
situation in which two persons of the same sex could be married to each other’, and 
such was outlawed under Finnish law. The Court therefore held that it first had to 
examine whether the recognition of such a right was required in the circumstances 
by Article 8 of the Convention.248
The Court reiterated that Article 8 ECHR could not be interpreted as imposing an 
obligation on Contracting States to grant same‑sex couples access to marriage. It 
noted that there was no European consensus on allowing same‑sex marriages, nor 
was there any consensus in those States which did not allow same‑sex marriages as to 
how to deal with gender recognition in the case of a pre‑existing marriage. Because 
of this absence of a European consensus and because the case at stake ‘undoubtedly’ 
raised ‘sensitive moral or ethical issues’, the Court considered that the margin of 
appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State ‘still’ had to be a wide one.249 
The dissenters disagreed also on this point, pointing out that the margin was to be 
narrow, where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity 
was at stake. Also, they adduced that proof of the existence of a consensus was not 
to depend ‘on the existence of a common approach in a super‑majority of States’ and 
that the Court had some discretion regarding its acknowledgment of trends.250
The majority of the Court found that the applicant had several options under Finnish 
law, including maintaining the status quo, converting her marriage into a registered 
partnership or divorce. In respect of the second option, around which the complaint 
revolved, the Court held that the differences between a marriage and a registered 
partnership were ‘not such as to involve an essential change in the applicant’s legal 
situation’ and that the applicant would be able ‘to continue enjoying in essence, and 
in practice, the same legal protection under a registered partnership as afforded by 
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marriage’.251 This was the third assumption underlying the majority’s reasoning with 
which the dissenters disagreed. They felt that the majority had overlooked the fact 
that the applicant and her wife felt united by a religious conviction which did not 
allow the transformation of their relationship into a partnership.252
What was furthermore specific to the Hämäläinen case was that in the case of the 
conversion of her marriage into a registered partnership, the applicant and her family 
would not lose any of the rights which they had earlier established by marrying, and 
it would not affect the paternity of the applicant’s child, nor the responsibility for 
the care, custody or maintenance of the child. The effect of the conversion of the 
marriage into a registered partnership on the applicant’s family life would thus be 
‘minimal or non‑existent’.253 The Court concluded that the Convention had not been 
violated, noting the following:
‘While it is regrettable that the applicant faces daily situations in which the incorrect 
identity number creates inconvenience for her, the Court considers that the applicant has 
a genuine possibility of changing that state of affairs: her marriage can be converted 
at any time, ex lege, into a registered partnership with the consent of her spouse. If no 
such consent is obtained, the possibility of divorce, as in any marriage, is always open 
to her. In the Court’s view, it is not disproportionate to require, as a precondition to 
legal recognition of an acquired gender, that the applicant’s marriage be converted into 
a registered partnership as that is a genuine option which provides legal protection for 
same‑sex couples that is almost identical to that of marriage […]. The minor differences 
between these two legal concepts are not capable of rendering the current Finnish system 
deficient from the point of view of the State’s positive obligation.’254
The applicant had further submitted before the Grand Chamber that the Court had 
to assess under Article 12 whether the compulsory termination of marriage affected 
‘the substance of the right to marry’ in line with the Court’s case law. The Grand 
Chamber, however, found as the Chamber had done, that this question had already 
been examined under Article 8 and had resulted in the finding of no violation of 
that Convention right. In these circumstances, the Court considered that no separate 
issue arose under Article 12, and accordingly made no separate finding under that 
Article.255
As noted above, the three dissenters in this case felt that the case had to be examined 
from the perspective of negative instead of positive obligations under the Convention. 
They concluded that the applicant had suffered an interference with her Article 8 
rights and noted that the only two legitimate aims that could possibly be claimed 
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to be pursued by this interference were the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others or morals. They were brief in rejecting the first aim, as they believed that the 
continuation of the applicant’s marriage would have no detrimental effects for the 
rights and freedoms of others. Also, while acknowledging that the protection of the 
traditional family could be justified ‘by certain moral concerns’, they felt that the 
protection of morals did not provide sufficient justification for the interference in 
this case, as the government had not shown that the danger to morals was substantial 
enough to warrant the interference in issue. The dissenters held:
‘The only interest in issue is, in plain terms, the public interest in keeping the institution 
of marriage free of same‑sex couples. While we do not purport to deny the legitimacy of 
the State’s interest in protecting the institution of marriage, we do consider that the weight 
to be afforded to this argument is a different question and one that must be considered 
separately. In our view, the institution of marriage would not be endangered by a small 
number of couples who may wish to remain married in a situation such as that of the 
applicant. In the light of the above, we are not able to conclude that the respondent State 
can invoke a pressing social need to refuse the applicant the right to remain married after 
the legal recognition of her acquired gender.’256
The dissenting Judges accordingly found a violation of Article 8 in this case. Given 
that finding, they felt that no separate issue under Article 12 arose. However, given 
the approach that the majority had taken, they believed that the majority should have 
assessed under Article 12 whether this Article also guaranteed ‘[…] a right to remain 




So far the Court has never directly addressed the question of whether the Convention 
imposes a positive obligation on States to introduce some form of legal recognition 
of same‑sex relationships.258 Although there have been cases were this issue has 
been (indirectly) put before it, the Court has held the answering of this question as 
not or no longer necessary, or ‘not its task’, in the respective cases. For instance, 
in Schalk and Kopf, the Court referred to the fact that the respondent State had 
introduced legislation on registered partnerships in the meantime (see above)259 and 
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in Vallianatos the Court explicitly stressed that the case before it was not about that 
general question in the abstract (see 8.2.3.4 above).
Still, in the more recent case law of the Court some hints may be found of a development 
towards the formulation of such an obligation.260 The first is the fact that the Court 
has stressed at a number of times that practice in this area is evolving in Europe. It 
expressly kept the option open that at some point there would be a consensus, which 
could constitute a ground for the Court to apply an evolutive interpretation of the 
Convention on this matter. The employment by the Court of terms like ‘not yet’ and 
‘still’ in the relevant case law (see 8.2.2 above)261 may be telling in this regard.262 
Accordingly, the Court may in the future come to formulate of a (minimum) positive 
obligation for States to recognise same‑sex relationships in some form.263
The Court has at the same time made clear that European consensus does not 
necessarily imply that a State holding on to a different position is in violation of the 
Convention. In Vallianatos the Court reiterated its older case law, where it had held 
that:
‘The fact that, at the end of a gradual evolution, a country finds itself in an isolated position 
as regards one aspect of its legislation does not necessarily imply that that aspect offends 
the Convention, particularly in a field – matrimony – which is so closely bound up with 
the cultural and historical traditions of each society and its deep‑rooted ideas about the 
family unit.’264
Still, in that case, Greece was obliged to change its civil union legislation in order to 
open it up to same‑sex couples. Hence, the relevant cultural and historical traditions 
of the Greek society and its deep‑rooted ideas about the family unit were outweighed 
by the individual interests of same‑sex couples. It must be noted, however, that in this 
case the State had made the first step itself by introducing partnership legislation, 
and that the case was about the question of whether it could be justified that this 
newly introduced institute was available to different‑sex couples only.
The Court has in any case expressly left States a margin of appreciation as regards 
the timing of the introduction of legislative changes in the ‘[…] area of evolving 
of the Act.’ Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens to ECtHR 24 June 2010, 
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social rights where there is no established consensus’.265 It held that it was not to 
‘[…] rush to substitute the legal provisions of national authorities, who [were] best 
placed to assess and respond to the needs of society’.266 Accordingly, it has held 
that States ‘not in the vanguard’,267 could not be ‘criticised’268 or ‘reproached’269 for 
not having introduced their civil partnership legislation any earlier. This phrasing 
makes one wonder if these States could have been reproached if they had introduced 
such legislation much later, and even more if States who have not introduced any 
partnership legislation could be reproached for not having introduced it at all. The 
answer may, again, depend on whether a European consensus can be held to exist. As 
the Court explained in M.W. v. the UK (2009) the UK could not be criticised because 
there existed at the material time no sufficient consensus:
‘The comparative material before the Court is not such as to suggest that at the relevant 
point in time (10 April 2001) there was sufficient consensus among the Contracting Parties 
to the Convention on the formal recognition of same‑sex relationships that would have 
significantly narrowed the United Kingdom’s margin of appreciation in this respect. Nor 
can the enactment of the Civil Partnership Act be taken as an admission by the domestic 
authorities that the non‑recognition of same‑sex couples, and their consequent exclusion 
from many rights and benefits available to married couples, was incompatible with the 
Convention. Instead, by acting as they did and when they did, the United Kingdom 
authorities remained within their margin of appreciation. Moreover, the comprehensive 
manner in which the Act ensures equal entitlements for same‑sex couples who enter into 
a civil partnership means that, although it was not in the vanguard, the United Kingdom 
is certainly part of the emerging European consensus described by the third party 
interveners.’270
This approach is understandable from the perspective that it may be very complex for 
the Court to decide at what point in the past consensus has come into being.271 It may 
be easier for the Court to decide at some point that a consensus on legal recognition 
of same‑sex relationships exists and to set a new standard from then on.272
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269 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 106.
270 ECtHR 23 June 2009 (dec.), M. W. v. the United Kingdom, no. 11313/02.
271 Koffeman 2010, supra n. 90. On this time aspect, see also the Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges 
Vajic and Malinverni to ECtHR 22 July 2020, P.B. and J.S. v. Austria, no. 18984/02.
272 In J. M. v. the United Kingdom where the relevant facts equally dated back to 2001, the Court had less 
difficulty in finding discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. This case may be distinguished 
however, in that it concerned not the question of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships as such, but 
a difference in treatment between unmarried same‑sex couples and unmarried different‑sex couples 
in respect of child support (see section 8.2.3.4 above). ECtHR 28 September 2010, J. M. v. the United 
Kingdom, no. 37060/06.







Hence, since the Court has so far noted at several occasions that a consensus in the 
area of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships is emerging, it is conceivable, 
although not inescapable, that at some point it will hold this to have developed 
sufficiently so as to find that a lack of any such recognition is incommensurable 
with the Convention. The formulation of a positive obligation to provide for some 
form of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships has also been held to be a logical 
consequence of the importance the Court attaches to legal recognition of de facto 
family life and the Court’s finding that same‑sex relationships fall within the scope 
of the right to respect for family life. Indeed, as Hodson has observed, it may be 
‘[…] hard to see how family life can be fully enjoyed without some form of legal 
recognition being offered to those in same‑sex relationships.’273
The exact shape that such legal recognition would have to take, remains an open 
question. In Schalk and Kopf the Court underlined that where a State chose to 
provide same‑sex couples with an alternative means of legal recognition, it enjoyed a 
certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact status conferred.274 It was thus not 
required that registered partnership had the same legal consequences as marriage.275 
Also, Vallianatos implied that such an institution would not have to exhaustively 
regulate for parental matters.276
The Court has also noted an ‘evolving consensus on same‑sex marriages in the 
European context’.277 Nevertheless, the Grand Chamber as recent as in 2014 
emphasised that ‘it [could not] be said that there [existed] any European consensus 
on allowing same‑sex marriages’.278 Here, it seems less likely that the Court will in 
the near future rule differently on this point. On the other hand, the fact that it has 
declared Article 12 applicable to the complaint in Schalk and Kopf, is an important 
step that leaves further development of the case law in this area open.279
The questions raised here may be addressed in two cases that were pending before 
the Court at the time of conclusion of this research (i.e., 31 July 2014). The first is 
Chapin and Charpentier,280 in which two men complained that their marriage as 
conducted by the Mayor of the French commune, Bègles, was subsequently declared 
273 Hodson 2011, supra n. 16, at p. 176.
274 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 108, ECtHR 15 March 2012, Gas 
and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07, para. 66 and ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, 
no. 19010/07, para. 106.
275 Hodson considered it likely that the Court would ‘[…] tolerate a degree of differentiation between 
marriage and registered partnership for some time to come.’ Hodson 2011, supra n. 16, at p. 177.
276 The Court considered it ‘possible for the legislature to include some provisions dealing specifically 
with children born outside marriage, while at the same time extending to same‑sex couples the general 
possibility of entering into a civil union.’ ECtHR [GC] 7 November 2013, Vallianatos a.o. v. Greece, 
nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, para. 89.
277 ECtHR 12 November 2012, H. v. Finland, no. 37359/09, para. 49.
278 ECtHR [GC] 16 July 2014, Hämäläinen v. Finland, no. 37359/09, para. 74.
279 Idem, para. 61. Hodson also observed that ‘[…] the Court’s decision on Article 12 [contained] 
progressive elements and hints at a future in which the right to marry is extended to same‑sex couples 
[…]. Hodson 2011, supra n. 16, at p. 173.
280 Chapin and Charpentier v. France, no. 40183/07, application lodged 6 September 2007.







null and void by the courts.281 The other set of pending cases is potentially even 
more interesting. These concern complaints originating from Italy about refusals 
of the Italian authorities to register same‑sex marriages contracted abroad. Apart 
from this cross‑border aspect – which is of course highly relevant to the present 
research (see also 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 below) – the complaints also concern the fact 
that in Italy it is impossible for same‑sex couples to obtain any legal recognition 
of their relationship.282 Because there is no national partnership legislation to refer 
to, it seems inescapable that the Court will have to examine whether a sufficient 
consensus has evolved for the Court to rule that the right to respect for private and 
family life requires States to provide for some form of legal recognition of same‑sex 
couples. If it indeed rules accordingly, another question – which is most likely to be 
answered in the affirmative – is whether that alternative registration form must then 
be available to different‑sex couples (see 8.2.3.4 above).
8.3. cross‑border cAses
As yet there have not been any cross‑border cases decided by the Court in matters 
directly pertaining to this case study.283 There are, however, very interesting (mostly 
Italian) cases pending. Further, inspiration for deciding these cases may be drawn 
from a handful of other cross‑border cases. For example, an often quoted judgment 
in this context has been Wagner (2007),284 in which the Court held that a Peruvian 
single‑parent adoption decision had to be recognised in Luxembourg. As also 
discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2, the Court noted that there was a consensus 
in Europe on single‑parent adoption and stressed that the child’s best interests were 
paramount in such a case. It concluded that the right to respect for family life as 
protected by Article 8 ECHR had been violated as the Luxembourg courts could 
not reasonably have refused to recognise the family ties that pre‑existed de facto 
between the child and its adoptive mother.285 The case has been held to be a possible 
authority for the claim that respect for family life requires States to recognise civil 
statuses legally established elsewhere.286 The subsequent cross‑border surrogacy 
cases Mennesson and Labasssee (2014) – that were decided on the basis of the right 
281 The Court communicated the application to the French Government on 7 April 2009 and put questions 
to the parties under Art. 14 (prohibition of discrimination) in conjunction with Art. 12 (right to 
marriage) and in conjunction with Art. 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention.
282 Orlandi and Others v. Italy, no. 26431/12 a.o., applications lodged on 20 April 2012 and subsequent 
dates. The Court communicated the applications to the Italian Government on 3 December 2013 and 
put questions to the parties under Art. 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and under Art. 14 
(prohibition of discrimination) read in conjunction with Art. 8 and/or Art. 12 (right to marry) of the 
Convention. See also Enrico Oliari and A. v. Italy and Gian Mario Felicetti a.o. v. Italy, nos. 18766/11 
and 36030/11, lodged on 21 March 2011 and 10 June 2011 respectively.
283 It is recalled that this research was concluded on 31 July 2014.
284 ECtHR 28 June 2007, Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01.
285 See also ECtHR 3 May 2011, Negrepontis‑Giannisis v. Greece, no. 56759/08.
286 J. Rijpma and N. Koffeman, ‘Free Movement Rights for Same‑Sex Couples Under EU Law; What role 
to Play for the CJEU?’, in: D. Gallo et al. (eds.), Same‑Sex Couples before National, Supranational and 
International Jurisdictions (Berlin, Springer 2014) p. 455 at pp. 462–463.







to personal identity of the child (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.2) – may also prove 
relevant in this regard.
8.3.1.	 Recognition	of	foreign	same‑sex	marriages	and	partnerships
In 2010 a complaint was lodged with the Court by two Russian women, Irina 
Fedotova‑Fet and Irina Shipitko, who had married in Canada in 2009.287 They 
complained about the refusal of the Russian authorities to register their marriage in 
the Russian register on the ground that under the Russian Family Code a marriage 
could only be registered between a man and a woman. Before this case was given an 
application number, it disappeared from the Court’s docket and could no longer be 
traced in the search engine HUDOC on the Court’s website, for reasons unknown 
to the present author.288 Yet earlier, however, another set of cases concerning the 
recognition of foreign same‑sex marriages, this time originating from Italy, had been 
brought before the Court.289 These cases were still pending at the time this research 
was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014).
8.3.2.	 Refusal	of	a	residence	permit	to	a	same‑sex	partner
In September 2009 a same‑sex couple, one of whom is an Italian and the other a New 
Zealand national, made an application to the ECtHR against Italy (see also 8.2.6 
above).290 They complained that the Italian authorities had refused to issue the second 
applicant with a residence permit because the national immigration legislation did 
not allow unmarried partners to obtain a family member’s residence permit. The 
applicants claimed that they had no other means of living together as a couple in 
Italy. At the time of writing, these cases are still pending for the Court.
8.3.3.	 Cross‑border	cases	involving	children
So far the ECtHR has not decided any cross‑border cases involving a same‑sex 
couple with children and the present author is not aware of any such cases pending. 
As discussed extensively in Chapter 2, the Court has, however, decided cross‑border 
surrogacy cases. The judgments in Mennesson and Labassee are also relevant for 
same‑sex couples who engage in international surrogacy, in any case as long as one 
of them is genetically related to the child. In these cases the Court ruled that a refusal 
to recognise the legal parenthood of a father whose genetic children were born 
287 According to an earlier version of the ECtHR’s factsheet on ‘Sexual orientation issues’ the complaint 
by Fedotova‑Fet and Shipitko v. Russia, was lodged on 21 July 2010.
288 See also www.archive.gayrussia.eu/en/inf/detail.php?ID=16197, visited October 2010.
289 Orlandi and Others v. Italy, no. 26431/12 a.o., applications lodged on 20 April 2012 and subsequent 
dates.
290 Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, no. 51362/09, application lodged in September 2009 and communicated 
to the Italian Government on 10 January 2012.







following surrogacy arrangements abroad, violated the right to respect for private 
life of the children concerned, in particular their right to personal identity. There is 
no indication in the judgments that this reasoning would not apply if the intended 
parents had been a same‑sex couple. This is even more so, now that the reasoning 
adopted by the Court in Mennesson and Labassee did not focus on the (non‑genetic) 
intended mother, while no importance was attached to the civil status of the intended 
parents (in those cases spouses).291
8.4. conclusIons
A number of findings of the ECtHR have been important for the advancement of 
the rights of persons with a homosexual orientation and (consequently) for same‑sex 
couples. The first is the finding that a person’s sexual orientation forms part of the 
most intimate aspects of private life and that consequently discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation requires particularly serious reasons by way of justification. 
The other is the finding that same‑sex relationships come within scope of right to 
respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR.
When it comes to legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, however, no enforceable 
rights have followed from the ECtHR’s case law. The Court has acknowledged that 
same‑sex couples have, just as much as different‑sex couples, a ‘need for legal 
recognition of their relationship’,292 and has even ruled that they come within the 
scope of the right to marry (Article 12 ECHR). Still it has not (yet) ruled that they 
therefore have a right to (some form of) legal recognition of their relationship. For 
one thing, they do not have a right under the Convention to marry. The Court has 
repeatedly held that ‘marriage’ under Article 12 ECHR concerns traditional marriage 
between a man and a woman only. While it has noted that the institution of marriage 
has undergone ‘major social changes since the adoption of the Convention’, it has 
attached decisive value to the lack of European consensus on this point. It has been 
noted that by holding on to this traditional concept of marriage, ‘[t]he Court is in 
danger of treating marriage as an untouchable, almost sacred, category.’293
In cases where same‑sex couples claimed that they were treated unequally from 
different‑sex couples, the special status of marriage has often been a ground for 
not even finding comparability in the situations of same‑sex couples and those of 
different‑sex couples, or in any case for justifying a difference in treatment between 
these groups. The fact that same‑sex couples did not at all have access to marriage, 
was not considered to have a bearing on these findings.
291 Compare N.R. Koffeman, ‘Case‑note to ECtHR 26 June 2014, Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11 and 
ECtHR 26 June 2014, Labassee v. France, no. 65941/11’, 15 European Human Rights Cases 2014/222 
(in Dutch).
292 ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 99.
293 Hodson 2011, supra n. 16, at p. 177.







Generally, in discrimination cases, the Court has held it determinative whether ‘a 
special legal status’ was involved – in other words ‘a public undertaking, carrying 
with it a body of rights and obligations of a contractual nature’. Only where no such 
status was involved, has the Court applied its strict scrutiny test for cases involving 
a difference in treatment on grounds of sexual orientation. In those cases the Court 
has furthermore tested if the relevant national law was coherent (X. and Others v. 
Austria (2013)). In this context it has been submitted that there is also Strasbourg 
case law that implies that civil status in itself is a suspect ground, that attracts a 
weighty reasons test,294 but such a finding has clearly not been upheld in cases 
involving same‑sex couples. Further, the critique has been issued that by taking this 
formalistic approach, the Court has overlooked the indirect discrimination involved 
in cases where same‑sex couples simply had no access to a particular civil status.295 
The Court’s approach in these cases has also been held as being more difficult to 
reconcile with those cases in which it held that the applicants could and should have 
resorted to alternative forms of registration.296
In cases concerning parental matters, the Court has accepted protection of the family 
in the traditional sense, as well as the best interests of the child, as legitimate aims 
for a difference in treatment, but it has been increasingly stricter in its examination 
of the proportionality of the measure in these cases. In choosing means to protect 
the family, States must take into account developments in society and changes in 
the perception of social and civil status and relationship issues. An examination of 
each individual case must also be made possible, as that is most in keeping with the 
best interests of the child. In X. and Others v. Austria, the Court even concluded that 
it was in fact in the interest of the child that no difference in treatment was made 
between same‑sex couples and different‑sex couples in respect of second‑parent 
adoption. While the Court has not adopted reasoning purely from the perspective of 
the child, as advocated by some of its Judges,297 it has increasingly taken the bests 
interests of the child into account in its reasoning. It has at the same time accepted 
that biological differences between different‑sex couples and same‑sex couples, 
decisively distinguish these groups in respect of parental matters.
The Court has accepted that a consensus in respect of alternative forms of registration 
for same‑sex couples is evolving in Europe and in its case law some hints can be 
found that the Court may go in the direction of the definition of a positive obligation 
for the States to provide for some form of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. 
This precise question has to date only come indirectly before the Court, and in those 
cases the Court – for different reasons – has not addressed the matter. It therefore 
remains to be seen what the future case law may bring in this regard. What is clear, 
is that, when States choose to provide for some alternative form of registration, 
they must guarantee that this alternative registration option is also accessible for 
294 Koffeman 2011A, supra n. 126.
295 Idem.
296 Koffeman 2014A, supra n. 138.
297 Dissenting opinion of Judge Villiger to ECtHR 15 March 2012, Gas and Dubois v. France, no. 25951/07. 
See section 8.2.3.2 above.







same‑sex couples. States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact 
status conferred by alternative means of recognition, and the Court has indicated 
that differences between same‑sex partners and different‑sex partners in respect of 
parental matters could potentially be justified.
All in all, from the case law as discussed in this chapter it becomes clear that 
States are generally given a lot of room in this area of law. Because marriage has 
‘deep‑rooted social and cultural connotations differing largely from one society to 
another’, States may each decide for themselves whether or not they want to open up 
marriage to same‑sex couples. They are furthermore free to grant certain rights or 
entitlements only to couples with a specific civil status, even when that status is not 
accessible for same‑sex couples. Where no such special status is involved, however, 
the Court has been much stricter, and in cases concerning parental matters it has 
increasingly ruled out discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation on the basis 
of the best interests of the child.
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9.1.1. Relevant Charter rights
Several Charter rights are relevant in the context of the present case study. Many of 
them have been briefly introduced in Chapter 3, namely the right to private and family 
life (Article 7 CFR); the right to found a family (Article 9 CFR); the prohibition of 
discrimination (Article 21 CFR); the rights of the child (Article 24 CFR); the legal 
economic and social protection of the family (Article 33 CFR) and the right to free 
movement (Article 45 CFR).
Article 9 of the Charter is of particular relevance for the present case study, because 
it provides also for a right to marry.2 The Article reads:
‘The right to marry and to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the 
national laws governing the exercise of these rights.’
This Article greatly resembles Article 12 ECHR, and equally refers to national 
laws. The reference to ‘men and women’ has been taken out, however, rendering the 
provision gender‑neutral.3 As a result Article 9 CFR does not seem to stand in the 
way of granting same‑sex couples access to marriage, but the wording of the Article 
does not require so either.4 The scope of this Article is also broader in the sense 
that it does not focus on marriage exclusively, but also covers other forms of legal 
recognition of relationships. The Explanations to the Charter explain in this regard:
‘This Article is based on Article 12 of the ECHR […]. The wording of the Article has 
been modernised to cover cases in which national legislation recognises arrangements 
other than marriage for founding a family. This Article neither prohibits nor imposes the 
granting of the status of marriage to unions between people of the same sex. This right 
1 The present chapter – particularly its section 9.6 – is based on J. Rijpma and N. Koffeman,’Free 
Movement Rights for Same‑Sex Couples Under EU Law; What role to Play for the CJEU? in: D. Gallo 
et al. (eds.), Same‑Sex Couples before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Berlin, 
Springer 2014) pp. 455–491.
2 On the connection between the right to marry and the right to found a family in this Article, see ch. 3, 
section 3.1.
3 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, June 2006, p. 98, www.ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental‑rights/files/
networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf, visited June 2014.
4 Idem, p. 102.







is thus similar to that afforded by the ECHR, but its scope may be wider when national 
legislation so provides.’5
There has not to date been any CJEU judgment in which this Charter Article has 
been referred to, safe interpreted.6
9.1.2. Relevant EU competences
The EU has no competence in the field of civil status or any related family law 
matters as such. For instance, there is no EU marriage institute and there are no 
EU rules on parental rights for same‑sex couples. These concern matters where the 
Member States have deliberately refrained from attributing any competences to the 
Union.7 Hence, in respect of legal recognition of same‑sex couples, the EU cannot 
set, and therefore has never set, any binding Union standards, and this is not likely 
to change in the near future. Civil status is nonetheless relevant in some areas of 
EU law, where obviously the EU does have competence. For instance, references to 
civil status have been made in the EU Staff Regulations as well as under various EU 
non‑discrimination instruments in the field of employment. Particularly in situations 
where same‑sex couples have been concerned, such references have raised questions 
as to their interpretation (see sections 9.2 and 9.3 respectively).
Several of the EU’s existing competences pertain to the present case study. The EU’s 
competence to adopt equal treatment law and its application in respect of LGBT 
rights is discussed in more detail in section 9.3 below. Another important competence 
concerns the free movement of persons. The application of this freedom in the context 
of the present case study is extensively set out in section 9.6. The EU’s competence to 
adopt measures relating to family law having cross‑border implications (Article 81(3) 
TFEU), has been set out in Case Study I (see Chapter 3, section 3.1.3.3), and will 
therefore not be discussed separately here. Private International Law instruments 
that have been adopted on this legal basis, or that may potentially be adopted in 
the future, and that are relevant or may prove to be so for the present case study are 
discussed in section 9.7 below.
5 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17.
6 This research was concluded on 31 July 2014. The provision has only been referred to by a few Advocate 
Generals in Opinions, for instance: Joined Cases C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden 
v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, ECLI:EU:C:2001:113, Opinion of AG Mischo and Case C‑147/08 Römer 
[2011] ECR I‑3591, ECLI:EU:C:2010:425, Opinion of AG Jääskinen.
7 In the words of Lenaerts ‘[…] Member States enjoy absolute discretion over the definition and legal 
effects of marriage, registered partnership, divorce, and other domestic issues […]’. K. Lenaerts, 
‘Federalism and the rule of law: perspectives from the European Court of Justice’, 33 Fordham 
International Law Journal 2009–2010, p. 1338 at p. 1359.







9.2. the eu stAff regulAtIons And sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps
Under the present EU Staff Regulations the rights of staff members in same‑sex 
relationships are fully equal to those of staff members in different‑sex relationships. 
This has not, however, always been the case. As will be discussed hereafter, the 
CJEU exercised considerable judicial restraint when it was asked if certain terms 
in the Regulations, such as ‘marriage’, included ‘non‑traditional’ unions, such as 
same‑sex registered partnerships. As further explained in section 9.6.2.1 below, this 
line of case law has often been referred to in academia when discussing the definition 
of the term ‘spouse’ under the Free Movement Directive.
The Dumay case (1993) concerned an application for a widow’s pension by the 
widow of Mr. Dumay, a Community Official who died in 1991.8 While Mr. and Mrs. 
Dumay had cohabited for many years, they married in 1989 only. The European 
Commissions’ Directorate General for Personnel and Administration rejected Mrs. 
Dumay’s application, informing her that because they were married for less than 
five years, she did not qualify for a widow’s pension. The CJEU, ‘while aware of 
the social context’ in which the action had been brought, did not consider that it 
was competent ‘[…] to widen the judicial interpretation of the specific terms used 
in the Staff Regulations in order to bring cohabitation’ – in casu by a different‑sex 
couple – ‘within the definition of “marriage”, or “cohabitee” within that of “husband” 
or “wife”.’9 The Court took account of the fact that any extension of those concepts 
would have ‘serious legal and financial consequences’ for the then Communities and 
for third parties.10 It ruled that ‘a change on that scale’ could only be made by the 
Community legislature if it considered such a change to be necessary.11 The Court 
did not consider it ‘appropriate’ in the case at hand to refer to provisions of national 
law for the purpose of interpreting the Community provisions in question.12
The subsequent case of D. and Sweden v. Council (2001),13 concerned a same‑sex 
couple and de facto had the same outcome as Dumay. A Swedish national, referred 
to as ‘D.’, was working for the Council, and had concluded a registered partnership 
with another Swedish national of the same sex under Swedish law. D. applied to 
the Council for his status as a registered partner to be treated as being equivalent 
to marriage for the purpose of obtaining the household allowance provided for in 
the Staff Regulations for EC Officials. The Council rejected his application on 
8 Case T‑65/92 Dumay [1993] ECR II‑597, ECLI:EU:T:1993:47.
9 Idem, para. 30. The Court referred to its preceding Reed judgment. Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed 
[1986] ECR 1283, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157.
10 Such financial considerations do not come back explicitly in later case law on the matter, although 
Reid and Caracciolo suggested it as a plausible explanation for the restrictive approach of the CJEU 
in Joined Cases C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:304 (see below). E. Reid and E. Caracciolo Di Torella, ‘The changing shape of the 
“European family” and fundamental rights’, 27 European Law Review (2002) p. 80 at p. 86.
11 Case T‑65/92 Dumay [1993] ECR II‑597, ECLI:EU:T:1993:47, para. 30.
12 Idem, para. 31.
13 Joined Cases C‑122/99 P & C‑125/99 P D. and Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:304.







the ground that the provisions of the Staff Regulations could not be construed as 
allowing a registered partnership to be treated as being equivalent to marriage.14 
D. subsequently applied to the Court of First Instance (now General Court).15 This 
Court dismissed his appeal, observing, inter alia, that for the purposes of the Staff 
Regulations the concept of marriage was to be understood as meaning ‘[…] a 
relationship based on civil marriage within the traditional meaning of the term’.16
In the subsequent appeal proceedings before the CJEU, D. and the Kingdom of 
Sweden, supported by Denmark and the Netherlands,17 asserted that, since civil 
status was a matter which came within the exclusive competence of the Member 
States, terms such as ‘married official’ or ‘spouse’ in the Staff Regulations were to 
be interpreted by reference to the law of the Member States and not to be given an 
independent definition. The parties argued that where a Member State had legislated 
to give legal status to an arrangement such as a registered partnership, which was 
to be treated in respect of the rights and duties it comprised as being equivalent 
to marriage, the same treatment was to be accorded in the application of the Staff 
Regulations.18 The Council, on the other hand, claimed that the wording of the Staff 
Regulations was unambiguous. To treat a registered partnership as being equivalent 
to marriage for the purposes of applying the Staff Regulations was to extend 
the scope of the benefits concerned, which, the Council alleged, required a prior 
assessment of its legal and budgetary consequences and ‘a decision on the part of the 
Community legislature rather than a judicial interpretation of the existing rules.’19 In 
the words of Bogdan ‘[…] the issue boiled down to the question whether under the 
Staff Regulations D. was to be considered married or not’.20
Basing himself on Reed (as discussed in section 9.6.1 below), Advocate General 
Mischo submitted that where the term ‘spouse’, or analogous terms such as 
‘marriage’ or ‘married person’, were used in an EU Regulation, they were to be 
given an independent interpretation.21 He held there to be no indication in the case 
14 Idem, para. 5.
15 By the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) the Court of First Instance (CFI) was renamed to ‘the General Court’.
16 Case T‑264/97 D. v. Council [1999] ECR FP‑I‑A‑00001, ECLI:EU:T:1999:13, para. 26–27, as 
paraphrased in para. 11 of the CJEU judgment. For a critical discussion of the judgment of the Court 
of First Instance, see C. Denys, ‘Homosexuality: a non‑issue in Community law?’, 24 European Law 
Review (1999) p. 419.
17 As Tridimas put it: ‘[…] this was not a one‑man legal struggle.’ He noted that by contrast, no government 
intervened in support of the Council. T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU law, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2006) p. 108.
18 See Joined Cases C‑122/99 P & C‑125/99 P D. and Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:304, para. 29.
19 Idem, para. 31. In this connection, the Council furthermore pointed out that at the time when Regulation 
781/98 was adopted a request by the Kingdom of Sweden for registered partnership to be treated as 
being equivalent to marriage had been rejected.
20 M. Bogdan, ‘Registered Partnerships and EC law’, in: K. Boele‑Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal 
recognition of same‑sex couples in Europe (Antwerp, Intersentia 2003) p. 171 at p. 172.
21 ‘An independent interpretation’ was defined by AG Mischo as ‘[…] an interpretation which takes into 
account the situation in the whole Community, and not merely in one Member State.’ Joined Cases 
C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union [2001] ECR 
I‑4319, ECLI:EU:C:2001:113, Opinion of AG Mischo, para. 43.







at hand of a general social development allowing a registered partnership between 
two people of the same sex to be included within the term ‘marriage’. He therefore 
concluded that the definition of ‘marriage’ included only ‘traditional’ marriage 
between two people of a different sex.22 On the basis of the CJEU’s case law, Mischo 
furthermore found that an official who had entered into a registered partnership was 
not in a situation comparable to that of a married official. He therefore concluded that 
the general principle of equal treatment did not require that the former was treated 
in the same way as the latter.23
In line with the Advocate General’s Opinion,24 the CJEU dismissed the appeals in their 
entirety. It ruled that ‘married official’ within the meaning of the Staff Regulations 
could not be interpreted as covering an official who had contracted a registered 
partnership.25 It held it to be ‘not in question’ that, according to the definition 
generally accepted by the Member States, the term ‘marriage’ meant a union between 
two persons of a different sex.26 The CJEU observed that in the preceding decade 
‘an increasing number of Member States’ had introduced, ‘[…] alongside marriage, 
statutory arrangements granting legal recognition to various forms of union between 
partners of the same sex or of the opposite sex and conferring on such unions certain 
effects which, both between the partners and as regards third parties’, were ‘the 
same as or comparable to those of marriage’.27 The Court also noted, however, that 
such arrangements were regarded in the Member States concerned as being distinct 
from marriage.28 The CJEU therefore found that as ‘Community judicature’ it could 
not interpret the Staff Regulations in such a way that ‘legal situations distinct from 
marriage’ were treated in the same way as marriage.29 The Court held it to be for 
the legislature instead to adopt measures in this matter. It noted, however, that the 
legislature had at that stage ruled out ‘[…] any idea of other forms of partnership 
being assimilated to marriage for the purposes of granting the benefits reserved 
under the Staff Regulations for married officials’.30
22 Joined Cases C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union 
[2001] ECR I‑4319, ECLI:EU:C:2001:113, Opinion of AG Mischo, para. 48.
23 Idem, para. 89.
24 See E. Ellis, ‘Case note to Joined Cases C‑122 & 125/99P, D. and Sweden v. Council. Judgment of the 
European Court of Justice of 31 May 2001, Full Court,’ 39 CMLRev (2002) p. 151 at p. 152.
25 See R. Wintemute, ‘Conclusion’, in: R. Wintemute and M. Andenæs (eds.), Legal Recognition 
of Same‑Sex Partnerships, A Study of National, European and International Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2001) p. 759, at p. 767.
26 Joined Cases C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:304, para. 34.
27 Idem, para. 35.
28 Idem, para. 36.
29 In the words of Bonini‑Baraldi the ratio decidendi of the judgment lied in the assessment of the 
(dis)similiarity between registered partnership and marriage. M. Bonini‑Baraldi, ‘The Employment 
Equality Directive and other aspects of European Law’, in: C. Waaldijk and M. Bonini‑Baraldi, Sexual 
orientation discrimination in the European Union, National laws and the Employment Equality 
Directive (The Hague, TMC Asser Press 2006) p. 5 at p. 22.
30 Joined Cases C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:304, para. 38.







This part of the judgment received much attention in legal academia. Ellis criticised 
that the Court had ‘[…] strayed into the dangerous territory of setting out what it 
regarded as the essential component of a “marriage” for the purposes of EU law, that 
is to say partners of opposite sex.’31 According to Bogdan the reasoning of the Court 
amounted ‘[…] in fact, to an autonomous interpretation of the concept of marriage’. 
He also noted however, that such interpretation was ‘not really independent’ as it 
was ‘based on the legal systems of the totality of Member States’.32 The author also 
warned that one had to understand that the Court ‘[…] did not feel free to experiment 
by going beyond the views prevailing in the totality of Member States at that time’.33 
Others were less understanding in this respect.34 Reid and Caracciolo Di Torella held 
that the Court’s ruling did not reflect the social reality that existed at the time.35 They 
furthermore pointed out that in D. and Sweden v. Council, a European notion was 
used to remove protection offered by the Member State,36 and argued that the Court 
should have recognised the ‘[…] principle of respect throughout the Community 
for the civil status enjoyed by a national in their own Member State’, as was also 
claimed by D.37 The authors acknowledged that this would have resulted in ‘some 
discrimination between the different Member States’, but they held such disparity 
in treatment ‘[…] (unfortunately) a necessary consequence of the need to respect 
national choices.’38
Tridimas observed that the judgment implied that the Court would be ‘[…] prepared 
to equate same sex relations with marriage if there was a sufficient degree of political 
and social consensus at the national level and this had crystallised in the laws of the 
Member States’. The author posed the question of what precise degree of support 
from the laws of the Member States would be required for the Court to take that step 
of equation.39 Lenaerts underlined that D. and Sweden v. Council ‘[…] dealt with a 
31 Ellis 2002, supra n. 24, at p. 155.
32 Bogdan 2003, supra n. 20, at p. 173.
33 Idem. Ellis also found it ‘[…] wholly understandable that the Court concluded that the extension of 
the law to protect homosexuals was a step for the legislature rather than the judiciary.’ She added ‘[i]
ndeed’ one has only to think of the criticism which the Court has attracted for its “activism” in far less 
controversial fields in the past to realize that this was a prudent course to take.’ Ellis 2002, supra n. 24, 
at p. 156.
34 Reid and Caracciolo Di Torella held that the CJEU’s approach in this case was ‘[…] in sharp contrast 
with the activist stand that the Court has taken on many occasions.’ They gave the example of the 
CJEU’s definitions of the concepts of indirect effect or state liability. Reid and Caracciolo Di Torella 
2002, supra n. 10, at p. 86 and footnote 37.
35 Idem, p. 89.
36 Idem, p. 82.
37 D. had also claimed that because the decision treated his situation as being equivalent to that of 
an unmarried official, his right as a national of a Member State to have his civil status respected 
throughout the Community (also referred to by the applicant as ‘the principle of the “integrity of a 
person’s status”’) had been infringed (see para. 42 of the judgment). As Reid and Caracciolo Di Torella 
observed, the CJEU did not challenge the existence of this principle, but side‑stepped it, by holding 
(in para. 43) that ‘[…] in applying to the appellant a provision of the Staff Regulations concerning an 
allowance, the competent institution was not taking a decision affecting his situation with regard to his 
civil status.’ Reid and Caracciolo Di Torella 2002, supra n. 10, at p. 85. Later on (at p. 90) the authors 
speak of ‘the principle of the unicity of legal status’.
38 Reid and Caracciolo Di Torella 2002, supra n. 10, at p. 87.
39 Tridimas 2006, supra n. 17, at p. 108.







common definition of marriage in a field of exclusive competence of the EU’ and that 
‘the case involved questions of statutory interpretation alone’.40 The author warned 
that the ruling of the CJEU in D. and Sweden v. Council could not be extended 
without reservation ‘to the mobility of same‑sex married couples’, as this judgment 
‘[…] did not examine the alterations in the civil status of same‑sex couples resulting 
from free movement’ (on this point see also section 9.6.2 below).41
As regards D.’s claim that the principle of equal treatment of officials irrespective of 
their sexual orientation had been infringed, the CJEU held it to be ‘clear’ that it was 
not the sex of the partner which determined whether the household allowance was 
granted, ‘but the legal nature of the ties between the official and the partner.’42 This 
finding – by some referred to as a ‘faulty reasoning’43 – has been criticised for not 
addressing the claim that the requirement of marriage was indirectly discriminatory 
on grounds of sexual orientation, insofar as same‑sex couples had no access to 
marriage.44 The Court held, however, that the general principle of equal treatment 
was not violated, as – given the great diversity of laws and the absence of any general 
assimilation of marriage and other forms of statutory union in the ‘Community as 
a whole’ – the situation of an official who had registered a partnership between 
persons of the same sex could not be considered to be comparable to that of a married 
official.45
The CJEU held, furthermore, that the contested decision was ‘not […] on any view, 
capable of constituting interference’ in private and family life within the meaning 
of Article 8 ECHR.46 While AG Mischo had also examined the case under Article 9 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – which at that time was recently adopted, 
but still legally non‑binding – the CJEU remained silent on this point.47 D.’s sixth 
argument – that by depriving partners registered under the legislation in force in 
some Member States of the rights associated with their status under national law, 
a decision such as the contested decision constituted discrimination on grounds 
of nationality and at the same time an obstacle to the freedom of movement for 
40 Lenaerts 2009–2010, supra n. 7, at p. 1358.
41 Idem, p. 1358, referring (in footnote 96) to H. Toner, Partnership Rights, Free Movement and EU Law, 
Hart Publishing: Oxford 2004, p. 187.
42 Joined Cases C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:304, para. 47.
43 Wintemute 2001, supra n. 25, at pp. 767–769.
44 Tridimas 2006, supra n. 17, at p. 108. Bogdan called this line of reasoning ‘hard to follow’. Bogdan 
2003, supra n. 20, at p. 173.
45 Joined Cases C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:304, paras. 50–51.
46 Idem, paras. 59–60. The Court considered: ‘[…] refusal by the Community administration to grant 
a household allowance to one of its officials does not affect the situation of the official in question 
as regards his civil status and, since it only concerns the relationship between the official and his 
employer, does not of itself give rise to the transmission of any personal information to persons outside 
the Community administration.’ See also Wintemute 2001, supra n. 25, at pp. 767–769.
47 See Reid and Caracciolo Di Torella 2002, supra n. 10, at p. 80. The authors criticised (on p. 83) the fact 
that the Advocate General omitted to refer to the prohibition of discrimination in Art. 21 of the Charter. 
They furthermore (on p. 89) suggested several possible explanations for the silence of the Court on this 
point, all reflecting ‘the political sensitivity of the Court’.







workers – was declared inadmissible as this plea was introduced for the first time 
at the appeal stage. Bogdan considered it ‘regrettable’ that this argument was not 
examined on the content, as he claimed there to be ‘an obvious risk’ that registered 
partners would refrain from moving from one Member State to another if their status 
would not be accepted there (on this issue, see also section 9.6.3 below).48
A couple of years after the D. v. Council judgment, the EU Staff Regulations 
were amended to the extent that from then on the term ‘spouse’ was interpreted as 
including same‑sex spouses.49 The amendment further provided for an extension of 
entitlement to the household allowance to officials registered as stable non‑marital 
partners, including those of the same sex.50 To qualify as stable non‑marital partners, 
the couple must produce a legal document recognised as such by a Member State, 
or any competent authority of a Member State, acknowledging their status as 
non‑marital partners.51 Given that, for example, the German registered partnership 
is also open to couples with no link to the German jurisdiction, it is submitted that in 
theory all EU officials and their same‑sex partners – including those from countries 
which do not provide for any form of legal recognition of their relationship – can 
qualify as ‘non‑marital partners’ and are thus entitled to the household allowance 
on the same footing as different‑sex married officials. If the partners have practical 
and effective access to legal marriage in an EU Member State, they cannot qualify 
as non‑marital partners for the purposes of the Staff Regulations.52 This presumably 
holds for most – if not all – different‑sex couples. For same‑sex couples, however, 
often no marriage alternative is open.53
In Roodhuijzen (2009) the General Court gave an autonomous interpretation 
of the term ‘non‑marital partnership’ within the meaning of the revised Staff 
Regulations, holding that it implied on the one hand, a union between two persons 
48 Bogdan 2003, supra n. 20, at p. 173.
49 Accordingly a case similar to D, was dismissed. Order of the Court of First Instance of 3 April 2003, 
Case T‑258/02 Hendrikus Boukes v. European Parliament [2003] OJ C171/27.
50 Council Regulation 723/2004/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 amending the Staff Regulations of 
officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the 
European Communities [2004] OJ L124/1, p. 37, annex I, para. 97. The present Staff Regulations can 
be found on www.ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf, visited June 2014.
51 Art. 1d (77)(96)(1) of the Staff Regulations juncto Art. 1(2)(c)(i) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations.
52 Art. 1d (77)(96)(1) of the Staff Regulations juncto Art. 1(2)(c)(iv) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations. 
A 2010 staff case concerned an EU official with both Belgian and Moroccan nationality who was 
cohabiting in Belgium with a same‑sex partner. The couple was refused the household allowance on 
the ground, that they did not satisfy the condition laid down in Art. 1(2)(c)(iv) of Annex VII to the Staff 
Regulations, since they had access to legal marriage in Belgium. The Civil Service Tribunal annulled 
the contested decisions, holding that the applicant’s access to marriage in Belgium was not ‘practical 
and effective’, as he risked persecution on grounds of his homosexuality in Morocco. Case F‑86/09 W 
v. Commission [2010] ECR 0000, ECLI:EU:F:2010:125.
53 If any of the EU Member States would give same‑sex couples access to marriage, irrespective of their 
nationality or their habitual residence, all EU officials in a same‑sex relationship would have access to 
marriage in a Member State and consequently none could qualify as ‘non‑marital partners’. However, 
since all States have made access to marriage dependent upon nationality and/or habitual residence, 
this does not hold.







and, on the other hand, certain formal aspects.54 The Court noted that the concept 
of ‘non‑marital partnership’ in the Staff Regulations had ‘a certain resemblance to 
that of marriage’,55 but held that it could not be interpreted ‘[…] as covering solely 
partnerships exclusively designed, under national law, to have effects similar to 
those of a marriage.’56 Evidence of cohabitation characterised by a certain stability 
was required by the Staff Regulations, but the partners were not required to be 
bound by specific reciprocal rights and obligations. The General Court rejected the 
Commission’s submission that earlier case law confirmed that a term like ‘non‑marital 
partnership’ could not be given an autonomous interpretation, as the civil status of 
persons fell within the exclusive competence of the Member States.57 It called to mind 
that in D. v. Council, the CJEU had interpreted the concept of marriage ‘as being in 
principle a Community concept’58 and held that any such autonomous interpretation 
did not affect the exclusive competence of Member States with regard to the civil 
status of persons and the determination of the benefits deriving therefrom.59
9.3. eu non‑dIscrImInAtIon lAw And sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps
Over the years, in accordance with social developments, sexual orientation has 
gradually gained a more prominent position in EU non‑discrimination law. This 
section sets out this development, both in legislation and case law. It also provides an 
outlook on relevant possible future developments in this realm of EU law.
Particularly at the time when sexual orientation was not yet included as a prohibited 
ground in the Treaties, complaints concerning same‑sex relationships were often 
construed as gender (or sex)60 equality cases, for instance based on the so‑called 
54 Case T‑58/08 P Roodhuijzen [2009] ECR II‑3797, ECLI:EU:T:2009:385.
55 Idem, para. 93.
56 Idem, para. 89.
57 Idem, para. 58. The Commission referred to Joined Cases C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom 
of Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, ECLI:EU:C:2001:304, paras. 34 and 35 and Case C‑267/06 
Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, 
paras. 59, 67 to 69 and 72.
58 Idem, para. 79.
59 Idem, para. 87.
60 As Gerards has explained: ‘In legal discourse, the term “sex” is used to refer to biological, genetically 
determined differences between women and men, such as differences related to pregnancy and lactation 
or average differences in physical strength. Other differences between men and women appear to be 
more social than biological in nature, such as (perceived) differences in the relation between parent and 
child. To describe these “social” differences between the sexes, the term “gender” is usually employed. 
Thus, “sex” refers to a biological reality, whereas “gender” refers to a social reality. […] In practice, it 
is sometimes hard to separate the two notions, as it is not always easy to classify a difference between 
men and women as either socially constructed or biological in nature. The result is that academic 
writers, courts and legislators do not always carefully distinguish between the terms, rendering 
the difference rather fuzzy. Indeed, although the term “gender” is now used more often than “sex”, 
many legal texts still primarily contain the ground “sex”. Further, it is important to remember that 
not all states distinguish between the two notions in their own languages; often, “sex” and “gender” 
are covered by a single term.’ J. Gerards, ‘Discrimination grounds’, in: D. Schiek et al. (eds), Cases, 
materials and text on national, supranational and international non‑discrimination law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2007) pp. 70–71.







Gender Equality Directives.61 This was also the case in the much debated Grant case 
(1998), the first case in the field of EU non‑discrimination law involving a same‑sex 
couple.62
9.3.1. The Grant	case	(1998)
In 1995, Ms. Grant applied to her employer South‑West Trains (SWT) for travel 
concessions for her female partner, with whom she claimed to be in a stable 
relationship for over two years. SWT refused to allow the benefit sought, on the 
ground that for unmarried persons such concessions could be granted only for 
a partner of the opposite sex.63 Ms. Grant argued that this refusal constituted 
discrimination based on sex, prohibited by Article 119 EC Treaty (the present 
Article 157 TFEU) and Directive 75/11764 (later repealed by Directive 2006/54/EC65). 
She pointed out that ‘[…] her predecessor in the post, a man who had declared that he 
had had a meaningful relationship with a woman for over two years, had enjoyed the 
benefit which had been refused her.’66 Ms. Grant contended, next, that such a refusal 
constituted discrimination based on sexual orientation.67
Advocate General Elmer concluded that the refusal by Ms. Grant’s employer 
constituted direct discrimination on the basis of gender, which could not be 
justified.68 He disagreed with the argument put forward by the Commission that the 
case concerned the definition of a ‘common law spouse’ and was thus a family law 
issue which did not fall under the (then) EC Treaty.69 He answered the question if 
the discrimination could be justified by reference to the employer’s conception of 
morality, in the negative:
‘South‑West Train’s justification amounts, in reality, to nothing more than saying that 
on the basis of its own private conceptions of morality that employer wishes to set aside 
a fundamental principle of Community law in relation to some people because it does 
61 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L45/19 
and Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40.
62 Case C‑249/96 Grant v. South‑West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I‑621, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63.
63 Case C‑249/96 Grant v. South‑West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I‑621, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, para. 8.
64 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L45/19.
65 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23.
66 Case C‑249/96 Grant v. South‑West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I‑621, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, para. 9.
67 Idem, para. 18.
68 Case C‑249/96 Grant v. South‑West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I‑621, ECLI:EU:C:1997:449, Opinion of AG 
Elmer, paras. 26, 38 and 43.
69 Idem, para. 27. In para. 34 of his Opinion Elmer concluded: ‘Gender discrimination is […], in this case, 
not the result of family law legislation in the Member State in question and for that reason outside the 
scope of Community law.’







not care for their life style. Whether the private conceptions of morality held by the 
employer in question correspond to those prevalent in the United Kingdom or not must 
be irrelevant in this connection. Under the Treaty it is the rule of law in the Community 
that the Court must safeguard; it is not its task to watch over questions of morality either 
in the individual Member States or in the Community, nor does it have any practical 
possibility of or political mandate for doing so. If a choice should have to be made in the 
Community between various views of morality that must be a task for the Community’s 
political institutions, and hence it is for the legislature to make such choices by way of 
treaty or Community legislation.’70
The CJEU took a somewhat different approach in this case. It ruled that the refusal 
by Ms. Grant’s employer to allow travel concessions to her same‑sex partner, did 
not constitute prohibited discrimination.71 The Court held, firstly, that the condition 
imposed by the employer’s regulations applied ‘in the same way to female and male 
workers’ and could therefore not be regarded as constituting discrimination directly 
based on sex.72 The Court next considered whether, with respect to the application 
of a condition such as that imposed by Ms. Grant’s employer, persons who had a 
stable relationship with a partner of the same sex were in the same situation as those 
who were married or had a stable relationship outside marriage with a different‑sex 
partner. It took note of the fact that the European Parliament had declared that it 
deplored all forms of discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation,73 
but also noted that the Community had, at the time, not adopted ‘rules providing 
for such equivalence’.74 The CJEU furthermore took into account that most Member 
States either treated cohabitation by two persons of the same sex as equivalent to a 
stable same‑sex relationship outside marriage only with respect to a limited number 
of rights, or did not recognise such cohabitation in any particular way.75 Lastly, the 
CJEU referred to the case law of the ECtHR and the ECmHR, which at the time had 
not (yet) ruled that stable homosexual relationships fell within the scope of the right 
to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR and who had interpreted the right to 
70 Idem, paras. 40–41.
71 Following Grant the English High Court withdrew its reference in the Perkins case (Case C‑168/97, 
R. v. Secretary of State for Defence, ex parte Perkins), concerning the discharge of persons from the 
armed forces of a Member State on account of their sexual orientation. See M. Bell, ‘Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination in Employment; An Evolving Role for the European Union’, in: R. Wintemute and 
M. Andenæs (ed.), Legal Recognition of Same‑Sex Partnerships, A Study of National, European and 
International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2001) p. 653 at p. 653.
72 Case C‑249/96, Grant v. South‑West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I‑621, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, para. 28. McInnes 
called this argument flawed, for failing to recognise ‘that the terms “opposite‑sex” and “same‑sex” are 
in themselves sex‑base criteria’. J. McInnes, ‘Case note to Case C249/ 96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. 
South West Trains Ltd, Judgment of the Full Court of 17 February 1998, [1998] ECR I636’, 36 CMLRev 
(1999) p. 1043 at p. 1049. See pp. 1050–1053 on the discussion whether discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation is a species of sex discrimination.
73 Case C‑249/96 Grant v. South‑West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I‑621, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, para. 31.The 
CJEU did not refer to any specific EP Resolution or document.
74 Idem, para. 31.
75 Idem, para. 32.







marry of Article 12 ECHR as applying only to the traditional marriage between two 
persons of different biological sex.76
On these grounds, the CJEU concluded that in the state of the law within the 
Community at the time, stable relationships between two persons of the same sex 
were not regarded as equivalent to marriages or stable relationships outside marriage 
between persons of different sex.77 The Court held it to be ‘[…] for the legislature 
alone to adopt, if appropriate, measures which may affect that position.’78 The Court 
further rejected Ms. Grant’s submission that differences of treatment based on 
sexual orientation were included in the ‘discrimination based on sex’ as prohibited 
by Article 119 EC Treaty (now 157 TFEU).79 It ruled that Community law as it stood 
at the time did not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation. In this respect 
the Court noted, however, that the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999)80 – which had not yet 
entered into force at the time81 – provided for a Union competence in this respect.82
9.3.2.	 The	inclusion	of	sexual	orientation	in	the	Treaties	in	1999
Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council is competent – on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament – to ‘[…] take appropriate 
action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation.’ The inclusion of this ‘enabling clause’83 – at the 
time Article 13 EC Treaty and presently Article 19 TFEU – was preceded by various 
discussions.84 It has, for example, been reported that the Dutch Presidency at a certain 
moment suggested dropping the reference to, inter alia, sexual orientation, as it was 
76 Idem, paras. 33–34. The ECtHR later ruled in the case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (2010) that 
same‑sex couples enjoy a right to respect for family life (see ch. 8 section 8.2.2.2).
77 Idem, para. 35. McInnes argued that the CJEU’s discussion of the equivalence of same‑sex and 
opposite‑sex relationship could, implicitly be seen as ‘one centred on morality’. McInnes 1999, supra 
n. 72, at p. 1053.
78 Case C‑249/96 Grant v. South‑West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I‑621, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, para. 36.
79 This position was also taken by the European Commission. The Commission submitted, however, that 
the discrimination of which Ms. Grant complained was based not on her sexual orientation but on the 
fact that she was not living as a couple or with a spouse, and that therefore the difference of treatment 
applied by the regulations of her employer was not contrary to Article 119 ECT Treaty. Case C‑249/96 
Grant v. South‑West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I‑621, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, para. 23.
80 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts [1997] OJ C340/1.
81 The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999.
82 Case C‑249/96 Grant v. South‑West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I‑621, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, para. 48. By 
some this was perceived as ‘a sign of judicial deference to the Member States’. McInnes 1999, supra 
n. 72, at p. 1055. The author explains that ‘[i]n choosing to keep Article 13 as an enabling provision, as 
opposed to a judicially enforceable right to non‑discrimination, the Member States have made it clear 
that they do not wish to relinquish their sovereignty. If, and only if, all the Member States agree will 
action be taken. Consequently, had the Court in Grant interpreted the existing law in such a way as to 
include sexual orientation discrimination, it would have been acting in defiance of the Member States.’
83 McInnes 1999, supra n. 72, at p. 1056.
84 According to McInnes, ‘[t]he disagreements during the IGC as to the actual grounds of protection in 
Article 13 are indicative of how controversial this area is and how difficult it is going to be to achieve 
the support of all the Member States.’ McInnes 1999, supra n. 72, at p. 1056, referring (in footnote 58), 







feared that its inclusion would prevent the clause from being accepted at all.85 This 
suggestion was not, in the end, accepted by the Intergovernmental Conference.86 
Bell concluded that ‘[o]ne of the important lessons from the negotiation of Article 13 
EC [was] the possibility of advancing sexual orientation issues when placed in the 
context of wider anti‑discrimination law reform.’87
The adoption of the new Article 13 EC Treaty was at the time perceived as ‘[a]n 
important, but largely symbolic step’.88 This is because the Council can only act 
unanimously,89 and because the provision has no direct effect.90 Nevertheless, soon 
after its creation, the new competence was employed. As Bell has explained, the 
European Commission ‘[k]een to build upon the existing momentum […] swiftly 
committed itself to proposing anti‑discrimination legislation founded on the new 
competence.’91 The two most prominent instruments adopted since Article 13 was 
included in the EC Treaty, are the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC)92 
and the Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC).93 While the latter has no significant 
relevance for the present case study on same‑sex relationships, interesting cases 
on the application of the Employment Equality Directive in situations concerning 
same‑sex relationships have come before the CJEU.
to: ‘NonPaper No. 6, Fundamental Rights and Non Discrimination, Conference of the Representatives 
of the Governments of the Member States, Secretariat, Brussels, 26 Feb. 1997, Conf/3827/97.’
85 See McInnes 1999, supra n. 72, at p. 1056.
86 L. Flynn, ‘The implications of article 13 EC – after Amsterdam, will some forms of discrimination be 
more equal than others?’, 36 CMLRev (1999) p. 117 at p. 132, referring (in footnote 18) to ‘Kingston, 
“Fundamental rights and non‑discrimination in the Treaty of Amsterdam”, in Tonra (ed.), Legal and 
Constitutional Implications of the Amsterdam Treaty (Institute of European Affairs, 1997), p. 49, 53.’
87 Bell 2001, supra n. 71, at p. 676.
88 K. Waaldijk, ‘Towards the Recognition of Same‑Sex Partners in EU law’, in: R. Wintemute and 
M. Andenæs (ed.), Legal Recognition of Same‑Sex Partnerships, A Study of National, European and 
International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2001) p. 635 at p. 648. Also McInnes expected in 1999 that 
Art. 13 EC Treaty would ‘prove to be of greater symbolic that practical value.’ McInnes 1999, supra 
n. 72, at p. 1057.
89 The present Art. 19(1) TFEU reads: ‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and 
within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously 
in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’
90 As Guild has explained, the provision ‘clearly lacks sufficient clarity, precision and unconditionality’. 
E. Guild, ‘Free Movement and Same‑Sex Relationships’, in: R. Wintemute and M. Andenæs (ed.), 
Legal Recognition of Same‑Sex Partnerships, A Study of National, European and International Law 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing 2001) p. 677 at p. 687. See also P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU law, Text, cases 
and materials, 5th edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2011) p. 868.
91 Bell 2001, supra n. 71, at p. 655, referring to ‘Commission, “An action plan against racism”, COM 
(1998) 183 (25 April 1998), at para. 2.2.2’.
92 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16.
93 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22. In 2008 the Commission furthermore 
made a proposal for a Council Directive which aims to implement the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation outside the labour 
market. This proposal and its implications for the present case study are discussed in section 9.3.4.1 
below.







9.3.3. The Employment Equality Directive and relevant case law
The Employment Equality Directive put in place a general framework to ensure the 
equal treatment of individuals in the European Union, regardless of their religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, as regards access to employment or 
occupation and membership of certain organisations.94 It was held that discrimination 
on the aforementioned grounds could undermine the achievement of the EU’s 
objectives, ‘[…] in particular the attainment of a high level of employment and social 
protection, raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity, and the free movement of persons.’95 The Directive covers 
matters like harassment96 and indirect discrimination,97 and has been received as 
‘[…] a significant advantage for lesbian and gay rights within European Union law’.98
Of particular interest for the present research is Recital No. 22 in the Preamble to the 
Directive, which reads:
‘This Directive is without prejudice to national laws on marital status and the benefits 
dependent thereon.’
The interpretation and legal status of this text was at stake in three prominent CJEU 
judgments concerning same‑sex couples, namely Maruko (2008),99 Römer (2011) 
and Hay (2013).100 The discussion of these three judgments hereafter will make clear 
that neither Directive 2000/78, nor the Court’s case law, require Member States to 
introduce a form of registered partnership.101 As Tobler and Waaldijk have made 
clear, ‘[u]nder the constitutional framework set up by the […] Treaty the Member 
States retain the competence to decide on the forms of civil status that are available 
under their national legal system.’102 However, once they introduce an alternative 
form of registration, States must observe the principle of equal treatment, so the case 
law shows.
94 See www.europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/employment_rights_
and_work_organisation/c10823_en.htm, visited July 2013.
95 Recital 11 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
96 Art. 2(3) Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
97 Art. 2(2)(b) Council Directive 2000/78/EC describes indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation as the situation ‘[…] where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put 
persons having […] a particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other 
persons unless: […] that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and 
the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary […].’
98 Bell 2001, supra n. 71, at p. 675.
99 Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:179.
100 Case C‑147/08 Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I‑3591, ECLI:EU:C:2011:286. 
Since both Maruko and Römer concerned a preliminary reference by a German Court, reference is also 
made to discussion of these cases and their follow‑up in the German legal order in ch.10, section 10.3.4.
101 C. Tobler and K. Waaldijk, ‘Case note to Case C‑267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der 
deutschen Bühnen, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 1 April 2008’, 46 
CMLRev (2009) p. 743.
102 Idem.







9.3.3.1. The Maruko judgment (2008)
The principal question in Maruko was whether Directive 2000/78/EC precluded 
regulations governing a supplementary pension scheme under which, after the 
death of his registered partner, the surviving partner did not receive a survivor’s 
benefit equivalent to that granted to a surviving spouse, even though he had lived 
in a union of mutual support and assistance which had been formally constituted 
for life.103 In its judgment of 1 April 2008 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU ruled 
that an occupational pension scheme as the one at issue in the Maruko case, was 
indeed precluded if, under national law, civil partnership placed persons of the same 
sex in a situation comparable to that of spouses so far as that survivor’s benefit was 
concerned.104 The CJEU left it up to the referring court to determine in a concrete 
case whether such comparability of situations could be found.105
Mr. Maruko and the Commission had qualified the refusal to grant a widower’s 
pension to Mr. Maruko as indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, 
because two persons of the same sex could not marry in Germany and, consequently, 
could not qualify for the widower’s pension, a benefit that was reserved to surviving 
spouses.106 In their opinion, surviving civil partners had to be granted the widower’s 
pension, because spouses and civil partners were in a comparable legal situation.107 
Advocate General Ruiz‑Jarabo Colomer adopted a similar line of reasoning108 and 
held in this respect:
103 The discussion here will focus on the third and fourth questions as posed by the referring court. The 
third question focussed in particular at compatibility of the pension scheme with Art. 1 in conjunction 
with Art. 2(2)(a) of 2000/78/EC. The preliminary questions as to (other elements of) the scope of the 
Directive and the temporal aspect of the matter, will not be discussed here.
104 Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:179.
105 As further explained in Ch. 10, the CJEU noted in its judgment that the referring court itself had 
acknowledged that in Germany a ‘harmonisation between marriage and life partnership’ took place, 
which could be regarded as ‘a gradual movement towards recognising equivalence’ and that therefore 
registered civil partnership, while not identical to marriage, placed persons of the same sex in a 
situation comparable to that of spouses as far as the survivor’s benefit was concerned. Idem, para. 69.
106 Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, para. 63.
107 H. Graupner, ‘Comparing people or institutions? Sexual Orientation Discrimination and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union’, in: K. Boele‑Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal recognition of same‑sex 
Relationships in Europe, National, cross‑border and European perspectives, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 
Intersentia 2012) p. 271 at p. 275. As Graupner explains (on pp. 275–276) ‘[t]his conclusion was […] 
made under the assumption that, under national law, a registered partnership is equivalent to a marriage 
[…]. Accepting such an assumption would lead to the strange, and perhaps even somewhat absurd, 
result that the lesser discrimination exhibited in Member States with a marriage‑equivalent registered 
partnership would be outlawed, whereas the (arguably) more serious discrimination (prevalent in 
Member States without registered partnership or with a form of registered partnership inferior to 
marriage) would remain admissible. This would be the result notwithstanding that in both cases the 
parties involved were subjected to the same kind of unequal treatment.’
108 According to the AG, Mr. Maruko had been refused a survivor’s pension ‘[…] because he was not 
married to his partner and [was] not a ‘widower’, a status which [was] restricted by law to the spouse 
of the deceased, and because there [was] no evidence that such a pension [had] been granted to other 
individuals in identical or analogous situations.’ Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt 







‘[…] it is not for the Court to define emotional relationships between persons of the same 
sex, a matter which is the subject of fierce debate, […] or to rule on the effects which the 
legislation of each Member State attributes to the registration of such partnerships. […] 
[It] is not a question of developing “European matrimonial law” but of ensuring that the 
principle that there should be no discrimination […] is fully effective […].’109
In legal scholarship it had been likewise anticipated that the CJEU would find 
indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in a Maruko type of 
case.110 It therefore came as a surprise to many that the CJEU established direct 
discrimination on this ground, instead.111 The CJEU’s approach has been welcomed 
by some, although it was regretted that the Court gave little explanation for its 
approach.112 The CJEU was indeed brief on this point: it reiterated the definitions of 
direct and indirect discrimination as laid down in Article 2 of the Directive113 and 
proceeded by examining the relevant German national law. It observed a gradual 
harmonisation between marriage and life partnership under German law and it 
concluded as follows:
‘If the referring court decides that surviving spouses and surviving life partners are in a 
comparable situation so far as concerns that survivor’s benefit, legislation such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings must, as a consequence, be considered to constitute direct 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2(2)
(a) of Directive 2000/78.’114
der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, ECLI:EU:C:2007:486, Opinion of AG Ruiz‑Jarabo Colomer, 
para. 96.
109 Idem, para. 98, referring (in footnote 96) to D. and Sweden v. Council and Moliner Navarro, R.M., 
‘El matrimonio de personas del mismo sexo en el Derecho comparado’, Matrimonio y adopción por 
personas del mismo sexo, Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial, no XXVI/2005, Consejo General del Poder 
Judicial, Madrid, 2006, p. 221 et seq.; (in footnote 97) to ‘Alonso Herreros, D., ‘Funcionamiento y 
eficacia de los Registros de uniones civiles de hecho en España y en otros países europeos’, Cuadernos 
de derecho público, no 15, January‑April 2002, p. 103 et seq.’ and to Case C‑117/01 K.B [2004] ECR 
I‑541, ECLI:EU:C:2007:486, Opinion of AG Ruiz‑Jarabo Colomer.
110 K. Waaldijk, ‘Case note to ECJ (GC) judgment of 1 April 2008 in Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko/
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen’ (in Dutch), 9 European Human Rights Cases 2008/65, 
who explains that most scholars anticipated indirect discrimination (Waaldijk referred to Bell 2001, 
supra n. 71, at p. 668 and ‘K. Waaldijk & M. Bonini‑Baraldi, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in 
the European Union, Den Haag: Asser 2006, p. 42 en 115–117’), while some saw legal ground for 
finding direct discrimination (Waaldijk referred to Bell 2001, supra n. 71, at p. 668; Waaldijk 2001B, 
supra n. 88, at p. 645; H. Ytterberg, ‘Sweden’, in: K. Waaldijk & M. Bonini‑Baraldi, Combating 
sexual orientation discrimination in employment (Leiden, Universiteit Leiden 2004) pp. 459–460 and 
R. Wintemute, ‘United Kingdom’, in: Waaldijk & Bonini‑Baraldi 2004, p. 495).
111 Direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is described in Art. 2(a) Directive 2000/78/EC 
as a situation ‘[…] where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be 
treated in a comparable situation, on […] grounds [of sexual orientation]’.
112 Tobler and Waaldijk 2009, supra n. 101, at pp. 736–737.
113 Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, para. 66.
114 Idem, para. 72.







Others considered the CJEU’s decision to treat the case as a case of direct 
discrimination problematic.115 There has been criticism of the fact that the logic was 
only applicable in States that had introduced a form of legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships comparable to marriage.116 This involved a risk of ‘differing approaches 
to comparability’117 and some even called this a ‘circular’ reasoning.118 Others noted 
that with this reasoning the CJEU strengthened citizens’ rights, while displaying 
‘[…] some respect for the constitutional differences between the Member States 
regarding same‑sex relations.’119 It has furthermore been observed that the Court 
opted for a finding of direct discrimination in Maruko ‘[…] in order to exclude the 
objective justification argument of fostering marriage, that had been accepted by the 
German courts on the basis of Article 6 of the German Constitution.’120
The referring court had also asked if – in the case that discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation was found – such discrimination was permissible by virtue of 
Recital 22 to the Directive, following which the Directive, as noted above, was held to 
be ‘[…] without prejudice to national laws on marital status and the benefits dependent 
thereon’. Both Mr. Maruko and the Commission asserted that the content of this 
Recital was not reflected in any of the enacting terms of the Directive.121 According 
to the Commission, the Recital did ‘[…] no more than state that the European Union 
lack[ed] competence in matters regarding civil status.’122 AG Ruiz‑Jarabo Colomer 
concurred that the Recital had no binding force and ‘merely’ assisted ‘with the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Directive’. He held that its significance was 
not to be overstated.123 The employer of Mr. Maruko’s deceased partner and the 
115 M. Moschel, ‘Germany’s Life Partnerships: Separate and Unequal’, 16 Colum. J. Eur. L. (2009–2010) 
p. 37 at p. 44 and J. Mulder, ‘Some More Equal than Others? Matrimonial Benefits and the CJEU’s Case 
Law on Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation’, 19 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law (2012) p. 505.
116 Moschel observed that the case brought ‘[…] no relief for nationals of Member States where the 
Member State [had] not provided for any legal recognition for same‑sex relationships, as in those 
cases no comparison between similar situations [was] possible since no institution similar or parallel to 
marriage exist[ed].’ Idem, at p. 44.
117 Idem, at p. 44.
118 J. Cornides, ‘Three Case Studies on Anti‑Discrimination’, 23 European Journal of International Law 
(2012) p. 517 at p. 523.
119 H. de Waele and A. van der Vleuten, ‘Judicial Activism in the European Court of Justice – The Case of 
LGBT Rights’, 19 Mich. St. U. Coll. L. J. Int’l L. (2010–2011) p. 639 at p. 662. Compare A. Eriksson, 
‘European Court of Justice: Broadening the Scope of European Nondiscrimination Law [notes]’, 7 
International Journal of Constitutional Law (2009) p. 731 at p. 744.
120 Tobler and Waaldijk 2009, supra n. 101, at p. 736, referring (in footnote 23) to ‘Lembke, ‘Sind an 
die Ehe geknüpfte Leistungen des Arbeitgebers auch an Lebenspartner zu gewähren? ’, (2008) NJW 
p. 1631 at p. 1633’.
121 Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, para. 38. See also Tobler and Waaldijk 2009, supra n. 101, at p. 731.
122 Mr. Maruko asserted that ‘[…] if the Community legislature had wanted to exclude all benefits bound 
up with civil status from the scope of Directive 2000/78, the content of that recital would have been 
the subject of a particular provision among the enacting terms of the Directive.’ Case C‑267/06 Tadao 
Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, 
para. 38.
123 Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:486, Opinion of AG Ruiz‑Jarabo Colomer, para. 76.







intervening United Kingdom government argued instead that on the basis of Recital 
22, provisions of national law relating to civil status or to benefits dependent on 
that status, were excluded from the scope of the Directive.124 The CJEU did not 
adopt this reasoning and ruled that Recital 22 could not affect the application of the 
Directive.125 It acknowledged that civil status and the benefits flowing therefrom 
were ‘[…] matters which [fell] within the competence of the Member States and 
Community law [did] not detract from that competence’. It also recalled, however, 
that ‘[…] in the exercise of that competence the Member States [had to] comply with 
Community law and, in particular, with the provisions relating to the principle of 
non‑discrimination’.126 On this ground, Tobler and Waaldijk called this an important 
case in the context of division of competences between the EU (at the time the EC) 
and the Member States, in particular in relation to civil status.127 They argued that
‘[…] the fact that the Treaty does not give the EC an explicit competence in a given 
field, thereby leaving it with the Member States, does not mean that EC law from other 
areas – either on the level of Treaty provisions or that of secondary law – cannot apply 
in this field. Put differently, the Member States’ competences are not “exclusive” in the 
sense that national legislation is immune from EC law. For the Member States, this may be 
difficult to accept, in particular where EC law touches upon fields that have traditionally 
been considered as Member State reserves, such as […] marriage.’128
Various other authors pointed out that the CJEU’s finding in respect of Recital 22 
was particularly important because the Recital had at the time been welcomed by 
Member States as providing strong protection for favourable treatment of spouses.129 
Bruns noted that States were still free to introduce an alternative registration form 
and to equalise this with marriage or not. However, once they decided to introduce 
such a registration or once they took the opportunity to equalise treatment, they were 
bound to observe the principle of equal treatment.130
124 Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, para. 39. As Tobler and Waaldijk explain, ‘[…] when implementing this 
Directive, at least three Member States (Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom) interpreted this recital 
as a basis allowing for more beneficial treatment of married partners.’ Tobler and Waaldijk 2009, supra 
n. 101, at p. 732, referring (in footnote 22) to C. Waaldijk and M. Bonini‑Baraldi, Sexual orientation 
discrimination in the European Union, National laws and the Employment Equality Directive (The 
Hague, TMC Asser Press 2006) p. 115.
125 Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, para. 60.
126 Idem, para. 59, under reference to Case C‑372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I‑4325, ECLI:EU:C:2006:325, 
para. 92 and Case C‑444/05 Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I‑3185, ECLI:EU:C:2007:231, para. 23.
127 Tobler and Waaldijk 2009, supra n. 101, at p. 723.
128 Idem, p. 735. In footnote 31 the authors explain: ‘Apart from the issue of competences, family law is a 
prime example of an area where EC law has an influence simply because of the frequent reference in 
EC law to concepts coming from this area; see e.g. Tobler, “Der Begriff der Ehe im EG‑Recht”, (2001) 
Die Praxis des Familienrechts, p. 479–499. More recently, see e.g. Art. 2 of Directive 2004/38/EC […].’
129 Moschel 2009, supra n. 116, at p. 42. See also Waele, de and Vleuten, van der 2011, supra n. 119, at 
p. 662.
130 M. Bruns, ‘Die Maruko‑Entscheidung im Spannungsfeld zwischen europäischer und nationaler 
Auslegung’, NJW (2008) p. 1929. Along similar lines, Eriksson observed that the finding of the Court 
meant that ‘[i]f the member states decide[d] to introduce a special civil status for homosexual couples, 







The subsequent Römer case (2011)131 ‘[…] provided the CJEU with the opportunity 
[…] to specify or even extend the scope of the Maruko‑judgment (and rule beyond 
comparability, on indirect discrimination).’132
9.3.3.2. The Römer judgment (2011)
The Grand Chamber of the CJEU ruled in Römer that a provision of national law 
under which a pensioner who had entered into a registered partnership received a 
supplementary retirement pension lower than that granted to a married pensioner 
could constitute discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, prohibited by 
Directive 2000/78.133 The Court held this to be the case if: (1) in the Member State 
concerned, marriage is reserved to persons of different sex and exists alongside a 
registered partnership which is reserved to persons of the same sex; and (2) there 
is direct discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation because, under national 
law, that registered partner is in a legal and factual situation comparable to that of 
a married person as regards that pension. The Court, like it had done in Maruko, 
left it to the referring court to assess the comparability of situations.134 This time it 
gave more guidelines, however, and made clear that this assessment should focus 
‘[…] on the respective rights and obligations of spouses and persons in a registered 
partnership, as governed within the corresponding institutions, which are relevant 
taking account of the purpose of and the conditions for the grant of the benefit in 
question’.135
Other than Advocate General Jääskinen, the CJEU did not address the referring 
court’s question of whether, and under what conditions, an objective pursued by a 
Member State on the basis of a national constitutional norm, such as the protection 
of marriage, contained in Article 6(1) of the German Basic Law, could justify direct 
discrimination on ground of sexual orientation.136 In this respect, the CJEU merely 
noted, in line with its previous Maruko judgment that as European Union law stood 
at that point in time, legislation on the marital status of persons fell within the 
competence of the Member States.137
they [had to] do so in conformity with the principle of non discrimination as contained in Directive 
2000/78/EC and ensure that they [were] not discriminated against in the field of employment.’ 
A. Eriksson, ‘European Court of Justice: Broadening the Scope of European Nondiscrimination Law 
[notes]’, 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2009) p. 731 at pp. 745–746.
131 Case C‑147/08 Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I‑3591, ECLI:EU:C:2011:286.
132 Graupner 2012, supra n. 107, at p. 279. As Tobler and Waaldijk explained, it was, for example, ‘unclear 
whether, in countries without registered partnership, […] unregistered same‑sex partners challenging 
their exclusion from a marital benefit, should invoke the prohibition of direct sexual orientation 
discrimination or that of indirect sexual orientation discrimination.’ Tobler and Waaldijk 2009, supra 
n. 101, at p. 744.
133 In particular Art. 1 in conjunction with Arts. 2 and 3(1)(c).
134 Case C‑147/08 Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I‑3591, ECLI:EU:C:2011:286, 
para. 52.
135 Idem, para. 52.
136 As rephrased by the CJEU in idem, para. 37.
137 Idem, para. 38.







Advocate General Jääskinen had underlined that it was exclusively for States to 
decide if they provided in their national legal order for a legal union between partners 
of the same sex. The AG had been of the opinion that it constituted discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation if a State did not provide for any form of legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships. He had held that, on grounds of the principle 
of equal treatment in combination with the obligation to respect the human dignity of 
homosexuals, States had an obligation to provide for some form of legal recognition 
for same‑sex couples. Jääskinen had acknowledged, however, that this matter of 
civil law fell outside the scope of EU law.138 With respect to matters that fell within 
the scope of EU law, on the contrary, such as matters within the scope of the free 
movement rules or within the scope of the Employment Equality Directive, the AG 
had held a reference to national law concerning civil status to be insufficient as 
justification for an infringement of these rights.139 Jääskinen had questioned whether 
protection of the family and marriage could form a valid objective justification for 
indirect discrimination.140 In any case, he had not seen how the disputed rule could be 
necessary and proportionate to attain this interest, as there was no causal relationship 
between this type of discrimination as a means and the protection of marriage as 
possible beneficial effect of this discrimination.141 He had furthermore made a plea 
for the recognition of a general principle of EU law of non‑discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation (see section 9.3.4.2 below). On this point also Jääskinen was not 
followed by the CJEU.
Graupner observed that the Maruko and the Römer cases ultimately boiled down 
to the issue of deciding upon the comparative parameters.142 The author concluded 
that the Court’s case law made clear that ‘[p]eople (couples) [were] to be compared, 
not abstract legal institutions’.143 According to Graupner, the CJEU established an 
‘individual‑specific comparison’, whereby comparability has to be established in the 
light of the benefit concerned.144 This line of reasoning was continued and even taken 
one step further in Hay (2013).145
9.3.3.3. The Hay judgment (2013)
The Hay case was not – unlike Maruko and Römer – decided by a Grand Chamber, 
and no Advocate General delivered an Opinion in this case. The CJEU held in this 
138 Case C‑147/08 Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I‑3591, ECLI:EU:C:2010:425, 
Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para. 76.
139 Idem, para. 77.
140 Idem, paras. 109–110. In para. 175 of his Opinion, the AG was even firmer in holding that it went without 
saying ‘[…] that the aim of protecting marriage or the family [could not] legitimise discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation.’ The AG found it ‘[…] difficult to imagine what causal relationship could 
unite that type of discrimination, as grounds, and the protection of marriage, as a positive effect that 
could derive from it.’
141 Idem, paras. 109–111.
142 Graupner 2012, supra n. 107, at p. 276.
143 Idem, at p. 281.
144 Idem, at pp. 276 and 280.
145 Case C‑267/12 Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente‑Maritime et des Deux‑Sèvres 
[2013] ECR 0000, ECLI:EU:C:2013:823.







case that partners who had concluded a civil solidarity pact under French law (Pacte 
civil de solidarité (PACS)) were in a comparable situation with spouses in respect of 
benefits that were granted under a national collective agreement to employees on the 
occasion of their marriage, such as days of special leave and a salary bonus.146 Not 
granting an employee such benefits upon the occasion of the conclusion of a civil 
solidarity pact, constituted direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
in breach of Directive 2000/78, the Court held. Thereby it was relevant that under 
French law at the time same‑sex couples had no access to marriage, rendering the 
PACS ‘[…] the only possibility under French law for same‑sex couples to procure 
legal status for their relationship which could be certain and effective against third 
parties.’147 Because marriage was not open to same‑sex couples, it was impossible 
for homosexual employees to meet the condition required for obtaining the benefit 
claimed, and they were thus directly discriminated against on grounds of sexual 
orientation.148 The fact that the French PACS was open to both different‑sex and 
same‑sex partners and the fact that there were general differences between the 
systems governing marriage and the PACS arrangement – for example with respect 
to the reciprocal obligations under property law, succession law and law relating to 
parenthood – did not alter that conclusion. The Court summarised its position in this 
regard as follows:
‘[…] as regards benefits in terms of pay or working conditions, such as days of special 
leave and a bonus like those at issue in the main proceedings, granted at the time of an 
employee’s marriage – which is a form of civil union – persons of the same sex who cannot 
enter into marriage and therefore conclude a PACS are in a situation which is comparable 
to that of couples who marry.’149
The CJEU thus by itself examined the question of comparability, instead of leaving 
this matter to the referring court, as it had done in both Maruko and Römer. 
Moreover, for the first time the Court also addressed the question of justification. As 
it had found that there was direct discrimination, this could only be upheld if one of 
the justification grounds of Article 2(5) of Directive 2000/78 applied, namely public 
security, the maintenance of public order and the prevention of criminal offences, 
the protection of health and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. By 
finding that none of these grounds had been relied upon in the main proceedings and 
stressing that Article 2(5) had to be interpreted strictly, the Court implied that the 
discrimination could not be justified.150
146 The Court reiterated that such an assessment of comparability had to be carried out ‘not in a global 
and abstract manner, but in a specific and concrete manner in the light of the benefit concerned’. Idem, 
para. 33.
147 Idem, para. 36.
148 Idem, para. 44.
149 Idem, para. 37.
150 Idem, para. 46.








9.3.4.1. Proposed horizontal Equal Treatment Directive
Under the present EU legal framework, discrimination based on sexual orientation 
is prohibited only in employment, occupation and vocational training (see above). In 
2008 the Commission proposed a new Council Directive based on Article 19 TFEU, 
which would apply outside the field of employment.151 The proposed Directive was 
aimed to combat discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation152 in respect of social protection (including social security and health care), 
social advantages, education and access to and supply of goods and services which 
are available to the public, including housing.153 Because of this ‘broad‑brush’154 
approach many doubted whether the proposal would receive the required unanimity 
in the Council.155
It has been submitted that in respect of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, 
the proposed Directive could imply ‘a setback’.156 The original proposal clearly held 
that the Directive was to be without prejudice to national laws on marital or family 
status, adoption and reproductive rights.157 The Explanatory Memorandum explained 
in this respect:
‘The diversity of European societies is one of Europe’s strengths, and is to be respected 
in line with the principle of subsidiarity. Issues such as the organisation and content of 
education, recognition of marital or family status, adoption, reproductive rights and other 
similar questions are best decided at national level. The Directive does not therefore 
require any Member State to amend its present laws and practices in relation to these 
issues.’158
151 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’, COM (2008) 
426 final, 2008/0140 (CNS). See also L.B. Waddington, ‘Future Prospects for EU Equality Law. 
Lessons to be Learnt from the Proposed Equal Treatment Directive’, 17 European Law Review (2011) 
p. 163.
152 Art. 1 of the Proposed Directive.
153 Art. 3 of the Proposed Directive.
154 M. Bell, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment; widening and deepening’, in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca, 
The evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2011) p. 611 at p. 620.
155 Waddington 2011, supra n. 151, at pp. 163–164 and Bell 2011, supra n. 154, at p. 620.
156 B. Verschraegen, ‘The Right to Private and Family Life, the Right to Marry and to Found a Family, 
and the Prohibition of Discrimination’, in: K. Boele‑Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal recognition 
of same‑sex Relationships in Europe, National, cross‑border and European perspectives, 2nd edn. 
(Cambridge, Intersentia 2012) p. 255 at p. 268.
157 Art. 3(2) of the Proposed Directive. See also Recital No. 17 of the Preamble to the Proposed Directive 
which reads: ‘While prohibiting discrimination, it is important to respect other fundamental rights 
and freedoms, including the protection of private and family life and transactions carried out in that 
context, the freedom of religion, and the freedom of association. This Directive is without prejudice to 
national laws on marital or family status, including on reproductive rights. […]’. ‘Family status’ was 
held to include adoption. COM (2008) 426 final, p. 8.
158 COM (2008) 426 final, p. 6.







An amendment by the European Parliament provided more neutrally that the Directive 
would not ‘[…] alter the division of competences between the European Union and 
its Member States.’159 It was furthermore explicitly held in the Memorandum that 
Member States remained ‘[…] free to decide whether or not to institute and recognise 
legally registered partnerships.’160 The Explanatory Memorandum also underlined 
however that once national law recognised such relationships as comparable to that 
of spouses, then the principle of equal treatment applied.161 The European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC) was very critical on this point.162 It acknowledged that 
marital status, family status and reproductive rights were matters on which Member 
States had competence to legislate, but did not accept that such competence was to 
‘[…] wholly negate EU‑wide legal protections against discrimination.’163 The EESC 
believed that Article 3(2) as a whole had to be reconsidered, whereby ‘any final 
formulation’ had to state that ‘[…] national laws relating to marital status, family 
status or reproductive rights [had to] be implemented without discrimination against 
any persons on any of the grounds within the Directive.’164 The Directive was debated 
for a number of years and in 2011 the legislative process stagnated.165 The division 
of competences, the overall scope of the Directive and subsidiarity were deemed 
159 The accompanying Recital 17 was changed into: ‘While prohibiting discrimination, it is important 
to respect other fundamental rights and freedoms, including the freedom of religion, the freedom 
of association, freedom of expression and freedom of the press. This Directive is without prejudice 
to the secular nature of the State, state institutions or bodies, or education. This Directive does not 
alter the division of competences between the European Union and its Member States, including 
in the area of marital and family law and health law.’ European Parliament legislative resolution 
of 2 April 2009 on the proposal for a Council directive on implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation 
(COM(2008)0426 – C6‑0291/2008 – 2008/0140(CNS)) [2010] OJ C 137E/68, Amendments 28 and 50.
160 COM (2008) 426 final, p. 8. See also the Commission, ‘Staff working document accompanying the 
proposal for a Council directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation – Impact assessment (COM(2008) 
426 final)’, SEC (2011) 328 final where it was held (at p. 6) that the new Directive ‘[…] would only 
prohibit discrimination in the areas that fall within EC competence, so would not affect […] questions 
of marital status (e.g. same sex partnerships/marriages) or family law (e.g. adoption) […]’.
161 COM (2008) 426 final, p. 8, referring (in footnote 21) to Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. 
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179.
162 European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion on the ‘Proposal for a Council directive on 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation’’, COM (2008) 426 final (Additional opinion) [2009] OJ C182/19.
163 Idem, para. 3.2.2.1. In para. 3.2.2.2, the EESC referred (in footnote 9) to Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko 
v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, para. 59.
164 Idem, para. 3.2.2.5.
165 The European Parliament declared in a 2012 Resolution to remain committed to the adoption 
of the Directive, which, so it was noted, had been blocked ‘due to the objections of some Member 
States’. European Parliament resolution of 24 May 2012 on the fight against homophobia in Europe 
(2012/2657(RSP)) P7_TA(2012)0222). The EU Fundamental Rights Agency has also held that ‘[e]qual 
protection against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation across all EU Member States 
would significantly improve if the EU‑wide prohibition of such discrimination extended beyond the field 
of employment and occupation’. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, EU LGBT survey, 
European Union lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender survey, Results at a glance (Luxembourg, 
Publications Office of the European Union 2013) p. 12, online available at www.fra.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/eu‑lgbt‑survey‑results‑at‑a‑glance_en.pdf, visited June 2014.







amongst the pressing issues around which further discussion was considered to be 
needed.166
9.3.4.2. Non‑discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation as a general principle 
of EU law?
As discussed above, Advocate General Jääskinen held in his Opinion to the Römer 
case (2011) that non‑discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was a general 
principle of EU law, on the same footing as non‑discrimination on grounds of age.167 
From a pure legal viewpoint the AG held there to be no justification for a weaker 
protection of the principle of equal treatment in situations of discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation, when compared to the other prohibited grounds in 
Article 19 TFEU. Jääskinen held that if the CJEU recognised the existing sensitivities 
in this regard, it would attach value to unjustified prejudices, irrespective of their 
origin, and it would withhold members of a minority equal legal protection.168 While 
the CJEU did not follow up this point, Graupner concluded that it was implicit in 
the CJEU judgment in Römer, that the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation was a general principle of Union law.169 It is questionable, however, 
if this conclusion really can be drawn from the Court’s ruling in that case.
9.4. lgbt rIghts In the eu’s fundAmentAl rIghts AgendA
LGBT rights take a prominent place on the EU’s fundamental rights agenda. The 
reach of Union action in respect of fundamental rights is, however, limited to those 
areas in which the EU has competences under the Treaties. For the present case 
study the EU’s competences in respect of the internal market (Articles 26 and 115(1) 
TFEU) and equal treatment (Article 19 TFEU) as discussed above, are most relevant.
Since 2010, the Commission has monitored the implementation of the EU 
Fundamental Rights Charter.170 It, inter alia, sees to it that the prohibition on 
166 Press release 3131st Council meeting Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs, Brussels, 
1 and 2 December 2011, 17943/1/11 REV 1, PRESSE 471, PR CO 75. The Dutch Government, for example, 
took the position that States had to be left as much room for making their own policy decisions in these 
matters. It held that access to social protection and education were matters to be regulated at national 
level. Inventarisatie EU‑regelgeving op subsidiariteit en proportionaliteit – Nederlandse lijst van 
actiepunten [Inventory of EU regulation with a view to subsidiarity and proportionality – Netherlands 
list of action points], p. 14, point 50.
167 Case C‑147/08 Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I‑3591, ECLI:EU:C:2010:425, 
Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para. 131.
168 Idem, para. 129.
169 Graupner 2012, supra n. 107, at p. 281, referring (in footnote 52), to para. 59 of the judgment, where the 
Court held that Directive 2000/78 ‘[…] does not itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the 
field of employment and occupation, which derives from various international instruments and from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, but has the sole purpose of laying down, in 
that field, a general framework for combating discrimination on various grounds ‘[…], including sexual 
orientation.’
170 Commission, ‘Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the 
European Union (Communication)’, COM (2010) 573 final.







discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation under Article 21 of the Charter is 
applied systematically in the preparation, adoption and implementation of EU law.171 
In the 2010 annual report on the implementation of the Charter, the Commission 
reiterated its position that ‘[t]he benefits of EU rules guaranteeing free movement 
and residence apply also to same‑sex couples.’172 In the report of the following year, 
the Commission qualified homophobia as ‘incompatible with the founding values 
of the EU’ and held that it was using all the powers at its disposal to fight against 
this phenomenon. It explained that it ‘[…] followed‑up petitions and parliamentary 
questions on discriminatory practices on grounds of sexual orientation, when they 
concerned matters falling within EU competence.’173 One such case concerned 
the refusal of Polish authorities to issue certificates on civil status to citizens who 
wished to marry or conclude a registered partnership with a person of the same 
sex in a Member State where this was possible (see also section 9.6.3 below). The 
Commission furthermore implements ‘a comprehensive anti‑discrimination policy’ 
which includes the ‘funding of a communication campaign to inform citizens about 
their rights; funding of NGO networks fighting against discrimination faced by 
LGBT people in the EU; conducting studies and exchanging good practices related 
to these issues.’174
The Commission is not the only EU institution actively advocating for LGBT rights. 
Indeed, the European Parliament (EP) has been ‘[…] a principal driving force in 
bringing LGB rights onto the European political agenda.’175 From early on it has 
strongly condemned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and in its 
non‑binding Resolutions and Recommendations on the issue, the Parliament did not 
limit itself to those areas of law in which the EU has competences. For example, 
as early as 1994 the EP passed a resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and 
lesbians in the EC, in which it also appealed to the Commission to present a draft 
Recommendation, that as a minimum would seek to end, inter alia, the exclusion of 
same‑sex couples from access to marriage or from ‘an equivalent legal framework’, 
as well as ‘any restrictions on the rights of lesbians and homosexuals to be parents 
or to adopt or foster children’.176 More recently, in 2012, the Parliament explicitly 
called on Member States to provide same‑sex couples access to legal institutions 
such as cohabitation, registered partnership or marriage, as it considered that as a 
result their fundamental rights were ‘more likely to be safeguarded’.177 The freedom 
171 European Commission, 2010 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, p. 44, 
www.ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental‑rights/files/annual_report_2010_en.pdf, visited June 2014.
172 Idem, p. 44.
173 Idem, p. 52.
174 Www.ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental‑rights/homophobia/index_en.htm, visited June 2014.
175 Www.ilga‑europe.org/home/guide_europe/eu/lgbt_rights/european_parliament, visited June 2014.
176 European Parliament Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC, [1994] OJ 
C61/20, pp. 40–43.
177 European Parliament Resolution of 24 May 2012 on the fight against homophobia in Europe 
(2012/2657(RSP)) P7_TA(2012)0222, para. 9 and European Parliament resolution of 12 December 
2012 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union (2010–2011)(2011/2069(INI)), P7_
TA(2012)0500, para. 103.







of movement for same‑sex couples is further amongst the priorities of the European 
Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT rights.178
It was also the European Parliament that requested that the EU Fundamental Rights 
Agency (FRA) investigated LGBT discrimination and homophobia in the EU.179 
Since its foundation in 2007, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation has 
been one of the thematic areas in which the FRA carries out its tasks.180 The FRA 
has frequently reported on legislative and policy developments in the Member States 
on issues concerning LGBT rights that strictly speaking do not come within the EU’s 
competences, such as hate crimes and legal recognition of same‑sex couples.181 In 
the FRA’s annual report on 2012 it was explained in respect of the latter, that some 
EU citizens had claimed that there were obstacles to the right of free movement ‘as 
a result of either the absence of provisions on legal recognition of same‑sex couples 
or the lack of harmonisation throughout the EU.’ The agency held that ‘[d]espite 
the lack of direct EU competence in the area of family and private life, observing 
developments in this field help[ed] in understanding the application of the EU right 
to free movement for all, including same‑sex couples wishing to move between 
Member States.’182 The FRA has, inter alia, pled for the incorporation of same‑sex 
partners ‘whether married, registered, or in a de facto union’, within the definitions of 
‘family member’ in relevant areas of EU law, ‘[…] in particular employment related 
partner benefits, free movement of EU citizens, and family reunification of refugees 
and third‑country nationals’.183 The European Parliament subsequently called on the 
178 See www.lgbt‑ep.eu/work, visited June 2014. According to its website, the Intergroup is ‘[…] an informal 
forum for Members of the European Parliament who are committed to upholding the fundamental 
rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people.’ In August 2013 the Intergroup had 153 
Members.
179 European Parliament press release of 17 May 2013, REF 20130513IPR08207, 
w w w. e u r o p a r l . e u r o p a . e u / n e w s /e n / p r e s s r o o m /c o n t e n t / 2 013 0 513I PR0 8 2 0 7/ h t m l /
International‑Day‑against‑Homophobia‑MEPs‑react‑to‑LGBT‑survey‑findings, visited June 2014.
180 Council Decision of 28 February 2008 implementing Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 as regards the 
adoption of a Multi‑annual Framework for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for 
2007–2012 (2008/203/EC) [2008] OJ L 63/14 and Council Decision No 252/2013/EU of 11 March 2013 
establishing a Multiannual Framework for 2013–2017 for the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (252/2013/EU) [2013]OJ L 79/1.
181 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Comparative legal analysis (Luxembourg, Publications 
Office of the European Union 2008) online available at www.fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2010/
homophobia‑and‑discr iminat ion‑grounds‑sexual‑or ientat ion‑eu‑member‑states‑par t‑i , 
visited June 2014 and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Homophobia, 
transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Comparative legal analysis. 2010 update (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the 
European Union 2010), online available at www.fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2012/
homophobia‑transphobia‑and‑discrimination‑grounds‑sexual‑orientation‑and‑gender, visited 
June 2014.
182 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 
2012, Annual report 2012 (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union 2013) p. 155, online 
available at www.fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/annual‑report‑2012_en.pdf, visited June 2014.
183 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010, supra n. 181, at p. 9.







Commission and Member States to implement the relevant FRA opinions to the 
greatest possible extent.184
In 2013 the FRA conducted an online EU‑wide LGBT survey.185 On the basis of 
its results the FRA, inter alia, took the position that ‘[e]qual protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation across all EU Member States 
would significantly improve if the EU‑wide prohibition of such discrimination 
extended beyond the field of employment and occupation’, as proposed by the 
European Commission in its Proposal for an Equal Treatment Directive (see 9.3.4.1 
above). The Parliament called on the Commission to carefully examine the results 
of this survey, and to take ‘appropriate action’.186 The Parliament has also called 
on the Commission, Member States and relevant agencies ‘to work jointly on ‘a 
comprehensive multiannual policy’ to protect the fundamental rights of LGBT 
people, by means of ‘a roadmap, a strategy or an action plan’.187
9.5. cross‑border movement of rAInbow fAmIlIes In the eu; some 
stAtIstIcs
There are no exact and exhaustive EU‑wide statistics on the cross‑border movement 
of same‑sex couples within the EU. For example, there are no statistics available 
in respect of the number of same‑sex couples who go from one EU Member State 
to another to have their relationship legally recognised by means of a registered 
partnership or marriage. Nor are there any statistics available concerning the number 
of same‑sex couples, or individuals with a homosexual orientation, who are deterred 
from making use of their free movement rights, because of restrictive legislation in 
the host Member State. There are not even exhaustive and reliable numbers available 
regarding the number of same‑sex partners of EU citizens who were given entry and 
residence as a ‘family member’ under the Free Movement Directive when moving 
to another EU Member State (see section 9.6.2 below). Nevertheless, there are some 
statistics available that may give some context to the present case study.
According to Eurostat, 12.8 million EU citizens – accounting for 2.5 per cent of 
the total EU population – were living in another Member State in the year 2011.188 
In 2014 that number was held to have risen to nearly 14 million.189 Further, in 2011 
184 European Parliament Resolution of 24 May 2012 on the fight against homophobia in Europe 
(2012/2657(RSP)) P7_TA(2012)0222, para. 5.
185 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013B, supra n. 165.
186 Supra n. 184, para. 6.
187 European Parliament Resolution of 4 February 2014 on the EU Roadmap against homophobia and 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity (2013/2183(INI)).
188 Eurostat press release of 11 July 2012, STAT/12/105, online available at w w w.e u r o p a .e u /
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/12/105&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en, visited June 2014.
189 The European Commission held in 2014 that nearly 14 million EU citizens were residing in 
a Member State of which they were not a national. See European Commission, The Future 
EU Justice and Home Affairs Agendas: Questions and Answers, Memo of 11 March 2014, 
Strasbourg, online available at www.europa.eu/rapid/press‑release_MEMO‑14‑174_nl.htm, 







the Commission held that ‘[o]f the approximately 122 million marriages in the 
EU, around 16 million (13%) ha[d] […] a cross‑border dimension.’190 In respect of 
registered partnerships, the latest figures stem from 2007. In that year there were 
reportedly approximately 211,000 registered partnerships in the EU, of which over 
41,000 had an ‘international dimension’.191
These European figures are not broken down into same‑sex and different‑sex couples. 
One may, however, assume that the statistics on the number of marriages include at 
least some same‑sex marriages, as there are (increasingly more) EU Member States 
in which same‑sex couples have access to marriage. The registered partnership 
statistics presumably include an even higher number of same‑sex couples, as 
considerably more States provide for a registered partnership, where in most cases 
such a partnership is not open to different‑sex couples, but to same‑sex couples only. 
One would need statistics on the number of same‑sex couples in the EU to make an 
estimate of the potential number of people that are involved. Such statistics are not, 
however, available. Some have tried to estimate the number of rainbow families in 
the EU. ILGA‑Europe, for example, has estimated that within the EU at least 43,000 
children were growing in same‑sex families.192
In any case, even though no complete or exhaustive statistics are available, there 
is considerable anecdotal evidence which shows that cross‑border movement of 
same‑sex couples and their families is taking place within the EU.193
visited June 2014. In 2013, at the website of the European Commission (last updated 16 July 
2013), it was held that there were ‘around 16 million international couples in the EU including 
a certain number of same‑sex couples.’ See www.ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/orien 
tation/legal‑aspects/index_en.htm, visited July 2014.
190 In a 2014 Commission Communication it was held: ‘Of 2.4 million marriages celebrated in the EU in 
2007, about 300,000 fell into this category. So did 140,000 (13 per cent) of the 1,040,000 divorces that 
took place in the EU in the same year. In addition, 8,500 international couples in registered partnerships 
were dissolved by separation and 1 266 were ended by the death of one of the partners.’ Commission, 
‘Bringing Legal Clarity To Property Rights For International Couples’ (Communication), COM (2011) 
125 final, p. 2. See also Commission, ‘EU Citizenship Report 2010, Dismantling the obstacles to EU 
citizens’ rights’, COM (2010) 603 final, p. 5.
191 This international dimension included international registered partnerships and couples in a registered 
partnership who were living abroad or who were having property abroad. SEC (2011) 328 final. See 
also European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion on COM (2011) 126 final and COM (2011) 
127 final’ [2011] OJ C376/87.
192 ILGA‑Europe, ILGA‑Europe’s contribution to the Green Paper (ILGA‑Europe 2011) p. 19, online 
available at www.ilga‑europe.org/home/publications/policy_papers/green_paper_april_2011, visited 
June 2014. ILGA‑Europe refers (in footnotes 37 and 38 respectively) to: ‘E. Jansen, Gay and lesbian 
family planning in Germany: Options and constraints (2009)’ and ‘L. Hodson, The Rights of Children 
Raised in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual or Transgender Families: A European Perspective (2008)’.
193 For such anecdotal evidence reference is also made to Ch. 10, section 10.4.1; Ch. 11, section 11.4.1 and 
Ch. 12, section 12.4.1 respectively.







9.6. free movement lAw And rAInbow fAmIlIes – open questIons
While free movement of persons under the original EEC Treaty was limited to the 
economically active, i.e., the workers (Article 3(1)(c) EEC Treaty, now Article 45 
TFEU), this gradually has been extended to economically inactive EU citizens. 
Under the present Article 21 TFEU every citizen of the Union has the right ‘to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’.
Already at an early stage it was clear to the Union legislature that if an EU citizen’s 
(a worker’s) right to move were to be effective, he had to be allowed to be joined by 
his relatives. Since this right was not written expressly in the Treaty, it was laid down 
in secondary legislation (first Regulation 1612/68194 and later Directive 2004/38195). 
Once exercised, this right remains effective also upon return to the home State.196 
Although more recently, in line with a less economic‑oriented approach to citizenship, 
the rights of family members have increasingly been placed in the light of the right 
to respect for family life,197 these rights remain first and foremost instrumental to the 
right of free movement of the EU citizen. They are derived rights, which exist only 
by virtue of the EU citizen’s right of free movement and the family tie between him 
and his relative. Since the free movement rights are really rights of the EU citizen, 
the nationality of the family member is irrelevant. Further, the right of an EU citizen 
to be joined by his close relatives does not depend on a prior right of residence of 
these family members in the home Member State.198 Being one of the fundamental 
Treaty freedoms, the CJEU has always interpreted the freedom of movement of 
persons broadly and the exceptions to it narrowly.199 This is particularly true also 
for the provisions of Directive 2004/38 the Free Movement Directive, which aims to 
facilitate the exercise of the fundamental right to free movement of EU citizens.200
194 Council Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Community [1968] OJ L257/2. Regulation 1612/68 was for the greater part repealed by the later 
Directive 2004/38 (see section 9.6.2 below).
195 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
[2004] OJ L158/77.
196 Case C‑370/90 Surinder Singh [1992] ECR I‑4265, ECLI:EU:C:1992:296, para. 21. In addition, the 
Court has held that the possibility for an EU worker to be joined by his long‑term stable partner who 
does not fall within the definition of ‘family’ as laid down in secondary legislation, may constitute 
a social advantage to the worker, requiring at least equal treatment as regards the right of entry and 
residence of long‑term partners of nationals of the host Member State. Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed 
[1986] ECR 1283, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157, para. 28.
197 Commission, ‘Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States’, COM (2001) 257 final, p. 5. See Case C‑540/03 Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I‑5769, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, para. 53 and the references to the case‑law of the ECtHR therein.
198 Case C‑127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I‑6241, ECLI:EU:C:2008:449, para. 58.
199 Joined Cases C‑482/01 and C‑493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] ECR I‑5257, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:262, paras. 64–65.
200 Case C‑127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I‑6241, ECLI:EU:C:2008:449, para. 89.







There has never been a free movement case before CJEU involving an EU citizen with 
a same‑sex partner, safe a same‑sex couple with children.201 There are consequently 
many open questions as to the free movement rights of rainbow families. Some 
guidance may be found in preparatory documents and in the CJEU’s free movement 
case law. In legal scholarship, where the issue has been discussed quite extensively,202 
reference has often also been made to the CJEU’s case law in employment cases, as 
discussed in section 9.3 above. Hereafter the matter is first assessed under Regulation 
1612/68 (section 9.6.1) and the Free Movement Directive (section 9.6.2 below) as 
where a secondary law instrument is available, this must be applied first.203 However, 
as primary law has precedence over secondary law, any such application must still 
be assessed in light of the latter. When the application of secondary law results in an 
unjustified restriction of the fundamental Treaty freedom found in primary law, the 
conflict must be resolved either through a harmonious interpretation of secondary 
law or by applying directly the Treaty freedom.204 Section 9.6.3 therefore provides 
for an assessment of the free movement rights of rainbow families under primary 
law. Although other free movement issues are conceivable in relation to the present 
case study,205 the focus here lies on the primordial free movement of persons.
Third‑country nationals (TCNs) do not fall under the free movement regimes as laid 
down in the Treaties and the Free Movement Directive, as these exclusively apply 
to EU citizens. Third‑country nationals and their families fall under a distinct and 
less favourable regime that has been developed in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFJS),206 and of which the Family Reunification Directive207 forms a 
prominent part. This Directive and the rights of entry and residence that it grants 
to limited categories of third‑country nationals are discussed in section 9.6.4 below.
201 Lenaerts has called the mobility of same‑sex married couples ‘[a]nother aspect of family law that [was] 
likely one day to find its way to Luxembourg’. Lenaerts 2009–2010, supra n. 7, at p. 1355. See also 
Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 489.
202 E.g. C. Karakosta, ‘Portability of same‑sex marriages and registered partnerships within the EU’, 2 
Cyprus Human Rights Law Review (2013) p. 53 and M. Župan, ‘Registered partnership in cross‑border 
situations – where invisibility to law lies?’, in: N. Bodigora‑Vukubrat et al. (eds.), Invisible Minorities 
in Law (Hamburg, Verlag Dr. Kovac 2013) p. 95.
203 Following the ‘Tedeschi principle’, substantive Treaty rules are applied only in the absence of secondary 
legislation. Case 5/77 Tedeschi [1977] ECR 1555, ECLI:EU:C:1977:144.
204 K. Ensig Sørensen, ‘Reconciling secondary legislation and the treaty rights of free movement’, 17 
European Law Review (2011) p. 339.
205 The interesting question of whether the conclusion of marriage and the registration of a partnership can 
be qualified as the provision of services and therefore whether nationality and residency requirements 
to enter into marriage or registered partnership constitute obstacles to the freedom to receive services, 
is not examined in detail here. It is only noted that if marriage and registered partnership can be 
regarded as services under the Treaty, the argument could be made that the nationality and residency 
requirements that Member States like the Netherlands set for the conclusion of a marriage or the 
registration of a partnership under their national laws, form an obstacle to the freedom to receive 
services. Such a restriction on the free movement of services recipients is, however, probably quite 
easily to justify on public policy grounds.
206 Art. 79 TFEU.
207 European Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003, on the right to family reunification, 
[2003] OJ L251/12.








Regulation 1612/68 provided for the free movement of workers and their families. 
When the Regulation was drafted, a proposal was made to include a Recital holding 
that discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation represented an obstacle to 
the free movement of workers and their families, which could seriously impair 
the integration of migrant workers exercising their right to freedom of movement, 
and that of their families, into the host country.208 No such Recital was, however, 
included in the final version of the Regulation, although it was provided that freedom 
of movement constituted ‘a fundamental right of workers and their families’ which 
required ‘equality of treatment’. It was also held in the Preamble that ‘[…] obstacles 
to the mobility of workers [had to] be eliminated, in particular as regards the 
worker’s right to be joined by his family and the conditions for the integration of that 
family into the host country’. Article 10(1) of the Regulation accordingly provided 
that ‘irrespective of their nationality’ certain family members had the right to install 
themselves with a worker who was a national of one Member State and who was 
employed in the territory of another Member State. These concerned the worker’s 
spouse and their descendants who were under the age of 21 years or were dependants 
and dependent relatives in the ascending line of the worker and his spouse.209
In the Reed case (1986),210 the question was raised if Article 10(1) was to be interpreted 
as meaning that in certain circumstances a person who had a stable relationship with 
a worker within the meaning of that provision was to be treated as his ‘spouse’.211 
Ms. Reed was a British national who unsuccessfully applied for a residence permit in 
the Netherlands on the ground that she was living with Mr. W. in a stable non‑marital 
relationship. W. was also a British national and he legally resided in the Netherlands 
as a worker within the meaning of the Treaty. The Netherlands government argued 
that a dynamic interpretation of the term spouse was only acceptable if it were based 
on developments in social and legal conceptions that were visible in the whole of the 
Community.212 The Commission concurred that in the Community as it stood at that 
time it was ‘impossible to speak of any consensus’ that unmarried companions were 
208 The proposed Recital No. 5 read: ‘Whereas discrimination on grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, 
religion or convictions, disability, age or sexual orientation represents an obstacle to the free movement 
of workers and their families; whereas the integration of migrant workers exercising their right to 
freedom of movement, and that of their families, into the host country can be seriously impaired by 
discrimination of this kind; whereas it is therefore essential to prohibit such discrimination within 
the scope of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 […].’ Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Regulation amending Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC on free movement for workers within the 
Community [1998] OJ C344/9. See Guild 2001, supra n. 90, at p. 687.
209 Art. 10(2) Regulation 1612/68 provided that Member States had to facilitate the admission of any 
member of the family not coming within the provisions of paragraph 1, if they were dependent on the 
worker or living under his roof in the country whence he came.
210 Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed [1986] ECR 1283, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157.
211 This concerned the third question as posed by the referring court.
212 According to the Netherlands government there was no reason to give the term ‘spouse’ an interpretation 
which would go beyond the legal implications of that term, which embraced rights and obligations 
which did not exist between unmarried companions.’ Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed [1986] ECR 
1283, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157, para. 10.







to be treated as spouses.213 The Court proved sensitive to this line of argumentation. 
It ruled that because Regulation 1612/68 had general application, was binding in 
its entirety and was directly applicable in all Member States, ‘any interpretation 
of a legal term on the basis of social developments’ had to ‘take into account the 
situation in the whole Community, not merely in one Member State.’214 It ruled that 
‘[i]n the absence of any indication of a general social development which would 
justify a broad construction, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary in 
the regulation,’ it was to be held that the term ‘spouse’ in Article 10 of the Regulation 
referred to a marital relationship only.215 The Court concluded:
‘[…] Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1612/68 cannot be interpreted as meaning that the 
companion, in a stable relationship, of a worker who is a national of a Member State and 
is employed in the territory of another Member State must in certain circumstances be 
treated as his ‘spouse’ for the purposes of that provision.’216
The Court redressed the issue, however, by application of the ‘social advantage’ 
concept ex Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68.217 It held that ‘[…] the possibility for a 
migrant worker of obtaining permission for his unmarried companion to reside with 
him, where that companion [was] not a national of the host Member State, [could] 
assist his integration in the host State and thus contribute to the achievement of 
freedom of movement for workers’.218 It made clear that if a Member State permitted 
the unmarried companions of its nationals, who were not themselves nationals of 
that Member State, to reside in its territory, it could not refuse to grant the same 
advantage to migrant workers who were nationals of other Member States.219
The CJEU thus ruled in Reed that non‑marital partners were not ‘spouses’ within the 
meaning of Regulation 1612/68. In 2004, this Regulation was, for the greater part, 
repealed and replaced by Directive 2004/38. Because by that time some States had 
introduced alternative forms of registration of (same‑sex) relationships, the question 
was raised when the latter Directive was drafted, of whether explicit provision had 
to be made for these registration forms.
213 According to the Commission the problem could not be resolved by means of a broad construction of 
Art. 10 of Regulation 1612/68. Idem, para. 11.
214 Idem, paras. 12–13.
215 Idem, para. 15.
216 Idem, para. 16.
217 Idem, para. 28. See also M. Fallon, ‘Constraints of internal market law on family law’, in: J. Meeusen 
et al. (eds.), International family law for the European Union (Antwerpen, Intersentia 2007) p. 149 at 
p. 174.
218 Idem, para. 28.
219 Idem, para. 29.








The Free Movement Directive (Directive 2004/38, also often referred to as ‘Citizens’ 
Directive’) grants EU citizens a general right of entry and stay of three months.220 
After three months the residence right is maintained if the EU citizen can prove 
themselves to be economically active or either a student or a person of independent 
means.221 Importantly, as noted above, the Directive lays down the rights of family 
members of the EU citizen to join him in the host Member State. Once these family 
members have been granted entry and residence in the host Member State, they are 
also entitled to take up employment or self‑employment there,222 and they must be 
treated equally to the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty.223
During the deliberations in the preparation of the Free Movement Directive, the 
European Parliament made a plea for the inclusion of same‑sex partners in the scope 
of the Free Movement Directive.224 It proposed recognising as family members 
the spouse and registered partner, irrespective of sex, on the basis of the relevant 
national legislation, and the unmarried partner, irrespective of sex, with whom the 
Union citizen had a durable relationship, if the legislation or practice of the host 
and/or home Member States treated unmarried couples and married couples in a 
corresponding manner and in accordance with the conditions laid down in any such 
legislation.225 The Council, however, was reluctant to opt for a definition of the term 
‘spouse’ which made a specific reference to spouses of the same sex.226 It noted that 
at the time, only two Member States provided for same‑sex marriages and referred 
to CJEU’s definition of marriage in D. and Sweden v. Council (see section 9.2 
above).227 The Council furthermore held that recognition of registered partners or 
unmarried partners had to be based exclusively on the legislation of the host Member 
State. It noted in this respect that ‘[r]ecognition for purposes of residence of non 
220 Art. 5 and 6(1) Directive 2004/38.
221 Art. 7 Directive 2004/38.
222 Art. 23 Directive 2004/38.
223 Art. 25(1) Directive 2004/38.
224 The original Commission proposal was laid down in COM (2001) 257 final.
225 See the paraphrasing in Commission, ‘Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States’, COM (2003) 199, pp. 10–11. The original Amendments 
14, 15 and 16 read:
‘(a) the spouse, irrespective of sex, according to the relevant national legislation;
(b) the registered partner, irrespective of sex, according to the relevant national legislation;
(c) the unmarried partner, irrespective of sex, with whom the Union citizen has a durable  relationship, 
if the legislation or practice of the host and/or home Member State treats unmarried couples and 
married couples in a corresponding manner and in accordance with the conditions laid down in any 
such legislation […].’
226 Common Position (EC) No 6/2004 adopted by the Council on 5 December 2003 with a view to adopting 
Directive 2004/.../EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of… on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/
EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (2004/C 54 E/02), 
p. 28.
227 See also M. Bell, ‘Holding Back the Tide? Cross‑Border Recognition of Same‑Sex Partnerships within 
the European Union’, 12 European Review of Private Law (2004) p. 613 at p. 621.







married couples in accordance with the legislation of other Member States could 
pose problems for the host Member State if its family law [did] not recognise this 
possibility.’ The Council added that ‘[t]o confer rights which [were] not recognised 
for its own nationals on couples from other Member States could in fact create 
reverse discrimination’ and this had to be avoided according to the Council.228 It was 
observed that the Council discussions revealed that several Member States stuck ‘to 
a very traditional definition of the family’.229
The European Commission subsequently amended its proposal in line with the 
Council’s Position. It reportedly felt that ‘[…] harmonisation of the conditions of 
residence for Union citizens in Member States of which they [were] not nationals’ was 
not supposed to ‘result in the imposition on certain Member States of amendments to 
family law legislation, an area which [did] not fall within the Community’s legislative 
jurisdiction.’230 The Commission preferred to restrict the proposal to the concept of 
spouse as meaning ‘in principle’ spouse of the opposite sex. Under reference to Reed, 
it indicated that this could be different if there would be ‘subsequent developments’.231
According to the Commission its amended proposal presented ‘an equitable solution’ 
to the issues as identified during the deliberations in Parliament and Council.232 
Others qualified the final text as ‘[…] a compromise which did not deliver as much 
for same‑sex couples as many had hoped.’233 According to Toner the Directive 
clearly showed the existence of ‘[…] a considerable reluctance to use EU law to 
push skeptical and reluctant Member States too far along the road of recognition of 
[non‑traditional] relationships until they are ready and willing to adopt such measures 
in national law.’234 Lenaerts observed that the EU legislature opted for a ‘hands‑off 
approach’, leaving the sensitive decision as to the definition of the term ‘spouse’ 
to judicial interpretation.235 Bell held that the overall picture painted by the Free 
Movement Directive was that of a legislature ‘[…] caught between acknowledging 
the pace of social and legal change within the Member States whilst respecting those 
states unwilling to see these changes crystallised in EU law.’236 The author held 
that ‘[…] the ambiguity on same‑sex marriage, the partial free movement rights for 
228 Common Position (EC) No 6/2004, supra n. 226, at p. 28.
229 H. Toner, ‘Immigration Rights of Same‑Sex Couples in EC Law’, in: K. Boele‑Woelki and A. Fuchs 
(eds.), Legal recognition of same‑sex couples in Europe (Antwerp, Intersentia 2003) p. 178 at p. 181.
230 COM (2003) 199, at p. 3.
231 Idem, at pp. 10–11.
232 Idem, at p. 3.
233 H. Toner, ‘Migration rights and same‑sex couples in EU law: a case study’, in: K. Boele‑Woelki and 
A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal recognition of same‑sex Relationships in Europe, National, cross‑border and 
European perspectives, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Intersentia 2012) p. 285 at p. 287.
234 Idem, at p. 289.
235 Lenaerts held that ‘[…] if a national court asks for guidance in the interpretation of this concept, the 
[CJEU] would have no choice but to provide a definition through the medium of common‑lawmaking.’ 
Lenaerts 2009–2010, supra n. 7, at pp. 1355–1356. In footnote 83 Lenaerts referred to: ‘H. Toner, 
Partnership Rights, Free Movement and EU Law, 2004, p. 60–68’, who reportedly explained ‘[…] that 
the regime laid down in the directive was the result of a political compromise among conservative and 
liberal Member States.’ For further discussion of this question, see section 9.6.2.1 below.
236 Bell 2004, supra n. 227, at p. 626.







registered partners and the non‑rights for unmarried partners [left] the Directive 
rather fork‑tongued in the signals it [was] sending.’237
The present Article 2 of Directive 2004/38 provides that the term ‘family member’ 
covers both the ‘spouse’ and ‘[…] the partner with whom the Union citizen has 
contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member 
State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as 
equivalent to marriage in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant 
legislation of the host Member State’.238 Provision has also been made for unmarried 
and unregistered partners: on the basis of Article 3(2) (b) the host state has an 
obligation ‘to facilitate entrance’ of ‘the partner with whom the Union citizen has a 
durable relationship, duly attested’. Article 24 provides that ‘[…] all Union citizens 
residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State […] 
enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of 
the Treaty.’ The benefit of this right is extended to third‑country national family 
members who have the right of residence or permanent residence.239 Further, Recital 
No. 31 of the Preamble to the Free Movement Directive, holds that
‘[i]n accordance with the prohibition of discrimination contained in the Charter, Member 
States should implement this Directive without discrimination between the beneficiaries 
of this Directive on grounds such as […] sexual orientation.’240
Following Article 27(1) of the Free Movement Directive, Member States may restrict 
the freedom of movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members 
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Any measure taken on 
ground of public policy must comply with the principle of proportionality and must 
be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned, which 
conduct must represent ‘a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting 
one of the fundamental interests of society’.241
As the CJEU has never ruled upon this issue, it remains an open question if or when 
same‑sex partners of EU citizens can be regarded as ‘family members’ within the 
meaning of the Free Movement Directive.242 This question becomes vital if the 
237 Idem, at p. 626.
238 Art. 2(a) and (b) Directive 2004/38 respectively. The term ‘family member’ furthermore covers the 
direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the spouse or partner 
and the dependent direct relative in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner. Art. 2 (c and 
d) Directive 2004/38. As noted by Fallon this excludes registration following the law of a third State. 
Fallon 2007, supra n. 217, at p. 175.
239 Art. 25(1) Directive 2004/38.
240 As Lenaerts explains: ‘This would mean, for example, that once a person is qualified as “a family 
member,” the host Member State cannot deprive him or her from receiving the benefits to which he or 
she is entitled under Directive 2004/38/EC just because of his or her sexual orientation […].’ Lenaerts 
2009–2010, supra n. 7, at p. 1360, footnote 108.
241 Art. 27(2) Directive 2004/38.
242 Lenaerts has noted that in any case the definition of ‘family member’ was considered to be a ‘broad’ 
one. Lenaerts 2009–2010, supra n. 7, at p. 1355.







relative of an EU citizen cannot himself claim free movement rights.243 Should a 
preliminary reference on this issue be made to the CJEU,244 there would be various 
possible avenues the Court could take.
In exploring these avenues, a distinction must be drawn between same‑sex 
spouses, same‑sex registered partners and same‑sex stable (or ‘de facto’) partners, 
respectively. The following subsections discuss different views on how the relevant 
Directive provisions must be read for each of these respective civil statuses and types 
of relationships. A recurring question in the academic debate on the matter has been 
– and still is – whether and if so, the extent to which the CJEU’s case law in other 
realms of EU law, such as in staff cases or in non‑discrimination cases, applies in 
this context. The following subsections intend to unravel these different arguments 
and try to analyse what the (minimum) requirements of EU law are in this respect.
9.6.2.1. Same‑sex spouses
The term ‘spouse’ under Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38 is not defined. In fact, 
the EU legislature deliberately left definition of this term to the judiciary.245 Because 
it concerns a term of EU law, the CJEU is indeed competent to interpret and define 
the term ‘spouse’.246 So far, there has not been a case before the CJEU in which it has 
been asked if the term ‘spouse’ in the Free Movement Directive also covers same‑sex 
spouses. The only relevant free movement case concerning the definition of ‘spouse’ 
is the above discussed Reed ruling, in which the Court ruled that unmarried partners 
were not covered by the term ‘spouse’ as at the time provided for in Regulation 
1612/68.
Various claims can and have been made in respect of what the CJEU could and should 
rule if the question is referred to it whether ‘spouse’ in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 
2004/38 includes same‑sex spouses. In the first place, the view can be defended that 
243 In fact, most free movement cases that have been brought before the Court regarding the rights of 
family members of EU citizens have concerned third‑country national relatives.
244 Art. 267 TFEU. ‘In theory, the Court could be seized of a question concerning the compatibility 
of national rules on the recognition of same‑sex relationships with EU law through infringement 
proceedings. These could be initiated either by the Commission or a Member State, if they were 
to believe that (non‑)recognition would amount to a violation of EU law. However, infringement 
proceedings initiated by Member States are extremely rare for their political implications. Likewise, 
the Commission has discretion to initiate infringement proceedings and is unlikely to do in such a 
sensitive area. It is therefore more probable that a case would reach Luxembourg by way of a preliminary 
reference from a national judge, who in domestic proceedings is confronted with a case in which a 
same‑sex couple challenges the non‑recognition of their relationship on the basis of EU law.’ Rijpma 
and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1 at p. 460.
245 Lenaerts 2009–2010, supra n. 7, at pp. 1355 and 1360.
246 As Bogdan has rightly observed, the concept of marriage in EU law is ‘in principle an autonomous 
concept, independent of the definitions of marriage in national legal systems’. M. Bogdan, ‘Private 
International Law Aspects of the Introduction of Same‑Sex Marriages in Sweden’, 78 Nordic Journal 
of International Law (2009) p. 253 at pp. 255–256, referring (in footnote 8) to the Reed judgment. In 
the words of Lenaerts ‘[…] if a national court asks for guidance in the interpretation of this concept, 
the ECJ would have no choice but to provide a definition through the medium of common‑lawmaking.’ 
Lenaerts 2009–2010, supra n. 7, at pp. 1355–1356.







because Article 2(2)(a) Directive 2004/38 makes no reference to national laws, an 
independent and uniform interpretation of this term of EU law is in place. Others 
have questioned whether Article 2(2)(a) lends itself to autonomous interpretation.247 
An alternative approach therefore claims that the Court should defer to national law, 
either the law of the host Member State or that of the home Member State. These 
different options are now explored in more detail.
It is settled CJEU case law that ‘[…] the need for a uniform application of European 
Union law and the principle of equality require that the terms of a provision of 
European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member 
States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given 
an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union.’248 
Because Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38 does indeed not make any express 
reference to national law, the question arises as to what independent and uniform 
meaning could be given to the term ‘spouse’ in this provision.
For the interpretation of a provision of European Union law its wording, the context 
in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part must 
be considered.249 In the present case, a textual interpretation of Article 2(2)(a) 
has been held to provide limited guidance, since the wording of Article does not 
make any reference to the (combined) gender of the spouses.250 When applying a 
contextual and a teleological interpretation, it has been noted that the legislature 
deliberately chose not to provide for same‑sex couples explicitly (see above).251 It 
furthermore made separate provision for registered partnerships – at the time the 
most common alternative to marriage for same‑sex couples – and made recognition 
of such partnerships subject to the legislation of the host Member State. These 
considerations support the conclusion that the EU legislature did not intend to oblige 
the Member States to recognise same‑sex spouses as spouses for the purposes of the 
Free Movement Directive.
247 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 468.
248 Case C‑34/10 Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669, para. 25, 
under reference to Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, ECLI:EU:C:1984:11, para. 11; Case C‑287/98 
Linster [2000] ECR I‑6917, ECLI:EU:C:2000:468, para. 43; Case C‑5/08 Infopaq International [2009] 
ECR I‑6569, ECLI:EU:C:2009:465, para. 27 and Case C‑467/08 Padawan [2010] ECR I‑10055, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:620, para. 32.
249 Case C‑648/11, MA a.o. [2013] ECR 0000, ECLI:EU:C:2013:367, para. 50; Case C‑19/08 Petrosian 
[2009] ECR I‑495, ECLI:EU:C:2009:41, para. 34 and Case C‑403/09 Detiček [2009] ECR I‑12193, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:810, para. 33 and Case C‑287/98 Linster [2000] ECR I‑6917, ECLI:EU:C:2000:468, 
para. 43, under reference to Case 327/82 Ekro [1984] ECR 107, ECLI:EU:C:1984:11, para. 11. See also 
P. Rott, ‘What is the Role of the ECJ in EC Private Law? – A Comment on the ECJ judgments in Océano 
Grupo, Freiburger Kommunalbauten, Leitner and Veedfald’, 1 Hanse Law Review (2005) pp. 7–9.
250 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 468.
251 A 2008 report of the for Fundamental Rights (FRA) was very critical in this respect, deeming it a 
problem that the EU legislature ‘[…] failed to impose a clear obligation on the host Member State to 
recognise as ‘spouse’ a person of the same‑sex validly married under the laws of the Member State of 
origin.’ This was considered an ‘omission in the wording of the Directive.’ European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2008, supra n. 181, at p. 63.







In interpreting the term ‘spouse’, the CJEU could also – as it did in Grant and D 
v. Council – refer to the national laws of the various EU Member States.252 These 
indicate certain social and legal developments,253 which the CJEU may be inclined to 
follow, even though it is under no Treaty obligation to do so and even though it would 
be somewhat circular to base the definition of an EU law term on the implementation 
of that same EU provision at national level. The Court could thereby take into 
account the number of Member States that have opened up marriage to same‑sex 
couples254 as well as the number of Member States that authorise the entry and 
residence of same‑sex spouses as ‘spouse’ for the purposes of the Free Movement 
Directive.255 The primordial question will then be whether those numbers are enough 
to prompt the CJEU to rule that ‘spouse’ within the meaning of Article 2(2) Directive 
2004/38 includes same‑sex spouses. While some have held that new social and 
legal developments in only a few Member States could not justify an autonomous 
interpretation of the term ‘spouse’,256 others have not outright rejected this idea. 
Lenaerts and Gutierrez‑Fons have held that Grant illustrated that ‘[…] the existence 
of divergences among national legal systems may not automatically rule out the 
incorporation, into the EU legal order, of a legal principle which is recognized in 
only a minority of Member States’. The authors explained this as follows:
‘[…] since the [CJEU] follows an evaluative approach in the discovery of general 
principles, incorporation may take place where “such a legal principle is of particular 
significance [for the project of European integration], or where it constitutes a growing 
trend”.’257
If applied in the present context, it must be assessed whether the increased legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships throughout the EU Member States can 
252 In 1998, in Grant, the Court held that in the state of the law within the Community at that time, stable 
relationships between two persons of the same sex were not regarded as equivalent to marriages or 
stable relationships outside marriage between persons of opposite sex. The Court came to a similar 
conclusion in Joined Cases C‑122/99 P & C‑125/99 P D. and Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:30.
253 Compare Waaldijk 2001B, supra n. 88, at p. 648, who held it to be likely that the EU would follow ‘the 
standard sequence followed by the member states’ in resect of recognition of same‑sex partners in 
fields other than employment.
254 In 2014 eight Member States had opened up marriage to same‑sex couples, namely the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, France and the United Kingdom, while it was anticipated 
that Luxembourg would do so as of 1 January 2015.
255 This concerns at least nine Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK). See Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 470, referring 
(in footnote 90) to: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010, supra n. 181, at p. 46 and 
Ministry of the Interior of Italy, Administrative Guideline n. 8996 of 26 October 2012.
256 Bogdan 2009, supra n. 246, at pp. 255–256, referring (in footnote 8) to Reed. In this respect Bogdan 
had previously noted that in D. and Sweden v. Council (2001) the interpretation of ‘marriage’ had 
‘not [been] really independent’ as in it had been ‘based on the legal systems of the totality of Member 
States’. Bogdan 2003, supra n. 20, at p. 173. Referring to Grant, Lenaerts and Gutiérrez‑Fons observed 
that the CJEU would be ‘careful before adopting an “EU” solution’, where there were important 
divergences among national legal systems. The authors pointed out that for EU law to develop in this 
field, legislative action was said to be needed. K. Lenaerts, J.A. Gutiérrez‑Fons, ‘The constitutional 
allocation of powers and general principles of EU law’, 46 CMLRev (2010) p. 1629 at p. 1634.
257 Idem, at p. 1635.







constitute a growing trend, as well as whether an interpretation of ‘spouse’ as 
covering same‑sex spouses is of particular significance for European integration.
Altogether, it cannot be ruled out that if the CJEU were to interpret the term ‘spouse’ 
under Article 2(2)(a) autonomously, it would conclude that it sees at different‑sex 
spouses only. In this regard it must be noted that the Directive sets a minimum norm 
only; States are free to offer more protection and thus to recognise also same‑sex 
spouses as ‘spouse’ for the purposes of the Directive. On the basis of the equal 
treatment provision (Article 24 of the Directive) there is even an obligation to do so 
for States who authorise the entry and residence of same‑sex spouses of their own 
nationals as ‘spouse’ for the purposes of the Directive. They must apply the same 
rules to the same‑sex spouses of migrating nationals of other EU Member States.258 
States who do not provide for same‑sex marriages under their national laws, are free, 
nevertheless, to recognise migrating same‑sex spouses as ‘spouse’ for the purpose 
of the Free Movement Directive. States may also decide to authorise the entry and 
residence of a foreign same‑sex spouse under Article 2(2)(b) or Article 3(2) (see 
sections 9.6.2.2 and 9.6.2.3 below).
If the CJEU, on the other hand, were to adopt a uniform definition of ‘spouse’ as 
including same‑sex spouses, reverse discrimination – whereby nationals of the host 
Member States would be treated less favourably when compared to EU citizens 
migrating to that Member State – would be the result in those States that do not 
foresee in same‑sex marriages. While the Council held this to be undesirable (see 
9.6.2 above), the practice of reverse discrimination is in itself not at variance with 
EU law.
As explained by Lenaerts, the fact that the CJEU is competent to define the concept 
‘spouse’ does not necessarily imply that the Court has to adopt an independent 
definition of ‘spouse’, if ever asked to interpret it.259 According to the author this would 
‘[…] foster uniformity and legal certainty, but it would disregard the sensitivities of 
some Member States to the benefit of others.’260 Others have submitted that ‘[…] in 
view of the legislative developments in the Member States since D. v. Council, the 
CJEU [was] no longer in the position to identify in EU law or in the general principles 
of Union law criteria enabling it to define the meaning and scope of marriage by way 
of independent interpretation’.261 As an alternative it has therefore been claimed that 
the CJEU should defer to national law as interpreted by national courts.
258 See Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed [1986] ECR 1283, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157.
259 Lenaerts 2009–2010, supra n. 7, at p. 1356. This conclusion is supported by the finding of the CJEU 
that ‘[…] the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law 
of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally [emphasis 
added] be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union.’ See supra 
n. 248.
260 Idem, at pp. 1356–1357.
261 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at pp. 470–471, referring (in footnote 95) to Case T‑43/90 
Díaz García [1992] ECR II‑2619, ECLI:EU:T:1992:120, para. 36 and Case T‑85/91 Khouri [1992] ECR 
II‑2637, ECLI:EU:T:1992:121, para. 32.







In interpreting Article 2(2)(a) of the Directive, the CJEU may defer to either the law 
of the host State or to that of the home State. The home State principle is strongly 
embedded in EU free movement law and has its basis in the principle of mutual 
recognition. Application of the latter principle in this context has been held to be 
consistent with the Directive’s objective to promote free movement,262 as well as 
to serve legal certainty.263 Taking the principle of mutual recognition as a starting 
point, it has been claimed, recently, even by EU institutions, that ‘a spouse is a 
spouse’.264 In its 2009 Guidance for better transposition and application of the Free 
Movement Directive, for example, the Commission held that ‘[m] arriages validly 
contracted anywhere in the world must be in principle recognized for the purpose of 
the application of the Directive.’265 While the wording ‘in principle’ leaves room for 
exceptions, former Justice Commissioner Reding, while addressing the European 
Parliament in 2010, was considerably firmer. She held:
‘If you live in a legally‑recognised same‑sex partnership, or marriage, in country A, you 
have the right – and this is a fundamental right – to take this status and that of your partner 
to country B. If not, it is a violation of EU law, so there is no discussion about this. This is 
absolutely clear, and we do not have to hesitate on this. The Free Movement Directive does 
not give the Member States discretion to discriminate – no EU directive does. We should 
not allow a mythology to be developed saying that, actually, it is possible to discriminate. 
We have to be very firm on the principles.’266
In fact, the Commissioner thus made an argument for the portability of civil 
statuses within the European Union. She argued that once an EU citizen and his 
or her same‑sex partner have married under the law of one Member State, all other 
Member States, regardless of their own national laws, must recognise this partner 
as ‘spouse’ within the meaning of the Free Movement Directive. The Commissioner 
stressed, in this regard, that in applying the Directive, Member States have to respect 
fundamental rights, including the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation (Article 21 Charter).
262 Idem, at p. 471.
263 Idem.
264 Compare Barnard who has held that a ‘spouse’ in the meaning of the Free Movement Directive is 
‘[…] the person to whom the EU citizen is married under the laws of the state where the marriage was 
entered into.’ C. Barnard, The substantive law of the EU. The four freedoms, 2nd ed (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2007) p. 418. Bogdan observed in 2003 that it was at that time ‘very doubtful’ whether 
(then existing) EC law contained any ‘country‑of‑origin principle’ with regard to civil status. Bogdan 
2003, supra n. 20, at p. 173.
265 It must be noted that the Commission ‘in principle’ extended the mutual recognition principle to 
outside the EU context, by holding that marriages ‘validly contracted anywhere in the world’ have to 
be recognised. Commission, ‘Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance 
for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’, COM 
(2009) 313 final, p. 4, para. 2.1.1. See critically Toner 2012, supra n. 233, at p. 290.
266 Tuesday, 7 September 2010 – Strasbourg, PV 07/09/2010 – 17 CRE 07/09/2010 – 17, online available 
at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=‑//EP//TEXT+CRE+20100907+ITEM‑
017+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN, visited 24 June 2014.







This approach has also been taken in various reports of the EU Fundamental Rights 
Agency (FRA). Its 2008 Legal study on homophobia and discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation concluded that any refusal to grant a same‑sex spouse, who 
entered into marriage under the laws of an EU Member State, an automatic and 
unconditional right of entry and residence, would constitute ‘[…] a form of direct 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, in violation of Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the general principle of equality, 
and of the prohibition on discrimination as reiterated in Article 21 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.’267 This view was later repeated in other FRA publications on 
the subject matter.268
Apart from the non‑discrimination argument, other grounds have been put forward 
to support the view that a spouse is a spouse. Costello, for example, based an 
argument on the CJEU judgment in the Metock case (2008).269 The author held 
that this judgment’s ‘[…] insistence that the time and place of the marriage [were] 
irrelevant to the enjoyment of the EC residence rights could lend some support to the 
assertion that a spouse [was] a spouse, in that it seem[ed] to remove marriages from 
the normal realms of private international law on recognition of legal relationships 
contracted elsewhere.’270
While the former Justice Commissioner has thus advocated application of the host 
State principle in all situations, Lenaerts has made a plea for leaving room for States 
to justify refusals to authorise entry and residence of same‑sex spouses on the basis 
of overriding requirements. In principle, the author and CJEU Judge considered 
application of the home State principle to be ‘most consistent with the fundamental 
freedoms’ and held that the term ‘spouse’ under Article 2(2)(a) of the Free Movement 
Directive had to be interpreted ‘in light of the principle of mutual recognition’.271 
However, because the EU legislature deferred to the judiciary on this point, the CJEU 
would have to proceed on the basis of a case‑by‑case analysis, ‘while embarking on 
an analogous legal reasoning to Maruko’.272 According to Lenaerts, Member States 
should be entitled to invoke overriding reasons of general interest to justify a refusal 
to recognise a same‑sex spouse as spouse under the Free Movement Directive. 
Any justification advanced by a Member State ‘[…] would have to be applied in 
compliance with fundamental rights, particularly the protection of family life.’273 
In the words of Lenaerts, the Court would thus engage ‘[…] in a balancing exercise, 
scrutinizing whether the reasons put forward by the host Member State pass muster 
under free movement law.’274
267 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2008, supra n. 181, at p. 70.
268 E.g. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010, supra n. 181, at p. 46.
269 Case C‑127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I‑6241, ECLI:EU:C:2008:449.
270 C. Costello, ‘Metock: free movement and “normal family life” in the Union’, 46 CMLRev (2009) p. 587 
at pp. 615–616.
271 Lenaerts 2009–2010, supra n. 7, at pp. 1360–1361.
272 Idem, at p. 1359.
273 Idem, at p. 1360.
274 Idem, at pp. 1360–1361.







Lenaerts’ alternative proposal to assess each case individually has been held to carry 
the risk of leading to ‘conceptual confusion, legal uncertainty and unnecessary 
litigation’.275 Also, various questions are left unanswered; it is not explained what 
is meant by an interpretation ‘in light of the principle of mutual recognition’, nor 
which overriding reasons of general interest are considered suitable ‘to pass muster 
under free movement law’. As noted above, Article 27(1) of the Directive provides 
for a limited number of grounds, of which only public policy has been held to be 
possibly applicable in the situation where a host State imposes restrictions on the free 
movement of an EU citizen and his or her same‑sex partner. It has been submitted 
that the mere fact that the spouse (or more generally the partner) of a migrating EU 
citizen is of the same sex cannot be said to constitute the required personal conduct 
which represents ‘[…] a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one 
of the fundamental interests of society’.276
In fact, Lenaerts’ proposal for the interpretation of this secondary law provision is 
based on a primary law reasoning. The application of primary law in this areas is 
discussed in section 9.6.3 below. First, however, the rights of same‑sex registered 
partners and same‑sex stable partners under the Free Movement Directive, are 
discussed.
9.6.2.2. Same‑sex registered partners
Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2004/38 expressly refers to the laws of the Member 
States. It defines the term ‘registered partner’ as ‘[…] the partner with whom the 
Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation 
of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered 
partnerships as equivalent to marriage in accordance with the conditions laid down 
in the relevant legislation of the host Member State’. Because of the explicit choice 
for the host State principle in Article 2(2)(b), the dominant view is that the obligations 
of States, and the corresponding rights of migrating same‑sex couples, are dependent 
upon the laws of the host State.
It is not entirely clear, however, how the phrase ‘equivalent to marriage’ should be 
interpreted. It can be debated, for example, if the French PACS meets this standard. 
The CJEU judgment in the Hay case may be held to support a conclusion in the 
affirmative, but one must be aware that the Court in that case only found comparability 
in respect of certain benefits that were granted on the occasion of marriage. Hence 
275 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 472.
276 Art. 27(2) Directive 2004/38. Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 479. Papadopoulou has 
held in this regard: ‘Allowing for wide and open‑ended grounds for restrictions on free movement 
within the EU based on the ambiguous notion of ‘public order’ would severely undermine the 
supremacy and autonomy of EC law and underestimate the depth and force of European integration. 
It can therefore safely be concluded that even Member States whose national laws do not recognize 
same‑sex partnerships will still be obliged to grant access to same‑sex married spouses of EU 
citizens or third‑country nationals legally residing in their territory.’ L. Papadopoulou, ‘In(di)visible 
Citizens(hip): Same‑sex Partners in European Immigration Law’, 21 Yearbook of European Law (2002) 
p. 229 at pp. 235–236.







such comparability does not necessarily imply the finding of equivalence to marriage 
as required in the context of the Free Movement Directive. A related question is who 
is to decide if a national registered partnership regime is equivalent to marriage.277 
A further question is whether a couple that has concluded a partnership under a 
relatively weak regime, such as a French PACS, is able to ‘boost’ its PACS by moving 
to a Member State that provides for a stronger registered partnership, and if so, 
whether they could subsequently retain stronger partnership rights upon return to 
their home Member State.278
Host States that do not provide for any registered partnership equivalent to marriage 
in their national laws, are under no obligation to recognise the registered partner of 
a migrant EU citizen as ‘family member’ within the meaning of the Free Movement 
Directive, although they are of course free to do so.279 In this situation the couple 
presumably falls under the rules on stable partners in a ‘durable relationship’ 
(Article 3(2), as discussed below). If the host State, however, provides for a 
partnership for same‑sex couples that is equivalent to marriage, it must authorise the 
entry and residence of same‑sex registered partners from other Member States as 
‘family member’ within the meaning of Directive 2004/38.280 This has made some 
conclude that there were ‘[…] two zones of migration for registered partners within 
the Union’.281
Former Justice Commissioner Reding has instead argued that host States have to 
recognise the registered partners from migrating EU citizens, regardless of their own 
national laws (see the quote in section 9.6.2.1 above). Thus, in her opinion, even host 
States who do not provide for any form of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships 
under their national laws, would have to authorise entry and residence of same‑sex 
registered partners from other Member States under the Free Movement Directive. 
This view seems rather difficult to reconcile with the wording of Article 2(2)(b), 
which clearly reflects the host State principle. It is furthermore provided that only 
host States which in their national laws provide for a partnership ‘equivalent to 
marriage’, have to authorise entry and residence of the (same‑sex) registered partners 
of nationals of other EU Member States. To claim that any host State, including those 
which in their national laws do not provide for any legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships, has to recognise same‑sex registered partners as ‘family member’ 
within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) may be stretching the interpretation limits 
of this text too far. The Commissioner’s position furthermore raises the question 
277 In the employment cases Maruko (2008) and Römer (2011), the CJEU left this to the national courts to 
assess, while in Hay (2013) the CJEU was prepared to examine this itself. See section 9.4 above.
278 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 473, referring (in footnote 109) to Toner 2012, supra n. 233, 
at pp. 288–289.
279 Idem, at p. 473, explaining in footnote 105 that Portugal, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark indeed do so.
280 As Fallon has pointed out, the wording of the Directive seems to exclude recognition of a registered 
partnership concluded outside the EU. Fallon 2007, supra n. 217, at p 175.
281 Bell 2004, supra n. 227, at p. 624. The author explained that ‘[i]n an inner zone of states that include 
registered partnership in their domestic legislation, there is unrestricted free movement. In the outer 
zone of states without registered partnership legislation, admission of the couple will be at the discretion 
of the national authorities.’







of how Member States who do not provide for any other form of legal recognition 
of relationships but marriage, should implement this in practice, namely whether 
they should treat such foreign registered partnerships as marriages, or create a new 
institution in their national laws.
The statements by former Commissioner Reding have not been supported by the 
Commission on all occasions. In 2010 a Luxembourg national petitioned to the 
European Parliament to have the Commission investigate the non‑recognition by 
Luxembourg of the British civil partnership that he and his partner had concluded in 
the UK.282 The petitioner held that this non‑recognition constituted a restriction on 
his and his partner’s right to freedom of movement within EU.283 In its response of 
May 2011, the Commission commented:
‘There is currently no EU legislation providing for the mutual recognition of registered 
partnerships in the European Union. The European Union, although committed to 
providing its citizens with a wide spectrum of civil rights, has no role to play in relation 
to Member States’ decisions to recognise registered partnerships. It is up to each Member 
State to resolve this issue and decide whether or not to recognize partnerships registered 
in other Member States. The issue raised by the petitioner is of exclusive competence of 
the Member States. However, the Commission is aware of the possible difficulties faced 
by EU citizens and has therefore published a Green Paper in order to obtain views on ways 
to reduce these problems.’284
The Commission thus held otherwise than Commissioner Reding had done earlier. In 
fact, it did not even explicitly qualify the matter as a free movement issue, although it 
did acknowledge, that the situation was problematic for EU citizens in the situation 
of the petitioner. The Green Paper to which it referred is discussed in section 9.7.3 
below.
282 The petitioner, who entered into a civil partnership in United Kingdom, and, therefore, could not 
engage in a Luxembourg civil union, considered that the two forms of partnership had to be regarded 
as equivalent.
283 This petition was similar to an earlier petition of 2009, namely Petition 1052/2008 by Aldwyn Llewelyn 
(British) on legal rights in connection with cohabitation agreements in France (PACS) and Britain (civil 
partnerships). In response to that petition the Commission had also underlined that there was at the 
time no Community legislation providing for recognition of civil partnerships in the European Union. 
It also acknowledged, however, that the situation in which the petitioner found himself ‘[…] could raise 
issues relating to Community law, in particular the principle of the ban on discrimination on grounds 
of nationality and the right of Union citizens to reside freely in the territory of another Member State.’ 
In this case the Commission had written a letter to the French Minister of Justice on the issue, although 
the comment to the petition does not make clear what the content or tenor of that letter was. The 
Commission did in any case welcome the final adoption by the National Assembly of a proposal for a 
law designed to recognise foreign partnerships in France.
284 European Parliament, Committee on Petitions (2011), Petition 0178/2010 by Oliver Hepworth 
(British), on the non‑recognition of the British civil partnership by Luxembourg, 6 May 2011, PETI_
CM(2011)464844, online available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/peti/
cm/866/866779/866779en.pdf, visited June 2014.







9.6.2.3. Same‑sex stable partners
Same‑sex stable partners of EU citizens who do not enjoy an automatic right of entry 
and residence in the host Member State as ‘family members’ within the meaning of 
Article 2(2) of the Free Movement Directive may, nevertheless, fall within the scope 
of Article 3(2) of this Directive. Following the latter provision the host State has 
an obligation ‘to facilitate entrance’ of ‘other family members’ who are members 
of the household of the Union citizen in the State of origin and of ‘the partner with 
whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested’. The host Member 
State must undertake an extensive examination of the personal circumstances and 
must justify any denial of entry or residence to these partners.285 In examining their 
situation on the basis of its own national legislation, the host State must take into 
consideration their relationship with the EU citizen or any other circumstances, such 
as their financial or physical dependence on the EU citizen.286
The general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality ex Article 24 of 
the Directive must be observed when applying this Article. Thus, a State may not 
authorise the entry and residence of all unmarried stable same‑sex partners of its 
own nationals, while refusing to do so for migrating EU citizens. Further, following 
Recital No. 31 of the Preamble to the Directive, States may not discriminate on 
grounds of sexual orientation when applying the Directive. They may not thus, for 
example, systematically refuse same‑sex partners when applying this provision.287 
It has furthermore been observed that States cannot adopt a blanket policy of not 
admitting unmarried partners under any circumstances, as they have to assess each 
case individually.288
The obligations of the host State under Article 3(2) are defined in considerable looser 
terms than under Article 2(2).289 The language of facilitation has been called ‘hazy 
and unclear’.290 A 2010 FRA report qualified the ‘duty to facilitate’ as ‘[…] a vague 
expression which does not necessarily translate into practical consequences in the 
absence of specific and inclusive yardsticks.’291 The CJEU’s has case law given 
only limited guidance since.292 In Rahman (2012), the CJEU ruled that Article 3(2) 
imposes ‘[…] an obligation on the Member States to confer a certain advantage, 
compared with applications for entry and residence of other nationals of third 
285 Art. 3(2) Directive 2004/38. See also COM (2009) 313 final, p. 4.
286 Recital 6 and Art. 3(2) Directive 2004/38.
287 This also follows from the obligation to respect fundamental rights – including the right to family 
life – in applying the Directive ex Art. 6(3) TEU. In 2011 Malta amended its law implementing Art. 3(2) 
Directive 2004/38 under which same‑sex partners could not qualify as durable, duly attested partners. 
It did so in response to an inquiry and negotiations by the Commission. European Union Nationals and 
their Family Members (Amendment) Order, 2011 (L.N. 329 of 2011).
288 Bell 2004, supra n. 227, at p. 625.
289 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2008, supra n. 181, at p. 63.
290 Toner 2012, supra n. 233, at p. 289.
291 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010, supra n. 181, at p. 50.
292 The CJEU further ruled that because of its imprecise formulation the provision could not be relied 
on directly against a Member State. Case C‑83/11 Rahman [2012] ECR 0000, ECLI:EU:C:2012:519, 
para. 21 and 24.







States, on applications submitted by persons who have a relationship of particular 
dependence with a Union citizen.’ States are left a wide discretion as regards the 
selection of the factors that could be relevant for the examination of the applicant’s 
personal circumstances. As a minimum they had to guarantee that they employed 
criteria that are consistent with the normal meaning of the term ‘facilitate’ and of 
the words relating to ‘dependence’ used in Article 3(2), and which do not deprive the 
provision of its effectiveness.
It is furthermore unclear how the terms ‘partner’ and ‘durable relationship, 
duly attested’ in this context should be interpreted. Following guidelines of the 
Commission on the Directive national rules on durability of the partnership can 
refer to a minimum amount of time as a criterion for whether a partnership can be 
considered as durable. However, other relevant aspects, such as a joint mortgage or 
children, should also be taken into account.293 The guidelines do not mention legal 
recognition of the relationship in another Member State as relevant criterion in this 
regard.
Generally, the application of this discretionary provision is unlikely to be problematic 
in States which provide in their national laws for some form of legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships. In the words of Toner, it is ‘[…] unlikely that we would find 
any State treating registered partnership as equivalent to marriage without granting 
residence rights for a non‑national partner in some form or other.’294 It has been 
submitted, particularly in view of the wide discretion left to States in Rahman, that 
‘[…] a host Member State that does not provide for any form of legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships, must accept that the condition that the relationship is duly 
attested is fulfilled in case the partners have entered into a registered partnership or 
marriage in another state.’295
9.6.2.4. Children of same‑sex couples
Following Article 2(2)(c) of the Free Movement Directive, the children (‘direct 
descendants’) of an EU citizen qualify for entry and residence as family members of 
the EU citizen. This only holds for children under the age of 21 or who are dependants. 
These rights extend to the children of the spouse or registered partner296 of the EU 
citizen. Even though the Directive does not specify this, it may be presumed that the 
EU citizen and/or his spouse or registered partner do not have to be the biological 
and genetic parents of the child, so it as long they are its legal parent(s). Hence, also 
adopted children qualify as family members under the Free Movement Directive and 
may consequently join their parent(s) when they move within the EU.
Complications could arise where the partner of a migrating EU citizen is not 
recognised by the host State as a family member under the Directive. For example, 
293 COM (2009) 313 final, at p. 4.
294 Toner 2012, supra n. 233, p. 287.
295 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 475.
296 As defined in Art. 2(2)(b), see above.







a situation could arise in which a third‑country national same‑sex registered partner 
of an EU citizen has a child with whom the EU citizen has not (yet) established 
parental links. When the partner is not recognised as a family member under the 
Directive, neither is the child. Matters may become even more complicated when 
the relationship of the partners has not at all been legally recognised in the home 
State. Where the child is a member of the household of the EU citizen, its entry and 
residence must be facilitated.297 Borg‑Barthet has observed that the child could thus 
‘[…] be granted free movement rights by virtue of the vertical relationship with 
one parent, while the horizontal relationship between the parents does not benefit 
similarly.’ The author held that ‘[i]n theory, the child could be denied the right to 
reside with one of its parents’, but found it more likely that in practice the right to free 
movement would be denied ‘[…] to the entire family, including any EU citizens in 
the family’.298 As Borg‑Barthet also noted, there have indeed been reports of rainbow 
families being denied free movement rights.299
9.6.3.	 The	free	movement	of	rainbow	families	under	primary	law
The foregoing discussion of the rights of migrating EU citizens and their family 
members under Directive 2004/38 has shown that there are various situations 
conceivable where application of the Directive does not preclude host States from 
refusing entry and residence to same‑sex spouses and registered partners of EU 
citizens as family members under Article 2 of the Directive. This may leave these 
same‑sex partners with a mere right to have their entry and residence ‘facilitated’ 
under Article 3 of the Directive. What is more, even if entry and residence are 
indeed facilitated by a host Member State, the same‑sex couple (and their family) 
may experience the consequences of the different regime in the host State in 
everyday life. When their civil status is downgraded or when their relationship is 
not at all legally recognised in the host State, the couple (or family) may experience 
difficulties, for instance in making their property rights effective, in obtaining social 
and fiscal benefits or in founding a family.300 Where they have children, this may 
also affect them, particularly when their parental links are not legally recognised in 
the host State.
297 Art. 3(2)(a) provides that host States must facilitate the entry and residence of ‘any other family 
members, irrespective of their nationality’ who, in the home State are dependants or members of the 
household of the EU citizen having the primary right of residence. This also applies where serious 
health grounds strictly require the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen.
298 J. Borg‑Barthet, ‘The principled imperative to recognise same‑sex unions in the EU’, 8 Journal of 
Private International Law (2012) p. 359 at p. 364.
299 Borg‑Barthet referred (at pp. 364–365) to cases reported by ILGA‑Europe in its contribution to the 
Green Paper of 2011. ILGA‑Europe 2011, supra n. 192. This Green Paper is further discussed in 
section 9.7.3 below.
300 For instance when same‑sex couples have no access to AHR treatment, or where they may not jointly 
adopt a child.







Because any application of secondary law must be commensurable with primary 
law,301 these situations require an examination under the Treaty rules. Space does 
not allow a detailed examination of each possible individual case at this place, but a 
couple of observations about the relevant legal examination can be made.
Where an EU citizen and his or her same‑sex partner (and their children) move to 
another Member State, this situation comes within the scope of the free movement 
of persons as provided for under Articles 21 and 45 TFEU (see above). It must 
next be examined whether there is a restriction of these rights. Not only rules that 
discriminate on the basis of nationality, but also national rules which hinder free 
movement or make the use of free movement rights less attractive are incompatible 
with the Treaties.302 A refusal to grant entry and residence to the same‑sex partner 
of a migrating EU citizen may indeed constitute such a restriction. The CJEU has 
on various occasions stressed that the possibility for an EU citizen to be joined by 
his or her partner, whatever the legal status of their relationship, is instrumental to 
the free movement of persons.303 Therefore, when the EU citizen is not allowed so, 
particularly when he or she is economically active, this may constitute a restriction 
of his right to free movement.304 The view has furthermore been taken that an EU 
citizen who wishes to use his or her free movement rights, but is effectively confined 
to the territory of those Member States that recognise his or her same‑sex marriage 
or registered partnership, is effectively deprived of the ‘genuine enjoyment’ of his or 
her citizenship rights in part of the EU territory.305
While in practice entry and residence may in many cases be facilitated under 
Article 3(2) of the Free Movement Directive, the couple or family may, as noted above, 
still come across difficulties once resident in the host Member State. The effects of 
the non‑recognition or downgrading of their civil status may have a (great) impact 
on their daily life in that State. While the CJEU has never pronounced itself on this 
particular issue, it has been submitted that a change in the civil status of incoming 
same‑sex couples may be seen as an obstacle to free movement.306 The Court has in 
any case held that changes in a person’s surname constitute such obstacles, as they 
have been held liable to cause serious inconvenience for those concerned at both 
301 In case of conflict, the conflict should be resolved either through a harmonious interpretation of 
secondary law or by applying directly the Treaty freedom. See Ensig Sørensen 2011, supra n. 204.
302 Case C‑415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I‑4921, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463. In the words of Toner: ‘Choice, 
and effective freedom to exercise that choice (not just legal rights subjected to conditions making 
them unattractive and unreasonable to exercise in practice), is the cornerstone of Community law on 
free movement, whether of goods, persons, establishment or service. […] The entire structure of free 
movement law is built around the concept that borders should be eliminated as far as possible.’ Toner 
2003, supra n. 229, at p. 186.
303 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 476, referring (in footnotes 120 and 121) to Case 59/85 
Netherlands v. Reed [1986] ECR 1283, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157, para. 28 and Case 249/86 Commission v. 
Germany [1989] ECR 1263, ECLI:EU:C:1989:204, para. 11.
304 Idem, at p. 476.
305 Idem, at p. 478.
306 Lenaerts 2009–2010, supra n. 7, at p. 1359. See also Karakosta 2013, supra n. 202, at pp. 66–68.







professional and private levels.307 The Court has furthermore acknowledged that 
civil status documents are of great importance to the free movement of persons.308 
Further, in relation to legal persons, the Court has held in cases such as Centros 
and Überseering, that the failure to recognise the legal personality of a company 
set up under the laws of another Member State could amount to a violation of the 
freedom of companies to move their business elsewhere within the EU.309 It has 
been submitted that legal personality is, like marriage, a construct of national law, 
and that by analogy the non‑recognition of a marriage could also be considered to 
constitute a restriction of the free movement of persons.310
The next question is which grounds may be invoked in order to justify such 
restrictions to the free movement rights. The Treaty itself provides for three grounds, 
namely public policy, public security and public health. Since the non‑recognition 
of same‑sex marriages or registered partnerships would amount to a restriction that 
does not differentiate on the basis of nationality, additional overriding reasons of 
public interest could also be invoked.311 The public policy argument is the broadest 
ground for justification, and possibly a public moral argument could be brought 
under this heading.312 The Court has at the same time consistently underlined that the 
concept of public policy as justification for a derogation from a fundamental freedom 
must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by 
each Member State without any control by the European Union institutions.313
Further, even if a justification ground has been accepted by the CJEU, the measure 
must still pass the proportionality test. It must be examined whether the measure 
is suitable for securing the objective which it pursues and whether it does not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to meet the pursued objective. Whether these 
criteria would be satisfied in cases where same‑sex relationships are refused 
recognition or where the civil status of same‑sex couple is downgraded, has been 
questioned.314 It has thereby been noted that once a same‑sex marriage or registered 
partnership has been recognised for the purpose of entry and residence, the couple 
is ‘firmly drawn within the scope of EU law’, at which point general principles and 
307 Case C‑148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613, ECLI:EU:C:2003:539 and Case C‑353/06 Grunkin 
[2008] ECR I‑7639, ECLI:EU:C:2008:559. In Konstantinidis the Court had held that the misspelling 
of an EU citizen’s name could create an inconvenience to such a degree that it would interfere with 
his freedom to exercise the right of establishment. Case C‑168/91 Konstantinidis [1993] ECR I‑1191, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:115.
308 Case C‑336/94 Dafeki [1997] ECR I‑6761, ECLI:EU:C:1997:579, para. 19.
309 Case C‑212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I‑1459, ECLI:EU:C:1999:126, para. 22 and Case C‑208/00 
Überseering [2002] ECR I‑9919, ECLI:EU:C:2002:632, para. 82.
310 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 477, referring (in footnote 128) to M. Melcher, ‘Private 
international law and registered relationships: an EU perspective’, 20 European Review of Private Law 
(2012) p. 1075 at p. 1081.
311 Case C‑55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I‑4165, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, para. 35.
312 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at pp. 478–479. For a contrary viewe see D. Kochenov, 
‘On options of citizens and moral choices of states: gays and European federalism’, 33 Fordham 
International Law Journal (2009) p. 156 at p. 203.
313 Case C‑36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I‑9609, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614, para. 30 and Case C‑33/07 Jipa [2008] 
ECR I‑5157, ECLI:EU:C:2008:396, para. 23.
314 Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 480.







fundamental rights – including the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation – apply as a matter of EU law.315
Another open question is what value the CJEU would attribute to an argument against 
the recognition of same‑sex relationships based on a Member State’s national identity 
under Article 4(2) TEU. In its case law the Court has given only limited guidance 
on the definition of this concept, and there have only been a handful of cases where 
this was accepted as a justification for an obstacle to free movement.316 It has often 
been held to be a limited concept, which should be defined as national constitutional 
identity,317 while not every rule of a constitutional nature would qualify for protection 
under Article 4(2) TEU.318 In Sayn‑Witgenstein (2010) and Runevič‑Vardyn (2011) the 
CJEU held that rules regarding the composition and spelling of surnames constituted 
justified restrictions on the basis of national identity.319 Also, in Sayn‑Wittgenstein 
the constitutional rule was held to protect not only constitutional identity, but also 
pursued the principle of equality, which has been recognised as a general principle 
of EU law as well. In Toressi (2013), by referring, inter alia, to national identity 
under Article 4(2) TEU,320 the Court accepted that the objective of promoting and 
encouraging the use of one of the official languages of the host State constituted a 
legitimate interest which, in principle, justified a restriction to the free movement 
of workers under Article 45 TFEU. When applied in the context of the present 
case study, the question must, for instance, be answered of whether the definition 
of marriage as a union between two people of a different‑sex in a Member State’s 
constitution would qualify as part of that State’s national identity. If it were, the next 
issue to be examined would, again, be whether the restrictive measure complied with 
the principle of proportionality.321 Here, weight could be attributed to the question of 
315 Idem, at p. 484.
316 Case C‑208/09 Sayn‑Wittgenstein [2010] ECR I‑13693, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806 and Case C‑391/09 
Runevič‑Vardyn [2011] ECR I‑3787, ECLI:EU:C:2011:291.
317 G. van der Schyff, ‘The constitutional relationship between the European Union and its member states: 
the role of national identity in article 4(2) TEU’, 37 European Law Review (2012) p. 563, at pp. 567–568. 
In a judgment of 2014, the Court confirmed that national identity within the meaning of Art. 4(2) TEU 
saw at the fundamental political and constitutional structures or the essential functions of the Member 
State. Joined Cases C‑58/13 and C‑59/13 Torresi, nyr, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2088.
318 Case C‑213/07 Michaniki [2008] ECR I‑9999, ECLI:EU:C:2008:544, Opinion of AG Maduro, para. 33. 
See Case C‑393/10 O’Brien [2012] ECR 0000, ECLI:EU:C:2012:110, para. 49 as regards the status of a 
Member State’s judiciary Case C‑399/11 Melloni [2013] ECR 0000 ECLI:EU:C:2012:600, Opinion of 
AG Bot, para. 142 as regards fundamental rights included in national constitutions.
319 In Sayn‑Wittgenstein the Court ruled that the Austrian prohibition to use titles of nobility as part 
of the surname could be saved on the basis of the public policy exception. The rule formed part of 
the country’s constitutional identity as a Republic and implemented the fundamental constitutional 
objective of equality before the law. In Runevič‑Vardyn, the Court allowed a Lithuanian rule under 
which the spelling of names in official documents would have to comply with the rules governing the 
spelling of the official national language. See supra n. 316.
320 The Court furthermore referred to the fourth subparagraph of Art. 3(3) TEU and Art. 22 CFR, following 
which the Union must respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity.
321 As noted by Rijpma and Koffeman ‘[i]n Sayn‑Witgenstein the Court exercised a – very 
light – proportionality test itself, while in Runevič‑Vardyn it referred back to the national court, 
hinting at the disproportionality of at least part of the measure’. Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra 
n. 1, at p. 482, referring (in footnote 156) to L. Besselink, ‘Case C‑208/09, Ilonka Sayn‑Wittgenstein 







whether the objective pursued by the restrictive measures had an equivalent at EU 
level.322
There are other situations conceivable in which the free movement rights of EU 
citizens in same‑sex relationships may be obstructed. For example, an obstacle to 
free movement may be formed by refusals by Member State authorities to issue 
civil status records to same‑sex couples who request such documents for the 
purpose of marrying or registering their partnership in another Member State. This 
was the case for Poland, until the Commission intervened in the matter,323 and has 
been reported to be the case in Estonia.324 Further, it has been pointed out that for 
same‑sex third‑country national partners of EU citizens it may be harder to obtain 
EU citizenship through marriage.325
9.6.4.	 The	Family	Reunification	Directive	and	third‑country	nationals	with	
rainbow	families
The Family Reunification Directive (2003/86) – which applies to third‑country 
nationals – provides for more discretion for States than the Free Movement 
Directive.326 When a third‑country national resides lawfully in a Member State he or 
she or his or her family members may apply for family reunification to be joined with 
him/her. While spouses are amongst the family members whose entry and residence 
States must authorise,327 the authorisation of entry and residence of the third‑country 
national registered partner or the third‑country national unmarried partner, with 
whom ‘the sponsor’ is in a ‘duly attested stable long‑term relationship’, is left to the 
v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, judgment of the Court (second chamber) of 22 December 2010’, 49 
CMLRev (2012) p. 671 at p. 692.
322 See Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 483.
323 European Commission – Directorate‑General for Justice, 2011 Report on the Application of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union 2012) p. 52, 
online available www.ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental‑rights/files/charter_report_en.pdf, visited 
June 2014. See also www.equal‑jus.eu/node/229 and www.equal‑jus.eu/node/237 visited June 2014.
324 ILGA‑Europe 2011, supra n. 192.
325 A. Tanca, ‘European Citizenship and the Rights of Lesbians and Gay Men’, in: K. Waaldijk and 
A. Clapham, Homosexuality: a European Community issue, Essays on Lesbian and gay rights in 
European Law and Policy (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993) p. 271 at p. 280.
326 European Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003, on the right to family reunification, 
deals with the conditions for the exercise of the right to family reunification by third‑country nationals 
residing lawfully in the territory of the Member States [2003] OJ L 251/12. The Family Reunification 
Directive determines the conditions under which third‑country nationals residing lawfully on the 
territory of the Member States may exercise the right to family reunification. The separate and less 
favourable regime for third‑country nationals has been held to appear ‘[…] difficult to reconcile with the 
EU’s commitment to a “fair” policy towards third‑country nationals who reside legally on the territory 
of its Member States, the aim of which should be to grant them rights and obligations comparable to 
those of EU citizens’. Rijpma and Koffeman 2014, supra n. 1, at p. 486, referring (in footnote 171) to 
Art. 67(2) TFEU and the Stockholm Programme [2010] OJ C115/1, para. 6.1.4.
327 Art. 5(1)(a) Directive 2003/86.







discretion of the Member States.328 They may decide that registered partners are to 
be treated equally as spouses with respect to family reunification.329
In respect of spouses, similar questions arise as under the Free Movement Directive 
(see 9.6.2 above), however if it were accepted that the term does not cover same‑sex 
spouses, the consequences would be much graver. This is so because of the Member 
States’ discretion in respect of unmarried partners under the Family Reunification 
Directive and the absence of a corresponding duty to facilitate the entry of long‑term 
stable partners.
When implementing and applying the provisions of the Directive, Member States 
are bound to observe fundamental rights.330 Recital No. 5 of the Preamble to the 
Family Reunification Directive furthermore provides that Member States must give 
effect to the provisions of the Directive without discrimination on the basis of, inter 
alia, sexual orientation. According to the Commission, it flows from this Recital 
that ‘Member States that recognise same‑sex marriages within their national family 
law should also do so in application of the Directive.’331 Conversely, it can be held 
that host States that do not recognise same‑sex marriages under their national law, 
are under no obligation to recognise same‑sex marriages legally concluded in other 
Member States. The Commission has furthermore held Recital No. 5 to imply that 
‘[…] whenever same sex registered partners are recognised under national family law 
and Member States apply the “may” clause of the Directive for registered partners, 
they should also do so for same sex partners.’332 This ‘may clause’ only binds the 
host State which applies it. If the same‑sex couple subsequently moves to another 
Member State, it is for this new host State to decide if the relationship is recognised 
for family reunification purposes.
A 2010 FRA report argued in even broader terms that ‘[…] the same‑sex spouse of the 
sponsor [had to] be granted the same rights as would be granted to an opposite‑sex 
spouse.’333 On the basis of the States’ obligation to implement the Directive without 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, while observing fundamental rights 
such as the right to respect for family life, this report supported the view that a 
spouse is a spouse.334 It was furthermore submitted that the fact that the Family 
328 Art. 4(3) Directive 2003/86.
329 Idem.
330 Case C‑540/03 Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I‑5769, ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, paras. 62–64.
331 Commission, ‘Green paper on the right to family reunification of third‑country nationals living in the 
European Union (Directive 2003/86/EC)’, COM (2011) 735 final, p. 4.
332 Idem. See also European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2008, supra n. 181, p. 151.
333 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010, supra n. 181, at p. 50.
334 Idem. The relevant para. reads: ‘The Directive does not define the meaning of ‘spouse’ in Article 4. 
However, the Member States should take into account their obligations under Art. 6(1) and 6(3) of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), to comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and with 
fundamental rights as general principles of EU Law. […] Where, by denying the possibility for the 
same‑sex spouse to join the sponsor, a Member State does not allow a durable partnership to continue, 
this would result in a disruption of private and family life and could constitute a violation of Article 8 
ECHR where the relationship could not develop elsewhere, for instance due to harassment against 
LGBT people in the countries of which the individuals concerned are nationals or where they could 







Reunification Directive granted more rights to the spouse of the sponsor, than to the 
unmarried partner of the sponsor, could ‘generate a form of indirect discrimination’, 
as the option of marrying was often not open to same‑sex couples.335
States must furthermore authorise the entry and residence of the joint minor children 
of the sponsor (the third‑country national who is residing lawfully in a Member 
State) and his or her spouse.336 This also holds for the children of either of them, 
where the sponsor or his or her spouse has custody and the children are dependent on 
him or her.337 The authorisation of entry and residence for children of third‑country 
national same‑sex couples who are in a registered partnership or who are unmarried, 
is left to the discretion of the Member States.338
The definition of ‘family’ under the Family Reunification Directive is also employed 
under the Long‑term Resident Directive, which grants third‑country nationals who 
have been legally present in EU territory a more permanent residence right, as well as 
a (limited) right to move to a second Member State.339 This implies that if a long‑term 
resident has entered into a (same‑sex) registered partnership in one of the Member 
States340 and wishes to move to another Member State, it is up to the discretion of 
the second Member State to allow him or her to bring his or her registered partner.
9.7. europeAn prIvAte InternAtIonAl lAw And rAInbow fAmIlIes
As illustrated by Chapters 10 and 12 on German, Dutch and Irish legislation, all EU 
Member States have their own set of conflict‑of‑laws rules. Over the years, a couple 
of EU instruments have entered into force, or have been proposed, that approximate 
certain elements of these national Private International Law regimes in respect of 
family law. These instruments have as their legal basis Article 81(3) TFEU (or any 
of its predecessors), according to which the Union is competent to take measures for 
the approximation of the laws and Regulations of the Member States in ‘family law 
with cross‑border implications’. For many of these instruments it is debated if they 
apply to same‑sex relationships.
Since 2007, the EU has been a Member of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law.341 It has ratified the Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law 
establish themselves. In addition, the Directive should be implemented without discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation. The implication is that the same‑sex spouse of the sponsor should be 
granted the same rights as would be granted to an opposite‑sex spouse.’
335 Idem. Such reasoning could be analogously applied to the Free Movement Directive, although there in 
more cases same‑sex couples may have the alternative option of registered partnership.
336 Art. 5(1)(b) Directive 2003/86.
337 Art. 5(1)(c) and (d) Directive 2003/86.
338 Art. 4(3) Directive 2003/86.
339 Art. 2(e) Directive 2003/109.
340 Art. 16(1) Directive 2003/109.
341 Council Decision of 5 October 2006 on the accession of the Community to the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law (2006/719/EC) [2006] OJ L297/1. The European Community became a 
Member of the Hague Conference on 3 April 2007. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 







Applicable to Maintenance Obligations,342 and it is debated whether this instrument 
applies to same‑sex relationships.343 The EU is no party to the 1978 Hague Convention 
on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages, and it is equally widely 
discussed if this could be interpreted as extending to same‑sex marriages.344 The 
same holds for the Hague Adoption Convention (1993),345 which ‘does not deal 
specifically with adoption by homosexual couples.’346
9.7.1. The Brussels I and Brussels II bis	Regulations	and	subsequent	EU	PIL	
instruments
The Brussels I Regulation of 2000 provides for rules governing the jurisdiction of 
courts and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters in EU Member States.347 Because the Regulation does not apply to matrimonial 
matters,348 Brussels II349 was subsequently adopted, which was soon replaced by the 
present Brussels II bis.350 The latter Regulation applies in civil matters relating to 
1 December 2009, the European Union replaced and succeeded the European Community as from that 
date. The Hague Conference on Private International Law is ‘a global inter‑governmental organisation’, 
which aims at the ‘progressive unification’ of private international law rules. See the website of the 
Hague Conference, www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26, visited June 2014.
342 Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, online available 
at www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=133, visited June 2014. See also Council 
Decision of 30 November 2009 on the conclusion by the European Community of the Hague Protocol 
of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations (2009/941/EC) [2009] OJ L 
331/17.
343 Following its Art. 1(1), the Protocol applies to maintenance obligations ‘[…] arising from a family 
relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity’. See also D. Martiny, ‘Workshop: cross‑border recognition 
(and refusal of recognition) of registered partnerships and marriages with a focus on their financial 
aspects and the consequences for divorce, maintenance and succession’, in: K. Boele‑Woelki and 
A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal recognition of same‑sex Relationships in Europe, National, cross‑border and 
European perspectives, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Intersentia 2012) p. 225 at p. 246.
344 E.g. Bell 2004, supra n. 227, at p. 627, referring (in footnote 70) to H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Freedom 
of movement of spouses and registered partners in the European Union’, in: J. Basedow et al. (eds), 
Private Law in the international arena – From national conflict rules towards harmonization and 
unification, Liber amicorum Kurt Siehr (The Hague, TCM Asser Press 2000) p. 527 at p. 534 and 
K. Siehr, ’Family unions in private international law’, 50 Netherlands International Law Review (2003) 
p. 419 at p. 426. See also Martiny 2012B, supra n. 343, at p. 233.
345 Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co‑operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, entry into force on 1 May 1995.
346 D. Martiny, ‘Private International Law Aspects of Same‑Sex couples under German Law’, in: 
K. Boele‑Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal recognition of same‑sex Relationships in Europe, National, 
cross‑border and European perspectives, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Intersentia 2012) p. 189 at p. 219.
347 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2010] OJ L 12/1. The regulation supersedes 
the Brussels Convention of 1968, which was applicable between the EU countries before the regulation 
entered into force. See also Ch. 3, section 3.6.3.
348 Idem.
349 Council Regulation 1347/2000/EC of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of both 
spouses [2000] OJ L160/19.
350 Council Regulation 2201/2003/EC of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, 







divorce, legal separation and the annulment of marriage, as well as to all aspects of 
parental responsibility. The latter excludes decisions on adoption.351 It provides for 
automatic recognition of all judgments without any intermediary procedure being 
required. Recognition of judgments relating to matrimonial matters and matters of 
parental responsibility may be refused if such recognition is manifestly contrary to 
public policy.352 In cases concerning parental responsibility, this exception may only 
be applied if it is in the best interests of the child. Generally any such application of 
the public policy exception must be in conformity with the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, of which also the prohibition of discrimination (Article 21) is particularly 
relevant in the present case study.353
The Brussels I and Brussels II bis Regulations function as a backbone for Union 
action in the field of cross‑border civil matters. In fact, Brussels II has been perceived 
as marking ‘the beginning of the ‘Europeanisation’ of family law’, ‘[…] with Member 
States ceding competence in core areas of social policy’, as it was ‘[…] the first EU 
measure to deal exclusively and directly with core family law matters’.354
It has been much debated if same‑sex marriages and registered partnerships fall 
within the scope of Brussels II bis.355 As Martiny explained, at the time of the drafting 
of the Regulation a same‑sex marriage was not a familiar element of the Member 
States’ family law, ‘[…] so that only a change of the concept based on systematic 
and teleological arguments could justify including same‑sex marriages in the 
Regulation’s scope.’356 So far none of the EU institutions have provided guidance on 
the matter.357 Wautelet has argued that ‘[…] the principle of autonomous interpretation 
probably means that there is today no room for application of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation when the court is seized of a petition concerning a same‑sex marriage.’358 
repealing Regulation 1347/2000/EC [2003] OJ L338/1. Somewhat confusing, this Regulation is referred 
to as Brussels II Bis or Brussels II A, or sometimes as ‘the new Brussels II’.
351 Art. 3(b) Regulation 2201/2003.
352 Arts. 22 and 23 Regulation 2201/2003.
353 Compare Recital No. 58 of the Preamble to European Parliament and Council Regulation 650/2012/EU 
of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance 
and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European 
Certificate of Succession [2012] OJ L201/107.
354 M. Ní Shúilleabháin, ‘Ten years of European family law: Retrospective reflections from a common law 
perspective’, 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2010) p. 1021 at pp. 1021‑1023.
355 Wautelet has called looking for the answer to this question ‘a frustrating experience, as there is very 
limited practice on the subject.’ P. Wautelet, ‘Private International Law aspects of same‑sex marriages 
and partnerships in Europe – Divided we stand?’, in: K. Boele‑Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal 
recognition of same‑sex Relationships in Europe, National, cross‑border and European perspectives, 
2nd edn. (Cambridge, Intersentia 2012) p. 143 at pp. 158–159. Verschraegen has opined that the 
Regulation does not apply to same‑sex relationships. Verschraegen 2012, supra n. 156, at p. 267.
356 Martiny 2012B, supra n. 343, at p. 236.
357 There is, for instance, no mention of same‑sex couples in: Commission, ‘Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000’, COM (2014) 225 final.
358 Wautelet 2012, supra n. 355, at p. 160, referring (in footnote 82) to M. Ní Shuilleabhan, Cross‑Border 
Divorce Law. Brussels II bis (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010) pp. 110–111 and 114–116.







The dominant view is, further, that the Regulation is not applicable to registered 
partnerships.359 ILGA‑Europe has urged the European Commission to ‘clarify’ that 
the Brussels II Regulation ‘[…] applies to marriages of same‑sex partners, and that 
the validity of marriages and the conditions for marriage are determined by the 
law of the place where the marriage was celebrated’.360 ILGA‑Europe furthermore 
has recommended extending the application of this Regulation ‘[…] to registered 
partnerships and possibly to other forms of legal cohabitation (where they are treated 
in a way comparable to married couples), and expressly exclude that any public 
policy claim can be made solely on the grounds that the decision concerns one of 
such schemes.’361
There is, furthermore, uncertainty in respect of the application of other EU PIL 
instruments to same‑sex relationships, such as the EU Regulation on maintenance 
of 2008362 and the 2012 Regulation on succession.363 In respect of divorce and legal 
separation, only few Member States could reach agreement through enhanced 
cooperation.364 Following Article 13 of the relevant Regulation 1259/2010, the courts 
of a participating Member State whose laws do not provide for divorce or do not 
deem the marriage in question valid for the purposes of divorce proceedings, are 
not obliged to pronounce a divorce by virtue of the application of this Regulation. 
According to Wautelet this ‘[…] seem[ed] to open up the possibility for States to 
refuse to entertain a petition for divorce filed by same‑sex partners.’365
All in all, the existing EU PIL instruments provide very little guidance in respect 
of cross‑border cases involving same‑sex couples and rainbow families. While, 
359 Martiny 2012A, supra n. 346, at p. 221, referring (in footnote 190) inter alia to R. Wagner, ‘Das 
neue Internationale Privat‑ und Verfahrens‑ recht zur eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft’ [‘The new 
international private and procedural law on civil partnerships’], 21 IPRax (2001) p. 281 at p. 282 and 
Martiny 2012B, supra n. 343, at p. 236.
360 ILGA‑Europe 2011, supra n. 192, at p. 5.
361 Idem.
362 Council Regulation 4/2009/EC of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations [2009] OJ 
L7/1. As Storskrubb explains, the Regulation is closely linked to the 2007 Hague Protocol on the Law 
Applicable to Maintenance Obligations and the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of 
Child Support and other forms of Family Maintenance. E. Storskrubb, ‘Civil Jusitice – A newcomer 
and an unstoppable wave?’, in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca, The evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2011) p. 313.
363 European Parliament and Council Regulation 650/2012/EU of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments 
in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession [2012] OJ L201/107. 
Following its Art. 1(3)(a) this Regulation does not apply to ‘[…] the status of natural persons, as well 
as family relationships and relationships deemed by the law applicable to such relationships to have 
comparable effects’. Martiny has argued that the Regulation applies to same‑sex registered partners. 
See Martiny 2012B, supra n. 343, at pp. 247 and 249.
364 Council Regulation 1259/2010/EU of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation [2010] OJ L343/10. On enhanced cooperation, 
see Art. 20 TEU.
365 Wautelet 2012, supra n. 355, at p. 182. Martiny considered this Regulation to apply to situations 
involving two nationals from Member States with same‑sex marriages. Martiny 2012B, supra n. 343, 
at pp. 238–239.







as hereafter discussed, initiatives have been taken for new PIL instruments that 
may prove very relevant to the present case study, none of them expressly refers to 
same‑sex couples.
9.7.2.	 Proposals	for	Regulations	on	property	regimes	(2010)
In 2006 the Commission launched ‘[…] a wide‑ranging consultation exercise on 
the legal questions which arise in an international context as regards matrimonial 
property regimes and the property consequences of other forms of union.’366 The 
consultation addressed questions that arise in connection with determination of the 
law applicable to property and the ways in which the recognition and enforcement 
of court decisions can be facilitated. In 2010, this exercise resulted in two separate 
proposals for Council Regulations, one on matrimonial property regimes and the 
other on the property consequences of registered partnerships.367
The proposals aimed to establish ‘a comprehensive set of rules of international 
private law’ applicable to matrimonial property regimes as well as to the property 
consequences of registered partnerships, and to facilitate ‘the movement of decisions 
and instruments among the Member States.’368 It was held that ‘[g] iven the nature 
and the scale of the problems experienced by European citizens’, these objectives 
could be achieved only at Union level.369 At the same time, the Commission stressed 
366 Commission, ‘Green Paper on conflict of laws in matters concerning matrimonial property regimes, 
including the question of jurisdiction and mutual recognition’, COM (2006) 400. As the Green Paper 
explains at p. 3: ‘[T]he adoption of a European instrument relating to matrimonial property regimes 
was among the priorities identified in the 1998 Vienna Action Plan […]. The programme of measures 
for implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters, 
adopted by the Council and the Commission at the end of 20003, provided for the development of an 
instrument on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of decisions as regards matrimonial 
property regimes and property consequences of the separation of unmarried couples. The Hague 
programme, which was adopted by the European Council on 4 and 5 November 2004 and established 
the implementation of the mutual recognition programme as a first priority, and the Council and 
Commission Action Plan implementing it called on the Commission to submit a Green Paper on 
“the conflict of laws in matters concerning matrimonial property regimes, including the question of 
jurisdiction and mutual recognition”.’ See Hague Programme, “Strengthening freedom, security and 
justice in the European Union”, included in the conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council 
of 4 November 2004 and Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme 
on strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union [2005] OJ C198/1.
367 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes’, COM (2011) 126 final and 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships’, COM 
(2011) 127 final.
368 COM (2011) 126 final, p. 3 and COM (2011) 127 final, p. 3. Coester furthermore observed that 
non‑discrimination was an important motive (‘Leitgedanke’) of the proposed Regulations. M. Coester, 
‘Art. 17b EGBGB unter dem Einfluss des Europäischen Kollisionsrechts’, 22 IPRax (2013) p. 114 at 
p. 116.
369 COM (2011) 126 final, p. 4 and COM (2011) 127 final, p. 4.







that it was not trying to harmonise the Member States’ laws concerning matrimonial 
property regimes and the property aspects of registered partnerships.370
The text of both proposals is gender neutral; there is no mention of terms like 
‘husband’ or ‘wife’.371 Furthermore, neither of the Proposals refers explicitly to 
same‑sex couples, not even in the Explanatory Memorandum.372 Initially it was held 
in both proposals that the terms ‘marriage’ and ‘registered partnership’ were defined 
by the national laws of the Member States. The European Parliament later subtly 
nuanced this. In respect of marriage, the new Recital No. 10 reads:
‘This Regulation covers issues in connection with matrimonial property regimes. It does 
not define “marriage”, which is defined by the national laws of the Member States. Rather, 
it adopts a neutral attitude towards that concept. This Regulation does not affect the 
definition of the concept of marriage in the national law of the Member States.’373
In respect of registered partnerships it is provided as follows:
‘This Regulation covers matters arising from the property consequences of registered 
partnerships. “Registered partnership” is defined here solely for the purposes of this 
Regulation. For the purposes of this Regulation, a registered partnership is a form of 
union other than marriage. The actual substance of the concept of a registered partnership 
is defined in the national laws of the Member States.’374
In respect of the applicable law, married couples had a choice of law under 
the Commission proposals,375 while the property consequences of registered 
partnerships were governed by the law of the State of registration.376 The Explanatory 
Memorandum made clear that this principle was adopted ‘[…] in view of the 
differences between the national laws of those Member States that make provision 
for registered partnerships’. The principle was furthermore held to be ‘[…] in line 
with the Member States’ laws on registered partnerships, which usually provide for 
application of the law of the State of registration, and do not offer partners the option 
370 Idem.
371 Martiny observed that this ‘gender‑neutral approach’, showed ‘that there [was] an intention that same‑sex 
marriages [were] not [to] be treated differently from opposite‑sex marriage under matrimonial law.’ 
The author suggested that under the influence of changes in substantive family law within the Member 
States, the Court could also change its position. Martiny 2012B, supra n. 343, at p. 237, referring (in 
footnote 26) to Bogdan 2009, supra n. 246, at p. 255.
372 Wautelet found it ‘striking’ that the text was ‘very timid’. Wautelet 2012, supra n. 355, at p. 182.
373 European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 September 2013 on the proposal for a Council 
regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matters of matrimonial property regimes (COM (2011)0126 – C7‑0093/2011 – 2011/0059(CNS)), P7_
TA(2013)0338, Amendment 1.
374 European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 September 2013 on the proposal for a Council regulation 
on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property 
consequences of registered partnerships (COM (2011)0127 – C7‑0094/2011 – 2011/0060(CNS)), P7_
TA(2013)0337, Amendment 3.
375 Proposed Arts. 16 and 17 COM (2011)126 final.
376 Proposed Art. 15 COM (2011) 127 final.







of choosing any law other than the State of registration, even though they may be 
entitled to conclude agreements between themselves.’ Lastly, it was held to ensure 
‘[…] the unity of the law applicable to all properties owned by the couple that [were] 
subject to the property consequences of registered partnerships, whatever their form 
or location.’377 While the Commission claimed to have verified that the proposal 
complied with the prohibition of discrimination ex Article 21 CFR, the Fundamental 
Rights Agency (FRA) issued harsh criticism, holding that this distinction between 
married couples and registered partners in respect of the choice of law constituted 
indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.378 The amended version of 
the Regulation on the property consequences of registered partnerships, as adopted 
by the European Parliament in September 2013, subsequently also provided for a 
choice of law for registered partners.379
Both proposals provide for public policy exceptions,380 however, it has been explicitly 
held that these may not be discriminatory.381 The application of a rule of the law 
determined by the Regulation can be refused only if such application is ‘manifestly 
incompatible’ with the public policy of the forum or the Member State concerned.382 
The accompanying Memorandum of the Proposal in respect of matrimonial property 
regimes explained:
‘Considerations of public interest dictate that courts in the Member States be given the 
possibility in exceptional circumstances of setting aside the foreign law in a given case 
where its application would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the forum. 
However, the courts should not be able to apply the public policy exception in order to 
set aside the law of another Member State or to refuse to recognise or enforce a decision, 
authentic instrument or legal transaction drawn up in another State if the application of 
the public policy exception would be contrary to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, and in particular Article 21, which prohibits all forms of discrimination.’383
For registered partnerships it is explicitly provided that the application of a rule of 
the law determined by the proposed Regulation can ‘[…] not be regarded as contrary 
to the public policy of the forum merely on the grounds that the law of the forum 
does not recognise registered partnerships.’384 The forum of habitual residence may 
however decline jurisdiction on this ground. Proposed Article 5(2) provides that in 
377 COM (2011) 126 final, p. 8.
378 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Opinion on the Proposal for a regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property 
consequences of registered partnerships, Opinion No. 1/2012 (FRA, Vienna 2012), online available at 
www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/research/opinions/opinions_en.htm, visited June 2014.
379 European Parliament, supra n. 373, Amendment 3.
380 Proposed Art. 23 COM (2011) 126 final and Proposed Art. 18 COM (2011) 127 final.
381 Consideration 25 of COM (2011) 126 final and Considerations 20–21 of COM (2011) 127 final. In 
both proposals reference is made to Art. 21 CFR. See also Art. 17 of the version of the Registered 
Partnership Regulations adopted by the European Parliament in September 2013. European Parliament, 
supra n. 373.
382 Proposed Art. 23 COM (2011) 126 final and European Parliament, supra n. 373, Amendment 70.
383 Consideration 25 of COM (2011) 126 final.
384 Proposed Art. 18(2) COM (2011) 127 final.







situations other than the death of one of the partners or the separation of the partners 
the forum of habitual residence may decline jurisdiction ‘[…] if their law does not 
recognise the institution of registered partnership’.
9.7.3.	 Green	Paper	on	recognition	of	civil	status	records	(2010)
In 2010 the Commission published a Green Paper on the recognition of civil status 
records,385 which has been discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.6.3.1. The Green Paper 
is also important for cross‑border cases involving same‑sex couples, even though 
this matter was not explicitly addressed in the Green Paper, a fact of which Toner 
was very critical:
‘[…] as before, the Commission does not seem to address head‑on the issues involved 
here. For example, there is no explicit mention at all of the cross‑border recognition of the 
validity [of] same‑sex marital relationships, and the only mention of registered partnership 
appears to be the possibility of a change of surname involved after such a partnership is 
entered into! […] there are far wider and more problematic issues than this involved.’386
The Green Paper is also relevant for migrating rainbow families, as civil status 
records were defined in the Green Paper as including records recording birth, 
filiation, adoption and recognition of paternity.387
As explained in Chapter 3, three policy options were proposed by the Commission in 
the Green Paper: (1) assisting national authorities to cooperate more effectively ‘[…] 
until there [was] greater convergence of MS’ substantive family law’; (2) automatic 
recognition of civil status situations established in other Member States; or (3) 
harmonisation of conflict‑of‑law rules.388
The Commission explained that automatic recognition (the second option) would be 
‘[…] simple and transparent […] with respect to all citizens exercising their right of 
freedom of movement throughout the European Union’, and that it would provide 
the citizen with ‘legal certainty’. It was also maintained that the host Member State 
‘[…] would not have to change its substantive law or modify its legal system.’ Some 
disagreed with this observation. The UK House of Lords, for example, held:
‘Contrary to the Commission’s assertion, that would involve a significant change to the law 
of a Member State, for example if a same sex marriage legally contracted and registered in 
385 Commission, ‘Green Paper ‘Less bureaucracy for citizens: promoting free movement of public 
documents and recognition of the effects of civil status records’’, COM (2010) 747 final.
386 Toner 2012, supra n. 233, at pp. 290–291.
387 According to the Green paper, civil status records are ‘[…] records executed by an authority in order 
to record the life events of each citizen such as birth, filiation, adoption, marriage, recognition of 
paternity, death and also a surname change following marriage, divorce, a registered partnership, 
recognition, change of sex or adoption.’ See COM (2010) 747 final, para. 4.1.
388 The Green Paper made clear that the Commission had ‘neither the power nor the intention […] to 
modify the national definition of marriage.’ COM (2010) 747 final, para. 4.3.







Member State A had to be given effect in Member State B which did not otherwise permit 
or recognise same‑sex marriages.’389
In respect of registered partnerships, this question may be even more important, 
as it has not been made clear what ‘automatic recognition’ entails if the host State 
does not provide for any form of registered partnership under its national law. Must 
this State then treat the foreign partnership as ‘marriage’ under its national law? 
The latter option would indeed not require any change of substantive domestic law, 
but it may also be politically sensitive. The Commission acknowledged automatic 
recognition could ‘[…] prove to be […] complicated in […] civil status situations such 
as marriage’ and noted that in any case, this possibility had to take ‘due account of 
the public order rules of the Member States.’390
In respect of the harmonisation of conflict‑of‑law rules the Commission held that this
‘[…] might be another possible way of allowing citizens to exercise fully their right to 
freedom of movement while providing them with greater legal certainty in relation to civil 
status situations created in another Member State. A body of common rules developed in 
the European Union would enshrine the right which would be applicable to a cross‑border 
situation when a civil status event takes place. This right would be defined on the basis of 
one or more connecting factors taking into account citizen mobility.’391
The Green Paper also stressed that the Commission had ‘[…] neither the power nor 
the intention to propose the drafting of substantive European rules on, for instance, 
[…] marriage or to modify the national definition of marriage.’392
Some of the State authorities and interested parties that had an input in the Consultation 
process393 explicitly addressed issues concerning same‑sex relationships. The Dutch 
Ministry of Justice, for example, held subsidiarity to be ‘the key principle’ in this 
context. Accordingly, it welcomed the Commission’s observation that the EU had no 
competence to intervene in the substantive family law of Member States. ‘However’, 
it was added, ‘[…] this [did] not alter the fact that the Netherlands [would] continue to 
push for the multilateral recognition of same‑sex marriages and registered partnerships 
in the EU.’394 The Federal Government of Germany was very critical in respect of 
the recognition option as proposed by the Commission. It believed that this was 
389 House of Lords, European Union Committee, p. 5, online available at w w w . e c . e u r o p a . e u / j u s 
tice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/110510/organisations/uk_house_lords_en.pdf, visited June 2014.
390 COM (2010) 747 final, para. 4.3.
391 Idem.
392 Idem.
393 See the official Commission website on the public consultation www.ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/
civil/opinion/110510_en.htm, visited June 2014. No contributions by the Irish authorities were 
published on this website.
394 The Netherlands asserted that ‘[…] any issue that can be regulated more effectively by the member 
states [was] not [to] be decided in Brussels.’ Dutch response to COM (2010) 747 final, p. 2, online 
available at ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/110510/public_authorities/netherlands_
minjust_en.pdf, visited May 2012.







‘[…] an unbalanced, systematically incorrect and incoherent makeshift solution.’395 
The German government considered the harmonisation of conflict‑of‑laws rules the 
only appropriate solution. The German Bundesrat for its part acknowledged that 
automatic recognition probably came ‘closest to a Community ideal’ and could 
for that reason be a desirable goal, but held that this could only be achieved if the 
applicable conflict‑of‑laws rules were first harmonised.396 ILGA‑Europe made a 
strong plea for the portability of rights of same‑sex partners in its response to the 
Green Paper.397 The NGO umbrella organisation held that all EU citizens had to be 
able to
‘[…] validly acquire a personal status of their choice elsewhere in the Union (especially 
if it is not possible in their own state); have a portable status wherever they go (including 
returning to the State); and circulate freely with an unmarried or unregistered partner.’398
ILGA‑Europe furthermore held that there were specific legal difficulties for the 
children of same‑sex parents in cross‑border situations as ‘[…] the varying degrees 
of non‑recognition of same‑sex partners’ had ‘an automatic negative impact on the 
rights of children of gay and lesbian parents.’399 The LGBT interest organisation 
stressed that in a majority of EU Member States children could not establish full 
parental links with both their same‑sex parents.400 Also, it was noted that there was a 
risk of parental links being stripped away from children upon movement to another 
Member State (see also 9.6.2.4 above).
As noted in Chapter 3 section 3.6.3.1, no further legislative initiative has been taken 
in respect of recognition of civil status documents, although in 2014 the Parliament 
called on the Commission to ‘[…] make proposals for the mutual recognition of the 
effects of all civil status documents across the EU, in order to reduce discriminatory 
legal and administrative barriers for citizens and their families who exercise their 
right to free movement’.401
395 Federal Government observations on COM (2010) 747 final, p. 14, online available at www.ec.europa.
eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/110510/public_authorities/germany_minjust_en.pdf, visited 
June 2014.
396 Idem, pp. 12–13 and Bundesrat Resolution of 15 April 2011, Document 831/10, point 12, online 
available at www.ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/files/110510/public_authorities/
germany_parliament_en.pdf, visited June 2014.
397 ILGA‑Europe 2011, supra n. 192.
398 Idem, at p. 20.
399 Idem.
400 It was claimed that this was so, as there was no second‑parent adoption for same‑sex partners in those 
countries. This may have been partly redressed as a result of ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. 
Austria, no. 19010/07 (see ch. 8, section 8.2.4.1.2).
401 European Parliament Resolution of 4 February 2014 on the EU Roadmap against homophobia and 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity (2013/2183(INI)).








While LGBT rights form a prominent part of the EU’s fundamental rights agenda 
(section 9.4) and while EU institutions have undoubtedly played a stimulating role in 
respect of the promotion of LGBT rights in the Member States, the actual protection 
that EU law offers in this regard has its limitations. Limitations, first of all, exist 
in the fact that the EU does not have competences in all areas of law, for instance, 
not in substantive family law. In addition, in some areas where the EU does have 
competence, for example in respect of free movement, there remain open questions 
as to the application of the relevant rules in cases concerning same‑sex couples and 
rainbow families.
Full equal rights for same‑sex couples have been guaranteed by the EU legislature 
under the EU Staff Regulations since 2004. Staff cases are of EU law pur sang 
in the sense that the Member States’ national legislation is not affected by them. 
On the other hand, as certain entitlements depend on the civil status of the staff 
member, national legislation still plays an important role in the obtainment of equal 
rights under EU law. That also holds for EU non‑discrimination law (section 9.3). 
Importantly, the CJEU has held that there is direct discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation where at national level certain employment benefits are reserved 
to spouses, while marriage is reserved to different‑sex couples only and while 
under national law, a same‑sex registered partner is in a legal and factual situation 
comparable to that of a spouse as regards that benefit. The existence of some form 
of civil status under national law has thus been decisive in the Maruko, Römer and 
Hay judgments, and it has therefore been held ‘arguable’ that the Union’s approach 
in this realm of EU law has perpetuated ‘the individuality of each Member State’s 
family law traditions.’402 It remains to be seen what the Court would rule in a case 
where there is no alternative form of recognition at national level. In Grant (1998) 
the Court expressly held that in respect of a certain employment benefit the situation 
of a same‑sex couple in a non‑marital relationship was not comparable to that of a 
married couple, but whether this would still be upheld today, particularly after the 
Hay judgment, remains to be seen.
The rights that are granted to same‑sex couples under EU free movement law are 
equally dependent on national legislation on civil status. Both the Free Movement 
Directive and the Family Reunification Directive leave room for host States to 
apply their own national standards to migrating same‑sex couples. While in 
respect of registered partners, the host State principle is clearly adopted by the EU 
legislature under the Free Movement Directive, this is less clear in respect of the 
term ‘spouse’. It has been observed that ‘[…] an uneven landscape with respect to 
freedom of movement and family reunification for same‑sex couples’ exists.403 Both 
402 Borg‑Barthet 2012, supra n. 298, at p. 359.
403 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Homophobia, transphobia and discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in the EU Member States. Summary of 
findings, trends, challenges and promising practices (Luxembourg, Publications Office of 
the European Union 2011) p. 28, online available at www.fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2011/







up and downgrading of foreign same‑sex marriages and registered partnerships 
takes place.404 While various Member States changed their definition of ‘family 
member’ to include same‑sex partners for the purposes of free movement and family 
reunification,405 in some Member States, contrary developments have taken place.406 
The diverse practice has been heavily criticised, since as a consequence ‘[…] the 
freedom of movement of LGBT persons is restricted and not uniformly recognised 
throughout the European Union’.407 While the Parliament has repeatedly called on 
the Member States and the Commission to guarantee the free movement of rainbow 
families,408 no legislative change has yet been implemented in this regard, rendering 
it even more probable that the matter will one day be decided by the CJEU. When 
confronted with a preliminary reference concerning the interpretation of the term 
‘spouse’, it has been explained that the CJEU has different options; it may interpret 
this term independently or apply a host State or a home state principle. The home 
State principle would provide the strongest protection of the free movement rights 
of both the EU citizen and his or her same‑sex spouse. In most situations the entry 
and residence of a same‑sex spouse will presumably be facilitated on the basis of 
Article 3(2) of the Directive.
This is different for same‑sex spouses of third‑country nationals, as the Family 
Reunification Directive does not provide for such a fall back option like Article 3(2) 
of the Free Movement Directive. The entry and residence of same‑sex registered 
homophobia‑transphobia‑and‑discrimination‑grounds‑sexual‑orientation‑and‑gender, visited 
June 2014.
404 Costello 2009, supra n. 270, at pp. 615–616. See ch. 10, section 10.4.6 and ch. 11, section 11.4.4, 
which shows that under German and Irish Private international law, foreign same‑sex marriages are 
‘downgraded’ to the German and Irish civil partnership.
405 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Annual Report 2011; Fundamental rights: challenges 
and achievements in 2011 (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union 2012). The report 
refers (on p. 134) to Austria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia as well as 
Lithuania. In 2008, the Commission concluded in its report on compliance with the Free Movement 
Directive that ‘[s]ame‑sex couples enjoy[ed] full rights of free movement and residence in thirteen 
Member States which consider[ed] registered partners as family members.’ COM (2008) 840, para. 3.1. 
at p. 4. The Commission indicated that these thirteen states were: BE, BG, CZ, DK, FI, IT, LT, LU, 
PT, NL, ES, SE and the UK. Toner has called this a ‘[…] laconic and quite possibly dubiously accurate 
assessment’. Toner 2012, supra n. 233, at p. 290.
406 The 2011 annual report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights pointed out: ‘[…] [N]
ew legislation in Romania prohibits the transcription/registration of civil status certificates or extracts 
issued by foreign authorities for same‑sex marriages or same‑sex civil partnerships concluded abroad. 
This transcription is a requirement for obtaining entry and residence into Romania for spouses or 
partners, which necessarily only recognise partnerships between men and women.’ European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights 2011A, supra n. 405, at p. 135.
407 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2008, supra n. 181, at p. 64.
408 The Parliament has repeatedly called on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the 
Free Movement Directive was implemented without any discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
European Parliament Resolution of 26 April 2007 on homophobia in Europe, P6_TA(2007)0167 
and European Parliament resolution of 24 May 2012 on the fight against homophobia in Europe 
(2012/2657(RSP)) P7_TA(2012)0222, para. 4. In 2014, the Parliament asked the Commission to produce 
‘[…] guidelines to ensure the Free Movement Directive and the family reunification Directive were 
‘[…] implemented so as to ensure respect for all forms of families legally recognised under Member 
States’ national laws.’ European Parliament Resolution of 4 February 2014 on the EU Roadmap against 
homophobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity (2013/2183(INI)).







partners and same‑sex stable partners of third‑country nationals is, moreover, within 
the discretion of the Member States, although they may not discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation when implementing this Directive.
What has furthermore become clear is that while the authorisation of the entry and 
residence of same‑sex partners of EU citizens or third‑country nationals is an essential 
step, the story does not end there. Same‑sex couples may still encounter difficulties 
in their daily lives if their relationships are not legally recognised in the host Member 
State. In cases involving EU citizens such difficulties can possibly be challenged 
on the basis of the primary free movement rules, as set out in section 9.6.3. The EU 
legislature may also redress these issues by adopting instruments on the basis of 
Article 81(3) TFEU, the legal basis for the approximation of conflict‑of‑laws rules 
concerning family law. The proposed Regulations on Property regimes (section 9.7.2) 
are a clear step in that direction and possibly further EU PIL instruments on the basis 
of the Green Paper on recognition of civil status records may follow. That is still in 
the future, however, and for the time being the automatic recognition of civil status 
records is not in sight.
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This first section discusses two Articles of the German Basic Law that are 
fundamental to the present case study, namely Article 3 (equality before the law) and 
Article 6 (protection of marriage and the family). The right to free development of the 
personality (including personal autonomy and private sphere) of Article 2 German 
Basic Law was introduced Chapter 4.1 Reference is also made to that Chapter for a 
discussion of how the principle of the best interests of the child is consolidated in 
German law.2
10.1.1.	 Article	3	Basic	Law:	equality	before	the	law
Article 3 of the German Basic Law lays down a guarantee for equality before the 
law. Its third paragraph lists a number of prohibited discrimination grounds, such 
as race and sex. Sexual orientation – in some German legislation and case law also 
referred to as sexual identity3 – is not amongst these grounds.4 By amendment of 
1994 disability was included as a suspect ground,5 but the proposal to also include 
sexual orientation did not receive the required two thirds majority in Parliament. 
Inclusion of this ground was considered to be unnecessary as Article 2(1) (the right 
to free development of the personality) and Article 1 Basic Law (protection of 
human dignity), as well as the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG), were considered to offer sufficient protection 
to homosexuals. Further – it was held – remaining deficits in the protection could 
best be remedied by the legislature and not by amendment of the Constitution.6
LGBT people nevertheless enjoy protection against discrimination by the general 
principle of equality of Article 3(1) Basic Law. This provision demands that all 
1 Ch. 4, section 4.1.2.
2 Ch. 4, section 4.1.5.
3 See for instance Art. 1 Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG) [Equal Treatment Act] and 
BVerfG 7 July 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439, para. 55.
4 Art. 3(3) Basic Law reads: ‘No person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race, 
language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person shall be disfavoured 
because of disability.’ Translation taken from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_
gg.html#p0034, visited June 2014.
5 Gesetz zur Änderung des GG [Act on the Amendment of the Constitution] Act of 27 October 1994, 
BGBl. p. 4216.
6 BT‑Drs. 12/6000, p. 54.







persons be treated equally before the law. It does not necessarily stand in the way 
of the granting of favourable treatment to one group of persons while it is denied 
to another group of persons.7 Following established case law of the BVerfG, 
the general principle of equality results in differing limits for the legislature or 
rulemaker, varying from the mere prohibition of arbitrariness to a strict subjection to 
proportionality requirements. The subject involved and the ‘differentiating elements’ 
(grounds of discrimination), are relevant factors to be taken into account in setting 
this limit.8 If unequal treatment is linked to sexual orientation, a strict standard of 
review is applied. As the Constitutional Court explained in 2009, while referring to 
European law standards:
‘If a legal provision treats a group of persons to whom a specific statute applies differently 
from other persons to whom the statute applies, although there are no differences between 
the two groups of such a nature and such weight that they could justify the unequal 
treatment, it violates the general principle of equality of Article 3.1 of the Basic Law 
[…]. Article 3.1 of the Basic Law requires that the unequal treatment must be linked to a 
factually justified distinguishing element. It is not sufficient to justify unequal treatment of 
groups of persons that the legislator or rulemaker took account of a distinguishing element 
that was suitable by its nature. Instead, there must also be an inner connection between the 
differences found and the differentiating provision to justify the degree of differentiation, 
a connection which can be adduced as an objectively justifiable differentiating factor of 
sufficient weight […]. […] The requirements in the case of unequal treatment of groups of 
persons are all the stricter the greater the danger is that a link to personal characteristics 
that are comparable to those of Article 3.3 of the Basic Law will lead to the discrimination 
of a minority […]. This is so in the case of sexual orientation.’9
For justification of a difference in treatment based on sexual orientation serious 
grounds (‘ernstlichte Gründe’) are thus required.10
‘Sexual identity’ is furthermore included as a prohibited ground of discrimination 
in Article 1 of the Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz 
(AGG)),11 by which Germany implemented Directive 2000/78/EC.12 The scope of 
this Act encompasses labour law, social security and public health matters, education 
and access to public goods and services.13 Further, a handful of other provisions 
concerning the legal position of employees and civil servants, explicitly prohibit 
7 BVerfG 7 July 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439, para. 85.
8 Idem.
9 Idem, para. 86–87.
10 E.g. OLG Hamburg 22 December 2010 (dec.), Az. 2 Wx 23/09, NJW 2011 p. 1104, para. 16.
11 Act of 14 August 2006, BGBl. I 2006, p. 1897. This Act entered into force on 18 August 2006.
12 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. The Member States were required to have 
transposed the Directive into national law no later than 2 December 2003.
13 Art. 2 AGG.







discrimination on ground of sexual identity.14 Lastly, the constitutions of several 
German States (‘Länder’) also contain a prohibition of unequal treatment on grounds 
of sexual identity15 or sexual orientation.16
In more recent years, bills were tabled which saw at the inclusion of ‘sexual 
orientation’ as a prohibited ground in Article 3(3) Basic Law,17 but at the time this 
research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014), none of them had yet made it into law. 
The Bundesrat held in 2009 that such inclusion would only be ‘symbol politics’, 
as the Constitutional Court had in the meantime granted strong protection against 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (see 10.4 below).18 Other objections 
voiced in the debates have been the suggestion that including sexual orientation would 
also mean including and protecting a particular sexual orientation towards children 
(paedophilia) and that it would do away with the special protection of marriage.
10.1.2.	 Article	6(1)	Basic	Law:	special	protection	of	marriage	and	the	family
According to Article 6(1) of the German Basic Law, ‘Marriage and the family shall 
enjoy the special protection of the state.’ The second paragraph of Article 6 Basic 
Law provides that parents have a natural right to as well as a duty for the care and 
the upbringing of children, while the State watches over them in the performance 
of this duty. While the third and the fifth paragraphs provide for special protection 
for children,19 the fourth paragraph concentrates on the mother and provides that 
‘every mother shall be entitled to the care and protection of the community.’ The 
‘Mutterkult’, of which this provision is an expression, can be considered unique to 
the German legal culture.
Article 6(1) finds its origin in Article 119 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919, 
which provided that marriage, ‘as the foundation of the family and the preservation 
and expansion of the nation’, enjoyed the special protection of the Constitution. 
The Weimar Article furthermore stated that it was task of both the State and the 
14 Art. 75(1) Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Works Constitution Act]; Art. 9 Bundesbeamtengesetz [Federal 
Civil Service Act]; Art. 9 Beamtenstatusgesetz [Act on the status of members of the State civil service] 
and Art. 19a Vierten Buches Sozialgesetzbuch [Social Code, Fourth Volume].
15 Art. 10(2) Constitution of Berlin; Art. 12(2) Constitution of the State of Brandenburg and Art. 2 
Constitution of the Free Hansa town of Bremen.
16 Art. 2(3) Constitution of the Free State of Thüringen.
17 For example, BR‑Drs. 741/09, BT‑Drs. 16/13596, p. 3; BT‑Drs. 17/88 p. 1 and BT‑Drs. 17/254.
18 The Bundesrat decided on 27 November 2009 not to put the Bill before the German Bundestag. See 
U. Kischel, ‘BeckOK GG Art. 3–2. Sexuelle Orienterung’ [‘BeckOK GG Art. 3–2. Sexual Orientation’], 
in: V. Epping and C. Hillgruber (eds.), Beck’scher Online‑Kommentar GG [Beck Online Commentary 
to the German Basic Law], 21st edn. (München, Verlag Beck 2014) Rn. 130.
19 Art. 6(3) Basic Law reads: ‘Children may be separated from their families against the will of their 
parents or guardians only pursuant to a law, and only if the parents or guardians fail in their duties or 
the children are otherwise in danger of serious neglect.’ and Art. 6(5) reads: ‘Children born outside 
of marriage shall be provided by legislation with the same opportunities for physical and mental 
development and for their position in society as are enjoyed by those born within marriage.’ Translations 
taken from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0034, visited June 2014.







communities to strengthen and socially promote the family.20 While the reference 
to the expansion of the nation was removed in the Basic Law of 1949, the special 
protection of ‘marriage and the family’ was included in Article 6, expressly and 
deliberately mentioning marriage and the family in one and the same sentence. Legal 
opinion differs strongly, however, as to the question of whether this also means that 
these two institutions are inseparably – or at least closely – interconnected. There is 
wide agreement that the Basic Law is more subjective and individualistic oriented 
than the Weimar Constitution was.21 In respect of Article 6 in particular, a clear 
freedom‑oriented trend (‘freiheitliche Tendenz’) since the Weimar Constitution, has 
been observed.22 Hofmann nevertheless argued that also the drafters of the Basic Law 
had population policy considerations in mind when awarding marriage a privileged 
status in the Basic Law.23 Robbers, for his part, claimed that from the systematics 
and wording of the Basic Law it follows that marriage and the family are ‘socially 
and legally’ connected with one another – together with the care and upbringing of 
children, the protection of the mother and the protection of children born outside of 
marriage, as protected in paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 6.24 The author has held that 
the Basic Law protects an ideal of the free development of the personality as well 
as an ‘in life positively perceived normality’. Marriage is the principled foundation 
of the family, he argues, and Article 6 protects and structures with the help of 
legal institutions, social relations. Others have disagreed with this interpretation of 
Article 6(1). Grösschner, for example, has held the word ‘and’ between ‘marriage’ 
and ‘the family’ in Article 6(1) to be ‘dogmatically meaningless’.25 He holds that 
Article 6 represents the difficult dilemma of ‘dualism’ (‘Dualismus’), whereby the 
provision is intended to have both personal meaning for the individual, as well 
as ‘transpersonal’ meaning for the society and the State (see also 10.1.2.2 below, 
concerning the three functions of Article 6).26
20 Art. 119(1) and (2) Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs (‘Weimarer Reichsverfassung’) [Weimar 
Constitution of 11 August 1919], Reichsgesetzblatt 1919, No. 152, pp. 1383–1418. Other than the 
subsequent Basis Law of 1949, did the Weimar Constitution not foresee in the possibility for individuals 
to enforce their rights before a Constitutional Court. H. Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz‑Kommentar, Band 1, 
Präambel, Artikel 1–19 [Commentary to the Basic Law, Volume 2, Preamble, Articles 1–19], 2nd 
edn. (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2004) p. 55. On the history of Art. 6 Basic Law, see also A. Saunders, 
‘Marriage, Same‑Sex Partnership, and the German Constitution’, 13 German Law Journal (2012) 
p. 911 online available at www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1448, visited 
June 2014.
21 H. Hofmann, Àrt 6’, in: B. Smidt‑Bleibtreu et al., GG Kommentar, 11th edn. (Berlin, Carl Heymanns 
Verlag 2011) at pp. 269–270 and G. Robbers, ‘Artikel 6’ [‘Article 6’], in: C. Starck et al., Kommentar 
zum Grundgesetz [Commentary to the Basic Law] (München, Verlag Franz Vahlen 2010) p. 683 at 
p. 687, Rn. 5.
22 R. Grösschner, ‘Art. 6’ [‘Art. 6’], in H. Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz‑Kommentar, Band 1, Präambel, Artikel 
1–19 [German Basic Law Commentary, Volume 1, Preamble, Articles 1–19], 2nd edn. (Tübingen, Mohr 
Siebeck 2004) p. 748 at p. 755, Rn. 4.
23 Hofmann 2011, supra n. 21, at pp. 269–270.
24 Robbers 2010, supra n. 21, at p. 691, Rn. 17.
25 Grösschner 2004, supra n. 22, at p. 755, Rn. 4.
26 Idem, at p. 755, Rn. 5.







10.1.2.1. Definition of ‘marriage’ and ‘ family’ in Article 6(1) Basic Law
The Basic Law itself contains no definition of the terms ‘marriage’ and ‘the family’. 
The German Constitutional Court has repeatedly defined marriage as the union of 
one man with one woman to form a permanent partnership, based on a freely made 
decision and with the support of the State,27 in which man and woman are in an 
equal partnership28 and may decide freely on the organisation of their cohabitation.29 
The fact that the spouses are of a different sex is considered one of the constitutive 
characteristics of marriage.30 Therefore, no right to marry for same‑sex couples can 
be derived from Article 6(1), as the BVerfG has on several occasions explicitly held.31 
This case law is discussed in further detail in section 10.3 below.
The ‘family’ within the meaning of this Article has been defined by the BVerfG 
as ‘die umfassende Gemeinschaft von Eltern und Kindern’,32 thus limiting the 
protection to the first bloodline. Müller‑Terpitz argues that the notions of ‘family’ 
and ‘marriage’ ex Article 6(1) are dogmatically separated from one another and that 
family exists, ‘where there are children’. Accordingly, the author claims, the notion 
should be broadly interpreted, encompassing, inter alia, a right to found a family for 
same‑sex oriented persons, for instance through heterologous insemination.33
10.1.2.2. The meaning of ‘special protection’ in Article 6(1) Basic Law
Under Article 6(1) marriage and the family enjoy the ‘special protection’ of the State. 
This entails a positive obligation on the State to protect marriage and the family from 
third party interference (‘Drittbeeinträchtigungen’), as well a negative obligation for 
the State not to interfere with marriage and family matters.34 In legal scholarship, 
three – closely related – functions (‘Regelungsinhalte’) of Article 6(1) are identified: 
it contains an individual fundamental right (‘Grundrecht’); it functions as an 
institutional guarantee (‘Institutsgarantie’); and it constitutes a general principle of 
law (‘Grundsatznorm’) that influences all areas of law that relate to marriage and the 
27 BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543.
28 Idem.
29 Idem.
30 Cf. BVerfG 27 May 2008 (dec.), Az. 1 BvL 10/05, NJW 2008 p. 3117 and BVerfG 27 May 2008 (dec.), 
Az. 1 BvL 10/05, NJW 2008 p. 3117, para. 50.
31 See K.S. Gerhard, Die eingetragene Lebensparterschaft – Eine historisch‑dogmatische Bestands‑
aufnahme zur Frage nach einem neuen familienrechtlichen Institut [The German Civil partnership – a 
historic‑dogmatic inventory of the question for a new family law institute] (Göttingen, Sierke Verlag 
2009), p. 25, and BVerfG 4 October 1993 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 640/93, NJW 1993 p. 3058.
32 BVerfG 29 July 1959, Az. 1 BvR 205/58 a.o., NJW 1959 p. 1483.
33 R. Müller‑Terpitz, ‘Das Recht auf Fortpflanzung – Vorgaben der Verfassung und der EMRK’ [‘The 
right to procreate – guidelines of the German Constitution and the ECHR’], in: H. Frister and 
D. Olzen (eds.), Reproduktionsmedizin, Rechtliche Fragestellungen. Dokumentation der Tagung zum 
10‑jahrigen Bestehen des Instituts fur Rechtsfragen der Medizin Dusseldorf [Reproduction medicine, 
legal questions. Proceedings of the Conference for the 10 year anniversary of the Düsseldorf institute 
for medical legal issues] (Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf University Press 2010) p. 9 at. p. 14.’
34 Cf. BVerfG 17 January 1957, Az. 1 BvL 4/54, NJW 1957 p. 417 and BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 
1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543.







family.35 As a fundamental right, it has been held to be first of all a negative right 
(‘Abwehrrecht’), entailing, inter alia, the right to unhindered access to marriage with 
a freely chosen partner36 and the right to decide upon the marriage settlement.37 As 
institutional guarantee Article 6(1) provides spouses with a normative framework 
which provides legal clarity and certainty for third parties.38 Article 6(1) protects 
an ‘Ordnungskern’ that the legislature must take into account when legislating on 
the institute of marriage,39 whereby the legislature enjoys considerable discretion.40 
The role of Article 6(1) as institutional guarantee finds its expression in, inter alia, 
the matrimonial property rights and the role of registrars (‘Standesbeamten’). As a 
general principle, Article 6(1) implies a binding value judgment (‘eine verbindliche 
Wertentscheidung’) for all areas of law concerning marriage and the family.41 
According to Schmitt‑Kammler and Von Coelln, from this a (positive) State 
obligation to protect and to give preferential treatment to marriage follows. The latter 
obligation to give preferential treatment means that marriage can not be put at a 
disadvantage vis‑à‑vis other partnerships, or ways of living.42 This reading has had a 
particular effect in economic areas of law, such as social insurance law.43 It has been 
widely discussed in legal commentaries as well as in case law whether this obligation 
to give preferential treatment also means that other partnerships cannot be treated 
as favourably as marriage. In other words, the question is whether Article 6(1) of 
the Basic Law contains a so‑called ‘requirement of distance’ (‘Abstandsgebot’), 
an obligation to differentiate between marriage and other partnerships, to the 
disadvantage of the latter. This discussion will recur throughout the various sections 
of this chapter. As will be set out in more detail, the BVerfG has held there not to 
be any such requirement of distance or disadvantage to other partnerships, because 
35 A. Schmitt‑Kammler and C. von Coelln, ‘Art. 6 [Ehe und Familie]’ [‘Art 6 [Marriage and Family’], in 
M. Sachs, Grundgesetz Kommentar [Basic Law Commentary], 5th edn. (München Verlag C.H. Beck 
2009 p. 348 at p. 357 and Hofmann 2011, supra n. 21, at pp. 270–271.
36 Cf. BVerfG 4 May 1971, Az 1 BvR 636/68, NJW 1971 p. 1509; BVerfG 14 November 1973 (dec.), Az. 
1 BvR 719/69, NJW 1974 p. 545; BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543 and BVerfG 
9 November 2004, Az. 1 BvR 684/98, NJW 2005 p. 1413. See Schmitt‑Kammler and von Coelln 2009, 
supra n. 35, at p. 359 and M. Antoni, ‘Art 6 [Schutz von Ehe und Familie, nichteheliche Kinder]’ [‘Art. 6 
[Protection of marriage and family, children born out of wedlock]’], in D. Hömig (ed.) Grundgesetz 
für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Constitution for the Federal Republic of Germany], 9th edn. 
(Baden‑Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2010) p. 110 at p. 112.
37 Schmitt‑Kammler and von Coelln 2009, supra n. 35, at p. 360 under reference to, inter alia, BVerfG 
14 November 1984 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 14/82 and 1642/82 and BVerfG 5 February 2002 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 
105/95 a.o., NJW 2002 p. 1185.
38 Idem, at pp. 361–362.
39 Idem.
40 Cf. BVerfG 28 February 1980, Az. 1 BvL 136/78 and BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 
p. 2543.
41 BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543, para. 90. Schmitt‑Kammler and von Coelln 
2009, supra n. 35, at p. 363 and Antoni 2010, supra n. 36, at p. 110. Saunders speaks of an ‘objective 
value’. Saunders 2012, supra n. 20, at p. 917.
42 Cf. Schmitt‑Kammler and von Coelln 2009, supra n. 35, at p. 363 and M. Forkert, Eingetragene 
Lebenspartnerschaften im deutschen IPR: Art. 17b EGBGB [Civil partnerships in German Private 
international law: Art. 17b EGBGB] (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2003) p. 32.
43 Antoni 2010, supra n. 36, at p. 115.







it considers marriage not be endangered by such other partnerships.44 In literature 
however, this ruling has met with strong criticism.45
10.1.2.3. The relationship of Article 6(1) to other provisions of the Basic Law
Article 6(1) is considered to strengthen the right to free development of one’s 
personality of Article 2(1).46 As discussed in section 10.3 below, it was the desire to 
give further protection to homosexuals’ right to free development of the personality 
that was a basis for the introduction of the registered civil partnership in Germany. 
From the latter right, however, no right to contract a marriage follows.47
For a long time Article 6(1) was considered to be a lex specialis of Article 3(1) 
and (3) Basic Law (the principle of equality) and thus to have precedence over 
this provision.48 As will become clear from section 10.3, the relationship between 
these two provisions has over time been reversed. Henkel has spoken of a change 
of perspective in respect of the relationship between Article 3 and Article 6 of the 
Basic Law, which according to the author found its cause in European law impulses 
in particular.49
10.1.2.4. Article 6(1) Basic Law as expression of a cultural identity
Hofmann has argued that, next to the ‘identity essence’ of Articles 1 (human dignity) 
and 20 (basic institutional principles; defence of the constitutional order), the German 
Basic Law contains various cultural identity elements. The author holds that the 
institutional guarantee of marriage – together with the right to equal treatment, the 
protection of Sundays and holidays and the prohibition of a State Church – belongs 
to these cultural identity elements.50 Hofmann distinguishes between the culturally 
infused constitutional order in its totality and the exceptional cultural infusion 
(‘Prägung’) of certain fundamental rights in the Basic Law. Following this 
distinction, the constitutional protection of freedoms (‘verfassungsrechtliche 
Freiheitsverbürgung’) is allegedly dependent upon the fulfilment of culturally 
44 BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543 and BVerfG 7 July 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 
1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439.
45 Inter alia, Hofmann 2011, supra n. 21.
46 Cf. Antoni 2010, supra n. 36, at p 110. See also P. Badura ‘GG Art 6’ [‘Art. 6 Basic Law’] in: R. Herzorg 
et al. (eds.), Maunz und Dürig Grundgesetz‑Kommentar [Maunz and Dürig Commentary to the Basic 
Law], 71st edn. (München, Verlag Beck 2014).
47 Schmitt‑Kammler and von Coelln 2009, supra n. 35, at p. 352.
48 Idem, at pp. 353 and 356, under reference to BVerfG 17 January 1957 (dec.), Az. 1 BvL 4/54, NJW 1957 
p. 417. See also W. Pauly, ‘Sperrwirkungen des verfassungsrechtlichen Ehebegriffs’ [‘Barrier effects of 
the constitutional concept of marriage’], NJW (1997) p. 1955.
49 Henkel refers primarily to Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen 
[2008] ECR I‑1757, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179. J. Henkel‚ ̀ Fällt nun auch das “Fremdkindadoptionsverbot”?’ 
[‘Is the ‘ban on international abortion’ now also being dropped?’], NJW (2011) p. 259 at p. 262. See 
R. Wiemann, `Rosige Aussichten für die Gleichstellung gleichgeschlechtlicher Lebenspartner mit 
Ehegatten?’ [‘A rosy future for the equal treatment of registered partners and spouses?’] NJW (2010) 
p. 1427 at p. 1428.
50 Hofmann 2011, supra n. 21, at p. 271. The author refers to A. Uhle, Freiheitlicher Verfassungsstaat und 
‘kulturelle Indentität, (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2004) p. 505.







infused preconditions, of which the constitutional protection of marriage is 
illustrative. From a cultural perspective, so Hofmann argues, the institute of marriage 
is open to one man and one woman only. The Constitutional State with a Basic Law 
based on freedom is bound to guarantee and protect its ‘cultural identity’ through 
the totality of the cultural State’s power to act (‘die Gesamtheit kulturstaatlicher 
Handlungsoptionen’). The Constitutional State is thus obliged to found a legal 
order based on human dignity, respect for freedom and equality, the rule of law and 
democracy, the institutional protection of the constitutive characteristics of marriage, 
the protection of Sundays and on the prohibition of a State Church. In other words, 
the State is bound to found an institutional order that is infused by identity (‘einer 
identitätsgeprägten institutionellen Ordnung’), which, so Hofmann argues, excludes 
constitutional neutrality.
The view of this author has not been widely endorsed in German legal academia 
and so far no German Court has adopted such reasoning in respect of Article 6(1) 
Basic Law. On the other hand, it is noted that in its important so‑called ‘Lisbon 
judgment’ of June 2009 the Constitutional Court qualified decisions on family law 
as ‘of particular cultural importance’ and therefore as ‘[…] particularly sensitive for 
the ability of a constitutional state to democratically shape itself […].’51 The BVerfG 
explained this by the fact that ‘the law on family relations’ particularly affected ‘[…] 
established rules and values rooted in specific historical traditions and experience.’52
10.2. (de‑)crImInAlIsAtIon of homosexuAl ActIvItIes
Articles 175ff of the Prussian Criminal Code of 1871 criminalised sexual acts 
between men. In 1949, when the German Basic law was adopted, this provision was 
still in force. During World War II and also during the decades after the war, in the 
FRG, Article 175 Criminal Code was far from obsolete: on the basis of this provision 
homosexuals were persecuted in the name of the State with considerable numbers 
of convictions as a result. Between 1950 and 1965, nearly 2,800 homosexuals were 
convicted annually.53 Under reference to the principle of morality, the BVerfG ruled 
in 1957 that Article 175 of the Criminal Code was compatible with the Basic Law.54 
The Court, inter alia, held the prohibition not to be incompatible with the right to 
51 BVerfG 30 June 2009, Az. 2 BvE 2/08 a.o., NJW 2009 p. 2267, para. 253.
52 Idem, para. 260.
53 EU Fundamental Rights Agency, Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of 
Sexual Orientation – Germany, February 2008, p. 3, online available at www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/
attachments/FRA‑hdgso‑NR_DE.pdf, visited June 2014. The report refers to J. Müller, Ausgrenzung 
der Homosexuellen aus der ‘Volksgemeinschaft’: die Verfolgung von Homosexuellen in Köln 1933–
1945 (Cologne, Emons 2003) p. 218. From this reference it is not clear if this goes for the former FRG 
only or whether the former GDR is included in these calculations. See also Gerhard 2009, supra n. 31, 
at pp. 17–19 who refers, inter alia, to H.‑G. Stümke, Homosexuelle in Deutschland, Eine politische 
Geschichte (München, Beck 1989) p. 127 and 132 and to F.J Wetz, Homosexualität, Ein rechtlicher 
Vorstoß als moralischer Anstoß, 88 ARSP (2002) pp. 102–113.
54 BVerfG 10 May 1957, Az. 1 BvR 550/52, NJW 1957 p. 865.







free development of the personality (Article 2(1) Basic Law),55 because homosexual 
conduct was considered to be in violation of the moral law, a factor which constituted 
a justification for interferences with this right. Under influence of the emancipation 
movement of the end of the 1960s, at beginning of the 1970s this criminal law 
provision was amended for the first time. In 1969 the complete prohibition on sexual 
acts between men was lifted and an age limit was set: from then on, only sexual 
acts between an adult man and a man under 21 years old were punishable with 
imprisonment.56 In 1973 this age limit was further lowered to the age of 18 years.57 It 
was only in 1994 that Article 175 of the Criminal Code was repealed in its entirety, 
thus paving the way for further equalisation of the legal position of homosexuals and 
heterosexuals through the introduction of a registered civil partnership for same‑sex 
couples.58
10.3. legAl recognItIon of sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps under germAn 
lAw
10.3.1.	 Early	(legislative)	developments
The first parliamentary initiatives to introduce legislation opening up marriage 
to same‑sex couples in the Federal Republic of Germany were taken in 1990 by 
the Greens (‘die Grünen’), a political party holding a small number of seats in the 
federal parliament (Bundestag).59 Although this proposal did not lead to any concrete 
legislative change, the (academic and public) discussion on the topic was initiated.60 
In August 1992, during the so‑called ‘Sturm of die Standesämter’ (Siege of the 
Registry Offices) on the initiative of the Schwulenverbands in Deutschland (the 
Gay Federation in Germany), approximately 250 lesbian and gay couples ‘besieged’ 
Registry Offices throughout the country, to apply for the issuances of notices of their 
intended marriage.61 Having met with refusals by the Registry Offices, several couples 
initiated judicial proceedings, but to no avail.62 Only one couple was successful in 
55 Art. 2(1) Basic Law reads: ‘Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality 
insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral 
law.’ Translation taken from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0034, 
visited June 2014.
56 Erste Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (1. StrRG) [First Act on the Reform of the Criminal Law] Act 
of 25 June 1969, BGBl. I p. 645.
57 The Constitutional Court confirmed in 1973 that this provision was compatible with the Basic Law. 
BVerfG 2 October 1973, Az. 1 BvL 7/72, NJW 1973 p. 2195.
58 Act of 31 May 1994, BGBl. I, p. 1168. Reportedly in the year 1987 there had still been over 100 
convictions on the basis of Art. 175 Criminal Code. See C. von der Tann, ‘Entwicklungen in der 
Rechtsstellung eingetragener Lebenspartnerschaften’ [‘Developments in the legal position of civil 
partnerships’], FamFR (2012) p. 195 at p. 196.
59 BT‑Drs. 11/7197.
60 Gerhard 2009, supra n. 31, at p. 24, footnote 167.
61 See the website of the present Lesben‑ und Schwulenverbands in Deutschland (LSVB) www.lsvd.
de/1399.0.html, visited June 2014.
62 See Gerhard 2009, supra n. 31, at p. 25, footnotes 170 and 171.







first instance: in December 1992, the district court (Amtsgericht) of Frankfurt am 
Main held non‑recognition of same‑sex marriage to be against the Basic Law.63 This 
judgment was however shortly overturned by the State Court (Landesgericht) of 
Frankfurt.64
Another couple filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, 
but the BVerfG did not take that complaint into consideration, as it considered it to 
contain no fundamental constitutional interest.65 In its decision of 1993, the Court 
held that the complaint did not raise any new points: the BVerfG’s case law was clear 
on the point that marriage within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Basic Law was 
defined as a union between one man and one woman.66 Furthermore, it held that no 
right to access to marriage for same‑sex couples could follow from the right to free 
development of the personality nor the right to equal treatment (Articles 2(1) and 3 
Basic Law respectively), as Article 6(1) as their lex specialis had precedence over 
these provisions. The Court added that the question of whether the legislature was 
under an obligation to provide same‑sex couples with some form of legal recognition 
of their relationship would be one of fundamental constitutional interest.67 As that 
question was however not raised by the complaint at hand, the Court did not examine 
the matter.
A Resolution of the European Parliament of 199468 triggered the discussion anew.69 
In this Resolution the European Parliament called on the EU Member States to 
avoid unequal treatment of persons of same‑sex orientation in their individual 
legal and administrative provisions, and appealed to the European Commission to 
grant same‑sex couples access to marriage or to corresponding legal institutions. 
In the years following the Resolution, several new proposals entailing the opening 
up of marriage70 or the introduction of a registered civil partnership for same‑sex 
couples were tabled in German Parliament, but none of them was followed up.71 
In the meantime, however, the State of Hamburg introduced the possibility for 
same‑sex couples to have their partnerships registered in a designated register 
63 AG Frankfurt a.M. 21 December 1992 (dec.), Az. 40 UR III E 166/92, NJW 1993 p. 940.
64 LG Frankfurt 22 March 1993 (dec.), Az. 2/9 T 17/93, NJW 1993 p. 1998.
65 Fundamental constitutional interest (‘grundsätzliche verfassungsrechtliche Bedeutung’) is one of the 
admissibility criteria ex Art. 93a (2) BVerfGG. BVerfG 4 October 1993 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 640/93, NJW 
1993 p. 3058.
66 The Court referred to, inter alia, BVerfG 29 July 1959, Az. 1 BvR 205/58 a.o, NJW 1959 p. 1483; 
BVerfG 11 October 1978, Az. 1 BvR 16/72, NJW 1979 p. 595 and BVerfG 17 November 1992, Az. 1 
BvL 8/87, NJW 1993 p. 643.
67 See also Pauly 1997, supra n. 48.
68 European Parliament Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC [1994] OJ 
C61/20, pp. 40–41.
69 As referred to in BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543, para. 2. See also 
K. Strick, ‘Gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaft – Vom Straftatbestand zum Status?’ [‘Same‑sex 
partnership – from criminal offence to legal status?’], Deutsches und Europaisches FamilenRecht, 
DEuFamR (2002) p. 82 at p. 86.
70 BT‑Drs. 13/2728.
71 See BT‑Drs. 13/7228; BT‑Drs. 13/10081 and BT‑Drs. 544/98.







(‘Partnerschaftsbuch’) at the Civil Registry.72 This so‑called ‘Hamburger Ehe’ 
(‘Hamburger Marriage’) had no legal effect,73 and has therefore often been referred 
to as ‘symbol politics’.74
After the parliamentary elections of 1998, the introduction of a registered partnership 
for same‑sex couples was included in the coalition agreement of the new governing 
parties, the Social Democrats and the Greens.75 While the Liberals were the first to 
draw up a bill to this effect,76 it was the bill of the coalition, as tabled in July 2000,77 
that resulted in the adoption of the Civil Partnerships Act in 2001.78
Given the division of seats amongst the political parties at the time and the 
anticipated opposition of the Bundesrat to the introduction of a civil partnership 
for same‑sex couples, the governing parliamentary parties intended to divide 
the original civil partnership bill into two statutes: one requiring the approval 
of the Bundesrat and the other requiring no such approval. After the Committee 
on Legal Affairs of the Bundestag also advised to that effect,79 the bill was 
indeed divided into two statutes: firstly, the Civil Partnerships Act (Act on the 
Termination of the Discrimination of Same‑Sex Couples: Civil Partnerships (Gesetz 
zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften: 
Lebenspartnerschaften, LPartEDiskrG))80 which concerned the civil partnership 
itself and its essential legal consequences; and secondly, the Civil Partnerships Act 
Supplementary Act (Act to Supplement the Civil Partnerships Act and other Acts 
(Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetzes und anderer Gesetze, 
Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetzergänzungsgesetz, LPartGErgG)), which concerned 
primarily procedural law implementing regulations.81
72 BT‑Drs. 16/1288. See also I. von Münch, Àntidiskriminierungsgesetz – notwendig oder überflüssig?’ 
[‘Anti‑discrimination Act – necessary or superfluous?’] NJW (1999) p. 260 at p. 261.
73 As Gerhard explains, the Hamburger Senate held that such an issue could only be regulated at State 
level. On the basis of Art. 74 Basic Law, does the registration of marriages belong to the list of subjects 
where the Federation and the States have concurrent legislative power. Gerhard 2009, supra n. 31, at 
p. 30.
74 On the symbolic character of the ‘Hamburger Ehe’, see also M. Schüffner, Eheschutz und 
Lebenspartnerschaft, Eine verfassungsrechtliche Untersuchung des Lebenspartnerschaftsrechts im 
Lichte des Art. 6 GG [Marriage protection and civil partnership, a constitutional examination of the 
law on civil partnership in light of Art. 6 of the German Basic Law] (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 2007) 
p. 101.
75 Coalition agreement of 20 October 1998, ZRP 1998, 485 ff.
76 BT‑Drs. 14/1259.
77 BT‑Drs. 14/3751.
78 Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften: 
Lebenspartnerschaften [Act on the Termination of the Discrimination of Same‑Sex Couples: Civil 
Partnerships] Act of 16 February 2001, BGBl. I, p. 266. Henkel 2011, supra n. 49, at p. 260, points 
at various constitutional concerns that were expressed at the time, inter alia, U. Diederichsen, 
‘Homosexuelle – von Gesetzes wegen?’ [‘Homosexual – by law?’], NJW (2000) p. 1841; P. Kirchhof, 
‘Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetze und Grundgesetz’ [‘Law on civil partnerships and the Constitution’], 
FPR (2001) p. 436 and R. Scholz and A. Uhle, ‘‘Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft’ und Grundgesetz’ 
[‘‘Civil partnership’ and Basic Law’], NJW (2001) p. 393 at p. 398.
79 BT‑Drs. 14/4545 with annexes.
80 Act of 16 February 2001, BGBl. I p. 266.
81 See also BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543, para. 5.







In November 2000, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Bundestag advised 
adopting the bill. It explained that the intimate personal sphere was constitutionally 
protected by Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the German Basic 
Law, and encompassed – as an element of the right to free development of the 
personality – the freedom to live in a same‑sex partnership.82 It acknowledged that 
such partnerships between same‑sex partners did not enjoy the special protection 
of Article 6(1) of the Basic Law, but stressed that the different treatment of certain 
groups in society required special justification on the basis of Article 3 of the Basic 
Law. Reference was made to judgments of the Constitutional Court (BVerfG) and 
the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG) of 1993 and 1996 respectively (see 
above),83 from which it followed – as the Committee observed – that the legislature 
could protect the personality rights of same‑sex partners and their rights to equal 
treatment without opening up the institution of marriage. While the Courts had held 
that the legislative measures taken in various European states strengthening the legal 
position of same‑sex partnerships, had at that time not yet resulted in a European 
consensus that same‑sex partnerships fell within the scope of the right to respect for 
family life ex Article 8 ECHR,84 the Committee stressed that they had accepted that 
such partnerships enjoyed the protection of the right to private life.85
The Civil Partnerships Act (LPartG) was adopted in February 2001 and was passed 
by the Bundesrat unaltered.86 The Civil Partnerships Act Supplementary Act, on 
the other hand, was approved by the Bundestag, but it encountered the opposition of 
the State of Bavaria in the Bundesrat. As a consequence, it was not approved by the 
Bundesrat and therefore did not make it into law.87 As a result, certain matters, such 
as the position of civil servants, were not covered (see 10.4.4.2 below).
10.3.2.	 The	Civil	Partnerships	Act	(2001)
The Civil Partnerships Act introduced a registered civil partnership for same‑sex 
partners – and for same‑sex couples only – as of 1 August 2001.88 The Explanatory 
Memorandum to the draft Act89 explained that the Act intended to reduce the 
discrimination of same‑sex couples vis‑à‑vis different‑sex‑couples. It aimed to 
give shape to the constitutional protection of relationships between persons of the 
same sex on the basis of Article 2(1) Basic Law, through the creation of a new 
82 BT‑Drs. 14/4550, pp. 4–5.
83 BVerfG 4 October 1993 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 640/93, NJW 1993 p. 3058 and BVerwG 27 February 1996, 
Az. 1 C 41/93, NJW 1997 p. 956.
84 The Committee on Legal Affairs refers to BVerwG 27 February 1996, Az. 1 C 41/93, NJW 1997 p. 956.
85 BT‑Drs. 14/4550, pp. 4–5.
86 BT‑Prot.14/131, p. 12629 D BR‑Prot. 757, p. 551 (C, D).
87 BT‑Drs. 14/4875 and BR‑Prot. 757, p. 551 (D).
88 This partnership has also been referred to as a `life partnership’. See, inter alia, Case C‑267/06 Tadao 
Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179. Here 
the English term ‘civil partnership’ or ‘registered civil partnership’ as used in the official English 
translations of BVerfG judgments (that can be found on www.bverfg.de/en/index.html, visited 
June 2014) will be used.
89 BT‑Drs. 14/3751, p. 33 ff.







legal institution.90 It was stressed that the Civil Partnerships Act aimed to adopt 
and transpose two documents of European origin in which States were called 
upon to create legal options for the registration of same‑sex unions, namely the 
aforementioned EP Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the 
EC of 199491 as well as a draft Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe of 6 June 2000.92
A civil partnership is created by a contract between two persons of the same 
sex that is registered with the public office responsible for marriage ceremonies 
(‘Standesamt’).93 A civil partnership is terminated by a decree of annulment by a 
Court, on the application of one or both partners.94
While the responsibilities of partners engaging in a partnership are the same as for 
married couples, the set of rights awarded to registered partners was more limited in 
the first version of the Act. In 2002 the BVerfG summarised the main features of the 
civil partnership as follows:
‘The partners are bound to each other in care and support and committed to plan their lives 
together. They are responsible for each other (Article 1 § 2). The statute does not require 
sexual intercourse. The legal consequences of the registered partnership are in part based 
on the legal consequences of marriage, but they also diverge from the latter. Thus, the 
partners owe each other support. This applies to a modified extent also to persons living 
apart and after the termination of the partnership (Article 1 §§ 5, 12 and 16). The partners 
must make a statement on their financial status; they may choose between a property 
regime of equalisation of surplus and a contract governing their financial relations 
(Article 1 §§ 6 und 7). They may choose a joint name (Article 1 § 3). The civil partner 
or former partner of a parent who has lived for a long period in a domestic community 
with the child has a right of access (Article 2 number 12, § 1685.2 of the German Civil 
Code). A partner is deemed to be a member of the other’s family (Article 1 § 11). A right 
of intestate succession of the civil partner corresponding to that of the spouse has been 
introduced (Article 1 § 10). In social security law too, entering into the civil partnership 
has legal consequences (Article 3 §§ 52, 54 und 56). Thus, for example, in the statutory 
health insurance scheme civil partners are covered by the family insurance (Article 3 § 52 
number 4). In the law concerning foreign nationals, the provisions relating to the right of 
entry of foreign families that apply to marital relationships are correspondingly extended 
to same‑sex partnerships (Article 3 § 11). In addition the Civil Partnerships Act grants 
the partner of a parent with sole custody, with the consent of the latter, the authority to 
90 Idem, p. 33.
91 Idem. For the Resolution, see supra n. 68. The Resolution was also printed in BT‑Drs. 12/7069.
92 BT‑Drs. 14/4550, pp. 4–5 and Parliamentary Assembly to the Council of Europe Doc. 8755 (6 June 2000), 
Situation of lesbians and gays in Council of Europe member states.
93 Art. 1(1)(1) LPartG. As Saunders explained, originally the States were free to choose whether they 
assigned the partnership ceremony ‘[…] to private notaries or to the public office responsible for 
marriage ceremonies (‘Standesamt’). Since 1 January 2012, however, partnership ceremonies are 
performed in all German Federal states at the Standesamt.’ Saunders 2012, supra n. 20, at p. 926.
94 Art. 15 LPartG.







make joint decisions in matters of the child’s everyday life, known as “limited custody” 
(Article 1 § 9).’95
Hence, while the legal consequences of the registered partnership were in part 
based on the legal consequences of marriage and while they show considerable 
resemblance, some differences in rights and entitlements between civil partners 
and married partners remained. These concerned, first of all, certain taxes, social 
benefits and social insurances. The Act did not, for instance, provide for adjustment 
of old‑age pension rights between the civil partners if their partnership was annulled, 
and contained no rules on pensions in case of death.96 Further differences remained 
in respect of asylum applications,97 the legal position of civil servants and parental 
rights (see 10.4.5 below).
Most issues regarding the legal position of members of the public service were 
excluded from the scope of the Civil Partnerships Act. Because the legal position of 
civil servants at State level is a matter of so‑called concurrent legislative power,98 the 
German federal legislature may only enact so‑called framework legislation; more 
detailed legislation requires the approval of the Bundesrat.99 The original bill for the 
Civil Partnerships Act was – as explained in section 10.3.1 above – divided over two 
statutes. The bill for the Act to Supplement the Civil Partnerships Act and other Acts, 
provided for the equalisation of civil servants in a civil partnership and married 
civil servants, but this bill was rejected by the Bundesrat. Only the bill for the Civil 
Partnerships Act, which did not require the approval of the Bundesrat, made it into 
law. This Act – and its 2004 Revision – necessarily applied only marginally to 
federal civil servants.100 The division of competences between the Bundestag and 
the Bundesrat and the political make up of both bodies at the time of the introduction 
of the Civil Partnerships Act, thus resulted in the exclusion of federal civil servants 
from the scope of this Act.
95 BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543.
96 Description of the law in BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543.
97 See BT‑Drs. 16/13596, p. 3.
98 Art. 75(1)(27) Basic Law, which reads: ‘Concurrent legislative power shall extend to the following matters: 
[…] the statutory rights and duties of civil servants of the Länder, the municipalities and other 
corporations of public law as well as of the judges in the Länder, except for their career regulations, 
remuneration and pensions […].’ In 2006 the powers of the States were widened. C.D. Classen, ‘Die 
Lebenspartnerschaft im Beamtenrecht’ [‘The registered partnership in civil servants law’], FPR (2010) 
p. 200.
99 Arts. 75, 74a and 73(8) Basic Law.
100 Originally full equalisation was foreseen (Art. 3 (10) of the LPartG Bill (BT‑Drs. 14/3751)), however 
those regulations were taken up in the Statute that required, but did not obtain Bundesrat approval. 
The 2001 Act nevertheless provided for equalisation in respect of certain matters of secondary 
importance, namely in respect of special leave (Art. 12 III SUV); career regulations (Art. 10 IV 
BundeslaufbahnVO), travel expenses (Art. 6 IV Bundesreise kostenG), costs for moving and in respect 
of allowances in case of divorce (Art. 1 II Bundesumzugs kostenG). Differences remained in respect of 
essential partner‑related allowances (Art. 40 I Nr. 1 BBesG and Art. 4 BeihVO) and survivors pensions 
(Art. 18 and Art. 27 BeamtVG). The 2004 Revision Act provided for full equalisation in respect of 
maintenaince and in respect of the legal situation of civil servants. See also Classen 2010 supra n. 98, 
at p. 200.







In the years following the entry into force of the Civil Partnerships Act, the 
existing differences in rights between civil partners and spouses were gradually 
removed through successive legislative amendments and court decisions. Below, 
in section 10.3.4, these gradual changes are discussed in greater detail. The 
following section, however, first discusses the 2002 BVerfG judgment upholding the 
constitutionality of the Act in its original form.
10.3.3.	 The	2002	BVerfG	judgment	upholding	the	Civil	Partnerships	Act
The constitutionality of the Civil Partnerships Act was challenged by the governments 
of the States (Länder) of Bavaria and Saxony. They initially applied for an interim 
injunction against the entry into force of the Act before the Federal Constitutional 
Court, but were unsuccessful in their action.101 The applicant States held the Act 
to be unconstitutional on both procedural and substantive grounds.102 They, inter 
alia, argued that the requirement of differentiation and distance of Article 6 Basic 
Law (special protection of marriage) was violated, because civil partnership imitated 
marriage.103 The Court considered there to be no urgent need justifying an interim 
injunction, as the entering into force of the Act was not to be expected to cause 
irreparable harm to the institute of marriage and because no serious detriment to the 
common weal104 was identifiable.105
After the entry into force of the Civil Partnerships Act, these same States, together 
with the Free State of Thuringia, again applied to the Federal Constitutional Court 
to have the compatibility of the Act with the Federal Basic Law examined. The 
applicant States again put forward both procedural and substantive grounds for their 
claim that the Act was unconstitutional. Here, only the substantive arguments as 
put forward by the States and the assessment thereof by the Court in its judgment of 
17 July 2002 are discussed.106
101 BVerfG 18 July 2001 (dec.), Az. 1 BvQ 23/01, NJW 2001 p. 2457. Such an action is possible on the basis 
of Art. 32 BVerfGG. See also A. Maurer, ‘Federal Constitutional Court Does Not Issue Temporary 
Injunction to Block the Entry Into Force of the Lifetime Partnership Law’, 2 German Law Journal 
(2001), available at www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=73.
102 The procedural grounds concerned the fact that the Bundestag had divided the subject‑matter between 
two statutes in order to prevent the Bundesrat from preventing provisions that in themselves were not 
subject to its consent. The BVerfG held this to be constitutionally unobjectionable.
103 The applicant States further held the Act to be in violation of Art. 3(1), Art. 2(1) and Art. 15(1) Basic 
Law, because they held it to interfere unjustifiably with civil partners’ parental rights, their maintenance 
and care rights and their right to and testamentary freedom respectively.
104 Art. 93(2) Basic Law and Art. 32(1) Gesetz über das Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfGG [Law on 
the Federal Constitutional Court]. Art. 32(1) BVerfGG reads: ‘In a dispute the Federal Constitutional 
Court may deal with a matter provisionally by means of a temporary injunction if this is urgently 
needed to avert serious detriment, ward off imminent force or for any other important reason for the 
common weal.’ English translation taken from: www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm#32, 
visited June 2014.
105 The judgment was based on a two to one vote.
106 BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543. For the English translation of the judgment, 
see www.bverfg.de/en/decisions/fs20020717_1bvf000101en.html, visited June 2014. The BVerfG held 
the fact that the Bundestag had divided the subject‑matter between two statutes in order to prevent 







The applicant States held that marriage enjoyed special protection as an essential 
element of State order to guarantee the conditions for the care and upbringing of 
children in the interest of parents and children, but also of the State community. They 
alleged that if parallel institutions were created for other forms of partnership that 
would be equal to marriage, marriage would be robbed of its special protection.107 
According to the applicant States, Article 6(1) of the Basic Law prohibited not only 
that marriage was made available to same‑sex partnerships, but also that, besides 
marriage, an institution was created incorporating structural elements of marriage, 
without there being any objective necessity to do so. They held that the Basic Law 
required a differentiation to be made between the legal form of marriage and that 
of a civil partnership and a prohibition on the reproduction of the legal structure of 
marriage by other partnerships. The applicant States argued that the partnership 
created by the Act was to a large extent brought into line with marriage, and 
therefore constituted an infringement of this prohibition and the ‘requirement to 
differentiate’.108
The Federal Government asserted that the Act did not violate Article 6(1) of the 
Basic Law, as this provision did not outlaw other institutions than marriage and 
contained no requirement to discriminate against persons who did not have access 
to marriage by reason of their sexual orientation. According to the government, the 
civil partnership in the statute was essentially different from that of marriage:
‘The Act contains no provisions on the housekeeping of civil partners and does not 
impose on them an obligation to show consideration for each other when they choose and 
exercise a gainful occupation. Civil partners are merely permitted to decide on a common 
name. Civil partners are not permitted to make a joint adoption or to adopt a stepchild. 
Under maintenance law, each partner is in principle referred to his or her own gainful 
employment. This and other differences show that the registered civil partnership is not a 
duplication of marriage.’109
The BVerfG held that the institution of marriage as guaranteed by the Basic Law had 
to be interpreted in correspondence with prevailing opinions,110 while taking into 
account ‘[…] the essential structural principles that follow from the application of 
Article 6.1 of the Basic Law to marriage as it is actually encountered in connection 
with the nature of the fundamental right guaranteed as a freedom and in connection 
with other constitutional norms’.111 On that basis, the Court provided the following 
definition of marriage:
the Bundesrat from preventing provisions that in themselves were not subject to its consent, to be 
constitutionally unobjectionable.
107 Idem, para. 20.
108 Idem.
109 Idem, para. 31.
110 Idem. The Court referred to BVerfG 4 May 1971, Az 1 BvR 636/68, NJW 1971 p. 1509.
111 Idem.







‘Part of the content of marriage, as it has stood the test of time despite social change and 
the concomitant changes of its legal structure and been shaped by the Basic Law, is that 
it is the union of one man with one woman to form a permanent partnership, based on a 
free decision and with the support of the state […], in which man and woman are in an 
equal partnership with one another […] and may decide freely on the organisation of their 
cohabitation […].’112
With five votes to three,113 the Federal Constitutional Court agreed with the 
government that the registered civil partnership was not interchangeable with 
marriage and could not enter into competition with marriage, ‘[…] if for no other 
reason than that the group of persons for whom the institution is intended does 
not overlap with the group of married persons’.114 According to the majority of the 
Court the introduction of the legal institution of the registered civil partnership for 
same‑sex couples did not infringe Article 6(1) of the Basic Law: it infringed neither 
the right to unhindered access to marriage guaranteed by this provision nor the 
institutional guarantee laid down in it.115 The Court furthermore held the registered 
civil partnership to be compatible with Article 6(1) in its character as a fundamental 
principle on which values are based. The Court considered that the special protection 
accorded to marriage by Article 6(1) Basic Law did not cover the institution of the 
registered civil partnership:
‘The fact that the partners are of the same sex distinguishes it from marriage and at the same 
time constitutes it. The registered civil partnership is not marriage within the meaning 
of Article 6.1 of the Basic Law. It grants rights to same‑sex couples. In this way, the 
legislature takes account of Article 2.1 and Article 3.1 and 3.3 of the Basic Law, by helping 
these persons to better develop their personalities and by reducing discrimination.’116
According to the Court the particular protection of marriage in that provision did not 
prevent the legislature from offering legal forms for permanent cohabitation other 
than the union of man and woman to different groups. Thus, the Court held, the 
special protection accorded to marriage by Article 6(1) did not prohibit the legislature 
from providing rights and duties for the same‑sex civil partnership that are equal or 
similar to those of marriage, precisely because it relates only to marriage.117 The 
Court considered the institution of marriage could not actually be at risk as a result 
of the introduction of an institution that is directed at persons who cannot be married 
to each other. In introducing the new institution of the registered civil partnership, 
the legislature did not violate the requirement of promoting marriage as a way of life.
112 BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543, para. 87.
113 On the basis of Art. 30(2) BVerfGG a judge holding a dissenting opinion on the decision or the reasons 
during deliberations may have it recorded in a separate vote (or dissenting opinion) which shall be 
annexed to the decision. In their decisions the Senates of the Court may state the number of votes for 
and against. In the here discussed case, two of the three dissenting judges, Papier and Haas, wrote 
dissenting opinions which were annexed to the judgment. These opinions will be discussed below.
114 BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543, para. 103.
115 Idem, para. 70.
116 Idem, para. 88.
117 Idem, para. 89.







A second substantive argument put forward by the applicant States, was that the Act 
infringed the principle of equality of Article 3(1) of the Basic Law because persons of 
a different sex cohabiting with each other and groups of people related to each other 
and living together had no possibility of becoming registered civil partners. The 
Federal Government rebutted that the fact that the registered civil partnership was 
reserved to persons of the same sex was not in violation of Article 3(3) (prohibition 
of discrimination on suspect grounds) of the Basic Law, since it was based not on 
gender, but on the choice of partner, which is not included in the list of suspect 
grounds of Article 3(3) Basic Law. The Constitutional Court (with a seven to one 
vote) followed the reasoning of the Federal Government on this point and held:
‘Men and women are always treated equally. They may enter into marriage with a person of 
the opposite sex, but not with one of their own sex. They may enter into a civil partnership 
with a person of their own sex, but not with one of the other sex.’118
The Court left open the option of the introduction of a civil partnership for 
different‑sex couples, but held there to be no constitutional requirement to create 
such a possibility.119 It held that the Civil Partnerships Act violated neither the 
prohibition of discrimination of Article 3(3) of the Basic Law nor the general principle 
of equality in Article 3(1) of the Basic Law. As the Court explained, this Article 
prohibited treating a group of persons who are addressed by a statute differently 
from other persons addressed by the statute while there were no differences between 
the two groups of such a nature and such weight that they could justify the unequal 
treatment. The Court held such differences to exist, however, ‘between same‑sex 
couples and the other social communities of persons’.120 The Court emphasised that 
civil partnership was open to same‑sex couples only, while marriage was only open 
to couples of a different sex. The fact that children of both spouses could be born to a 
permanent two‑person relationship between man and woman, but not to a same‑sex 
partnership, justified directing heterosexual couples to marriage if they wished to 
give their relationship a permanent legally binding form.121 Further, the Court held 
that there were differences in the relationship of the same‑sex partnerships to the 
communities of mutual support between siblings or other relatives, and that these 
differences justified different treatment.122 Lastly, the Court held the legislature to 
be free, but not constitutionally required, to create new possibilities for different‑sex 
couples or for other communities of mutual support to acquire legal recognition 
118 Idem, para. 106.
119 Idem, para. 111.
120 Idem, para. 108.
121 Idem, para. 109.
122 Idem, para. 110. The Court held: ‘This relates even to the exclusivity of the registered civil partnership, 
which admits no further relationship of the same kind beside itself, whereas communities of mutual 
support between siblings and other relations are often part of further comparable relationships and 
also exist side‑by‑side with another relationship by marriage or partnership. Communities of mutual 
support between relations, in addition, are given a certain support even under existing law, a support 
that was first granted to same‑sex couples in the form of the civil partnership. Thus, in connection with 
relations, there are rights to refuse to give evidence, rights of succession and in part also rights to a 
compulsory portion and for it to be given favourable tax treatment.’







of their relationships if this could be done without the given institute being 
interchangeable with marriage.123 The arguments put forward by the applicant States 
that the provisions in the Act on the rights to custody and succession of civil partners 
and on maintenance law were objectionable from a constitutional point of view, were 
unanimously rejected by the Constitutional Court.
Judges Papier and Haas dissented. They both held that the principle that marriage was 
the union of one man and one woman in a comprehensive, essentially indissoluble 
partnership,124 was an essential fundamental principle defining the institution of 
marriage125 that enjoyed special protection under Article 6(1) of the Basic Law. With 
the creation of a civil partnership between persons of the same sex, with rights and 
duties corresponding to those of marriage, the legislature disregarded this essential 
structural principle, laid down by Article 6(1) of the Basic Law. The judges considered 
it ‘[…] a false conclusion to assume that precisely because of deviation from an 
essential structural principle the constitutional institutional guarantee cease[d] to 
apply as a standard.’ Judge Haas opined that the Constitutional Court should have 
examined more closely whether the civil partnership was comparable to that of the 
institution of marriage. Judge Papier was convinced that this was the case; the Judge 
held that the civil partnership as created by the disputed Act resembled marriage in 
basically all respects but its name.
Following the judgment, an intense debate was initiated in German academic 
literature about the compatibility of the Act with the German Basic Law.126 One 
of the issues widely debated was whether the Act was in violation of fundamental 
rights as enshrined in Article 3 (principle of equal treatment) and Article 6(1)
(special protection of the marriage and the family) of the Basic Law.127 Hofmann 
was very critical to the ‘obvious’ watering down (‘Relativierung’) of the wording of 
Article 6(1) by the Court. According to the author, the Court did not satisfactorily 
take into account the legislative history of the Article and its predecessor, Article 119 
of the Weimar Constitution (see 10.1.2 above).128
123 Idem, para. 111.
124 Judge Papier referred to BVerfG 30 November 1982, Az. 1 BvR 818/81, NJW 1983 p. 511.
125 Judge Papier referred to BVerfG 4 May 1971, Az 1 BvR 636/68, NJW 1971 p. 1509.
126 See Forkert 2003, supra n. 42, at p. 12; J. Braun, ‘Das Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz auf dem Prüfstand’ 
[‘The Civil Partnership Act in trial phase’], Juristische Schulung, JuS (2002) p. 21; R. Kemper, 
`Die Lebenspartnerschaft in der Entwicklung – Perspektiven für die Weiterentwicklung des 
Lebenspartnerschaftsrechts nach dem Urteil des BVerfG vom 17. 7. 2002’ [‘The civil partnership 
in development – Prospects for the further development of the law on civil partnership after the 
judgment of the German Constitutional Court of 17 July 2002’], FPR (2003) p. 1; A. Maurer, ‘Federal 
Constitutional Court To Decide Whether to Issue a Temporary Injunction Against Germany’s New 
Lifetime Partnerships Law for Homosexual Couples’, 2 German Law Journal (2001), available at www.
germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=42, visited June 2014; Maurer 2001B, supra 
n. 101 and S. Stüber, `Lebenspartnerschaft – viele offene Fragen’ [‘Civil partnership – many open 
questions’], NJW (2003)p. 2721.
127 E.g. Forkert 2003, supra n. 42, at p. 16, footnotes 29 and 33. The procedural elements of the case, that 
have not been discussed here, were also a great cause for discussion. This critique will not be discussed 
here.
128 Hofmann 2011, supra n. 21, at p. 270, para. 50.







In 2008, in a judgment concerning the German Transsexuals Act,129 the Federal 
Constitutional Court once again stressed that the institute of marriage was exclusively 
reserved for partners of different sex.130 However, because post‑operative transsexuals 
also have a right under Article 2(1) in combination with Article 1(1) Basic Law to 
choose their own sexual identity, the Court held that marriages concluded before 
one of the spouses had a change‑sex operation, deserved legal protection after the 
sex change.131 The Court left it up to the legislature to decide in such situation how a 
yet existing marriage was to be registered: as marriage (‘Ehe’), as civil partnership 
(‘Lebenspartnerschaft’) or as civil union sui generis (‘Lebensgemeinschaft sui 
generis’).132 Following this judgment the German legislature struck out the impugned 
provision (Article 8(1) (2))133 of the Transsexuals Act.134 The Administrative Court 
of Berlin ruled in 2010 that from the fact that the legislature had thus allowed for 
a same‑sex marriage in the exceptional circumstance that one of the spouses had 
changed sex during marriage, it did not follow that in general same‑sex marriage 
was permitted in Germany.135
As the following sections show, in the years after its entry into force, the German 
civil partnership was made increasingly more equivalent to marriage. On the one 
hand, this mitigated the debate on the constitutionality of the partnership in itself, 
yet on the other hand, it made the question as to the meaning of Article 6(1) Basic 
Law even more pressing.
10.3.4.	 Further	equalisation	of	the	Civil	Partnership	with	marriage
In the years after the entry into force of the Civil Partnerships Act, the civil 
partnership was ‘gradually made equivalent to […] marriage.’136 The first amendment 
129 Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in 
besonderen Fällen (Transsexuellengesetz – TSG) [Act on changing the first name and on determination 
of one’s sex in special circumstances (Act on Transsexuals)], Act of 10 September 1980 (BGBl. I 
p. 1654).
130 BVerfG 27 May 2008 (dec.), Az. 1 BvL 10/05, NJW 2008 p. 3117, para. 50.
131 Idem, para. 36 ff.
132 Idem, paras. 67‑ 71.
133 Art. 8(1)(2) TSG provided: ‚Auf Antrag einer Person, die sich auf Grund ihrer transsexuellen Prägung 
nicht mehr dem in ihrem Geburtseintrag angegebenen, sondern dem anderen Geschlecht als zugehörig 
empfindet und die seit mindestens drei Jahren unter dem Zwang steht, ihren Vorstellungen entsprechend 
zu leben, ist vom Gericht festzustellen, dass sie als dem anderen Geschlecht zugehörig anzusehen ist, 
wenn sie […] nicht verheiratet ist […]’.
134 Art. 1 Act of 17 July 2009, BGBl. I p. 1978.
135 VG Berlin 15 June 2010, Az. 23 A 242/08, para. 13. For discussion of other elements of this judgment 
see section 10.4 below.
136 As observed by the CJEU in Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen 
Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, para. 67. On this equalisation, see for example, 
F. Brosius‑Gersdorf, ‘Gleichstellung von Ehe und Lebenspartnerschaft’ [‘Equalisation of marriage 
and civil partnership’], FamFR (2013) p. 169 and G.D. Gade and C. Thiele, ‘Ehe und eingetragene 
Lebenspartnerschaft: Zwei namensverschiedene Rechtsinstitute gleichen Inhalts?‘ [‘Marriage and 
civil partnership: Two legal institutions with a different name but the same content?’], DÖV (2013) 
p. 142.







of the Act dates from 2005.137 The drafters of this Civil Partnership Law (Revision) 
Act (‘Gesetz zur Überarbeitung des Lebenspartnerschaftsrechts’) held that the 2002 
BVerfG judgment, upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Partnerships Act, had 
paved the way for a far‑reaching equalisation of the civil partnership with marriage.138 
The 2004 Revision Act – which entered into force on 1 January 2005 – has indeed 
been held to contribute to ‘the gradual harmonisation of the regime put in place for 
the life partnership with that applicable to marriage.’139 It governed the adoption of 
matrimonial property law; a more extensive harmonisation of maintenance law; the 
assimilation of the requirements for dissolution of a registered partnership to those 
of divorce law; the introduction of second‑parent adoption;140 the introduction of 
pension rights adjustment; and the extension of the statutory old‑age pension scheme 
to civil partners. Certain areas, such as taxes and the legal position of civil servants, 
were not covered by this Act. Consequently, various differences remained between 
civil partners and spouses.
After the 2004 revision of the Civil Partnership Act, several other bills envisaging 
(further or full) equalisation of the civil partnership with marriage were drafted 
and tabled, both at federal141 and state level.142 None of these, however, resulted in 
legislative amendments.143 Instead, it proved to be judicial decisions – both at the 
national and the European levels – in cases concerning issues like taxes, social benefits 
for civil servants and adoption rights that prompted the legislature to adopt further 
amendments to civil partnership law. The latest change to the Civil Partnerships 
Act, for example, was implemented in 2014, as a follow‑up to the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court on successive adoption (see section 10.3.5.3 below).144
The following (sub)sections discuss in more detail four important fields of law 
in which full equalisation has long been no reality or was no reality at the time 
this research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014). These concern employment law 
(section 10.3.4.1), the legal position of civil servants (section 10.3.4.2), tax issues 
(section 10.3.4.3), and parental rights. Because of their centrality to the present case 
study, the latter are discussed separately in section 10.3.5.
137 Gesetz zur Überarbeitung des Lebenspartnerschaftsrechts [Civil Partnership Law (Revision) Act], 
Act of 15 December 2004, BGBl. I No. 69, p. 3396. The Act was passed on 12 October 2004 by the 
Bundestag [Parliament] and entered into force on 1 January 2005.
138 BT‑Drs. 15/3445, p. 14.
139 Observation of the Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht München, the referring Court in the case of 
Maruko, as discussed below, and as quoted in Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der 
deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, para. 68.
140 See section 10.3.5.1 below.
141 BT‑Drs. 16/497 and BT‑Drs. 16/3423.
142 For example, LT‑Drs. 14/2724.
143 For example, Plenarprotokoll 14/55 of the Landestag Nordrhein‑Westfalen of 8 March 2007, p. 6199.
144 BGBl. I, p. 786.








A prominent issue under employment law in respect of which Lebenspartners were, 
for a long time, treated differently from spouses concerns survivors’ pensions. This 
difference in treatment resulted in various court proceedings and in one of these a 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was 
made. The Maruko case concerned the occupational pension scheme managed 
by the German Theatre Pension Institution (‘Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen 
Bühnen’), under which a civil partner – contrary to a spouse – did not receive a 
survivor’s pension after the death of the partner. This was reason for the Bavarian 
Administrative Court to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU in June 2006.145 
The principal question of the referring court was whether Article 1, in conjunction 
with Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/EC,146 precluded regulations governing a 
supplementary pension scheme of the kind at issue in the case.
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, the CJEU ruled in its judgment of 1 April 
2008 in the Maruko case147 that an occupational pension scheme under which a civil 
partner did not receive a survivor’s pension after the death of the partner like spouses 
did, was indeed precluded if, under national law, the civil partnership placed persons 
of the same sex in a situation comparable to that of spouses so far as that survivor’s 
benefit was concerned. The CJEU left it up to the referring court to determine in 
a concrete case whether such comparability of situations could be found. In the 
CJEU judgment it was, however, already indicated that the referring court itself 
had acknowledged that in Germany a ‘harmonization between marriage and life 
partnership’ existed, which could be regarded as ‘a gradual movement towards 
recognizing equivalence’ and that therefore the registered civil partnership, while 
not identical to marriage, placed persons of the same sex in a situation comparable 
to that of spouses as far as the survivor’s benefit was concerned.148 Therefore it came 
not by surprise that the Bavarian Administrative Court subsequently decided in the 
plaintiff’s favour.149 It held that, as a surviving civil partner, Maruko was in a situation 
comparable to that of a spouse who was entitled to the survivor’s benefit provided 
for under the occupational pension scheme managed by the ‘Versorgungsanstalt der 
deutschen Bühnen’.
A year later, the Federal Labour Court (Bundes Arbeitsgericht, BAG) confirmed that 
since the entry into force of the Civil Partnership (Revision) Act of January 2005, 
civil partners of the same sex were in a situation comparable to that of spouses, 
145 VG München 1 June 2006 (dec.), Az. M 3 K 05.1595.
146 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16.
147 Case C‑267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I‑1757, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:179. See M. Bruns, ‘Die Maruko‑Entscheidung im Spannungsfeld zwischen 
europäischer und nationaler Auslegung’ [‘The Maruko judgment in the area of tension between 
European and national reading’], NJW (2008) p. 1929 and S. Stüber, ‘Was folgt aus “Maruko”?’ [‘What 
follows from “Maruko”?’], NVwz (2008) p. 750.
148 Idem, para. 69.
149 VG München 30 October 2008, Az. M 12 K 08.1484.







as far as survivors’ benefits were concerned.150 Referring to the BVerfG judgment 
of 2002 concerning the Civil Partnerships Act,151 the Labour Court held that while 
Article 6(1) Basic Law prohibited the legislature from giving preferential treatment 
to other ways of life over marriage, there was no obligation on the legislature in the 
form of a ‘Abstandsgebots’ (requirement of distance) to disadvantage other ways of 
life vis‑à‑vis marriage.152
10.3.4.2. The legal position of civil servants
As explained above, civil servants were not covered by the 2001 Civil Partnerships 
Act, nor by its 2004 revision. Subsequently, also in this area of law, court litigation 
eventually forced the legislature to take action.
In cases decided at the time when the Maruko case was pending before the CJEU,153 
and shortly after the CJEU judgment in that case was delivered,154 both the Federal 
Administrative Court155 and the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court held 
differences in treatment between civil servants in a civil partnership and married 
civil servants as regards social benefits to be compatible with the German Basic 
Law. The Constitutional Court held that the situation of civil partners and spouses 
in respect of child benefits was not comparable, because of the special role marriage 
played in the raising of children and because of the resultant connected loss of 
income.156 Decisive importance was attached to the fact that the German legislature 
had not provided for full equalisation of civil servants in the Civil Partnerships Act, 
nor in its 2004 Revision Act.157 In a judgment delivered soon thereafter, the Federal 
Administrative Court even held the situation of civil partners and spouses to be 
generally incomparable.158
150 BAG 15 September 2009, Az. 3 AZR 294/09, NJW 2010 p.1474. See A. Bissels and M. Lützeler, ̀ Aktuelle 
Rechtsprechung zum Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetz 2009/2010 (Teil 2)’ [‘Recent case‑law 
on the General Equal Treatment Act 2009–2010 (Part 2)’], BB (2010) p. 1725 at pp. 1728–1729 and 
U. Langohr‑Plato, ‘Hinterbliebenenversorgung für eingetragene Lebenspartner’ [‘Survivors’ pensions 
for registered partners’], juris Praxis Report ‑ArbR 11/2010 Anm. 5. By judgment of 14 January 
2009 the Federal Labour Court had yet held that in respect of company pensions (‘betrieblichen 
Altersversorgung’), civil partners and spouses were in a comparable situation. BAG 14 January 2009, 
Az. 3 AZR 20/07. See also BAG 29 April 2004, Az. 6 AZR 101/03, where the BAG had held that civil 
partners were like spouses entitled to residence allowance (‘Ortszuschlag’).
151 See 10.3.3 above.
152 BAG 15 September 2009, Az. 3 AZR 294/09, NJW 2010 p.1474, para. 23.
153 BVerfG 20 September 2007 (dec.), Az. 2 BvR 855/06, NJW 2008 p. 209 and BVerfG 8 November 2007 
(dec.), Az. 2 BvR 2466/06.
154 BVerfG 6 May 2008 (dec.), Az. 2 BvR 1830/06, NJW 2008 p. 2325.
155 BVerwG 15 November 2007, Az. 2 C 33/06, NJW 2008 p. 868. See D. Kugele, ‘Kein Anspruch auf 
Familienzuschlag der Stufe 1 bei eingetragener Lebenspartnerschaft’ [‘No entitlement to family 
benefits in category 1 for civil partnerships’], jurisPR‑BVerwG 10/2008 Anm. 3.
156 BVerfG 6 May 2008 (dec.), Az. 2 BvR 1830/06, NJW 2008 p. 2325, para. 17.
157 Idem, para. 13.
158 BVerwG 15 November 2007, Az. 2 C 33/06, NJW 2008 p. 868. See Wiemann 2010, supra n. 49, at 
p. 1427, footnote 7.







In 2009 – possibly under influence of the CJEU judgment in the Maruko case – the 
BVerfG departed from this line of case law. In a judgment of 7 July 2009, the First 
Senate of the BVerfG took a diametrically opposite position on the matter than the 
Second Senate had taken before, by holding that that the unequal treatment of married 
civil servants and civil servants in a civil partnership in respect of survivors’ pensions 
was contrary to the general principle of equality of Article 3(1) Basic Law.159 The First 
Senate held the unequal treatment of marriage and registered civil partnerships with 
regard to survivors’ pensions under an occupational pension scheme, for civil service 
employees who had supplementary pensions insurance with the Supplementary 
Pensions Agency for Federal and State Employees (‘Versorgungsanstalt des 
Bundes und der Länder’), to be incompatible with Article 3(1) of the Basic Law.160 
The Federal Court of Justice (BGH), against whose judgment this appeal with the 
BVerfG had been lodged, had held that personal or marital status constituted the 
differentiating criterion for the unequal treatment, and had considered that this status 
was available to the persons affected irrespective of their sexual orientation. The 
BVerfG considered that line of reasoning to be ‘too formal’ and not doing justice to 
reality.161 The Constitutional Court stressed that the civil partnership was introduced 
with the explicit objective to terminate discrimination against same‑sex couples. 
Therefrom it followed that ‘provisions which govern[ed] the rights of registered civil 
partners […] typically relate[d] to homosexual persons, and those which govern 
the rights of spouses typically relate[d] to heterosexual persons.’162 On that ground 
the Court concluded that the difference in treatment between marriages and civil 
partnerships with regard to survivors’ pensions, constituted unequal treatment on 
the basis of sexual orientation.163 From established case law it followed that such 
unequal treatment was to be subjected to a strict review under Article 3(3) Basic 
Law.164 The BVerfG considered that a mere reference to marriage and its protection 
under Article 6(1) of the Basic Law was not sufficient to justify the unequal treatment 
on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court held:
‘If the privileged treatment of marriage is accompanied by unfavourable treatment of 
other ways of life, even where these are comparable to marriage with regard to the life 
situation provided for and the objectives pursued by the provisions, the mere reference 
159 BVerfG 7 July 2009, 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439. See M. Grunberger, ‘Die Gleich behandlung von 
Ehe und eingetragener Lebenspartnerschaft im Zusammenspiel von Unionsrecht und nationalem 
Verfassungsrecht. Das Urteil des BVerfG zur VBL‑Hinterbliebenenrente’ [‘The equal treatment of 
marriage and civil partnership in interaction with Union law and national constitutional law’], FPR 
(2010) p. 203.
160 BVerfG 7 July 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439. For an analysis of the retroactive 
effects of this finding, see T. Hoppe, ‘Verpartnerte Beamte: Rückwirkender Anspruch auf 
Gleichstelling?’, ZBR Heft (2010) p. 189 at pp. 189–191. This case concerning survivor’s pensions also 
had a tax dimension. This limb of the case is discussed in further detail below (section 10.3.4.3).
161 Wiemann welcomed that the BVerfG took real life considerations into account, which reminded her 
of the reasoning by which the CJEU in the Maruko case came to the conclusion that there was indirect 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. Wiemann 2010, supra n. 49, at p. 1428.
162 BVerfG 7 July 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439, para. 92. 
163 Idem. The wording of the judgment does not allow for a conclusion as to the question whether the 
BVerfG considered this to be direct or indirect discrimination.
164 Idem, para. 88. See, inter alia, BVerfG 26 January 1993, Az. 1 BvL 43/92, NJW 1933 p. 1517.







to the requirement of protecting marriage does not justify such a differentiation. For the 
authority to give favourable treatment to marriage over other ways of life in fulfilment 
and further refining of the constitutional mandate to promote marriage does not give rise 
to a requirement contained in Article 6.1 of the Basic Law to disadvantage other ways of 
life in comparison to marriage. It cannot be constitutionally justified to derive from the 
special protection of marriage a rule that other partnerships are to be structured in a way 
different from marriage and to be given lesser rights […]. Beyond the mere reference to 
Article 6.1 of the Basic Law, a sufficiently weighty factual reason is required here which, 
measured against the given subject and objective of regulation, justifies the unfavourable 
treatment of other ways of life.’165
The Court did not consider there to be any viable objective reasons for unequal 
treatment in the area of occupational survivors’ pensions: such objections did not 
result from the objectives and the concrete structure of this pensions system, nor 
from a difference of the life situations of married couples and civil partners. The 
Court held both civil partnership and marriage to be of a permanent nature and 
to create a mutual obligation of support.166 The BVerfG rejected the reasoning of 
the Federal Court of Justice that a reason for differentiating between marriage and 
civil partnership could be found in the fact that married couples typically had a 
different pension requirement than civil partners because of gaps in their working 
lives due to their care for children. Not only could the image of the ‘breadwinner 
marriage’ no longer be regarded as the yardstick for assigning survivors’ benefits, 
but this argument also overlooked that just as in marriage, in civil partnerships the 
community of the partners could be structured in such a way that one partner had an 
increased need for provision. The Court ruled that ‘insofar as privileged treatment of 
marriage is based on the fact that it produces children, the constitutionally permissible 
and constitutionally required promotion of parents is primarily the subject of the 
constitutional protection of the fundamental rights of the family, and as such it is 
not restricted to married parents’.167 By thus holding that raising children was not a 
typical distinction between marriage and civil partnership, the Court disconnected 
the special protection of marriage from the special protection of the family (see also 
section 10.3.5, concerning parental issues).168
This judgment had implications for other areas of law in which civil partners and 
spouses were treated unequally, for instance concerning taxes (see section 10.3.4.3) 
and parental rights (see section 10.3.5).169 However, the judgment did not solve all 
issues concerning the legal position of civil servants in civil partnerships,170 nor did 
165 Idem, para. 105. See also Bissels and Lützeler 2010, supra n. 150, at p. 1729.
166 Idem, para. 102.
167 Idem, para. 103.
168 Wiemann 2010, supra n. 49, at p. 1429 and Henkel 2011, supra n. 49, at p. 259.
169 See also K. Muscheler, ‘Die Reform des Lebenspartnerschaftsrechts’ [‘The reform of the Civil 
Partnership Act’], FPR (2010), supra n. 49, at p. 1429.
170 It is therefore not without reason that Musscheler wrote in 2010 that ‘chaos had broken out’ in this area 
of law. Muscheler 2010, supra n. 169, at p. 233.







its implementation law of 2011.171 Another step towards full equalisation was taken 
by the Constitutional Court in a judgment of June 2012, when it outlawed differences 
in treatment in respect of family benefits (‘Familienzuschlag’).172 By the time this 
research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014), the position of federal civil servants 
in a registered partnership was equalised with civil servants who were married in 
basically all respects.173
10.3.4.3. Tax issues
Tax law has for a long time been another area of law in which civil partnerships and 
marriage have been treated differently. The Civil Partnerships Bill had originally 
foreseen some equalisation in this area, however this was included in the statute that 
required the approval of the Bundesrat and that subsequently did not make it into 
law.174
An example of such unequal treatment concerned income tax. Under the Income 
Tax Act (Einkommensteuergesetzes (EStG)) civil partners, contrary to spouses,175 
had no option of combining their incomes for the purpose of tax assessment 
(‘Zusammenveranlagung’), which also implied that they had no entitlement to the 
financial benefit of income splitting (‘Ehegattensplitting’), whereby the total income 
of a married couple was taxed on the basis of equal halves.176 In 2004 and 2005 various 
financial district courts held this difference in treatment between civil partners and 
spouses to be compatible with the Constitution, because Article 6(1) Basic Law 
allowed for privileged treatment of marriage over other forms of cohabitation in 
respect of taxes.177 The Federal Financial Court (BFG) confirmed this approach on 
various occasions.178 It thereby underlined that the legislature had explicitly not opted 
for a full equalisation of civil partnership and marriage in respect of income taxes.
171 Gesetz zur Übertragung ehebezogener Regelungen im öffentlichen Dienstrecht auf 
Lebenspartnerschaften [Act on the application of marriage‑related regulations in civil service law on 
civil partnerships], Act of 14 November 2011, BGBl. I 2011, No. 58, p. 2219.
172 BVerfG 19 June 2012 (dec.), Az. 2 BvR 1397/09, NJW 2012 p. 2790. As a result of this judgment the law 
was amended at Federal level. Gesetz zur Neuregelung der Professorenbesoldung und zur Änderung 
weiterer dienstrechtlicher Vorschriften, Professorenbesoldungsneuregelungsgesetz [Act introducing a 
new regulation on the pay of professors and on the amendment of other applicable regulations], Act of 
20 June 2013. BGBl. I 2013, 1514. The Act entered into force on 1 August 2013.
173 On its website, the LSVD has provided a useful overview of the situation in the several States. See www.
lsvd.de/recht/ratgeber‑zum‑lpartg/7‑arbeiter‑angestellte‑und‑beamte.html#c1372, visited June 2014.
174 See J. Selder, ‘Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und die Homo‑Ehe im Steuerrecht’ [‘The German 
Constitutional Court and same‑sex marriage in the area of tax law’], DStR (2013) p. 1064 at p. 1065. 
See also section 10.3.1 above.
175 As provided for at the time under Arts. 26, 26b and 32a (5) EStG.
176 For a calculation example of the resulting differences of the tax assessment between civil partners and 
spouses, see M. Maurer, ‘Die rechtliche Behandlung von Lebenspartnern im Steuernrecht’ [‘The legal 
treatment of civil partner in the area of tax law’], FPR (2010) p. 196 at pp. 196–197.
177 FG Saarland 21 January 2004, Az. 1 K 466/02, NJW 2004 p. 1268; FG Berlin 21 June 2004, Az. 9 K 
9037/03; FG Hamburg 8 December 2004, Az. II 510/03; FG Niedersachsen 15 December 2004, Az. 2 K 
292/03 and FG Niedersachsen 8 June 2005, Az. 2 K 267/03.
178 BFH 26 January 2006, Az. III R 51/05, NJW 2006 p. 1837. See also BFH 20 July 2006, Az III R 
8/04, NJW 2006, 3310 and BFH 19 October 2006, Az. III R 29/06. By decision of 8 June 2011 the 







The Constitutional Court in the end ruled differently in a judgment of May 2013. 
However, before that judgment is discussed, first its line of case law on another 
tax issue, namely inheritance tax, is set out. Under the Gift and Inheritance Tax 
Act of 1996 and the 1997 Annual Tax Reform Act,179 registered civil partners 
were significantly more burdened than spouses in respect of inheritance tax: civil 
partners were placed in a different tax class from spouses and were consequently 
not granted the same personal exemptions.180 Following the Inheritance Tax Reform 
Act (Erbschaftsteuerreformgesetz, EStG) of 24 December 2008,181 the personal 
exemption and the exemption for retirement benefits were determined in the same 
way for both inheriting civil partners and spouses. Still, civil partners continued to 
be treated like distant relatives and unrelated persons and taxed at the highest tax 
rates. The lawsuits of two individuals, who were in a civil partnership and who were 
disadvantageously affected by these regulations, reached the BVerfG.
By order of 21 July 2010, the First Senate of the BVerfG ruled that the inheritance 
tax law discrimination against civil partners in comparison to spouses regarding the 
personal exemption and the tax rate, as well as their exclusion from the exemption 
for retirement benefits, was incompatible with the general principle of equality 
(Article 3(1) of the Basic Law).182 The Court considered that there was no difference 
Bundesfinanzhof rejected the claim that civil partners could claim change of their income tax category. 
BFH 8 June 2011 (dec.), Az. III B 210/10.
179 Erbschaftsteuer‑ und Schenkungsteuergesetz a.F., ErbStG a.F. [Gift and Inheritance Tax Act. old 
version], version dated 20 December 1996.
180 The BVerfG’s press office described the relevant provisions as follows: ‘While pursuant to §§ 15.1 
and 19.1 ErbStG a.F. spouses were subject to the most beneficial Tax Class 1 and, depending upon the 
amount of the inheritance, were subject to a tax rate between 7 and 30%, civil partners were classified 
as “other recipients” and placed in Tax Class III, which provides for tax rates of between 17 and 50%. 
Moreover, § 16.1 no. 1 ErbStG a.F. granted spouses a personal exemption in the amount of DM 600,000/€ 
307,000 and § 17.1 ErbStG a.F. granted a special exemption for retirement benefits in the amount of 
DM 500,000/€ 256,000. On the other hand, registered civil partners, because of their placement in Tax 
Class III, were only entitled to an exemption in the amount of DM 10,000/€ 5,200 (§ 16.1 no. 5, § 15.1 
ErbStG a.F.). They were completely excluded from the benefit of the tax exemption for retirement 
benefits. In the Inheritance Tax Reform Act (Erbschaftsteuerreformgesetz) of 24 December 2008, 
the provisions described above in the Gift and Inheritance Tax Act were amended to the benefit of 
registered civil partners to the extent that the personal exemption and the exemption for retirement 
benefits are determined in the same way for both inheriting civil partners and spouses. Nevertheless, 
registered civil partners continue to be treated like distant relatives and unrelated persons and taxed at 
the highest tax rates. Pursuant to the Federal Government’s draft legislation for the 2010 Annual Tax 
Reform Act of 22 June 2010, complete equality for civil partners and spouses in the gift and Inheritance 
tax law – also in regard to tax rates – is intended.’ Press release of the Press Office of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, no. 63/2010 of 17 August 2010, online available at: www.bverfg.de/
pressemitteilungen/bvg10‑063en.html, visited July 2011.
181 Gesetz zur Reform des Erbschaftsteuer‑ und Bewertungsrechts (ErbStRG) [Inheritance Tax Reform 
Act] BGBl. I 2008 p. 3018. This Act was adopted following a judgment of the BVerfG of 2006 (BVerfG 
7 November 2006 (dec.), Az. 1 BvL 10/02, NJW 2007 p. 573), in which the Constitutional Court held 
the Inheritance Tax Act to be partly incompatible with Art. 3(1) Basic Law, on grounds that were not 
related to the difference in treatment between civil partners and spouses.
182 BVerfG 21 July 2010 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 2464/07, NJW 2010 p. 2783. See M. Messner, 
‘Lebenspartnerschaft – Steuerliche Konsequenzen des BVerfG‑Beschlusses vom 21. 7. 2010’ [‘Civil 
partnership – implications of the decision of the German Constitutional Court of 21 July 2010 for tax 
law’], DStR (2010) p. 1875.







between civil partners in comparison to spouses that was of such weight that it could 
justify the disadvantage to civil partners in the Gift and Inheritance Tax Act in the 
version pursuant to the 1997 Annual Tax Reform Act.183 Granting a privilege to 
spouses and not to civil partners under the law regarding the personal exemption could 
not be justified solely by reference to the State’s special protection of marriage and 
the family (Article 6(1) Basic Law). Referring to its judgment concerning survivors’ 
pensions for civil servants of July 2009 (see 10.3.4.2 above), the Court reiterated that 
if the promotion of marriage was accompanied by unfavourable treatment of other 
ways of living together – even where these were comparable to marriage with regard 
to the life situation provided for and the objectives pursued by the legislation – the 
mere reference to the requirement of protecting marriage under Article 6(1) of the 
Basic Law did not justify such a differentiation. The Court held that the authority 
of the State to be active in respect of marriage and the family in fulfilment of its 
duty of protection as set forth in Article 6(1) remained completely unaffected by the 
question of the extent to which others can assert claims for equal treatment.184 Only 
the principle of equality (Article 3(1) Basic Law), in accordance with the relevant 
principles as developed by the Federal Constitutional Court, determined whether and 
to what extent others – in this case registered civil partners – had a claim for treatment 
equal to the statutory or actual promotion of married spouses and family members.185 
The Constitutional Court noted that marriage was fundamentally different from civil 
partnership in its suitability as ‘starting point for the succession of generations’. For a 
civil partnership it was fundamentally impossible to produce joint children, because 
of its limitation to same‑sex couples. Marriage, on the contrary, – as a union between 
different sex couples and despite the free choice of spouses for parenthood – was 
considered by the Court to be the privileged legal institute for family building.186 The 
Court accepted that it could be argued that this suitability of marriage as a starting 
point for the succession of generations could justify higher personal allowances for 
spouses in tax law, with a view to the possible inheritance of the family property by 
joint children. However, now that the legislature had not made a distinction between 
marriages with children and childless marriages in setting the personal allowance 
rates, the Court rejected this argument.187
The Court gave the legislature until 31 December 2010 to enact a new rule for those 
old cases affected by the (former version of the) Gift and Inheritance Tax Act. These 
new rules were to remove the infringement on equality from the time period between 
the effective date of the Civil Partnerships Act of 16 February 2001 until the effective 
date of the Inheritance Tax Reform Act of 24 December 2008.188 The legislature 
did not immediately take action, however, presumably because it was awaiting the 
judgment of the Second BVerfG in the pending cases in respect of income splitting.
183 The Court considered that this applied to the personal exemption pursuant to § 16 ErbStG a.F., to the 
exemption for retirement benefits pursuant to § 17 ErbStG a.F., and to the tax rate pursuant to § 19 
ErbStG a.F.
184 BVerfG 21 July 2010 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 2464/07, NJW 2010 p. 2783, para. 92.
185 Idem, para. 92.
186 Idem, para. 106.
187 Idem, para. 107.
188 See also Maurer 2010, supra n. 176.







Before the Constitutional Court issued that long‑awaited ruling it firstly found, 
in another case, the unequal treatment of spouses and civil partners in respect of 
conveyance tax (‘Grunderwerbsteuerrecht’) incommensurable with Article 3 Basic 
Law and thus unconstitutional.189
This judgment of July 2012 was received as fitting in with a consistent line of case 
law of the BVerfG.190 It therefore did not come as a surprise that in respect of income 
tax also, the BVerfG ruled that civil partners had to be treated equally with spouses. 
This was decided by the Second Senate of the BVerfG in May 2013, when it dealt 
with the tax dimension of the 2009 judgment of the First Senate of the BVerfG 
concerning survivors’ pensions for civil servants, as discussed above.191
On 7 May 2013, the BVerfG ruled that the unequal treatment of registered partners 
when compared to spouses in respect of income splitting constituted indirect 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.192 This implied that a strict 
proportionality test applied. The Court reiterated that the special protection of 
marriage ex Article 6(1) Basic Law was in itself no sufficient justification.193 Further, 
neither the aim of the income splitting for spouses, nor the legislature’s competence 
to apply categorisation in tax law constituted a sufficiently weighty reason justifying 
the indirect discrimination. The Court underlined that the legislature had from the 
beginning structured civil partnership ‘in a way comparable to marriage as a community 
of extensively shared responsibility’194 and that it had continuously equalised civil 
partnership further with marriage.195 Both marriage and civil partnership formed 
unions of economic production and consumption (‘Gemeinschaften des Verbrauchs 
und Erwerbs’).196 Because the income splitting applied to spouses irrespective of 
whether they were raising children, any ‘family‑related intentions’197 could not justify 
the indirect discrimination either. Supporting family‑building was no justification 
for category‑based preferential treatment of marriage over civil partnership. The fact 
that generally more children were raised within marriage when compared to civil 
partnership, did not alter this conclusion, as it could not be ignored that children were 
also raised in civil partnerships.198
189 BVerfG 18 July 2012 (dec.), Az. 1 BvL 16/11, NJW 2012 p. 2719. See F. Strohal, ‘Verfassungswidrige 
Ungleichbehandlung von Ehegatten und eingetragenen Lebenspartnern im Grunderwerbsteuerrecht’ 
[‘Unconstitutional unequal treatment between spouses and registered partners in the area of conveyance 
tax law’], FamFR (2012) p. 432.
190 S. Muckel, ‘Ungleichbehandlung von Ehe und eingetragener Lebenspartnerschaft –  Grunderwerbsteuer’ 
[‘Unequal treatment of marriage and civil partnership – conveyance tax’], JA (2012) p. 877.
191 BVerfG 7 May 2013 (dec.), Az. 2 BvR 909/06 a.o., NJW 2013 p. 2257.
192 Idem, para. 78.
193 Idem, paras. 80–85.
194 Federal Consitutional Court Press Office, Press release no. 41/2013 of 6 June 2013, online available at: 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg13‑041en.html, visited August 2013.
195 BVerfG 7 May 2013 (dec.), Az. 2 BvR 909/06 a.o., NJW 2013 p. 2257, para. 90.
196 Idem, paras. 95 and 102.
197 Federal Consitutional Court Press Office, Press release no. 41/2013 of 6 June 2013, online available at: 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg13‑041en.html, visited August 2013.
198 BVerfG 7 May 2013 (dec.), Az. 2 BvR 909/06 a.o., NJW 2013 p. 2257, paras. 102–103.







The Court concluded that the legislature had to eliminate the established violation of 
Article 3(1) Basic Law, and it had to do so retroactively to the moment of the entry 
into force of the Civil Partnerships Act in August 2001.199 Because the legislature 
could choose between different means in order to achieve this, the BVerfG issued a 
declaration of incompatibility of the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act with 
the Basic Law.200 Until the legislature had introduced new legislation, the relevant 
provisions had to be applied to civil partners and spouses equally.201
Two out of eight Judges disagreed with the majority finding and wrote a separate 
opinion. They disputed that the legislature had from the outset intended to structure 
civil partnership in a similar fashion as marriage. This could only be said from the 
moment the Civil Partnerships Revision Act had entered into force, hence from the 
year 2005. Since the facts of the cases before it originated from fiscal years 2001 
and 2002, the preferential treatment of marriage during that period could be justified, 
exactly because civil partnership and marriage were not comparable. Justices 
Landau and Kessal‑Wulf warned that the ‘Senate [had replaced] the assessment of 
the legislature, which [was] the only legitimate authority, with its own.’202
This ruling was generally considered to be consistent with the existing line of BVerfG 
case law in respect of equal treatment of civil partners, which had been based on 
the legislature’s own principled choices.203 That the BVerfG accorded retroactive 
effect to its ruling to the moment of introduction of the civil partnership, may have 
come more as a surprise. The costs involved for the German State were estimated at 
approximately 175 million euro in 2013 and around 60 million annually from then 
on.204
This time the legislature acted quickly. On 19 July 2013, a new Article 2(8) in the 
Income Tax Act (Einkommensteuergesetz) entered into force, providing that those 
clauses that applied to spouses, equally applied to civil partners.205 The legislature 
thus deliberately chose to equalise the position of civil partners with that of spouses in 
respect of the entire Income Tax Act, and not just the question of income splitting. Not 
199 Idem, paras. 107–111.
200 Idem, para. 112.
201 Idem, para. 113.
202 Federal Consitutional Court Press Office, Press release no. 41/2013 of 6 June 2013, online available at: 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg13‑041en.html, visited August 2013.
203 E.g. S. Muckel, ‘Ausschluss eingetragener Lebenspartner vom Ehegattensplitting verfassungs‑
widrig’ [‘Exclusion of civil partners from income splitting unconstitutional’], JA (2013) p. 714. 
Brosius‑Gersdorf regretted that the Court did not examine whether the income splitting in itself was 
constitutional. The author held that the measure constituted gender discrimination. F. Brosius‑Gersdorf, 
‘Verfassungswidrigkeit der Ungleichbehandlung von Ehen und eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaften 
beim Ehegattensplitting’ [‘Unconstitutionality of unequal treatment of marriage and civil partnership 
in respect of income splitting’], FamFR (2013) p. 312.
204 ‘Ehegattensplitting für eingetragene Lebenspartner: Koalitionsfraktionen bringen Gesetzentwurf ins 
Parlament ein’, Becklink 1026983 (Verlag C.H. Beck 2011).
205 Art. 1(1) Gesetz vom 15. 7. 2013 zur Änderung des EStG in Umsetzung der Entscheidung des BVerfG 
vom 7. 5. 2013 [Act of 15 July 2013 on the Amendment of the EStG with a view to implementation of 
the judgment of the BVerfG of 7 May 2013], BGBl. I, p. 2397.







all related tax acts were simultaneously amended at the time, but some amendments 
followed suit.206 Moreover, in April 2014 the Federal Government tabled a bill that 
provided for equal treatment of civil partners and spouses in all tax laws.207 This Act 
entered into force on 24 July 2014.208
On the basis of the discussed line of BVerfG case law in tax matters, Selder concluded 
that the Constitutional Court had ‘dismantled the constitutional position of marriage 
in tax law in a radical way’. According to the author the special protection of marriage 
under Article 6(1) Basic Law had become an empty shell that had developed over 
time from an obligation to privilege marriage to a prohibition on discrimination.209
10.3.5.	 Parental	rights	for	same‑sex	couples
Parental rights for same‑sex couples have been much debated in German politics and 
it is in this area that marriage and registered partnership have not (yet) been fully 
equalised under the law.
When civil partnership was introduced in 2001, the legislature held that same‑sex 
civil partnerships were ‘fundamentally’ different from different‑sex unions, 
because no common genetic children could be born within civil partnerships.210 It 
was acknowledged that nonetheless in civil partnerships children could also be, 
and were, raised, and that their best interests required that certain measures were 
taken. Provision was therefore made for a right to parental access for civil partners.211 
The possibility was also introduced that in the case of death, an order could 
be given that the child remained with the person(s) to whom it related (so‑called 
‘Verbleibensanordnungen’). Civil partners were furthermore given the power to 
share in decisions on matters relating to the child’s everyday life if he or she lived 
together with the parent (the so‑called ‘kleines Sorgerecht’).212
More far‑reaching parental rights for civil partners were only granted gradually 
over the past decade, and the most principled amendments were commanded by 
rulings of the German Constitutional Court. The various subsections below contain 
a chronological and – mostly – thematical discussion of the (development of) the 
relevant laws.
206 E.g. Act of 18 July 2014, BGBl. I p. 1042, providing for the relevant amendment of the 
Einkommensteuer‑Durchführungsverordnung (EStDV) [Income Tax Implementation Decree].
207 BT‑Drs. 18/1306.
208 BGBl. I 2014, no. 32, p. 1042.
209 Selder 2013, supra n. 174, at p. 1067.
210 BT‑Drs. 14/3751, p. 33.
211 Art. 2 no. 12 LPartG, now provided for in Art. 1685(2) BGB.
212 Art. 9(1) LPartG.







10.3.5.1. 2004: Introduction of second‑parent adoption
When the Civil Partnerships Act was revised in 2004, it was felt that the best 
interests of the child had not been not sufficiently served by the 2001 Act.213 
Measures were considered necessary to strengthen the legal position of children 
raised in civil partnerships, as well as their parents. The 2004 Revision Act therefore 
made it possible for a civil partner to adopt the genetic child of the other civil 
partner, so‑called Stiefkindadoption (step‑child adoption), hereafter referred to as 
second‑parent adoption.214 The BVerfG later held such second‑parent adoption to be 
compatible with the Basic Law.215 In its judgment, the Court made clear that each 
parent individually enjoyed the constitutional parental rights of Article 6(2) Basic 
Law and not merely two parents as a union.216
The pre‑existing option of single‑parent adoption had not been affected by the Civil 
Partnerships Act of 2001. Since the 2004 revision it is, however, provided that if a 
person in a civil partnership wishes to adopt a child, the consent of one’s civil partner 
is required. The 2004 Revision Act explicitly did not provide for successive adoption 
(‘Sukzessivadoption’) or joint adoption by civil partners.217 While the latter is still218 
not possible for civil partners under German law (see 10.3.5.4 below), legislative 
change in respect of successive adoption was only achieved after court proceedings 
(see 10.3.5.3 below). Before the relevant BVerfG ruling of 2013 is discussed, first the 
relevant aspects of the Court’s case law of the preceding years are set out.
10.3.5.2. 2009 and 2010: principled BVerfG rulings
As noted above, the rulings of the Constitutional Court on survivors’ pensions 
and inheritance also had implications for parental rights for civil partners. For 
long it has been a controversial matter in German law and doctrine whether the 
close intertwining of marriage and the family in the wording of Article 6(1) of the 
Basic Law, implied that only the families of married partners enjoy constitutional 
protection.219 In its ruling of July 2009 on survivors’ pensions for civil partners (see 
10.3.4.2 above) the Constitutional Court rejected this reading of Article 6(1) Basic 
Law. It held:
213 BT‑Drs. 15/3445, p. 14.
214 Art. 9(7) LPartG, Art. 1755(1) and (3), Art. 1755(2) BGB, as introduced by the 2004 Revision Act.
215 BVerfG 10 August 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvL 15/09. See also AG Elmshorn 20 December 2010 (dec.), Az. 
46 F 9/10, NJW 2011 p. 1085. The case concerned a lesbian couple in a civil partnership, one of whom 
had become pregnant with the use of anonymously donated sperm. The Elmshorn Court ruled that it 
was in the child’s best interest for the civil partner of the biological mother not to have to comply with 
the year of caring for the child before adoption could take place (‘Adoptionspflegejahr’), as had been 
requested by the competent child welfare office.
216 BVerfG 10 August 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvL 15/09, para. 15.
217 BT‑Drs. 15/3445, p. 15.
218 State of affairs on 31 July 2014.
219 E.g. Grösschner 2004, supra n. 22, at p. 825; W. Heun, ‘Art. 3’, in H. Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz‑Kommentar, 
Band 1, Präambel, Artikel 1–19 [German Basic Law Commentary, Volume 1, Preamble, Articles 1–19], 
2nd edn. (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2004) p. 399 at p. 482, Rn. 140.







‘[…] the constitutionally permissible and constitutionally required promotion of parents 
is primarily the subject of the constitutional protection of the fundamental rights of the 
family, and as such it is not restricted to married parents […].’220
With this ruling the Court disconnected the special protection of marriage from that 
of the family (see also 10.3.4.2 above). The Court furthermore took into account the 
reality that a growing number of children were raised outside marriage.221 On the 
other hand, in its 2010 judgment on inheritance tax (see 10.4.4.2 above), the Court 
held that marriage differed in principle from civil partnership ‘[…] in its qualification 
as a starting point for a succession of generations’.222 It therefore considered marriage 
a privileged area of law for family building. It has been concluded on the basis of 
this reasoning that the Court had thus ‘[…] stated cautiously that the reproductive 
abilities of a married couple may justify providing benefits for married couples 
that are not provided for civil partners.’223 This has indeed proven true in respect of 
reimbursement for AHR treatment (see 10.4.5.6 below). However, the relevant case 
law of the Constitutional Court predates the judgment here discussed. In later case 
law of the Constitutional Court no such reasoning has been repeated. In fact, the 
Constitutional Court took a different approach in its ruling of 2013 on successive 
adoption by civil partners, by instead focusing on the right to equal treatment of the 
children concerned.
10.3.5.3. 2013: Successive adoption
As explained above, there has for long been a prohibition on successive adoption 
for civil partners (‘Verbot der Kettenadoption’) under German law.224 Thus, for 
civil partners, it was not possible to adopt the minor adopted child225 of the other 
civil partner.226 A bill tabled by the Greens in 2007, aiming at the abolition of this 
difference in treatment, did not make it to the debate stage.227
220 BVerfG 7 July 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439, paras. 102–103.
221 Idem, para. 113, where the Court refers to ‘Rupp/Bergold, in: Rupp, Die Lebenssituation von Kindern in 
gleichgeschlechtlichen Lebenspartnerschaften, Staatsinstitut für Familienforschung an der Universität 
Bamberg 2009, p. 282’, from which it followed that at that time an estimated number of approximately 
2,200 children in Germany lived in 13,000 registered civil partnerships. See also Wiemann 2010, supra 
n. 49, at p. 1429 referring to a study of the Central Statistical Office of 2008, which showed that in 2006 
in West Germany 23 per cent and in Eastern Germany 42 per cent of all children under 18 were raised 
in so‑called alternative types of family situations. See www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/
Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/Querschnittsveroeffentlichungen/Datenreport/
Downloads/Datenreport2008Familie,property=file.pdf, p. 32ff.
222 BVerfG 21 July 2010 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 2464/07, NJW 2010 p. 2783. English translation by Saunders in 
Saunders 2012, supra n. 20, p. 935.
223 Saunders 2012, supra n. 20, at p. 935.
224 Art. 1742 BGB and Art. 9(7) of the Civil Partnerships Act (LPartG).
225 In principle this adopted child was also the non‑genetic child, although this could be different in 
surrogacy cases. See ch. 4, section 4.3.9.
226 Art. 1742 BGB read at the time: ‘An adopted child may, as long as the adoption relationship exists, in 
the lifetime of an adoptive parent only be adopted by that parent’s spouse’.
227 BT‑Drs. 16/5596.







By judgment of 1 December 2009, the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht, OLG) of 
Hamm held the prohibition on successive adoption by civil partners to be compatible 
with the Basic Law.228 This Court held that while the emotional and social parentage 
of the civil partner of a parent enjoyed protection under Article 6(1) Basic Law, from 
this provision no imperative requirement for the legislature to provide for adoption 
by same‑sex couples followed.229 According to the OLG, the institutes of marriage 
and family within the meaning of Article 6 Basic Law were based on the view that 
the upbringing of children was the task of the family consisting of mother, father and 
child.230 The judgment received considerable criticism in legal scholarship. Often, it 
was argued that the principled question of whether it would be contrary to the child’s 
best interests to be raised by a same‑sex couple, had already been answered by the 
legislature when the possibility of second‑parent adoption was introduced in 2005.231 
Further, the critique was issued that primarily children raised by parents in a civil 
partnership were put in a disadvantaged position vis‑à‑vis children raised by married 
couples.232 Other scholars agreed with the Court that the upbringing of children by 
same‑sex couples would be contrary to the child’s best interests.233
In April 2010 the Greens tabled another bill seeking full equalisation of civil 
partnership and marriage in respect of adoption rights.234 Considering how the 
political parties were balanced in the German Parliament at the time, Henkel observed 
in 2011 that this bill had limited chances of making it into law.235 This proved to be 
different, however, after the issue of successive adoption by civil partners had been 
put before the BVerfG.236
228 OLG Hamm 1 December 2009 (dec.), Az. 15 Wx 236/09, NJW 2010 p. 2065. Earlier decisions in 
this matter had been rendered LG Münster 16 March 2009 (dec.), Az. 05 T 775/08 and AG Münster 
30 September 2008 (dec.), Az. 105 XVI 5/08.
229 The Court referred to BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01,NJW 2002 p. 2543, in particular to para. 103.
230 The Court held that the at the time most recent judgment of the BVerfG on the matter – namely BVerfG 
7 July 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439 – did not alter this conclusion.
231 L. Milzer, Ànmerkung zum OLG Hamm, Beschluss vom 01.12.2009 – 15 Wx 236/09’ [‘Case‑note to 
OLG Hamm decision of 1 December 2009 – 15 Wx 236/09’], FamFR (2010) p. 47 and Henkel 2011, 
supra n. 49, at p. 263. See also H. Grziwotz, ‘Anmerkung zum Urteil des OLG Hamm vom 01.12.2009 
(I‑15 Wx 236/09, FamRZ 2010, 1259) – Partner einer eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft kann 
Adoptivkind des anderen Partners nicht an Kindes statt annehmen’ [‘Commentary to the judgment 
of the OLG Hamm of 01.12.2009 (I‑15 Wx 236/09, FamRZ 2010, 1259) – Civil partner cannot adopt 
adoptive child if his or her partner’], Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht, FamRZ (2010) p. 1261.
232 Muscheler 2010, supra n. 169, at p. 231; N. Dethloff, ‘Adoption und Sorgerecht – Problembereiche 
für die eingetragenen Lebenspartner?’ [‘Adoption and parental authority – area of concern for the 
civil partner?’], FPR (2010) p. 208; W. Enders, ‘Stiefkindadoption’ [‘Second‑parent adoption’], FPR 
(2004) p. 60 and G. Müller, ‘Anmerkung zu OLG Hamm: Sukzessivadoption eines Kindes durch 
den eingetragenen Lebenspartner’ [‘Case note to OLG Hamm: successive adoption of a child by a 
registered partner’], DNotZ (2010) p. 698.
233 Schüffner alleged that there was an increased risk of phaedophilic offences if a child was raised by a 
same‑sex couple. Schüffner 2007, supra n. 74, at pp. 161–162.
234 BT‑Dr 17/1429.
235 Henkel 2011, supra n. 49, at p. 259. Henkel, however, also refers in his comment to an 
opinion poll which showed wide public support for the introduction of joint adoption 
for civil partners. He refers to www.mingle‑trend.respondi.com/de/28_06_2010/
deutsche‑befurworten‑adoption‑durch‑gleichgeschlechtliche‑paare (Opinion poll of 28 June 2010).
236 Request for constitutional review of 29 December 2009, Az. 1 BvR 3247/09.







Only a year after the OLG of Hamm had held the prohibition on successive adoption 
by civil partners in the German Civil Code to be compatible with the Basic Law, 
another OLG, namely the Hanseatic Court of Appeal (Hamburg) ruled to the contrary 
and held this prohibition to be in violation of the principle of equal treatment of 
Article 3(3) of the Basic Law.237 This court therefore referred the constitutional 
issue at hand to the BVerfG.238 The Hanseatic OLG acknowledged that the wording 
of Article 1742 BGB – following which ‘[…] an adopted child may, as long as the 
adoption relationship exists, in the lifetime of an adoptive parent only be adopted by 
that parent’s spouse’ – was unambiguous. The Hanseatic OLG also acknowledged 
that during the various revisions of the Civil Partnerships Act, the legislature had 
deliberately not introduced the option of a simultaneous or subsequent joint adoption 
by civil partners. The fact that the 2004 Revision Act provided for second‑parent 
adoption by the civil partner, was considered a political compromise, at a time when 
no parliamentary majority could be formed for a full equalisation of civil partnership 
with marriage.239 Nevertheless, the OLG ruled that there were no weighty reasons 
for this difference in treatment on grounds of sexual orientation. At the time when 
the Adoption law was drafted in the 1970s, a distinction between marriage and other 
types of partnerships was considered justified because only marriage enjoyed legal 
protection.240 According to the OLG that justification ground was superseded in the 
meantime, since civil partnership and marriage had been equalised in terms of legally 
binding responsibilities for the partner.241 The OLG did not, furthermore, accept that 
the difference in treatment could be justified on the basis of the child’s best interests. 
As the OLG observed, the upbringing of children by a same‑sex couple had yet been 
made possible under German law. The Court held as unconstitutional the assumption 
of the legislature that the best interests of a child who was adopted by one of the 
civil partners by whom it was raised would be harmed, while that would not be the 
case for a child that was genetically related to one of the civil partners by whom it 
was raised. On the contrary, the OLG reasoned that an adopted child was even more 
in need of legal protection. The OLG held the legal implications of the prohibition 
on joint adoption by civil partners for the inheritance and maintenance rights of the 
child adopted by one parent only to be harmful to the child’s best interests. It also 
referred to a study of 2009 conducted by order of the Ministry of Justice,242 which 
237 OLG Hamburg 22 December 2010 (dec.), Az. 2 Wx 23/09, NJW 2011 p. 1104.
238 Art. 100(1) Basic Law in combination with Art. 13 No. 11, 80 ff. BVerfGG.
239 OLG Hamburg 22 December 2010 (dec.), Az. 2 Wx 23/09, NJW 2011 p. 1104, para. 12.
240 BT‑Drs. 7/3061, p. 30.
241 The Court referred to, inter alia, BVerfG 7 July 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439; 
C. Hillgruber, ‘Über die Ungleichbehandlung von Ehe und eingetragener Lebenspartnerschaft 
im Bereich der betrieblichen Hinterbliebenenversorgung – Kritische Anmerkung zum Beschluss 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 07.07.2009 (AZ: 1 BvR 1164/07)’ [‘On the unequal treatment 
of marriage and registered civil partnership in respect of survivor’s pensions – A critical note on 
the decision of the German Constitutional Court of 7 July 2009 (AZ: 1 BvR 1164/07)’], JZ (2010) 
p. 41 at p. 44 and to T. Hoppe, ‘Die Verfassungswidrigkeit der Ungleichbehandlung von Ehe und 
eingetragener Lebenspartnerschaft im Bereich der betrieblichen Hinterbliebenenrente (VBL)’ [‘The 
unconstitutionality of the unequal treatment of marriage and civil partnership in respect of occupational 
survivor’s pensions (VBL)’], DVBl. (2009) p. 1516 at p. 1517.
242 M. Rupp (ed.), Lebenssituation von Kindern in gleichgeschlechtlichen Lebenspartnerschaften [The 
social situation of children in same‑sex partnerships] (Köln, Bundesanzeiger Verlag 2009).







had shown that for a sound development it was not necessary for a child to be raised 
by parents of different sex. Instead, the quality of the inner family ties was decisive. 
The report had concluded that full equalisation of civil partnership with marriage 
in respect of adoption would be in the child’s best interests.243 Under reference to 
the BVerfG decision of 7 July 2009,244 the OLG Hamburg ruled that the special 
protection of marriage on the basis of Article 6(1) Basic Law could not justify the 
difference in treatment between civil partners and married partners in this respect.
While the case was pending before the BVerfG,245 various bills aiming to lift the 
prohibition on successive adoption for civil partners were tabled.246 The Federal 
Government announced in December 2011 that the issue was under consideration, 
but that it first wished to await the BVerfG judgment.247 It asserted that successive 
adoption was prohibited under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on the 
Adoption of Children. At the time, Germany was investigating signing of the 2008 
Revised European Convention on the Adoption of Children, which provides for an 
opt‑in for adoption by same‑sex (married or civil) partners.248
In February 2013, the First Senate of the BVerfG rendered its long awaited judgment 
in the case.249 The Court unanimously ruled that the exclusion of registered partners 
from successive adoption was in violation of the right to equal treatment of both 
the children living in such a relationship and the respective civil partners under 
Article 3(1) of the German Basic Law. The Court held the exclusion of civil partners 
from successive adoption not to be in violation of certain rights under Article 6 of 
the German Basic Law, however, more precisely the right of children to be ensured 
parental care by the State under Article 2(1) in combination with Article 6(2) of the 
Basic Law; the natural right of parents to the care and upbringing of their children 
(Article 6(2)) and the special protection of the family under Article 6(1) Basic Law.
On the outset, the Court noted that the legislative proceedings did not provide any 
explanations as to why the legislature had not provided for successive adoption 
by civil partners, while in fact the bill for the 2004 Revision Act had – without 
distinguishing between genetic and non‑genetic children – pointed at the beneficial 
consequences for both child and parents of an adoption by a civil partner.250
243 OLG Hamburg 22 December 2010 (dec.), Az. 2 Wx 23/09, NJW 2011 p. 1104, para. 30.
244 BVerfG 7 July 2009 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439, paras. 104–105.
245 Request for constitutional review of 29 December 2009, Az. 1 BvR 3247/09. See also Henkel 2011, 
supra n. 49, at p. (264) and the position paper (‘Stellungnahme’) of the Lesben‑ und Schwulenverbandes 
in Deutschland on case 1 BvR 3247/09 of 17 February 2010, online available at www.tmp.lsvd.de/
fileadmin/pics/Dokumente/Adoption/Adoption‑100217.pdf, visited July 2011.
246 For example, BT‑Drs. 17/1429 and BR‑Drs. 124/11.
247 BT‑Drs.17/8248.
248 Germany finally signed the Revised European Convention on the Adoption of Children in May 2014. 
See also BT‑Drs. 17/2329.
249 BVerfG 19 February 2013, Az. 1 BvL 1/11, 1 BvR 3247/09, NJW 2013 p. 847.
250 The Court referred to BT‑Drs. 15/3445, p. 15.







As to the State’s obligation under Article 6(2) Basic Law to watch over parents in 
the performance of their duty, the Court ruled that this did not include an obligation 
for the legislature to provide for successive adoption for civil partners.251 The Court 
acknowledged that the prohibition on successive adoption implied in practice that the 
children concerned could only have one legal parent.252 It held, however, that this in 
itself did not exceed the discretion that the legislature enjoyed as regards the manner 
in which it made constitutional rights effective, particularly not now that the child 
concerned was not parentless and that the civil partner of the adoptive parent could 
obtain the power to share in decisions on matters relating to the child’s everyday 
life.253 In the same vein, the Court held that the exclusion of civil partners from the 
option of successive adoption did not violate the right to special protection of the 
family under Article 6(1). Even though a family consisting of two civil partners and 
a biological or adopted child of one of them enjoyed protection under this provision, 
there was no obligation on the State under the Basic Law to create a possibility 
to adopt the non‑biological child of the civil partner. While the legislature had an 
obligation to provide for a legal framework within which family relations could 
develop, it also enjoyed a certain discretion as to the family forms it provided for.254
The Constitutional Court further ruled that the ‘parental constitutional right’ 
(‘Elterngrundrecht’) ex Article 6(2) Basic Law was not violated. The Court reiterated 
that the best interests of the child are an essential element of this Article and that the 
rights of legal parents in the first place served the protection of children.255 While 
legal parents of the same sex were included in the scope of this right and while each 
legal parent on his or her own was a bearer of this right,256 ‘mere’ social parenthood 
did not come within the scope of this Article, the Court ruled. Because the civil 
partner of a person who adopted a child was not the legal parent of that child, he or 
she could not rely on the constitutional parental right under Article 6(2) of the Basic 
Law. Hence, civil partners could not claim any right to successive adoption on this 
ground.257
The Court also ruled, however, that the exclusion of civil partners of successive 
adoption violated the right to equal treatment of the children concerned (Article 3(1) 
Basic Law). It held that those children who had been adopted by a person in a 
registered partnership were denied possibilities for their personal development 
(‘Entwicklung und Lebensgestaltung’), which children adopted by married persons 
and children born with a person in a civil partnership did enjoy.258 In particular, the 
law excluded that these children would have a second legal parent, who could fully 
251 The second paragraph of Art. 6 Basic Law provides that parents have a natural right to as well as a duty 
for the care and the upbringing of children, while the State watches over them in the performance of 
this duty.
252 BVerfG 19 February 2013, Az. 1 BvL 1/11, 1 BvR 3247/09, NJW 2013 p. 847, para. 44.
253 Idem, paras. 45–46.
254 Idem, para. 68.
255 Idem, para. 49.
256 Idem, paras. 49–50.
257 Idem, paras. 58–59.
258 Idem, para. 73.







take up the care and upbringing of the child, as envisaged in the Constitution.259 This 
difference in treatment could not be justified, the Court held. The court examined no 
less than eight possible justifications, but rejected them all.
Principally the Court considered that the difference in treatment was not in the 
interests of the child. It could not be maintained that to grow up within a same‑sex 
relationship or that the practice of successive adoption in itself harmed the child’s 
interests. The Court noted that successive adoption had a stabilising effect on the 
child’s developmental psychology and served the integration and consolidation of the 
adopted child in the new family. An equal legal position of the parents towards the 
child would have an equally stabilising effect and could strengthen the child’s sense 
of belonging and the parents’ sense of responsibility. The denial of legal recognition 
of such a family, on the other hand, could be experienced by the child as a rejection 
of its person and its family.260 The Court also noted that successive adoption would 
improve the legal position of the children concerned in respect of parental authority, 
as well as succession and maintenance, in situations of separation or decease of (one 
of) the parents.
In respect of a general aim to restrict the practice of successive adoption, the Court 
held there to be no justification to distinguish in that regard between children adopted 
by persons in a civil partnership and children adopted by married persons. The Court 
also was not convinced by the argument that the exclusion served to prevent that the 
legal prohibition on joint adoption by civil partners was circumvented. The Court 
stressed that the case before it was not about the constitutionality of the prohibition 
on joint adoption by civil partners, but noted in this regard that the exclusion of 
civil partners from successive adoption could not prevent that an adopted child 
lived together with its adoptive parent and his or her civil partner. Justifications on 
grounds of protection of marriage and family or the constitutional parental rights, 
were equally rejected by the Court.
The Court further held that the unequal treatment of civil partners when compared 
with spouses in respect of successive adoption under Article 9(7) LPartG violated 
Article 3(1) Basic Law.261 The same held for the unequal treatment of civil partners of 
parents with an adopted child, when compared to civil partners of genetic parents.262 
The Court left open the question of whether the unequal treatment of children who 
were adopted by a parent in a civil partnership when compared to children who were 
adopted by a married parent, violated the prohibition on unequal treatment between 
children born within marriage and children born out of wedlock.263
259 Idem, para. 73. In its oral submission to the Constitutional Court, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen had 
extensively set out the beneficial effects of successive adoption for the children concerned. For an 
account of their argument, see in particular para. 33 of the BVerfG judgment.
260 Idem, para. 83.
261 Idem, para. 104.
262 Idem, para. 105.
263 Idem, para. 103.







As a rule a violation of the Basic Law results in the nullity of the relevant legislative 
provision. In the present case, however, the Court merely declared Article 9(7) 
LPartG incompatible with the Basic Law, because, so the Court noted, the 
legislature had various options to remedy the unequal treatment, including a general 
non‑discriminating restriction of the legal possibilities for adoption.
In academia this judgment was generally received as fitting in well with the existing 
case law of the BVerfG that eliminated unequal treatment of civil partners when 
compared to spouses.264 However, the approach of the Court in this case was 
received differently. Some praised the Constitutional Court for its courage to base its 
reasoning on the best interests of the child.265 Others, were (very) critical instead, and 
claimed that the Court had unjustifiably completely shunted off Article 6(1) Basic 
Law.266 It was furthermore observed that marriage had now been completely untied 
of its historical connotation and was only seen from a functional perspective.267 
Again it was concluded that Article 6(1) Basic Law was now read as a prohibition on 
discrimination against other relationship forms (‘Lebensformen’).268
The question was also raised whether the judgment implied that the legislature 
now also had to legislate for joint adoption for same‑sex couples.269 The BVerfG 
judgment left this question open. Although a bill to that effect had been pending 
since 2010,270 Parliament was divided over this matter and could not reach agreement 
on this point.271 It therefore only legislated on successive adoption. On 27 June 2014 
a new Article 9(7) LPartG entered into force, which reads: ‘A civil partner may 
adopt the child of his civil partner alone.’272 While the introduction of this provision 
thus brought an end to the debate on successive adoption for same‑sex couples, the 
question of joint adoption for these couples remained open.
264 S. Muckel, ‘Sukzessive Adoption – Ablehnung für eingetragene Lebenspartner verfassungswidrig’ 
[‘Successive adoption – nonadmission of civil partners unconstitutional’], JA (2013) p. 396 and 
W. Frenz, ‘Eheschutz ade? BVerfG stärkt gleichgeschlechtliche Paare’, NVwZ (2013) p. 1200.
265 E.g. Muckel 2013A, supra n. 264 and I. Kroppenberg, ‘Unvereinbarkeit des Verbots der sukzessiven 
Stiefkindadoption durch eingetragene Lebenspartner mit dem Grundgesetz’ [‘The incompatibility of 
the prohibition of successive adoption by civil partners with the German Basic Law’], NJW (2013) 
p. 2161 at p. 2162.
266 E.g. Brosius‑Gersdorf 2013A, supra n. 136, at p. 170 and P. Reimer and M. Jestaedt, JZ 2013, 468, at 
469.
267 W. Frenz, ‘Eheschutz ade? BVerfG stärkt gleichgeschlechtliche Paare’ [‘Protection of marriage, 
farewell? German Constitutional Court supports same‑sex couples’], NVwZ (2013) p. 1200 at p. 1201.
268 Idem, at p. 1202.
269 Kroppenberg 2013, supra n. 265, at p. 2162.
270 BT‑Drs. 17/1429.
271 Legal academia was also divided. For references see Kroppenberg 2013, supra n. 265, at p. 2162, 
footnote 19.
272 Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur Sukzessivadoption durch 
Lebenspartner [Act on the implementation of the judgment of the German Constitutional Court on 
successive adoption by civil partners], Act of 20 June 2014, BGBl. I p. 786. The Article further reads: 
‘In this case, section 1743, first sentence, section 1751(2) and (4), second sentence, section 1755(1) and 
(3), section 1755(2), section 1756(2), section 1757(2), first sentence, and section 1772(1), first sentence, 
letter c of the Civil Code shall apply mutatis mutandis.’







10.3.5.4. Exclusion of civil partners from joint adoption
Same‑sex couples are excluded from joint adoption.273 The lifting of the successive 
adoption prohibition implies that same‑sex civil partners can establish the same 
legal situation in two (albeit in principle time‑consuming) steps.274 Joint adoption 
of a child has nonetheless been considered a different matter. As Kroppenberg has 
explained, to allow for joint adoption by civil partners, would require the legislature 
to definitively depart from its traditional norm, underlying German adoption laws, 
of the ‘core family’, consisting of spouses and their natural children.275 Kroppenberg 
has also questioned whether this norm is still consistent with the present day and 
whether it serves the best interests of the child.276
In March 2013 the Administrative Court (AG) of Schöneberg asked the Constitutional 
Court to rule on the constitutionality of the exclusion of civil partners from joint 
adoption,277 but because the referring Court had not yet taken the recently issued 
judgment on successive adoption into account, this referral was declared inadmissible 
in January 2014 for insufficient motivation.278
In May 2014 the German government signed the Revised European Convention on 
the Adoption of Children in May 2014, which allows for – but does not impose on 
States – joint adoption by same‑sex partners. Whether this was an indication that 
legislative change on this point was forthcoming was insufficiently clear at the time 
this research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014).
10.3.5.5. Legal parenthood by operation of the law
Under the present state of the law, German law does not provide for legal parenthood 
by operation of the law for same‑sex couples. Under German law only the woman 
who gave birth can be registered on the birth certificate of the child as mother of the 
child (see also Chapter 4, section 4.3.9). If she is married, a rebuttable presumption 
that her husband is the child’s father applies (Article 1592 Civil Code).279 No such 
presumption applies between civil partners, as a case of 2010 has confirmed.
273 Art. 1741(2) Civil Code reads: ‘A person who is not married may adopt a child only alone. A married 
couple may adopt a child only jointly. A spouse may adopt a child of his spouse alone. He may also 
adopt a child alone if the other spouse cannot adopt the child because he is incapable of contracting or 
has not yet reached the age of twenty‑one.’
274 M. Zschiebsch, ‘Nichtzulassung der Sukzessivadoption durch eingetragenen Lebenspartner 
verfassungswidrig’ [‘Non‑admission of successive adoption by a civil partner unconstitutional’], Juris 
Praxiz Report FamR 22/2013, Anm. 6. The author further explains that parents who give up their child 
for adoption cannot require that the child is not placed with a same‑sex couple. Increasingly more 
Courts, however, deal with both adoptions in one and the same sitting.
275 Kroppenberg 2013, supra n. 265, at p. 2163.
276 Idem.
277 AG Berlin‑Schöneberg 8 March 2013, Az. 24 F 250/12.
278 BVerfG 23 January 2014 (dec.), Az. 1 BvL 2/13.
279 Art. 1592 BGB.







In 2009 two women in a civil partnership, one of whom had given birth to a child 
after heterologous insemination, applied to the Courts to have the child’s birth 
certificate changed. They wished to be both registered on it as parents of the child 
and thus to have the blank space on the certificate filled with the name of the civil 
partner of the birth mother. The two women relied on Articles 3 and 6 of the Basic 
Law. They also claimed that the presumption of parenthood of Article 1592 was to 
be applied analogously in their case. As they explained, the legal father of a child 
was either the man who was married to the birth mother at the time of birth, or the 
man who recognised the child. Whether this man was also the genetic father of 
the child and whether he was its carer was irrelevant for the establishment of legal 
parenthood under German Law. The Hamburg District Court rejected this reasoning 
and ruled instead that the presumption of Article 1592 Civil Code was based on a 
presumption of descent and that such descent could be ruled out in the case at hand. 
The Court further noted that the legislature had already provided for a possibility to 
establish parental links between a child and the civil partner of that child’s parent, 
by introducing second‑parent adoption in 2005. The District Court accordingly 
dismissed the claim as being unfounded.280
The two women unsuccessfully appealed their case before the competent appeals 
courts.281 Moreover, by judgment of 2 July 2010, the Constitutional Court rejected 
their constitutional complaint.282 Because the complainants in this case subsequently 
(unsuccessfully) lodged a complaint with the ECtHR under Article 8 in conjunction 
with Article 14, the latter Court’s summary of the findings of the Constitutional 
Court can be quoted here:
‘The Constitutional Court observed, at the outset, that there was no indication that the 
lower courts had failed to take into account the requirements of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. It further considered that the refusal to insert the first applicant into 
the birth certificate prior to adoption did not violate the applicants’ right to the enjoyment 
of their family life. Article 6 of the Basic Law protected the family as a union of parents 
and children. It did not matter in this respect whether the children descended from their 
parents and whether they were born in or out of wedlock. However, the entry of the name 
of a civil partner into the birth certificate did not concern the family life between the 
civil partners and the child. The birth certificate had the sole purpose of giving evidence 
of the child’s descent. It did not interfere in any way with the child’s living together with 
his or her parents within the family. […] The Constitutional Court further considered that 
the applicant had not been discriminated against. Civil partners did not have a right to 
be treated equally to legal or biological fathers with respect to their entry into the birth 
certificate. In this respect, the two groups were not comparable, as biological or legal 
paternity established a legal relationship comprising mutual rights and duties. Such a legal 
relationship did not exist between the civil partner and the child, as long as the child was 
280 AG Hamburg 24 June 2009 (dec.), Az. 60 III 35/09.
281 On 4 November 2009 the Hamburg Regional Court rejected the applicants’ appeal. LG Hamburg 
4 November 2009 (dec.), Az. 301 T 596/09. On 26 January 2010 the Hanseatic Court of Appeal rejected 
the applicants’ appeal on points of law. OLG Hamburg 26 January 2010 (dec.), Az. 2 Wx 125/09.
282 BVerfG 2 July 2010 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 666/10, NJW 2010 p. 2783.







not adopted. The fact that there was no legal presumption that the mother’s civil partner 
was the child’s second parent did not amount to discrimination vis‑à‑vis married couples, 
as the legal presumption was based on biological descent and did not have a basis in the 
case of civil partners.’283
In May 2013 the Strasbourg Court declared this complaint manifestly ill‑founded 
and therefore inadmissible (see Chapter 8, section 8.2.4.2).284
10.3.5.6. Access to AHR treatment
As more extensively explained in Chapter 4, single women and women with a 
same‑sex partner are in many German States excluded from access to AHR treatment 
with the use of donated gametes.285 Further, only married couples are entitled to 
reimbursement for artificial insemination.286 By judgment of 28 February 2007 
the BVerfG upheld this regulation as compatible with the Basic Law.287 The Court 
considered that by reason of the constitutional protection of marriage, the legislature 
was not, in principle, prevented from treating marriage more favourably than other 
ways of life. To give preferential treatment to marriage in the social law provisions 
on the financing of artificial insemination was at the time considered justified by the 
Court, in particular out of consideration for the legally protected status of marriage 
as a responsible relationship and a guarantee of stability.288 Whether this reasoning is 
commensurable with the above‑discussed later BVerfG case law in respect of equal 
treatment of registered partners and spouses in other realms of law, may, however, 
be questioned.
10.3.6.	 Towards	access	to	marriage	for	same‑sex	couples?
From the moment civil partnership for same‑sex partners was introduced in Germany 
in 2001, the question as to whether and to what extent it should be equalised with 
marriage has been on the table in politics, court proceedings and academia.289 As the 
283 ECtHR 7 May 2013 (dec.), Boeckel and Gessner‑Boeckel v. Germany, no. 8017/11, paras. 13–14. A 
comparable line of reasoning was adopted by the Court of Appeals of Karlsruhe in a case concerning 
parental access after the separation of civil partners. In a 2010, this Court ruled that the female civil 
partner of a mother did not have a right to access to the child after separation of the civil partners. The 
Court noted that the legislature had deliberately not provided for parenthood by operation of the law for 
female civil partners and thus not for automatic parenthood of the social mother (the civil partner of a 
mother). In the case at hand the Court furthermore did not consider access by the social mother in the 
interests of the child. OLG Karlsruhe 16 November 2010 (dec.), Az. 5 UF 217/10, NJW 2011 p. 1012.
284 ECtHR 7 May 2013 (dec.), Boeckel and Gessner‑Boeckel v. Germany, no. 8017/11.
285 Ch. 4, section 4.3.3.
286 Art. 27a (1)(3) SGB V.
287 See BVerfG 28 February 2007, Az. 1 BvL 5/03, NJW 2007 p. 1343, as referred to in BVerfG 21 July 
2010 (dec.), Az. 1 BvR 2464/07, NJW 2010 p. 2783.
288 See BVerfG 28 February 2007, Az. 1 BvL 5/03, NJW 2007 p. 1343. See also BVerfG 7 July 2009 (dec.), 
Az. 1 BvR 1164/07, NJW 2010 p. 1439, paras. 102–103, where the BVerfG refers to its judgment of 
28 February 2007.
289 An important question in academia has been what was left of the special protection of Art. 6 Basic 
Law. Wiemann answered this question in 2010 with ‘not much’. Wiemann 2010, supra n. 49, at p. 1430. 







discussion above has shown, the Federal Constitutional Court’s case law has been 
a major driving force in indeed establishing further equalisation between these two 
institutions.
While many differences in areas such as tax law, social protection and the position of 
civil servants have thus been lifted over the course of time, certain differences still 
remain today. These mainly concern parental rights for same‑sex civil partners (see 
10.3.5 above). Legislative initiatives to achieve full equalisation of civil partnership 
and marriage have so far been unsuccessful.290
Over the years there have also been various bills tabled seeking the opening up of 
marriage to same‑sex couples.291 In a bill of 2010 it was held that public opinion on 
the institute of marriage had changed in German society and it was argued that there 
was therefore no longer a justification for different treatment between homosexual 
and heterosexual couples and to limit marriage to couples of different sex only.292 
The German debate about the opening up of marriage gained a particular momentum 
in 2013 when the two important Constitutional Courts rulings in respect of income 
splitting and successive adoption came out (see above). In that same year more than 
3,000 prominent Germans petitioned the German Parliament for the equal access of 
same‑sex couples to marriage.293 Various bills seeking the opening up of marriage 
were also tabled in Parliament by left‑wing parties.294 In the Senate (Bundesrat) 
several States jointly tabled a bill seeking the opening up of marriage to same‑sex 
couples.295 The Senate consequently tabled a bill to that effect in Parliament.296 The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill explained, inter alia, that marriage was by 
then understood as a union in which partners supported each other and carried 
responsibilities for one another (‘Beistands‑ und Verantwortungsgemeinschaft’), 
irrespective of whether they were also raising children. A new definition and 
understanding of the term ‘marriage’ in Article 6(1) of the Basic Law, to the effect 
of including same‑sex spouses, was considered possible without amending the text 
of the Article. The Explanatory Memorandum also pointed out that civil partnership 
was perceived as marriage by the public and that research had shown that a clear 
majority of the population was in favour of opening up marriage to same‑sex 
couples.297 Finally, reference was made to the legislation of countries that had yet 
legislated for access to marriage for same‑sex couples.
Henkel spoke of a `fight’ in German academia about the question what from a constitutional point of 
view was the difference between the institute of marriage and that of the registered civil partnership. 
Henkel 2011, supra n. 49, at p 259. Henkel did not explicitly refer to authors with different points of 
view on this matter. Concerning the terminology used, however, the author referred to Hillgruber 2010, 
supra n. 241, at p. 43. Saunders has held that the concept of marriage in Art. 6(1) had to include civil 
partnerships. Saunders 2012, supra n. 20, at p. 930.
290 Inter alia BT‑Drs. 16/497; BT‑Drs. 16/3423 and BT‑Drs. 17/2113.
291 Inter alia BT‑Drs. 16/13596; BT‑Drs. 17/2023 and BT‑Drs. 17/6343.
292 BT‑Drs. 17/2113.
293 ‘Prominente fordern volle Gleichstellung der Homo‑Ehe’, Becklink 1026468 (Verlag C.H. Beck 2013).
294 BT‑Drs. 17/12677; BT‑Drs. 17/13912 and BT‑Drs. 18/8.
295 BR‑Drs. 196/13.
296 Idem and BT‑Drs. 17/13426.
297 BT‑Drs. 17/13426, p. 7.







In late 2011 a new government was formed, as a result of which the above discussed 
bill ceased to be pending.298 The newly governing Christian parties, the CDU and 
CSU, openly opposed the opening up of marriage,299 and the coalition agreement 
between the CDU, CSU and SPD (the Social Democrats) parties of November 2013 
did not include the matter.300 As a result, the opening up of marriage to same‑sex 
couples had not materialised at the time this research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 
2014) and it was uncertain if and, if so, when access to marriage for same‑sex couples 
would become reality in Germany. It was further insufficiently clear to what extent 
the possible opening up of marriage would also provide for full equalisation between 
same‑sex and different‑sex spouses in respect of parental rights.
10.4. sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps And cross‑border movement
This section discusses the cross‑border perspective of the German laws on legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships. Following the structure of the other chapters 
of this case study as set out in Chapter 1, section 1.5, the relevant German Private 
International Law regime, as well as implementation of the relevant EU Directives are 
discussed. It is furthermore noted here that in 2010 Germany and France concluded 
a bilateral agreement on optional matrimonial property regimes.301 The agreement 
provides for a matrimonial property regime of the ‘community of accrued gains’ 
model, that all married couples whose matrimonial property regime is covered 
by the substantive law of one of the contracting states can choose. Also couples 
who have concluded a registered partnership under German law may opt for this 
regime.302 The Agreement, that is open to other EU Member States,303 was received 
as revolutionary and of ‘European significance’, because it was the first step in the 
direction of harmonisation of substantive family law in Europe.304
298 See www.dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP17/517/51735.html, visited 18 April 2012.
299 G. Bohsem, ‘Union verweigert volle Gleichstellung der Homo‑Ehe’, Süddeutsche.de 4 June 2014.
300 ‘Deutschlands Zukunft Gestalten, Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU UND SPD’ [‘Giving shape 
to Germany’s future. Coalition Agreement between CDU, CSU UND SPD’], 18th legislative period, 
online availabe at www.cdu.de/koalitionsvertrag, visited 2 February 2014.
301 Deutsch‑französische Güterstand der Wahl‑Zugewinngemeinschaft [Franco‑German Agreement 
on the Optional Matrimonial Property Regime], adopted in January 2010. The Agreement and its 
implementation Act entered into force on 1 May 2013. See BGBl. 2013 II, 431 and BGBl. 2012 II, 178.
302 Art. 7 LPartG in combination with Art. 1519 German Civil Code. See T. Jäger, ‘Der neue 
deutsch‑französische Güterstand der Wahl‑Zugewinngemeinschaft – Inhalt und seine ersten Folgen 
für die Gesetzgebung und Beratungspraxis’ [‘The new Franco‑German Agreement on the Optional 
Matrimonial Property Regime – Content and ist first consequences for the legislative process and 
consulting practice’], DNotZ (2010) p. 804 at p. 822.
303 Art. 21 of the Franco‑German Agreement, supra n. 301.
304 European Parliament, Directorate‑General for Internal Policies Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights 
And Constitutional Affairs Legal And Parliamentary Affairs, ‘The Franco‑German agreement on 
an elective ‘community of accrued gains’matrimonial property regime’, Note PE 425.658. See also 
A. Fötschl, ‘The COMPR of Germany and France: Epoch‑Making in the Unification of Law’, 18 
European Review of Private Law (2010) p. 881.








There are only limited statistics available in respect of Germany that are relevant 
for the present case study. According to the data provided by the German Federal 
Statistical Office, 32,000 civil partnerships had been concluded in Germany by the 
year 2012, while in total 72,000 same‑sex couples were living together in a shared 
household.305 The statistics did not provide for information about the nationality or 
country of residence of the civil partners. However, it was also clear that in that 
same year more than 7 million non‑German citizens were living in Germany.306 How 
many of them had concluded a civil partnership in Germany, or had yet entered into 
a registered partnership or marriage with a same‑sex partner in a foreign country, 
can only be guessed. The case law below on cross‑border cases shows that, in any 
case also, cross‑border movement to from and Germany by same‑sex couples and 
their families has taken and is taking place.
10.4.2.	 (Development	of)	the	relevant	German	conflict‑of‑laws	rules
As noted in Chapter 4,307 German Private International Law is laid down in the 
Second Chapter of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche, EGBGB).308 The Third Section of this Chapter sees at 
Family Law. Articles 13 to 17 EGBGB determine the applicable law on marriage 
and related issues. Guiding principles thereby are the nationality or citizenship 
(‘Staatsangehörigkeit’) and the habitual residence (‘domicile’) of the (future) 
spouses.309
The introduction of same‑sex civil partnerships in other European states and in 
particular the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples in the Netherlands in 
2001,310 raised the question as to if, and if so, how, such partnerships and marriages 
were to be recognised. Until the entry into force of the Civil Partnerships Act in 
2001, German law itself did not provide for any form of registered partnership 
for same‑sex couples.311 At the time, the prevailing view in legal scholarship was 
that a marriage between two persons of the same sex conflicted with the German 
305 Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 2013, p. 56, online available at: www.destatis.de/DE/
Publikationen/StatistischesJahrbuch/Bevoelkerung.pdf;jsessionid=A0654F39FB762DD168CF40CC
ABC19328.cae3?__blob=publicationFile, visited 2 February 2014.
306 Idem, p. 40.
307 Ch. 4, section 4.5.3.
308 Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche, EGBGB [ Introductory Act to the Civil Code], 
promulgated on 21 September 1994, BGBl. I p. 2494.
309 Translation taken from www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_bgbeg/index.html, visited June 2014.
310 See ch. 12, section 12.3.5.
311 Röthel therefore at the time pleaded for recognition of foreign same‑sex partnerships under the marriage 
regime of Art. 13ff EGBGB. A. Röthel‚ ‘Registrierte Partnerschaften im internationalen Privatrecht’ 
[‘Civil partnerships in international private law’], IPRax (2000) p. 74.







public order (Article 6 EGBGB)312 and therefore had to be refused recognition under 
German law.313
The Civil Partnerships Act of 2001 provided for the incorporation of a new Article on 
registered partnerships in the Introductory Act to the Civil Code.314 This new Article, 
now Article 17b EGBGB,315 promised to put an end to the debate in German legal 
scholarship as to which German Private International Law regime was to be applied 
to foreign same‑sex partnerships and marriages.316 While it may have tentatively 
done so, soon new debates were evoked, as will become clear from the subsections 
below.
Foreign judgments in family matters are in principle recognised under German law,317 
unless such recognition is considered manifestly incompatible with fundamental 
principles of German law, in particular when it is incompatible with fundamental 
rights.318
10.4.3.	 Access	to	registered	partnership	for	foreign	same‑sex	couples
The German Civil Partnerships Act contains no requirements in respect of 
nationality or habitual residence of the future registered partners. In fact, Article 17b 
(1) EGBGB provides that ‘[t]he formation of a registered life partnership, its general 
effects and property regime, as well as its dissolution are governed by the substantive 
provisions of the country in which the life partnership is registered.’319 This also 
312 Art. 6 EGBGB provides that ‘[a] provision of the law of another country shall not be applied where its 
application would lead to a result which is manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles 
of German law.’ The Article adds to this that inapplicability ensues, in particular, if the application of 
foreign law ‘would be incompatible with civil rights.’
313 See A. Röthel 2000, supra n. 311, at p. 78.
314 Art. 3 (25) LPartG.
315 Originally this Article was numbered Art. 17a EGBGB (Act of 16 February 2001, BGBl. I p. 266, entry 
into force 1 August 2001). This changed to Art. 17b EGBGB by Act of 11 December 2001, BGBl. I 
p. 3513, entry into force 1 January 2002.
316 See for example Röthel 2000, supra n. 311, at pp. 74–79, who pleaded for recognition of such foreign 
partnerships under the marriage regime of Art. 13ff EGBGB.
317 Art. 108 Gesetz über das Verfahren in Familiensachen und in den Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen 
Gerichtsbarkeit (FamFG) [Act on the Procedure in Family Matters and in Matters of Non‑contentious 
Jurisdiction], Act of 7 December 2008, BGBl. I p. 2586.
318 Art. 109(4) FamFG.
319 The English translation of the first para. of Art. 17b reads: ‘The formation of a registered life partnership, 
its general effects and property regime, as well as its dissolution are governed by the substantive 
provisions of the country in which the life partnership is registered. Matters related to maintenance 
and succession shall be governed by the law designated as applicable by the general rules; if under 
these rules, the life partnership fails to qualify for statutory rights to maintenance or succession, 
the first sentence of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis. The balancing of future pensions is 
governed by the law applicable under sentence 1; it shall only be carried out if accordingly German 
law is applicable and if the law of one of the countries, whose nationals the life partners are at the time 
when the application for termination of the life partnership is filed, recognizes a balancing of future 
pensions of life partners. Otherwise, it shall be carried out pursuant to German law on application of 
a life partner if the other life partner has acquired during the subsistence of the life partnership an 







goes for the balancing of future pensions (the so‑called ‘Versorgungsausgleich’).320 
Matters related to maintenance and succession on the other hand, are governed by 
‘the law designated as applicable by the general rules’.321 Certain areas, including 
parental issues (‘Kindschaftsrecht’), are not covered by Article 17b EGBGB;322 here, 
the general conflict‑of‑laws rules of Articles 19–22 EGBGB apply.323
The fact that Article 17b EGBGB makes the law of the country of registration (and 
not the nationality or the habitual residence (domicile)) decisive in determining the 
applicable law, was new in German Private International Law324 and unique in its 
inclusiveness when compared to the Private Inter national Law regimes of other 
European states.325 By making the law of the country of registration decisive in the 
determination of the applicable law, the German legislature deliberately enabled 
foreigners to enter into a registered civil partnership in Germany, even if that was not 
possible under the law of their state of nationality.326 Moreover, the third paragraph of 
this Article enables couples who entered into a civil partnership abroad to re‑register 
their partnership under the German civil partnership regime.327 This also deviates 
from general international practice: more commonly previous registration abroad 
forms an obstacle to such re‑registration.328
inland future pension right insofar as carrying it out would not be inconsistent with equity in light of 
the economic circumstances of both sides also during the time which was not spent within the country.’ 
Translation taken from: www.gesetze‑im‑internet.de/englisch_bgbeg/englisch_bgbeg.html#p0099, 
visited June 2014.
320 There is considerable German case law on the balancing of future pensions in cross‑border situations. 
This is not discussed in detail in this chapter. Refence is made to, inter alia, AG Stadtroda 3 April 2012, 
Az. 2 F 151/11 and BGH 16 October 2013 (dec.), Az. XII ZB 176/12, NJW 2014 p. 61.
321 Art. 17b (1)(2) EGBGB.
322 Apart from parental issues, also rent law is excluded. Coester claimed in this regard that the German 
legislature obviously did not consider parental issues relevant for same‑sex couples. M. Coester, 
‘Art. 17b EGBGB Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft’ [‘Art. 17b EGBGB Civil Partnership’], in: 
F. Jürgen Säcker and R. Rixecker (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum BGB [Münchener Commentary 
to the BGB], 5th edn. (München, Verlag C.H. Beck 2010) Rn. 76.
323 See Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 73 and V. Gärtner, ‘Art. 17 b EGBGB, Eingetragene 
Lebenspartnerschaft’ [‘Art. 17b EGBGB, civil partnership’], in: M. Herberger et al., Juris 
Praxiskommentar BGB [Juris Commentary on the BGB for legal practitioners], 7th edn. (Saarbrücken, 
juris GmbH 2014) Rn. 54–58.
324 A. Röthel, ‘Art. 17b EGBGB’, in: M. Würdinger, Juris Praxiskommentar BGB, Band 6 – Internationales 
Privatrecht [Juris Commentary on the BGB, Volume 6 – International Private Law], 5th edn. 
(Saarbrücken, juris GmbH 2010).
325 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 9.
326 BT‑Drs. 14/3751 p. 60 and BT‑Drs. 17/8248, p. 3. See, inter alia, R. Süß, ‘Notarieller Gestaltungsbedarf 
bei Eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaften mit Ausländern’ [‘The need for notary guidance in civil 
partnerships with foreign partners’], DNotZ (2001) p. 168 at p. 169.
327 Art. 17b (3) provides that if a civil partnership between the same persons is registered in different 
countries, ‘[…] its effects shall, from the time of its registration on, be determined on the basis of the 
last life partnership entered into’.
328 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 18. Coester observed in 2013 that the clause was becoming increasingly 
more redundant, because European Union law increasingly more covered the relevant areas, such 
as maintance and inheritance. M. Coester, ‘Art. 17b EGBGB unter dem Einfluss des Europäischen 
Kollisionsrechts’ [‘Art. 17b EGBGB under the influence of European conflict‑of‑laws rules’], 22 IPRax 
(2013) pp. 114‑ 122 at p. 121.







The fact that the legislature thus accepted or even encouraged ‘registration 
tourism’,329 received only limited criticism in legal scholarship.330 As Coester 
explains, both the registration criterion and the possibility of re‑registration fitted 
in with the central aim of the Civil Partnerships Act, which was the abolition of 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. The German aspirations in this 
respect where clearly not limited to its own citizens and residents; the legislature 
explicitly permitted couples from foreign countries with no or with weaker same‑sex 
partnership regimes to enter into the stronger German civil partnership.331 There are, 
however, no statistics available on whether, and if so, the extent to which, this option 
was indeed also taken up by foreign couples (see 10.4.1 above). In other words, the 
scope of any possible ‘registration tourism’ is unknown.
10.4.4.	 Implementation	of	Directives	2004/38	and	2003/86	in	German	law
Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 was implemented in German law by means of the 
Residence Act of (Aufenthaltsgesetz/EWG) of 1969.332 Its Article 7 provided for 
rights of entry and residence for the family members of workers. Family members 
were defined in line with the Regulation as the worker’s spouse and their children 
who were under 21 years old or were dependants, as well dependent relatives in 
the ascending line of the worker and his spouse. The Aliens Act 1990333 provided 
for rules in respect of family reunification, both to German nationals, as well as 
to foreigners legally resident in Germany. Spouses, children and dependent family 
members of foreigners with a residency permit, and those of Germans, could 
qualify for such family reunification.334 The Act also provided for a hardship clause 
for other family members.335 By way of the 2001 Civil Partnerships Act the group 
of qualifying family members for family reunification under the Aliens Act was 
extended to civil partners.336 No provision was made at the time for any amendment 
329 Röthel 2010, supra n. 324, Rn. 18, referring, inter alia, to D. Henrich, ‘Kollisionsrechtliche Fragen der 
eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft’ [‘Conflict‑of‑laws questions on Civil Partnership’], Zeitschrift für 
das gesamte Familienrecht, FamRZ (2002) p. 137.
330 Röthel refers to T. Rauscher, Internationales Privatrecht, 3rd edn. 2009, p. 196.
331 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 12 and 17–18. See also B. Heiderhoff, ‘BeckOK EGBGB Art. 17b’ 
[‘Beck Online Commentary Art. 17b EGBGB’], in: H.G. Bamberger and H. Roth (eds.), Beck’scher 
Online‑Kommentar BGB [Beck Online commentary to the BGB], 32nd edn. (München, Verlag C.H. Beck 
2014) Rn. 2. Coester has observed that this fitted in with the general trend of ‘materialisation’ of Private 
international law. The author has explained that Art. 17(3) furthermore aimed to provide clarity and 
legal certainty as well as to provide a choice of law to registered partners. Coester 2013, supra n. 328, 
at pp. 115–116.
332 Gesetz über Einreise und Aufenthalt von Staatsangehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (AufenthG/EWG) [Act on the entry and residence of nationals of EC Member 
States], Act of 22 July 1969, BGBl. I p. 927, Revised by Act of 31 January 1980, BGBl. I p, 116, as well 
as by by the Ausländergesetz [Aliens Act], Act of 9 July 1990, BGBl. I p. 1354 at p. 1356 ff.
333 Gesetz über die Einreise und den Aufenthalt von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet (Ausländergesetz) [Act 
on the entry and residence of aliens in the Federal State (Aliens Act)], Act of 9 July 1990, BGBl. I 
p. 1354, at p. 1356.
334 Arts. 17 to 23 of the Aliens Act 1990 (no longer in force).
335 Art. 22 of the Aliens Act 1990 (no longer in force).
336 Art. 3 (11)(1) LPartG, inserting a new Art. 27a in the Ausländergesetz [Aliens Act].







to the Residence Act to provide for civil partners of workers within the meaning of 
Regulation 1612/68.
In September 2004 the Administrative Court of Karlsruhe delivered a judgment in a 
case in which a Chinese man who was married to a Dutchman appealed against the 
refusal of the German authorities to grant him an EU residence permit for spouses of 
EU citizens (at the time called a ‘Aufenthaltserlaubnis‑EG’) on the basis of Article 7 
Aufenthaltsgesetz/EWG.337 The Chinese citizen and his same‑sex Dutch partner had 
married in the Netherlands in 2001. The Dutchman was employed in Germany and 
he therefore had a residence permit as a worker. His spouse had lived and studied 
in Germany since 1986 and had on that ground been repeatedly granted a student 
residence permit for a period of two years. Soon after the marriage, the student 
residence permit was going to expire, and the Chinese husband had submitted an 
application for the issuing of an EU residence permit for spouses of EU workers 
for a period of five years. The German authorities refused to issue such a permit, 
as recognition of the Dutch same‑sex marriage as marriage for this purpose was 
held to conflict with German public order (Article 6 EGBGB).338 The Chinese man 
could accordingly not be considered a ‘spouse’ within the meaning of Article 10(1)(a) 
Directive 1612/68 EEC.339 The marriage of the couple was nevertheless recognised 
as a registered civil partnership. On that basis the Chinese man was granted a 
residence permit for a duration of two years.340 The Chinese man appealed to the 
Administrative Court of Karlsruhe, which confirmed that a marriage between 
same‑sex partners concluded under Dutch law was not a lawful German marriage. 
From CJEU case law it followed that ‘spouse’ within the meaning of the relevant 
Article 10(1)(a) of Directive 1612/68, related to traditional different‑sex marriages 
only. This interpretation was confirmed by the newly enacted Directive 2004/38/
EC which had not yet been transposed into German law, as well as by Article 9 of 
the – at the time non‑binding – EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Under reference 
to the CJEU judgment in the Reed case341 the Court of Karlsruhe concluded that 
only a general, Europe‑wide societal change could justify the extension of the term 
‘spouse’ to include same‑sex partners. In the Court’s opinion the sole fact that the 
Netherlands and Belgium had opened up marriage to same‑sex couples could not 
be regarded as such a societal change. Accordingly, the German court upheld the 
refusal to issue the five‑year residence permit for spouses of EU citizens.
337 VG Karlsruhe 9 September 2004, Az. 2 K 1420/03, IPrax (2006) p. 284. See also A. Röthel, 
‘Anerkennung gleichgeschlechtlicher Ehen nach deutschem und europäischem Recht’ [‘Recognition 
of same‑sex marriage under German and European law’], IPrax (2006) p. 250 and R. Koolhoven, ‘Het 
Nederlandse opengestelde huwelijk in het Duitse IPR. De eerste rechterlijke uitspraak is daar!’ [‘The 
Dutch opened up marriage in German Private international law. The first court judgment has been 
issued!’], NIPR (2005) p. 138. The subsequent appeal lodged with the BVerwG in this case (Az. 1 C 
26.04) was repealed.
338 See ch. 4, section 4.5.3.
339 Art. 7(1) AufenthG/EWG, as applicable at the time, was based on Art. 10 (1a) Directive 1612/68. The 
Act was lifted as of 1 January 2005, and replaced by the Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von 
Unionsbürgern (Freizügigkeitsgesetz/EU – FreizügG/EU) [Act on the Free movement of EU‑citizens 
(Free movement Act EU)], Act of 30 April 2004, BGBl. I, p. 1950.
340 Art. 27a in combination with Art. 18 I No. 1 AuslG and Art. 15 AufenthG/EWG.
341 Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed [1986] ECR 1283, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157. See ch. 9, section 9.6.1.







The subsequent Free Movement Directive (2004/38), as well as the EU Family 
Reunification Directive (2003/86) were implemented in German law by means of the 
Immigration Act (‘Zuwanderungsgesetz’) that entered into force on 1 January 2005.342 
This Act contained both the Residence Act (AufenthG)343 and the Free Movement Act 
(FreizügG/EU),344 as well as amendments to several other acts.
The Free Movement Act of 2004 provided that spouses of EU citizens, being family 
members within the meaning of the Directive, had a right to entry and residence. 
It was not clarified in this Act, however, whether this included same‑sex spouses. 
As explained in more detail below (sections 10.4.5 and 10.4.6) later case law has 
confirmed the above discussed ruling of the Karslruhe Administrative Court holding 
that same‑sex spouses of EU citizens are not recognised as ‘spouses’ and thus not 
as ‘family members’ within the meaning of the Free Movement Act.345 They have 
nonetheless been granted entry and residence rights, because – as explained more 
elaborately below346 – spouses have been, and still are, recognised as civil partners 
(‘Lebenspartners’) under German law. The latter group was, as noted above, not 
included in the definition of ‘family member’ under the relevant Article 3(2) of the 
Free Movement Act.347 Instead, in respect of the entry and residence of civil partners 
of EU citizens, who did not have a free movement right of their own, those provisions 
of the Residence Act (AufenthG) that applied to civil partners (‘Lebenspartners’) 
of German nationals, applied in these cases.348 As illustrated by the ruling of the 
Administrative Court of Karlsruhe discussed above, this meant that the residency 
permits issued to civil partners could be shorter in duration than those of spouses 
who were granted derived rights under the Free Movement Act.
Some authors wondered whether the relevant provisions of the Free Movement Act 
were in conformity with Article 2(2) of the Free Movement Directive, which provides 
that registered partners are recognised as ‘family members’ if the legislation of 
342 Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der 
Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz) [Act on the regulation and 
limitation of immigration and regulating the residence and integration of EU‑citizens and aliens 
(Immigration Act)], Act of 30 July 2004, BGBl. I p. 1950. This Act revoked the Aufenthaltsgesetz/
EWG.
343 Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet 
(Aufenthaltgesetz, AufenthG) [Act on the residence, access to the labour market and integration of 
aliens in the Federal State (Residence Act)], Act of 30 April 2004, BGBl. I, p. 1950.
344 Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von Unionsbürgern (Freizügigkeitsgesetz/EU – FreizügG/
EU) [Act on the Free movement of EU‑citizens (Free movement Act EU)], Act of 30 April 2004, BGBl. 
I, p. 1950.
345 In 2008, in a case concerning a Brazilian national who had concluded a marriage under Spanish law 
with a same‑sex Spanish national, the Administrative Court of Darmstadt left open the question of 
whether the Brazilian national was entitled to free movement as the spouse or as the civil partner of an 
EU citizen. VG Darmstadt 5 June 2008 (dec.), Az. 5 L 277/08.
346 See section 10.4.6.
347 This Art. 3(2) FreizügG/EU only concerned spouses, the direct descendants who were under the age 
of 21 or were dependants and those of the spouse, as well as at the dependent direct relatives in the 
ascending line and those of the spouse.
348 Art. 3(6) FreizügG/EU.







the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage.349 
Particularly as civil partnership and marriage were increasingly more equalised 
under German law, it was claimed that same‑sex registered partners of EU citizens350 
had to be granted entry and residence as family members under the Free Movement 
Directive.351 In 2013, the legislature indeed amended the Free Movement Act, so as 
to provide expressly that in respect of entry and residence, civil partners and spouses 
were treated equally under this Act.352 This also implied that same‑sex spouses of 
migrating EU citizens, who were, and are, recognised as civil partners under the 
Free Movement Act, were from then on effectively treated equally with different‑sex 
spouses in respect of entry and residence.
The Residence Act (AufenthG) of 2005 contains rules in respect of family 
reunification, including for third‑country nationals. The relevant Articles 27 to 
31 of the Act provide family reunification rights for spouses, as well as for minor 
relatives in the direct descending line, and for carers of these children. It has 
not been made explicit in the Act whether the term ‘spouses’ includes same‑sex 
spouses. Generally, however, same‑sex spouses have instead been recognised as 
civil partners (‘Lebenspartners’) under German law, as noted above and explained 
more elaborately below. In respect of family reunification that does not make any 
difference, since Article 27(2) of the Residence Act provides that the rules regarding 
family reunification also apply to partners in a ‘partnership‑like relationship’ 
(‘lebenspartnerschaftlichen Gemeinschaft’). It has been held that this category 
concerns same‑sex partners only, as the term would refer to civil partners within 
the meaning of the German Civil Partnership Act (see more elaborately below).353 In 
any case, it follows from this Article 27(2) that both same‑sex spouses and same‑sex 
registered partners of third‑country nationals may qualify for family reunification 
on an equal footing with different‑sex spouses.
The following subsections explain how foreign same‑sex marriages and registered 
partnerships are recognised under German Private International Law. As will become 
clear, marriages between partners of the same sex are recognised under German law 
as civil partnerships, not as marriages. The question has come before a German 
Court whether such ‘downgrading’ is commensurable with EU free movement law. 
This matter is discussed in subsection 10.4.7.
349 H. Hoffmann, ‘FreizügG/EU § 3’ [‘§ 3 FreizügG/EU’], in R. Hofmann and H. Hoffmann, Ausländerrecht 
[Aliens law], 1st edn. (Baden‑Baden, Nomos 2008)Rn. 19; H. Tewocht, ‘Die Neuregelung des 
Freizügigkeitsgesetzes/EU’ [‘The new regulation of the EU freedom of movement Act’], ZAR (2013) 
p. 221 at p. 225. See also G. Brinkmann, ‘Zehn Jahre Freizügigkeitsgesetz’ [‘Ten years Free Movement 
Act’], ZAR (2014) p. 213 at p. 217.
350 As explained in section 10.4.5 below, under German law only same‑sex partners may be recognised as 
registered partners within the meaning of the Civil Partnerships Act.
351 Tewocht 2013, supra n. 349, at p. 225.
352 Gesetz zur Anderung des Freizugigkeitsgesetzes/EU [Act amending the Free Movement EU Act], Act 
of 21 January 2013, BGBl. I p. 86, entry into force on 29 January 2013.
353 R. Göbel‑Zimmermann, ‘Gleichgeschlechtliche Lebenspartnerschaften (§ 27 Abs 2)’ [‘Same‑sex civil 
partnerships (§ 27 para. 2)’], in: B. Huber, Aufenthaltsgesetz [Residence Act], 1st edn. (München, Verlag 
C.H. Beck 2010) Rn. 45.









As noted above, Article 17b EGBGB provides for conflict‑of‑laws rules in respect 
of registered partnerships. The German civil partnership sets the standard for the 
functional qualification of partnerships registered abroad. Constitutive for this 
qualification is the formal establishment of a relationship in a foreign country, 
resulting in a certain civil status with legal effects.354 Whether it is required that 
both partners are of the same sex is a controversial matter. While some answer this 
question in the negative,355 other scholars have held this to be a constitutive element 
for the German civil partnership.356
The fourth paragraph of Article 17b limits the effects of civil partnerships registered 
abroad. This so‑called ‘Sperrklausel’ or ‘Kappungsgrenze’357 reads:
‘The effects of a life partnerships registered abroad shall not exceed those arising under 
the provisions of the German Civil Code and the Registered Partnerships Act.’358
Article 17b (4) is considered to be a lex specialis of the general public order clause 
of Article 6 EGBGB (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.3).359 It limits the effects of more 
advanced civil partnership regimes to those of the German civil partnership. The 
effects of more limited foreign partnership regimes are however not lifted to the 
German standard.360 Effectively, in all situations the ‘weakest’ regime is applied.361
While most scholars agree that the clause should be broadly interpreted,362 it is unclear 
what the term ‘effects’ covers exactly363 and when such effects can be considered 
to ‘exceed’ those of the German civil partnership.364 There is wide agreement that 
354 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 10.
355 Idem, Rn. 11 and Heiderhoff 2014B, supra n. 331, Rn. 13–14.
356 Röthel 2010, supra n. 324, Rn. 6.
357 Idem, Rn. 2.
358 Translation of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code (in the version promulgated on 21 September 
1994, BGBl. I p. 2494, last amended by law of 25 June 2009, BGBl. I p. 1574) provided by Dr. Juliana 
Mörsdorf‑Schulte LL.M. (Univ. of California, Berkeley), online available at: www.gesetze‑im‑internet.
de/englisch_bgbeg/englisch_bgbeg.html, visited June 2014.
359 Art. 17b (4) EGBGB is perceived as not to rule out application of Art. 6 EGBGB entirely; the 
general public order clause forms the fall‑back option. Forkert 2003, supra n. 42, at p. 296; Röthel 
2010, supra n. 324, Rn. 50 and 55; P. Kiel, `Hk‑LpartR’ [‘Hk‑LpartR’], in: M. Bruns and R. Kemper, 
Lebenspartnerschaftsrecht, Handkommentar [Civil Partnership Commentary], 2nd edn. (Baden‑Baden, 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2006) at pp. 427–428.
360 As noted above, partners instead have the option of re‑registering their partnership under the German 
law (Art. 17b (3)). See Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 84 and Röthel 2010, supra n. 324, Rn. 50.
361 Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at p. 427.
362 M. Gebauer and A. Staudinger, ‘Registrierte Lebenspartnerschaften und die Kappungsregel des 
Art. 17b Abs. 4 EGBGB’ [‘Civil partnerships and the limitation clause of Art. 17b para. 4 EGBGB’], 
IPRax (2002) p. 275 at p. 276 and Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 10.
363 Inter alia, Gebauer and Staudinger 2002, supra n. 362, at p. 276; Forkert 2003, supra n. 42, at p. 297 
and Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at p. 427.
364 Wagner 2001, supra n. 358, as referred to by Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 87. Coester has furthermore 
pointed out that since Art 17(4) EGBG was introduced, increasingely more matters have been regulated 







effects in respect of parental rights, in any case fall under the ‘Kappungsgrenze’, as 
these are expressly excluded from the scope of Article 17b (1) EGBGB.365
Legal scholarship has furthermore been divided over the question of whether a tie 
with Germany is required for the application of Article 17b (4). In other words, it is 
debated whether Article 17b (4) contains a so‑called ‘Inlandsbezug’, as is the case 
in respect of the general public order clause of Article 6 EGBGB. Strictly following 
its wording, Article 17b (4) seems to apply even in cases where the partners have 
no (strong) ties with Germany.366 Many scholars have therefore held the existence 
or the intensity of such ties not to be required or relevant for the application this 
provision.367 Others are critical,368 while some even argue that the ‘Inlandsbezug’ is 
an implied constitutive element of Article 17b (4).369
From the moment of its introduction, the ‘Kappungsgrenze’ of Article 17b (4) 
received considerable criticism in legal scholarship.370 A fundamental line of 
criticism concerns the aims pursued by the legislature with the provision.371 The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Article explained that this provision was intended 
as a compromise between the protection of the good faith of interested parties 
(‘Vertrauensschutz für die Beteiligten’) on the one hand and legal certainty and the 
guarantee and facilitation of national judicial matters (‘Sicherheit und Leichtigkeit des 
Rechtsverkehrs im Inland’) on the other.372 In legal scholarship, it has been questioned 
whether this aim was indeed achieved with this clause.373 A general consensus consists 
that the fourth paragraph was additionally – or perhaps even primarily – inspired by 
the legislature’s wish to give material protection to the institution of marriage,374 
as well as by the national legal discussion about the constitutionality of the Civil 
Partnerships Act.375 The clause was held to implement the requirement of distance 
(‘Abstandsgebot’), which the legislature at that time considered to be required by 
by EU law, such as maintenance and inheritance, as a result of which these effects no longer fall under 
this ‘Kappungsgrenze’. Coester 2013, supra n. 328, at p. 121.
365 Forkert 2003, supra n. 42, at p. 301; Röthel 2010, supra n. 324, Rn. 52. See also Coester 2013, supra 
n. 328, at p. 121.
366 Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at p. 427.
367 Wagner 2001, supra n. 358, at p. 292; Süß 2001 supra n. 326, at p. 171; Röthel 2010, supra n. 324, Rn. 53, 
P. Mankowski, J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz 
und Nebengestezen [J. von Staudinger’s Commentary to the Civil Code, with the Introductory Act and 
anciliary acts] (Sellier, Berlin 2011) p. 863, Rn. 86.
368 Gebauer and Staudinger 2002, supra n. 362, pp. 280–281.
369 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 96. The author holds that the aims of ‘guaranty and facilitation of 
national judicial matters’ and the special protection of marriage can only be pursued in cases with a 
clear link with the German jurisdiction (see below).
370 Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at p. 427. For an example of such criticism see D. Jakob, Die eingetragene 
Lebenspartnerschaft im internationalen Privatrecht [Civil partnership in International Private Law] 
(Köln, Schmidt 2002) p. 183 ff and 232 ff.
371 E.g. Süß 2001, supra n. 326.
372 BT‑Drs. 14/3751, p. 61.
373 Inter alia Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at pp. 427–428.
374 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 87.
375 Idem, Rn. 84.







Article 6(1) Basic Law.376 The tenability of this aim became, however, questionable377 
after the BVerfG had ruled in 2002 that from this Article no such ‘Abstandsgebot’ 
followed (see also 10.3.3 above).378 In search for an alternative legitimate aim that 
could justify the maintenance in force of Article 17b (4) EGBGB after the 2002 
BVerfG judgment, Coester observed that this judgment could be interpreted such 
that from Article 6(1) Basic Law a prohibition of disfavouring of marriage vis‑à‑
vis civil partnership followed. If the special protection of marriage was interpreted 
in that manner, the author considered, the function of the fourth paragraph would 
be to ensure that foreign law concerning same‑sex partnerships did not negatively 
affect the legal position of spouses in Germany.379 Kiel thought the legislature had 
primarily aimed to ward off foreign regulations concerning the effects of same‑sex 
partnerships in respect of parental rights.380 The author maintained, however, that 
parental rights established under foreign law could not be undone by Article 17b (4). 
Nevertheless, the clause prevents that partners who entered into a civil partnership 
under the law of a foreign country, can in respect of their parental rights rely on that 
foreign partnership regime in Germany.
Various scholars further have questioned why the legislature felt the need to create 
a special reservation clause (‘Vorbehaltsklausel’), instead of trusting the general 
public order clause of Article 6 EGBGB to be sufficient to deal with ‘dubious’ foreign 
institutions.381 Also the criticism was issued that the ‘Kappungsgrenze’ scaled down 
or even contradicted the openness towards foreign law of the registration criterion of 
the first paragraph of Article 17 EGBGB.382 The ‘Kappungsgrenze’ was furthermore 
held to be difficult to reconcile with the EU law principle of mutual recognition, 
to the extent that this could be held to apply in cross‑border family law matters.383 
Coester observed that the combination of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 17b EGBGB 
showed the – what he called the – ‘questionable’ and ‘disproportional’ tendency 
of the German legislature to impose the German civil partnership model at the 
376 Idem, Rn. 85. See also Gebauer and Staudinger 2002, supra n. 362, at p. 282; Henrich 2002, supra 
n. 329, at p. 144), Süß 2001, supra n. 326, at p. 172 and K. Thorn, ‘Entwicklungen des Internationalen 
Privatrechts 2000–2001’ [‘Developments in International Private Law 2000–2001’], IPRax (2002) 
p. 349 at p. 355.
377 Röthel 2010, supra n. 324, Rn. 51.
378 BVerfG 17 July 2002, Az. 1 BvF 1/01, NJW 2002 p. 2543.
379 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 87.
380 Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at p. 428.
381 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 84 and A. Röthel, jurisPK‑BGB, Article 17b EGBGB, 5th edn. 2010, 
Rn. 51.
382 Jakob 2002, supra n. 370, at p. 183ff; Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 84 and 88; Röthel 2010, supra 
n. 324, Rn. 50 and B. Heiderhoff, ‘BeckOK EGBGB Art. 17b’ [‘Beck Online Commentary Art. 17b 
EGBGB’], in: H.G. Bamberger and H. Roth (eds.), Beck’scher Online‑Kommentar BGB [Beck Online 
commentary to the BGB], 19th edn. (München, Verlag C.H. Beck 2011) Rn. 45.
383 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 88. See also R. Baratta, ‘Problematic elements of an implicit rule 
providing for mutual recognition of personal and family status in the EC’, IPRax (2007) pp. 4–7.







international level as far as possible.384 Gebauer and Staudinger argued that the rule 
led to contradictory values (‘Wertungswidersprüchen’) and to discrimination.385
With a view to all these points of criticism it has been suggested in legal scholarship 
from the moment of its introduction that Article 17b (4) EGBGB had to be abolished.386 
The ongoing process of equalisation of the German registered civil partnership with 
marriage, provided even more ground for such appeals.387 By way of alternative, a 
case has been made for a reasonable teleological interpretation and application of the 
clause.388 By the time this research was concluded, however, i.e., by 31 July 2014, the 
provision was still in force, and being applied by the German courts.
10.4.6.	 Recognition	of	foreign	same‑sex	marriages	under	German	law
As explained above, the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples in other 
European states, starting with the Netherlands in 2001, raised the question as to 
which German Private International Law regime had to be applied to these marriages: 
Articles 13–17 EGBGB concerning marriage, or Article 17b EGBGB concerning 
civil partnerships?
German legal scholarship was divided on the matter. Firstly there were legal scholars 
who argued that a same‑sex marriage registered abroad between two spouses of 
the nationality of a country in which such a marriage was provided for, had to be 
qualified and recognised as a marriage within the meaning of Article 13ff EGBGB 
under German law.389 They mostly stressed that habitual residence (domicile) and 
nationality were the criteria on the basis of which the applicable law was to be 
determined. In their view there only would be an obstacle to recognition of a foreign 
same‑sex marriage as marriage if one of the spouses was a national from a country 
which law did not provide for a same‑sex marriage – as was the case if one of the 
spouses was German. Such an obstacle to marriage would result in the nullity of the 
marriage (a so‑called ‘Nichtehe’,390 a void marriage). Others opined that since the 
entry into force of the German Civil Partnerships Act, when the German legislature 
expressly awarded legal recognition and protection to formal partnerships between 
384 Institutions with less far‑reaching legal effects than the German registered civil partnership can 
be lifted to the German level through re‑registration (Art. 17b (3) EGBGB). At the same time more 
advanced institutions are levelled down to the German standard (Art. 17b (4) EGBGB), in order to 
maintain the difference between marriage and partnership also at the international level. Coester 2010, 
supra n. 322, Rn. 18. See also Röthel 2010, supra n. 324, Rn. 50.
385 Gebauer and Staudinger 2002, supra n. 362, at p. 276.
386 Idem, at pp. 275–282.
387 Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 88.
388 Idem, Rn. 88 ff. See also Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at p. 428.
389 Inter alia Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at pp. 427–428. See also a 2006 Bill of the Greens (BT‑Dr 16/3423), 
which proposed to recognise foreign same‑sex marriages as marriage, instead of a registered civil 
partnerships. For a critical note to this proposal, see Muscheler 2010, supra n. 169, at p. 227.
390 For marriage, a relevant factor is the nationality of the spouses. So if a German national is involved, a 
same‑sex marriage is for certain a ‘Nichtehe’ (void marriage). It can only be recognised as a registered 
civil partnership. Compare VG Berlin 15 June 2010, 23 A 242/08.







two persons of the same sex, it could no longer be maintained that a same‑sex 
marriage was manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of German 
law. These authors therefore argued that a foreign same‑sex marriage could no longer 
be refused recognition on the basis of public order arguments.391 They contended that 
the mere fact that the foreign legislature had moved further forward in the process 
of equal treatment of same‑sex couples and different‑sex couples than the German 
legislature had, could not form a justification for the warding off of foreign law.392
Yet other scholars opined that a foreign same‑sex marriage could be registered 
in Germany as a civil partnership only.393 This view has been confirmed by case 
law. The first relevant case dates from June 2002, when the Financial Court 
of Niedersaksen ruled that a marriage between two Dutch women, concluded 
in conformity with Dutch law, could not be recognised as a marriage within the 
meaning of German law. The applicant could therefore not claim child benefits for 
the children of her lesbian partner, as were granted to spouses under German law.394 
By judgment of 30 November 2004, the Federal Financial Court (‘Bundesfinanzhof’ 
(BFH)) confirmed that on the basis of Article 17b (4) EGBGB a marriage between 
a couple of the same sex that was concluded abroad could under German law only 
be recognised as a civil partnership, as from Article 17b (4) EGBGB it followed that 
the effects of a civil partnership registered abroad did not exceed those arising under 
the German civil partnership.395 Hence, as confirmed in various judgments of a later 
date,396 a same‑sex marriage concluded under foreign law can only be registered in 
Germany as civil partnership (‘Lebenspartnerschaft’).397 This is not different if the 
spouses are German nationals.398
391 Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at p. 429, under reference to, inter alia, A. Röthel, ‘Gleichgeschlechtliche Ehe 
und ordre public’ [Same‑sex marriage and ordre public], IPRax (2002) p. 496 at p. 498f and Gebauer 
and Staudinger 2002, supra n. 362, at p. 277.
392 Kiel 2006, supra n. 359, at p. 429.
393 E.g. Coester 2010, supra n. 322, Rn. 144–148 and Gärtner 2014, supra n. 323, Rn. 11. As Martiny 
explained in 2012: ‘From the point of view of the existing German law, it is not a same‑sex relationship 
as such, but only the exceeding effect which is offensive. It would be inconsistent if a foreign life 
partnership in Germany were recognised, whereas an exceeding relationship would find no recognition 
at all. This is an argument for the recognition of the same‑sex marriage at least as a life partnership in 
the sense of Art. 17b Introductory Law.’ D. Martiny, ‘Private International Law Aspects of Same‑Sex 
couples under German Law’, in: K. Boele‑Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds), Legal recognition of same‑sex 
Relationships in Europe, National, cross‑border and European perspectives, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 
Intersentia 2012) p. 189 at p. 198.
394 FG Niedersachsen 4 June 2002, Az. 6 K 525/98 Ki. See also FG Niedersachsen 10 June 2004, Az. 5 K 
156/03.
395 BFH 30 November 2004, Az. VIII R 61/04 (NV).
396 E.g. VG Münster 13 December 2007, Az. 3 K 1845/05, in which the Court held that the legal effects of 
a Dutch same‑sex marriage could not extend further than those of a registered civil partnership under 
German law (i.e. the BGB and the LPartG). See also VG Köln 19 March 2009, Az. 13 K 1841/07 and 
VG Berlin 15 June 2010, Az. 23 A 242/08; OLG Zweibrücken 21 March 2011 (dec.), Az. 3 W 170/10, 
NJW‑RR 2011 p. 1156; AG München 4 January 2011 (dec.), Az. 721 UR III 193/10; OLG Zweibrücken 
21 March 2011 (dec.), Az. 3 W 170/10, NJW‑RR 2011 p. 1156 and OLG München 6 July 2011 (dec.), Az. 
31 Wx 103/11.
397 Art. 35 Personenstandsgesetz (PStG) [Civil Status Act].
398 OLG Köln 5 July 2010 (dec.), Az. 16 Wx 64/10 and KG 3 March 2011 (dec.), Az. 1 W 74/17.







Interestingly, however, the Court of Appeal (‘Kammergericht’ (KG)) of Berlin has 
been willing to apply Dutch law to a request for a divorce between a couple who had 
concluded same‑sex marriage under Dutch law.399 The Court held that the Dutch 
same‑sex marriage was valid on the basis of Article 13(1), as its conclusion was 
governed by Dutch law.400 Further, from Article 15(1)(17)(1) first sentence EGBGB it 
followed that Dutch law applied to the dissolution of a marriage between two persons 
of the same sex that had been concluded under Dutch law. The Court held that the 
application of Dutch law did not lead to a result that was manifestly incompatible 
with the fundamental principles of German law, precisely because its result was 
that a same‑sex marriage was no longer existent.401 Other courts have reportedly 




The previous subsections have shown that ‘downgrading’ may take place under 
German law. Consequently the question has been raised before the German Courts 
as to whether this ‘downgrading’ constituted a violation of EU free movement rights.
The Administrative Court (‘Verwaltungsgericht’ (VG)) of Berlin ruled in 2010 
that the fact that a same‑sex marriage concluded between two EU citizens 
under foreign law was registered as a civil partnership in the German register 
(‘Lebenspartnerschaftsregister’), did not impede the free movement rights of 
Articles 21(1) and 22(1) TFEU of the EU citizens concerned.403 The fact that the 
same‑sex marriage was registered as marriage in the register of another EU Member 
State did not alter this conclusion.
The case was brought by a German national who had entered into a marriage with a 
Spanish same‑sex partner in Canada, hence under Canadian law. While their marriage 
had been registered in the Spanish marriage register, in Germany their marriage was 
registered as a civil partnership (‘Lebenspartnerschaft’). The plaintiff requested this 
to be changed into ‘marriage’ (‘Ehe’), but the authorities instead changed his civil 
status into ‘unmarried’ (‘ledig’), because a marriage between same‑sex partners was 
considered void (‘Nichtehe’). The plaintiff asked the Administrative Court of Berlin 
399 KG 19 June 2008 (dec.), Az. 16 WF 163/08.
400 Art. 13(1) EGBGB reads: ‘The conditions for the conclusion of marriage are, as regards each person 
engaged to be married, governed by the law of the country of which he or she is a national.’
401 KG 19 June 2008 (dec.), Az. 16 WF 163/08.
402 D. Martiny, ‘Workshop: cross‑border recognition (and refusal of recognition) of registered partnerships 
and marriages with a focus on their financial aspects and the consequences for divorce, maintenance 
and succession’, in: K. Boele‑Woelki and A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal recognition of same‑sex Relationships 
in Europe, National, cross‑border and European perspectives, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Intersentia 2012) 
p. 225 at p. 241, referring in footnote 39 to AG Münster 20 January 2010, Az. 56 F 79/09, NJW‑RR 2010 
p. 1308.
403 VG Berlin 15 June 2010, Az. 23 A 242/08. See B. Heiderhoff 2011, supra n. 382, Rn. 46.







to have the entry in the German register changed into ‘married’, or, alternatively, 
into ‘Lebenspartnerschaft’. He argued that the EGBGB was not applicable as it 
only dealt with private law matters, while here a public law matter was concerned. 
He furthermore claimed that from EU law an obligation followed to recognise his 
same‑sex marriage.404 The Berlin Court rejected this reasoning. It ruled that the 
entry had to be changed into ‘Lebenspartnerschaft’, but that an entry as ‘married’ 
was not required. Because of a lack of an interstate element, the Court held that the 
case before it fell outside the scope of EU law.405
Even if EU law was applicable, the Court held, there was no interference with EU 
law, as the entry of the plaintiff’s marriage into the register as ‘Lebenspartnerschaft’ 
did not have any serious disadvantages of a professional or a private character.406 
Further, the record in the register was not legally binding.407 Even if there were an 
interference with free movement law, the Court held this to be justified on grounds of 
the special protection of marriage ex Article 6(1) Basic Law.408 The Court considered 
that – other than name, which is part of a person’s identity409 – civil status was not 
of great importance in judicial matters. The general prohibition on discrimination 
ex Article 18 TFEU was not violated, as the entry into the register affected all 
citizens equally. Besides, the entry into the register was not in violation of Directive 
2000/78 as the lack of a Union competence in respect of the question of whether a 
marriage is concerned, prevented the matter from falling within the scope of this 
Directive. Lastly, on the basis of Article 2 (2b) of the Free Movement Directive 
(Directive 2004/38) the Court concluded that there was no obligation under EU law 
to recognise the same‑sex marriage of the plaintiff.410 The Court saw no reason to 
make a preliminary reference to the CJEU as it held there to be no uncertainty about 
the interpretation of Union Law in the matter before it.411 In addition and conclusion, 
the VG Berlin held the ECHR not to be violated as its Article 12 did not require the 
recognition of same‑sex marriages.412
It is noted that this judgment of the Administrative Court of Berlin – as far as 
the present author is aware, so far the only judgment of a German Court on the 
404 Idem, para. 3.
405 The Court held that there was no interstate element because the plaintiff was a German national who 
lived in Germany and because the question at issue concerned only the legal relationship between him 
and the State. See para. 18 of the judgment, in which the Court referred to Joined Cases C‑64/96 and 
C‑65/96 Ücker/Jacquet [1997] ECR I‑3171, ECLI:EU:C:1997:285.
406 VG Berlin 15 June 2010, Az. 23 A 242/08, para. 19.
407 Idem, para. 19.
408 Idem, para. 20.
409 Idem, para. 20. The Court referred to Case C‑148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:539 and Case C‑353/06 Grunkin [2008] ECR I‑7639, ECLI:EU:C:2008:559.
410 Following Art. 2(2)(b) of Directive 2004/38 a ‘family member’ is ‘[…] the partner with whom the 
Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, 
if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and 
in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State.’ See 
more elaborately Ch. 9, section 9.6.2.
411 VG Berlin 15 June 2010, Az. 23 A 242/08, para. 24.
412 Idem, para. 25.







matter – dates from 2010. Since that time, the German civil partnership has only 
been more equalised with marriage. That fact may render it less likely that a German 
Court would rule otherwise on the question of the commensurability of this type of 
downgrading with EU free movement rules.
10.4.8.	 Cross‑border	parental	issues
There have also been several cross‑border cases relating to parental rights of same‑sex 
couples before the German courts. Generally, the parental rights established by 
couples under foreign law, have been recognised by the courts, including in cases 
where such rights could not have been established under German law.
In cross‑border cases concerning second‑parent adoption by same‑sex partners, 
German courts have applied German law. For example, in 2010 the District Court 
(‘Amtsgericht’ (AG)) of Nürnberg decided a case that concerned an American from 
California who lived in Germany and who wanted to adopt the biological child 
of his Italian same‑sex spouse, with whom he was married under Belgian law. 
The child had Russian and Italian citizenship.413 While in principle the relevant 
Californian adoption was to apply, because the adopter had American nationality,414 
the Court applied German law instead. It did so under Article 4(2)(1) EGBGB 
(renvoi, ‘Rückverweisung’), because for application of the relevant Californian law 
it was required that the adoptive parent and child had been living in California for 
at least six uninterrupted months, a criterion that was not fulfilled in the case at 
hand. The adoption was approved by the Court on the basis of Article 9(7) of the 
Civil Partnership Act, which allows for second‑parent adoption by civil partners, 
in combination with Articles 1755(1) and 1755(2) of the German Civil Code (BGB). 
In another case of 2010,415 the District Court (AG) of Stuttgart applied German law 
to a case involving a foreign national who wanted to adopt the biological child of 
her German civil partner, with whom she had concluded a civil partnership under 
German law.416
There are also examples of recognition by German Courts of foreign court orders 
concerning joint adoptions by same‑sex partners. As noted, above, foreign judgments 
in family matters are in principle recognised under German law,417 unless such 
recognition is considered manifestly incompatible with fundamental principles of 
413 AG Nürnberg 25 September 2010 (dec.), Az. XVI 57/09.
414 As explained in Ch. 4, section 4.5.3, Art. 22 EGBGB provides that the adoption of a child is governed 
by the law of the country of which the adopter is a national at the time of the adoption. Art. 23 EGBGB 
further provides that ‘[t]he necessity and the granting of the consent of the child, and of a person who is 
related to the child under family law, to a declaration of descent, to conferring a name, or to an adoption 
are additionally governed by the law of the country of which the child is a national.’ However, where 
the best interest of the child so requires, German law is applied instead.
415 AG Stuttgart 25 October 2010 (dec.), Az. 29 F 2062/09.
416 The Court held Art. 22(1) second sentence EGBGB applicable, following which adoption by (one or 
both) spouses is subject to the law governing the general effects of marriage.
417 Art. 108 FamFG.







German law.418 In a judgment of 2012, the Berlin Court of Appeal (‘Kammergericht’ 
(KG)) held that it could not be maintained that the recognition of a foreign adoption 
order, concerning a joint adoption by a same‑sex couple, would be contrary to 
the foundations of the German legal order, to such an extent that it would lift the 
fundamental rule that foreign adoption orders could not be challenged.419 The Court 
noted that this was particularly so since the question of the validity of a same‑sex 
joint adoption under German law was much debated. The obligation to observe 
German law could not be pursued by trampling upon the interests of the children 
concerned. Instead, holding on to the fundamental rule that adoption orders could 
not be challenged, served the best interests of the child to a much greater extent, the 
Court ruled.420
A similar line of reasoning was adopted by the Appeals Court (Oberlandesgericht 
(OLG)) of Schleswig‑Holstein in a judgment of March 2014.421 The case concerned 
a joint adoption by a German national and her same‑sex US‑national partner under 
US law. At the time the adoption order was issued, the relationship of the two 
women was not legally recognised in any way. This was ground for the competent 
German administrative court of first instance to refuse to recognise the American 
adoption order.422 While that judgment was appealed, the two women got married 
in California (USA). In its judgment of March 2014, the Appeals Court ruled that 
in view of the increasing extension of adoption rights to same‑sex partners under 
German law, it could not be maintained that recognition of the contested adoption 
order was manifestly incompatible with the foundations of German law. The Court 
therefore recognised the adoption.
All these judgments date from recent years, and the German courts evidently 
grounded their reasoning in recent developments in the area of adoption rights for 
same‑sex couples under German law. That fact may also explain that same‑sex 
couples have been less successful in claiming legal parenthood by operation of the 
law in cross‑border situations. As explained in section 10.4.5 above it is not possible 
under German law for so‑called ‘co‑mothers’ to be recognised by operation of the 
law as legal parent of the child of their same‑sex partner who is the biological parent. 
On the basis of Article 1592(1) German Civil Code (BGB) the father of a child is the 
man who is married to the mother of the child at the date of birth, but there is no 
such presumption of parenthood for same‑sex registered partners. In March 2011, the 
OLG of Celle ruled that the presumption of paternity did not analogously apply to a 
418 Art. 109(4) FamFG.
419 KG 11 December 2012 (dec.), Az. 1 W 404/12; See also F. Strohal, jurisPR‑FamR 3/2013 Anm. 4 
and B. Heiderhoff, ‘BeckOK EGBGB Art. 22’ [‘Beck Online Commentary Art. 22 EGBGB’], in: 
H.G. Bamberger and H. Roth (eds.), Beck’scher Online‑Kommentar BGB [Beck Online commentary 
to the BGB], 32nd edn. (München, Verlag C.H. Beck 2014) Rn. 64–65. The case concerned an adoption 
order by a South‑African Court.
420 KG 11 December 2012 (dec.), Az. 1 W 404/12, para. 20. This case was subsequently appealed to the 
Federal Court (BGH), which case was still pending (Az. XII ZB 730/12) at the time this research was 
concluded (i.e. 31 July 2014).
421 OLG Schleswig 14 March 2014 (dec.), Az. 12 UF 14/13.
422 AG Schleswig 4 January 2013 (dec.), Az. 91 F 276/11.







situation involving two women, one German national and the other Italian, who had 
concluded marriage under Spanish law.423 The so‑called ‘co‑mother’, who had been 
recognised as such under Spanish law, could not be registered on the German birth 
register as (co‑)mother of the child, because German filiation law did not allow for the 
granting of paternity to two same‑sex partners, except for in adoption situations.424
10.4.9.	 Recognition	of	German	civil	partnerships	in	other	Member	States
The present author has not become aware of any report of couples in a German civil 
partnership having particular difficulties with having that civil status recognised 
in other EU Member States. These couples presumably encounter refusals of 
such recognition in those Member States that do not provide for any form of legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships. Because of the fact that the German civil 
partnership has been extensively equalised with marriage, it is unlikely that Member 
States that have themselves introduced a registered partnership for same‑sex 
partners, will refuse the German partnership recognition under their national law. 
Countries that have refrained from introducing a separate regime, but have instead 
opened up marriage to same‑sex couples, may possibly be willing to recognise the 
German civil partnership as marriage under their national law, now that it has been 
equalised with this institute to such a great extent.
10.5. conclusIons
The German debate and standard‑setting on legal recognition of same‑sex couples 
has pre‑eminently been a step‑by‑step process. The first concrete step by means of 
the introduction of the German civil partnership in 2001, was followed by numerous 
legislative amendments over the subsequent 13 years. With a view to further 
equalising the legal position of civil partners with that of spouses, amendments were 
introduced in areas of law varying from tax law to parental rights. Such change was 
frequently imposed by a Court judgment, in many cases by the Constitutional Court.
This phased process can be explained by a long existing tensed relation between the 
special protection of marriage under Article 6 of the German Basic Law and the right 
to equality before the law under Article 3 Basic Law. While initially the former was 
seen as a lex specialis of the latter, and thus as having precedence, over time this 
relationship has been reversed. The most recent line of case law of the Constitutional 
Court in relation to same‑sex relationships is no longer about the special protection 
of marriage, so it has been observed, but about the protection of civil partnership 
423 OLG Celle 10 March 2011 (dec.), Az. 17 W 48/10, NJW‑RR 2011 p. 1157. See also AG Hannover 
3 November 2010 (dec.), Az. 85 III 103/10 and B. Heiderhoff, ‘Der gewönliche Aufenthalt von 
Säuglingen’ [‘The habitual residence of infants’], IPRax (2012) p. 523.
424 Idem.







against discrimination.425 The special protection of marriage under Article 6(1) Basic 
Law has consequently been qualified by some as ‘an empty shell’.426
In particular in relation to parental matters, the equal treatment argument provided 
for an important new perspective, as it was directly related to the rights of the child. 
In the ground‑breaking 2013 judgment of the Constitutional Court on successive 
adoption, it was the child’s right to equal treatment on the basis of which the Court 
ruled that the prohibition on successive adoption by civil partners could not be 
justified.
Regardless of these developments, the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples, 
while debated at various occasions, has proven a bridge too far. It is possible that the 
far‑reaching equalisation of civil partnership with marriage has taken the sting out of 
this debate. On the other hand, there are still clear differences between civil partners 
and spouses in the sphere of parental rights, namely in respect of joint adoption and 
legal parenthood by operation of the law. For some, these differences may be reason 
for finding the opening up of marriage even more important, yet others may hold 
these differences justified because of the special status of marriage and the biological 
differences between different‑sex and same‑sex couples.
In cross‑border situations, change has been brought about at the same fairly slow, 
perhaps even slower, pace. For example, it took until 2013, before the legislature 
amended the Free Movement Act, so as to provide expressly that in respect of entry 
and residence, civil partners and spouses were treated equally under this Act. Further, 
in cross‑border situations, a clear domination of the German standard is visible. On 
the one hand, the German Civil Partnership is unique in its openness to foreign 
same‑sex couples, exactly because the German legislature wished to broaden its 
aspirations for equal treatment to couples from outside Germany. On the other hand, 
the special protection of marriage as a bond between a man and a woman under 
Article 6(1) Basic Law has also found expression in German Private International 
Law. Under the so‑called ‘Kappungsgrenze’, foreign same‑sex marriages are 
downgraded to the standard of the German Partnership. Such downgrading has 
been held unproblematic under EU free movement rules, by German courts. Serious 
criticism has also been issued, however, on the German conflict‑of‑laws rules in this 
context, particularly because of the increased equalisation of civil partnership with 
marriage. Interestingly, in cross‑border parental matters, such developments under 
German law have – together with the best interests of the child – been grounds for 
German courts to recognise parental links that same‑sex couples had established 
abroad.
425 Coester 2013, supra n. 328, at p. 121.
426 Selder 2013, supra n. 174, at p. 1067. See section 10.3.4.4 above.









The Irish Constitution, as enacted in 1937, makes no express provision for the right 
to respect for private life. This right is covered by Article 40.3, which protects more 
generally the ‘personal rights’ (see Chapter 5, section 5.1). Two other Articles that 
are highly relevant in the context of the present case study are Article 40.1 (equality 
before the law) and Article 41 (protection of marriage and the family).
11.1.1.	 Equality	before	the	law
Article 40.1 of the Irish Constitution provides that ‘[a]ll citizens shall, as human 
persons, be held equal before the law.’ While this Article does not specify any 
discrimination grounds, under statutory law sexual orientation has constituted 
a prohibited ground of discrimination in employment1 and access to goods and 
services since the late 1990s.2 These statutory norms have proven a more common 
and more successful avenue for complaints about discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation than Article 40.1 of the Constitution.
11.1.2.	 The	right	to	marry	and	the	protection	of	family	under	the	Irish	
Constitution
Even though the Irish Constitution (1937) does not contain an express right to marry, 
the institution of marriage is strongly embedded in it. Article 41.1.1° recognises the 
family as ‘the natural primary and fundamental unit group of society, and as a moral 
institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior 
to all positive law.’ The third paragraph of this Article furthermore reads:
‘The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which 
the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.’3
1 Art. 6(2)(d) Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993 and Employment Equality Act 1998, No. 
21/1998.
2 Art. 3(2)(d) Equal Status Act 2000, No. 8/2000.
3 Art. 41.3.1° Constitution of Ireland.







In Donovan v. Minister for Justice (1951) the High Court found for the first time that 
a right to marry was implied in the Irish Constitution.4 This right was subsequently 
recognised by Justice Kenny in Ryan (1965)5 as an example of the personal rights 
latent in Article 40.3.1°.6 The constitutional right to marry was confirmed in later 
case law on various occasions.7
Marriage and family are intrinsically linked in Article 41 of the Irish Constitution. 
Consequently, the constitutional protection of the family is confined to families based 
on marriage, as the Court held in the State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála (1966)8 and 
since then this has repeatedly been confirmed.9 In other words, non‑marital families 
do not enjoy protection under the Irish Constitution. As Ryan has explained, this 
implies that ‘[…] somewhat counter‑intuitively […], children do not necessarily make 
a constitutional “family”. Everything depends on the marital status of their parents.’10 
The marital family unit is thus afforded ‘robust protection’.11 As a consequence, as 
observed in 2010 ‘[i]n practice in Irish law the marital status of a child’s parents will 
often have a significant, if not decisive, bearing on the nature and extent of the rights 
of the child and his or her parents.’12 Such concerns have been addressed in both the 
envisaged Thirty‑first Amendment to the Constitution (see Chapter 5, section 5.1.3) 
as well as in the Children and Family Relationships Bill (see section 11.3.5.3 below).
At the same time, childless married couples also enjoy protection under this 
constitutional provision;13 procreation is not essential in the context of the Irish 
4 Donovan v. Minister for Justice [1951] 85 ILTR 134. See also A. O’Sullivan, ‘Same‑sex marriage and 
the Irish Constitution’, 13 The International Journal of Human Rights (2009) p. 477 at pp. 480 and 487, 
who explains that ‘[a]s a personal right, it is not absolute and its exercise may be restricted by the 
state within constitutionally permissible limits, namely, protection of other constitutional rights and 
maintenance of the “common good”.’
5 Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] IESC 1; [1965] IR 294.
6 See G. Hogan and G. Whyte, J.M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution (Dublin, LexisNexis Butterworths 
2003) p. 1468.
7 E.g. O’Shea v. Ireland [2007] 2 IR 313. See F. Ryan, ‘Out of the shadow of the Constitution: civil 
partnership, cohabitation and the constitutional family’, 48 The Irish Jurist (2012) p. 201 at p. 209. See 
also C. Power, ‘The right to Marry’, 9 Irish Journal of Family Law (2006) p. 3.
8 The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála [1966] IR 567. See also Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at p. 210.
9 E.g. in WO’R v. EH [1996] IESC 4; [1996] 2 IR 248. See Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at pp. 211–212.
10 Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at p. 208.
11 N. O’Shea, ‘Can Ireland’s Constitution Remain Premised on the “Inalienable” Protection of the Marital 
Family Unit Without Continuing to Fail its International Obligations on the Rights of the Child?’, Irish 
Journal of Family Law (2012) p. 87 at pp. 92–93. The author observed: ‘While the referendum’s positive 
result may have symbolic value for the rights of the Irish child, any practical changes brought about by 
the referendum are likely to be minimal, particularly as Art. 41 remains unchanged.’
12 Joint Committee on the Constitutional Amendment on Children, Third Report. Twenty‑eighth 
Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2007 Proposal for a constitutional amendment to 
strengthen children’s rights. Final Report, February 2010, p. 19, online available at 
www.oi reachtas.ie/parl iament /media /housesof theoi reachtas/contentassets /documents/
JC‑Constitutional‑Amendment‑on‑Children‑Final‑Report.pdf, visited September 2010. In The State 
(Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála (1966) the Supreme Court held that that while all children had the same 
natural and imprescriptible rights regardless of the marital status of their parents at birth, children with 
unmarried parents did ‘not necessarily’ have the same legal rights. Walsh J. in The State (Nicolaou) v. 
An Bord Uchtála [1966] IR 567.
13 Murray v. Ireland [1985] IR 532.







constitutional protection of marriage.14 Indeed, also the Irish courts accepted in 1985 
that the inability to procreate does not remove the right to marry.15
The exclusion of non‑marital relationships and families from constitutional protection 
does not mean that protection by the law of these relationships and families is 
precluded. As long as they are not treated more favourably than married couples and 
marriage‑based families,16 legal recognition of non‑marital couples and families is 
not unconstitutional.17
The text of Article 41 of the Irish Constitution is neutral as regards gender of the 
spouses, but the reference to the role of women and mothers in that same provision is 
a first indication that only traditional families, based on a marriage between one man 
and one woman, have been legally recognised in Ireland. This reading has indeed 
been repeatedly confirmed in case law. In Murphy v. Attorney General (1982), 
Hamilton J. spoke of marriage as a ‘permanent, indissoluble union of man and 
woman’.18 In Murray (1985), it was noted that ‘[t]he concept and nature of marriage, 
was derived from the Christian notion of a partnership based on an irrevocable 
personal consent given by both spouses which establishes a unique and very special 
life‑long relationship’.19 In B. v. R. (1995)20 Judge Costello held marriage to be ‘[…] 
the voluntary and permanent union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others for life’.21 In Foy ‑v‑ An t‑Ard Chláraitheoir & Ors (2002), a case involving a 
transsexual, High Court Judge McKechnie held that ‘marriage as understood by the 
Constitution, by statute and by case law’ referred to ‘the union of a biological man 
with a biological woman’. The Judge considered it to be ‘crucial for legal purposes’ 
in the Irish jurisdiction that the parties were of different sexes and concluded that 
Article 12 ECHR was ‘equally so predicated’.22 The Judge ruled in conclusion:
‘[…] in my view there is no sustainable basis for the applicant’s submission that the existing 
law, which carries the impugned provision which prohibits the applicant from marrying a 
party who is of the same biological sex as herself, is a violation of her constitutional right 
to marry. Finally and in any event, as with the other rights as asserted, this right to marry 
is not absolute and has to be evaluated in the context of several other rights including the 
14 B. Tobin, ‘Law, politics and the child‑centric approach to marriage in Ireland’, 48 The Irish Jurist 
(2012) p. 210.
15 Tobin has held that as a result of Murray v. Ireland ‘[…] procreation is not an essential element of a valid 
subsisting marriage under Irish law’. B. Tobin, ‘Gay marriage – a bridge too far?’, 15 Irish Student Law 
Review (2007) p. 175 at p. 176 and Murray v. Ireland [1985] IR 532, 537.
16 C. Power, ‘Family law’, 12 Irish Journal of Family Law (2009) p. 22, referring to Murphy v. Attorney 
General [1982] IR 241 and Zappone v. Revenue Commissioners [2006] IEHC 404. See also Ryan 2012, 
supra n. 7, at p. 231.
17 See also Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at pp. 211–212.
18 Murphy v. Attorney General [1982] IR 241. Compare the judgment of Costello J. in Murray v. Ireland, 
[1985] IR 532.
19 Murray v. Ireland [1985] ILRM 536.
20 B v. R [1995] 1 ILRM 491.
21 Idem, at 495.
22 Foy v. An t‑Ard Chláraitheoir & Ors [2002] IEHC 116, at 175.







rights of society. When so looked at I believe that for the purposes of marriage the State 
can legitimately hold the view which is espoused by and is evident from its laws.’23
The position that the Irish constitutional right to marry only concerns marriage 
between parties of different sexes was confirmed in subsequent case law. In D.T. v. 
C.T. (2002)24 Justice Murray defined marriage as ‘a solemn contract of partnership 
entered into between a man and a woman with a special status recognised by the 
Constitution.’ Another judgment to this effect is Zappone & Anor v. Revenue 
Commissioners & Ors (2006),25 which is discussed in more detail below.26 An even 
more recent confirmation that only different‑sex spouses enjoy a constitutional right 
to marry dates from 2010.27
11.2. (de‑)crImInAlIsAtIon of homosexuAl ActIvItIes
Until the 1990s, certain homosexual activities between consenting adult men were 
punishable under Irish law.28 Section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 
provided that:
‘Any male person who, in public or in private, commits […] any act of gross indecency 
with another male person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof 
shall be liable at the discretion of the court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding 
two years, with or without hard labour.’29
What particular acts in any given case could be held to amount to gross indecency 
was a matter which was not statutorily defined and was therefore for the courts to 
decide on the basis of the particular facts of each case. Although in practice hardly 
any prosecutions were brought on this basis, Irish courts were unwilling to declare 
23 Idem. After the ECtHR judgment in the case of Christine Goodwin (2002, see Ch. 8, section 8.2.1), a 
new case was brought by Dr. Foy, however, this time the High Court did not make any finding on the 
applicant’s complaint under Art. 12 ECHR and accordingly did not address the question whether of the 
Irish constitutional right to marry concerns different‑sex spouses only. Foy ‑v‑ An t‑Ard Chláraitheoir 
& Ors [2007] IEHC 470.
24 D.T. v. C.T. [2003] 1 ILRM 321.
25 Zappone & Anor v. Revenue Commissioners & Ors [2006] IEHC 404.
26 Section 11.3.2.
27 HAH v. SAA, unreported, High Court, November 4, 2010, as referred to in B. Tobin, ’Same‑ Sex 
Marriage in Ireland: The Rocky Road to Recognition’, Irish Journal of Family Law (2012) p. 102 at 
p. 104.
28 Sections 61 and 62 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 and Section 11 of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, 1885.
29 This section of the 1885 Act is also known as the Labouchere Amendment, named after the Member 
of Parliament who introduced it. Section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 provided: 
‘Whosoever shall be convicted of the abominable crime of buggery, committed either with mankind 
or with any animal, shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life.’ Section 62 of the same Act 
read: ‘Whosoever shall attempt to commit the said abominable crime, or shall be guilty of any assault 
with intent to commit the same, or of any indecent assault upon a male person, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for any term 
not exceeding ten years.’







the relevant provisions unconstitutional. It took a judgment by the ECtHR for this 
effect to be reached.
In November 1977 Mr. Norris, an active homosexual and campaigner for homosexual 
rights in Ireland, instituted proceedings in the High Court. Although he himself had 
not been prosecuted for gross indecency with another male person, he claimed before 
the High Court that these laws were no longer in force by reason of the effect of 
Article 50 of the Constitution of Ireland, which declared that laws passed before the 
enactment of the Constitution but which were inconsistent with it, did not continue 
to be in force. The High Court dismissed Mr. Norris’s action on legal grounds.30 
On appeal, the Supreme Court, by a three to two majority in its decision of 22 April 
1983, upheld the judgment of the High Court. Chief Justice O’Higgins, who was in 
the majority, held:
‘On the ground of the Christian nature of our State and on the grounds that the deliberate 
practice of homosexuality is morally wrong, that it is damaging to the health both of 
individuals and the public and, finally, that it is potentially harmful to the institution 
of marriage, I can find no inconsistency with the Constitution in the laws which make 
such conduct criminal. It follows, in my view, that no right of privacy, as claimed by the 
plaintiff, can prevail against the operation of such criminal sanctions.’31
According to the majority the State had an interest in the general moral well‑being 
of the community and was entitled to discourage conduct which was ‘morally wrong 
and harmful to a way of life and to values which the State wishes to protect’. Hamilton 
remarked that the three‑of‑two majority was heavily influenced by the Christian 
ethos of the Constitution itself, that was particularly prevalent in the Preamble.32 
O’Connell observed that the majority relied ‘on a perfectionist theory of morality 
to limit the right to sexual freedom of gay men and others wishing to have anal 
intercourse’. Thereby the majority accepted that the conventional morality of society 
defined the limits of individual freedom.33 O’Connell contrasted this approach with 
that of the majority in McGee (1973),34 a case on contraceptives, where the judges 
paid ‘great respect to the principles of autonomy and pluralism’.35
30 Norris v. Attorney General [1983] IESC 3; [1984] IR 36.
31 Idem, judgment by O’Higgins CJ. In its majority decision, the Supreme Court based itself, furthermore, 
and, inter alia, on the following considerations: ‘(1) Homosexuality has always been condemned in 
Christian teaching as being morally wrong. It has equally been regarded by society for many centuries 
as an offence against nature and a very serious crime; (2) Exclusive homosexuality, whether the 
condition be congenital or acquired, can result in great distress and unhappiness for the individual and 
can lead to depression, despair and suicide; (3) The homosexually oriented can be importuned into a 
homosexual lifestyle which can become habitual; (4) Male homosexual conduct has resulted, in other 
countries, in the spread of all forms of venereal disease and this has now become a significant public 
health problem in England; (5) Homosexual conduct can be inimical to marriage and is per se harmful 
to it as an institution.’
32 L. Hamilton, ‘Matters of life and death’, 65 Fordham Law Review (1996) p. 543 at p. 547.
33 R. O’Connell 2010, supra n. 3, at p. 598.
34 See Ch. 5, section 5.1.1.
35 R. O’Connell 2010, supra n. 3, at p. 599.







Before the Supreme Court Mr. Norris contended unsuccessfully that the ECtHR 
judgment in the case of Dudgeon (1981) had to be followed,36 as the ECtHR had 
ruled in that case that the very same statutory provisions as had been in force until 
that time in the United Kingdom constituted a violation of Article 8 ECHR. Chief 
Justice O’Higgins, in the majority judgment, held that the Convention, being an 
international agreement, did not, and could not, form part of Ireland’s domestic law, 
nor affect in any way questions which arose thereunder.
Norris lodged a complaint with the European Commission for Human Rights 
(ECmHR), which referred the case to the ECtHR. In its judgment of October 1988, 
the Court, under reference to the ‘indistinguishable’ case of Dudgeon, held the 
relevant Irish statutory provisions to be in violation of Article 8 ECHR.37 The Court 
delivered its judgment in 1988, but the criminal law in Ireland remained unchanged 
until the Criminal Justice (Sexual Offences) Act of 1993 entered into force,38 which 
made consensual sexual activity between all persons above 17 years of age lawful.39 
It has been submitted that the Convention played a relatively minor role in this 
change of the law; by that time other legislative measures, making sexual orientation 
a protected status in various fields, had already been adopted or were to be adopted.40
The abolishment of the criminalisation of homosexual activities as late as 1993, 
formed the starting point for dramatic changes in respect of legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships in a time frame of two decades only. Less than 20 years later, 
in 2011, a civil partnership for same‑sex couples was introduced, as will now be 
discussed.
11.3. legAl recognItIon of sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps under IrIsh 
lAw
As noted in section 11.1.2 above, the family holds a very prominent place in the 
Irish Constitution. It is recognised as ‘the natural primary and fundamental unit 
group of Society’. The Constitution only protects the family based on marriage and 
consequently Irish family laws for long also only employed this restrictive definition 
of the family (see 11.3.5 below).41 Very traditional family laws have been in force 
for a longtime, for example:
36 ECtHR [GC] 22 October 1981, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, no. 7525/76. See Ch. 8, section 8.1.1.
37 ECtHR 26 October 1988, Norris v. Ireland, no. 10581/83.
38 Criminal Justice (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993, No. 20/1993.
39 See D. O’Connell, ‘Ireland’, in: R. Blackburn and J. Polakiewicz (eds.), Fundamental Rights in Europe. 
The ECHR and its Member States 1950–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001) p. 423 at p. 467.
40 See L. Flynn, ‘From individual Protection to Recognition of Relationships? Same‑Sex Couples and 
the Irish Experience of Sexual Orientation Law Reform’, in: R. Wintemute and M. Andenæs (eds.), 
The legal recognition of same‑sex partnerships? A study of national, European and international law 
(Oxford: Hart 2001) p. 591 at pp. 594–595.
41 F. Ryan, The Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (Round 
Hall, Dublin 2011) p. 8.







‘Only in 1973 was a ban on married women working in the civil service lifted. Women 
were not allowed to sit on juries before this date either. Nor were single mothers 
entitled to social assistance. Contraceptives became available to everyone only in 1984. 
Divorce – limited – arrived in 1986. In 1991, it became illegal for a man to rape his wife. 
Two years later homosexuality was decriminalised.’42
Until a decade into the second millennium, there was hardly any recognition of 
non‑marital relationships in general, including those of different‑sex couples. As 
Ryan explains, to the extent that non‑martial relationships enjoyed legal protection, 
same‑sex couples were generally excluded as the relevant provisions applied to 
couples ‘living together as husband and wife’.43 Once the first steps were made, 
however, change was brought about at a relatively fast pace: in 2011 the civil 
partnership was introduced for same‑sex couples; in 2013 legislation was drafted 
which would allow for joint adoption by same‑sex couples; and even a referendum 
on same‑sex marriage has been planned for 2015. This section 11.3 describes and 
analyses the various developments over time under Irish law in the direction of legal 
recognition of relationships between same‑sex partners.
11.3.1. Early developments towards legal recognition
At the beginning of the new millennium the Irish Equality Authority44 published 
various reports that were of direct relevance to the rights of same‑sex partners. The 
first report dealt with partnership rights of same‑sex couples.45 Its authors recognised 
a need for action in this area but did not make specific recommendations. The report 
served as a basis for the work of the Advisory Committee established to report to 
the Equality Authority on the equality agenda for lesbian, gay and bisexual people, 
which issued a report in 2002.46 One of the recommendations made by the latter 
Committee read:
‘The Department [of Justice, Equality and Law Reform] should ensure that same‑sex 
couples are treated in an equal manner by extending the right to nominate a partner with 
legal rights to same‑sex couples, comparable with those recognised for a spouse.’47
42 Wording ascribed to S.‑A. Buckley, a social historian at National University of Ireland in Galway, 
as quoted in H. Mahoney, ‘Same‑sex marriage underlines social change in Ireland’, euobserver.com 
7 May 2013, www.euobserver.com/lgbti/119963, visited July 2013.
43 Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at pp. 8–9. This was, for instance, the case in respect of social assistance. See 
Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at p. 20.
44 The Irish Equality Authority is an independent body set up under the Employment Equality Act 1998. 
It was established on 18th October 1999.
45 J. Mee and K. Ronayne, Partnership rights of same sex couples (Dublin, The Equality Authority 2000).
46 The Equality Authority, Implementing Equality for Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals, 2002, online 
available www.equality.ie, visited September 2002.
47 Idem, at p. 29.







This was the first time that a statutory organisation publicly made such statements 
in support of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships.48 In April 2004 the Irish 
Law Reform Commission (LRC)49 issued a consultation paper on the rights and 
obligations of cohabitants.50 The Commission proposed a presumptive scheme, 
imposing certain legal rights and duties on ‘qualified cohabitants’,51 who had been 
living together in a marriage‑like relationship for three years.52 The LRC took the 
view that such a scheme should be extended to different‑sex as well as same‑sex 
cohabitants.53 The option of civil registration of same‑sex relationships was not 
addressed in the consultation paper.54
The recommendations of the LRC were not immediately followed up. Instead, 
in 2004 a new Act on Civil Registration entered into force, which provided that 
there was an impediment to a marriage if both parties are of the same sex.55 The 
inclusion of this explicit provision at a time when the first European countries had 
opened up marriage to same‑sex couples was criticised by equality groups for being 
discriminatory.56
Further, in that same year the Civil Partnership Act was introduced in the United 
Kingdom, including in Northern Ireland, which provided for civil partnership for 
same‑sex couples.57 Various authorities and authors claimed that this entailed a need 
for action for the Irish legislature, as under the Good Friday agreement, the Republic 
48 Center for Evaluation Innovation, Civil Partnership and Ireland: How a Minority Achieved a Majority. 
A case study of the gay and lesbian equality network, Center for Evaluation Innovation November 
2012, p. 2, online available at www.glen.ie/attachments/Case_Study_‑_How_a_minority.PDF, visited 
July 2014.
49 The Law Reform Commission was established on 20 October 1975, pursuant to section 3 of the Law 
Reform Commission Act 1975. It is an independent statutory body whose main aim is to keep the law 
under review and to make practical proposals for its reform, ‘so that the law reflects the changing needs 
of Irish society’. See www. lawreform.ie, visited October 2010.
50 Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on the Rights and Duties of Cohabitants, Law Reform 
Commission: April 2004 CP 32–2004.
51 The Commission defined ‘qualified cohabitees’ as persons who, although they are not married to one 
another, live together in a ‘marriage like’ relationship for a continuous period of three years, or where 
there is a child of the relationship, for two years. Law Reform Commission 2004, supra n. 50, at pp. 1 
and 4.
52 Presumptive meant that the scheme only applied once the cohabitation had ended. See B. Tobin, 
‘Relationship Recognition for Same‑Sex Couples in Ireland: The Proposed Models Critiqued’, 11 Irish 
Journal of Family Law (2008) p. 10.
53 Law Reform Commission 2004, supra n. 50, at p. 14.
54 Critical in this regard was Mee. J. Mee, ‘A critique of the Law Reform Commission’s consultation paper 
on the rights and duties of cohabitees’, 39 The Irish Jurist (2004) p. 74. In 2006 the paper was followed 
up by a report in which the LRC also pleaded for the development of a legal framework concerning 
cohabitants, either different‑sex or same‑sex, who live together in an intimate relationship. Again, the 
option of civil partnership was not discussed. Law Reform Commission, Report, Rights and Duties of 
Cohabitants (Law Reform Commission December 2006, LRC 82‑2006).
55 Section 2(2)(e) Civil Registration Act 2004. Tobin has noted that this impediment to same‑sex marriage 
was not discussed during the Committee’s debate. Tobin 2012B, supra n. 27, at p. 103.
56 See C. Power, ‘The benefits of marriage’, 7 Irish Journal of Family Law (2004) p. 29.
57 Civil Partnership Act 2004, Act of 18 November 2004, 2004 ch. 33.







of Ireland was under an obligation to provide for an ‘at least an equivalent level of 
human rights protection’ as prevalent in Northern Ireland.58
It was also in 2004 that Senator Norris – who had also been a successful plaintiff 
in various legal proceedings on the prohibition on homosexual conduct (see 11.3 
above) – presented his Civil Partnership Bill.59 According to its Explanatory 
Memorandum the purpose of the Bill was:
‘[…] to make provision for and in connection with civil partnership, that is a conjugal 
relationship entered into and registered in accordance with the Act between two persons 
aged 18 and upwards of either the same or different gender or sex, who are cohabiting, 
and who are not already married or in another civil partnership, and are not within certain 
prohibited degrees of relationship with each other.’60
The Bill was the first legislative initiative for introducing legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships. It provided that civil partners were to be regarded in law 
‘[…] as having the same rights and entitlements as parties to a marriage’.61
When the Norris Bill was debated in the Senate (‘Seanad’) in February 2005, the 
Minister for Justice acknowledged that the position before the law of same‑sex 
couples and the possible extension of State recognition to civil partnerships between 
such persons, needed to be addressed. Two aspects of this Bill were nevertheless 
considered problematic: (1) the fact that the Bill provided a status for cohabitants 
which attracted the same rights and entitlements as conventional marriage; and (2) 
the fact that the proposed legislation was restricted to so‑called ‘conjugal relations’. 
The first issue was even held to be contrary to the Constitution. Consequently the 
debate on the Bill was adjourned62 and ultimately (on 11 October 2007) this Bill was 
withdrawn. This delay and withdrawal had much to do with other ongoing issues, 
such as the issuing of the tenth progress report of the Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution in 2006. In this report the Committee held that:
‘Provision for same‑sex marriage would bring practical benefits. But it would require 
a constitutional amendment to extend the definition of the family. However, legislation 
could extend to such couples a broad range of marriage‑like privileges without any need 
to amend the Constitution (as has been suggested in the case of cohabiting heterosexual 
couples).’63
58 See Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Equality for all families, April 2006, pp. 49 and 60, online 
available at: www.iccl.ie/equality‑for‑all‑families‑.html, visited 19 June 2014, p. 60; B. Tobin, 
‘Same‑Sex Couples and the Law: Recent Developments in the British Isles’, 23 International Journal 
of Law, Policy and the Family (2009) p. 309 at p. 318 and Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at p. 12.
59 Bill Number 54 of 2004.
60 Explanatory memorandum to Bill Number 54 of 2004.
61 Section 6 of the Bill Number 54 of 2004.
62 Seanad Éireann Debates [Senate debates], Vol. 179, 16 February 2005.
63 The All‑party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, Tenth progress report, The Family (Stationery 
Office, Dublin 2006), p. 87, online available at www.constitution.ie/Documents/Oireachtas%20
10th‑Report‑Family%202006.pdf, visited June 2014.







The Committee furthermore held that ‘[…] an amendment to extend the definition of 
the family would cause deep and long‑lasting division in our society and would not 
necessarily be passed by a majority.’64 Still, it recommended the introduction of the 
civil partnership for both same‑sex and different‑sex couples.65 Other authoritative 
pleas for the introduction of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships were 
simultaneously made. A 2006 report of the Irish Human Rights Commission (IHRC) 
on de facto couples concluded that from an international human rights point of view 
there was a compelling case to be made for the State to provide some formal level of 
legal recognition to same‑sex couples, if not to de facto couples generally.66 The Irish 
Council for Civil Liberties, for its part, made a plea for the opening up of marriage 
to same‑sex couples.67
In March 2006 the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform established a 
Working Group on Domestic Partnership.68 The Group’s task was
‘[…] to consider the categories of partnerships and relationships outside of marriage to 
which legal effect and recognition might be accorded, consistent with Constitutional 
provisions and to identify options as to how and to what extent legal recognition could 
be given to those alternative forms of partnership, including partnerships entered into 
outside the State.’69
For this purpose the Working Group was to take into account models in place in other 
countries.70 By the end of November 2006 the working group published an options 
paper,71 which examined various options for unmarried cohabiting couples, namely: 
contractual arrangements; a presumptive scheme; limited civil partnership; full civil 
partnership; and legislative review and reform. The introduction of partnership for 
different‑sex couples which would be equivalent or closely analogous to marriage 
was considered to be ‘[…] vulnerable to constitutional challenge on the ground that 
it constitute[d] an attack on the institution of marriage by providing a competing 
institution’.72 In addition the Working Group was ‘[…] not convinced that there [were] 
many cohabiting opposite‑sex couples who [were] unwilling to marry but [would] be 
willing to enter a registration scheme which ha[d] all the attendant obligations of 
64 Idem, at p. 122.
65 Tobin argued that a civil partnership for different‑sex couples would be unconstitutional, as it would 
amount to a state‑sponsored institution competing with marriage. Tobin 2008, supra n. 52.
66 J. Walsh and F. Ryan, The Rights of De Facto Couples (Dublin, Irish Human Rights Commission 2006) 
p. 130, online available at www.ihrc.ie/download/pdf/report_defactocouples.pdf, visited June 2014.
67 Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Equality for all families, April 2006, p. 60, online available at www.
iccl.ie/equality‑for‑all‑families‑.html, visited June 2014.
68 See www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR07000328, visited June 2014.
69 Www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR07000947, visited June 2014.
70 See the Group’s Terms of reference as reproduced on www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR07000328, 
visited June 2014.
71 Options Paper presented by the Working Group on Domestic Partnership to the Tánaiste and Minister 
for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Mr. Michael McDowell, T.D., November 2006, online available 
at www.justice.ie/en/JELR/OptionsPaper.pdf/Files/OptionsPaper.pdf, visited July 2014.
72 Idem, at p. 45.







marriage’.73 By contrast, the Group believed that full civil partnership for same‑sex 
couples was recommendable. Such a partnership was seen as a distinct institution 
separate from, and not competing with, marriage, and thus not suffering the same 
constitutional vulnerability as full civil partnership for different‑sex couples.74 The 
opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples was nevertheless held to be vulnerable 
to constitutional challenge, ‘[…] given the special position marriage [was] afforded in 
the Constitution and the interpretation of the definition of marriage in constitutional 
actions before the Courts’.75 In this respect the options paper also noted that a High 
Court judgment was pending in the Zappone & Anor case, concerning the recognition 
of a foreign same‑sex marriage.76 Even though this concerned a cross‑border case, 
and would thus fit in best under section 11.4 below, it is discussed most extensively 
in this section, as the case has proven highly important for Ireland’s national debate 
and standard‑setting on legal recognition of same‑sex couples.
11.3.2. The Zappone & Anor	judgment	(2006)
In Zappone & Anor v. Revenue Commissioners & Ors (2006),77 two women who 
had concluded a marriage in Canada unsuccessfully claimed they should be allowed 
to profit from certain tax benefits that were afforded exclusively to married couples 
under the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. The Revenue Commissioner refused to 
recognise their marriage certificate from British Columbia, Canada. When the case 
came before the Irish High Court in 2006, Justice Dunne was confronted with the 
question of whether the right to marry inherent in the Constitution encompassed the 
right to same‑sex marriage, and if not, whether the traditional right as interpreted in 
the impugned provisions was incompatible with the provisions of the ECHR. Justice 
Dunne ruled that the refusal to recognise the Canadian marriage certificate had not 
breached any of the plaintiffs’ rights as marriage as defined in the Irish Constitution 
was between a man and a woman. The Justice did not accept the arguments of the 
plaintiffs to the effect that the definition of marriage as understood in 1937, when the 
Constitution was enacted, required to be reconsidered in the light of standards and 
conditions prevailing in 2010.
Justice Dunne first observed that there was no consensus around the world that 
supported a widespread move towards same‑sex marriage. She then continued:
‘Marriage was understood under the 1937 Constitution to be confined to persons of the 
opposite sex. That has been reiterated in a number of […] decisions […], notably the 
decision of Costello J. in Murray v. Ireland, the Supreme Court decision in T.F. v. Ireland 
and the judgment of Murray J. in T. v. T. […] Judgment in the T. v. T. case was given as 
73 Idem, at p. 45.
74 Idem, at p. 51.
75 Idem, at pp. 50–51.
76 Idem, at p. 51.
77 Zappone & Anor v. Revenue Commissioners & Ors [2006] IEHC 404.







recently as 2003. Thus it cannot be said that this is some kind of fossilised understanding 
of marriage.’78
Justice Dunne furthermore pointed out that in Ireland ‘as recently as 2004’ 
Section 2(2)(e) of the Civil Registration Act had been enacted, an Act which was 
entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and which had to be considered ‘an 
expression of the prevailing view as to the basis for capacity to marry’. Reading 
Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution together,79 Justice Dunne found it ‘[…] very 
difficult to see how the definition of marriage could, having regard to the ordinary 
and natural meaning of the words used, relate to a same sex couple.’
The High Court Justice furthermore found that the plaintiffs were not treated in 
law any differently from any other non‑married different‑sex couple. And even if 
there was in fact any form of discriminatory distinction between same‑sex couples 
and different‑sex couples by reason of the exclusion of same‑sex couples from the 
right to marry, ‘then Article 41 in its clear terms as to guarding’ and ‘the issue as to 
the welfare of children’ provided the necessary justification.80 In conclusion Justice 
Dunne held that the plaintiffs’ claim for recognition of their Canadian marriage and 
the challenge to the relevant provisions of the Tax Code failed.
The strong adherence by Justice Dunne to the historical approach, instead of 
interpreting the Constitution contemporaneously as a living instrument, was 
criticised for not being consistent with previous case law.81 O’Sullivan furthermore 
wondered whether ‘[…] in dealing with capacity to exercise a right constituting a 
traditional constitutional value, recently enacted legislation or regulation [could] 
suffice.’82
As regards the claims made under the ECHR, Justice Dunne referred to the judgment 
of the English High Court in the case of Wilkinson and Kitzenger.83 She found 
that judgment ‘compelling’ in setting out ‘[…] the position in relation to the right 
of marriage as identified by the European Court of Human Rights in [Christine] 
Goodwin.’84 Christine Goodwin had concerned a post‑operative transsexual who 
was refused an alteration of her sex on the birth register and could therefore not 
marry someone from the post‑operative different sex. The English High Court had 
held that the breach of Article 12 found in Christine Goodwin was based on the 
78 Idem. The T. v. T case to which the Judge refers concerns D.T. v. C.T., 1 ILRM 321.
79 Art. 42 of the Constitution of Ireland provides for a right to education and refers to ‘parents’ in this 
regards.
80 For a critique on this reasoning see B. Tobin, ‘Recognition of Canadian Same‑sex Marriage: Zappone 
and Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners and Others’, 1 Irish Human Rights Law Review (2010) p. 217 at 
p. 222.
81 O’Sullivan for example argues that the contemporaneous interpretation as adopted by the Court in 
Sinnott v. Minister for Education [2001] 2 IR 505 should have been applied. O’Sullivan 2009, supra 
n. 4, at p. 488.
82 Idem, at p. 485.
83 Wilkinson and Kitzinger v. Attorney General, a decision of the High Court (Unreported, 31st July, 2006) 
by Potter J.
84 On Christine Goodwin (2002), see Ch. 8, section 8.2.1.







ECtHR’s finding that gender could be determined by criteria other than simply 
biological factors. Thus, from Christine Goodwin no right to same‑sex marriage 
could be deduced. The English High Court held that ‘[…] the wording of Article 12 
refer[red] to the right to “marry” in the traditional sense (namely as a marriage 
between a man and a woman)’ and noted that there were clear limitations to the 
‘living instrument’ doctrine. Because there was no Europe‑wide consensus on 
the subject, the Convention could not be treated as having evolved and as having 
expanded its scope to encompass same‑sex relationships within the concept of 
marriage, the English Court concluded. Justice Dunne saw no reason for reaching 
any conclusion different from that which the English High Court had reached in the 
Wilkinson and Kitzenger case.
Justice Dunne nevertheless explicitly invited the Irish legislature to take further 
action in this field. She acknowledged that undoubtedly people in the position of the 
plaintiffs, whether they were same‑sex couples or different‑sex couples, could ‘[…] 
suffer great difficulty or hardship in the event of the death or serious illness of their 
partners.’ Therefore she held that it was ‘to be hoped that the legislative changes 
to ameliorate these difficulties’ would not be ‘long in coming.’ The Justice did not 
consider this a matter up to the courts though; ultimately, it was for the legislature to 
determine the extent to which such changes had to be made, she held. This invitation 
did not go unheard, but the legislative process proved time consuming.85
11.3.3. Towards a Civil Partnership Act
In December 2006 – the same month in which the High Court judgment in Zappone 
& Anor was delivered – the Irish Labour Party tabled its Civil Unions Bill.86 In line 
with the abovementioned options paper on domestic partnership, the Bill proposed 
a civil registration scheme extending the full range of rights and duties of marriage 
to same‑sex couples.87 The second stage of the debate on the Bill was delayed after 
the approval of a government amendment to that effect. The amendment noted that 
terms of the Civil Unions Bill 2006, as presented, appeared to be ‘inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Constitution’, in particular ‘the State’s constitutional duty to 
protect with special care the institution of marriage’. Also, it was regarded as prudent 
to await the Supreme Court decision in the Zappone & Anor case as that case had 
been appealed in the meantime.88
Late April 2007 the Dáil Éireann was dissolved. After the elections of May 24, 2007 
the Bill was put before the new parliament, but again the debate was adjourned. 
85 As explained further in section 11.3.6 below, the Zappone case was subsequently appealed to the 
Supreme Court.
86 Bill Number 68 of 2006.
87 Explanatory Memorandum to Bill Number 68 of 2006, p. 3.
88 Dáil Éireann – Volume 632 – 21 February, 2007, Civil Unions Bill 2006: Second Stage (Resumed), 
online available at www.historical‑debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0632/D.0632.200702210028.html, visited 
9 July 2014.







Reportedly the Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform, opposed the Bill after 
having been ‘[…] advised by the Attorney General that it was contrary to the explicit 
recognition given to the family based on marriage in the Constitution.’89 The 
legislative programme of the newly appointed Irish government, however, contained 
the commitment to legislate for civil partnership at the earliest possible date in the 
lifetime of the government.90 Subsequently in June 2008, the General Scheme of the 
Civil Partnership Bill was published91 and a year later, in June 2009, the government 
presented its Civil Partnership Bill 2009 to the Houses of the Oireachtas.92 According 
to its Explanatory Memorandum the purpose of the Bill was the following:
‘The purpose of the Bill is to establish a statutory civil partnership registration scheme for 
same‑sex couples together with a range of rights, obligations and protections consequent 
on registration, and to set out the manner in which civil partnerships may be dissolved and 
with what conditions.’93
By limiting access to civil partnership to same‑sex couples, the new institution 
would not rival marriage (which was open to different‑sex couples only) and would 
thus not be subject to constitutional challenge on this point.94 It was presumably 
because of the same constitutional concerns that the complex and lengthy Bill stated 
in detail which rights and obligations applied to civil partners. Ryan observed in this 
regard at the time:
‘The earlier bills simply stated that civil partnership would be equivalent to marriage 
in most respects. The Government Bill, by contrast, seeks to enumerate one by one 
the various rights and responsibilities that will apply to civil partners. While far more 
laborious, it appears this approach was preferred for constitutional reasons, the logic 
being that a direct equation with marriage is more likely to provoke constitutional 
concerns. The Government thus preferred to list explicitly the various consequences of 
civil partnership without seeking to compare it directly with marriage. A review of the 
proposal, however, reveals a union that (with some important exceptions) is substantially 
89 Y. Moynihan, “God has given you one face and you give yourself another”: The implications of 
transsexual recognition in matters of marriage: Dr Lydia Foy’s laudable victory spawns reform in 
terms of same‑sex unions’, 11 Irish Journal of Family Law (2008) p. 38.
90 Programme for Government 2007–2012, www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/.../ProgforGovEng.rtf, visited 
June 2014. At p. 87 of this Programme it was held: ‘This Government is committed to full equality for 
all in our society. Taking account of the options paper prepared by the Colley Group and the pending 
Supreme Court case, we will legislate for Civil Partnerships at the earliest possible date in the lifetime 
of the Government.’
91 Ryan referred to the publication of this scheme as marking ‘a watershed in modern Irish law’. F. Ryan, 
‘The General Scheme of the Civil Partnership Bill 2008: Brave New Dawn or Missed Opportunity?’, 
11 Irish Journal of Family Law (2008) p. 51.
92 Civil Partnership Bill 2009, Bill No. 44 of 2009.
93 Explanatory Memorandum to the Civil Partnership Bill 2009, p. 1.
94 Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at pp. 233–234, referring (in footnote 182) to J. Mee, ‘Cohabitation, Civil 
Partnership and the Constitution’ in Doyle and Binchy (eds.), Committed Relationships and the Law 
(Dublin, Four Courts Press 2007), pp. 201–207.







equivalent to marriage. In fact, it is clear from the heavy borrowing from current marriage 
legislation, that civil partnership is based largely on the same blueprint.’95
This approach thus removed most constitutional concerns and the Bill passed through 
the Dáil ‘relatively smooth and speedy’.96 In the Senead it met with more concerns, 
mainly, as Ryan has explained, in relation to conscientious objections.97 Still, in July 
2010, both Houses of the Oireachtas passed the Bill; in the Dáil it was passed without 
a vote, while the Senead adopted the Bill with a 48‑4 vote.98 Soon thereafter, on 
19 July, the President signed the Bill, without a reference to the Supreme Court 
for a review of its constitutionality.99 The Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and 
Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010100 (hereafter referred to as ‘Civil Partnership 
Act’ or ‘the 2010 Act’) entered into force in January 2011. The Act introduced two new 
schemes, namely civil partnership and (qualified) cohabitation.101 The latter scheme, 
that applies automatically to cohabiting partners in an ‘intimate and committed 
relationship’ – whether of different or the same sex – who meet certain criteria, is 
not extensively discussed here. Instead, the focus lies on the civil partnership.
11.3.4. The Civil Partnership Act 2010
Civil partnership as introduced by the 2010 Act is open to same‑sex partners only. 
In other words, only same‑sex couples have the option of entering into a civil 
partnership, while different‑sex couples only have the option of concluding a civil 
marriage. Other impediments to the registration of a civil partnership occur, inter 
alia, when the parties to the intended civil partnership are married, already in a civil 
partnership or are under the age of 18 years.102
The prospective civil partners must give three months’ written notice of their 
intention to enter into the partnership. While marriage can be celebrated by religious 
solemnisers, this does not hold for civil partnership; the ceremony for registering the 
partnership is wholly secular.103 A civil partnership can be dissolved through a court 
order, after the partners have lived apart for two out of the three preceding years.104 
95 Ryan 2008, supra n. 91, at pp. 51‑ 57. See also Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at p. 247.
96 See Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at p. 13.
97 Idem. This concern was no longer very visible in the debate once the Act was adopted.
98 See Center for Evaluation Innovation, Civil Partnership and Ireland: How a Minority Achieved a 
Majority. A case study of the gay and lesbian equality network (Center for Evaluation Innovation, 
November 2012) p. 13, online available at www.glen.ie/attachments/Case_Study_‑_How_a_minority.
PDF, visited 9 July 2014.
99 Art. 26 Constitution of Ireland.
100 Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010, No. 24/2010, online 
available at www.irishstatutebook.ie/2010/en/act/pub/0024/print.html, visited 9 July 2014.
101 Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at p. 8.
102 Section 2(2)(A) Civil Registration Act 2004, as amended by Section 7(3) of the Civil Partnership and 
Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010.
103 See Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at p. 13.
104 Section 12 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010.







Again, there is a difference with marriage in this regard, as spouses must have been 
living apart for four out of the five preceding years before they can divorce.105
Despite these differences of a more procedural nature, civil partnership has 
substantially generally been put on a par with marriage. The rights and obligations of 
civil partners are in many respects ‘largely identical’ to those of spouses, for example 
in respect of maintenance, property and succession.106 The Civil Partnership Act 
does not deal with taxes and social assistance, but simultaneous and subsequent 
amendments of the relevant legislation established that, also in respect of these 
matters, civil partners were treated the same as spouses.107 Still, a 2011 study by 
LGBT advocacy organisation Marriage Equality found 169 differences in treatment 
between civil partners and spouses under Irish legislation, concerning mainly 
‘[…] family law, immigration, housing, court procedure, inheritance, taxation and 
freedom of information […].’108
The most prominent – and much debated – exception to the general equalisation 
of civil partnership with marriage indeed concerned parental rights and various 
other situations involving children. As discussed more extensively in the following 
subsection, the 2010 Civil Partnership Act did not provide for anything in this 
regard. As this was heavily criticised, in the years that followed, new proposals for 
legislation were drafted which aimed to protect the position of children born with 
civil partners and cohabiting (same‑sex) partners (see section 11.3.5 below).
While the Civil Partnership Act was generally welcomed as a great improvement for 
the protection of the rights of same‑sex couples, the ‘separate but equal’ approach 
at the bottom of the introduction of this new regime for same‑sex couples only, has 
been criticised.109 As Ryan has pointed out, an important implication thereof is that 
there is no constitutional protection of the civil partnership. As a consequence, ‘civil 
partnership could be abolished without constitutional difficulty’.110 This lack of 
constitutional protection was further confirmed by the Supreme Court, which ruled 
in a 2009 judgment that the constitutional protection of the family did not extend to 
de facto families, as further explained hereafter in section 11.3.5.1.111
105 Art. 41.3.2° of the Constitution of Ireland.
106 Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at p. 14.
107 Finance (No. 3) Act 2011, No. 18/2011 and Social Welfare and Pensions Act 2010, No. 37/2010.
108 P. Faugan, Missing pieces. A comparison of the rights and responsibilities gained from civil partnership 
compared to the rights and responsibilities gained through civil marriage in Ireland (Marriage Equality 
2011) p. 6, online available at www.marriagequality.ie/download/pdf/missing_pieces.pdf, visited July 
2014.
109 Ryan 2008, supra n. 91, referring (in footnote 4) to the arguments put forward by Marriag Equality. See 
www.marriagequality.ie, visited July 2014.
110 Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at p. 242.
111 McD v. L. & Anor [2009] IESC 81, [2010] 2 IR 199. See 11.3.5.1 below.








As the previous sections have made clear, for a long time same‑sex relationships did 
not enjoy any legal protection under Irish law. This was even more so for so‑called 
rainbow families – families built by same‑sex partners. In fact, de facto families in 
general – including unmarried different‑sex couples – have long had to do without 
any legal protection.112 The Irish constitutional reading and protection of the family 
is limited to the family based on marriage (as explained above) and the legislation 
long showed a strong adherence to biological parenthood. As O’Connell noted in 
2010, ‘[a]part from adoption and guardianship situations, there is no recognition of 
non‑biological parenthood in Irish law.’113 In that same year McLoone observed that 
there seemed to be ‘[…] a reluctance to recognise the position of same‑sex couples 
as parents’.114 Reddington noted that ‘[…] perhaps it [was] time that Ireland’s own 
historic interpretation of the family under the Constitution [was] revisited and 
amended to suit the needs of the citizens it serve[d] in a more modern, diverse and 
increasingly secular society.’115 As explained in the following subsections, change 
may indeed be underway.
Access to reproductive services is in principle guaranteed for same‑sex couples and 
lesbian and gay individuals under equality legislation that has been in place in Ireland 
since the year 2000. Nonetheless, as explained in Chapter 5, section 5.3.3, same‑sex 
couples may encounter refusals when they try to get access to AHR treatment.
Yet before the introduction of civil partnership for same‑sex couples in 2011, 
incidental High Court rulings showed an increased recognition of parenting by 
same‑sex couples. In Zappone & Anor (2006) Justice Dunne held that further studies 
were necessary before a firm conclusion as to the consequences of same‑sex marriage 
for the welfare of children could be reached,116 but she also held that there was
‘[…] no evidence of any kind tendered to the court to demonstrate that children brought 
up by a same sex couple or a single homosexual parent [were] adversely affected by the 
family structure in which they are raised.’117
112 The lack of legal rights for non‑biological parents was also ‘one of the key themes’ running through 
a 2013 study on LGBT parents in Ireland. J. Pillinger and P. Fagan, LGBT parents in Ireland. A study 
into the experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in Ireland who are parents or 
who are planning parenthood, Report commissioned by LGBT Diversity, February 2013, p. 113, online 
available at www.marriagequality.ie/download/pdf/lgbt_parents_in_ireland_full_report.pdf, visited 
July 2014.
113 D. O’Connell, Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity, Thematic Study Ireland (Galway 2010) p. 12, online available at http://fra.europa.eu/en/
national‑contribution/2012/country‑thematic‑studies‑homophobia‑transphobia‑and‑discrimination, 
visited June 2014.
114 C. McLoone, ‘Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010: A 
Practitioner’s Guide’, 14 Irish Journal of Family Law (2011) p. 58.
115 D. Reddington, ‘Civil Partnership vs Marriage – the Approach of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, 14 Irish Journal of Family Law (2011) p. 15.
116 Zappone & Anor v. Revenue Commissioners & Ors [2006] IEHC 404.
117 Idem, at 118.







In 2008, the High Court in McD v. L & Anor even went as far as to grant legal 
protection to same‑sex de facto families. This ground‑breaking ruling was, however, 
overruled by the Supreme Court a year later.
11.3.5.1. McD v. L & Anor (2009): no constitutional protection of same‑sex de facto 
family life
In December 2009 the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in the McD v. L & 
Anor case. The facts of this case about a sperm donor who wished to have access to 
his biological child, born to a lesbian couple, have been set out in Case Study I (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.3.4). In McD v. L & Anor, the High Court had initially – and for 
the first time – ruled that the two lesbian women and their child enjoyed protection 
as a de facto family under Article 8 ECHR. Judge Hedigan had acknowledged that 
the Irish Constitution did not recognise ‘the concept of a same‑sex de facto family’, 
but had noted that this did not preclude the recognition of the ‘de facto heterosexual 
family’ by the courts.118 The High Court Judge based this protection on the right to 
respect for family life ex Article 8 ECHR, even though the ECtHR had at the time 
not yet brought same‑sex relationships within the scope of that Article. The Judge 
concluded:
‘[…] where a lesbian couple live together in a long term committed relationship of mutual 
support involving close ties of a personal nature which, were it a heterosexual relationship, 
would be regarded as a de facto family, they must be regarded as themselves constituting 
a de facto family enjoying rights as such under article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Moreover, where a child is born into such a family unit and is cared for and 
nurtured therein, then the child itself is a part of such a de facto family unit. Applying this 
to the case here it seems clear that between the respondents and the infant there exist such 
personal ties as give rise to family rights under article 8 of the ECHR.’119
On this basis the High Court denied the applicant, the sperm donor, access to his 
biological child that was being raised by its biological and genetic mother and her 
lesbian partner. The case was, however, appealed and consequently the ruling of 
the Irish High Court was overturned by a unanimous Supreme Court judgment of 
10 December 2009.120 The Supreme Court judges felt that the High Court had gone 
too far and exceeded its jurisdiction by ‘outpacing’ the ECtHR and so developing 
‘previously non‑existent rights by reference to the ECHR’.121 In the words of Judge 
Fennelly:
118 C. Power and G. Shannon, ‘Practice and Procedure, Sperm donors and the legal recognition for 
same‑sex couples’, 11 Irish Journal of Family Law (2008) p. 44.
119 McD v. L. & Anor [2009] IESC 81, [2010] 2 IR 199 at 235–236, as quoted in Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at 
p. 216.
120 C. Hogan,’JMcD v PL and BM Sperm Donor Fathers and De Facto Families’, 13 Irish Journal of Family 
Law (2010) p. 83.
121 C. Murray, ‘Recognising the Modern Family: Extending Legislative Guardianship Rights in Ireland’, 
15 Irish Journal of Family Law (2012) p. 39.







‘The existing case‑law of the European Court seems clearly to be to the effect that a de 
facto family of the sort claimed does not come within the scope of Article 8. […] It is 
important that the Convention be interpreted consistently. The courts of the individual 
states should not adopt interpretations of the Convention at variance with the current 
Strasbourg jurisprudence.’
The Supreme Court reiterated that the protection of the family under the Irish 
Constitution only saw at the family based on marriage and in addition held that 
there was no Irish law in place that recognised de facto same‑sex families. Judge 
Fennelly explained that ‘[…] [n]either the Constitution nor the law in force in Ireland 
recognise[d] persons in the position of the respondents as constituting a family with 
the natural child of one of them’.122 Judge Geoghegan observed that there was ‘[…] 
nothing wrong with the rather useful expression ‘de facto family’ provided it [was] 
not regarded as a legal term or given a legal connotation’.123 Judge Denham was as 
firm as to hold that ‘[t]here is no institution in Ireland of a de facto family.’124
The Supreme Court made clear that this finding did not mean that the de facto 
situation of the parties to the case should not be taken into consideration. However, in 
assessing the matter, so the Supreme Court ruled, the child’s welfare was a primary 
consideration. It was ‘the kernel of the issue’ in questions concerning guardianship, 
custody and access.125 On the basis of the welfare of the child central to this case, 
the Supreme Court requested the High Court to make access arrangements for the 
applicant to the child.126
This Supreme Court judgment thus once again confirmed the ‘narrow conception of 
the family in the Constitution’.127 Hogan observed that the judgment was ‘in keeping 
with the trend in favour of biological truth and contact with natural parents’ and 
‘clearly’ represented ‘a blow for so called “non‑traditional families”’.128 Daly held it 
conceivable that the decision would be challenged in the future ‘on the basis that it is 
no longer in conformity with the Convention.’129 Ryan observed, on the other hand, 
that the judgment made clear that, ‘[…] to the extent that the definition of family 
in the Convention would bring the Convention into conflict with the Constitution, 
the Constitution would, as a matter of domestic law, prevail.’130 With a view to the 
later judgment of the ECtHR in the case of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria to the effect 
that same‑sex couples enjoy protection of the right to respect for family life under 
Article 8 ECHR,131 this is an even more interesting finding.
122 McD v. L & Anor [2010]1 ILRM 461, Fennelly J.
123 McD v. L & Anor [2010]1 ILRM 461 at 495, Geoghegan J.
124 McD v. L & Anor [2010]1 ILRM 461, Denham J.
125 Idem, at 63.
126 O’Shea 2012, supra n. 11, at p. 90.
127 Murray 2012, supra n. 121.
128 Hogan 2010, supra n. 120.
129 A. Daly, ‘Ignoring Reality: Children and the Civil Partnership Act in Ireland’, 14 Irish Journal of 
Family Law (2011) p. 82.
130 Ryan 2008, supra n. 91, p. 218.
131 See Ch. 8, section 8.2.2.







The Supreme Court’s ruling thus denied the legal protection that High Court Judge 
Hedigan had granted to rainbow families. Supreme Court Judge Fennelly expressly 
noted that the absence of any provisions in Irish law securing the rights of these 
families seemed something that called ‘for urgent consideration by the legislature.’132 
By the time the McD v. L & Anor judgment came out, the Civil Partnership Act and 
a revision of the Adoption Act were yet under debate in Parliament. However, both 
Acts failed to provide for the identified need for legal protection of rainbow families.
11.3.5.2. Limited change brought about by the 2010 Adoption Act and the 2010 Civil 
Partnership Act
In 2010 a new Adoption Act entered into force which was still in force when this 
research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014). While until that time only married 
couples who were living together could adopt a child,133 the new Act introduced 
single‑parent adoption, rendering it possible for lesbian and gays to become parents 
of a non‑genetic child. A single person or one partner of a couple – irrespective of 
his or her sexual orientation – may adopt if the Adoption Authority considers it 
desirable. The Authority must regard the welfare of the child as its first and paramount 
consideration.134 The civil partner or cohabiting partner of an adoptive parent may 
seek access to the child, but cannot establish any parental links with the child.135
While the Ombudsman for Children had at the time advised to also enable both 
different‑sex and same‑sex unmarried couples to jointly adopt a child, no such option 
was introduced by the Adoption Act 2010.136 Same‑sex couples only have the option 
of submitting a joint application to foster children.137 The Children’s Ombudsman 
considered the State’s policy in this regard inconsistent and ‘arbitrary from the 
child’s point of view’.138 She wondered what the purpose was of barring these couples 
from applying to adopt and observed in this respect:
‘It cannot logically arise from a concern on the part of the State regarding the capacity 
of unmarried opposite‑sex and same sex couples to care for children, given that the State 
already entrusts young people to their care – potentially for many years – and has already 
provided in law for a situation in which they can effectively occupy the role of guardians. 
Indeed, during the debates in the Seanad regarding the Adoption Bill, the Minister for 
132 McD. v. L. & Anor [2008] IEHC 96, Hedigan J.
133 E.g. Section 10 Adoption Act 1991, No. 14/1991.
134 Section 33 Adoption Act 2010, No. 21/2010.
135 See also www.citizensinformation.ie/en/birth_family_relationships/cohabiting_couples/adop 
tion_and_unmarried_couples.html, visited July 2014.
136 Ombudsman for Children, Advice of the Ombudsman for Children on the Adoption Bill 2009, 2009, 
p. 27, online available at www.oco.ie/wp‑content/uploads/2014/03/Adviceonadoption.pdf, visited July 
2014.
137 Murray 2012, supra n. 121.
138 Ombudsman for Children 2009, supra n. 136, at p. 23.







Children and Youth Affairs clarified that, based on the experience of the foster services, 
the State has no difficulty with same‑sex couples being parents or minding children.’139
The Civil Partnership Act that entered into force a few months after the 2010 
Adoption Act did not bring any further protection for rainbow families. In fact, the 
Act did simply not address the question of parental rights for civil partners.140 As Ryan 
observed, ‘a studious effort’ had been made ‘[…] generally to avoid the use of the 
term “family” as a description for civil partners’. The author was of the view that this 
was ‘undoubtedly a consequence of the confinement of family in the Constitution to 
the family based on marriage.’141 Daly explained that the 2010 Civil Partnership Act 
contained many provisions that were taken from laws relating to marriage and noted 
that while ‘[…] in many of the original provisions, references were made to the need 
to provide for the interests of children of the family’, such references had not been 
included in the Civil Partnership Act 2010, ‘intentionally removing children from the 
legislative picture.’142
That the matter had simply not been unforeseen, was also illustrated by the fact 
that during the debates on the Civil Partnership Bill in the Seanad an amendment 
to provide for step‑parenthood for civil partners had been rejected.143 Also, the 
Ombudsman for Children had been critical of the Civil Partnership Bill:
‘Although the situation of children was clearly considered in the drafting of the Civil 
Partnership Bill, the approach adopted was not one which placed the rights of the children 
who will be affected by the Bill to the forefront. Indeed, provisions from other areas of the 
law that acted as templates for the Civil Partnership Bill and which included references 
to the need to provide for dependent children of the family were adapted for the Civil 
Partnership Bill in a manner which effectively removed the protections afforded to 
children of marital families from children with same‑sex parents in a civil partnership.’144
As a result of the approach chosen, children of parents in civil partnerships were not 
granted the same protection as children of married parents. For example, as explained 
139 Idem, p. 24, referring (in footnote 36) to Seanad Éireann, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 194 No. 6, p. 361, 
online available at www.oco.ie/wp‑content/uploads/2014/03/Adviceonadoption.pdf, visited July 2014. 
See also GLEN – Gay and Lesbian Equality Network, Submission to Joint Oireachtas Committee 
on Justice, Defence and Equality on the Heads of the Children and Family Relationships Bill, 
February 2014, p. 3, online available at www.glen.ie/attachments/GLEN_Submission_to_Oireachtas_
Committee_on_the_Heads_of_Children__Family_Relationships_Bill.pdf, visited July 2014.
140 As Ryan explains, the Act was not ‘entirely oblivious to the existence of children’. For example, in 
granting maintenance in case of dissolution of a civil partnership, the Court must take into account 
the civil partner’s obligations to his or her biological and adopted child(ren). Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at 
p. 27.
141 Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at pp. 236–237.
142 Daly 2011A, supra n. 133.
143 Amendment 37. See also Law Reform Commission, Report on the Legal Aspects of Family Relationships, 
December 2010, LRC 101–2010, p. 39, online available on www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/
r101Family(1).pdf, visited July 2014.
144 Ombudsman for Children, Advice of the Ombudsman for Children on the Civil Partnership 
Bill 2009, July 2010, online available at www.oco.ie/wp‑content/uploads/2014/03/
Advice‑OCO‑Civil‑Partnership‑Bill‑2009.pdf, visited July 2014.







by Ryan, ‘[…] civil partnership dissolution […] may be granted without reference to 
the needs of children’ and no mechanism is in place ‘[…] allowing the biological 
parent to share guardianship rights with his or her civil partner.’145 Other differences 
between the legal position of children raised by spouses and those growing up with 
civil partners relate to maintenance upon relationship breakdown, shared home 
protection and succession to the tenancy of a deceased parent.146
The Law Reform Commission urged the legislature in December 2010, thus right 
before the entry into force of the Civil Partnership Act, to introduce legislation to 
facilitate the extension of parental responsibility to civil partners and step‑parents.147 
This did not go unheard, although it would take the Minister until January 2014 to 
introduce draft legislation.
11.3.5.3. The Children and Family Relationships Bill (2014)
The Irish government announced in 2011 that it intended to amend the 2010 Civil 
Partnership Act, in order ‘to address any anomalies or omissions, including those 
relating to children’.148 It took until 2014, however, for the Children and Family 
Relationships Bill (as also discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.3.2) to be drafted, in 
which (some of) these matters were indeed addressed.
A first important change that was to be brought about by the Children and Family 
Relationships Bill concerned joint adoption by civil partners,149 something which 
the Ombudsman for Children had pleaded for years earlier.150 The Bill envisaged 
that civil partners would be able to jointly adopt a child, including in intercountry 
situations. In a revised version of the Bill this was extended to cohabiting couples 
who had been living together for at least three years.151 The Bill did not explicitly 
provide for second‑parent or successive adoption, but it seems unlikely that this 
would be outlawed now that joint adoption is to be introduced.
145 Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at p. 239.
146 Daly 2011A, supra n. 129, at pp. 82–86.
147 The Commission recommended that where parental responsibility was extended by court order the 
court would have regard ‘to, among other factors, the wishes and best interests of the child and the 
views of other parties with parental responsibility.’ Law Reform Commission 2010, supra n. 143, at 
p. 41.
148 Government for National Recovery 2011–2016, online available at www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Work_
Of_The_Department/Programme_for_Government/Programme_for_Government_2011–2016.pdf, 
visited June 2014.
149 Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014, Head 77.
150 See note 136 above. This development was welcomed by the Ombudsman for Children. 
Ombudsman for Children, Advice on the General Scheme of the Children and Family 
Relationships Bill 2014, May 2014, p. 57, online available at www.oco.ie/wp‑content/uploads/ 
2014/06/OCOAdviceonChildandFamilyRelBill2014.pdf, visited June 2014.
151 General Scheme of the Children and Family Relationships Bill, Summary of Provisions, online 
available at www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Note%20on%20the%20General%20Scheme%20of%20the%20
Children%20and%20Family%20Relationships%20Bill.pdf/Files/Note%20on%20the%20General%20
Scheme%20of%20the%20Children%20and%20Family%20Relationships%20Bill.pdf, visited July 
2014.







Secondly, the Bill provided for detailed rules on the establishment of parental links in 
situations involving AHR treatment and/or surrogacy. As explained in Chapter 5,152 
the relevant provisions of the Bill were based on the rule that the birth mother was 
always considered the child’s mother, and thus, as the parent. Importantly, provision 
was made for legal parenthood by operation of the law for female civil partners. 
Under the Bill it was made possible for the civil or cohabiting partner of the mother 
to become the parent, and thus guardian, of the child.153 As explained in the General 
Scheme, ‘[t]he husband, civil partner or cohabitant of the mother [was] considered to 
be the other parent of the child if he or she ha[d] given a consent which remain[ed] 
valid at the time the procedure leading to implantation [took] place.’154 Also, there 
was a rebuttable presumption of consent on the part of the mother’s spouse, partner 
or cohabitant to becoming a child’s parent.155
Further, disputes between parents were not solved on the basis of a genetic link only; 
in order to protect the rights of the child ‘[…] a genetic parent [could not] exclude the 
other parent by obtaining a declaration that s/he [was] not a parent of the child, nor 
[could] a parent repudiate her or his responsibilities to a child on the grounds that 
they [were] not genetically connected.’156 These rules thus implied a correction of the 
McD v. L & Anor case (see 11.3.5.1 above).
The described rules thus envisaged the granting of strong protection to the families 
of same‑sex couples consisting of two women. This protection was not extended to 
male same‑sex couples. The proposed rules concerning parentage in cases involving 
surrogacy would have enabled same‑sex couples consisting of two men to both 
establish parental links with a child born with a surrogate mother that was genetically 
related to one of them.157 Following the proposed Bill this could be done through 
assignment of parentage by the Court. The consent of the birth mother would have 
been decisive; if she did not consent, she would be the legal mother. This would 
also hold in situations where a lesbian couple resorted to a surrogacy agreement, 
including where one of them provided the ovum for the creation of an embryo that 
was to be implanted in the surrogate mother’s womb.158 As explained in Chapter 5,159 
the provisions on surrogacy were, however, removed from the revised version of the 
Bill that was published in September 2014.
152 See section 5.3.2.
153 Heads 10 and 38 Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014.
154 Explanation to Head 10, General Scheme, p. 22. Following Head 10(8) it is for the Minister to make 
regulations on the form that such consent must take.
155 Head 10(6) Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014.
156 Explanation to Head 10, General Scheme, p. 23. As acknowledged in the Explanatory Memorandum, 
these rules […] could limit the rights of a “known donor” who wishes to establish a legal connection 
with a child.’. ‘However’, it is held, ‘[…] there is a balance of rights to be achieved and the best interests 
of the child are likely to be served by having legal certainty and security in his or her family unit.’
157 Head 12(1) Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014.
158 Head 12(2) Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014.
159 See section 5.3.9.







The Bill furthermore provided for the equalisation of the legal position of children 
whose parents were in a civil partnership with that of children whose parents were 
spouses, in respect of maintenance, shared home protection and responsibilities 
towards the children in situation of a dissolution.160 The Minister for Justice affirmed 
in April 2014 that the Bill would not ‘downgrade or devalue’ the traditional marital 
family but [would] ensure all children are treated equally’.161
11.3.6.	 Towards	access	to	marriage	for	same‑sex	couples?
Already before civil partnership was introduced in Ireland, voices were heard that 
the creation of a new institution only for same‑sex couples, instead of opening up 
marriage to these couples was discriminatory and treated this group as second‑class 
citizens. The Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL), for example, held such in 2006. 
The ICCL noted ‘the inherent paradox in the adage “separate but equal”’ and was of 
the view that the marriage ban compromised same‑sex couples’ right to dignity and 
equality.162 In legal scholarship it was also observed that full equality for same‑sex 
couples ‘undoubtedly’ demanded equal access to civil marriage.163
It has been much debated in legal academia and in politics whether the opening up 
of marriage to same‑sex couples would require constitutional amendment, and thus 
whether a referendum on the matter would be mandatory. While the Constitution 
refers to the marriage institution in neutral terms, the Supreme Court in its case law 
defined marriage as between a man and a woman only.164 As Ryan explained in 2011:
‘[…] it remains somewhat unclear whether the Constitution precludes same‑sex marriage. 
Article 41.3 does not define marriage and on its face does not appear to prevent same‑sex 
marriage from being enacted. On the other hand, to interpret Article 41.3 as potentially 
applying to same‑sex as well as opposite‑sex marriage would involve a significant 
departure from the historical meaning of marriage.’165
The strong reliance on this historical and static constitutional understanding of 
marriage by High Court Justice Dunne in Zappone, could be held to support the 
conclusion that the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples would require a 
160 Heads 72–74 of the Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014 (Revised version September 2014). 
See also GLEN – Gay and Lesbian Equality Network, Submission to Joint Oireachtas Committee 
on Justice, Defence and Equality on the Heads of the Children and Family Relationships Bill, 
February 2014, p. 8, online available at www.glen.ie/attachments/GLEN_Submission_to_Oireachtas_
Committee_on_the_Heads_of_Children__Family_Relationships_Bill.pdf, visited June 2014.
161 P. Duncan, ‘New Bill ‘won’t devalue’ traditional marital families’, Irishtimes.com 10 April 2014, www.
irishtimes.com/news/social‑affairs/new‑bill‑won‑t‑devalue‑traditional‑marital‑families‑1.1757969, 
visited July 2014.
162 Faugan 2011, supra n. 108, at p. 8.
163 Ryan 2008, supra n. 91.
164 See 11.1.2 above. O’Sullivan held in 2009 that there was ‘[…] no textual exclusion in the Constitution 
precluding a same‑sex couple from exercising a personal right to marry each other.’ O’Sullivan 2009, 
supra n. 4, at p. 487.
165 Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at p. 36.







referendum.166 Others expressed the view that there was no constitutional impediment 
to the opening up of marriage.167 Tobin grounded this conclusion in the clear judicial 
deference of the Court in this matter and in other sensitive social matters, as displayed 
by Justice Dunne in Zappone.168 At the same, the author took into account the option 
that the judiciary would instead ‘slam the door firmly shut on same‑sex marriage’, 
if a Bill opening up marriage to same‑sex couples would be referred to the Supreme 
Court by the President under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution.169
When the Irish government prepared the Civil Partnership Act, some authors 
wondered whether the government planned ‘on it being the last word on the 
same‑sex marriage debate’.170 This turned out not to be the case, however, for long, 
an argument against the undertaking of any legislative action on the matter was the 
pending appeal in the Zappone & Anor case (see 11.3.2 above) before the Supreme 
Court.171 Many authors at the time thought that the Supreme Court was likely to 
defer to the legislature, just like the High Court had.172 The case remained pending 
for several years, however, and in the meantime, the legislature took the initiative in 
the matter.
In 2011 the government announced the establishment of a Constitutional 
Convention, a forum of 100 representatives from Irish society and politics, to make 
recommendations on possible Constitutional reform. Amongst the topics to be 
covered by the Convention was ‘provision for same‑sex marriage’.173
While the Convention was in progress, a hearing in the Zappone case was scheduled 
for June 2012. Reportedly, the plaintiffs dropped the case just a few weeks before 
that, and lodged a fresh application with the High Court instead. As Tobin explained:
166 Ryan 2012, supra n. 7, at pp. 222–223.
167 Idem, at p. 223, referring (in footnotes 120 and 121) to E. Carolan, ‘Committed Non‑Marital Couples 
and the Irish Constitution’, in Doyle and Binchy (eds.), Committed Relationships and the Law 
(Dublin, Four Courts Press 2007); Tobin 2012A, supra n. 14; C. O’Mahony, ‘Constitution is not an 
obstacle to legalising gay marriage’, Irish Times, July 16, 2012, online available at www.irishtimes.
com/newspaper/opinion/2012/0716/1224320203659.html and E. Daly, “Same sex marriage doesn’t 
need a referendum”, 15 July 2012, online available at www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2012/07/15/
same‑sex‑marriage‑doesnt‑need‑a‑referendum.
168 Tobin 2012A, supra n. 14.
169 Idem. See also supra n. 99.
170 Idem, at p. 321. Tobin later opined that the enactment of Civil Partnership legislation ‘[…] could sound 
the death knell for the recognition of a right to same‑sex marriage under Art. 41 of the Constitution.’ 
He explained that that was ‘[…] because the High Court could display the same legislative deference 
as Dunne J. in 2006 and consequently refuse to expand the current constitutional understanding 
that marriage is heterosexual in nature by finding that the 2010 Act represents the prevailing social 
consensus on the appropriate form of legal recognition for same‑sex relationships.’ Tobin 2012B, supra 
n. 27, at p.104.
171 The appeal to the Supreme Court was lodged in 2007. See also Tobin 2007, supra n. 15, at p. 175.
172 Inter alia, O’Sullivan, supra n. 4, at p. 488 and Tobin 2010, supra n. 80, at p. 221.
173 The task that the Constitutional Convention has been given is set out in the Resolution of the Houses of 
the Oireachtas of July, 2012, online available at www.constitution.ie/Documents/Terms_of_Reference.
pdf, visited 8 July 2014.







‘In the new High Court proceedings, the plaintiffs are seeking to impugn s. 2(2)(e) of the 
Civil Registration Act 2004 […], the first Irish statutory provision to define marriage as 
between a man and a woman. This provision went unchallenged in the original High Court 
proceedings in 2006. The plaintiffs also claimed that they would mount a challenge to the 
Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 […].’174
The latter application was still pending at the time of conclusion of this research 
(i.e., 31 July 2014). As a result of rapid developments in the meantime, however, the 
opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples in Ireland has become increasingly more 
realistic. In July 2012 the Deputy Prime Minister, the Tánaiste, declared his support 
for marriage equality.175 In April 2013 the Constitutional Convention favoured 
a Constitutional amendment requiring the legislature to legislate for same‑sex 
marriage, by a clear majority of 79 per cent.176 The Convention also supported 
the introduction of legislation ‘[…] to address the parentage, guardianship and 
upbringing of children in families headed by same‑sex married parents.’177 In early 
2014 the government announced that a referendum on same‑sex marriage would be 
held in spring 2015. It was furthermore announced that the Minister for Justice and 
Equality would bring legislative proposals to government in 2014.178 By the time this 
research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014), no such Bill had been published.
11.4. sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps And cross‑border movement
11.4.1.	 Cross‑border	movement;	some	statistics
The Central Statistics Office (CSO) of Ireland keeps statistics on the number of civil 
partnerships registered per year. For example, there were 536 civil partnerships 
registered in 2011179 and 429 in 2012.180 These statistics do not give any details on 
matters like the nationality of the partners concerned.
174 Tobin 2012B, supra n. 27, at p. 102.
175 See www.humanrights.ie/index.php/2012/07/01/
marriage‑equality‑and‑the‑weight‑to‑be‑borne‑by‑the‑constitutional‑convention, visited July 2014.
176 This outcome was in line with opinion polls of 2012 which showed that at the time 74 per cent of 
the Irish people was in favour of marriage equality for same‑sex couples. See Marriage Equality’s 
submission to the 2013 Constitutional Convention, pp. 4–5, online available at www.marriagequality.
ie/getinformed/me_publications/marriage‑equality‑constitutional‑convention‑submission, visited 
July 2014.
177 Third Report of the Convention on the Constitution. Amending the Constitution to provide for 
same‑sex marriage, June 2013, online available at www.constitution.ie/AttachmentDownload.
ashx?mid=c90ab08b‑ece2‑e211‑a5a0‑005056a32ee4, visited July 2014.
178 Programme for Government: Annual Report 2014, Government for National Recovery 2011–2016, 
March 2014, p. 70, online available at: www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Work_Of_The_Department/
Programme_for_Government/Programme_for_Government_Annual_Report_20141.pdf, visited 
June 2014.
179 These concerned 335 male unions and 201 female unions. See www.cso.ie/en/newsandevents/
pressreleases/2013pressreleases/pressreleasemarriagesandcivilpartnerships2011, visited June 2014.
180 These concerned 263 male unions and 166 female unions. See www.cso.ie/en/newsandevents/
pressreleases/2014pressreleases/pressreleasemarriagesandcivilpartnerships2012, visited June 2014.







This is different for statistics that Gay and Lesbian Equality Network GLEN has 
published, on the basis of figures provided by the General Registrar Office.181 These 
statistics show that by August 2014, in total 2,934 people entered Civil Partnerships 
in Ireland since they first became available in 2011. It was thereby noted that ‘[t]hese 
figures [did] not account for the hundreds of Irish lesbian and gay people who were 
married or entered a civil partnership abroad.’182
Of the 2,934 people that entered Civil Partnerships in Ireland since 2011, no less than 
25 per cent (714 persons) had another nationality than Irish. Almost half of them 
(300 persons) were EU citizens, with UK nationals and Polish nationals being the 
biggest groups represented (136 and 53 respectively). At the same time, it was noted 
that ‘[…] most of the couples who entered a Civil Partnership in Ireland intended to 
live in Ireland after their civil partnership.’ Only 64 out of 1,467 couples – hence 
9.6 per cent – intended to live in another country. Out of these 64, 22 intended to 
live in another EU Member State. This may be an indication of the scale at which 
so‑called ‘registration tourism’ takes place, however, because these statistics are not 
accompanied by any interpretation, no firm conclusions can be drawn in this regard.
11.4.2.	 Access	to	civil	partnership	for	foreign	same‑sex	couples
Before civil partnership was introduced in the Irish jurisdiction, foreign same‑sex 
couples had, just as Irish same‑sex couples, no access to any form of legal recognition 
in Ireland. This changed with the entry into force of the Civil Partnership Act 2010. 
Under this Act there is no requirement of residence, domicile or nationality of 
the (future) civil partners.183 This implies that foreign same‑sex couples can enter 
into a civil partnership in Ireland, so long as they – like residents and nationals of 
Ireland – fulfil the criteria under the 2010 Act184 and meet the general requirements 
set out by the General Register Office (GRO).185 The statistics referred to above show 
that this opportunity has indeed been seized upon by same‑sex couples consisting of 
one or two foreign partners.
181 GLEN – Gay and Lesbian Equality Network, Civil Partnerships in Ireland: Figures from April 2011 
to 30th June 2014 Released: 17th August 2014, online available at www.glen.ie/attachments/Civil_
Partnership_Statistics_to_June_2014.pdf, visited June 2014.
182 Idem .
183 A domicile requirement has only been set for special court orders, for instance for court orders 
declaring ‘[…] that the civil partnership was at its inception a valid civil partnership’. Art. 4(1) Civil 
Partnership Act.
184 Article 7A Civil Partnership Act.
185 General Register Office (GRO) of Ireland, ‘Information note on Civil Partnership’, www.welfare.ie/en/
Pages/Civil_Partnership.aspx, visited July 2014.








The Free Movement Directive (2004/38) was implemented in Ireland by means 
of a statutory instrument of 2006 (‘the 2006 Regulations’).186 This instrument 
makes a distinction between ‘qualifying family members’ of Union citizens and 
‘permitted family members’. The first group includes the spouse of the EU citizen 
and their minor or dependant children.187 Qualifying family members may not be 
refused entry, unless there is a clear and individualised health or public security 
risk.188 The category of ‘permitted family members’ includes other members of the 
EU citizen’s household, as well as ‘the partner with whom the Union citizen has 
a durable relationship, duly attested’.189 Whether someone is indeed a ‘permitted 
family member’ within the meaning of this instrument, is established on the basis of 
‘an extensive examination of the personal circumstances of the person concerned’.190 
Unless the Minister is not satisfied that the person concerned is a permitted family 
member, entry may, again, only be refused if such entry would pose a clear and 
individualised health or public security risk.191
The Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) has not been transposed into Irish 
law.192 Only for persons with refugee status has provision been made for family 
reunification. Under Article 18 of the Refugee Act 1996,193 spouses, minor children 
and – in exceptional cases – other dependent family members194 of refugees can 
apply for family reunification. This excludes same‑sex partners, whether they are 
spouses, civil partners or stable partners. As pointed out by O’Connell in 2010, the 
existence of such formal relationships could, however, ‘[…] impact positively on the 
assessment of a relationship for the purpose of dealing with a family reunification 
claim […].’195 On an ad hoc discretionary basis exceptional leave to enter for the 
186 European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) (No. 2) Regulations 2006, S.I. No. 656 of 
2006, amended in 2008 by European Communities (Free Movement Of Persons) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2008, S.I. No. 310 of 2008.
187 Art. 2(1) S.I. No. 656 of 2006 reads: ‘[…] “qualifying family member”, in relation to a Union citizen, 
means – (a) the Union citizen’s spouse; (b) a direct descendant of the Union citizen who is – (i) under 
the age of 21, or (ii) a dependant of the Union citizen; (c) a direct descendant of the spouse of the Union 
citizen who is – (i) under the age of 21, or (ii) a dependant of the spouse of the Union citizen; (d) a 
dependent direct relative of the Union citizen in the ascending line, or (e) a dependent direct relative of 
the spouse of the Union citizen in the ascending line.’
188 Art. 4(2) S.I. No. 656 of 2006.
189 Art. 2(1) S.I. No. 656 of 2006.
190 Art. 5(2) S.I. No. 656 of 2006.
191 Art. 5(4) S.I. No. 656 of 2006.
192 D. O’Connell 2010, supra n. 113, at p. 13.
193 Refugee Act 1996, No. 17/1996.
194 This excluded life partners, as ‘dependent member of the family’, in relation to a refugee, is defined as 
‘[…] any grandparent, parent, brother, sister, child, grandchild, ward or guardian of the refugee who is 
dependent on the refugee or is suffering from a mental or physical disability to such extent that it is not 
reasonable for him or her to maintain himself or herself fully.’ Art. 18(4)(b) Refugee Act 1996.
195 D. O’Connell 2010, supra n. 113, at p. 13.







purpose of reunifying same‑sex partners had been granted by the Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform.196
When Civil Partnership was introduced in Ireland in 2011, neither the 2006 
Regulations, nor the Refugee Act were amended. The immigration authorities, 
however, adopted an official policy of treating a civil partnership in the same way 
as marriage for immigration purposes.197 In other words, both same‑sex registered 
partners and same‑sex spouses of EU citizens are – in principle – granted entry 
as ‘qualifying family members’ under the 2006 Regulations, and same‑sex civil 
partners and same‑sex spouses of refugees qualify for family reunification under the 
Refugee Act. Couples in partnerships that are not recognised under Irish law as civil 
partnership,198 may be recognised as de facto couples (hence as ‘permitted family 
members’) under the 2006 Regulations. There is also a policy of treating same‑sex 
stable partners and different‑sex stable partners in the same way.199 These policies 
were only made publicly available through the website of the Irish Naturalisation and 
Immigration Service.
LGBT advocacy organisation Marriage Equality reported in 2011 that there was a 
gap between the official policy and the legislative reality. It was held:
‘Differences include, civil partners not being included under the definition of ‘qualifying 
family members’ in regulations which transposed EU free movement provisions. This 
may mean the Irish Government are in breach of their obligations under this EU directive. 
As a result of the approach taken to deal with civil partnership through immigration 
policy rather than by amending immigration legislation […] civil partners are left without 
the protection and certainty of the law. Rather they are reliant on measures of policy that 
may change in a way that does not apply to legislation.’200
When this research was concluded (i.e., 31 July 2014) no legislative amendments 
had been made in this respect, except for that in 2011 it was established that civil 
partners are treated equally with and married couples in legislation on acquiring 
Irish citizenship.201
196 O’Connell underlined that there was only anecdotal evidence to this effect and that in the absence of 
statistical evidence of this granting of exceptional leave, it was ‘impossible to analyse the manner in 
which this discretion [had been or was being] exercised.’ D. O’Connell 2010, supra n. 113, at p. 13.
197 Website of the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/Civil%20
Partnership, visited June 2014.
198 On recognition, see section 11.4.4 below.
199 Website of the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/Civil%20
Partnership, visited June 2014. It is there held that: ‘There is no change in the manner in which partners 
who are neither civil partners […] nor married persons are dealt with. The existing arrangements 
continue to apply and the gender mix in such partnerships is not material to the immigration decision.’
200 Faugan 2011, supra n. 108, at p. 7.
201 Section 33 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011, No. 23/2011.








Before the introduction of civil partnership in Ireland, foreign same‑sex civil 
partnerships and marriages were not recognised under Irish law. This practice was 
confirmed by the High Court judgment in Zappone & Anor, where the High Court 
held that under Irish law ‘marriage’ saw at different‑sex marriage only (see 11.3.2 
above).
The situation changed with the entry into force of the Civil Partnership Act in 
2011. Following its Section 5, foreign legal relationships can be recognised as 
civil partnerships under Irish law, provided certain requirements are met. The 
relationship must be exclusive in nature under the law of the jurisdiction in which 
the legal relationship was entered into. Also, it must be registered under the law of 
that jurisdiction and it must be permanent, unless the parties dissolve it through the 
courts. Lastly, the rights and obligations attendant on the relationship must be, in the 
opinion of the Irish Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, ‘[…] sufficient to 
indicate that the relationship would be treated comparably to a civil partnership’.202 
If the same‑sex partners to a relationship legally recognised in another country are 
within the prohibited degrees of relationship, as set out in the Irish Civil Registration 
Act, they are not treated as civil partners under Irish law.203 This means, inter alia, 
that foreign different‑sex partnerships are not recognised as civil partnership in 
Ireland, as there is an impediment to enter into a civil partnership in Ireland if the 
partners are not of the same sex.
The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform has the power to recognise 
classes of foreign civil partnerships by order, which must be laid before the Houses 
of the Oireachtas.204 Since the entry into force of the 2010 Act, three such orders have 
been adopted.205 The lists of recognised partnerships includes the UK Registered 
Partnership and the German Eigetragene Lebenspartnerschaft, but the French PACS 
and the Dutch registered partnership – which can both be dissolved without court 
order – are not on the list and thus not recognised as civil partnerships under Irish 
law.
Foreign same‑sex marriages are only recognised as civil partnerships in Ireland, not 
as marriages. Same‑sex marriages from countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Spain and Portugal are included in the relevant orders. Consequently, ‘downgrading’ 
takes place in the Irish context. The present author is not aware of any case law 
202 Art. 5(1) S.I. No. 656 of 2006.
203 Art. 5(3) S.I. No. 656 of 2006.
204 Art. 5(1) and (5) S.I. No. 656 of 2006.
205 State of affairs on 31 July 2104. These concern: S.I. No. 649 of 2010 Civil Partnership (Recognition of 
Registered Foreign Relationships) Order 2010; S.I. No. 642 of 2011 Civil Partnership (Recognition of 
Registered Foreign Relationships) Order 2011 and S.I. No. 505 of 2012 Civil Partnership (Recognition 
of Registered Foreign Relationships) Order 2012. These are online available on the website of the Irish 
Naturalisation and Immigration Service, www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/Civil%20Partnership, visited 
July 2014.







from the Irish courts in which this has been challenged on the basis of the EU free 
movement provisions.
11.4.5. Parental issues
The present author has not become aware of any court proceedings following 
difficulties that foreign same‑sex couples have had in having their parental links 
recognised in Ireland. A 2008 study by O’Connell implied that such difficulties 
could, nonetheless, occur. He noted:
‘Because of the privilege attaching to biological parenthood in Irish law the family 
reunification rights of children and their biological parents are stronger. Obviously, this 
may have a further disproportionate adverse impact on LGBT parents where only one or 
neither party is the biological parent of the child or children in question.’206
Same‑sex couples who have resorted to surrogacy in another country, may, moreover, 
experience difficulties in establishing their legal parenthood in Ireland, as set out in 
Chapter 5, section 5.5.4.
The 2014 Family Relationships Bill provided for various amendments to the Adoption 
Act as a result of which adoptive parents from other countries moving to Ireland 
would have their adoptions recognised in Ireland.207 Gay and Lesbian Equality 
Network GLEN observed in this regard:
‘This is an important provision for lesbian and gay couples who may have adopted jointly 
in other countries, for example the UK and who subsequently move to live and work 
Ireland, to be recognised as the parents of the child here.’208
11.4.6.	 Recognition	of	Irish	civil	partnerships	in	other	Member	States
There is little reason to think that people who concluded a civil partnership in 
Ireland will experience difficulties in having their partnership recognised in other 
EU Member States that also provide for a civil partnership for same‑sex couples. 
Obviously this may be different in States that do not provide for any such form of 
recognition.
206 D. O’Connell, Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds 
of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Thematic Study Ireland (Galway 
2008), p. 10, online available at http://fra.europa.eu/en/country‑report/2012/
country‑reports‑homophobia‑and‑discrimination‑grounds‑sexual‑orientation‑part‑1, visited 
June 2014, as confirmed in D. O’Connell 2010, supra n. 113, at p. 13.
207 Part 12 of Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014 (version September 2014).
208 GLEN – Gay and Lesbian Equality Network, Submission to the Justice, Defence and Equality 
Committee on the Heads of the Children & Family Relationships Bill, February 2014, pp. 8–9, online 
available at www.glen.ie/attachments/GLEN_Submission_to_Oireachtas_Committee_on_the_
Heads_of_Children__Family_Relationships_Bill.pdf, visited June 2014.








The development of the Irish law on legal recognition of same‑sex couples 
demonstrates how much Ireland has changed in over one generation.209 While 
homosexual conduct was criminalised until 1993, because it was considered ‘morally 
wrong’ and ‘damaging to the health both of individuals and the public’,210 in 2013 the 
Constitutional Convention, by a clear majority, favoured a Constitutional amendment 
requiring the legislature to legislate for same‑sex marriage. These progressive legal 
changes have been attributed to a series of factors, such as ‘[…] joining the EU in 
1973, an increasingly vocal feminist movement, the economic boom of the 1990s 
and the weakening grip of the Catholic Church, largely due to sex abuse scandals.’211
The Irish Courts have been firm in defining marriage as protected under the Irish 
Constitution as between man and woman only. They explicitly deferred to the 
legislature in respect of the introduction of any form of legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships. The High Court Zappone judgment (2006) thus formed an impetus for 
legislative change, together with the introduction of civil unions in the UK in 2004 
combined with Ireland’s obligations under the Good Friday agreement (section 11.3).
While the first civil partnership Bill was already on the table in 2004, it took until 
2011 before the introduction of civil partnership for same‑sex couples was a reality. 
Various debates were adjourned and bills withdrawn. Also, there were constitutional 
concerns that the new institute would be too similar to marriage. This was reason 
for the legislature to take a ‘separate but equal’ approach (section 11.3.4). Parental 
matters have proven most controversial in this context. This is, again, explained 
by the traditional understanding of family that dominated the Irish laws for 
centuries. At the time of conclusion of this research (i.e., 31 July 2014), there was 
no second‑parent adoption, no successive adoption, no joint adoption and no legal 
parenthood by operation of the law for same‑sex couples. This could all change at 
once if the Children and Family Relationships Bill is adopted. The guiding principle 
for this fundamental change has been the rights of the child.212
Moreover, by 2014 the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couple had become a 
realistic option. Because a constitutional amendment was considered necessary, a 
referendum was announced for spring 2015. All in all, because of these significant 
changes, Ireland is ‘[…] less likely to be seen as an anomalous case among Western 
developed nations.’213
209 Ryan noted in 2011 that ‘[…] in many respects the [Civil Partnerships] Act demonstrate[d] just how 
much Ireland [had] changed in less than a generation.’ Ryan 2011, supra n. 41, at p. v.
210 Norris v. Attorney General [1983] IESC 3; [1984] IR 36.
211 Wording ascribed to S.‑A. Buckley, a social historian at National University of Ireland in Galway, by 
H. Mahoney, ‘Same‑sex marriage underlines social change in Ireland’, euobserver.com 7 May 2013, 
www.euobserver.com/lgbti/119963, visited July 2014.
212 As noted by Canavan in 2012, ‘Ireland has been part of the global shift in the position of children, 
primarily facilitated by an increasing emphasis on children’s rights […]’. J. Canavan, ‘Family and 
Family Change in Ireland: An Overview’, 33 Journal of Family Issues (2012) p. 10 at p. 24.
213 Idem, at p. 23.







Religion played a fairly modest role in the Irish debates and standard‑setting in 
respect of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. While in early cases like 
Norris (1983) and Murray (1985) references were made to Christianity, in later 
cases in this area, no such references were repeated. When civil partnership was 
introduced in 2010, religion was explicitly left out of the equation, as it was provided 
that religious solemnisers could not celebrate civil partnership.
The case law of the ECtHR has played a twofold role in the Irish context. On the one 
hand it has been an important (although presumably not the only) factor in abolishing 
the criminalisation of homosexual conduct in the early 1990s. On the other hand, 
it has been referred by Irish courts as a ground for not extending certain rights to 
same‑sex couples.214
In cross‑border cases the Irish standard is upheld. Foreign same‑sex civil partnerships 
and marriages are only recognised in Ireland if they meet the criteria of the Irish 
civil partnership. This means that partnerships that can be dissolved outside the 
courts and different‑sex partnerships are not recognised. Most relevant rules in 
this regard are laid down in Ministerial orders and policy documents, instead of 
in statutory legislation. In respect of cross‑border cases involving parental matters, 
much may change when the foreseen changes of Family Relationships Bill may take 
effect. Also, if marriage is indeed opened up, this will inevitably mean that foreign 
same‑sex marriages are also recognised as such under Irish law
Because Irish law sets no domicile or nationality requirements, the Irish civil 
partnership is very accessible to foreign same‑sex couples. Statistics show that the 
Irish civil partnership indeed has an international character (section 11.4.1), yet as 
these statistics are not accompanied by any further interpretation, one has to be 
careful in inferring any conclusions from these numbers.
214 In Zappone & Anor v. Revenue Commissioners & Ors (2006) the Court (indirectly) referred to the 
ECtHR’s judgment in Christine Goodwin (2002) as justification for holding on to the traditional 
marriage concept, while in McD v. L & Anor (2009) the Supreme Court referred to the ECtHR caselaw 
when it ruled that de facto same‑sex family life enjoyed no protection under the Convention or Irish 
law. The Court explicitly held in the latter case that the Irish Courts were not to ‘outpace’ the ECtHR 
(see section 11.3.5.1 above).
MSICBM.indd   563 21-9-2015   9:35:09









The number of provisions in the Dutch Constitution that are of direct relevance for 
the present case study on legal recognition of same‑sex couples is fairly limited. The 
Dutch Constitution does not contain a right to respect for family life, nor is the right 
to marry constitutionally protected. Article 10(1) of the Constitution protects the 
right to respect for private life, and it may be said to also cover a right to establish 
personal and intimate relationships with other persons of one’s choosing.1 However, 
as pointed out by Boele‑Woelki et al. in 2006, this right has not been invoked in any 
legal procedures, presumably because Dutch legislation sufficiently protected this 
right,2 as this chapter will confirm. Also of importance are the rights of the child, 
which are not expressly protected by the Constitution either; the protection of these 
rights was further explained in Chapter 6, section 6.1.2. By contrast, an important 
provision of the Dutch Constitution for the present case study is its Article 1, which 
protects the right to equal treatment.
As stressed before, because the Netherlands’ constitutional system adheres to a 
relatively ‘monist theory’ of International Law, international guarantees binding 
upon the Netherlands such as the ECHR, directly filter into the national legal system. 
Therefore, the ECHR as interpreted and applied in the ECtHR’s case law, and as set 
out in Chapter 8, basically makes up for an important part of the Dutch constitutional 
framework in respect of legal recognition of same‑sex couples.
12.1.1.	 Equal	treatment	(Article	1)
Since 1983 the Dutch Constitution has contained a non‑discrimination clause 
which prohibits ‘[d]iscrimination on grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, 
1 See W.C.J. Robert and J.M.A. Waaijer (eds.), Relatievrijheid en recht: inleidingen en verslag van de 
Leidse Conferentie van 25 en 26 mei 1982 [Relationship freedom and the law: introductory remarks to 
and report of the Leiden Conference of 25 and 26 May 1982] (Deventer, Kluwer 1983) p. XI.
2 K. Boele‑Woelki et al., Huwelijk of geregistreerd partnerschap? Een evaluatie van de Wet openstelling 
huwelijk en de Wet geregistreerd partnerschap in opdracht van het Ministerie van Justitie [Marriage or 
registered partnership? An evaulation of the Act opening up marriage and the Registered Partnership 
Act by order of the Ministry of Justice] (The Hague, WODC, Ministerie van Justitie 2006, Annex to 
Kamerstukken II 30800‑VI no. 32), p. 13, referring (in footnote 60) to W. Schrama, De niet‑huwelijkse 
samenleving in het Nederlandse en Duitse recht [Non‑marital cohabitation in Dutch and German law] 
(Amsterdam, Ars Notariatus Kluwer 2004) pp. 233–234.







race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever’.3 The wording ‘or any other 
grounds whatsoever’ was inserted first of all because Parliament explicitly wished 
to also cover discrimination against lesbians and gays.4 This was accompanied by 
discussions in Parliament about the introduction of equal treatment legislation. In 
1994 the Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling (General Equal Treatment Act (GETA)) 
entered into force. It outlaws discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in the 
area of employment and the provision of services.5 Further, under Article 429quater 
of the Criminal Code it is a criminal offence to ‘discriminate against persons on 
the grounds of their race, religion, beliefs, sex or heterosexual or homosexual 
orientation’, in the execution of a ‘profession, business or official capacity’.6
Over the past decade in particular, the Dutch government has taken an active stance 
against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, for example by means of a 
national action plan to improve the social acceptance and empowerment of LGBT 
citizens.7
12.2. (de‑)crImInAlIsAtIon of homosexuAl ActIvItIes
When the Netherlands were under French rule after the French Revolution, in 
1791, the criminalisation of homosexual acts was abolished. This was confirmed 
in the Code Pénal of 1811.8 A century later, however, in the year 1911, as part of 
the Legislation on Public Morals (‘Zedelijkheidswetgeving’) a new Article 248bis 
was included in the Criminal Code, which criminalised ‘lewd acts’ (‘ontuchtige 
handelingen’) between an adult and a consenting minor of the same sex who had 
not reached the age of 21 years.9 Fundamental societal changes during the 1960s 
3 Stb. 1983, 70.
4 See C. Waaldijk, ‘Constitutional Protection Against Discrimination of Homosexuals’, 13 Journal of 
Homosexuality (1986/1987) p. 57 at pp. 59–60.
5 Stb. 1994, 230.
6 For the purposes of this provision, Art. 90 quater Sr defines discrimination as ‘[…] any form of 
distinction or any act of exclusion, restriction or preference that intends or may result in the destruction 
or infringement of the equal exercise, enjoyment or recognition of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social or cultural field, or in any other area of society’.
7 For example, during the period 2008–2011, a comprehensive LGBT national action plan entitled 
‘Simply Gay’, was in implemented, which encompassed 60 different measures, including 24 projects 
sponsored by various government departments to improve the social acceptance and empowerment of 
LGBT citizens. Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (2007), Gewoon homo zijn; Lesbisch 
en homoemancipatiebeleid 2008–2011 [Simply gay; Dutch Government LGBT Policy document 2008–
2011], Netherlands: Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, online available (in Dutch) at www.
rijksoverheid.nl/documenten‑en‑publicaties/notas/2007/11/14/notalesbisch‑en‑homo‑emancipatiebel
eid‑2008–2011‑gewoon‑homo‑zijn.html, visited April 2011.
8 G. Hekma, Homoseksualiteit in Nederland van 1730 tot de moderne tijd [Homosexuality in the 
Netherlands from 1730 to the modern age] (Amsterdam, Meulenhoff 2004) p. 40.
9 Act adopted on 20 May 1911, Stb. 1911, 130, entry into force 15 June 1911, Stb. 1911, 135. The present 
author is not aware of any official statistics on the number of prosecutions based on this provision in the 
Dutch Criminal Code. Historian Hekma has reported (without references) that in the period 1911–1971 
a total number of approximately 5,000 persons were prosecuted on the basis of Art. 248bis Sr (old), 
of which approximately 2,800 were convicted, while 1,500 cases were dismissed. Hekma 2004, supra 
n. 8, at p. 70. Hekma notes (at p. 96) that the number of criminal convictions on the basis of Art. 248bis 







resulted in the crossing out of Article 248bis of the Criminal Code in the year 1971.10 
Since that time, the minimum age of 16 years for consensual intercourse also applies 
to acts between persons of the same sex.11
12.3. legAl recognItIon of sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps under dutch 
lAw
The question of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships was briefly discussed 
in parliament in 1970, in the context of the abolition of the criminal prohibition on 
homosexual acts (see 12.2 above).12 In the early 1990s it became the subject of several 
court proceedings, but in most of these cases, the applicants were unsuccessful. 
For instance, the Court of Appeal of The Hague ruled in 1981 that under Dutch 
law same‑sex marriage could not exist.13 While this ruling triggered discussion on 
same‑sex marriage in legal scholarship,14 eventually the issue only really got political 
attention after a judgment of the Supreme Court of 1990.15
12.3.1	The	1990	Supreme	Court	judgment	on	same‑sex	marriage
In 1988 a woman appealed to the District Court of Rotterdam against the refusal of a 
registrar of the municipality of Ridderkerk to conclude a marriage between her and 
did not increase considerably during the Second World War. He claims (at p. 100) that the factual 
persecution of gay men even increased after the War. The author furthermore notes (at p. 234) that is 
it very probable that under the Act on Public Morals many gay men were prosecuted and convicted of 
public indecency/outrage to public decency, which concerned another provision in the Criminal Code. 
Hekma refers in this context to P. Koenders, Tussen christelijk Réveil en seksuele revolutie. Bestrijding 
van zedeloosheid in Nederland, met nadruk op de repressie van homoseksualiteit (IISG Amsterdam 
1996) pp. 830–831.
10 Amendment of 12 May 1971, Stb. 1971, 212. For the Explanatory memorandum, see Kamerstukken II 
1969/70, 10347 no. 3. See also Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 3.
11 Art. 245 Sr.
12 Kamerstukken II 1969/70, 10 347, no. 5, p. 2. See C. Waaldijk, ’Partnerschapsregistratie en huwelijk: 
toenemende rechtsgelijkheid voor geslachtsgelijke partners en hun kinderen’ [Partnership registration 
and marriage: increasing equality before the law for same‑sex partners and their children’], in: 
H. Lenters et al., De familie geregeld? [The family taken care of?] (Lelystad, Koninklijke Vermande 
2000) p. 121 at p. 126.
13 Hof ’s‑Gravenhage 18 June 1981, NJ 1983 No. 94, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:1981:AC7248. Waaldijk 
has explained that […] ‘the exclusion of same same‑sex couples from marriage and from certain 
marriage‑related rights and duties, led to several test cases in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of these 
focused on particular privileges of marriage, such as joint parental authority, adoption, partner 
immigration, widow’s pensions, or specific tax benefits. These cases were generally unsuccessful.’ 
C. Waaldijk, ‘Small change; how the road to same‑sex marriage got paved in the Netherlands’, in: 
R. Wintemute and M. Andenaes (eds.), Legal Recognition of Same‑Sex Partnerships – A Study of 
National, European and International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2001) p. 437 at p. 443. See also 
Waaldijk 2000, supra n. 12, at p. 128, where the author, inter alia, referred (in footnote 30) to Hof 
Amsterdam 6 May 1993, NJ 1994 No. 681, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:1993:AB9423.
14 E.g. C. Waaldijk, ‘Beantwoording rechtsvraag (170). Gelijkheidsbeginsel. Homohuwelijk’ [‘Answer to 
legal question (170). The principle of equal treatment. Same‑sex marriage’], 36 Ars Aequi (1987) p. 644.
15 E.g. I. Stroosnijder, ‘Aandacht fracties gewekt. Beweging in landelijke politiek over homohuwelijk’, 
NG no. 41, 12 October 1990, p. 8.







another woman. The District Court held that to rule, as the plaintiff petitioned, that 
Book 1 of the Dutch Civil Code allowed same‑sex partners to enter into marriage, 
would be to go beyond an acceptable interpretation of the law. Since such a decision 
would conflict with the system of the law, it would in fact be tantamount to creating 
a new right.16 The Court held this to be a matter for the legislature, not the judiciary, 
even more so because a ruling to that effect would have far‑reaching consequences 
for legislation on matters like parentage, inheritance and adoption. Because of the 
Dutch prohibition on constitutional review of acts of parliament (‘toetsingsverbod’),17 
the Court did not examine the law in the light of the principle of equality ex Article 1 
of the Dutch Constitution. Referring to the Rees judgment, where the ECtHR had 
ruled that Article 12 ECHR (the right to marry) pertained to the traditional marriage 
between persons of opposite biological sex (see Chapter 8, section 8.2.1), the District 
Court furthermore held that the relevant Dutch legislation was not in violation of 
this provision. Because of this interpretation of Article 12 ECHR, it also found no 
discrimination in violation of Article 14 ECHR. On largely similar grounds, the 
District Court dismissed the claims based on Articles 23 and 2 ICCPR, protecting 
the right to marry and the prohibition of discrimination.
The District Court’s ruling was confirmed on appeal.18 The Court of Appeal of The 
Hague held that the laws on marriage primarily served to legitimate reproduction 
between man and woman. Because same‑sex couples did not have such a possibility 
of procreation, they did not come within the scope of the (existing) marriage laws. 
The Appeals Court endorsed the finding of the District Court that it was for the 
legislature to decide upon lifting the ban on access to marriage for same‑sex couples. 
It held that if the Court were to rule to that effect, the result would be a definitive 
amendment of the law, which would be done entirely outside the democratic 
decision‑making process, and which related to a complex subject‑matter. Moreover, 
the present legislation was based on the notion that marriage was open to man and 
woman only, an idea that was firmly embedded in the entire western world, which 
had existed for many centuries and which many at the time still considered entirely 
natural. The plaintiff subsequently lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme 
Court.
A few months before the Supreme Court gave a final ruling in this case, the District 
Court of Amsterdam issued a judgment in a similar case brought by two men who 
appealed against a refusal by a civil servant to register their same‑sex marriage.19 On 
the basis of teleological and systematic interpretation, the District Court ruled that 
a same‑sex marriage did not exist under Dutch law. In line with the judgments of 
the Rotterdam District Court and the Court of Appeal, the District Court refused to 
16 Rb. Rotterdam 5 December 1988, NJ 1989 No. 871, as referred to by C. Waaldijk, ‘De heteroseksuele 
exclusiviteit van het huwelijk na Hoge Raad 19 oktober 1990’ [‘The heterosexual exclusivity of 
marriage after Supreme Court 19 October 1990’], 40 Ars Aequi (1991) p. 47 at p. 47.
17 Article 120 Gw.
18 Hof ’s‑Gravenhage 2 June 1989, NJ 1989 No. 871, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:1989:AB8024.
19 Rb. Amsterdam 13 February 1990, Rekest no. 89.2072 H. See also K. Boele‑Woelki and P.C. Tange, 
‘Geen huwelijk tussen personen van hetzelfde geslacht’ [‘No marriage between partners of the same 
sex’], NJCM‑Bulletin 1990, p. 456.







review the matter on the basis of International treaty law. It held that even if the refusal 
were in violation of a Treaty provision, it was not for the judiciary to determine the 
manner in which the equal treatment of same‑sex couples and different‑sex couples 
was to be established.20
In cassation, the Supreme Court (‘Hoge Raad’) ruled, on the basis of grammatical 
and teleological interpretation of the relevant section of the Dutch Civil Code,21 
that same‑sex couples could not enter into marriage.22 Even if developments in 
society supported the view that it was no longer justified that civil marriage was 
not open to same‑sex couples, this could not justify an interpretation of the law 
which unmistakably deviated from the spirit of the law. This was even more so, 
since a matter was at stake which concerned public order and in relation to which 
legal certainty played an important role. The view that the law had to be interpreted 
in conformity with the principle of equality (Article 1 of the Constitution) could 
not alter this conclusion. The Supreme Court furthermore agreed with the Court of 
Appeal that Articles 12 ECHR and 23 ICCPR concerned the traditional marriage 
between man and woman and that the case disclosed no discrimination in violation 
of Article 14 ECHR or Article 2 ICCPR. The Supreme Court considered that there 
was no ground for interpreting Article 12 ECHR in conjunction with Articles 8 
and 14 ECHR ‘more dynamically’ than the ECtHR had done so far in its case law.23 
According to the Supreme Court, civil marriage was traditionally defined as a durable 
civil union between a man and a woman, to which a series of legal effects were given 
which partly related to the difference in sex between the spouses and the thereto 
related legal consequences in respect of their future children. The fact remained, 
the Supreme Court considered, that it was possibly insufficiently justifiable to 
exclude certain legal effects that follow from marriage from the durable cohabitation 
of two partners of the same sex. The Supreme Court held, however, that such an 
issue – which could generally only be decided by the legislature anyway – was not 
under discussion in the case at hand. Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal.
The Supreme Court’s ruling met with both approval and criticism in legal scholarship. 
Most scholars considered the Court’s interpretation of the national and international 
law reasonable,24 but some claimed that the ‘heterosexual exclusiveness’ of marriage 
as defined by the Supreme Court was in violation of the relevant ECHR and ICCPR 
provisions.25 It was the obiter dictum in the Court’s judgment – where the Court 
20 Idem, para. 4. The Court furthermore considered the matter not to be that urgent that it could not be left 
to the legislature.
21 The relevant Art. 1:30 BW (old) read at the time: ‘The law only sees at the civil aspects of marriage’ 
(‘De wet beschouwt het huwelijk alleen in zijn burgerlijke betrekkingen’). It thus did not refer to the 
combined gender of the future spouses.
22 HR 19 October 1990, NJ 1992 No. 129, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AD1260. See also L. Mulder, ‘Té gelijk 
voor de wet: het ‘homo‑huwelijk’ als heet hangijzer’ [‘Too equal for the law: same‑sex marriage as 
controversial issue’], 46 Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen en Publiekrecht (1991) p. 307 and 
Waaldijk 1991, supra n. 16, at p. 47.
23 Critical on this point was E. Alkema in his case note to this judgment in NJ 1992 No. 129. The author 
found this exercise of judicial restraint by the Supreme Court striking.
24 Inter alia, the case note by E.A.A. Luijten to the ruling in NJ 1992 No. 129.
25 Waaldijk 1991, supra n. 16, at p. 54.







held that it was possibly insufficiently justifiable to exclude certain legal effects that 
follow from marriage from the durable cohabitation of two partners of the same 
sex – that laid the foundations for legislative change in the field.26
12.3.2.	 The	first	legislative	initiatives	towards	legal	recognition	of	same‑sex	
relationships
Very soon after the Supreme Court judgment, most political parties embraced the 
idea of the introduction of a registered partnership for partners with a marriage 
impediment.27 In the early 1990s a special commission, the Kortmann Commission, 
was installed by the government to investigate whether legal effects could be given 
to other forms of durable relationships than marriage.28
In its report entitled ‘Ways of living together’ (‘Leefvormen’),29 the Kortmann 
Commission observed that over the years a complex web of laws regulating 
forms of de facto cohabitation had come into existence which lacked coherence. 
The Commission therefore suggested creating three forms of registration of 
relationships: (1) marriage, open to different‑sex couples only; (2) a life partnership 
(‘levensgezelschap’) which resembled marriage, but was also open to couples with 
marriage impediments, such as same‑sex couples and relatives; and (3) a ‘light’ 
registered partnership (‘partnerschap’) which formalised de facto cohabitation, but 
with legal effects which were more limited than marriage. The report was generally 
positively received in the political arena.30 The government agreed with the finding 
of the report that everyone had to have the possibility to have his or her durable 
union with another person formally registered and recognised by public law. The 
government also agreed that cohabiting partners who, because of an impediment 
to marriage, could not marry, should be enabled to officially register their durable 
relationship in the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages. Such registration was 
not to have any effect in regard to parental links, but the government held that it 
26 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 4.
27 Waaldijk 1991, supra n.16, at p. 56 and Waaldijk 2001A, supra n. 13, at p. 443.
28 In practice, various municipalities began to register same‑sex relationships in special registers. These 
registrations had no legal effect. According to Curry‑Sumner about 130 municipalities established 
such registers in the early 1990s. I. Curry Sumner, All’s well that ends registered?: the substantive and 
private international law aspects of non‑marital registered relationships in Europe: a comparison 
of the laws of Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Antwerp, 
Intersentia 2005) pp. 119–120. See also P.P.M. Hoevenaars, ‘Het wetsvoorstel partnerschapsregistratie’ 
[‘The bill on partnership registration’], 128 WPNR (1997) p. 226 at p. 227.
29 Kortmann I Commission, Leefvormen [Ways of living together], Annex to Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 
22 300 VI, no. 36. Handelingen II 1990–91, 18, pp. 907–908. See also. C. Waaldijk, ‘Vrij samen. 
Over het advies van de commissie‑Kortmann inzake de vrijwillige registratie van leefvormen’ [‘Free 
together. On the Advice of the Kortmann Commission in respect of voluntary registration of ways of 
living together’], Regelmaat (1992) p. 43.
30 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 700, no. 1 and Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 700, no. 3.







should be possible for a registered partner to share in the partner’s parental authority 
(see also 12.3.6 below).31
In 1994 the government tabled a bill for the introduction of a registered partnership, 
with legal effects which were very similar to those of marriage.32 There was one 
principled exception: the registered partnership would have no legal effects in respect 
of parental rights. Matters relating to (joint) parental authority were covered by 
another bill (see 12.3.6 below).33 The original partnership bill introduced registration 
only for couples who were prevented from marrying because of kinship or because 
they were of the same sex.34 It was held that because marriage was reserved for man 
and woman, an alternative form of registration for same‑sex couples was desirable.35 
During the deliberations this was, however, soon amended. The registration for close 
relatives was rejected and the registered partnership was also opened to couples of 
different sexes who were not prevented from marrying, as this was considered to 
meet a need of different‑sex couples.36
The (amended) registered partnership bill was adopted with a majority vote in 
the Lower House of Parliament (‘Tweede Kamer’) in December 1996.37 The 
Senate (‘Eerste Kamer’) adopted the bill without voting in July 1997.38 The Wet 
Geregistreerd Partnerschap (Act Introducing Registered Partnerships) entered into 
force on 1 January 1998.39 It was evaluated for the first time in 2006, together with 
the 2001 Act which opened up marriage (see 12.3.5 below).40
12.3.3.	 The	Act	Introducing	Registered	Partnerships	(1998)
With the Act Introducing Registered Partnerships, two objectives were pursued: 
(1) to ensure equal treatment for same‑sex couples who wished to formalise their 
31 Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 714, nos. 1–3. The intention to draft this bill was yet announced in a 
Government Memorandum of 1993. Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22700, no. 3.
32 Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 761, no. 3, p. 2. As Hekma rightly points out the 1994 so‑called ‘purple’ 
government was the first in many decades in which no Christian political party was represented. 
Hekma 2004, supra n. 8, at p. 174. For an analysis of the bill see L. Schutte‑Heide‑Jorgensen, ‘Recht op 
homohuwelijk?’ [‘A right to same‑sex marriage?’], 47 Ars Aequi (1997) p. 86.
33 Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 714, nos. 1–3.
34 Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 761, no. 3, p. 2.
35 Idem, at p. 3.
36 Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 23 761, no. 5. See also S.F.M. Wortmann, ‘Zo zijn we niet getrouwd. De 
openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde geslacht’ [‘That was not what we agreed 
on. The opening up of marriage for same‑sex couples’], 49 Ars Aequi (2000) p. 82 at p. 83. Critical was 
M.J.A. van Mourik, ‘Privaatrecht Aktueel. Geregistreerd partnerschap!’ [‘Topical issues of private law. 
Registered partnership!’], 128 WPNR (1997) p. 225.
37 Handelingen II 1996/97, 14, pp. 3374–3375. The Christian Democrats (CDA), who voted against the 
bill, critically noted that precision and legal certainty suffered from the haste with which this bill had 
been drafted. This political party, inter alia, felt that insufficient attention had been paid to the legal 
effects of this partnership in other countries. Handelingen II 1996/97,14, p. 3375.
38 Handelingen I 1996/97, 33, p. 1963.
39 Act of 5 July 1997, Stb. 1997, 324. The Act entered into force on 1 January 1998.
40 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2.







relationships; and (2) to provide an alternative to different‑sex couples who preferred 
registering a partnership over getting married.41 To a certain extent, these objectives 
were difficult to reconcile: while the first objective implied that registered partnerships 
had to be equalised with marriage as much as possible, the second implied that the 
two institutions had to be ‘clearly distinguishable’.42 The result was that, while the 
institution of the registered partnership was sculpted ‘as far as possible according 
to the marital model’, a ‘number of exceptions to this overall resemblance’ were 
created.43 These concerned primarily parental rights (see section 12.3.6 below).
The rights and duties of registered partners are generally equal to those of married 
partners.44 The legal effects of the registered partnership are for the most part also 
similar to those of marriage. This in any case holds for legislation concerning property, 
name, inheritance, taxes, social security, criminal procedure and nationality.45
A registered partnership can be entered into by two persons, either of different or 
the same sex.46 The partners may not be married at the time they enter into the 
registered partnership. The conditions for establishment of a registered partnership 
are broadly similar to those for marriage. The future partners must give notice of 
their intention to enter into a partnership to the Registry of a Dutch municipality 
at least two weeks before the registry ceremony.47 The ceremony takes place in the 
presence of a Registrar, who draws up a certificate of registration, which is archived 
in the Registry of Registered Partnerships.48 Also with regard to termination, the 
legislation on the registered partnership is broadly similar to that in respect of 
marriage.49 A registered partnership may be dissolved by a court order at the request 
of one of the registered partners or of both of them.50 If both partners consent to 
the termination of their partnership, they can have their partnership terminated by 
registration through the Registrar of Civil Status of a dated declaration, signed by 
both registered partners and one or more solicitors or notaries, which confirms that 
the registered partners have made an agreement with regard to the termination of 
their registered partnership.51 Hence, while court intervention is always required for 
41 Idem, supra n. 2, at p. 246. The Evaluation Report furthermore concluded (at p. 247) that ‘[f]rom 
the sociological research it would appear that registered partnership is regarded by both same‑sex 
and different‑sex couples as an alternative to marriage. Registered partnerships is regarded more a 
business arrangement, whilst the reasons for choosing to marry lie more embedded in the symbolic and 
emotional sphere.’
42 Idem.
43 Idem, at pp. 246–247.
44 Art. 1:80b BW. The exception is what is provided for in regard of a legal separation of married partners.
45 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 219.
46 Art. 1:80a (1) BW.
47 Art. 1:80a (4) BW. Where both prospective registered partners, of whom at least one has the Dutch 
nationality, have their domicile outside the Netherlands, but intend to enter into a registered partnership 
with each other in a Dutch municipality, the formal notice of registered partnership must be given to the 
Registrar of Civil Status of the municipality of The Hague.
48 Art. 1:17(1) BW.
49 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 247.
50 Art. 1:80c (1)(d) BW.
51 Art. 1:80c (1)(c) BW. Translation taken from www.dutchcivilcode.com, visited June 2014. See also 
Art. 1:80d BW.







dissolution of a marriage, a registered partnership can be terminated without court 
proceedings. Further, a registered partnership may be converted into marriage.52
Over the years, the legislation regulating the registered partnership has been amended 
several times, with the main result that the differences regarding parental rights have 
levelled out and the institution of registered partnerships is now even more similar to 
marriage than it was before. This increased equalisation of registered partnerships 
with marriage is discussed hereafter. First, for reasons of chronology, the opening up 
of marriage to same‑sex partners is discussed. It has been held to be ‘[…] plausible 
that the discussion enveloping the introduction of registered partnership paved the 
way for or, at the very least, contributed to the opening of civil marriage to same‑sex 
couples.’53
12.3.4.	 Towards	the	opening	up	of	marriage
The entry into force of the Act Introducing Registered Partnerships did not end the 
debate about equal treatment of same‑sex couples. In fact, even before the adoption 
of this Act, there was much debate in Parliament on whether marriage should be 
opened up to same‑sex couples.54 The above‑discussed 1990 Supreme Court 
judgment played an important role in this debate. In 1996, i.e., before adoption of 
the Registered Partnerships Act, a motion was adopted in Parliament which held 
that marriage had to be opened up to same‑sex couples.55 In response to the motion, 
the Secretary of State for Justice asked the Kortmann Commission – the same 
Commission that had published a report on ways of living together in 1990 – to 
map out the advantages and disadvantages, both at the national and the international 
level, of the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples.56 When the report of this 
‘Kortmann II Commission’ was published in 1997,57 it was clear that the Commission 
was divided on the matter. Controversial issues were the implications of the principle 
of equal treatment, the (symbolic) meaning of marriage and the effects of opening up 
marriage at the international level, as well as the desirability of those effects.58 It was 
52 Art. 1:80g BW. For same‑sex registered partners this has only been possible since the opening up 
of marriage in 2001. Until 1 March 2009 it was also possible to convert a marriage into a registered 
partnership, but the relevant Art. 1:77(a) BW (old) was repealed by the Wet bevordering voortgezet 
ouderschap en zorgvuldige scheiding [Act advancement of continued parenthood and divorce with 
care] Act of 27 November 2008, Stb. 2008, 500, entry into force per 1 March 2009.
53 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 247.
54 Idem, at, p. 7.
55 Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 22 700, no. 18. It has been pointed out that this suggestion was already 
made in 1990 by the political party D66. Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 7, referring to 
Handelingen II 1990/91, 18, p. 926.
56 Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 22 700, no. 20. The Commission was installed following two motions 
adopted by Parliament. Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 22 700, nos. 14 and 18. See also P. Vlaardingerbroek, 
GS Personen‑ en Familierecht, titel 5A Boek 1 BW, aant. 2, update of 1 April 2011.
57 S.C.J.J. Kortmann, Commissie inzake openstelling van het burgerlijk huwelijk voor twee personen van 
hetzelfde geslacht, Den Haag Ministerie van Justitie, October 1997. The report was presented to the 
Secretary of State of Justice on 28 October 1997.
58 See Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 8.







noted that the different views within the Commission reflected the different views 
within society on the matter.59 A small majority of five out of eight Commission 
members was of the opinion that marriage had to be opened up to same‑sex couples, 
the decisive argument being that the existing discriminating and grievous exclusion 
of this group had to be ended.60 The minority was of the view that same‑sex couples 
and different‑sex couples were equally worthy of protection, but they were not in an 
identical position because of same‑sex couples’ inability to reproduce. The minority 
considered reproduction an essential element of marriage.61 These three members 
of the Commission furthermore attached considerable weight to the international 
perspective of opening up marriage and warned that the problematic consequences 
of the creation of so‑called ‘limping relationships’ – relationships that were legally 
recognised in one State, but not in another – were not to be underestimated.62 The 
majority had held that those couples concerned had to consciously accept the legal 
phenomenon of limping relationships.
The government agreed with the minority of the Kortmann II Commission. It held 
that the aim of equal treatment of same‑sex and different‑sex couples could also be 
achieved through further development of the institution of registered partnership.63 
An important argument for the government was that various other countries had 
introduced registered partnerships for same‑sex couples or were in the course of 
introducing such registered partnerships, while no other country in the world 
had opened up marriage to same‑sex couples. It subscribed to the warning of the 
minority of the Kortmann II Commission that opening up marriage would result in 
limping relationships. It furthermore felt that a ‘relatively small jurisdiction like the 
Netherlands’ was not to deviate from international practice.64
Parliament disagreed with the position taken by the government and, by a relatively 
small majority (81 to 60 votes), adopted a motion requesting the government to 
draft a bill for the opening up of marriage.65 This time, albeit with some delay, 
the government acted accordingly66 and a bill for an act opening up marriage was 
tabled in July 1999.67 Just before the tabling of this bill the Advisory Department 
59 Idem, at p. 9.
60 See also the Article by of one of the Commission‑members A.W.M. Willems, ‘Het homohuwelijk: een 
te hoge prijs?’ [‘Same‑sex marriage: a too high a price?’], 21 Tijdschrift voor Familie‑ en Jeugdrecht 
(1999) p. 217.
61 F. van Vliet, ‘Van achterdeur naar zij‑ingang: Commissie Kortmann en gelijkgeslachtelijke leefvormen’ 
[‘From backdoor to side entrance: the Kortmann Commission and ways of living together by same‑sex 
couples’], 14 Nemesis (1998) p. 13 at p. 20.
62 Idem.
63 Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 22 700, no. 23, pp. 7–8. The government was, however, prepared to introduce 
adoption for persons of the same sex. See 12.3.6 below. See also S.F.M. Wortmann, ‘Zo zijn we niet 
getrouwd. De openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde geslacht’ [‘That was not what 
we agreed on. The opening up of marriage for same‑sex couples’], 49 Ars Aequi (2000) pp. 82, at p. 84.
64 See Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, no. 3, p. 3.
65 Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 22 700, no. 26 and Handelingen II 1997/98, 49, pp. 5642–5643.
66 See the Coalition Agreement of 1998, Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 26 024, no. 9. p. 68.
67 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, nos. 1–2.







of the Dutch Council of State issued a negative opinion on the matter.68 Given that 
no other country in the world had at the time opened up marriage to same‑sex 
couples, the Council of State was particularly concerned about the non‑recognition 
of marriages between same‑sex spouses in other countries, which would result in 
limping relationships.69 The Council felt that as long as no special rules of Private 
International Law were drafted on the matter, the time was not ripe for the opening 
up of marriage to same‑sex couples.70 The government nonetheless proceeded 
with the bill and postponed regulation of the Private International Law aspects to 
a later date (see section 12.4 below).71 The Deputy Prime Minister even held that 
she wanted to try and convince other States also to open up marriage to same‑sex 
couples.72 The Secretary of State for Justice later explained to Parliament that this 
would primarily take the form of initiating consultation at the international level on 
registered partnerships and similar institutions, in which the opening up of marriage 
would be included.73 The government first of all intended to raise awareness of and 
understanding for recognition issues. Subsequently it could be explored if the drafting 
of an international instrument was feasible, it was held.74 The government expected it 
to take considerable time before these discussions would pay off.75 The government 
found it difficult to predict to what extent the Dutch opening up of marriage 
would meet with understanding within the Council of Europe, the International 
Commission on Civil Status and the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law. From the fact that support had been expressed by these organisations for 
international consultation on the Private International Law aspects of new forms of 
unmarried cohabitation, the government concluded that in other States also views 
were changing. The government was therefore not afraid that the Netherlands would 
not be taken seriously at the international level.76 In response to the argument made 
by some parties in Parliament that from an international perspective the Netherlands 
isolated itself by opening up marriage to same‑sex couples, the government held that 
the legislation was drafted ‘in full awareness’ of the fact that for the time being, the 
Dutch legislation would be relatively exceptional.77
68 Advisory Department of the Council of State, Opinion of 23 March 1999, no. WO3.98.0593–19I, 
Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, no. B.
69 Idem, at p. 2.
70 The Explanatory Memorandum had acknowledged this legal issue and had therefore proposed to ask 
the State Commission on Private International Law for advice, after the bill had been adopted by 
Parliament. The Council of State held that conflict rules had to be drafted before the bill was sent to 
Parliament. This advice was, however, not followed‑up. See also section 12.4 below.
71 Kamerstukken II 27 762 no. 3, p. 5. The Senate (Eerste Kamer) adopted the Bill on 23 January 2001. 
Handelingen I 2000/01, 15, pp. 687–688.
72 ‘Homohuwelijk exporteren’, Algemeen Dagblad 12 December 1998, p. 3. See also Kamerstukken II 
1999/00, 26 672, no. 4, p.16.
73 Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 672, no. 4, p. 21.
74 Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 672, no. 5, pp. 14 and 20–21.
75 Idem, at p. 12.
76 Idem, at p. 24.
77 Idem, at pp. 23–24.







On 7 September 2000 the Act opening civil marriage to same‑sex couples was 
adopted in the Lower House by a large majority.78 The Preamble of the Act did not 
express the legislature’s motivation for introducing the Act, but in an accompanying 
press release of the Ministry of Justice it was stated that, against the background of 
the principle of equal treatment, there was no objective justification for the exclusion 
of same‑sex couples from marriage.79 As explained by the authors of the 2006 
Evaluation of the Act:
‘The creation of registered partnership was, in the eyes of the legislature, not sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements imposed by the principle of equality, as laid down in the Dutch 
Constitution. This principle necessitated that exactly the same institution be open to 
same‑sex and different couples.’80
The government showed full awareness that, by opening up marriage, it broke 
with a long tradition of Western civilisation. It acknowledged that the departure of 
what had long been an essential characteristic of marriage, namely that marriage 
was between man and woman only, implied an essential change of the meaning of 
marriage, which was no longer linked to religious views. The government also held, 
however, that the opening up of marriage by no means ‘denatured’ marriage between 
different‑sex couples.81
The new Act was both endorsed and criticised in legal scholarship. Some scholars 
held the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples to be against the essentiale of 
marriage.82 Others were critical of the haste with which the legislature had proceeded 
and the choice it had made to postpone regulation of the Private International Law 
aspects.83 Various authors pointed out that, from a legal perspective, there was no need 
for opening up marriage, because a registered partnership had yet been introduced.84 
Some received the Act as primarily symbolic and ‘a matter of ideology’.85 Others, 
however, stressed the importance of the signal that the new Act gave that full equality 
before the law was desirable and possible.86
78 The Act was adopted with 109 votes in favour and 33 votes against. Handelingen II 1999/00, 100, 
pp. 6468.
79 C. Waaldijk, ’De voorgestelde Wet openstelling huwelijk en de daarmee samenhangende wijzigingen 
inzake adoptie en geregistreerd partnerschap’ [‘The proposed Act opening up marriage and the related 
amendments of the law on adoption and registered partnership’], 21 Tijdschrift voor Familie‑ en 
Jeugdrecht (1999) p. 198 at p. 199.
80 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 246.
81 Kamerstukken II 1999/2000, 26 672, no. 5, p. 7.
82 L. Westerhof, ‘Is het huwelijk tussen personen van hetzelfde geslacht een fictie en, zo ja, kan op deze 
fictie de wettelijke regeling van dit huwelijk worden gebaseerd?’ [‘Is same‑sex marriage a fiction, and 
if so, can the legal regulation of this marriage be based on this fiction?’], 75 Nederlands Juristenblad 
(2000) p. 1021.
83 K. Boele‑Woelki, ‘De prijs van het homohuwelijk’ [‘The price of gay marriage’], Tijdschrift voor 
Familie‑ en Jeugdrecht (1999) p. 113.
84 Inter alia, Wortmann 2000, supra n. 63, at p. 84.
85 Idem.
86 Waaldijk 1999, supra n. 79, at p. 208.








Since the entry into force of the Act opening civil marriage to same‑sex couples in 
2001,87 Article 1:30(1) Civil Code provides that ‘[a] marriage may be entered into by 
two persons of a different or of the same sex.’ The conditions for the conclusion of 
a marriage, for instance in respect of age of the marriage candidates, are the same 
for both same‑sex and different‑sex couples and there are no differences in regard 
to interruption of an intended marriage or annulment of a marriage.88 The legal 
effects of marriage are also generally the same. For example, both same‑sex and 
different‑sex spouses have marital community of property, unless they have provided 
otherwise by nuptial agreement and they can use each others’ family name.89 There 
are, however, two important differences in legal effects between same‑sex spouses 
and different‑sex spouses. These concern parental rights and the recognition and 
effects of their marriages abroad.90 Both these issues will be discussed separately in 
this Chapter. The gradual awarding of parental rights to same‑sex couples – either 
registered partners or married – is discussed in section 12.3.6 below. The development 
of the relevant Dutch rules of Private International Law is discussed in section 12.4.
At the time when marriage was opened up to same‑sex couples in the Netherlands, 
there was discussion if registered partnership should be abolished.91 After all, the 
primary aim of the introduction of registered partnership had been to provide legal 
recognition to same‑sex relationships and with the opening up of marriage even 
more equal treatment was established. Both institutes were maintained, however, 
and still exist today, because there was and is a considerable group of different‑sex 
and same‑sex couples that prefer the less value‑laden registered partnership over 
marriage.92 Over the years the differences between the legal regimes and effects of 
marriage and registered partnership have been increasingly more levelled out.93
A thorny issue in the Dutch debate on the opening up of marriage that has been 
debated for many years concerns the question of civil registrars with conscientious 
objections. The government initially held that this was a matter for the municipalities 
87 Wet openstelling huwelijk [Act on the Opening Up of Civil Marriage] of 21 December 2000, Stb. 2001, 
9, entry into force on 1 April 2001.
88 Arts. 1:50–1:57 and 1:69–1:77 BW.
89 Arts. 1:9; 1:93 and 1:94 BW.
90 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, no. 3, p. 4.
91 Some even suggested that civil marriage had to be abolished, leaving religious marriage and civil 
registered partnership as only choices. Wortmann 2000, supra n. 63, at pp. 84–85. Nuytinck regretted 
the choice not to abolish registered partnership. A.J.M. Nuytinck, ‘Het geregistreerd partnerschap 
wordt niet afgeschaft. Jammer, een gemiste kans!’ [‘The registered partnership will not be abolished. 
Shame, a missed opportunity!’], 139 WPNR (2008) p. 306.
92 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 10. See also Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 672, no. 5, p. 15 and 
Waaldijk 2000, supra n. 12, at pp. 180–181.
93 A.J.M. Nuytinck, ‘Huwelijk en geregistreerd partnerschap groeien steeds verder naar elkaar toe’ 
[‘Marriage and registered partnership are growing towards one another’], 142 WPNR (2011) p. 1001. 
As Curry‑Sumner explained in 2005, ‘[t]he two institutions are treated exactly the same with respect to 
public law (e.g. taxation and social security) and are effectively treated the same for private law issues 
as well.’ Curry‑Sumner 2005A, supra n. 28, at p. 127.







to find practical solutions to, as long as it was guaranteed that same‑sex couples could 
conclude a marriage in every Dutch municipality.94 The issue remained controversial 
for a number of years; it was debated in Parliament on various occasions,95 it was 
the subject of various court proceedings,96 and bodies like the Equal Treatment 
Commission (now the Human Rights Institute)97 and the Council of State98 issued 
opinions on the question. Only in July 2014, a bill was adopted into law, marking the 
end of a long debate on this topic. It provided that civil servants with conscientious 
objections to the conclusion of marriage and/or a registered partnership between 
to persons of the same sex could no longer be appointed as registrars. It was left to 
the municipalities to decide on how to deal with already employed registrars with 
conscientious objections.99
12.3.6.	 Parental	rights	for	same‑sex	couples
Parental rights for same‑sex couples have long been, and still are, a rather debated 
topic in Dutch politics and society. Although the legislature has consistently tried 
to stay as close as possible to biological reality in its laws on parentage, it has 
increasingly departed from that basic principle. Parental rights have gradually been 
strengthened over the years, particularly for couples consisting of two women. As 
will be explained below, for reasons of differences in biological reality, the parental 
rights of gay couples are not as strong as those of lesbian couples.
Before the gradual development of parental rights for same‑sex couples is set 
out, it is important to clarify the distinction between legal parenthood (‘juridisch 
94 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, no. 12.
95 See also Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at pp. 15–16.
96 Rb. Leeuwarden 24 June 2003, ECLI:NL:RBLEE:2003:AH8543. In October 2013 District Court 
‘s‑Gravenhage upheld the dismissal by the Municipality of ‘s‑Gravenhage of a registrar who refused to 
conclude marriages between same‑sex couples. The Court dismissed the registrar’s claim that his freedom 
of religion had been violated. Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage 23 October 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:14133.
97 In an Opinion of 2008, the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC) held that municipalities were under 
an obligation to enforce the law; that they had to refrain from discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation and that they had to see to it that their civil servants carried out their tasks in conformity 
with these obligations. Only in cases where a civil servant had more tasks than the conclusion of 
marriages only, there was limited room to give in to such objections. Following the Opinion of the 
ETC the government asked the Advisory Department of the Council of State to issue an Opinion on 
the matter. Equal Treatment Commission (now College voor de Rechten van de Mens), Trouwen? Geen 
bezwaar! [‘To marry? No objections!’], ECT, Advisory Opinion, No. 2008/04. See also the ECT’s 
earlier Opinions Nos. 2008/40 and 2002/25.
98 The Council of State took the view that while all municipalities were under a legal obligation to 
guarantee access to marriage for same‑sex couples, in individual cases of conscientious objections 
individual arrangements could be made in order to protect the registrar’s right to respect for religion. 
The Council saw no ground for separate, national legislation on the matter. Advisory Division of the 
Council of State, Opinion of 9 May 2012, Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 344, no. 5.
99 Wet van 4 juli 2014 tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Algemene wet gelijke behandeling 
met betrekking tot ambtenaren van de burgerlijke stand die onderscheid maken als bedoeld in de 
Algemene wet gelijke behandeling [Act of 4 July 2014 amending the General Equal Treatment Act 
as regards civil servants who make a difference in treatment in the meaning of the General Equal 
Treatment Act]], Stb. 2014, 260.







ouderschap’) and parental authority (‘ouderlijk gezag’) under Dutch law. Legal 
parenthood forms part of the law on lineage (‘afstammingsrecht’) and has, inter alia, 
effect for the name and nationality of the child, as well as for succession.100 Legal 
parenthood may be established by operation of the law (i.e., through birth), through 
the act of recognition or adoption of the child, or through judicial determination 
of legal parenthood.101 Under Dutch law, the woman who gives birth to a child is 
always the legal mother of that child (mater semper certa est).102 The man who is 
married to the woman who gives birth, is legal parent of the child by operation of 
the law. In 2014 this was extended to the female spouse and the (male or female) 
registered partner of the woman who gives birth (see section 12.3.6.4 below).103 If an 
unmarried woman gives birth to a child, another person – usually her partner – may 
become legal parent through adoption, recognition or determination of parenthood 
by a court.
Parental authority creates rights and duties which are relevant for the upbringing 
of, and care for, the child.104 A person who has been vested with parental authority 
may, for instance, hold the child’s property under trust. A person endowed with 
parental authority is not necessarily also the legal parent of the child. For instance, 
a person may have parental authority over his or her partner’s child, without being 
the child’s legal parent.105 On the other hand, although the legal parent mostly has 
parental authority over the child, sometimes a special act may be required to obtain 
such authority, as in the case of recognition of a natural child by the father.
Dutch society changed considerably in the 1960s. Next to the traditional family, 
consisting of husband and wife and their children, other forms of family became 
more common practice and were increasingly socially accepted. These new forms 
of family life were accorded protection by the ECtHR under Article 8 ECHR, as 
well as by the Dutch Supreme Court.106 This was different, however, in respect of 
parental rights for same‑sex couples; with regard to this sensitive issue, the Dutch 
courts deferred to the legislature.107 For example, in a judgment of 1989 the Supreme 
100 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 032, no. 3, p. 1.
101 Arts. 1:198–199 BW.
102 Art. 1:198 BW.
103 As will be explained below (in section 12.3.7.4), this does not apply to same‑sex couples consisting of 
two men.
104 Arts. 1:251–253y BW.
105 Art. 1:245 and 1:253sa BW. The notion ‘authority’ under Dutch law, covers both parental authority 
(‘ouderlijk gezag’) and guardianship (‘voogdij’). Parental authority is exercised by one parent or two 
parents jointly. Guardianship is exercised by a third person.
106 As acknowledged in a Government Memorandum on ‘ways of living together’ (‘Notitie leefvormen’), 
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 700, no. 5, p. 8. The memorandum referred to ECtHR 13 June 1979, 
Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74; ECtHR 18 December 1986, Johnston a.o. v. Ireland, no. 9697/82; 
ECtHR 26 May 1995, Keegan v. Ireland, no. 16969/90; HR 6 November 1987, NJ 1988 No. 829, 
ECLI:NL:HR:1987:AB9568; HR 10 March 1989, NJ 1990 No. 24, ECLI:NL:1989:AC1343 and HR 
23 March 1990, NJ 1991 Nos. 149 and 150, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:AD1066.
107 The 1995 government Memorandum on ways of living together held that the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights had not – to date – given any indications that it was plausible that the relationship 
of two persons who were not or who could biologically not be the parents of a child could be qualified 
as ‘family life’ within the meaning of Art. 8 ECHR. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 700, no. 5, p. 8.







Court ruled that, other than different‑sex couples, same‑sex couples were not entitled 
to parental authority, because they could not both establish parental links with the 
child, mainly because same‑sex couples could not conclude a marriage.108 In 1997 
the Supreme Court furthermore rejected a request by a woman who wished to adopt 
the children born with her female partner within their stable relationship.109 The 
Supreme Court held that it was not for the Court to set aside the existing requirement 
in the Civil Code that only married (hence different‑sex) couples could adopt a 
child.110
In the legislative debate on legal recognition of same‑sex relationships during the 
1990s, parental rights for same‑sex couples proved to be a controversial issue.111 It 
was clear from the outset that the Registered Partnership Act would not regulate 
parental rights.112 The legislature acknowledged, however, that increasingly more 
children were raised by same‑sex couples. While it expressly wished to refrain 
from giving ‘a moral or pedagogical/psychological judgment on the general issue 
of whether it was in the interest of the child to be cared for by a couple of the same 
sex’, the legislature felt that the interests of the child required that some form of legal 
protection was given to these forms of de facto family life.113 At the same time it 
wished to hold on to the principle that the laws on lineage were in line with biological 
descent.114 For that reason, the government at the time rejected joint adoption by two 
persons of the same sex. It furthermore pragmatically held that such an adoption 
108 HR 24 February 1989, NJ 1989 No. 741, ECLI:NL:HR:1989:AD0648 (with a case note by EAA en 
EAAL). For an early plea for the right to acknowledge a child as hers for female partners of mothers, see 
F. van Vliet, ‘Erkenning: mensenrecht of mannenrecht?’ [‘Recognition: human right or men’s right?’], 
63 Nederlands Juristenblad (1988) p. 1263.
109 The two petitioners had been in a stable and committed relationship for many years when one of them 
conceived a child with the use of sperm from an anonymous donor. The woman subsequently gave birth 
to two more children. The two women jointly cared for the children and after several years the partner 
of the mother wished to adopt the children.
110 Even if it were accepted that partnerships between same‑sex couples and their relationships with 
children raised within these relationships deserved greater protection, the way in which to provide for 
this would still require a political choice, the Court considered. HR 5 September 1997, NJ 1998 No. 686, 
ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2420.
111 For instance, the Emancipatieraad [Emancipation Council], a government‑appointed advisory body, 
held in 1991 (as paraphrased in Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22700, no. 5, p. 6) that it was time to depart 
from the general principle that laws on lineage had to be in line with biological descent. It advised 
introducing joint adoption for same‑sex couples.
112 Boele‑Woelki et al. hold that registered partnership was originally intended to provide for legal 
regulation of the relationship between partners and not of their relation to children who would be raised 
within that relationship. According to the authors, this was so because registered partnership was not 
intended for couples with children. Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 6. It must also be noted, 
however, that the Kortmann Commission had yet proposed in 1997 to introduce second‑parent adoption 
and joint adoption for same‑sex couples and that, as Vlaardingerbroek pointed out, the government had 
not rejected this suggestion in its Memorandum on ways of living together of 1998. Kamerstukken II 
1997/98, 22700 no. 23 and P. Vlaardingerbroek, ‘Adoptie door paren van gelijk geslacht’ [‘Adoption by 
same‑sex couples’], 22 Tijdschrift voor Familie‑ en Jeugdrecht (2000) p. 198.
113 Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 700, no. 3, p. 18.
114 Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 700, no. 5, pp. 9–10.







would in all probability not be recognised by foreign countries.115 The government 
was considering, however, the introduction of single‑parent adoption.116
The first actual step on the path to recognition of parental rights for same‑sex 
couples was the granting of parental authority. In the beginning of the 1990s a 
bill was drafted following which (same‑sex) registered partners could apply for 
parental authority over their partner’s child.117 The Act on joint parental authority for 
registered partners entered into force on 1 January 1998, the same date as the Act 
Introducing Registered Partnerships.118
12.3.6.1. Early developments; single‑parent adoption
In 1998, single‑parent adoption was introduced in Dutch law.119 Because no 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was permitted, persons with a 
homosexual orientation or in a same‑sex relationship were also enabled adopt a 
child.120 If the adoptive parent had a (same‑sex) partner, he or she could subsequently 
apply for parental authority over the child. It was furthermore provided that unmarried 
different‑sex couples could jointly adopt a child from the Netherlands.121 Adoption 
by the same‑sex partner of a child’s legal parent (second‑parent adoption (in Dutch: 
‘partneradoptie’)) and joint adoption by same‑sex couples were not introduced at the 
time, because to establish such parental links between a child and two persons of the 
same sex was considered to be too big an abstraction from biological reality.122
In the meantime, however, support for greater legal protection of the links between 
children and the same‑sex couples caring for them, was rapidly growing.123 In 1996 
Parliament had adopted two motions which held that joint adoption by same‑sex 
115 Idem, at p. 10.
116 Idem, at p. 1.
117 Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 714, nos. 1–3. Because parental authority had no effect on the laws on 
lineage, this approach was considered to fit in with two basic principles underlying the Dutch family 
laws, namely that the laws on lineage in essence reflected the biological parentage and that parental 
authority, safe a few exceptions, belonged to those from whom the child was descended. Kamerstukken 
II 1992/93, 22 700, no. 3, p. 17.
118 Wet van 30 oktober 1997 tot wijziging van, onder meer, Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband 
met invoering van gezamenlijk gezag voor een ouder en zijn partner en van gezamenlijke voogdij [Act 
of 30 October 1997 amending, inter alia, Volume 1 of the Civil Code with a view to introduction of 
joint authority for a parent and his partner and of joint guardianship], Stb. 1997, 506, entry into force 
per 1 January 1998.
119 Wet van 24 december 1997 tot herziening van het afstammingsrecht alsmede van de regeling van 
adoptie [Act of 24 December 1997 amending the law on descent as well as the adoption regulations] 
Stb. 1997, 772, entry into force per 1 April 1998. See also Vliet, van 1998, supra n. 61, at p. 17.
120 Vlaardingerbroek 2000, supra n. 112, at p. 200. Second‑parent adoption had been possible for 
different‑sex couples since 1979.
121 Art. 1:227 BW (old). For a clarification that the couple had to be of different sex, see also Kamerstukken 
II 1995/96, 24 649, no. 3, p. 14. Interstate adoption was the only possible for married couples or for 
individuals. Art. 1 Wet opneming buitenlandse kinderen ter adoptie (Wobka) [Act on the fostering of 
children from foreign countries with the purpose of adoption].
122 See also Curry‑Sumner 2005A, supra n. 28, at pp. 120–121 and Vlaardingerbroek 2000, supra n. 112, 
at p. 202.
123 For a plea for greater protection of these links see Waaldijk 2000, supra n. 12, at pp. 177–179.







couples had to introduced,124 and the subsequently appointed Kortmann II 
Commission (see above) had taken the same view.125 The government also endorsed 
the viewpoint that any child raised and cared for by a same‑sex couple in a durable 
relationship was entitled to legal protection of the links between this couple and the 
child126 and a bill introducing adoption by same‑sex couples was tabled in 1999.127
When the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples was debated in Parliament, 
however, the debate on parental issues was separated from the debate on the actual 
opening of marriage. Following the advice of the Kortmann Commission II, the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Act opening up marriage expressly mentioned 
that a marriage between same‑sex partners would not establish any parental links 
by operation of the law.128 Measures to enforce the protection of the links between 
the child and the same‑sex couple caring for it, were introduced separately, but 
simultaneously.
12.3.6.2. 2001: Joint adoption of children from the Netherlands; second‑parent and 
successive adoption and joint parental authority
By Act of 2001, same‑sex couples (either married, registered or in a stable relationship) 
were enabled to jointly adopt a child from the Netherlands.129 Because annually only 
50 to 100 children from the Netherlands were given up for adoption,130 in practice 
only a limited number of same‑sex couples could establish a family through this 
newly introduced institute of joint adoption. The simultaneous introduction of 
second‑parent and successive adoption for same‑sex couples,131 following which 
a same‑sex married, registered or stable partner was able to adopt the (genetic or 
adopted) child of his or her partner, was of greater practical relevance.132
124 Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 22 700, nos. 14 and 18.
125 Rapport Commissie inzake openstelling van het burgerlijk huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde 
geslacht [Report of the Commission on opening up of civil marriage to couples of the same sex] (The 
Hague, Ministry of Justice, October 1997) pp. 9–10. The Commission furthermore recommended 
providing for parental authority by operation of the law when a child was born within a registered 
partnership and to provide that this form of joint authority had effect for the laws on inheritance. See 
Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 22 700, nos. 23 and Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 22 700, no. 31.
126 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26673, no. 3, p. 2.
127 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 673, nos. 1–3. See also Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 22 700, no. 23, p. 3 
and F. van Vliet, ‘Door de zij‑ingang naar niemandsland?’ [‘Through the side entrance into no man’s 
land?’], 16 Nemesis (2000) p. 41. The coalition agreement of 1997 yet provided that a bill to this effect 
was to be tabled by the end of 1998 and this was done accordingly. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 26 024, 
no. 9, p. 68. See also Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 22 700, no. 23.
128 Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 27 762 no. 3, p. 4. See also Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 22 700, no. 23, p. 2.
129 Wet adoptie door personen van hetzelfde geslacht [Act on adoption by persons of the same sex] Act 
of 21 December 2000, Stb. 2001, 10. The Act entered into force 1 April 2001, the same date on which 
the Act Opening up Marriage entered into force. See also Vlaardingerbroek 2000, supra n. 112 and 
A.W.M. Willems, ‘Adoptie door homo‑ouders en de positie van de spermadonor’ [‘Adoption by gay 
parents and the position of the sperm donor’], 22 Tijdschrift voor Familie‑ en Jeugdrecht (2000) p. 226.
130 Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 22 700, no. 5, p. 13. See also Vlaardingerbroek 2000, supra n. 112, at p. 200.
131 Act on adoption by persons of the same‑sex (Wet adoptie door personen van hetzelfde geslacht), Act of 
21 December 2000, Stb. 2001, 10. Entry into force 1 April 2001.
132 Vlaardingerbroek 2000, supra n. 112, at pp. 200–201.







Following the new adoption laws, any couple or any partner of a legal parent 
could petition to the Court for a joint adoption, a second‑parent adoption or a 
successive adoption, if the partners had lived together uninterruptedly for a period 
of at least three years and had jointly cared for the child for a period of at least one 
uninterrupted year immediately preceding the adoption request.133 Next to the yet 
existing requirement that any adoption had to be in the best interests of the child,134 a 
new requirement was introduced that an adoption could only be approved if the child 
could not expect anything from its ‘original parent(s)’ (‘oorspronkelijke ouder(s)’).135 
This could concern both a legal and a genetic parent.136
International (interstate) adoption was not (yet) introduced for same‑sex couples, 
as the legislature considered that ‘not appropriate’ given existing international 
relations.137 In fact, the Act on interstate adoption was explicitly amended to clarify 
that the term ‘spouses’ in this context referred to different‑sex spouses only.138 
According to the government, this was ‘no principled position’, but concerned a 
practical measure which was required not to imperil the relations with countries 
of origin of adoptees and not to create false expectations with adoptive parents.139 
The State Commission for Private International Law criticised the discriminating 
character of this rule in its report on the Act opening civil marriage to same‑sex 
couples.140
In addition to the adoption laws, the laws on parental authority were amended in 
2001. Same‑sex spouses and registered partners were vested with joint parental 
authority, by operation of law, over a child born during their marriage or registered 
133 Art. 1:227(3) and Art. 1:228(1)(f) BW.
134 Art. 1:227(2) BW.
135 Art. 1:227(3) BW. See also Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 673, no. 3, p. 1. For an example of a judgment in 
which this condition was applied see Hof Amsterdam 4 May 2010, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2010:BM3903.
136 See also M.J. Vonk, Commentaar op Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 1 art. 227 (en 228) (artikeltekst geldig 
vanaf 01‑01‑2009) [Commentary on the Civil Code, Book 1 (art. 227 (and 228) (version valid as of 
01‑01‑2009)] (Sdu Opmaat (online) 2011) para. C.3.1.
137 Reference was made to a survey by the Ministry of Justice into six countries of origin and six countries 
of destination in the adoption context of 1997, which had shown a strong preference for married couples 
for interstate adoption. Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 673, no. 3, p. 3 and Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 22 
700, no. 22. Critical on this point: Waaldijk 1999, supra n. 79, at pp. 202–203. The author considered it 
‘unnecessary’ to codify other countries’ policies in the Dutch law.
138 Art. II Wet van 8 maart 2001 tot aanpassing van wetgeving in verband met de openstelling van het 
huwelijk en de invoering van adoptie door personen van hetzelfde geslacht [Act of 8 March 2001 
amending legislation with a view to the opening up of marriage and the introduction of adoption by 
couples of the same sex], Stb. 2001, 128.
139 Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 27 256, no. 4, pp. 10–11.
140 Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht, Advies inzake het internationaal privaatrecht 
in verband met de openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde geslacht [Advice con‑
cerning Private International Law in relation to the opening up of marriage for persons of the same 
sex], December 2001, pp. 26–27, online available at www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten‑en‑ 
publicaties/rapporten/2001/12/01/internationaal‑privaatrecht‑in‑verband‑met‑de‑openstelling‑van‑
het‑ huwelijk‑voor‑personen‑van‑hetzelfde‑geslacht/internationaalprivaatrechtinverbandmetdeopen 
stellingvanhethuwelijkvoorpersonenvanhetzelfdegeslacht.pdf, visited May 2010, as well as at www.
justitie.nl/themas/wetgeving/rapporten_en_notas/privaatrecht/Staatscommissie_IPR.asp, visited May 
2010.







partnership, provided the child had no other legal parent.141 Because of the latter 
restriction, the new provision was primarily relevant for couples consisting of two 
women, who could now exercise joint parental authority in situations where there 
was no father, for instance because the child had been conceived with the use of 
anonymously donated sperm.142 The newly introduced Article 1:253 (sa) Civil 
Code did and does not apply to couples consisting of two men (whether married or 
registered) because in that situation there is in principle always another legal parent, 
namely the mother of the child.143
The 2001 amendments did not end the debate on parental rights for same‑sex couples. 
Various parties insisted on a further equalisation of the parental rights of same‑sex 
couples – in particular couples consisting of two women – with those of different‑sex 
couples. During the deliberations on the opening up of marriage, Parliament had 
adopted a motion requesting the government to explore the legal options, including 
recognition, which could achieve the greatest (as reasonably) possible equalisation 
of the legal position of children born within a relationship of two women with that 
of children born within a different‑sex relationship.144 In response, the government 
maintained that full equalisation of the position of same‑sex couples with that of 
different‑sex couples in respect of parental links and the laws on lineage, would be 
too far removed from the basic principle underpinning Dutch family laws that legal 
parenthood in principle corresponded with genetic parenthood.145 The government 
furthermore felt that such equalisation paid too little attention to the fact that a third 
party could be involved and that it fell out of pace with international standards.146 
141 Art. 1: 253 BW, introduced by Wet tot wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband 
met het gezamenlijk gezag van rechtswege bij geboorte tijdens een geregistreerd partnerschap [Act 
Amending Volume 1 of the Civil Code with a view to joint authority by operation of the law after birth 
in a registered partnership], Act of 4 October 2001, Stb. 2001, 468 entry into force on 1 January 2002, 
Stb. 2001, 544.
142 As Curry‑Sumner and Vonk point out, lesbian couples were the primary addressees of the new Act. 
I. Curry‑Sumner and M.J. Vonk, ‘Adoptie door paren van hetzelfde geslacht: wie probeert de wet te 
beschermen?’, 28 Tijdschrift voor Familie‑ en Jeugdrecht (2006) p. 39 at p. 39. The authors refer to 
Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 673, no. 3, p. 3.
143 This follows from the above discussed mater semper certa est rule. In those situations Art. 1:253 (t) 
BW applies, which provides that the partner of a parent endowed with parental authority may apply 
for parental authority, even in situations where another person has established parental links with 
the child. For such a request for joint parental authority to be granted, the couple must have jointly 
taken care of the child for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the request for parental 
authority by the partner and the parent must have exercised parental authority for a period of at least 
three years immediately preceding his/her partner’s request for parental authority. The granting of joint 
parental authority is refused if, in the light of the interests of the other parent, there is a reasonable fear 
that the awarding of such joint parental authority would neglect the child’s interests (Art. 253t (2) and 
(3) BW).
144 Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 672 and 26 673, no. 9.
145 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 21, referring (in footnote 140) to: Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 
26 672 and 26 673, no. 14, pp. 3–5 and Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 26 672 and 26 673, no. 15. The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Act Opening up marriage had also yet held that to assume that a child 
born within the relationship of two women descended from both women, would unacceptably stretch 
reality and would create too big a distance between biological truth and law. Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 
26 672, no. 3, pp. 4–5.
146 Idem.







Because of these considerations the improvement of the legal position of children born 
within lesbian relationships was initially established through further amendment of 
the adoption laws. While the first legislative initiatives to this effect were taken in 
2005, it took until 2009 before a new Act entered into force.147
12.3.6.3. 2009: Interstate adoption by same‑sex spouses and simplification 
of second‑parent adoption
An important change brought about by the 2009 Act was that interstate adoption 
was made possible for same‑sex spouses.148 In 2012, the Netherlands furthermore 
ratified the Revised CoE Adoption Convention149 which provides for the possibility 
of joint adoption by same‑sex couples.150 In practice, however, the practical effect of 
this change so far has been limited. Not many same‑sex spouses are able to jointly 
adopt a child from abroad, as many foreign countries do not want to collaborate in 
such an interstate adoption.
Moreover, the 2009 amendments simplified the procedures for second‑parent 
adoption, especially for couples consisting of two women.151 The three year 
cohabitation condition (see above),152 was lifted for situations where the child was 
born ‘within the relationship’ of the parent and the adoptive parent.153 For the 
situation where a child was born within the relationship of two female life partners, 
the condition was lifted that they had to have jointly taken care of the child for a 
147 Wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met verkorting van de adoptieprocedure 
en wijziging van de Wet opneming buitenlandse kinderen ter adoptie (Wobka) in verband met adoptie 
door echtgenoten van gelijk geslacht tezamen. Act of 24 October 2008 [Act amending Volume 1 of 
the Civil Code with a view to shortening of the adoption procedure and amendment of the Act on the 
fostering of children from foreign countries with the purpose of adoption, in relation to joint adoption 
by same‑sex spouses], Stb. 2008, 425, entry into force per 1 January 2009. See also L. van Hoppe, 
‘Wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met verkorting van de adoptieprocedure 
en wijziging van de Wet opneming buitenlandse pleegkinderen ter adoptie in verband met adoptie door 
echtgenoten van gelijk geslacht tezamen’ [‘Amendment of Book 1 of the Civil Code in relation to the 
adoption procedure and amendment of the Act placement of foreign foster children for adoption in 
relation to joint adoption by same‑sex spouses’], 48 Ars Aequi (2009) p. 191.
148 Art. III Wet van 24 oktober 2008 tot wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met 
verkorting van de adoptie‑procedure en wijziging van de Wet opneming buitenlandse kinderen ter 
adoptie in verband met adoptie door echtgenoten van gelijk geslacht tezamen [Act amending Chapter 1 
of the Civil Code concerning the shortening of the adoption procedure and amendment of the Act on the 
fostering of children from foreign countries with the purpose of adoption as regards joint adoption by 
couples of the same sex], Act of 24 October 2008, Stb. 2008, 425, entry into force per 1 January 2009.
149 European Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised) CETS No.202 (Strasbourg 2008).
150 Art. 7(2) European Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised).
151 Wet van 24 oktober 2008 tot wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met 
verkorting van de adoptie‑procedure en wijziging van de Wet opneming buitenlandse kinderen ter 
adoptie in verband met adoptie door echtgenoten van gelijk geslacht tezamen [Act amending Chapter 1 
of the Civil Code concerning the shortening of the adoption procedure and amendment of the Act on the 
fostering of children from foreign countries with the purpose of adoption as regards joint adoption by 
couples of the same sex], Act of 24 October 2008, Stb. 2008, 425, entry into force per 1 January 2009.
152 The cohabitation condition set the rule that the legal parent and his or her partner had to have lived 
together for a period of at least three uninterrupted years, immediately preceding the adoption request.
153 The new Art. 1:227(2) BW.







period of at least a year.154 Further, it was provided that a request for second‑parent 
adoption was as a rule granted, where the child was born in a relationship of two 
women and was conceived with the use of donated gametes in correspondence with 
the Act Donor Information Artificial Reproduction.155 Lastly, the 2009 Act stipulated 
that the procedure for second‑parent adoption could be initiated before the child’s 
birth and would have effect from the date of birth, provided no existing parental 
links were severed by the adoption.156 Because of the latter condition, this rule did 
and does not apply to couples consisting of two men, as in that situation the parental 
links between the mother and the child stand in the way of an immediately effective 
second‑parent adoption.
Some Dutch scholars have concluded that, as a result of these amendments to the 
adoption laws, the legal position of a child born in a relationship between two women 
was as much as possible equalised with that of a child born within a different‑sex 
relationship.157 Others felt that full equalisation required something more than 
amendments to the adoption laws only. In their view, after all, adoption procedures 
were time consuming and the law as it stood provided no solution to the deadlock 
situation where a mother and the genetic father of a child disagreed on who should be 
the second legal parent of the child, the female partner of the mother or the genetic 
father of the child.158
12.3.6.4. 2014: Legal parenthood by operation of the law for female couples
In 2007, when the bill on interstate and second‑parent adoption for same‑sex couples 
was under debate, Parliament adopted a motion which called for the introduction of 
recognition and legal parenthood by operation of the law for situations where a child 
was born within the relationship of two women.159 The government subsequently 
appointed an advisory expert commission, the Kalsbeek Commission, which was 
154 The new Art. 1:228(3) BW. See Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 673, no. 15.
155 The new Art. 1:227(4) BW. This would only be different if such adoption would be evidently not in the 
child’s interests or if the conditions of Art. 1:228 BW were not met. For a case where a Court granted 
an adoption request to the same‑sex former spouse of the mother (the original ‘co‑mother’) instead 
of the new same‑sex partner of the mother (as desired by the mother), see Rb. Breda 27 July 2011, 
ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2011:BR2383.
156 New Art. 1:230(2) BW. See also M.J.C. Koens, Groene Serie Personen‑ en Familierecht, 2.4 Adoptie 
door personen van gelijk geslacht bij: Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 1, Artikel 227 [Verzoek tot adoptie] 
[Green Series Family Law, 2.4 Adoption by persons of the same sex: Civil Code Book 1, Article 
227 [Adoption reguest]] (Kluwer, update 12 December 2011) and P. Vlaardingerbroek, Groene Serie 
Personen‑ en Familierecht, 1 Geregistreerd partnerschap; algemeen bij: Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 1, 
Titel 5A Het geregistreerd partnerschap [Green Series Family Law, 1 Registered Partnership, general: 
Civil Code Book 1, Title 5A, The registered partnership] (Kluwer, update 1 April 2011). In 2011 the 
Central Appeals Tibunal ruled in a case originating from 2006 (hence before the possibility of prenatal 
adoption was introduced for same‑sex couples) that there were no particularly serious reasons which 
could justify a difference in treatment between a child born within a same‑sex marriage and a child 
born within a different‑sex marriage with respect to half orphan’s benefits. CRvB 24 June 2011 (dec.), 
ECLI:NL:CRVB:2011:BQ9855.
157 Vlaardingerbroek 2011, supra n. 156.
158 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 032, no. 3.
159 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30 800 VI, no. 60.







asked to explore the legal options, other than adoption, to establish legal parenthood 
for a so‑called ‘co‑mother’.160 Taking the interests of the child and the principle 
of equal treatment as a point of departure, the Kalsbeek Commission was of the 
opinion that legal protection of social parenthood had to prevail over holding on to 
(the presumption of) biological parenthood.161 It recommended enabling co‑mothers 
to establish parental links with their partner’s child through recognition and advised 
making judicial determination of parenthood possible for co‑mothers under the same 
conditions as applied to male partners of mothers. The Commission held it a matter 
for the legislature, however, to decide upon legal parenthood for the co‑mother by 
operation of the law in situations where a child was born within a marriage between 
two women.162
The legislature followed the advice of the Kalsbeek Commission in a bill tabled in 
2011.163 Taking the interests of the child as primary consideration, the bill provided 
for legal parenthood for the co‑mother by operation of the law, where a child was 
born within marriage between two women and where it was established that the 
genetic father of the child would play no role in the child’s upbringing. This would 
be the case where the child was conceived with the use of sperm from a sperm bank, 
situation in which the donor was not known to the two women. In all other situations, 
so it was proposed, the co‑mother could recognise the child as her child. Further, the 
legal parenthood of a co‑mother could be judicially established if, as life partner of 
a mother, she had agreed with an act which could have resulted in the begetting of 
the child.164 At the same time, some improvement of the legal position of the sperm 
donor who maintained close ties with the child, was proposed. In situations where 
the mother refused to give permission to this donor to recognise the child as his, the 
donor could petition to the court for substitute permission.165
160 Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30 551, no. 8. The term ‘co‑mother’ (in Dutch ‘duomoeder’ or ‘meemoeder’) 
refers to the woman in a lesbian relationship who is not the birth mother but cares for the child that was 
born in or grows up in their relationship.
161 Commissie lesbisch ouderschap en interlandelijke adoptie (Commissie Kalsbeek) [Commission on 
lesbian parenthood and interstate adoption (Kalsbeek Commission)], Lesbisch ouderschap [Lesbian 
parenthood], Report of October 2007, online available at www.aoo.nl/downloads/2007‑10‑31‑MvJ.pdf, 
visited March 2010.
162 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 032, no. 3.
163 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 032, no. 2. The bill was generally positively received by interest groups 
during the internet consultation by the Ministry of Justice, as well as in academia. See M.J. Vonk, 
‘Het conceptwetsvoorstel lesbisch ouderschap onder de loep’ [‘A closer look at the bill on lesbian 
parenthood’], 141 WPNR (2010) p. 348 and www.internetconsultatie.nl/ouderschapduomoeder, visited 
January 2011. See also A.J.M. Nuytinck, ‘Concept‑wetsvoorstel lesbisch ouderschap: meemoeder 
wordt juridisch moeder van rechtswege of door erkenning’ [Draft bill lesbian parenthood: co‑mother 
becomes legal mother by operation of the law or by recognition’], 141 WPNR (2010) p. 343. Forder and 
Bakker argued that the Bill paid too little attention to the rights of the child. C.J. Forder and R. Bakker, 
‘Kroniek van personen‑ en familierecht’ [‘Chronicle of family law legislation’], 85 Nederlands 
Juristenblad (2010) p. 1796.
164 This entailed, inter alia, that the co‑mother could be subjected to a maintenance order on the basis of 
Arts. 11:394 and 11:395(b) BW.
165 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 032, no. 3, p. 5.







This bill meant a change in the existing family laws because – next to genetic 
parenthood – social parenthood was firmly introduced as ground for the establishment 
of legal parenthood.166 It was particularly in respect of this ‘fundamental’ change that 
the Council of State was very critical in its Advisory Opinion on the bill.167 The 
Council failed to see a justification for the proposed departure of the basic principle 
underpinning Dutch family laws that legal parenthood in principle corresponded 
with genetic parenthood.
The Council of State furthermore warned that the forms of legal parenthood for 
co‑mothers as proposed in the bill would not be recognised in other countries. The 
Kalsbeek Commission had been of the opinion that such risks should not prevent 
the Dutch legislature from once again taking the role of a ‘model country’, as it 
also had done by the opening up of marriage and the introduction of joint adoption 
for same‑sex couples.168 During the debate in Parliament on the bill possible legal 
problems that co‑mothers could encounter abroad were also a point of discussion, 
but this risk was generally accepted and it was hoped that this could be remedied as 
much as possible through informing the public and other countries on this point.169
Parliament (‘Tweede Kamer’) adopted the bill on lesbian parenthood in October 
2012.170 It was adopted by the Senate (‘Eerste Kamer’) on 12 November 2013.171 On 
that same date the Senate adopted another bill that had been tabled by the government 
in the meantime. This bill provided for rules extending the co‑mothers regime to 
female registered partners.172 The government regarded this as the tailpiece of the 
existing (or soon to be introduced) legislation, which provided for legal parenthood 
for the male spouse, the female spouse and the male registered partner of a woman 
who gives birth to a child.173 The bill did not focus on legal parenthood by operation 
of the law in respect of relationships between two men, as it was held that a child 
‘cannot be born in a relationship of two men’.174
Both Acts entered into force on 1 April 2014.175 Since that time Article 1:198 of the 
Civil Code provides that the mother of a child is the woman (a) who gave birth to the 
166 Idem, p. 4.
167 Advisory Division of the Council of State, Opinion of 15 April 2011, W03.11.0034/II, Kamerstukken II 
2011/12, 33 032, no. 4.
168 A.J.M. Nuytinck, ‘Lesbisch ouderschap. Bespreking van het rapport van de Commissie lesbisch 
ouderschap en interlandelijke adoptie (commissie‑Kalsbeek)’ [‘Lesbian parenthood. Review of the 
Report lesbian parenthood and interstate adoption (Kalsbeek Commission)’] 139 WPNR (2008) p. 44.
169 The Secretary of State for Justice acknowledged that if a lesbian couple moved to another State, the best 
solution could be that the co‑mother could adopt the child, as that form of legal parenthood was most 
likely to be recognised by the other State. Handelingen II 2011/12, 13, pp. 13, 18 and 68.
170 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 032, no. 16.
171 Handelingen I 2013/14, pp. 9–7.
172 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 526, no. 2.
173 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 526, no. 3, p. 2.
174 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 33 032, no. 3, p. 2 and Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 526, nos. 2–3.
175 Wet van 25 november 2013 tot wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met 
het juridisch ouderschap van de vrouwelijke partner van de moeder anders dan door adoptie [Act of 
25 November amending Volume 1 of the Civil Code, with a view to legal parenthood of the female 
partner of the mother other than by means of adoption], Stb. 2013, 480 and Wet van 27 november 2013 







child; or (b) who is at the moment of birth the spouse or the registered partner of the 
woman who gives birth to the child, if this child was conceived as a result of IVF 
with the use of a donor not known to the woman and in accordance with the Donor 
Information Act; (c) who has recognised the child; (d) whose parenthood has been 
judicially established; or (e) who has adopted the child.
During the parliamentary debates on the bills on lesbian parenthood the question was 
raised if the law was also to provide for parental authority for multiple parents. The 
Secretary of State for Justice promised to have a research conducted on this issue.176 
In February 2014 the ‘Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek‑ en Documentatiecentrum’ 
(WODC), the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Security and 
Justice, published a report,177 that, inter alia, addressed the situation where a child 
is born in a relationship between two women with the use of a sperm donor who is 
known to the women. The authors of the report held that any action undertaken by the 
legislature had to put the best interests of the child first. However, as these interests 
required different approaches, they could not recommend one particular approach. 
Also, the report questioned whether any legislative action in respect of parental 
authority was at all necessary in these situations, as only few problems had been 
reported by the families concerned in a survey conducted by the researchers. The 
relations between these parties were generally good. The researchers considered a 
more inclusive approach, addressing both parental authority and legal parenthood for 
multiple parents, fruitful, and they therefore welcomed the appointment of the State 
Commission on Legal Parenthood (‘Staatscommissie Herijking Ouderschap’). This 
Commission has the mandate to advise on possible amendments of the Civil Code 
in respect of: (a) legal parenthood, (b) multiple parenthood and parental authority by 
multiple parents, and (c) surrogate motherhood.178
12.3.6.5. Access to AHR treatment
As explained in Chapter 6, section 6.3.2, the standard applied in decision‑making 
around reproduction in the Netherlands is the reasonable well‑being of the child. 
While IVF clinics have a considerable discretion when it comes to access to 
treatment,179 the categorical exclusion of certain groups in society is not allowed.180 
This certainly entails that exclusion of all same‑sex couples or individuals with 
tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en het Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering mede in 
verband met de evaluatie van de Wet openstelling huwelijk en de Wet geregistreerd partnerschap [Act 
of 27 November 2013 amending the Civil Code and the Civil Proceedings Act, inter alia, with a view 
to the evaluation of the Act opening up marriage and the Registered Partnership Act], Stb. 2013, 486.
176 Handelingen II 2012/13, pp.13–18.
177 M.V. Antokolskaia et al., Meeroudergezag: een oplossing voor kinderen met meer dan twee ouders? 
Een empirisch en rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek [Parental authority by multiple parents: a solution for 
children who have more than two parents? An empirical and comparative legal study] (Den Haag, 
Boom Juridische uitgevers 2014).
178 As discussed more extensively in Ch. 6, section 6.3.8.
179 See Ch. 6., section 6.3.2. See also Rb. ‘s‑Gravenhage (pres.) 17 July 1990, ECLI:NL:RBSGR: 
1990:AD1197.
180 NVOG, Modelprotocol Mogelijke morele contra‑indicaties bij vruchtbaarheidsbehandelingen 
[Model Protocol concerning possible moral counter‑indications for fertility treatment], p. 3, online 







a homosexual orientation is prohibited and the present author is not aware of any 
cases where access was nonetheless refused to same‑sex couples. Still, in practice 
their access to AHR treatment may be more limited when compared to different‑sex 
couples. This may, for instance, be so because not all clinics cooperate with a sperm 
bank.181
12.4. sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps And cross‑border movement
12.4.1.	 Cross‑border	movement:	some	statistics
Statistics Netherlands keeps statistics on the number of registered partnerships and 
marriages concluded by same‑sex couples on an annual basis in the Netherlands. On 
average two per cent of the total number of marriages annually concluded concerns 
same‑sex spouses.182 In respect of registered partnerships this percentage was much 
higher in the first years after registered partnerships were introduced (65 per cent 
in 1998; 53 per cent in 1999 and 55 per cent in 2000), but after the opening up of 
marriage in 2001, this number decreased to a steady 5 to 6 per cent of the total 
number of partnerships annually registered in the Netherlands.183 For marriages a 
(detailed) breakdown in country of birth of the spouses is available.184 For example, 
in 2001, 437 same‑sex marriages were concluded whereby at least one partner was 
born outside the Netherlands. In 2013, this number had dropped to 305. The numbers 
do not make clear whether these partners have Dutch nationality and/or how long 
they had been resident in the Netherlands by the time they got married. There are 
no statistics available in respect of the country of birth, nationality or country of 
residence of persons entering into a registered partnership under Dutch law. On the 
basis of statistics of the Civil Registry of the Municipality of Amsterdam, Jessurun 
d’Oliveira estimated in 1999 that approximately 5 per cent of the total number of 
available at www.nvog.nl/Sites/Files/0000000935_NVOG%20Modelprotocol%20Mogelijke 
%20Morele%20Contraindicaties%20Vruchtbaarheidsbehandelingen%202010.pdf, visited June 2014.
181 As explained in Ch. 6, section 6.3.2, the Dutch government has held this to be acceptable. Kamerstukken 
II 32 500 XVI, no. 112, p. 3. See also Dutch Equal Treatment Commission, Decision 2009‑31.
182 Data of Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek [Statistics Netherlands] of 28 October 2011 give 
the following numbers per year. The number between brackets is the total number of marriages 
concluded in the Netherlands in the relevant year: 2001: 2,414 (73,190); 2002: 1,838 (76,393); 
2003: 1,499 (72243); 2004: 1,210 (66,847); 2005: 1,150 (65,859); 2006: 1,212 (60,102); 2007: 
1,341 (67,152); 2008: 1,408 (69,971); 2009: 1,385 (67,663); 2010: 1,354 (67,051). Online available 
at www.statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=60036NED&D1=1‑2,4‑16,74, 
128&D2=a&HDR=G1&STB=T&VW=T, visited February 2013. Hence, only in the year 2001, when 
marriage was opened up, was the percentage of same‑sex marriages slightly higher, namely 3 per cent.
183 Data of Statistics Netherlands of 27 June 2012 give the following numbers per year. The number 
between brackets is the total number of partnerships registered in the Netherlands in the relevant year: 
1998: 3,010 (4,626); 1999: 1,757 (3,257); 2000: 1,600 (2,922); 2001: 530 (3,377); 2002: 547 (8,321); 2003: 
542 (10,119); 2004: 583 (11,156); 2005: 608 (11,307); 2006: 619 (10,801); 2007: 605 (10,550); 2008: 611 
(10,842); 2009: 495 (9,497); 2010: 487 (9,571); 2011: 481 (9,945). Online available at www.statline.
cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37772ned&D1=35‑47&D2=48‑l&HD=120104‑
1452&HDR=G1&STB=T, visited 21 February 2013.
184 See www.statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=60036NED&D1=107‑127,161‑
181,213&D2=5‑17&HDR=G1&STB=T&VW=T, visited September 2014.







partnerships that were annually registered in the Netherlands involved non‑Dutch 
nationals.185
In respect of (im)migration there are only very few relevant statistics available. 
The present author is not aware of any Dutch statistics on the number of Dutch 
same‑sex married and registered couples that migrate to other (EU Member) States. 
There are furthermore no detailed statistics available on the number of same‑sex 
couples or partners from other (EU) countries that are annually granted (or refused) 
residence rights in the Netherlands. On the basis of the data available it may be very 
tentatively estimated that annually approximately 50 same‑sex partners are admitted 
to the Netherlands under Directive 2004/38/EC,186 while approximately 2 per cent of 
the requests for family reunification under Directive 2003/86/EC concern same‑sex 
partners.187
185 H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Het geregistreerd partnerschap, het ‘homohuwelijk’ en het IPR’ [‘Registered 
partnership, ‘gay marriage’ and Private International Law’], 74 Nederlands Juristenblad (1999) p. 305 
at p. 305.
186 These estimations are based on K. Waaldijk et al., Homophobia, transphobia and discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, Comparative legal analysis, Thematic study 
Netherlands, 2010 Update, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2010, online available at 
www.fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1363‑LGBT‑2010_thematic‑study_NL.pdf, visited 
February 2013. The authors hold on p. 25: ‘[…] for a recent study a sample of 336 cases were examined 
involving successful applications of non‑EU citizens claiming residence in the Netherlands on the basis 
of EU law, because their spouse/partner was a EU (or EEA or Swiss) citizen. It was found that 15 of these 
cases involved a same‑sex partner. The sample of 336 represented around 10 per cent of all such cases 
having been decided in the years 2005–2008. It should be noted however that only for two thirds of all 
honoured applications of that period the study could establish both the citizenship of the sponsor and 
the type of (family) relationship between applicant and sponsor. Furthermore, the number of successful 
applications increased from around 900 in 2005 to around 2,500 in 2008, while the annual number of 
rejected applications increased similarly from around 100 to around 300 during that period. Taking all 
that into account, it could be estimated – very tentatively – that in these four years perhaps over 200 
same‑sex partners were admitted to the Netherlands under Directive 2004/38/EC.’ The report refers 
in (in footnote 96) to: A. Schreijenberg et al., Gemeenschapsrecht en gezinsmigratie. Het gebruik van 
het gemeenschapsrecht door gezinsmigranten uit derde landen [Community law and family migration. 
The use of Community law by third‑country migrants for family migration] (The Hague Ministry 
of Justice 2009), pp. 11, 16, 29, 31 and 83, online available at www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/
neveneffecten‑van‑toepassing‑van‑het‑europese‑gemeenschaps‑recht‑bij‑gezinsmigratie.
aspx?cp=44&cs=6796, visited June 2014.
187 Waaldijk et al. 2010, supra n. 187, have noted (at p. 30): ‘Not many figures are available on the number 
of same‑sex partners that have successfully applied for family reunification/formation. However, 
a recent study of the period July 2003 to February 2006 yielded some figures. Over that period of 
32 months there were 23,407 successful applications for a provisional residence permit for a spouse 
or partner. The study found that 461 of these cases involved same‑sex partners, i.e. two per cent. 
Same‑sex partners were much more often involved in the 8,296 cases where the sponsor was a Dutch 
citizen (3.4 per cent or 282 permits) than in the 15,111 cases where the sponsor was a foreigner (1.2 
per cent or 179 permits). It should be noted however that the total number of successful applications 
between 01.07.2003 and 01.11.2004 was more than 50 per cent higher than that between 01.11.2004 
and 01.03.2006. This is probably due to the increased income and age requirements for family formation 
that took effect on 1.11.2004. Since then the sponsor needs to be at least 21 years of age, and needs to 
have an income equal to at least 120 per cent of the minimum wage.’ In footnote 119 this report refers to: 
H. Muermans and J. Liu, ‘Gezinsvorming in cijfers’ [Family formation in numbers’], in: Internationale 
gezinsvorming begrensd? Een evaluatie van de verhoging van de inkomens‑ en leeftijdseis bij migratie 
van buitenlandse partners naar Nederland [International family formation restricted? An evaluation 
of the raised income and age requirements with regard to the migration of foreign partners to the 








Dutch Private International Law is firmly rooted in international Treaty law. In 
respect of marriage, for instance, the applicable law was, for 70 years, the Hague 
Convention relating to the settlement of the conflict of the laws concerning marriage 
of 1902.188 When this Treaty was annulled in the late 1970s,189 the Netherlands 
subsequently ratified the Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on Celebration and 
Recognition of the Validity of Marriages.190 The latter Convention entered into force 
in the Netherlands in 1991.191 However, because it was for a long time uncertain 
whether there would be enough ratifications for this Convention to enter into force,192 
the Dutch legislature soon after ratification drafted national conflict‑of‑laws rules 
in respect of marriage.193 This Private International Law (Marriages) Act (Wet 
conflictenrecht huwelijk) implemented and supplemented the Hague Convention.194 
Other relevant instruments of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
to which the Netherlands is a Contracting Party, are the 1970 Convention on the 
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations195 and the 1978 Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes.196 The Netherlands neither signed 
nor ratified the – not (yet) in force – Convention on the recognition of registered 
partnerships of the International Commission on Civil Status (ICCS).197
Netherlands] (The Hague: Ministry of Justice 2009), pp. 25, 29, 31 and 175, online available at www.
wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/de‑gevolgen‑van‑de‑aanscherping‑van‑het‑gezinsvormingsbeleid.
aspx?cp=44&cs=6799, visited June 2014.
188 Convention of 12 June 1902 relating to the settlement of the conflict of the laws concerning marriage, 
Stb. 1904, 121.
189 Wet van 10 februari 1977, houdende goedkeuring van het voornemen tot opzegging van het Verdrag 
van ‘s‑Gravenhage van 12 juni 1902 [Act of 10 February 1977 approving of the intention to revoke 
the Hague Concention of 12 June 1902], Stb. 1977, 61. The Treaty was revoked as of 1 June 1979 (Trb. 
1977, 57), because it was considered to no longer conform to modern standards. A.P.M.J. Vonken, GS 
Personen‑ en Familierecht, regeling WCH, aant. 1, Kluwer (last update 01‑05‑2004).
190 Convention of 14 March 1978 on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages, no. 26, 
entry into force 1 May 1991.
191 Stb. 1989, 391.
192 A.P.M.J. Vonken, GS Personen‑ en Familierecht, regeling WCH, aant. 1, Kluwer (last update 1 May 
2004). In the end only two other States, Luxembourg and Australia, ratified the Convention. Three 
other States (Egypt, Finland and Portugal) have signed the Convention but not (yet) ratified it.
193 Kamerstukken II 1987/88, 20 507 and Kamerstukken I 1988/89, 20 507.
194 Private International Law (Marriages) Act) of 7 September 1989 (Wet conflictenrecht huwelijk) Stb. 
1989, 392, entry into force 1 January 1990.
195 Convention of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, entry into force on 
24 August 1975. In the Netherlands the Convention entered into force on 22 August 1981. Next to the 
Netherlands, 18 other States are Contracting Parties to this Convention.
196 Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes (entry into 
force 1 September 1992). In the Netherlands the Convention also entered into force on 1 September 
1992. Only the Netherlands, France and Luxembourg are Contracting Parties to this Convention.
197 Convention on the recognition of registered partnership, ICCS Convention no. 32, opened for signature 
at Munich on 5 September 2007. Following its Art. 19, the Convention will enter into force after two 
member States of the ICCS have ratified, accepted or approved it. Following the chart of signatures 
and ratifications as published on the website of the ICCS (update 15 June 2014) only Spain ratified this 
Convention, while Portugal signed the Convention.







When registered partnerships were introduced in the Netherlands, and later when 
marriage was opened up to same‑sex couples, a recurring theme in the debate was 
the applicability of these International Treaties – and the Dutch laws implementing 
them – to these ‘new’ institutions. This will therefore also be a recurring theme in 
the subsections below, which set out the relevant Dutch conflict‑of‑laws rules. First a 
brief introduction to the development of these rules is given.
The ‘international aspects’ of the introduction of the registered partnership and 
the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples have been much debated. In both 
cases, although heavily criticised by some, the legislature postponed the drafting 
and adoption of conflict‑of‑laws rules until well after the entry into force of the 
new legal regime.198 Neither the Act Introducing Registered Partnerships nor the Act 
Opening Up Marriage contained any provisions on recognition or the applicable law 
in international cases. When the Registered Partnerships Bill was under debate in 
Parliament in the mid‑1990s, the Secretary of State for Justice felt that as long as the 
(details of the) substantive law had not yet been decided upon, there was little use in 
endeavouring to draft conflict‑of‑laws rules, or in asking the State Commission on 
Private International Law for advice on the matter.199 Just before the entry into force 
of the Act Introducing Registered Partnerships, the latter Commission was indeed 
asked to give an advice on the Private International Law aspects of the Act and to make 
a proposal for conflict‑of‑laws rules, which could then for the time being function as 
‘policy measures’ (‘beleidsregels’).200 Actual implementation of the advice and the 
accompanying proposal for legislation was, however, postponed. On the one hand, 
the government wanted to wait to see if the rapid legislative developments in respect 
of registered partnerships in other countries would perhaps result in the drafting of a 
Treaty instrument. On the other hand, legislation for the opening up of marriage was 
already in preparation at the time and the government wished to capture all Private 
International Law issues in one piece of legislation.201 By 2001, the year when the 
Act Opening Up Marriage entered into force, the government – acknowledging that 
it was not very likely that an international treaty on the matter would be drafted and 
adopted in the foreseeable future – felt that it was time to draft legislation.202
198 Very critical of this choice for postponement was H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Het raadselachtige 
buitenland, de partnerregistratie en het burgerlijk huwelijk voor homo’s en lesbo’s’ [‘The mysterious 
other countries, partner registration and civil marriage for gays and lesbians’], 71 Nederlands 
Juristenblad (1996) p. 755.
199 Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 22700 no. 7, p. 1.
200 The advice of the State Commission on Private International Law (Staatscommissie voor het 
Internationaal Privaatrecht) of 8 May 1998 was published in 20 Tijdschrift voor Familie‑ en Jeugdrecht 
(1998), pp. 146–159 and in 131 WPNR (2000) p. 375. See also I.S. Joppe, ‘Het geregistreerd partnerschap 
in het Nederlands IPR (I)’ [‘Registered partnership in Dutch Private International Law (I)’], 131 WPNR 
(2000) p. 371 and I.S. Joppe, ‘Het geregistreerd partnerschap in het Nederlands IPR (II)’ [‘Registered 
partnership in Dutch Private International Law (II)’, 131 WPNR (2000) p. 391. Critical of the fact that 
the advice was published in legal journals only was H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira 1999, supra n. 186, at 
p. 306.
201 Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 924, no. 3, p. 2. See also Joppe 2000A, supra n. 200.
202 Idem. Earlier intentions to draft legislation on this matter had been expressed in Kamerstukken I 
1996/97, 23 761, no. 157b, p. 4 and Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 672, no. 5, p. 18.







A much debated issue was (and is) whether any of the existing Private International 
Law Treaty instruments – in particular the Hague Convention on the Celebration 
and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages of 1978203 – and the Dutch laws 
implementing them, applied to (same‑sex) registered partnership and to same‑sex 
marriage. The government took the view that none of the international Treaties did, 
as they were drafted at a time when the institutes of registered partnerships and 
same‑sex marriage did not yet exist.204 It therefore concluded that the Netherlands 
was free to adjust its national legislation to changed views in society and to draft its 
own conflict‑of‑laws rules on the issue.205
This approach has been criticised. Boele‑Woelki, for example, held that from a Private 
International Law perspective, the price for the introduction of same‑sex marriage 
was too high.206 The opening up of marriage would imply that the Netherlands 
would unilaterally breach the silent consensus on the definition of marriage that 
underpinned the relevant international Treaties, she held.207 Boele‑Woelki warned 
that Dutch family law was ‘no isolated practice ground’ but had to operate in the 
wider European context. Following this publication, concerns were expressed in 
Parliament that the Netherlands no longer would be taken seriously internationally.208
Because the government was of the opinion that the Hague Treaties did not apply to 
same‑sex marriages, however, it saw no need – as suggested by some members in 
Dutch Parliament following Boele‑Woelki’s critique – to revoke these Treaties, nor 
to ask other States for permission to employ a different interpretation of ‘marriage’. 
For the sake of clarity and to increase the chances of recognition by other States, 
the government nonetheless wished to bring the Dutch rules of Private International 
Law as much as possible in line with the Treaties to which it was a party.209 The 
government held that the responsibility of the Netherlands vis‑à‑vis other States did 
203 Convention of 14 March 1978 on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages, The Hague, 
entry into force per 1 May 1991.
204 In respect of registered partnerships: Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 924, no. 3, p. 3, in respect of 
same‑sex marriage: Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 27 762 no. 3, p. 5 and Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 672 
no. 5, p. 19.
205 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 27 762 no. 3, p. 5 and Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 672, no. 5, p. 23.
206 Boele‑Woelki 1999, supra n. 83, at p. 113.
207 Idem. See also Bogdan who held in respect of the 1970 Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and 
Legal Separations and the 1978 Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes: 
‘At the time of the conclusion of […] [these] legal instruments, the concept of same‑sex marriages 
was unheard of and it was certainly not taken into consideration by the parties. The introduction, by 
one contracting state, of a new dimension to a traditional legal term cannot reasonably obligate the 
other contracting states. It is therefore submitted that it would be contrary to the principle of good 
faith to consider the contracting states bound by the rules of the said conventions as far as Dutch 
same‑sex marriages are concerned.’ M. Bogdan, ‘Some Reflections on the Treatment of Dutch 
Same‑sex Marriages in European and Private International Law’, in: T. Einhorn and K. Siehr (eds.), 
Intercontinental cooperation through private international law: essays in memory of Peter E. Nygh 
(The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2004) p. 25 at p. 29.
208 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, no. 4, pp. 14–18. For the government response to this concern, see 
section 12.3.6 below.
209 Kamerstukken II 1999/2000, 26 672, no. 5, pp. 19–20.







not go any further than to provide for clear information.210 It had no intentions to 
assist same‑sex couples in individual cases in explaining the status of their marriage 
to foreign authorities, but planned to issue a brochure which briefly explained the 
main features of the new Dutch legislation in various languages.211 This brochure 
could also be used by official representations of the Netherlands in other States.212 
The government held it to be impossible to predict what legal effects would be given 
to the Dutch same‑sex marriage by other States, but it expressed the hope that foreign 
legal practice would be ‘innovative’ in finding solutions.213
The State Commission on Private International Law held in December 2001 that 
there was no use (then) in drafting rules on the recognition of foreign same‑sex 
marriages, because no other country had (then) introduced legislation to that effect.214 
It furthermore noted that such recognition would most probably not be problematic 
in the Dutch legal order.215 The Commission did not consider the question of the 
recognition of Dutch same‑sex marriages by other States, as that matter did not come 
within the competences of the Dutch legislature anyway.216
The State Commission was divided on the question of whether the Dutch ‘opened 
up marriage’ fell within the scope of the Hague Convention on the Celebration and 
Recognition of the Validity of Marriages of 1978.217 As the report explained, if the 
Convention indeed applied to same‑sex marriages, the other Contracting States 
to this Convention were, in principle, under the obligation to recognise a Dutch 
same‑sex marriage,218 as well as to celebrate a same‑sex marriage if its choice of 
law rules designated Dutch law as the applicable law.219 In both situations, however, 
so it was explained, the States could invoke a public policy exception.220 One part 
of the Commission agreed with the government that the Convention did not apply 
210 Idem, at p. 23.
211 Idem, at p. 18.
212 Idem, at p. 23.
213 Idem, at p. 17.
214 Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht 2001, supra n. 140, at p. 4. The Commission had 
examined to what extent the relevant existing Private International Law Treaties relating to family law 
left room for the Dutch legislature to provide for specific conflict‑of‑laws rules concerning the Dutch 
opened up marriage and concerning adoption by same‑sex couples. Joppe 2000A, supra n. 200, at 
p. 371.
215 Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht 2001, supra n. 140, at p. 6.
216 Idem, at p. 4. The government was also well aware that any Dutch Private International Law legislation 
could not guarantee that a same‑sex marriage concluded under Dutch law would be recognised abroad, 
as this was wholly dependent upon the rules of Private International Law of the State where recognition 
was sought. Kamerstukken II 1999/2000, 26 672, no. 5, p. 22.
217 Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht 2001, supra n. 140, at p. 7.
218 Art. 9 (first sentence) of the 1978 Hague Convention on the Celebration and Recognition of the Validity 
of Marriages reads: ‘A marriage validly entered into under the law of the State of celebration or which 
subsequently becomes valid under that law shall be considered as such in all Contracting States, subject 
to the provisions of this Chapter.’ It must be noted that in fact the only other Contracting States to this 
Convention next to the Netherlands are Luxembourg and Australia.
219 Art. 3(2) of the 1978 Hague Convention on the Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages. 
See also Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht 2001, supra n. 140, at p. 6.
220 Arts. 5 and 14 of the 1978 Hague Convention on the Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of 
Marriages.







and that therefore the Dutch government was free to draft its own conflict‑of‑laws 
rules.221 On the basis of a historic interpretation, other members of the Commission 
came to a different conclusion. These members pointed out that same‑sex marriage 
was indeed discussed during the drafting of the Convention and that – partly for that 
reason – the drafters had deliberately not provided for a definition of ‘marriage’ in 
the Convention.222 In any case, so the full Commission concluded, the Dutch Private 
International Law (marriages) Act, which implemented the Convention, also applied 
to same‑sex marriages and no amendment to this Act was required.223
The Commission also held that the 1978 Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Matrimonial Property Regimes224 adopted the same definition of marriage as the 
Hague Convention on the Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages 
and that it could therefore possibly be held to be applicable to same‑sex marriage.225 
The Commission was furthermore of the opinion that the Brussels II Regulation also 
applied to the Dutch (opened up) marriage, and that there was therefore only limited 
room for the Dutch legislature to make use of its residual competence to draft rules 
on jurisdiction.226 Further, the Commission held that there were strong (historic) 
arguments that the Hague Adoption Convention of 1993227 excluded adoption by 
same‑sex couples.228 The Commission therefore recommended that the government 
conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with (Contracting) States that had no 
principled objections to adoption by same‑sex couples.229
Following the advice of the Commission, the government continued the drafting 
of conflict‑of‑laws rules for registered partnerships. It acknowledged that the 
existing rules of Private International Law concerning marriage could not be fully 
analogously applied to registered partnerships as they were distinct institutes after 
all.230 However, because the underlying principle of the Act Introducing Registered 
221 These members of the Commission referred to the Explanatory Report to the Convention according to 
which marriage was to be defined ‘in its broadest, international sense’.
222 These members of the Commission referred to the Actes et Documents de la Treizième Session Tome 
III, Mariage (1978). Support for this vision can be found in L. Pellis, ‘Het homohuwelijk: een bijzonder 
nationaal product’ [‘Same‑sex marriage: a special national product’] 24 Tijdschrift voor Familie‑ 
en Jeugdrecht (2002) p. 162 and A.P.M.J. Vonken, Asser/Vonken, Asser 10‑II Het internationale 
personen‑, familie‑ en erfrecht, 69 Huwelijk personen gelijk geslacht, update of 23 July 2012.
223 In one necessary amendment was yet foreseen in the Act of 8 March 2001 amending legislation with 
a view to the opening up of marriage and the introduction of adoption by couples of the same sex 
(Wet van 8 maart 2001 tot aanpassing wetgeving in verband met openstelling van het huwelijk en 
de invoering van personen van hetzelfde geslacht, Stb. 2001,128. This concerned the prohibition on 
polygamy in Art. 3(1)(d), which provided that one man could be married to one woman only and one 
woman to one man only. This wording was changed to the more neutral ‘person’.
224 Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes, entry into 
force 1 September 1992.
225 Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht 2001, supra n. 140, at p. 13.
226 Idem, at p. 34.
227 Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co‑operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, The Hague, entry into force 1 May 1995.
228 Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht 2001, supra n. 140, at p. 24.
229 Idem, at, p. 34.
230 As Frohn explained, analogous application of the conflict‑of‑laws rules in relation to marriage to 
registered partnership, could have resulted in a reference to the laws of a country which did not provide 







Partnerships had been to equalise registered partnerships as much as possible with 
marriage, the legislature also applied the conflict‑of‑laws rules for marriage as 
analogously as possible.231 For partnerships registered in the Netherlands, unilateral 
conflict‑of‑laws rules were adopted, which determined in what situations Dutch law 
applied to these registered partnerships entered into under Dutch law.232 For foreign 
partnerships, the lex loci celebrationis was applied (see below).233
After the Private International Law (registered partnership) Act (Wet conflictenrecht 
geregistreerd partnerschap) had entered into force in 2004,234 in 2012 all Dutch 
Private International Law rules, including those relating to marriage and registered 
partnership, were brought together in a new tenth chapter in the Dutch Civil Code.235 
This was mainly a ‘cosmetic’ operation; substantively very little changed.236 
The following subsections set out the relevant substantive rules of Dutch Private 
International Law for various situations involving same‑sex registered partnerships 
and marriages, starting with the situation where foreign same‑sex couples wish to 
enter into a marriage or partnership in the Netherlands.
12.4.3.	 Access	to	marriage	and	registered	partnerships	for	foreign	same‑sex	
couples
Since the Netherlands was of the first countries in the world which provided for a 
form of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, there was, when the registered 
partnership was introduced, a certain fear of ‘registration tourism’ and sham 
registrations.237 Until 2001, when marriage was opened up, the rules concerning 
access to registered partnerships were more stringent when compared to the rules on 
for registered partnership. E.N. Frohn, ‘Geregistreerd Partnerschap’ [‘Registered Partnership’], in: Th. 
M. de Boer and F. Ibili (eds.), Nederlands internationaal personen‑ en familierecht: wegwijzer voor de 
rechtspraktijk [Dutch international family law: guidance for legal practice] (Deventer, Kluwer 2012) 
p. 281 at p. 281.
231 Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 924, no. 3, p. 3.
232 As Bell explained: ‘[…] the Dutch legislation governing registered partnership sought to depart from 
normal rules of private international law in order to ensure that Dutch law would remain the applicable 
jurisdiction in most disputes surrounding Dutch registered partners.’ M. Bell, ‘Holding Back the Tide? 
Cross‑Border Recognition of Same‑Sex Partnerships within the European Union’, 12 European Review 
of Private Law (2004) p. 613 at p. 627. At the time of drafting of the Act, the legislature accepted that 
it could prove desirable in the future to amend the law on this point. See Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 
924, no. 3, p. 3.
233 Art. 10:61(5)(a) and (b) BW. See also Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 924, no. 3, p. 3 and Frohn 2012, 
supra n. 231, at p. 281.
234 Wet conflictenrecht geregistreerd partnerschap [Act conflict‑of‑laws rules registered partnership], Act 
of 6 July 2004, Stb. 2004, 334. This Act was revoked per 1 January 2012 by Art. IV of Vaststellings‑ en 
Invoeringswet Boek 10 BW [Implementation Act Volume 10 of the Civil Code].
235 Stb. 2011, 272.
236 As Heijning explains, the new Arts. 10:60 to 10:90 BW were an ‘almost literal copy’ of the Private 
Internatinal Law (Registered Partnership) Act. S.H. Heijning, ‘Boek 10 BW: IPR‑regels geregistreerd 
partnerschap (art. 10:60 t/m 10:91 BW)’ [‘Book 10 BW: PIL‑rules registered partnership (Art. 10:60 to 
10:91 BW)’], 141 WPNR (2010) p. 311.
237 Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 23 761, no. 3, p. 5; no. 7, p. 15; no. 11, pp. 7–8. See also Curry‑Sumner 2005A, 
supra n. 28, at pp. 123–124 and Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at pp. 13–14.







access to marriage.238 While a marriage could also be celebrated in the Netherlands 
if one of the future spouses had neither Dutch nationality, nor a valid residence 
title,239 for registered partnerships both partners had to be either Dutch nationals or 
nationals of an EU/EEA country or legal residents in the Netherlands.240 Following 
the advice by the Kortmann II Commission (see section 12.3.4 above) this difference 
was lifted in 2001,241 when the laws on marriages of convenience and registered 
partnerships of convenience were equated.242 Another amendment concerned the 
repeal of a provision in the conflict‑of‑laws marriages Act according to which a 
marriage involving one or two non‑Dutch nationals, on public order grounds, could 
not be celebrated in the Netherlands if the future spouses were of the same sex.243
Under the present legislation, two partners – whether of the same or different 
sex – can celebrate a marriage or enter into a registered partnership in the Netherlands 
if at least one of the partners is legally resident in the Netherlands or has Dutch 
nationality.244 In this regard it is irrelevant whether the law of the country of which 
the non‑Dutch partner(s) is or are (a) national(s), recognises same‑sex marriage.245
One remaining difference between the registered partnership and marriage relates 
particularly to cross‑border situations and concerns choice of law. Non‑Dutch 
nationals residing in the Netherlands, who meet the conditions of Dutch law for 
concluding a marriage, may also decide to celebrate the marriage under the law 
of their country of nationality.246 For partners who wish to enter into a registered 
partnership, this option is not open. Article 10:60(2) Civil Code provides that the 
238 See also Waaldijk 1999, supra n. 79, at p. 207.
239 Art. 1:43(1) BW (old).
240 Art. 1:80a (1) and (2) BW (old). See also Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 22 700, no. 3, p. 6 and Kamerstukken 
II 1993/94, 23 761, no. 3, p. 4, as well as H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Geregistreerd partnerschap en de 
Europese Unie, kanttekeningen over de internationale reikwijdte van het wetsvoorstel’ [‘Registered 
partnership and the European Union: comments on the international scope of the bill’], 70 Nederlands 
Juristenblad (1995), p. 1569 and Jessurun d’Oliveira 1996, supra n. 199.
241 Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 0862, no. 3, p. 5. Wet van 13 december 2000 tot wijziging van de 
regeling in Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek met betrekking tot het naamrecht, de voorkoming van 
schijnhuwelijken en het tijdstip van de totstandkoming van de scheiding van tafel en bed alsmede van 
enige andere wetten [Act of 13 December 2000 amending Book One of the Civil Code concerning the 
right of the name, the prevention of marriages of convenience and legal separation as well as several 
others Acts], Stb. 2001, 11.
242 Following Arts. 1:50 and 1:80a (5) BW an intended marriage or registered partnership may be 
interrupted when the objective of the prospective spouses or registered partners of one of them is not 
the fulfillment of the duties which the law connects to a marriage or registered partnership, but to 
obtain access to the Netherlands.
243 Art. 3(1)(d) Wet Conflictenrecht Huwelijk (old). See Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, no. 3, p. 7.
244 Arts. 1:43(1) and 1:80a (4) BW. As explained by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, if neither partner is a 
Dutch national while they both live abroad, they may not marry in the Netherlands. If neither partner 
is a Dutch national, they may marry in the Netherlands provided one of them is resident there. If both 
partners live outside the Netherlands, they may marry in the Netherlands provided one of them is a 
Dutch national. Partners who both live in the Netherlands may marry even if neither of them is a Dutch 
national. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FAQ Same‑sex marriage 2010, p. 7, online available 
at www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/minbuza/en/import/en/you_and_the_netherlands/about_
the_netherlands/ethical_issues/qa‑homohuwelijk‑2011‑en‑‑‑def.pdf, visited June 2012.
245 Idem, at p. 6.
246 Art. 10:28 BW.







question of whether the partners qualify for entering into a registered partnership 
with each other in the Netherlands, is governed by Dutch law.247 Application of 
foreign law may be rejected for being manifestly incompatible with Dutch public 
order.248 The wording ‘manifestly incompatible’ makes clear that this exception must 
be applied restrictively.249 For marriages, the public order notion is given further 
interpretation in Article 10:29 Civil Code. Issues such as too young in age, too 
close in kinship, and disturbed mental capacity of the future spouses, as well as 
non‑exclusiveness of the marriage, may justify a refusal to apply foreign law.250 On 
the other hand, the celebration of a marriage cannot be refused on the ground that 
there is an impediment to this marriage under the law of the State of nationality of 
the future spouses, if that impediment itself is contrary to Dutch public order.251 
Hence, the fact that the future spouses are of the same sex cannot be accepted as 
impediment to the celebration of a marriage in the Netherlands, for to accept such 
unequal treatment would be against Dutch public order.
12.4.4.	 Implementation	of	Directives	2004/38	and	2003/86	in	Dutch	Law
Unmarried different‑sex and same‑sex partners have been recognised for purposes 
of immigration to the Netherlands since 1975.252 Under Dutch law both same‑sex and 
different‑sex spouses or registered partners of EU citizens are considered ‘family 
members’ within the meaning of Directive 2004/38.253 A right to residence is also 
provided for the partner with whom the EU citizen is in a duly attested, stable, 
long‑term relationship, as well as for the minor children of this partner.254
247 Art. 10:60(2) BW. See also M. Gordijn, ‘Geregistreerd Partnerschap’ [‘Registered partnership’], 
in: A. Baptiste and E.W.M. Gubbels, Burgerzaken & Boek 10 BW [Civil matters and Book 10 BW] 
(Zoetermeer, NVVB 2012) p. 92 at pp. 94–95. The Minister for Justice held that it constituted no 
unacceptable restriction if non‑Dutch national partners who did not meet the conditions of Dutch law, 
were not allowed to enter into a registered partnership under Dutch law. Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 
924, no. 3, p. 9.
248 Art. 10:6 BW.
249 A.P.M.J. Vonken, Asser/Vonken 10‑II 2012/114 (update 23 July 2012).
250 Following Article 10:29(1) BW the celebration of a marriage in the Netherlands is against public policy, 
if (a) the future spouses have not reached the age of 15 years; (b) if the future spouses are siblings or 
related to each other in the direct line by blood or by adoption; (c) if the free consent of one of the future 
spouses is missing or the mental capacity of one of them is so disturbed that he is unable to determine 
his own will or to understand the significance of his declarations; (d) if the marriage would be in 
conflict with the rule that a person may only be united in marriage with one other person at the same 
time and (e) if the marriage would be in conflict with the rule that a person who wishes to conclude a 
marriage may not simultaneously be registered as a partner in a registered partnership.
251 Art. 10:29(2) BW.
252 Waaldijk et al. 2010, supra n. 188, at p. 24. The report refers (in footnote 91) to K. Waaldijk, More or 
less together: levels of legal consequences of marriage, cohabitation and registered partnership for 
different‑sex and same‑sex partners. A comparative study of nine European countries (Paris, Institut 
National d’Études Démographiques 2005) p. 147, online available at www.hdl.handle.net/1887/12585, 
visited June 2010.
253 Art. 8.7 Vreemdelingenbesluit [Aliens Decree], implementing Directive 2004/38/EC.
254 Art. 8.7(4) Vreemdelingenbesluit [Aliens Decree]. Until 2009 the relationship could be attested by the 
partners signing a relatieverklaring [‘declaration of relationship’]. Vreemdelingencirculaire [Aliens 
Circular] B10/5.2.2. As of 31 January 2009 the partners should normally also produce evidence either 







Also in respect of family reunification255 Dutch law makes no distinction between 
same‑sex and different‑sex partners or between their family members.256 In 2012 
family reunification was limited to – what was called – the ‘core family’ (‘kerngezin’), 
i.e. spouses, registered partners and minor children only.257 In other words, unmarried 
stable partners no longer qualified for family reunification. Provision was made for 
same‑sex couples who had no access to marriage in their home countries. They could 
apply for a ‘marriage visa’ for the duration of six months, enabling them to enter the 
Netherlands to conclude a marriage or a registered partnership. These amendments 
were repealed in 2013.258
12.4.5.	 Recognition	of	foreign	registered	partnerships	and	marriages	under	
Dutch law
Because a foreign same‑sex marriage will always be of later date than the entry into 
force of the Dutch opening up of marriage Act, it has never been an issue whether 
foreign same‑sex marriages would be recognised as such under Dutch law.259 They 
are indeed recognised as marriage under Dutch law.260 In the words of Vonken, the 
principle of equal treatment as provided for in Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution 
and Article 26 ICCPR also has effect in Dutch Private International Law.261
With respect to registered partnerships the situation is somewhat different. At the 
time when the Dutch legislature drafted conflict‑of‑laws rules, registered partnership 
legislation was introduced in a limited number of countries only and the various 
regimes varied significantly. Therefore, the Dutch legislature set certain standards 
which foreign registered partnerships have to meet in order to be recognised as 
registered partnership under Dutch law.262
that they have or recently had a joint household for at least six months, or that they have a child together. 
Aliens Circular A2/6.2.2.2.
255 Under Dutch law the term ‘family reunification’ includes family formation.
256 Arts. 3.13 to 3.15 Vreemdelingenbesluit [Aliens Decree]. Family members are: (a) the adult who is, 
according to Dutch Private International Law, legitimately married to the foreigner or who is, according 
to Dutch law, the registered partner of the foreigner; (b) the adult who has a lasting and exclusive 
relationship with the foreigner, provided that certain requirements are met; and (c) the minor natural 
or legitimate child of the foreigner who, in the Minister’s opinion, is actually a family member of that 
foreigner and already was so in the country of origin and who comes under the legitimate authority of 
the foreigner. For each of the three categories a requirement is that the partners actually live together 
and have a joint household (Art. 3.17, Aliens Decree).
257 Decree of 27th March 2012 amending the Aliens Decree 2000, Stb. 2012, 148.
258 Stb. 2013, 184.
259 Compare Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht 2001, supra n. 140, at p. 6.
260 Following Art. 10:31(1) BW ‘[a] marriage that is contracted outside the Netherlands and that is valid 
under the law of the State where it took place or that has become valid afterwards according to the 
law of that State, is recognised in the Netherlands as a valid marriage.’ Translation taken from www.
dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook01010.htm, visited June 2014.
261 A.P.M.J. Vonken, Asser/Vonken, Asser 10‑II Het internationale personen‑, familie‑ en erfrecht, 69 
Huwelijk personen gelijk geslacht, update of 23 July 2012.
262 Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 924, no. 3, pp. 2–3. These requirements were included in the bill, 
following advice of the Council of State. Kamerstukken II 28 924, no. B, pp. 2–3.







As a rule a registered partnership that is entered into outside the Netherlands and that 
is valid under the (Private International) law of the State where it is entered into or 
that has become valid afterwards according to the law of that State, is recognised in 
the Netherlands as a valid registered partnership.263 However, only partnerships that 
have ‘Standesfolge’ (i.e., excluding purely contractual partnerships) and which are 
open to two persons in a close personal and effective relationship only, qualify for 
recognition as registered partnership under Dutch law.264 The partnership must be 
registered with a competent public authority and the partnership must be exclusive in 
the sense that the partners cannot at the same time be in a marriage or any comparable 
institution.265 Furthermore, the rights and obligations of the registered partners to 
each other must be equal to or in essence corresponding to those of spouses.266 This 
includes the obligation to support one another and to provide each other with ‘what is 
needed’ (‘het nodige’).267 Other relevant indications that the partnership corresponds 
to marriage, are an obligation to have a reasonable share in the costs of the household 
and several liability for the debts of the common household.268
The Civil Code also provides for two corresponding public policy exceptions 
for registered partnerships and marriage in recognition cases.269 However, these 
exceptions can (again) only be successfully invoked in cases of a manifest conflict 
with Dutch public order and must be applied (very) restrictively.270 In a situation 
where mere recognition is requested of a marriage or registered partnership that has 
been celebrated or registered in another State, the connection with the Dutch legal 
order will be looser, than in a situation where a request is made to have marriage or 
partnership celebrated in the Netherlands. This is even more so, if considerable time 
has elapsed since the celebration of the marriage or registration of the partnership in 
the other State. These factors render invocation and application of the public order 
exception in recognition cases even less appropriate.271 In any case, it is obvious that 
the mere fact that the future spouses or registered partners are of the same sex can 
263 Art. 10:61(1) and (2) BW. Following the fourth paragraph of this Article, ‘[…] a registered partnership is 
presumed to be valid if a certificate of registered partnership has been issued by a competent authority’. 
See also Heijning 2010, supra n. 237.
264 Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 924, no. 3, p. 10 and Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 924, no. 3, pp. 2–3.
265 Art. 10:61(5)(a) and (b) BW.
266 Art. 10:61(5)(c) BW.
267 Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 924, no. 3, pp. 2–3.
268 Idem. In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Private International Law (registered partnership) Act, 
the Dutch legislature held that the Belgian legal cohabitation (‘wettelijke samenwoning’), the French 
‘pacte civil de solidarité’ and the legally recognised forms of cohabitation in the laws of Catalonia and 
Aragon met these criteria.
269 Arts. 10:21 and 10:62 BW. See also Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32137, no. 3, p. 47.
270 Gordijn 2012, supra n. 248, at pp. 100–101 and Frohn 2012, supra n. 231, at, pp. 286–287. Possible 
examples the authors mention are if one of the partners or both partners was yet in a registered 
partnership or marriage at the time of entering into the partnership; if one of the partners or both 
partners were younger than 15 years of age at the time of the registration; if one of the partners or 
both partners were at the time of entering into the partnership incapable of his or her free will, or of 
understanding the meaning of his or her declaration to enter into the partnership. As Frohn has pointed 
out, application of the public order exception must be in line with the principle of proportionality: the 
lesser close the partnership is related to Dutch law, the lesser reasonable it is to apply the exception.
271 A.P.M.J. Vonken, Asser/Vonken 10‑II 2012/92, update of 23 July 2012.







never constitute ground for application of the public order exception under Dutch 
law.
12.4.6. Parental issues
Under the present state of Dutch law,272 the recognition of parental links established 
in another country is not to be expected problematic on the mere ground that the 
couple is of the same sex.273 This may possibly only be different in the – as yet 
hypothetical – case that a foreign State allows for the establishment of parental links 
for couples consisting of two men through operation of the law.
Same‑sex couples from the Netherlands may, however, experience problems if they 
wish to have their parental links recognised in another country. Very few other States 
provide for as far‑reaching parental rights for same‑sex couples as the Netherlands. 
It is generally accepted that parental links of same‑sex couples or partners have a 
higher chance of being recognised abroad if they are established through adoption, 
than if they are established through recognition or by operation of the law, because 
adoption involves an examination by a court.274
12.4.7.	 Recognition	of	Dutch	partnerships	and	marriages	in	other	Member	
States
From the first moment registered partnership was considered in the Netherlands, 
and later when the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples was under debate, 
concerns have been expressed that recognition abroad could be (very) problematic.275 
After all, the new Dutch regimes represented ‘a challenge to the Private International 
Law of other countries.’276
The Kortmann II Commission conducted a questionnaire amongst the Council of 
Europe Member States, which showed that only very few countries would recognise 
a Dutch same‑sex marriage.277 The government acknowledged that same‑sex spouses 
272 It is recalled that this research was concluded on 31 July 2014.
273 In the past this was, however, different. For instance in 2003 – before joint interstate adoption was 
introduced for same‑sex couples – a District Court refused to recognise a joint adoption by a same‑sex 
couple under American law. Rb. Zwolle 30 June 2003, ECLI:NL:RBZWO:2003:AI0668. See also 
Curry‑Sumner and Vonk 2006, supra n. 142. The authors hold that a week earlier in a similar case 
another District Court, however, recognised the adoption.
274 The Commission on lesbian parenthood and interstate adoption (also referred to as Kalsbeek 
Commission) had therefore proposed to issue a declaratory decision in situations where a co‑mother 
had established parental links with a child through recognition or by operation of the law. So far, this 
has not been followed up, but the adoption option for co‑mothers was deliberately upheld. Commissie 
lesbisch ouderschap en interlandelijke adoptie 2007, supra n. 161, at p. 44. See Nuytinck 2010, supra 
n. 169, at pp. 343–348.
275 E.g. Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, no. 4, pp. 14–18.
276 Bogdan 2004, supra n. 208, at p. 25.
277 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, no. 3, pp. 7–8.







could encounter ‘several practical and legal problems’ abroad, but also held that 
this was ‘one aspect’ the future same‑sex spouses had to be aware of.278 The fact 
that same‑sex spouses may possibly not be awarded any rights as ‘family members’ 
of migrating EU citizens was acknowledged by the government to be ‘a practical 
problem which should not be underestimated’. The government also held, however, 
that this did not constitute a decisive argument against opening up marriage. It was 
for the individuals concerned to consider the pros and cons, the government held.279 
It stressed that the legislation was initiated with the express consideration that the 
risk of limping relationships was no reason to refrain from opening up marriage to 
same‑sex couples. The government intended to inform the public through a brochure 
(see above).280 The State Commission on Private International Law agreed with the 
government that it was important to inform same‑sex couples who wished to enter 
into a marriage, about the risk that their marriage would not be recognised as such in 
other countries, even though it also considered it very well possible that certain legal 
effects would be given to it.281
It indeed proved to be the case that same‑sex couples experience ‘substantial 
problems’ in other countries.282 Obviously the (level of) recognition depends on the 
national regime of the host Member State. As Boele‑Woelki et al. explain:
‘In those countries to have opened civil marriage to same‑sex couples, the recognition 
of Dutch same‑sex marriages is generally not problematic. In those countries where a 
domestic form of registered partnership has been created, same‑sex marriages celebrated 
abroad are often afforded recognition as this domestic form of registered partnership. In 
those jurisdictions were no substantive law regime is available for same‑sex couples to 
formalise their relationship, the chances are great that a Dutch same‑sex marriage will 
not be recognised.’283
Hence, even if some form of recognition is afforded, this may entail the downgrading 
of a civil status as spouses to registered partners with considerably more limited legal 
278 Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 672, no. 3, p. 8. Waaldijk has translated the relevant paragraph in the 
Explanatory Memorandum as follows: ‘The question relating to the completely new legal phenomenon 
of marriage between persons of the same sex concerns the interpretation of the notion of public order to 
be expected in other countries. Such interpretation relates to social opinion about homosexuality. As a 
result of this, spouses of the same sex may encounter various practical and legal problems abroad. This 
is something for future spouses of the same sex to take into account.’ C. Waaldijk, ‘Others may follow: 
the introduction of marriage, quasi‑marriage, and semi‑marriage for same‑sex couples in European 
countries’, 38 New England Law Review (2004) p. 569 at p. 577.
279 Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 672, no. 5, p. 11. On this question see also H.U. Jessurun d’Oliveira, 
‘Vrijheid van verkeer voor geregistreerde partners in de Europese Unie. Hoog tijd!’ [‘Free movement 
for registered partners in the European Union. High time!’], 76 Nederlands Juristenblad (2001) p. 205.
280 Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 672, no. 5, p. 6.
281 Staatscommissie voor het Internationaal Privaatrecht 2001, supra n. 140, at p. 11. Pellis held that the 
State Commission should have urged the government more to raise the issue of ‘limping relationships’ 
at European and international level. Pellis 2002, supra n. 223, at p. 167.
282 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 246.
283 Idem, at p. 247.







effects,284 as many States do not recognise the Dutch distinction between marriage 
and registered partnership.285 Other States do not recognise the Dutch registered 
partnership as registered partnership under their national laws because it is open 
to both same‑sex and different‑sex couples. Yet other States refuse to give Dutch 
same‑sex marriages and partnerships any recognition on public order grounds.286 
Further, the fact that same‑sex spouses and registered partners cannot obtain an 
international (marriage) certificate under the ICCS Convention on the issue of 
multilingual extracts from civil status records,287 may cause practical problems when 
these couples go abroad.288
12.5. conclusIons
When it comes to legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, the Netherlands is, and 
always has been, in the vanguard. Firmly based on the principle of equal treatment, 
the legal recognition of same‑sex relationships has gradually increased since the 
1990s towards a strong level of protection nowadays. Same‑sex couples now have 
access to the institutions of marriage and registered partnerships on the same footing 
as different‑sex couples. After various amendments to the law over the past decades, 
these institutions now generally have the same legal effects and there are almost 
no differences between same‑sex couples and different‑sex couples in this regard. 
Parentage has proven to be the most controversial issue, however, and it is in this 
area that same‑sex marriages and registered partnerships are still not entirely equal 
to different‑sex marriages and registered partnerships. On grounds of biological 
differences, this holds especially for couples consisting of two men. This difference 
has so far been upheld on the ground that from a biological perspective, couples of 
two men are not in the same position as couples of two women. Nonetheless, it is 
284 For example, it was reported that in Germany, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Switzerland, Dutch same‑sex marriages were not recognised as 
a marriage, but as registered or civil partnerships. It was unclear if Dutch same‑sex marriage and 
registered partnerships would be recognised at all in France and Italy. Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, 
supra n. 2, at pp. 190 and 247 and K. Boele‑Woelki et al., ‘The evaluation of same‑sex marriages and 
registered partnerships in the Netherlands’, 8 Yearbook of Private International Law (2007) p. 27 at 
p. 31. See also Bell 2004, supra n. 233, at p. 629.
285 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 224.
286 See Waaldijk 2004, supra n. 279, at p. 577, referring (in footnote 41) to K. McKnorrie, ‘Would Scots 
Law Recognise a Dutch Same‑Sex Marriage?’, 7 Edinburgh L. Rev (2003) p. 147.
287 ICCS Convention on the issue of multilingual extracts from civil status records, Vienna 8 September 
1976, ICCS Convention no. 16.
288 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 80. In response to Parliamentary Questions on this issue, 
the Minister for Justice informed Parliament in 2010 that the ICCS was in the progress of adapting 
its model certificate accordingly. He furthermore held that in the meantime there were various other 
means through which the Civil Registry could issue a translated civil status record to same‑sex spouses. 
Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, 95. As to date (i.e. 31 July 2014) the ICCS certificate as available 
on the website of the ICCS (www.ciec1.org/Conventions/Conv16.pdf, visited 31 July 2014) has not been 
amended on this point. In this regard it is furthermore interesting to note that the original bill for the 
Act Opening Up Marriage provided that an official declaration of no impediment to marriage would 
only be issued to a Dutch national who wished to conclude a marriage abroad under (then) Art. 1:49a 
BW, if the person intended to conclude a marriage with a person of different sex. This provision was 
not included in the final Act.







not inconceivable that gay couples will challenge this difference in treatment in the 
future.289
Legal recognition of same‑sex relationships has primarily been introduced in the 
form of legislation and on the initiative of the Dutch Parliament and government, 
although court judgments sometimes functioned as a trigger. In general the courts 
have, however, shown strong deference towards the legislature, both in respect of 
legal recognition of same‑sex relationships and in respect of parental rights for 
same‑sex couples. In this respect, Waaldijk has described the Dutch process as ‘an 
extremely gradual and almost perversely nuanced (but highly successful) process 
of legislative recognition of same‑sex partnership’. The author finds this a ‘prime 
example’ of the operation of what he calls the ‘law of small change’.290 It is indeed 
true that the Dutch process is an incremental one, with every step taken raising the 
question why another step should not be taken as well. In the words of Waaldijk, 
‘[…] the debate could focus on whether there were any acceptable arguments against 
reducing the legal distinctions between same‑sex and different‑sex partners a little 
further.’291 At the same time, it cannot go unnoticed that certain steps were taken 
rather quickly. For instance, as Boele‑Woelki et al. hold:
‘At the start of the 1990s it was almost impossible to foresee that within ten years it would 
have been possible to open civil marriage to same‑sex couples. Changes in the political 
composition of the government and unremitting social change both contributed to the 
rapid legal developments in this field.’292
The ‘foreign countries’ argument has played an ambiguous role in the whole process. 
On the one hand the clear wish to be a pioneer in Europe, or even in the world, 
prompted the Dutch legislature to (rapidly) introduce legislation.293 At the same time, 
fear that other countries would not accept or recognise the Dutch legislative choices, 
was presented as an argument against legislative change. In this way, the ‘foreign 
countries’ argument functioned almost as an ‘excuse’.294 This was the main reason 
why the Dutch government initially did not want to risk opening up marriage, and 
289 See Nuytinck 2010, supra n. 275. Earlier see Hoevenaars 1997, supra n. 28, at p. 232.
290 Waaldijk describes the ‘law of the small change’ as follows: ‘Any legislative change advancing the 
recognition and acceptance of homosexuality will only be enacted, if that change is either perceived 
as small, or if that change is sufficiently reduced in impact by some accompanying legislative 
‘small change’ that reinforces the condemnation of homosexuality’. Waaldijk 2001A, supra n. 13, at 
pp. 440–441.
291 Idem, at p. 453.
292 Boele‑Woelki et al. 2006, supra n. 2, at p. 249.
293 The Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands held in 1998 that in ethical issues, the Netherlands 
was often the first, while often other States followed after some time. ‘Homohuwelijk exporteren’, 
Algemeen Dagblad 12 December 1998, p. 3.
294 See for example C. Waaldijk, ‘Naar een gelijkgeslachtelijk huwelijk. Waarom het buitenland, het 
afstammingsrecht en de invoering van geregistreerde partnerschap geen argumenten zijn voor 
handhaving van de heteroseksuele exclusiviteit van het huwelijk’ [‘Towards a same‑sex marriage. Why 
other countries, the law on descent and the introduction of registered partnership are no arguments 
for maintaining the heterosexual exclusivity of marriage’], 17 Tijdschrift voor Familie‑ en Jeugdrecht 
(1995) p. 223.







the argument also played an important role in the debates about parental rights for 
same‑sex couples. In the end, although heavily criticised for it, the legislature was 
prepared to put up with the risk of ‘limping relationships’ as it – once again – felt that 
the principle of equal treatment had to prevail.
The development of Private International Law rules has been a considerably less 
smooth process than the introduction of registered partnership and same‑sex 
marriage in the first place. While there remains, today, debate about the applicability 
of International Treaties, the application of the Dutch conflict‑of‑laws rules to foreign 
same‑sex relationships, has not proven very problematic (see section 12.4.5), and 
Dutch law makes no distinction between same‑sex couples and different‑sex couples 
in respect of free movement of EU citizens and family reunification (section 12.4.4). 
This is different for the recognition of Dutch same‑sex marriages and same‑sex 
registered partnerships, as well as parental links established by same‑sex couples 
under Dutch law, by other States (section 12.4.7). Although limited statistical data is 
available in this respect (see section 12.4.1), it is clear that migrating same‑sex couples 
have encountered various legal and practical problems when seeking recognition of 
their civil status in other countries.







conclusIons cAse study II
13.1. the InternAl pIcture – whAt do the vArIous jurIsdIctIons 
provIde In respect of legAl recognItIon of sAme‑sex 
relAtIonshIps?
13.1.1.	 Different	paths,	different	paces,	but	similar	direction
From the present case study a picture has emerged of different jurisdictions moving 
at different paces, a movement which nonetheless generally seems to be going in 
a similar direction. Whether the legislature or the judiciary is taking the lead, this 
direction consists of awarding increasingly more protection to same‑sex couples and 
rainbow families. Nevertheless, the difference in pace of the three States studied 
in this research is striking. Moreover, not only are there differences in the speed of 
their movement, but the case studies have also shown that the States have followed 
different paths.1 The paths chosen have been very determinative for the nature of the 
debates at the national level and for the ensuing (judicial) balancing exercises. For 
example, where a separate civil partnership was created for same‑sex couples, as 
was the case in Germany and Ireland, the debates in essence related to a (presumed) 
tension between traditional notions of marriage and – initially – family on the one 
hand, and the principle of equal treatment on the other.2 This also implied that for the 
assessment of whether there was discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, 
civil partnership was compared with marriage. In the Netherlands, on the other 
hand, a registered partnership was introduced that was open to different‑sex couples 
and same‑sex couples, while marriage was soon thereafter opened up to same‑sex 
couples as well. Consequently, civil status has played a less prominent role in debates 
on differences in treatment between same‑sex and different‑sex couples in the 
Netherlands.
1 Curry‑Sumner has divided formalised registration schemes for same‑sex couples into five 
different models, namely: monistic, dualistic with weak registration; dualistic with strong 
registration; pluralistic with weak registration and pluralistic with strong registration. 
I. Curry Sumner, All’s well that ends registered?: the substantive and private international law aspects 
of non‑marital registered relationships in Europe: a comparison of the laws of Belgium, France, The 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Antwerp, Intersentia 2005).
2 Other considerations in debates on legal recognition of same‑sex relationships have been legal certainty 
and coherence of legislation. For instance, one of the reasons in the Netherlands to consider the 
introduction of a registered partnership, was the fact that in the Netherlands over the years a complex 
web of laws regulating forms of de facto cohabitation had come into existence which lacked coherence. 
The ECtHR has also at times held that States must ensure that their legislative framework in the area is 
coherent. See ch. 12, section 12.3.2 and ch. 8, section 8.2.4.1.2.







As set out in the various subsections below, European law has so far had only 
minimal impact on national standard‑setting in respect of legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships. This first section of this concluding Chapter will firstly 
address the balancing of equal treatment and traditional notions of marriage and 
the family in section 13.1.2. Subsequently, the question of when same‑sex couples 
and different‑sex couples are in a comparable situation and require equalisation of 
their position, is addressed (section 13.1.3). Section 13.1.4 discusses how the various 
jurisdictions studied for this research have dealt with parental rights for same‑sex 
couples and how this developed over time. The diversity in legislative and judicial 
processes is set out in section 13.1.5. Section 13.2 addresses the cross‑border picture 
and discusses the various legal responses to cross‑border movement that can be 
identified in the present case study.
13.1.2. Equal treatment vs.	traditional	notions	of	marriage	and	the	family
In all jurisdictions studied for this case study, equal treatment has been an important 
and often decisive argument in the debates on legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships. A desire to abolish discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation has 
been at the basis of a gradual but generally steady development towards increased 
protection of LGBT rights and, correspondingly, legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships in the three States studied. Still, other (general) interests have at times 
been considered weightier. Traditional notions of marriage and (marriage‑based) 
family have been the most prominent and most often accepted counter‑interests in 
this regard.
Because of its long history and tradition, marriage has a special place in the national 
legal orders of the three States studied for this case study. As elaborately set out 
in Chapters 10 and 11, this particularly holds for Germany and Ireland, whose 
Constitutions provide for special protection of marriage. Marriage is thereby 
understood as between man and woman only. Initially, the protection of traditional 
marriage and family was put forward in national legislative debates as an argument 
against any legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. Later, in Germany and 
Ireland, the special protection of marriage was ground for creating a separate 
institution for same‑sex relationships, while reserving marriage for different‑sex 
couples only (see also 13.1.3 below). Both EU law and the ECtHR have respected 
such national choices. In the case law of the ECtHR, traditional marriage has 
generally enjoyed strong protection. As set out in Chapter 8, the ECtHR has held that 
marriage is ‘singled out for special treatment’ under Article 12 ECHR, and that it 
confers a special status on those who enter into it.3 The ECtHR has repeatedly ruled 
that ‘marriage’ under Article 12 ECHR concerns traditional marriage between man 
and woman only and the Court has recognised a State interest in maintaining ‘the 
traditional institution of marriage intact’.4 States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation 
3 See Ch. 8, section 8.1.3.
4 See Ch. 8, section 8.2.5.
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when it comes to access to marriage and protection of traditional marriage has been 
accepted as justification ground for a distinction between (different‑sex) spouses and 
(same‑sex) stable partners, whether registered partners or unmarried partners (see 
also section 13.1.3 below).5
These debates have been, and are, however, in flux. Support for protection of traditional 
marriage has been or is eroding in all three States studied for this case study. The 
Dutch legislature deliberately gave precedence to the principle of equal treatment 
over tradition in 2001 when it opened up marriage to same‑sex couples. In Ireland, 
the opening up of marriage to same‑sex couples is presently being contemplated. 
In Germany this is not (yet) the case, but clear changes are also visible there. As 
observed in Chapter 10, the most recent line of case law of the German Constitutional 
Court in relation to same‑sex relationships is no longer about the special protection 
of marriage, but about the protection of civil partnership against discrimination.6 
A similar development can be seen partly in the case law of the CJEU. The CJEU 
has also implicitly begun to tamper with the protection of traditional marriage by 
finding same‑sex registered partners in a legal and factual situation comparable to 
that of spouses as regards certain employment benefit (see also 13.1.3 below).7 The 
Luxembourg Court thereby gave a neutral reading of marriage as ‘a form of civil 
union’, without referring to any special status of marriage. Even the ECtHR has 
made the (though so far only symbolic) steps of finding that same‑sex couples come 
within the scope of Article 12 (the right to marry).
In the same vein, views on traditional family have also developed over time. In 
particular, there is a trend emerging towards increased protection of the interests 
of the child in this context. This development has been visible both at the national 
level and in the case law of the Strasbourg Court, and it has had clear implications 
for the development of parental rights for same‑sex couples, as is further discussed 
in section 13.1.4 below.
Moreover, outside the sphere of marriage, in fact, the protection of LGBT rights and 
same‑sex relationships has grown increasingly stronger, including at the European 
level. Within the EU, equal treatment has been very strongly pursued in the field of 
employment, but even in areas of law where the EU has no competences, Member 
States must comply with the principle of non‑discrimination as protected under EU 
law.8 Under the ECHR, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation requires 
particularly serious reasons by way of justification. In cases where no difference 
in civil status was concerned (see 13.1.3 below), this rule has resulted in stronger 
protection of same sex relationships. The ECtHR has furthermore held that same‑sex 
5 In cases where same‑sex couples claimed that they were treated differently from different‑sex 
couples, the special status of marriage has often been a ground for not even finding comparability of 
the situations of same‑sex couples and those of different‑sex couples, or in any case for justifying a 
difference in treatment between these groups.
6 See Ch. 10, section 10.5.
7 See Ch. 9, section 9.3.3.2.
8 See Ch. 9, section 9.3.







relationships enjoy the protection of both private and family life under Article 8 
ECHR and has explicitly recognised that same‑sex couples – just like different‑sex 
couples – have a need for legal recognition and protection of their relationships. 
Although – as yet – no full consequences were given to these findings, there are, as 
observed in Chapter 8, hints that the Strasbourg Court may move in the direction of 
the definition of a positive obligation for the States to provide for some form of legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships.
The notion of protection of morals has not, as such, appeared explicitly in debates and 
decision‑making on legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. It was underlying 
the initial criminalisation of homosexual acts in all three States studied for this 
case study and was in that context in itself accepted as a legitimate state interest by 
the ECtHR.9 The protection of morals has, however, scarcely been relied upon in 
respect of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, nor has the ECtHR accepted 
the protection of morals as a legitimate aim to justify reserving marriage for man 
and woman only.10
13.1.3.	 The	comparability	issue	and	the	equalisation	imperative
Courts and legislatures in the various jurisdictions studied in this research have dealt 
differently with discrimination complaints, in particular with the question of whether 
same‑sex couples and different‑sex couples were in a comparable situation if their 
civil status was different. This accordingly has had implications for the question of 
whether these groups should be treated equally.
As observed in Chapter 8, in the case law of the ECtHR, the special status of 
marriage has often been a ground for the ECtHR for not even finding comparability 
of the situations of unmarried same‑sex couples and married different‑sex couples, 
or in any case for justifying a difference in treatment between these groups. The 
fact that marriage was not open to same‑sex couples under the law of the respective 
State had no bearing on these findings. In other words, the Court did not find indirect 
discrimination in these cases. The ECtHR has extended this formal equality based 
approach to cases involving other forms of a ‘special legal status’, such as registered 
partnerships.11 The Strasbourg Court has thus only held couples with the same civil 
status to be in comparable situations; where different‑sex couples had a ‘special legal 
status’, this status distinguished their situation from that of same‑sex couples who 
did not have this status, irrespective of whether same‑sex couples had access to that 
9 See Ch. 8, section 8.1.1.
10 In Schalk and Kopf (2010), the wide margin was justified because general measures of economic or 
social strategy were concerned. Only in Hämäläinen (2013) – which case concerned the marriage of a 
post‑operative transsexual – did the Court note that the case raised ‘sensitive moral or ethical issues’. 
ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04, para. 98 and ECtHR [GC] 16 July 2014, 
Hämäläinen v. Finland, no. 37359/09, para. 75. See also Ch. 8, section 8.2.2.
11 As more elaborately discussed in Ch. 8, section 8.2.3.2, this has been defined in the Court’s case law as 
‘a public undertaking, carrying with it a body of rights and obligations of a contractual nature’. ECtHR 
[GC] 29 April 2008, Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, para. 65.
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special legal status or not. This approach of the Strasbourg Court also implies that 
States are under no obligation to equalise alternative registration forms with marriage. 
In fact, the ECtHR has held that States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation as 
regards the exact status conferred by alternative means of recognition.12
The CJEU, on the other hand, has taken a different approach. In older case law 
the CJEU had been as evasive as the ECtHR by holding that a special legal status 
was decisive in cases where discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was 
claimed.13 However, more recently the CJEU has held in various cases that there is 
direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation where at the national level 
certain employment benefits are reserved to spouses, while marriage is reserved to 
different‑sex couples only and under national law, same‑sex registered partners are in 
a legal and factual situation comparable to that of spouses as regards that benefit. The 
Luxembourg Court has thus imposed on States the obligation to equalise alternative 
registration forms with marriage, where marriage is open to different‑sex couples 
only. This obligation only applies, however, where that alternative registration form 
is comparable to marriage under the national law, and only in respect of certain 
employment related benefits. While initially the CJEU left it to the national courts 
to assess the issue of comparability of situations, more recently, the Court instead 
assessed this issue itself. It held that even the French PACS met the requirement of 
comparability, while that partnership form is not as close to marriage as, for example, 
the German civil partnership, which was central to earlier case law of the CJEU in 
the area.14 The Luxembourg Court has thus over time become more instructive in 
this area and has correspondingly left less room for national courts to decide such 
cases.
Both Ireland and Germany have chosen a ‘separate but equal’ approach, by creating 
a separate institute for same‑sex couples that nonetheless granted equivalent rights. 
In Germany this was first introduced in 2001 and over time the German civil 
partnership was increasingly more equalised with marriage on the basis of the 
principle of equal treatment. German courts thus did not hesitate to compare the 
position of (same‑sex) civil partners with that of (different‑sex) spouses and found 
indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation where they were treated 
differently without sufficient justification. In Ireland, the comparison with marriage 
was generally avoided by the legislature when introducing civil partnerships, and 
the fact that the opening up of marriage was explored the very same year that civil 
partnerships were introduced, rendered such comparison and any equalisation of 
civil partnership increasingly more redundant. As noted above, in the Netherlands, 
differences in legal status have been even less relevant in debates over equal rights 
for same‑sex couples. Instead, for instance in the context of parental rights, biological 
differences have been at times accepted as justification for a difference in treatment 
between same‑sex couples and different‑sex couples.
12 See Ch. 8, sections 8.2.2.2 and 8.2.6.
13 Joined Cases C‑122/99 P and C‑125/99 P D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council [2001] ECR I‑4319, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:304, as discussed in section 9.2 of Ch. 9.
14 See Ch. 9, section 9.3.3.







When it comes to the examination of discrimination cases, more precisely the 
question of whether situations are comparable, there are thus clear differences in 
approach between the various jurisdictions. This is a matter in respect of which not 
only do the national jurisdictions diverge, but also under the two European systems 
(EU law and the ECHR), different approaches to these questions have been taken.
13.1.4.	 Parental	rights	for	same‑sex	couples:	gradual	shift	to	best	interests	of	
the child
Clear developments towards stronger protection of parental rights of lesbians and gays 
and of same‑sex couples have been visible in all national jurisdictions studied for this 
case study, as well as under the ECHR. Where initially the interests of the child were 
perceived as an argument against the granting of parental rights to same‑sex couples 
or single lesbians and gays, it is nowadays generally no longer accepted that to be 
born and/or raised in a same‑sex relationship is not in the interests of the child.15 On 
the contrary, it has been increasingly accepted by legislatures and courts that it is 
in the interests of these children that legal protection is given to the family they are 
born and/or raised in. Also, the view that equal treatment of same‑sex parents is in 
fact in the interest of the child has received increasingly more support. There has 
thus been, as also noted in 13.1.2 above, a discernible shift from more traditional 
notions of the family to more child‑centred approaches.
The ECtHR’s contribution to these developments has consisted first of all of its 
insistence on the importance of granting legal recognition to de facto family life.16 
Further, this Court has ruled that sexual orientation may not be the decisive factor 
in decisions on parental rights for individuals.17 Moreover, while the Strasbourg 
Court has accepted the protection of the interests of the child and protection of the 
traditional family as weighty and legitimate reasons which may justify a difference 
in treatment between same‑sex and different‑sex couples in relevantly similar 
situations, it has been increasingly stricter in its examination of the proportionality 
of limitations on parental rights for same‑sex couples.18 In its most recent case law in 
the area, the Strasbourg Court noted that it was in fact in the interest of the child that 
unmarried same‑sex couples and unmarried different‑sex couples were not treated 
differently in parental matters.
15 For example, in X. a.o. v. Austria (2013), the ECtHR implicity found that generally no evidence existed 
‘[…] to show that a family with two parents of the same sex could in no circumstances adequately 
provide for a child’s needs’. ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, para. 142. 
See also Ch. 8, section 8.2.4.1.2.
16 Ch. 8.1.2. See also Ch. 2, section 2.1.1.
17 Ch. 8, section 8.2.4.
18 As concluded in Ch. 8, section 8.2.4.1.2, in choosing means to protect the family, States must take into 
account developments in society and changes in the perception of social and civil status and relational 
issues. Also, an examination of each individual case must be made possible, as that is most in keeping 
with the best interests of the child.
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The German Constitutional Court recently adopted a similar line of reasoning in a 
case on successive adoption for same‑sex couples of 2013 and took it further in two 
respects. Firstly, while the relevant ECtHR judgment concerned a case in which 
no ‘special legal status’ was involved (see 13.1.3 above), in the German case such a 
status was involved, but the German Court nonetheless found that (same‑sex) civil 
partners were in a comparable situation to (different‑sex) spouses.19 Moreover, and 
more importantly, the German Constitutional Court found that the difference in 
treatment of (same‑sex) civil partners and (different‑sex) spouses, violated the right 
to equal treatment of the child. The child’s rights were thus made central to the 
assessment of the parents’ claim to be treated equally with different‑sex partners.
Still, in Germany, and this also holds for Ireland, the protection of the parental rights 
of same‑sex couples is lagging behind when compared to those of different‑sex 
couples. Joint adoption and legal parenthood by operation of the law are prime 
examples of such differences.20 In respect of Ireland it has in fact been observed that 
the rights, interests and needs of children living in rainbow families were ‘largely 
ignored’,21 although some fundamental changes in this regard have been anticipated 
recently.
It seems that not all such differences in protection of parental rights for same‑sex 
couples and different‑sex couples are necessarily ruled out under the ECHR. The 
ECtHR has accepted differences in treatment if a difference in legal status is also 
concerned (see 13.1.3 above) and in recent case law the Court once again confirmed 
that alternative registration forms do not have to exhaustively regulate on parental 
matters.22 The ECtHR has, moreover, accepted that biological differences between 
different‑sex couples and same‑sex couples, decisively distinguish these groups 
in respect of parental matters.23 Such biological differences have also been a 
consideration in debates on parental rights for same‑sex couples at the national level. 
In the Netherlands this debate has, over the years, moved from biological differences 
between same‑sex couples when compared to different‑sex couples to the biological 
differences between male and female same‑sex couples. Under Dutch law, as it 
presently stands, the parental rights of couples consisting of two men stay behind 
when compared to two women and this has been justified on grounds of biological 
differences between these groups.24
Parental rights for same‑sex couples have thus enjoyed increasingly more protection, 
both at the national level and under the ECHR, but parental rights of (male) same‑sex 
couples generally still enjoy less protection when compared to different‑sex couples.
19 See Ch. 10, section 10.3.5.3.
20 See Ch. 10, sections 10.3.5.4 and 10.3.5.5, and Ch. 11, section 11.3.5.
21 A. Daly, ‘Ignoring Reality: Children and the Civil Partnership Act in Ireland’, 14 Irish Journal of 
Family Law (2011) p. 82.
22 See Ch. 8, section 8.2.6.
23 See Ch. 8, section 8.2.4.2.
24 See Ch. 12, sections 12.3.6.4 and 12.5.









As noted above in 13.1.1, the legislative and judicial processes in the various national 
jurisdictions studied for the present case study have differed. Amongst them, the 
Netherlands have proven the most progressive and most proactive. In a way the 
Netherlands can be said to belong to those States who have set the tone within the 
European Union – or even the world – in respect of legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships. Being a pioneer in this area, the Netherlands set and followed its own 
pace. After the initial impetus came from the judiciary, the legislature took the 
lead by introducing a few fundamental changes in a relatively short period of time. 
Subsequently, as observed in Chapter 12, a legislative process commenced that has 
been described as ‘the law of the small change’.25
In Germany a step‑by‑step approach has been taken as well, although the German 
point of departure has been different and the Courts have played a much more 
prominent role in the process. Here, the initial impetus came from the legislature 
who introduced a civil partnership for same‑sex couples in 2001. It has been 
mainly court decisions that have subsequently prompted the legislature to remove 
differences between (same‑sex) registered partners and (different‑sex) spouses, in 
respect of all sorts of matters, ranging from taxes, to pensions, to parental rights (see 
13.1.3 above).26 The German process can thus well be described as an incremental 
one.27 Perhaps, it may even be qualified as ‘disjointed incrementalism’, because this 
kind of decision‑making could be held to have led ‘to a less desirable outcome than 
radical action at the outset would have achieved.’28
In Ireland, the process had different phases, each with a different pace. Overall, 
however, it is striking that fundamental change was introduced in a relatively short 
period of time. Ireland was comparatively late with the abolition of the criminalisation 
of homosexual conduct, and the build‑up to the introduction of a civil partnership for 
same‑sex couples took some time, namely from 2004 to 2011. The impetus for the 
introduction of this civil partnership came from the judiciary and was reinforced by 
the introduction of a civil union for same‑sex couples in the UK in 2004.29 The Civil 
Partnership Act was in the end adopted following a remarkably smooth legislative 
process, however, and without any review of constitutionality by the Irish Supreme 
25 See Ch. 12, section 12.5.
26 See ch. 10, section 10.5.
27 Incrementalism has been defined as ‘[t]he political or administrative practice of making small changes 
to existing policy rather than undertaking radical or ambitious plans’. C. Calhoun (ed.), Dictionary of 
the Social Sciences (Oxford, Oxford University Press, published online: 2002, eISBN: 9780199891184). 
In some definitions of incrementalism, the decision‑making process is started ‘not with some ideal goal 
in mind but from current policies.’ I. McLean and A. McMillan, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of 
Politics, 3rd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, Published online: 2009, eISBN: 9780191727191).
28 Calhoun 2002, supra n. 28.
29 As explained in Ch. 11, section 11.3.1, the Republic of Ireland was under an obligation to provide for 
an ‘at least an equivalent level of human rights protection’ as prevalent in Northern‑Ireland, under the 
so‑called Good Friday agreement.
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Court. It was, moreover, followed by rapid developments as a result of which a strong 
increase in parental rights for same‑sex couples and the opening up of marriage to 
same‑sex couples were being contemplated in Ireland at the time this research was 
concluded.30
Compared to the action taken at national level, the European jurisdictions generally 
have taken a rather reactive, pragmatic and incremental approach.31 The EU 
legislature as well as the CJEU and the ECtHR generally follow the pace set by 
national legislatures and courts and (the absence of) European consensus in the area 
has played a primordial role in the case law of both European Courts.32 While the 
decriminalisation of homosexual conduct was expressly demanded by the ECtHR, 
fundamental choices in respect of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships have 
been left to the States. They enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing of the 
introduction of legislative changes and the Strasbourg Court has never ‘reproached’ 
a State for not introducing legislative change in respect of legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships any sooner than it did. In a way, the ECtHR could therefore 
be said to have provided States with an ‘excuse’ to delay or postpone the introduction 
of (fundamental) change in the area. Its case law has in any case enabled, or perhaps 
even stimulated, States to take an incremental approach in these matters.
While the ECtHR has thus been primarily reactive in the area, case law has at the 
same time been continually developing. Slowly and carefully, the Strasbourg Court 
has increasingly defined its position in respect of legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships. As noted above and as elaborately discussed in Chapter 8, there are 
hints in the case law of the ECtHR that this Court may be taking more firm stances 
in future case law, for example by defining a positive obligation for States to provide 
for an alternative registration form. At the same time it must be noted that the ECtHR 
has made clear that isolated positions in this area are not necessarily incompatible 
with the Convention.33
30 That is 31 July 2014.
31 Incrementalism has been explicitly advocated by the EU Justice Commissioner, who has held the 
following during a meeting of the European Parliament in 2010: ‘I am sure you understand that this is, 
for some Member States, a very delicate political and social question, because the way of looking at 
things is not the same all across Europe. […] We have to advance step by step. We must, most of all on 
the basis of our guidelines, bring the Member States to accept these rules. For many, this is very new 
and very unusual. For some, it is very shocking. We have to advance cautiously, because what we do 
not want […] is […] to be too harsh. In saying this, I am not speaking about the basic values, which are 
not in question, but we have to bring resisting Member States, step by step, to accept the general rules. 
What we do not want is to have people starting to oppose same‑sex marriages, the recognition of rights 
and non‑discrimination. […]. I do not want there to be any doubts about the fundamentals, about the 
rights of free movement, irrespective of sexual orientation or ethnicity. These we are going to apply 
step by step.’ Tuesday, 7 September 2010 – Strasbourg, PV 07/09/2010 – 17 CRE 07/09/2010 – 17, online 
available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=‑//EP//TEXT+CRE+20100907+ITEM‑
017+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN, visited 24 June 2014.
32 See Ch. 8 and Ch. 9, in particular section 9.2.
33 In Vallianatos (2013), the ECtHR held: ‘The fact that, at the end of a gradual evolution, a country finds 
itself in an isolated position as regards one aspect of its legislation does not necessarily imply that that 
aspect offends the Convention, particularly in a field – matrimony – which is so closely bound up with 
the cultural and historical traditions of each society and its deep‑rooted ideas about the family unit.’ 







13.1.6. Resumé and outlook
The present case study has made clear that when it comes to legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships across the European Union, States have taken the lead, rather 
than the European institutions. National legislatures, courts and administrative 
bodies set the tone and pace and the European level generally only follows. The 
European Courts have at times given some subtle nudges to the national legislature 
or judiciary, but this has generally only been in situations where first (principled) 
steps towards legal recognition had yet been taken at the national level. In the case 
law of the ECtHR, civil status has often functioned as a vehicle for unequal treatment 
of same‑sex couples and different‑sex couples. Only in cases where no ‘special legal 
status’ was involved, the ECtHR has applied a strict scrutiny test.
Traditional notions of marriage and the family have toned down in all three States 
studied in this research, although they have not been completely abandoned in all 
States. Also, under the ECHR marriage still enjoys strong protection. Moreover, 
the increased acknowledgement and legal protection of de facto family life has been 
paired with the acceptance of biological differences between different‑sex couples 
and same‑sex couples, and between lesbian couples and gay couples, as justification 
for certain differences in treatment between these groups in respect of parental 
matters. Unequal treatment of same‑sex couples does thus still exist, but there has 
been a shift in the justification grounds from more morally charged grounds to more 
value‑neutral grounds.
Generally a steady development towards increased protection of LGBT rights, and 
correspondingly, legal recognition of same‑sex relationships has been discernible. 
Such change has been in most cases brought about gradually and at a slow pace, with 
some exceptions of much quicker developments. These developments are likely to 
continue in the future. Possibly the European level will take a more proactive stance 
in some respects. In any case it is likely that the European Courts will continue to 
nudge national legislatures and courts in this process of increased equalisation of the 
legal position of same‑sex couples with that of different‑sex couples.
13.2. the cross‑border pIcture – legAl responses to cross‑border 
movement
As set out in the various Chapters of this case study, cross‑border movement within 
the context of the present case study is taking place in the sense that, naturally, 
same‑sex couples and rainbow families have been, and are, moving around the EU.34 
From a legal perspective a distinction can be made between two types of cross‑border 
movement. The first concerns situations where same‑sex couples move to another 
State with the express purpose of having their relationship legally recognised under 
ECtHR [GC] 7 November 2013, Vallianatos a.o. v. Greece, nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, para. 92. See 
Ch. 8, section 8.2.6.
34 See Ch. 9, section 9.5, Ch. 10, section 10.4.1, Ch. 11, section 11.4.1 and Ch. 12, section 12.4.1.
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the more permissive regime of that other State. This type of cross‑border movement 
has been referred to as ‘registration tourism’ and ‘marriage tourism’. Secondly, there 
are cross‑border situations where same‑sex couples or rainbow families move to 
other States, or desire to do so, for other purposes, such as work.
Following the approach taken in Chapter 7, this section identifies categories of 
legal responses of States to these two types of cross‑border movement by same‑sex 
couples and rainbow families. Based on the findings of this case study two such 
categories can be distinguished. The first consists of warding off (the effects of) 
cross‑border movement. As further explained in section 13.2.1, States may (try to) 
deter same‑sex couples and rainbow families from going to other States or from 
moving to their State. Secondly, as a mirror of the ‘warding off’ approach, States 
may choose to accommodate (the effects of) cross‑border movement of same‑sex 
couples and rainbow families, as is discussed in section 13.2.2 below. For both these 
categories it is assessed in this section what interests, considerations, perspectives or 
values have inspired or dictated these legal responses.35 Also, this section discusses 
the extent to which European law (both EU law and the ECHR) leaves room for the 
respective legal responses at national level or in fact even encourages or dictates 
them. Lastly, it is examined what the implications of these legal responses are or may 
be for the States concerned, as well as for the same‑sex couples and rainbow families 
involved in the cross‑border movement.
Section 13.2.3 explains that two categories of legal responses that were identified 
in Case Study I on reproductive matters have not been very visible in the present 
case study. These are outsourcing, whereby foreign options (partly) justify a 
restrictive regime at domestic level, and adaptation, entailing the adjustment of 
national standard‑setting in the area to that of another State or other States to which 
cross‑border movement takes place. Instead, as further explained in section 13.2.3, 
the present case study has shown that the troubles that same‑sex couples and rainbow 
families may encounter when moving abroad may be a reason for States to ‘back out’ 
from introducing legal recognition of same‑sex relationships at national level.
The final section, section 2.4, assesses how the various legal responses to cross‑border 
movement as identified in the present case study relate to one another.
13.2.1.	 Warding	off
Two types of warding off can be discerned in the present case study, which 
correspond with the two types of cross‑border situations set out above. States 
may firstly desire to prevent cross‑border movement for registration or marriage 
purposes (section 13.2.1.1). Also, they may obstruct cross‑border movement by 
same‑sex couples and rainbow families for other purposes than registration or 
35 As also noted in Ch. 7, one of course needs to take care not to ascribe more intentions or underlying 
motives to the various State measures discussed than can be derived from the type of legal research 
conducted in this case study.







marriage (section 13.2.1.2). In the latter situation, the warding off by States is not 
necessarily directed against the cross‑border movement of the same‑sex couples and 
rainbow families concerned as such, but rather against certain legal effects of their 
relationship, such as their civil status or their parental links.
13.2.1.1. Restrictions on access to marriage and civil partnership
The present case study has made clear that some States with relatively permissive 
regimes in respect of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships have warded off 
cross‑border movement by same‑sex couples towards their countries for the purpose 
of concluding a marriage or a civil partnership. For example, when the Netherlands 
introduced registered partnership and later opened up marriage to same‑sex 
couples, it wished to prevent so‑called marriage and registration ‘tourism’ towards 
the Netherlands. Presumably, the Netherlands did not wish to upset its diplomatic 
relations with States which did not (yet) provide for legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships. There was also a fear of sham registrations. As discussed in Chapter 12, 
this initially resulted in setting particularly strict conditions for access to registered 
partnerships.36 While these requirements have been relaxed over time, at least one of 
the future spouses or future partners still must be legally resident in the Netherlands 
or have Dutch nationality in order to register a partnership or enter into a marriage 
under Dutch law.37 This thus renders it impossible for foreign couples to go to the 
Netherlands with the mere purpose of having their relationship legally recognised 
under Dutch law. Whether such limitations are acceptable under EU (free movement) 
law, is a matter that has not been discussed extensively in Chapter 9, although it was 
noted that they are probably not problematic.38
States that function as home States in this type of cross‑border situations, may for 
their part try to restrict travel by same‑sex couples to other States for registration and 
marriage purposes. They may do so in order to uphold certain national standards, 
such as the special protection of traditional marriage. While none of the three States 
studied in this research appears to have taken such warding off measures, they have 
nonetheless been identified in this case study. As noted in Chapter 9, reports have 
been made to the European Commission about refusals by national authorities to 
issue civil status records to same‑sex couples who requested such documents for the 
purpose of marrying or registering their partnerships in another Member State.39 The 
intervention by the European Commission in these cases showed that such warding 
off measures may be problematic under EU law. The Commission held the national 
practices incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life (Article 7 
CFR), the prohibition of non‑discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
(Article 21 CFR) and EU rules guaranteeing free movement and residence.
36 See Ch. 12, section 12.4.3.
37 Idem.
38 See Ch. 9, section 9.6, footnote 205.
39 See Ch. 9, section 9.6.3.
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13.2.1.2. Non‑recognition or downgrading of foreign civil status and parental links
States that function as host States in cross‑border situations – or States to which 
couples return (see above) – may take a warding off approach by refusing to recognise 
the civil status of a same‑sex couple whose relationship was legally recognised in 
another State by means of registered partnership or marriage. Warding off by the 
host State may also consist of downgrading such a civil status or by non‑recognition 
of parental links of rainbow families established abroad.
This type of warding off may first of all have implications for decisions on entry 
and residence of same‑sex couples. As explained in Chapter 9, here a distinction can 
be made between migrating EU citizens and third‑country nationals (TCNs) with 
same‑sex partners. Warding off in this context may consist of refusals to authorise 
entry and residence of same‑sex partners of EU citizens or of family reunification 
applications of same‑sex partners of TCNs. It may also consist of the subjecting of 
such authorisation to stricter conditions, when compared to different‑sex partners.
For example, as explained in Chapter 10, in Germany until 2005, same‑sex spouses 
and registered partners of workers (EU citizens) were not recognised as qualifying 
family members under the Residence Act and could thus be refused entry and 
residence. Between 2005 and 2013 residency permits for same‑sex spouses and 
same‑sex civil partners of migrating EU citizens could be of shorter duration when 
compared to those of different‑sex spouses.40 Also, until 2005 same‑sex spouses and 
same‑sex registered partners of third‑country nationals could not qualify for family 
reunification on an equal footing with different‑sex spouses.41 In Ireland it was only 
in 2011, when civil partnership was introduced in Ireland, that same‑sex spouses 
and same‑sex registered partners of EU citizens were granted entry and residence as 
‘qualifying family members’. Until that time, their formal relationship status could 
positively impact the authorities’ assessment of whether they were ‘permitted family 
members’. Also for family reunification purposes was a marriage or civil partnership 
status of a same‑sex couple until 2011 only an element in the authorities’ assessment, 
but not a qualifying status per se.
As elaborately discussed in Chapter 9, there are as yet various open questions as to 
whether this kind of warding off is compatible with EU free movement law. It has 
been shown that it cannot be ruled out that same‑sex spouses of EU citizens may be 
refused recognition as spouses and thus as family members within the meaning of the 
Free Movement Directive, and the same holds for registered partners of EU citizens 
where the host State does not provide for a partnership status under the national law. 
In those cases there is nonetheless a duty to facilitate entry and residence of these 
same‑sex stable partners of EU citizens.42 Such a fallback option does not exist under 
40 In 2013 these differences were abolished. See Ch. 10, section 10.4.4 and see section 13.2.2.2 below.
41 Since 2005 both same‑sex spouses and same‑sex registered partners of third‑country nationals 
may qualify for family reunification on an equal footing with different‑sex spouses. See Ch. 10, 
section 10.4.4 and see section 13.2.2.2 below.
42 See Ch. 9, section 9.6.2.3.







the Family Reunification Directive, however, and Member States have discretion in 
respect of reunification applications by registered and unmarried partners of TCNs, 
although States may thereby not discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation.43 
There is thus particular room for warding off in the context of family reunification 
by same‑sex partners of TCNs.
Further, even if entry and residence have been granted to the same‑sex partner of a 
migrating EU citizen or a third‑country national, there are other realms of the law 
in which warding off may take shape. Same‑sex couples may encounter difficulties 
in their daily lives if their civil status is not recognised or is downgraded in the host 
Member State.
Before Germany and Ireland introduced civil partnerships for same‑sex couples 
in 2001 and 2010 respectively, foreign same‑sex marriages were not recognised at 
all in these States. Since that time marriages between same‑sex couples that were 
celebrated abroad have been recognised as civil partnerships and thus downgraded. 
As explained in Chapter 10, the so‑called ‘Kappungsgrenze’ has been held to have 
been inspired by the German legislature’s wish to give material protection to the 
institution of marriage. Out of the three States studied in this research, only in 
the Netherlands are foreign same‑sex marriages recognised as marriage, and this 
has been so from the outset since this country was the first to open up marriage 
to same‑sex couples. Chapter 12 has shown that there are also EU Member States 
where same‑sex marriages are not at all recognised under the law.44
When it comes to registered partnerships of same‑sex couples that were entered 
into abroad, the situation is somewhat different. In Ireland and Germany, these are 
recognised, but only those that resemble the national registered partnerships. Also 
in the Netherlands foreign registered partnerships must meet certain requirements in 
order to be recognised as registered partnerships. The setting of such requirements 
may result in downgrading or even the non‑recognition of the foreign registered 
partnership. For instance in Ireland, foreign same‑sex civil partnerships that can 
be dissolved outside the courts – such as the Dutch registered partnership – are not 
recognised.
Lastly, while not numerous, there have been cases where one of the three States 
studied in this research has not recognised parental links of same‑sex couples that 
had been established under the law of another State. For example, in a Dutch case of 
2003 – before joint interstate adoption was introduced for same‑sex couples in the 
Netherlands – a District Court refused to recognise a joint adoption by a same‑sex 
couple under American law.45 In Germany in 2011 a so‑called ‘co‑mother’, who had 
been recognised as such under Spanish law, could not be registered in the German 
43 It has also been shown that if a long‑term resident has entered into a (same‑sex) registered partnership 
in one of the Member States and wishes to move to another Member State, it is at the discretion of the 
second Member State whether he or she is allowed to bring his or her registered partner.
44 See Ch. 12, section 12.4.7.
45 See Ch. 12, section 12.4.6.
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birth register as (co‑)mother of the child of her and her female partner, because 
German filiation law did not allow for the granting of paternity to two same‑sex 
partners, except for in adoption situations.46 As discussed in Chapter 9, it has been 
reported more broadly in respect of the situation within the EU that parental links 
may be stripped away from children in rainbow families upon movement to another 
Member State.47
As explained in depth in Chapter 9, there remain many open questions as to whether 
EU law allows for warding off by means of non‑recognition or downgrading of 
civil status and/or parental rights of migrating same‑sex couples. German Courts 
have held the downgrading of a marriage of a same‑sex couple involving an EU 
citizen into a civil partnership unproblematic under EU free movement rules,48 but 
as the CJEU has never ruled on the question, it is not certain whether it would follow 
this reasoning. As also discussed in Chapter 9, it may in fact be problematic under 
primary EU law, as it may hinder the free movement of the EU citizen concerned.49 
The ECtHR has so far not given guidance in this area, except for its rulings in 
international adoption and surrogacy cases, which provide clear clues that warding 
off by means of non‑recognition of parental links legally established in another State 
may be incompatible with the best interests of the child (see also 13.2.2.2 below).50
13.2.1.3. Observations
Warding off measures may be perceived by States with less permissive regimes as 
enabling them to prevent the ‘import’ of undesired partnership or marriage forms. 
By subjecting couples with a foreign civil status to their national standards, States 
can uphold these standards, such as the special protection of marriage. Also, by doing 
so, States can prevent that migrating same‑sex couples are treated more favourably 
than same‑sex couples within their own jurisdiction. Such reverse discrimination 
might, after all, put pressure on States to treat the latter group as favourably as 
the former. States with more permissive regimes may, for their part, ensure, with 
warding off measures such as those described under section 13.2.1.1, that they cannot 
be reproached for ‘exporting’ their regimes and thus for imposing their standards 
on other States. Warding off, in other words prevents any ‘spill‑over effects’ and 
confirms jurisdictions along State borders.
Clearly, same‑sex couples and individuals carry the burden of warding off measures 
as they restrict their cross‑border movement. This is particularly so where the entry 
and residence of a same‑sex partner is refused and couples can thus not move as 
couple to another State. While entry and residence of a same‑sex stable partner of an 
46 See Ch. 10, section 10.4.8.
47 See ILGA Europe, ILGA Europe’s contribution to the Green Paper (ILGA‑Europe 2011) p. 20, online 
available at www.ilga‑europe.org/home/publications/policy_papers/green_paper_april_2011, visited 
June 2014. See also Ch. 9, section 9.7.3.
48 See Ch. 10, section 10.4.7.
49 Ch. 9, section 9.6.3.
50 Ch. 8, section 8.3.3. See also Ch. 7, section 7.2.2.1.







EU citizen will in principle be facilitated under EU law, this is different for same‑sex 
partners of third‑country nationals, regardless of whether or not they are registered 
partners, and possibly even regardless of whether they are spouses.51 Moreover, as 
noted above, same‑sex couples may meet obstacles in their daily lives as a result of 
warding off measures. Both non‑recognition and downgrading of their civil status 
by a host State may imply for same‑sex couples that upon moving to another State 
certain or all legal effects of their relationship status are no longer recognised. Hence, 
they carry the risk of so‑called ‘limping relationships’, which, for example, may have 
implications for their property or their pensions. Also, the rights and entitlements 
that the couples concerned enjoy in the host State, for example in respect of tax 
benefits or parental rights, depend on the regime of the host State. In cases where 
families no longer enjoy legal recognition upon crossing a border, because parental 
links are not recognised, this inevitably also has (serious) implications for children 
involved.
13.2.2. Accommodation
Instead of warding them off, States may also opt for an entirely different approach 
towards (the effects of) cross‑border movement, which is to accommodate them. 
Again, a distinction can be made between two types of accommodating responses, 
which correspond to the two kinds of cross‑border movement that were described 
above.
13.2.2.1. Providing access to marriage and registered partnership
Both the German and the Irish legislature have deliberately enabled foreign same‑sex 
couples to enter into registered civil partnerships under their domestic regimes. No 
nationality or domicile (or habitual residence) requirements are set for having access 
to civil partnerships in these States.52 German law also gives couples who entered 
into civil partnerships abroad the option to re‑register their partnerships under 
the German civil partnership regime.53 A need to prevent ‘registration tourism’ 
(see 13.2.1.1 above) was thus apparently not felt in Ireland and Germany. Indeed, 
as explained in Chapter 10, the German Civil Partnership is so open to foreign 
same‑sex couples because the German legislature wished to extend its aspirations 
to abolish discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation outside Germany. The 
Netherlands, even though it had a clear wish to be a pioneer in Europe, or even 
in the world, in respect of the legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, has – as 
discussed above – not made marriage and registered partnerships so easily accessible 
to foreign couples. As discussed in Chapter 12, only in 2012, and only for a period of 
little over a year, did the Netherlands actively accommodate cross‑border movement 
51 See Ch. 9, section 9.6.4.
52 Ch. 10, section 10.4.3 and Ch. 11, section 11.4.2.
53 Ch. 10, section 10.4.3.
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towards it for registration purposes, by enabling same‑sex couples from abroad to 
apply for a ‘marriage visa’.54
13.2.2.2. Recognition of foreign civil status and parental links
As briefly noted in section 13.2.1.2, and as extensively discussed in Chapter 9, as 
matters stand today there are still a few open questions regarding the application 
of EU (free movement) law to cross‑border movement by same‑sex couples. Some 
accommodation obligations can nonetheless be identified. A clear accommodation 
obligation exists in respect of the entry and residence of registered partners 
of migrating EU citizens under the Free Movement Directive. This is only a 
conditional accommodation obligation, however, as States are only obliged to grant 
registered partners entry and residence as family members within the meaning 
of the Directive, if their legislation treats registered partnerships as equivalent to 
marriage. In that regard, as noted in Chapter 9, it is unclear what ‘equivalent to 
marriage’ means exactly. In any case, Article 3(2) Free Movement Directive sets a 
clear minimum accommodation obligation, as States must facilitate the entry and 
residence of same‑sex stable partners of EU citizens. As noted above, States have 
more discretion when it comes to family members of third‑country nationals. The 
only firm accommodation obligation in respect of TCNs concerns their spouses, but 
it is as yet not sufficiently clear whether this includes same‑sex spouses.55
The EU Commission, for its part, has strongly advocated an accommodating 
approach, as voiced by former Commissioner Reding, who has held that EU Member 
States must recognise any marriage or registered partnership legally concluded 
in another State.56 The Commission has, moreover, explored the options for, or 
initiated, legislation that imposes certain accommodation obligations on States or 
could potentially do so, in respect of matters that concern the daily life of migrating 
same‑sex couples, such as their property regimes.57
There may furthermore be a positive accommodation obligation by means of 
recognition under ECHR. The Strasbourg case law gives the strongest indication 
that this may be so in respect of parental links. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 7, the 
Court’s case law in international adoption and surrogacy cases is a strong indication 
that the best interests of the child, in particular its right to personal identity, indeed 
require an accommodating approach in cross‑border cases concerning rainbow 
families.58
54 As explained in Ch. 12, section 12.4.4, this measure was introduced to alleviate the effects of a newly 
introduced rule that unmarried stable partners no longer qualified for family reunification. When the 
latter rule was lifted, so was the marriage visa measure.
55 See Ch. 9, section 9.6.4.
56 See Ch. 9, section 9.6.2.1.
57 See Ch. 9, section 9.7.2.
58 See also Ch. 7, section 7.2.2.1.







Turning to the national level, in the Netherlands, the granting of entry and residence to 
same‑sex partners of EU citizens, or the approving of family reunification applications 
by same‑sex partners of third‑country nationals, has never been an issue. In Ireland 
explicit accommodation of the cross‑border movement of same‑sex couples (whether 
or not it involved EU citizens) was introduced in 2011, albeit that these changes were 
only laid down in policy, not in law.59 In Germany, same‑sex partners of EU citizens 
have only been recognised on a fully equal basis with different‑sex partners of EU 
citizens since 2013, while same‑sex spouses and same‑sex registered partners of 
third‑country nationals have qualified for family reunification on an equal footing 
with different‑sex spouses since 2005.
The picture in respect of the legal position of same‑sex couples after entry and 
residence, is equally diverse. In the Netherlands, foreign same‑sex registered 
partnerships and marriages have been recognised as such and it is therefore 
unlikely that foreign same‑sex couples will lose certain rights upon moving to the 
Netherlands. In Ireland and Germany same‑sex marriages are downgraded, while 
foreign same‑sex registered partnerships are recognised only if they meet certain 
standards (see 13.2.1.2 above). This could be perceived as partial, conditional 
accommodation. Same‑sex couples that migrate to Germany or Ireland (may) thus 
enjoy protection under the law of these States, but the level of protection may be 
lower when compared to the home State. Boosting or upgrading of the same‑sex 
couple’s civil status has been explicitly ruled out in Germany.60
When it comes to parental links, there have been clear examples of an accommodating 
approach being taken by national courts. For instance, various German courts 
have, in more recent years, recognised parental links that same‑sex couples had 
established abroad, including – with some exceptions61 – in cases where such links 
could not have been established under German law. The best interests of the child 
as well as developments in German law towards the greater equalisation of civil 
partnership with marriage in respect of parental matters, have been express grounds 
for such accommodation. In that regard it has been expressly held by some courts 
that children were not to be the victim of their parents’ cross‑border movement; 
the obligation to observe German law could not be pursued by trampling upon the 
children concerned.62 In Ireland a similar approach has been adopted in the 2014 
Family Relationships Bill.63 In the Netherlands, apart from a few early exceptions,64 
generally an accommodating approach has been taken in respect of cross‑border 
cases involving parental matters. This is unsurprising, since the Netherlands has also 
been in the vanguard when it comes to granting parental rights to same‑sex couples.
59 Ch. 11, section 11.4.3.
60 Ch. 10, section 10.4.5.
61 See the situation involving a so‑called co‑mother, as discussed in section 13.2.1.2 above.
62 See Ch. 10, section 10.4.8.
63 See Ch. 11, section 11.4.5.
64 See the example referred to in section 13.2.1.2 above.
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Accommodation in the context of the present case study, may take either more (pro‑)
active or more passive forms, which may each have different implications for the 
States concerned. Firstly, the kind of measures as discussed in section 13.2.2.1 above, 
may be perceived as active promotion of national standards at the international level, 
possibly even as ‘exportation’ of national standards to other States. This may have 
implications for the diplomatic relations of the State concerned.65
Accommodation by means of recognition of civil status or parental links established 
abroad generally takes a more passive form, as in most cases States only recognise 
these to the level they provide for them at national level, and do not actively have 
to provide for anything under their national law in this regard. This clearly holds 
for the forms of partial and conditional accommodation that Ireland and Germany 
employ in respect of foreign same‑sex marriages and partnerships (see above). The 
recognition of foreign same‑sex marriages and partnerships, as well as parental 
links, by the Netherlands is also mainly passive, as it comes down to recognising 
something foreign that meets the national standard.
Accommodation by means of recognition takes a more active form where a civil 
status is recognised that is not at all provided for at national level, or where parental 
links are recognised that could not have been established under the national law of 
the host state in the first place. Recognition in such circumstances may imply reverse 
discrimination and this may put pressure, perhaps even ‘serious pressure’,66 on host 
States to amend their national family laws and to adapt them to the standard of the 
State of origin.
For individuals, accommodation is evidently much more beneficial than warding off, 
as it optimises their free movement. Accommodation enables same‑sex couples to 
move to (other) EU Member States and to continue to enjoy their family lives there. 
Moreover, it reduces or takes away the risk of limping relationships and of parental 
links not being recognised in the daily lives of the rainbow families in the host 
States. Same‑sex couples may also profit from access to registration forms abroad, 
although the positive effect may be diminished if this status is not recognised upon 
return to the home State or upon movement to another State with a less permissive 
regimes.
65 As noted above, the Dutch legislature feared being accused of imposing their national standards 
upon other States through the claiming of recognition of a civil status acquired under their national 
law. Within the confines of the present legal research no backlash implications have, however, been 
identified.
66 M. Melcher, ‘Private international law and registered relationships: an EU perspective’, 20 European 
Review of Private Law (2012) p. 1075 at p. 1085.








Different from in Case Study I on reproductive rights, in the present case study 
on legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, an outsourcing approach has not 
been seen to have been employed by the ECtHR. In other words, this Court has not 
accepted foreign registration options as (part of a) justification of restrictive national 
regimes in respect of legal recognition of same‑sex couples. States have also not 
claimed an interest in such an outsourcing option. This may be explained by the fact 
that in many cases, there is no true ‘safety valve’ or ‘outsourcing option’ for States 
in the context of the present case study, as various States subject access to marriage 
or partnership registration to conditions relating to residency and/or nationality (see 
13.2.1.1 above).67 Also, the possible existence of an ‘outsourcing’ option does not 
exclude that, upon return to their States of origin, the couples concerned may claim 
recognition of their newly acquired civil status. The pressure on the national law 
that ensues from such claims, may considerably diminish the desired effects of the 
‘outsourcing’ option.
It is very likely that States may also respond to cross‑border movement in the 
context of the present case study by adjusting their national standard‑setting in 
the area to that of another State or other States to which cross‑border movement 
takes place. In the present case study no such express adaptation measures can be 
identified, however. The fact that cross‑border movement is taking place, has not, 
as such, been put forward as a reason for introducing forms of legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships at the national level. What has been visible, however, is that 
developments in other European countries and at the European and international 
levels have had some impact at the national level in all three national jurisdictions 
studied in this case study. Some States did not want to lag behind other (European) 
States or in European integration in a broader sense. For instance, the German Civil 
Partnership Act aimed to adopt and transpose two European calls for the creation of 
legal options for the registration of same‑sex unions.68
The present case study has also revealed another response to cross‑border movement 
by same‑sex couples which is perhaps best described as ‘backing out’. As discussed 
in Chapter 12, in the Netherlands fear that other countries would not accept or 
recognise the Dutch legislative choices, was presented as an argument against the 
granting of certain rights to same‑sex couples. It was the main reason why the Dutch 
government initially did not want to risk opening up marriage or to introduce joint 
international adoption for same‑sex couples. Hence, although in the end the fears did 
not materialise in the Netherlands, cross‑border movement potentially has a chilling 
effect on the development of national standard‑setting in respect of legal recognition 
of same‑sex relationships. This is of course most likely to occur where States are in 
the vanguard and this chilling effect may diminish the more other States grant legal 
recognition to same‑sex relationships.
67 See Ch. 12, section 12.4.3.
68 See Ch. 10, section 10.3.2.
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13.2.4. Resumé and outlook
In the present case study in essence two categories of legal responses to cross‑border 
movement have been identified: warding off and accommodation. In their 
most extreme form these are, in the context of the present case study, mutually 
exclusive. However, it has turned out that different degrees of warding off and of 
accommodation are possible. For example, in some cases States, like Ireland and 
Germany have resorted to partial or conditional accommodation in their dealing 
with cross‑border movement in the context of the present case study (see 13.2.2.3 
above). It has furthermore been shown that States have generally maintained their 
national standards in cross‑border cases, which implies that they have either warded 
off or resorted to passive forms of accommodation only. Generally only if, or to the 
extent that, a certain level of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships and rainbow 
families was provided for at national level, have States recognised foreign civil status 
and parental links. In other words, these legal responses have been in most cases a 
perfect reflection of what has been provided for at domestic level and have developed 
as progressively as national standards. This has only differed exceptionally, with 
cross‑border cases involving parental matters being the clearest example. Here, 
sometimes – and increasingly – the best interests of the child have been considered 
to require such recognition. However, in these cases generally reference has also 
been made to the family law standards of the host State and at times this has implied 
that recognition is not provided for.69
Because all three States studied in this research have introduced some form of legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships and have granted some parental rights to these 
couples, the implications for individual couples and families moving to these States 
may be not so severe when compared to States that do not provide for any form 
of legal recognition under their national law. Still, the effects on individuals of for 
example downgrading should not be underestimated (see 13.2.1.3 above).
Standard‑setting at the European level for cross‑border cases in the context of the 
present case study has so far been fairly minimal. Some minimum accommodation 
obligations in respect of the entry and residence of same‑sex partners of EU citizens 
follow from the relevant Free Movement Directive, but particularly as regards the 
legal position of these couples once entry and residence have been granted, there 
remain various open questions. Here, case law of the CJEU or further guidance of 
the EU legislature on the discretion that States either have or do not have in these 
matters, is much desired. The ECtHR has given the clearest guidance in this regard 
in respect of cases concerning parental matters, but under the ECHR also, not all 
issues arising in cross‑border cases have crystallised. This also implies that, as goes 
for Case Study I,70 there is room and potential for (further) bilateral or coordinated 
legal responses to develop, for example, by means of the harmonisation of Private 
International Law.
69 See the German case concerning a co‑mother as discussed in section 13.2.1.2 above.
70 See Ch. 7, section 7.2.5.







Other categories of – and in fact also different types of – legal responses to cross‑border 
movement in the context of the present case study that have been visible, albeit to a 
limited extent only, are adaptation and ‘backing out’. These concern not so much the 
responses of States to individual cross‑border cases, but their reaction to (potential) 
incidences of such movement at a more abstract level. They are in fact opposites, or 
in any case communicating vessels, as the greater the number of States that provide 
for legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, the more likely it is that adaptation 
instead of ‘backing out’ takes place.
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14.1. morAlly sensItIve Issues And cross‑border movement In 
the eu
This concluding chapter firstly sketches the overall picture that arises from the two 
case studies on reproductive matters and legal recognition of same‑sex relationships 
respectively. Parallels are drawn and trends are discerned in respect of balancing 
exercises and legislative and judicial processes in these morally sensitive issues 
(sections 14.1.1 and 14.1.2 respectively). Section 14.1.3 focuses on the case law of the 
two European Courts in these matters. Legal responses to cross‑border movement in 
morally sensitive issues are subsequently discussed in section 14.1.4. The concluding 
section, section 14.2, reflects upon this overall picture by means of a number of 
observations.
14.1.1. Balancing exercises in morally sensitive issues
Given that both case studies concern morally sensitive issues, they have also 
addressed complex balancing exercises. The interests included in such balancing 
exercises differ in number and (sometimes) in nature between the case studies. 
In Case Study I on reproductive matters, a broader range of interests is involved 
when compared to Case Study II on the legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. 
The spectrum of interests involved in reproductive issues ranges from interests 
like personal autonomy to human dignity and protection of the (unborn) child. In 
Case Study II on the legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, by contrast, most 
balancing exercises concern, or at least have concerned in the past, equal treatment 
on the one hand and traditional notions of marriage and the family on the other.1 This 
difference in the number of interests may first of all be explained by the fact that 
Case Study I on reproductive matters covers a wide(r) variety of issues, ranging from 
abortion to various types of assisted human reproduction (e.g. donation of gametes 
and preimplantation genetic diagnosis), to surrogacy. The subject‑matter of Case 
Study II on the other hand, is more straightforward, as it is about access to civil 
status and parental rights for same‑sex couples. Moreover, with each reproductive 
issue discussed in Case Study I, generally a broader range of interests is involved, 
when compared to the subject‑matter of Case Study II. This may be explained by 
the fact that in reproductive matters generally more parties are concerned (e.g. 
1 This was different in respect of parental rights for same‑sex couples, however, as there also the interests 
of the child came in (see below). See more elaborately Ch. 13, section 13.1.4.







the (unborn or future) child, gamete donors or surrogate mothers) whose interests 
the State may also intend to protect. In Case Study II any conflict is between the 
interests of same‑sex couples and those of the State, or the general interest. This is 
only different in respect of parental matters, as there are also the rights of the child 
to consider (see below).
The present research has shown that the jurisdictions studied generally recognise 
the same interests in the relevant case studies, but the weight that is, or has been, 
accorded to these interests differs between the various jurisdictions. The ECtHR 
has recognised most of the relevant individual interests and has held that these 
fall within the scope of the ECHR. The actual protection of such interests has, 
however, sometimes lagged behind. Striking examples are Schalk and Kopf, where 
the Strasbourg Court held that same‑sex couples come within the scope of Article 
12 ECHR (the right to marry), but nonetheless considered a complete barrier on 
access to marriage for same‑sex couples compatible with the ECHR; and A, B and C, 
where the Court held that abortion on social and medical grounds fell within scope 
of the right to private life (Article 8 ECHR), but nonetheless held that an absolute 
prohibition on this practice could be upheld.2
The interests of the child have prevailed in both case studies, and can thus be said 
to be a connecting factor between the two case studies. In Case Study I, it has been 
demonstrated that the rights of the (future) child have been put forward in legislative 
debates and in judicial proceedings, and at times they have been accepted by 
legislatures and courts as an argument against certain forms of reproductive treatment. 
In Case Study II this interest has been – increasingly – prominent in the context of 
parental rights for same‑sex couples. Both case studies have shown that involvement 
of the interests of the (future) child makes a crucial difference to balancing exercises 
and in both case studies developments towards a more child‑centred approach have 
been visible. Even more so once a child is born, its rights and interests are accepted 
to be the primordial consideration in all legal systems studied. This has proven of 
particular relevance in cross‑border cases, such as cross‑border surrogacy cases.3
This great focus on the interests of the child also reveals, at a more general level, 
a shift in the nature of interests. Both case studies point to an emerging trend of 
granting more protection to relatively concrete interests such as the best interests of 
the child, over rather abstract interests like ‘the traditional institution of marriage’. 
This development can also be regarded as a shift from values deeply entrenched 
in the society and law of a specific State, to less value‑charged values that are 
(more) commonly shared and transnational. Put differently, an erosion of the 
typical national is taking place. For example, ‘the best interests of the child’ can be 
regarded a value‑neutral interest, to which not many would object and that is not 
unique to one specific State. That the ECtHR has been focusing increasingly on 
similarly value‑neutral principles like legal certainty and information in the context 
2 See Ch. 8, section 8.2.2; and Ch. 2, section 2.2.3, respectively.
3 See, inter alia, Ch. 2, section 2.4.2.







of reproductive matters, reveals a similar trend. That is not to say that tradition has 
completely dissolved as a relevant interest in the national and European debates and 
standard‑setting. For example, the ECtHR accepts the special status of traditional 
marriage as a justification for reserving access to marriage to different‑sex couples. 
Also, traditional notions of the family can be held to have indirectly played a role 
where importance has been attached to biological reality, as has been the case in 
the context of both case studies.4 While the ECtHR will presumably not reduce the 
protection of traditional marriage so long as a majority of States strongly holds on 
to it, it is to be expected that the trend of focusing on value‑neutral interests in the 
ECtHR case law will continue in the future, which may also have implications for 
traditional notions of the family.
When it comes to the actual balancing exercises, another trend is a greater legal 
recognition of de facto situations, such as de facto family life (see also 14.2.3 
below). Over time, legislatures and courts have come to acknowledge that those 
in relationship forms and family forms that were not as such recognised under the 
law also required protection. The ECtHR in particular has given important impetus 
to this development that has clearly had implications for national standard‑setting 
in these areas. Next to this, there appears to be increased focus on balancing in 
individual cases. Although Case Study I has made clear that there has been room 
under the ECHR for bright line rules in reproductive matters, generally there has 
been increasing attention paid to careful balancing in individual cases, with due 
regard for the individual circumstances of the case concerned. This holds expressly 
for situations where a child is involved, and it also applies in abortion cases, for 
example. Both these developments have proven relevant in both internal and 
cross‑border situations.
These trends regarding the nature of interests and regarding balancing exercises 
have brought about concrete changes at the national level in standard‑setting in these 
areas and there is reason to assume that further changes will be brought about in 
the (near) future. In both case studies there have been hints or even clear signs that 
change is, or may be, forthcoming in the relevant standard‑setting on reproductive 
matters and/or legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. Presumably because the 
balancing exercises are more straightforward, in Case Study II the direction and 
possible end point of debates and standard‑setting in the area are clearer and more 
well‑defined than in Case Study I. In Case Study II, generally developments towards 
greater protection of LGBT rights and increased legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships have been discernible in the various jurisdictions, and there is reason 
to assume that these developments will continue in the five jurisdictions included 
in this research.5 In Case Study I, on the other hand, because of the advancement of 
medical science there is more (potential) for new scientific developments and thus 
new (ethical) challenges for the legislature and the judiciary whereby it is not so clear 
from the outset which direction they will take. For instance, recently a technique has 
4 See, inter alia, Ch. 2, section 2.4.1 and Ch. 8, section 8.2.4.2.
5 See Ch. 13, section 13.1.1.







been developed as a result of which children may have three genetic parents, which 
also raises questions regarding multiple parenthood.6 In a State like the Netherlands, 
this may possibly trigger the ‘repeating break’ process, as set out in Chapter 6, 
whereby such a new medical technological development will meet with concerns 
about its ethical acceptability, but will nonetheless been regulated for, by subjecting 
it to certain limitations.
14.1.2.	 Legislative	and	judicial	processes	in	morally	sensitive	issues
The European jurisdictions generally have taken a rather reactive, pragmatic 
and incremental approach to morally sensitive issues. There has been little to no 
substantive standard‑setting at the EU level on these matters, but the relevance of 
the vast body of EU law in areas like cross‑border health care, the free movement of 
persons, and equal treatment for the two case studies, must not be underestimated. 
Where a case was brought before the CJEU that related to either reproductive 
matters or legal recognition of same‑sex relationships more substantively, this Court 
has generally taken a very careful and reactive approach (see also 14.3.1 and 14.3.2 
below). The Strasbourg Court has also generally been reluctant to intervene in these 
matters. States have been left much room to introduce change at their own pace, as 
long as the competing interests were weighed in the national legislative process, and 
as long as they kept the area under review. The ECtHR has never reproached States 
for delays in the adoption of legislation in these areas; only where States had taken 
a first step, has the ECtHR sometimes found violations of the ECHR (see 14.3.2 
below). The ECtHR has thus enabled, or perhaps even stimulated, States to take an 
incremental approach in these matters.
When it comes to the legislative and judicial processes at the national level studied 
in the two case studies, some general trends can be discerned, although these 
have often been accompanied by evident exceptions. In both case studies change 
was generally brought about at a slow pace, often step‑by‑step, and in both case 
studies there has often been a certain or even considerable reluctance on the side 
of the legislature to regulate the relevant area. At times faster developments were 
also discernible, however, for instance in Ireland in the context of Case Study II.7 
Reluctance on the side of the legislature has also proven no ironclad rule, as, for 
instance, the Dutch legislature showed, with its eagerness to legislate for the legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships.
Presumably because a broader range of interests appears to be involved in reproductive 
matters (see 14.1.1 above) and because the issues discussed in Case Study I are more 
diverse, so the legislative and judicial processes have been broader and more diverse. 
In the context of Case Study I, setbacks have been identified more often when 
6 C. Pritchard, ‘The girl with three biological parents’, bbc.com 31 August 2014, www.bbc.com/news/
magazine‑28986843, visited February 2015 and J. Callagher, ‘MPs say yes to three‑person babies’, bbc.
com 3 February 2015, www.bbc.com/news/health‑31069173, visited February 2015.
7 See Ch. 13, section 13.1.1.







compared to Case Study II, where the developments appeared to take a more steady 
course, namely towards increasing recognition of same‑sex relationships (see above). 
In Case Study II the pace at which such change was brought about has differed much 
though, both between the national jurisdictions studied, as within State jurisdictions.8 
As explained in Chapter 13, this difference in pace may be related to a difference in 
the path chosen by States. For instance, in Germany fairly early (in 2001) a separate 
civil partnership for same‑sex couples was introduced, which was, over the years, 
slowly but steadily increasingly equalised with marriage. Ireland, on the other hand, 
for long provided for no form of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships, but 
once it introduced civil partnerships in 2011, developments happened very fast, as 
that very same year the initial steps towards the opening up of marriage were taken.9
The interplay between the legislature and the judiciary, as well as between the 
European and the national levels has differed in and between the case studies. 
Generally, when compared to the Netherlands, in Ireland and Germany the judiciary 
has played a more important role in standard‑setting in morally sensitive matters. The 
German Constitutional Court has impacted much of the national standard‑setting in 
both case studies, while in the case of Ireland some issues were in the end decided by 
the ECtHR, most profoundly in the context of abortion.
14.1.3.	 Morally	sensitive	issues	before	the	European	Courts
A number of things are striking if one takes a closer look at how the CJEU and the 
ECtHR have dealt with cases concerning morally sensitive issues. As also noted 
above, these Courts have generally taken a very prudent approach to such matters, 
leaving ample room to States to decide on these issues at the national level. This 
section observes, first of all, that the approach of both Courts could at times even be 
described as ‘evasive’. In addition, both European Courts have applied a similar kind 
of reasoning that is – in subsection 14.1.3.2 below – typified as the ‘in for a penny, 
in for a pound’ approach. Lastly, in the case law of the ECtHR, for both case studies 
variations on the margin of appreciation doctrine can be identified, as discussed in 
subsection 14.1.3.3.
14.1.3.1. Very careful, at times evasive, Courts
Both the CJEU and the ECtHR have repeatedly emphasised in cases concerning 
morally sensitive issues that their judgment applied only in the case at hand and 
that they were ‘not called upon’,10 or that it was not their ‘task’11 to answer ‘general 
8 Idem.
9 See Ch. 11, section 11.3.6.
10 Inter alia, Case C‑506/06 Sabine Mayr [2008] ECR I‑1017, ECLI:EU:C:2008:119 and Case C‑34/10 
Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669. See Ch. 3, sections 3.1.1.
11 Inter alia, ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04 and ECtHR [GC] 3 November 
2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00. See Ch. 8, section 8.2.2 and Ch.2, section 2.3.3 respectively.







questions’12 or ‘broach’13 ethical questions. Both Courts have at times gone to great 
lengths to explain what the case before them was not about, and what their judgment 
did not implicate.14 They thus explicitly delineated the scope of the cases before 
them and correspondingly the effects of their rulings. While this is inherent in case 
law and the role of the judiciary in general, the explicitness of such statements in 
the relevant judgments discussed in this research have caught the eye. Moreover, 
although one has to be careful not to become suggestive, at times it proves difficult 
to avoid the impression that these Courts have been eager to find a ‘way out’ in 
such cases, in order to avoid the need to address the respective thorny issues. In 
any case, some of the rulings in these areas deviated from standing case law. For 
example, the finding of the CJEU in Grogan, that the link between the activity of 
the defendant student associations and medical terminations of pregnancies carried 
out in clinics in another Member State was ‘too tenuous’ for there to be a restriction 
of free movement,15 has been received as at variance with the then existing line of 
case law.16 Another example are the surrogacy cases C.D. and Z., where the CJEU 
was fairly rigid in holding that the cases did not come within the scope of any of 
the Directives invoked by the plaintiffs.17 One of the rulings of the ECtHR with 
a semblance of evasiveness, is its inadmissibility decision in abortion case D. v. 
Ireland. The ECtHR accepted that the exhaustion of domestic remedies criterion 
was fulfilled because it found it ‘unlikely’ that the Irish courts would interpret the 
Irish abortion prohibition ‘with remorseless logic’, a finding from which the ECtHR 
itself later deviated.18 The ECtHR seems, further at times, to have been ‘hiding 
behind’ what already had been introduced at the national level. In Schalk and Kopf, 
for example, the Court noted that a civil partnership for same‑sex couples had been 
introduced in Austria in the meantime, and therefore considered it ‘not its task’ to 
establish whether the lack of any means of legal recognition for same‑sex couples 
would have constituted a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 
if this situation had persisted at the time the Court decided the case.19 Also, the 
ECtHR’s formal equality approach in respect of complaints about discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation, whereby the Court held that same‑sex partners 
were not in a comparable situation to different‑sex spouses,20 can be perceived in 
some cases as a ‘way out’, especially where the Court did not take into account 
12 Inter alia, ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07 and ECtHR [GC] 7 November 
2013, Vallianatos a.o. v. Greece, nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09. See Ch. 8, sections 8.2.4.1.2 and 8.2.3.4.
13 Inter alia, Case C‑506/06 Sabine Mayr [2008] ECR I‑1017, ECLI:EU:C:2008:119 and Case C‑34/10 
Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I‑9821, ECLI:EU:C:2011:669. See Ch. 3, section 3.1.1.
14 Idem; ECtHR 26 June 2014, Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11 and ECtHR [GC] 7 November 2013, 
Vallianatos a.o. v. Greece, nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09. See Ch. 3, section 3.1.1; Ch. 2, section 2.4.2; 
and Ch. 8, section 8.2.3.4 respectively.
15 See Ch. 3, section 3.5.2.1.
16 Idem.
17 See Ch. 3, section 3.3.4.
18 See Ch. 2, sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.3.
19 See Ch. 8, section 8.2.2.2. See also N.R. Koffeman, ‘Case note to ECtHR 24 June 2010, Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria, no. 30141/04’, 11 European Human Rights Cases 2010/92 (in Dutch).
20 See Ch. 13, section 13.1.3.







that marriage was not open to same‑sex couples.21 The latter brings us to a specific 
approach that both European Courts have taken on morally sensitive issues.
14.1.3.2. The ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ approach
In both case studies both the CJEU and the ECtHR have taken a specific approach 
that has been referred to as ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’.22 It entails the idea that 
States may decide whether or not to grant a certain right or entitlement at the national 
level, but once they do indeed grant that right or entitlement and they thereby act 
within the scope of European law, they must do so in a way which meets European 
standards. In other words, the European Courts respect national decisions in these 
areas in their most fundamental and principled forms, but subject national measures 
that give effect to such principled choices to their scrutiny as soon as they have a 
connection with European law.
In the case law of the CJEU, the ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ approach has been 
visible in particular in the employment cases discussed in the context of Case Study 
II. The Luxembourg Court there has held that if States introduce legislation which 
puts (same‑sex) civil partners and (different‑sex) spouses in a comparable situation 
in respect of a certain employment benefit, while marriage is under the law of that 
State open to different‑sex couples only, they must then extend the employment 
benefit concerned to civil partners.23 Hence, it is up to States to decide on the legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships, but once they have introduced a partnership 
form for these couples, they must ensure their equal treatment in the context of 
employment as provided for under EU law.
The ECtHR has employed the ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ approach in more 
diverse settings and correspondingly in more diverse fashions. It has held, firstly, 
and following similar lines as are visible in the CJEU case law, in the context of Case 
Study II that States must grant rights and entitlements that come within the scope of 
the Convention in a non‑discriminatory manner.24 However, as noted in Chapter 13, 
21 See Ch. 8, section 8.2.5.
22 J. Gerards, ‘Judicial Minimalism and ‘Dependency’’, in: M. van Roosmalen et al. (eds.), Fundamental 
Rights and Principles. Liber Amicorum Pieter van Dijk (Cambridge, Intersentia 2013) p. 73 at p. 81 
and J. Gerards, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the national courts: giving shape to the 
notion of ‘shared responsibility’’, in: J. Gerards and J. Fleuren, Implementation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and of the judgments of the ECtHR in national case law. A comparative 
analysis (Cambridge, Intersentia 2014) pp. 13–94. In Dutch academia the approach has also been 
referred to as ‘vastklikmethode’, which is most literally translated as ‘pinning down method’. See, 
inter alia, J.H. Gerards, EVRM – algemene beginselen [ECHR – general principles] (Den Haag Sdu 
2011) pp. 58–62 and N.R. Koffeman, ‘Het Ierse abortusverbod en het EVRM; is uitbesteding de 
nieuwe norm?’ [‘The Irish abortion ban and the ECHR: is outsourcing the new standard?’], 36 NTM/
NJCM‑Bulletin (2011) p. 372 at pp. 374–375.
23 See Ch. 3 section 9.3.
24 In Case Study I the non‑discrimination requirement has not been so visible in the case law of the 
ECtHR. It was applied by the Chamber in the S.H. and Others case concerning gamete donation, but 
this was later overruled by the Grand Chamber. In fact, the Strasbourg Court has – without explaining 
this further – held a same‑sex couple, not to be in a similar situation to infertile heterosexual couples. 
See Ch. 2, section 2.3.3.







when compared to the CJEU, the ECtHR has taken a more formal equality approach 
in the relevant cases by accepting civil status as a vehicle for a difference in 
treatment.25 The ECtHR has thus only applied the ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ 
approach in cases where different‑sex couples and same‑sex couples with the same 
legal status were treated differently. In other words, the reach of the approach has 
been narrower in the case law of the ECtHR, when compared to that of the CJEU. 
On the other hand, the CJEU’s application of the approach in the context of Case 
Study II has been – given the division of competences within the EU – confined to 
employment cases, while the ECtHR’s case law extends to all matters that fall within 
the scope of a material Convention right, such as the right to respect for private life 
(Article 8 ECHR). In the context of Case Study I the ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ 
approach in the case law of the ECtHR has entailed that if States decide to legalise 
abortion on certain grounds, they must ensure that there are sufficient procedural 
safeguards in place to make that right effective.26 States must furthermore shape 
their legal frameworks in the area of reproductive matters ‘[…] in a coherent manner 
which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be adequately taken into 
account.’27 Also, in respect of both case studies, the ECtHR has made clear that 
States must ensure that their legislation in these areas is consistent,28 and thus that 
principled choices are continued on in various realms of the law.29
That both European Courts have employed the ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ can be 
explained in different ways. Firstly, in respect of the CJEU it must be noted that when 
it comes to civil status, an area is concerned in which the EU has no competence. 
The CJEU can accordingly not give any ruling in respect of the question of whether 
States must introduce a civil partnership for same‑sex couples, but it can rule upon 
the implications of such a choice in the field of employment, as that is an area in 
respect of which the EU is competent. Under the Convention, the rationale for the ‘in 
for a penny, in for a pound’ reasoning is not so much a matter of a classic division of 
competences, but it nonetheless has everything to do with the relationship between 
the ECtHR and the States. When it comes to the ECtHR, the ‘in for a penny, in 
for a pound’ approach can be perceived as a means of steering a middle course 
between respect for States’ sovereignty and national (democratically justified) 
decision‑making on the one hand, and protection of the rights of individuals on 
the other. By pressing for relatively value‑neutral aspects such as consistency, the 
ECtHR can impose certain common standards on States without touching upon the 
true difficulties (see more elaborately 14.2.1 below).
25 See Ch. 13, section 13.1.6.
26 See more elaborately Ch. 2, sections 2.2.3.5 and 2.2.4.
27 E.g. ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 100. See Ch. 2, section 2.3.3.
28 Inter alia, ECtHR 28 August 2012, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, no. 54270/10 and ECtHR [GC] 19 February 
2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07. See Ch. 2, section 2.3.4 and Ch. 8, section 8.2.3.1.
29 It has been noted in this regard that one may wonder if it is indeed feasible to be entirely coherent 
in regulation in these fields. Plus, there is a risk that ‘coherence’ is interpreted in a rather subjective 
manner. N.R. Koffeman, ‘Case‑note to ECtHR 28 August 2012, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, no. 54270/10’, 
13 European Human Rights Cases 2012/222 (in Dutch).







14.1.3.3. Variations on the margin of appreciation in the ECtHR’s case law
What is also striking, if one studies the case law of the ECtHR in both case studies, is 
that this Court has introduced some unprecedented variations on its well‑established 
margin of appreciation in these morally sensitive areas. This especially holds for the 
ECtHR’s case law in reproductive matters,30 but it can also be noted in the context 
of Case Study II. These variations mainly concern the use of consensus based 
arguments for determining the width of the margin. Firstly, in some cases the Court 
has set a higher barrier, by holding that for a common ground to decisively narrow 
the margin, it had to be ‘based on settled and long‑standing principles established 
in the law of the member States’.31 Also, incidentally the lack of consensus on a 
broadly defined issue could trump an existing consensus on a more specific issue.32 
A third variation has featured only in Case Study II so far and concerns the limiting 
of the number of States that were taken into account in the determination of the 
consensus. As discussed in Chapter 8, in the Austrian X. and Others case concerning 
second‑parent adoption for same‑sex couples, the ECtHR held that it could only 
compare the Austrian choice to limit second‑parent adoption for unmarried couples 
to different‑sex couples with that of those States that allowed for second‑parent 
adoption in unmarried couples. The Court consequently found the relevant group 
of ten States to be too narrow a sample to draw a conclusion as to the existence of a 
possible European consensus on this issue.33
While in the first two variations the established absence of consensus resulted in 
the granting of a wide margin and thus in more discretion for the States, in the 
latter case, consensus was sidelined as a factor influencing the width of the margin 
of appreciation. The margin in the X. and Others case was narrow(ed) because 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was concerned. While the former 
variations thus stood in the way of finding any violation, in the latter case it in fact 
‘enabled’ the Court to find a violation. It is noted that the Court’s determination of 
the width of the margin in the X. and Others case also fits in with the ‘in for a penny, 
in for a pound’ approach as described above, that it had taken in that case. After 
all, the Court ruled that States were under no obligation under the Convention to 
introduce second‑parent adoption for unmarried couples, but once they had, they 
could not discriminate between same‑sex and different‑sex couples in this respect. 
That the Court in those circumstances also only compared with those States that had 
introduced second‑parent adoption for unmarried couples, thus logically followed 
from the approach it had taken.
30 As observed in Ch. 2, section 2.5.
31 ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 96.
32 It is recalled that in the abortion case, A, B and C v. Ireland (2010) an existing consensus towards 
allowing abortion for abortion on social and medical grounds was outweighed by a lack of European 
consensus in respect of the right to life of the unborn. Ch. 2, section 2.2.3.4.
33 ECtHR [GC] 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, para. 149.







14.1.3.4. Resumé and outlook
The European Courts have thus taken a careful, at times evasive, approach in morally 
sensitive matters, but have nonetheless held States to take the consequences of their 
choices in these matters. The wide margin of appreciation that the ECtHR generally 
accords in these matters and the above discussed variations on the determination of 
the width of the margin of appreciation resulting in an (even) wide(r) margin being 
accorded, fit in with the picture of a careful (or even evasive) Court. The ‘in for a 
penny, in for a pound’ approach, and – in the case of the ECtHR – the tailoring of 
the margin of appreciation to that approach, on the other hand, illustrate that both 
European Courts have in certain circumstances and to some extent intervened in 
these morally sensitive matters. Both these developments are likely to be continued 
in the (near) future, with possibly the latter taking the overhand over the former.
14.1.4.	 Legal	responses	to	cross‑border	movement	in	respect	of	morally	
sensitive matters
On the basis of the research in the case studies, a range of legal responses to 
cross‑border movement in morally sensitive issues has been identified in Chapters 
7 and 13. In both case studies ‘warding off’ (the effects of) cross‑border movement, 
that is the deterring of people from going to other States or from coming to their State, 
and the opposite, ‘accommodation’ of (the effects of) cross‑border movement, have 
turned out to be taking place, with the latter gaining ground. A gradual converting 
of warding off into accommodation is visible for both case studies, and it also 
has been found that increasing numbers of accommodation obligations have been 
formulated at the European level. Concrete accommodation obligations that have 
been demanded from the European level are first of all that in cross‑border abortion 
cases and cross‑border reproductive care (CBRC) cases, information about foreign 
treatment options and – in any case in cross‑border abortion cases – follow‑up care 
must be provided.34 Accommodation by means of recognition of the legal effects 
of foreign options, is obligatory in cross‑border surrogacy cases, as parental links 
established abroad must be recognised, in any case if the intended father is also the 
genetic father. In the context of Case Study II, the accommodation obligation can be 
mentioned that States must ‘facilitate’ the entrance of stable same‑sex partners of 
migrating EU citizens. Also, States that have a registered partnership at national level 
that is equivalent to marriage, must authorise the entry and residence of registered 
partners of migrating EU citizens.
The present research has furthermore revealed that there are different forms of 
accommodation. In both case studies, but particularly in Case Study II on legal 
recognition of same‑sex relationships, there have been cases of partial accommodation 
or conditional accommodation, which means that accommodation is made dependent 
upon the national (internal) standards. For instance, none of the States studied have 
34 See Ch. 7, section 7.2.2.







recognised a civil status of same‑sex couples that was not provided for at the national 
level,35 while in Germany and Ireland foreign marriages of same‑sex couples are 
downgraded to a civil partnership. An example of conditional accommodation in 
the context of Case Study I is that under EU law, States only have to reimburse 
treatment obtained abroad if their national scheme provides for reimbursement for 
that kind of treatment.36 Such conditional accommodation is thus fairly passive, as 
it does not require any extra effort from the State concerned. There have also been 
more active forms of accommodation by means of recognition that were taken by 
States or even imposed on them by the European level. For instance, in cross‑border 
cases involving parental rights of same‑sex couples, exceptionally but recently 
increasingly more often, domestic courts have recognised parental links established 
abroad,37 while such recognition is, under certain circumstances, obligatory under 
the ECHR in cross‑border surrogacy cases (see above).
That accommodation is gaining ground may be explained by an increased 
acknowledgement of the fact that in cross‑border situations different interests are 
at stake, or in any case that these interests are weighted differently in cross‑border 
situations. While the relevant individual and general interests do not cease to exist 
at the border,38 other interests may become weightier once a cross‑border situation is 
concerned. This holds true particularly in cross‑border situations where individual 
burdens exist, and even more so when a child is involved whose interests must prevail. 
For instance, in the cross‑border surrogacy case Mennesson, the ECtHR understood 
that the respondent State in international surrogacy cases aimed to protect children 
and surrogate mothers by refusing recognition of parental links established abroad 
and acknowledged that it had an interest ‘in ensuring that its members conform[ed] 
to the choice made democratically within that community’. Still, a fair balance had to 
be struck between this interest of the State and individual interests, the best interests 
of the child concerned being paramount.39 In this international surrogacy case, this 
finding resulted in an obligation to recognise parental links legally established in 
another State.
While accommodation may alleviate or remove individual burdens that are 
involved in cross‑border movement, certainly not all individual burdens involved in 
cross‑border movement have been addressed at State level. From the analysis in both 
Chapters 7 and 13 it can be concluded that sometimes States have appeared unwilling 
to alleviate individual burdens, taking the stance that these are the responsibility of 
the individuals. It must also be noted in this regard that some individual burdens may 
prove very difficult to protect unilaterally, as for the protection of certain interests, 
States are dependent upon other States. For example, if a State wants to protect the 
right of children to know their genetic origins, it must make arrangements with 
35 See Ch. 13, section 13.2.2.3.
36 See Ch. 3, section 3.6.2.1 and Ch. 7, section 7.2.2.2.
37 See Ch. 13, section 13.2.2.2.
38 Compare the dissenters to ECtHR [GC] 3 November 2011, S.H. a.o. v. Austria, no. 57813/00, para. 13 
and ECtHR 26 June 2014, Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11.
39 See Ch. 2, section 2.4.2.







another State in situations where the children have been conceived with the use of 
gametes donated in that other State.
Legal responses at a more abstract level to the phenomenon of cross‑border 
movement in morally sensitive issues have been: ‘outsourcing’ as identified in Case 
Study I; ‘backing out’ as identified in Case Study II; and ‘adaptation’ as has been 
visible in both case studies, albeit in Case Study I more expressly than in Case 
Study II. As explained in Chapter 13, the fact that ‘outsourcing’ – whereby foreign 
options contribute to the justification of restrictive regimes at domestic level – has 
not occurred in the context of Case Study II, may be partly explained by the fact 
that foreign registration and marriage options are not always easily accessible.40 In 
‘backing out’, fear that other countries may not accept or recognise the domestic 
legislative choices has been a ground for not introducing certain change. That this 
particular response has not been so expressly visible in the context of Case Study I 
may be explained in different ways. For Germany and the Netherlands it is possibly 
explained by the fact these States have not contemplated introducing a reproductive 
method that included a risk that its legal effects would not be recognised in other 
States. In Ireland, by contrast, there were plans on the table to legalise surrogacy, but 
these were withdrawn. Whether ‘backing out’ was part of the motivation behind this 
decision, is insufficiently clear.
Chapters 7 and 13 have pointed out that the various legal responses also have 
implications for the individual. Although foreign options in principle contribute to 
the range of options that individuals have, cross‑border movement inherently brings 
with it burdens for individuals, which, in fact, may be considerable, particularly 
in outsourcing situations.41 The warding off of cross‑border movement may add 
to such burdens, while accommodation may alleviate some of them. Burdens for 
individuals that can only be removed by means of adaptation, are burdens involved 
in the travelling itself and burdens that occur in the daily lives of families living in a 
State that does not legally recognise their civil status or their parental links.
14.2. observAtIons
14.2.1.	 Limited	substantive	European	standard‑setting,	but	nonetheless…
Despite limited competences at EU level and the granting of a wide margin of 
appreciation by the ECtHR in many of the morally sensitive issues addressed in 
this research, it cannot be denied that there is increasingly more (indirect) European 
standard‑setting in these areas, both in internal and cross‑border situations.
As noted in section 14.1.4 above, the present research has made clear that there is a 
growing set of European standards for cross‑border situations. States’ legal responses 
40 As noted in Ch. 13, section 13.2.1.1, various States subject access to marriage or partnership registration 
to conditions relating to residency and/or nationality.
41 See Ch. 7, section 7.2.4.







to cross‑border situations are increasingly more dictated by European law. However, 
the (potential for) (indirect) impact of European law on internal situations can also 
not be overlooked. This may first of all be the consequence of the ‘in for a penny, in 
for a pound’ approach, as described in section 14.1.3.2 above. This rather pragmatic 
approach of the European Courts has created obligations for States that cannot be 
ignored. In other words, while not encroaching upon the most fundamental moral 
choices of States, there is European standard‑setting in these areas, albeit in a more 
implicit manner. After all, if States recognise the existence of a right at the national 
level, they are also obliged to set up sufficient preconditions for the effective and 
non‑discriminatory enjoyment of that right.42 They furthermore have to ensure 
that their legal framework in the area is coherent and consistent. While this is not 
harmonisation per se, such reasoning may nonetheless have a harmonising impact. 
States can only escape such European influence by not making a first step at all 
(see also 14.2.1 below), but whether that is a realistic scenario, can be questioned. 
Particularly where other (non‑European) States are taking steps in these areas, and 
where medical scientific developments keep progressing, States may desire to make 
their regimes more permissive, at least to some extent.
It has furthermore proven increasingly difficult to separate the ‘European’ from the 
‘national’ in these areas, since terminology is employed at the European level that is, 
in principle, defined at the national level. EU law texts contain terms such as ‘spouse’, 
‘embryo’ and ‘pregnant worker’, which concern or relate to matters in respect of 
which the Member States are exclusively competent. Even though the relevant 
documents generally refer to national legislation in this regard, it can be difficult to 
keep these two levels of jurisdiction apart. The CJEU has repeatedly stressed in the 
relevant cases that its definition of such terms is a legal definition concerning the 
relevant Directive only (see also 14.1.3.1 above), but it remains very difficult to rule 
out any radiating effect of any such definition adopted by the CJEU. It may affect 
standard‑setting at the national level, and/or may influence other realms of EU law. 
For example, in academia often references have been made to the CJEU case law in 
staff cases and employment cases to substantiate an argument on the approach the 
CJEU should take in free movement cases involving same‑sex couples.43 The Court 
may be indeed inclined to take that case law into account if such a case should come 
before it. This effect may be reinforced by non‑binding standard‑setting in the EU, 
in particular in the area of LGBT rights.44 Related hereto is that obligations of States 
under EU equal treatment legislation may also have a radiating effect on national 
standard‑setting in other fields of law. For instance, the more States are required to 
equalise the position of same‑sex couples with that of different‑sex couples in the 
area of employment, the more likely it seems that they will also do so in other areas, 
possibly including parental matters.
42 Heringa and Van Hoof speak in this regard of ‘the socialising effect of Article 14’. Heringa and Van 
Hoof, ‘Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14)’, in: P. van Dijk et al. (eds.), Theory and Practice of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Antwerpen, Intersentia 2006) p. 1051.
43 See Ch. 9, section 9.6.
44 See Ch. 9, section 9.4.







On the basis of the above one could conclude that EU law, as well as the ECHR, 
are spreading like oil in these areas. The ‘European’ and the ‘national’ are thus 
becoming increasingly interwoven. This may also have implications for (variety in) 
national moral choices.
14.2.2.	 Implications	for	(the	variety	in)	national	moral	choices
The present research has confirmed the premise that there is (a wide) diversity in 
national standard‑setting in morally sensitive issues in the European Union. At the 
same time, it can be observed that various factors have or may have implications for 
(the variety in) national moral choices throughout the European Union. This holds, 
firstly, for the increased indirect impact of European law on national standard‑setting 
in morally sensitive issues, as described above. Further, cross‑border movement in 
itself, as well legal responses thereto – whether deliberately chosen by States or 
imposed on them by European law – have an impact in this respect.
When it comes to internal situations, it can be observed that the implicit or indirect 
harmonising effect of the ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ approach of the European 
Courts as described above, is a particular one. It namely risks becoming an ‘all 
or nothing’ approach, and may in this way drive a wedge between the European 
States. States may either choose not to recognise a certain right or to grant a certain 
entitlement at all – a principled approach for which the European level leaves 
room – or they recognise the existence of a right at the national level, but are also 
obliged to set up the above‑mentioned sufficient preconditions for the enjoyment of 
that right. This effectively limits States’ room for manoeuvre; either they take no 
steps at all or they take the first step, which often, although not necessarily, results 
in an obligation to take even more steps or many steps at once. The latter implication 
is reinforced by the fact that States must provide for a coherent framework in these 
areas, which entails that any principled choice made must be followed up on in all 
realms of the law. Also, the principle will keep applying to each new step that States 
make. The States’ range of options has thus become rather black‑and‑white; either 
they take a very traditional approach to these matters,45 or they join the States in 
the vanguard. There is not much middle ground left, as intermediary and partly 
discriminatory or partly ineffective approaches to these morally sensitive issues 
cannot be easily justified. This particularly holds true in the context of Case Study II 
where the range of options is more black‑and‑white to begin with, but also applies in 
respect of Case Study I. All in all, the variety in moral choices may be delimited by 
the ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ approach.
Turning to the cross‑border picture, it has been observed that in some circumstances 
cross‑border movement can provide a means to uphold national standards for internal 
situations, and thus (a variety in) moral choices. This may hold particularly true in 
45 Cf. F. de Londras and K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, A, B 
& C v Ireland’, 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2013) p. 250 at p. 262.







the context of Case Study I, and academic literature has been especially elaborate 
in respect of such an effect of cross‑border reproductive care (CBRC). Pennings has 
opined, for example, that CBRC should be seen as ‘[…] a safety valve that avoids 
moral conflict, and as such, contributes to a peaceful coexistence of different ethical 
and religious views in Europe.’46 The present research has shown that any such effect 
of cross‑border movement in morally sensitive issues may, however, be diminished 
if the discretion of States to react to such cross‑border movement is restricted by 
European standard‑setting. Whether this is indeed the case, depends on the type 
of legal response that is imposed on States by the European level. Where States are 
required to recognise the legal effects of cross‑border movement, this is more likely 
to have an impact on their standard‑setting at the national level in the area.47 Hence, 
in those situations cross‑border movement may not function as a safety valve. Where 
no such recognition of legal effects is involved, however, as is the case in respect 
of some of the types of reproductive treatment discussed in Case Study I, this may 
be different. The ‘mere’ accommodating of such cross‑border movement by means 
of arranging practicalities such as information and follow‑up care, may put less 
pressure on national standard‑setting and may thus may enable States to uphold less 
permissive regimes. Here, outsourcing – whereby foreign options contribute to the 
justification of restrictive regimes – becomes more realistic.48 Storrow has observed 
in respect of CBRC that ‘[…] the opportunity for patients to go abroad for treatment 
tempers organized resistance to the law and allows government to pass stricter 
regulations than it otherwise might.’49 In other words, where the ECtHR applies an 
outsourcing approach and combines it with accommodation obligations of a limited 
impact, as it has done in the context of Case Study I,50 States with less permissive 
regimes may be less inclined to move towards the more permissive side of the moral 
spectrum. They may instead remain on the less permissive side.
Where there are no realistic outsourcing options, however, cross‑border movement 
and legal responses thereto may instead impact national standard‑setting for internal 
situations and lead to the dominance of more permissive regimes in this regard. 
Firstly, it has appeared in the context of Case Study I that cross‑border movement 
may in itself be a trigger for adaptation of the national standard to those of States 
functioning as countries of destination in these situations. For instance, in the 
context of CBRC, quality and safety concerns about foreign treatment options have 
been put forward as grounds for such adaptation.51 In addition, in both case studies 
46 G. Pennings, ‘Legal harmonization and reproductive tourism in Europe’, 19 Human Reproduction 
(2004) p. 2689 at p. 2694. See also A.P. Ferraretti et al., ‘Cross‑border reproductive care: a phenomenon 
expressing the controversial aspects of reproductive technologies’, 20 Reproductive BioMedicine 
Online (2010) p. 261 at p. 262.
47 See Ch. 7, section 7.2.2.3 and Ch. 13, section 13.2.2.3.
48 See Ch. 7, section 7.2.4.
49 R.F. Storrow, ‘The pluralism problem in cross‑border reproductive care’, 25 Human Reproduction 
(2010) p. 2939 at p. 2941.
50 See Ch. 7, section 7.2.4.
51 See Ch. 7, section 7.2.3. Concerns about ‘deleterious extra‑territorial effects’ (Storrow 2010, supra 
n. 50, at p. 2941) of such cross‑border movement could potentially be another ground for adaptation. 
Here one may think of concerns about risks of exploitation of gamete donors or surrogate mothers in 
foreign countries.







(potential for) more implicit impact on national standard‑setting by means of legal 
responses to cross‑border movement has been identified. As also noted above, 
accommodation consisting of the recognition of the legal effects of such cross‑border 
movement – a civil status or parental links established in another country – may 
affect national standard‑setting for internal situations. Possibly even more so when 
such accommodation is imposed upon them by European law, States acting as host 
States or countries of origin in such cross‑border situations may feel pressurised to 
adapt their national standard‑setting in these areas to the standard that they (must) 
apply in cross‑border situations.52 This may hold particularly true in situations 
where States are required under European law to recognise a civil status or forms of 
parental links that their national law does not even provide for. There is thus reason 
to assume that, in certain circumstances, because of cross‑border movement and 
because legal responses to such movement are required, States are inclined to move 
in the direction of more progressive regimes. Whether this also inherently implies 
a move to the most progressive regime, cannot be firmly concluded on the basis of 
the present research, but requires further (sociological) research. It seems a probable 
conclusion, since so long as more progressive regimes exist, adaptation or implicit 
pressure of accommodation may occur. In other words, cross‑border movement may 
imply that also States that are yet on the fairly progressive side, (feel pressurised to) 
move towards the most progressive regime. This is further confirmed by the fact that 
while ‘backing out’ has been visible as well, this has been only incidentally and only 
occurred when a State was considering being very first to take a step towards a more 
progressive side of the moral spectrum.53
There are thus simultaneous dynamics in opposite directions taking place, that 
all may have implications for (the variety in) national choices in morally sensitive 
issues in the European Union. Where an outsourcing approach is applied, it may 
be more likely that States with less permissive regimes remain on that side of the 
moral spectrum, while accommodation obligations and concerns about implications 
of cross‑border movement, may prompt States to move to or towards the other side of 
this spectrum. These dynamics not only have implications for individuals involved 
in cross‑border movement in these matters (see also 14.1.4 above), but – as national 
standard‑setting for internal situations may be affected by these dynamics – also for 
the nationals of the States concerned that do not cross borders.
14.2.3.	 Reality	outpaces	and	dictates	the	law,	particularly	in	cross‑border	
cases
The present research has, furthermore, shown that in many situations complex 
balancing exercises and ethical objections to certain practices were outpaced by 
real time developments. This applies in internal situations, but even more so in 
cross‑border situations. Even if national legislatures desired so on ethical or moral 
52 See Ch. 7, section 7.2.2.3 and Ch. 13, section 13.2.2.3.
53 See Ch. 13, section 13.2.3.







grounds, they have not been able to prevent certain matters from becoming reality 
and correspondingly from becoming facts of law. Particularly relevant for Case 
Study II has been the reality that States cannot prevent that de facto family life is 
being formed. Particularly in the ECtHR case law, increasingly more protection has 
been granted to de facto family life.54
States may ban or limit certain practices deemed undesirable within their own 
jurisdictions, but to prevent people from going abroad for such practices has proven 
much harder. As a result it has been even more so in cross‑border situations that 
reality has outpaced and dictated the law. The faits accomplis of a born child and of 
parental links having been established abroad in cross‑border surrogacy cases, with 
which States have been confronted in cross‑border situations, have proven forceful 
arguments for narrowing the room for manoeuvre for States in such situations. 
Although so far not confirmed in any European case law, in the future this also may 
hold for the fait accompli of an established civil status in the context of Case Study II.
This time the dynamic of cross‑border movement has thus had clear implications for 
legal responses to cross‑border movement. Accommodation obligations have most 
often been dictated by reality. The reality of cross‑border movement as such has 
furthermore at times been the ground for pragmatic responses like adaptation, as 
also observed above.
14.2.4.	 The	cross‑border	dimension	of	multilevel	jurisdictions
Lastly, the present research has provided the insight that in cross‑border situations in 
fact a unique realm of law applies. Those who cross borders (within the EU), enter 
a special dimension of law. EU free movement law and Private International Law 
are the readiest and most established areas of law that set standards for cross‑border 
situations, but the present research has revealed that standard‑setting for cross‑border 
situations in morally sensitive issues is more comprehensive than those two realms of 
law alone. It encompasses the aforementioned areas of law, but also includes others, 
most profoundly human rights law. This shows all the more that the cross‑border 
dimension is not confined to one level of jurisdiction in the European multilevel 
jurisdiction. Cross‑border situations cut diagonally through horizontal and vertical 
interaction of legal systems and form the trigger, the legal stepping stone, for 
such interaction. Moreover, apart from such interaction between legal systems, 
cross‑border movement may establish an interrelation or interdependency between 
legal systems, in the sense that foreign options can contribute to the justification of 
domestic restrictions. This makes it even more likely that cross‑border situations 
concern a distinct realm of law.
54 ECtHR 19 February 2013, X. a.o. v. Austria, no. 19010/07, para. 145, under reference to ECtHR 
28 June 2007, Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, no. 76240/01, para. 119; ECtHR 25 January 2007, 
Eski v. Austria, no. 21949/03, para. 39 and ECtHR 13 December 2007, Emonet a.o. v. Switzerland, 
no. 39051/03, paras. 63–64.







For individuals involved in cross‑border movement this generally implies that they 
have more legal means to have their interests protected. For States it implies that 
their decision‑making in cross‑border situations is encroached upon. This may, as 
observed above, indirectly affect national standard‑setting in morally sensitive issues 
and thus have implications for (the variety of) moral choices in the European Union.







morAlly sensItIve Issues And cross‑border movement In the eu
the cAses of reproductIve mAtters And legAl recognItIon 
of sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps
Within the European Union (EU) considerable diversity exists in respect of morally 
sensitive issues like abortion, assisted human reproduction (AHR), surrogacy and 
legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. While the 20th century has witnessed 
an increased intergovernmental cooperation between States as well as an increased 
transferral of State powers to supranational organisations such as the EU, certain 
competences have traditionally remained with the States. The aforementioned 
morally sensitive issues are areas of law par excellence where standards are primarily 
set at State level. It is usually considered that it should be left to each State to decide 
whether, for example, abortion is available on social grounds, whether couples can 
become parents with the involvement of a surrogate mother and whether same‑sex 
couples can marry and/or adopt children.
While there is no strong degree of European regulation in these areas, and diversity 
is generally respected at European level, there is nonetheless a certain potential for 
European regulation in these fields. The EU has competences in respect of issues 
that are strongly related to, and at times intertwined with, reproductive matters and 
legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. Here, one may think of competences in 
the areas of health and equal treatment. In addition, several of these morally sensitive 
issues come within the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
for instance by means of the right to respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR. 
There is thus (potential for) (indirect) European influence in these areas.
Cross‑border movement within the EU furthermore adds a new dimension to this 
complex picture. Cross‑border movement is a given within the EU; people move 
around for various reasons and purposes, not uncommonly pursuing economic 
objectives. Such mobility is enabled and stimulated by the EU free movement rules 
that, inter alia, protect the free movement of persons and the freedom to receive 
services in another EU Member State. Diverging regimes in the aforementioned 
morally sensitive matters may create obstacles to such cross‑border movement; they 
may hinder or deter persons from making use of their free movement rights. For 
instance, same‑sex couples may be discouraged from moving to an EU Member 
State where they have no possibility to have their relationship legally recognised by 
means of a civil partnership or marriage. Differences in regimes in morally sensitive 







issues may, by contrast, also be the direct impetus for cross‑border movement within 
the EU, as people from Member States with less permissive regimes may wish to 
enjoy the possibilities, rights and benefits of more permissive regimes of other States. 
For example, in Member States with restrictive abortion regimes, women who wish 
to have their pregnancies terminated may want to travel to Member States with more 
liberal regimes.
Such cross‑border movement and the existing obstacles thereto do not only highlight 
existing diversity in morally sensitive issues, they also imply, among other things, 
that States are increasingly confronted with (the consequences and effects of) other 
States’ regimes. For example, same‑sex couples residing in one EU Member State 
may claim recognition of their marriage concluded in another Member State, while 
women or couples who had a certain type of AHR treatment in another State that 
is outlawed under the law of their own State, may claim reimbursement of the costs 
involved in that treatment under the national health system of their State. Such 
confrontation may require a reaction from the States involved, whether they function 
as country of origin or as country of destination or both.
The present research explores this cross‑border dimension of morally sensitive issues 
within the European Union. It provides an overview of trends and developments 
in national and European law in morally sensitive issues and gives insight into 
the interests that are at stake and the dynamics that apply both in internal and in 
cross‑border situations.
two themAtIc cAse studIes And fIve jurIsdIctIons
The backbone of the present research consists of two thematic case studies – one 
on reproductive matters (Case Study I) and one on legal recognition of same‑sex 
relationships (Case Study II) – which focus on five jurisdictions. The latter encompass 
three national jurisdictions – Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands – and two 
European jurisdictions or systems, namely the EU and the ECHR. The case studies 
have been chosen because they concern pre‑eminently morally sensitive issues and, 
consequently, politically controversial matters, in respect of which EU Member 
States have long taken different positions and still did so at the time this research was 
commenced (i.e., in 2009), as well as when it was concluded (i.e. July 2014). Moreover, 
the issues covered by the two case studies are not ‘just’ morally sensitive issues, they 
also concern areas in which fundamental rights claims can be made and – importantly, 
given the focus of this research – that have a demonstrable cross‑border dimension. 
The three national jurisdictions have been selected, inter alia, because they cover a 
certain range in approaches in respect of reproductive matters and legal recognition 
of same‑sex relationships and have different (constitutional) profiles.
Both case studies follow the same structure. Each one consists of six chapters, five 
describing the standard‑setting in the five selected jurisdictions (the ECHR, the EU, 







Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands respectively), and one drawing conclusions 
for the respective case study.
cAse study I – reproductIve mAtters
Case Study I on reproductive matters covers three subjects, namely abortion, 
assisted human reproduction (AHR) and surrogacy. For each of these topics, the 
five substantive chapters in Case Study I (i.e. Chapters 2 to 6) investigate, for the 
relevant European and national jurisdictions, what – if any – standard‑setting is in 
place, and how this developed over time. For a better understanding of the relevant 
standard‑setting and – where relevant – the debates in politics and legal scholarship 
concerning these often controversial matters, a general (constitutional) framework is 
sketched first. A brief introduction is given to very prominent rights in the relevant 
jurisdiction (e.g. the protection of the unborn on the Irish jurisdiction), as well as to 
a selection of themes and – in the case of the EU – competences that are key in the 
case study. It is subsequently set out if the relevant reproductive services are at all 
legalised and if so, under what conditions access to these services is provided for. 
Also, the financing of abortion and AHR treatment under each State’s national health 
system is briefly addressed. In the discussion of national regulation of surrogacy, the 
possibilities – if they exist at all – for intended parents to establish parental links with 
a child born following a surrogacy arrangement are also discussed. The discussion 
of regulation of AHR addresses a number of issues that may occur in the course 
of AHR treatment, namely, the donation of gametes and embryos, preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD), gender selection and vitrification of egg cells.
The analysis of the internal picture for each of the jurisdictions provides insight 
into what considerations and interests play, or have played, a role in legislative 
debates and case law and how change was or may be brought about. It also provides 
the basis for the subsequent analysis of the cross‑border picture that is enclosed in 
each substantive chapter. The latter analysis starts – where available – with some 
statistics on the scale of cross‑border movement in the context of the case study in the 
respective jurisdiction. Subsequently each of the substantive chapters examines for 
the respective jurisdiction how it has dealt and deals with cross‑border situations in 
reproductive matters and how the jurisdictions interact in this regard. Thereby, inter 
alia, Private International Law regimes and (national implementation of) the EU free 
movement rules are studied, in order to answer questions like whether foreign birth 
certificates are recognised in cross‑border surrogacy cases or whether women who 
wish to have an abortion in another country have a right to access to information 
about such foreign abortion services, as well as a right to follow‑up treatment upon 
return.
Chapter 7 draws conclusions on Case Study I. It discerns trends in standard‑setting 
and in judicial and legislative processes regarding reproductive matters. It is, for 
instance, observed in Chapter 7 that balancing of interests related to reproductive 
matters has often had different outcomes in the three States studied and that the 







legislative and judicial processes in the States have taken different shapes. Also, 
European law (both EU law and the ECHR) explicitly allows for such diversity 
between legal regimes in reproductive matters. States are left room to make their 
own principled choices in these moral and ethical issues and they are free to prohibit 
reproductive practices, as long as the relevant interests have been balanced in the 
decision‑making and as long as their principled choices are consistent. However, 
once they decide to regulate in the area, they must also provide for the effective 
enjoyment of rights and entitlements, which entails that they must ensure that the 
applicable procedures enable careful decision‑making. There are, at the same time, 
also similarities in the ways in which reproductive matters have been dealt with in 
the various jurisdictions. Generally, over time more reproductive practices have been 
legalised and regulated for, or at least initiatives to that effect have been taken. Also, 
a gradual development towards a central role for the best interests of the child is 
clearly visible, although the views on what these require exactly have in some cases 
changed over time. Furthermore, a development has been visible towards assessment 
of reproductive matters with due regard to the individual circumstances of the case. 
Both at European and national levels, there has been increased attention focused on 
the introduction of procedures allowing for careful decision‑making in reproductive 
matters.
On the basis of the analysis of Chapters 2 to 6, Chapter 7 continues to identify four 
types of legal responses to cross‑border movement for reproductive matters. The first 
is ‘warding off’ (the effects of) cross‑border movement, that is the deterring of people 
from going to other States or from coming to their state. Such warding off may take 
different shapes, ranging from travel bans to non‑recognition of legal parenthood 
established in another State in an international surrogacy situation. Secondly, as a 
mirror to the ‘warding off’ approach, States may choose to accommodate (the effects 
of) cross‑border movement in reproductive matters, for example by providing for 
information and follow‑up care in case of cross‑border abortion. A third type of 
response is ‘adaptation’, which means the adjustment of national standard‑setting 
in the area to that of another State or other States to which cross‑border movement 
takes place. Lastly, cross‑border movement has in some situations enabled States 
to ‘outsource’ the protection of certain interests in reproductive matters to other 
States. The ECtHR has in some cases namely held that foreign treatment options 
contributed to the justification of restrictive regimes.
For each of these legal responses, Chapter 7 assesses the extent to which the 
respective response is commensurable with or even dictated by European law. For 
example, it is concluded that warding off by means of non‑recognition of legal effects 
of foreign options or by means of bans on information on foreign treatment options 
has generally proven not easily justified under European law, and refusing follow‑up 
care may also be problematic. It is furthermore assessed how these legal responses 
relate to one another and what the implications of each respective category of legal 
responses are, or may be, for the States concerned, as well as for the individuals 
involved in the cross‑border movement.







cAse study II – legAl recognItIon of sAme‑sex relAtIonshIps
Chapters 8 to 12 of Case Study II explore what the five selected jurisdictions provide 
for in respect of legal recognition of same‑sex relationships. Thereby a first focal 
point is whether same‑sex couples have (a right to) access to a registration form – civil 
partnership or marriage – under the relevant jurisdictions and, if so, what these 
entail. Secondly, the case study covers the question of parental rights for same‑sex 
couples. Thereby various forms of adoption are discussed, namely second‑parent 
adoption (adoption of a child by the partner of the child’s legal and genetic parent), 
successive adoption (the situation where a partner adopts the child of an adoptive 
parent) and joint adoption. Also, legal parenthood by operation of the law and access 
to AHR treatment for same‑sex couples are addressed.
The five substantive chapters of this case study follow the same basic structure 
as Chapters 2 to 6 of Case Study I (see above). They thus start with a general 
(constitutional) framework, followed by a discussion of the internal and the 
cross‑border picture respectively. As in Case Study I, the debates in politics and 
legal scholarship are – where relevant – included in those discussions.
Chapter 13 concludes for Case Study II that when it comes to legal recognition of 
same‑sex relationships across the European Union, States have taken the lead, rather 
than the European institutions. National legislatures, courts and administrative 
bodies set the tone and pace and the European level generally only follows. The 
European Courts have at times given some subtle nudges to the national legislature 
or judiciary, but this was generally only in situations where first (principled) steps 
towards legal recognition had already been taken at the national level. In the case law 
of the ECtHR, civil status has often functioned as a vehicle for unequal treatment of 
same‑sex couples and different‑sex couples. Only in cases where no ‘special legal 
status’ was involved, has the ECtHR applied strict scrutiny.
Traditional notions of marriage and the family have toned down in all three States 
studied, although they have not been completely abandoned in all States. Also, under 
the ECHR marriage does still enjoy strong protection. Moreover, the increased 
acknowledgement and legal protection of de facto family life has been paired with 
the acceptance of biological differences between different‑sex couples and same‑sex 
couples, and between lesbian couples and gay couples, as justification for certain 
differences in treatment between these groups in respect of parental matters. Unequal 
treatment of same‑sex couples does thus still exist, but there has been a shift in 
the justification grounds from more morally charged grounds to more value‑neutral 
grounds.
Generally a steady development towards increased protection of LGBT rights and 
correspondingly legal recognition of same‑sex relationships has been discernible. 
Such change has been in most cases brought about gradually and at a slow pace, with 
some exceptions of much quicker developments. These developments are likely to 
continue in the future. Possibly the European level will take a more proactive stance 







in some respects. In any case it is likely that the European Courts will continue to 
nudge national legislatures and courts in this process of increased equalisation of the 
legal position of same‑sex couples with that of different‑sex couples.
In respect of cross‑border situations, Chapter 13 concludes that in essence two 
categories of legal responses to cross‑border movement can be identified in Case 
Study II: ‘warding off’ and ‘accommodation’. In their most extreme form these are, 
in the context of the case study at hand, mutually exclusive. However, it has turned 
out that different degrees of ‘warding off’ and of ‘accommodation’ are possible. In 
some cases States have resorted to partial or conditional accommodation in their 
dealing with cross‑border movement in the context of Case Study II. For example, 
in Ireland and Germany same‑sex marriages have been ‘downgraded’ to the level of 
civil partnership, while foreign same‑sex registered partnerships are recognised only 
if they meet certain standards. Other categories of legal responses to cross‑border 
movement in the context of Case Study II that have been visible – albeit to a limited 
extent only – are ‘adaptation’ and ‘backing out’. The latter implies the situation 
where fear that other countries will not accept or recognise the national legislative 
choices, is presented as an argument against the granting of certain rights to same‑sex 
couples. Following the lines of Chapter 7, it is assessed subsequently in Chapter 13 
how the various legal responses relate to one another and what the implications of 
each respective category of legal responses are, or may be, for the States concerned, 
as well as for the individuals involved in the cross‑border movement. Chapter 13 
furthermore concludes that standard‑setting at the European level for cross‑border 
cases in the context of Case Study II has so far been fairly minimal. Some minimum 
accommodation obligations in respect of the entry and residence of same‑sex partners 
of EU citizens follow from the relevant Free Movement Directive, but particularly 
as regards the legal position of these couples once entry and residence have been 
granted, there remain various open questions. Here, case law of the CJEU or further 
guidance of the EU legislature as to the discretion that States either have or not do 
not have in these matters is much desired.
conclusIons
The concluding chapter, Chapter 14, provides a synthesis of the relevant findings 
of Chapters 7 and 13, as well as a number of observations about morally sensitive 
issues and cross‑border movement within the EU more generally. It draws parallels 
and discerns trends in respect of balancing exercises and legislative and judicial 
processes in morally sensitive issues. For example, while the jurisdictions studied 
for this research generally recognise the same interests in the relevant case studies, 
the weight that is, or has been, accorded to these interests differs or has differed 
between the various jurisdictions. The interests of the child have prevailed in both 
case studies, and both case studies have shown that involvement of the interests 
of the (future) child, makes a crucial difference to balancing exercises, especially 
in cross‑border cases, such as cross‑border surrogacy cases. The two case studies 
furthermore point to an emerging trend of granting more protection to relatively 







concrete interests such as the best interests of the child, over rather abstract interests 
like ‘the traditional marriage institute’. This development can also be regarded as a 
shift from values deeply entrenched in the society and law of a specific State, to less 
value‑charged values that are (more) commonly shared and transnational. When it 
comes to the actual balancing exercises, another trend is a greater legal recognition 
of de facto situations, such as de facto family life. Next to this, there appears to be 
increased attention for balancing in individual cases.
European jurisdictions generally have taken a rather reactive, pragmatic and 
incremental approach in morally sensitive issues. Particularly the approach of both 
European Courts (the CJEU and the ECtHR) at times could even be described as 
evasive. Nevertheless, both European Courts have applied a similar kind of reasoning 
that is typified as the ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ approach. This entails the 
idea that States may decide whether or not to grant a certain right or entitlement 
at national level, but once they do indeed grant that right or entitlement and they 
thereby act within the scope of European law, they must do so in a way which meets 
European standards. States have thus been held to take the consequences of their 
choices in morally sensitive matters. Further, in the case law of the ECtHR, for 
both case studies variations on the margin of appreciation doctrine can be identified, 
which mainly concern the use of consensus based arguments for determining the 
width of the margin.
In respect of the legal responses to cross‑border movement in respect of morally 
sensitive matters, Chapter 14 concludes, inter alia, that a gradual converting of 
‘warding off’ in ‘accommodation’ is visible for both case studies, while increasingly 
more accommodation obligations have been formulated at the European level. 
For example, in cross‑border abortion cases and cross‑border reproductive care 
(CBRC) cases, information about foreign treatment options and – in any case in 
cross‑border abortion cases – follow‑up care must be provided and States must 
‘facilitate’ the entry and residence of stable same‑sex partners of migrating EU 
citizens. That accommodation is gaining ground may be explained by an increased 
acknowledgement of the fact that in cross‑border situations different interests are 
at stake, or in any case that these interests are weighted differently in cross‑border 
situations. This holds particularly true in cross‑border situations where individual 
burdens exist, and even more so when a child is involved whose interests must 
prevail.
One of the general observations made in Chapter 14, is that despite limited 
competences at EU level and the granting of a wide margin of appreciation by the 
ECtHR in many of the morally sensitive issues addressed in the research, it cannot 
be denied that there is increasing (indirect) European standard‑setting in these areas, 
both in internal and cross‑border situations. This also has implications for (the variety 
in) national moral choices throughout the European Union. The ‘in for a penny, in 
for a pound’ approach of the European Courts as described above, (potentially) has 
particular implications. It namely risks becoming an ‘all or nothing’ approach, and 
may in this way drive a wedge between the European States. Further, cross‑border 







movement in itself, as well legal responses thereto – whether deliberately chosen by 
States or imposed on them by European law – also has implications for (the variety 
in) national choices in morally sensitive issues in the European Union. On the one 
hand, cross‑border movement may in principle provide a means to uphold national 
standards for internal situations and thus (a variety in) moral choices. This especially 
holds true if an outsourcing approach is taken under European law. However, where 
other legal responses to such cross‑border movement are dictated by European law, 
such an effect of cross‑border movement may be diminished. This applies in particular 
where States are, under European law required to recognise legal effects of, and thus 
accommodate, cross‑border movement. As a consequence thereof, they may feel 
pressurised to adapt their national standard‑setting in these areas to the standards 
they are bound to apply in cross‑border situations. This also implies that where an 
outsourcing approach is applied, it is likely that States with less permissive regimes 
remain on their side of the moral spectrum, while accommodation obligations and 
concerns about implications of cross‑border movement, may prompt States to move 
to or towards the more permissive of this spectrum.
Chapter 14 furthermore observes that in many situations complex balancing 
exercises and ethical objections to certain practices have been outpaced by real 
time developments. Even if national legislatures desired so on ethical or moral 
grounds, they have not been able to prevent certain matters from becoming reality 
and, correspondingly, from becoming facts of law. States may ban or limit certain 
practices deemed undesirable within their own jurisdictions, but to prevent people 
from going abroad for such practices has proven much harder. As a result it has been 
even more so in cross‑border situations that reality has outpaced and dictated the 
law.
The final chapter is concluded with the observation that in cross‑border situations in 
fact a unique realm of law applies. Those who cross borders (within the EU) enter a 
special dimension of law that encompasses, apart from EU free movement law and 
Private International Law, also other areas of law, most profoundly human rights law.






executIve summAry (In dutch)
moreel gevoelIge onderwerpen en grens overschrIjdend verkeer 
In de eu
voortplAntIngsvrAAgstukken en wettelIjke erkennIng vAn 
relAtIes tussen personen vAn gelIjk geslAcht
Binnen de Europese Unie (EU) bestaat aanzienlijke verscheidenheid ten aanzien 
van moreel gevoelige onderwerpen als abortus, kunstmatige voortplanting, 
draagmoederschap en wettelijke erkenning van relaties tussen personen van gelijk 
geslacht. Terwijl in de twintigste eeuw steeds meer bevoegdheden zijn overgedragen 
naar supranationale organisaties zoals de EU, is een aantal bevoegdheden van 
oudsher bij de staten gebleven. Voornoemde moreel gevoelige onderwerpen betreffen 
bij uitstek rechtsgebieden waarbinnen normstelling eerst en vooral op het nationale 
niveau plaatsvindt. Het wordt veelal geacht aan staten te zijn om te beslissen of 
zij – bijvoorbeeld – abortus op niet‑medische gronden of draagmoederschap toestaan 
en of koppels van gelijk geslacht kunnen trouwen of kinderen kunnen adopteren.
Hoewel er geen sterke mate van Europese regulering op deze terreinen bestaat en 
bovendien de bestaande diversiteit over het algemeen op Europees niveau wordt 
erkend, is er niettemin een zeker potentieel voor Europese regulering. De EU 
heeft namelijk bevoegdheden op terreinen die dicht raken aan en soms zelfs nauw 
verbonden zijn met voorplantingskwesties en wettelijke erkenning van relaties tussen 
personen van gelijk geslacht. Bovendien vallen diverse van deze moreel gevoelige 
onderwerpen binnen de reikwijdte van het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de 
Mens (EVRM), bijvoorbeeld onder het recht op respect voor privéleven van artikel 8 
EVRM. Er is dus (potentieel voor) (indirecte) Europese invloed op deze terreinen.
Grensoverschrijdend verkeer binnen de EU voegt bovendien een nieuwe dimensie 
toe aan dit in zichzelf al complexe beeld. Grensoverschrijdend verkeer is een 
gegeven binnen de EU: mensen bewegen zich door de EU om diverse redenen, 
niet zelden economische redenen. Dergelijke mobiliteit wordt mogelijk gemaakt en 
gestimuleerd door de EU vrij verkeersregels, die onder meer het vrij verkeer van 
personen en de vrijheid diensten te ontvangen in andere EU lidstaten omvatten. 
Onderling afwijkende regimes in bovengenoemde moreel gevoelige onderwerpen 
kunnen dergelijk verkeer hinderen; zij kunnen mensen beperken in hun mobiliteit 
of hen afschrikken gebruik te maken van hun vrij verkeersrechten. Koppels van 
gelijk geslacht kunnen bijvoorbeeld ontmoedigd zijn om naar een andere lidstaat 
te verhuizen als zij daar geen mogelijkheid hebben tot wettelijke erkenning van 
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hun relatie. Tegelijkertijd kunnen verschillen tussen de regimes van landen op deze 
terreinen ook juist de directe aanleiding zijn voor grensoverschrijdend verkeer, 
omdat mensen uit staten met restrictievere regimes de mogelijkheden, rechten en 
aanspraken van lidstaten met meer liberale regimes wensen te genieten. Hier kan 
bijvoorbeeld gedacht worden aan vrouwen uit lidstaten met strenge abortuswetgeving 
die voor een abortus naar een lidstaat met liberalere regelgeving gaan.
Dergelijk grensoverschrijdend verkeer en de bestaande beperkingen daarop 
maken niet alleen de verschillen tussen de staten op deze terreinen zichtbaar, zij 
impliceren onder meer ook dat staten in toenemende mate geconfronteerd worden 
met (de gevolgen en effecten van) de regimes van andere staten. Dit gebeurt 
bijvoorbeeld omdat koppels van gelijk geslacht die in de ene EU lidstaat wonen, om 
erkenning vragen van hun in een andere staat gesloten huwelijk, of omdat vrouwen 
of koppels die een bepaalde reproductieve behandeling hebben ondergaan in een 
andere lidstaat, terwijl die behandeling in eigen land wettelijk niet is toegestaan, 
bij thuiskomst om vergoeding vragen van de kosten van die behandeling onder 
de ziektekostenverzekering. Dergelijke confrontaties vragen doorgaans om een 
(juridisch) antwoord van de betrokken staten, of ze nu als thuisland of als gastland 
of beide fungeren.
Dit proefschrift verkent deze grensoverschrijdend verkeersdimensie van moreel 
gevoelige onderwerpen in de Europese Unie. Het geeft een overzicht van trends en 
ontwikkelingen in nationaal en Europees recht in moreel gevoelige kwesties en geeft 
inzicht in de belangen die daarbij spelen en de dynamieken die zich in zowel interne 
als grensoverschrijdende situaties voordoen.
twee themAtIsche cAsestudy’s en vIjf rechtsstelsels
De basis van dit onderzoek bestaat uit twee thematische casestudy’s: één over 
voortplantingsvraagstukken (Casestudy I) en één over wettelijke erkenning van 
relaties tussen personen van gelijk geslacht (Casestudy II). Deze casestudy’s 
concentreren zich op vijf rechtsstelsels; drie nationale stelsels – Ierland, Duitsland en 
Nederland – en twee Europese stelsels of systemen, namelijk de EU en het EVRM. De 
casestudy’s zijn gekozen omdat zij bij uitstek moreel gevoelige onderwerpen en dus 
politiek gevoelige kwesties betreffen, ten aanzien waarvan de EU lidstaten lange tijd 
verschillende posities hebben ingenomen en dat nog steeds deden toen dit onderzoek 
werd aangevangen in 2009 en (gedeeltelijk) tevens toen het werd afgesloten in juli 
2014. Bovendien gaat het niet ‘slechts’ om moreel gevoelige kwesties, het betreffen 
ook terreinen ten aanzien waarvan mensenrechtelijke aanspraken kunnen worden 
gemaakt en die – belangrijk gelet op de focus van dit onderzoek – een evidente 
grensoverschrijdend verkeersdimensie hebben. De keuze voor de drie nationale 
rechtstelsels is onder meer ingegeven door het feit dat zij een zekere spreiding 
vertegenwoordigen in benaderingen ten aanzien van voortplantingsvraagstukken en 
wettelijke erkenning van relaties tussen personen van gelijk geslacht en omdat deze 
landen verschillende (constitutionele) profielen hebben.
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De twee casestudy’s hebben dezelfde opbouw. Elk bestaat uit zes hoofdstukken: vijf 
die de regelgeving in de vijf geselecteerde jurisdicties beschrijven (het EVRM, de 
EU, Duitsland, Ierland en Nederland respectievelijk) en één met conclusies voor de 
casestudy.
cAsestudy I – voortplAntIngsvrAAgstukken
Casestudy I over voortplantingsvraagstukken omvat drie onderwerpen: abortus, 
medische geassisteerde voortplanting en draagmoederschap. Voor ieder van deze 
onderwerpen onderzoeken de vijf basishoofdstukken van Casestudy I (hoofdstuk‑
ken 2 tot en met 6) voor de betreffende Europese en nationale stelsels welke regel‑
geving er al dan niet bestaat en hoe deze zich over de tijd ontwikkeld heeft. Ter 
vergroting van het begrip van deze regelgeving en – waar relevant – de debatten 
in politiek en de rechtswetenschap over deze vaak controversiële onderwerpen, 
wordt allereerst een algemeen (constitutioneel) kader geschetst. Een korte inleiding 
wordt gegeven op prominente rechten in de relevante rechtsstelsels (bijvoorbeeld 
de bescherming van het ongeboren kind in het Ierse recht), alsook op een selectie 
van thema’s en – in het geval van de EU – bevoegdheden die van centraal belang 
zijn in de casestudy. Vervolgens zet ieder van deze hoofdstukken uiteen of de rele‑
vante voortplantings behandelingen wettelijk zijn toegestaan en gereguleerd en zo ja, 
onder welke voorwaarden er een recht op toegang tot deze behandelingen bestaat. 
Bij de  bespreking van de nationale regelgeving ten aanzien van draagmoederschap 
wordt ook  besproken of en in hoeverre wensouders ouderschapsrechten kunnen 
krijgen over een kind dat in het kader van een draagmoederschapsovereenkomst 
is geboren. De bespreking van regulering van medische geassisteerde voortplan‑
tingsbehandelingen in de vijf rechtsstelsels omvat een viertal onderwerpen: donatie 
van voortplantings cellen en embryo’s, preïmplantatie genetische diagnostiek (PGD), 
geslachtsselectie en vitrificatie van eicellen.
De analyse van de interne situatie voor ieder van de rechtstelsels biedt inzicht in 
het soort belangen en overwegingen dat in parlementaire debatten en rechtspraak 
speelt of heeft gespeeld en in de wijze waarop verandering is of zou kunnen worden 
doorgevoerd. Het legt ook de basis voor de analyse van de grensoverschrijdende 
situatie, die vervolgens in ieder van deze hoofdstukken wordt uitgevoerd. 
Laatstgenoemde analyse begint – waar voorhanden – met enige cijfers over 
de omvang van het relevante grensoverschrijdend verkeer in de betreffende 
jurisdictie. Vervolgens onderzoekt ieder van de vijf basishoofdstukken voor het 
betreffende rechtsstelsel hoe is en wordt omgegaan met grensoverschrijdende 
situaties in voortplantingsvraagstukken en hoe de stelsels zich in dit opzicht tot 
elkaar verhouden. Daarbij worden, onder meer, de internationaalprivaatrechtelijke 
regimes en de (nationale implementatie van) de EU vrij verkeersregels bestudeerd, 
teneinde vragen te beantwoorden als de vraag of buitenlandse geboorteakten worden 
erkend in internationale draagmoederschapszaken en of vrouwen die in een andere 
lidstaat een abortus wensen te ondergaan recht hebben op informatie over dergelijke 
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abortusdiensten, alsook een recht op vervolgbehandeling na terugkeer naar hun 
eigen staat.
Hoofdstuk 7 formuleert conclusies voor Casestudy I. Het ontwaart trends in regulering 
van voortplantingsvraagstukken en in wetgevingsprocessen en rechtspraak. Zo wordt 
in hoofdstuk 7 vastgesteld dat belangenafwegingen bij voortplantingsvraagstukken 
vaak uiteenlopende uitkomsten hebben gehad in de drie bestudeerde staten en dat de 
processen in wetgeving en rechtspraak in de staten op verschillende wijze vorm hebben 
gekregen. Daarnaast laat Europees recht (EU‑recht en het EVRM) uitdrukkelijk 
ruimte voor dergelijke diversiteit in de regulering van voortplantingsvraagstukken. 
Staten wordt ruimte gelaten om eigen principiële keuzes te maken in deze moreel 
gevoelige en ethische kwesties en ze zijn vrij om bepaalde praktijken te verbieden 
zolang ze de relevante belangen hebben meegewogen in hun besluitvorming en zolang 
hun principiële keuzes consistent zijn. Zodra een staat echter besluit op dit gebied 
te gaan reguleren, dan moet hij ook een effectieve bescherming van de relevante 
rechten en aanspraken waarborgen. Dit betekent dat staten moeten garanderen 
dat de toepasselijke procedures een zorgvuldige besluitvorming mogelijk maken. 
Behalve dergelijke verschillen zijn er ook overeenkomsten in de wijze waarop met 
voorplantingsvraagstukken is en wordt omgegaan in de verschillende rechtsstelsels. 
Over het algemeen zijn over de tijd steeds meer praktijken en behandelingen 
gelegaliseerd en gereguleerd, of zijn daartoe in ieder geval initiatieven genomen. 
Tevens is een geleidelijke ontwikkeling naar een (meer) centrale rol voor het belang 
van het kind duidelijk zichtbaar, hoewel in sommige gevallen de opvattingen over wat 
dit belang precies vereist over de tijd zijn gewijzigd. Bovendien is een ontwikkeling 
zichtbaar waarbij voortplantingsvraagstukken worden beoordeeld met veel aandacht 
voor de bijzondere omstandigheden van het geval. Zowel op Europees als nationaal 
niveau is er in toenemende mate aandacht voor procedures die zorgvuldige 
belangenafwegingen in voortplantingskwesties mogelijk maken.
Op basis van de analyse van hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 6 identificeert hoofdstuk 7 
vervolgens vier categorieën ‘legal responses’ op grensoverschrijdend verkeer 
in voortplantingsvraagstukken. De eerste is het ‘afweren’ (‘warding off’) van de 
(gevolgen van) grensoverschrijdend verkeer, waarbij staten mensen ontmoedigen 
naar een andere staat te gaan of naar het eigen land te komen. Dergelijk afweren kan 
verschillende vormen aannemen, variërend van reisverboden tot – in internationale 
draagmoederschapszaken – het niet‑erkennen van het in een ander land gevestigde 
juridisch ouderschap van wensouders. Een tweede ‘legal response’, accommodatie 
(‘accommodation’), vormt het spiegelbeeld van afweren. Deze doet zich bijvoorbeeld 
voor als staten ervoor kiezen informatie over buitenlandse abortusdiensten te 
verschaffen en medische vervolgbehandeling aan te bieden. Ten derde kunnen 
staten hun eigen op interne situaties toepasselijke regelgeving ook aanpassen 
aan die van een andere staat of andere staten waarnaartoe grensoverschrijdend 
verkeer plaatsvindt (‘adaptation’). Tot slot heeft grensoverschrijdend verkeer in 
voortplantingszaken in bepaalde gevallen ertoe geleid dat staten de bescherming 
van belangen die bij voortplantingsvraagstukken spelen, kunnen uitbesteden naar 
andere staten (‘outsourcing’). Het EHRM heeft in enkele zaken namelijk geoordeeld 
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dat buitenlandse behandelmogelijkheden bijdroegen aan de rechtvaardiging van de 
strenge regelgeving van een land.
Voor ieder van deze ‘legal responses’ analyseert hoofdstuk 7 in welke mate zij 
verenigbaar zijn met Europees recht of daar zelfs door worden voorgeschreven. 
Er is bijvoorbeeld gebleken dat het afweren van grensoverschrijdend verkeer 
door middel van het niet‑erkennen van de juridische gevolgen van buitenlandse 
behandelopties of door middel van het verbieden van informatie over buitenlandse 
behandelmogelijkheden niet gemakkelijk gerechtvaardigd kan worden onder 
Europees recht, terwijl weigering van vervolgbehandeling bij terugkomst ook 
problematisch kan zijn. Tevens onderzoekt hoofdstuk 7 hoe de verschillend ‘legal 
responses’ zich tot elkaar verhouden en wat de implicaties van elke categorie van 
‘legal responses’ zijn of zouden kunnen zijn voor de betrokken staten, alsmede voor 
de betrokken individuen.
cAsestudy II – wettelIjke erkennIng vAn relAtIes tussen 
personen vAn gelIjk geslAcht
Hoofdstukken 8 tot en met 12 van Casestudy II brengen in kaart wat de vijf 
bestudeerde rechtsstelsels bepalen ten aanzien van wettelijke erkenning van relaties 
tussen personen van gelijk geslacht. Daarbij is een eerste centrale vraag of koppels 
van gelijk geslacht (een recht op) toegang tot een vorm van wettelijke erkenning 
van hun relatie hebben (huwelijk of geregistreerd partnerschap) en zo ja, wat dit 
behelst. Ten tweede gaat de casestudy in op de ouderschapsrechten van koppels van 
gelijk geslacht. Daarbij worden verschillende adoptievormen behandeld, namelijk 
stiefouderadoptie (adoptie door de partner van de juridische en genetische ouder van 
een kind), ‘successieve adoptie’ (waarbij een adoptiekind wordt geadopteerd door de 
partner van de adoptieouder) en gezamenlijke adoptie. Tevens worden ouderschap 
van rechtswege en toegang tot medische geassisteerde voortplanting voor koppels 
van gelijk geslacht besproken.
De vijf basishoofdstukken van deze casestudy hebben dezelfde opbouw als 
hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 6 van Casestudy I (zie hierboven). Zij beginnen dus met 
een algemeen (constitutioneel) kader, gevolgd door een bespreking van het interne, 
respectievelijk het grensoverschrijdende plaatje. Net als in Casestudy I worden 
daarbij – waar relevant – ook de debatten in politiek en rechtswetenschap betrokken.
Hoofdstuk 13 concludeert voor Casestudy II dat ten aanzien van wettelijke erkenning 
van relaties tussen personen van gelijk geslacht binnen de Europese Unie de staten het 
voortouw hebben genomen en niet zozeer Europese instanties. Nationale wetgevers 
en bestuursorganen hebben de toon gezet en ‘Europa’ heeft over het algemeen slechts 
gevolgd. De Europese Hoven (het EU HvJ en het EHRM) hebben soms wel prikjes 
uitgedeeld naar de nationale wetgever of rechter, maar dit was over het algemeen 
enkel het geval in situaties waar de eerste (principiële) stappen in de richting van 
wettelijke erkenning reeds op nationaal niveau waren gezet. In de rechtspraak van 
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het EHRM heeft burgerlijke status vaak als vehikel gefungeerd voor ongelijke 
behandeling van koppels van gelijk geslacht en koppels van verschillend geslacht. 
Slechts in gevallen waar geen sprake was van een ‘speciale wettelijke status’, heeft 
het EHRM een strenge toets toegepast.
Traditionele noties van het huwelijk en het gezin hebben in alle drie de staten aan 
gewicht ingeboet, hoewel ze niet geheel zijn verlaten. Bovendien geniet het huwelijk 
onder het EVRM nog altijd sterke bescherming. Daarnaast is de toegenomen 
erkenning en juridische bescherming van de facto gezinsleven gepaard gegaan met 
het aanvaarden van biologische verschillen tussen koppels van verschillend geslacht 
en koppels van gelijk geslacht en tussen koppels bestaande uit twee vrouwen en 
koppels bestaande uit twee mannen als rechtvaardiging voor bepaalde verschillen 
in behandeling van deze groepen ten aanzien van ouderschapsrechten. Ongelijke 
behandeling van koppels van gelijk geslacht komt dus nog steeds voor, maar er heeft 
een verschuiving plaatsgevonden van meer moreel beladen rechtvaardigingsgronden 
naar meer moreel neutrale gronden.
Over het algemeen is een gestage ontwikkeling zichtbaar naar toenemende 
bescherming van LHBT‑rechten en zodoende ook naar toenemende wettelijke 
erkenning van relaties tussen personen van gelijk geslacht. Dergelijke verandering 
is in de meeste gevallen langzaam en geleidelijk doorgevoerd, al zijn er ook 
uitzonderingen van veel snellere ontwikkelingen. Het valt te verwachten dat deze lijn 
in de toekomst wordt doorgezet. Mogelijk neemt ‘Europa’ in sommige opzichten een 
meer proactieve houding. In ieder geval ligt het in de lijn der verwachtingen dat de 
Europese Hoven prikjes zullen blijven uitdelen aan nationale rechters en wetgevers 
in dit proces van toenemende gelijkstelling van de wettelijke positie van koppels van 
gelijk geslacht met die van koppels van verschillend geslacht.
Ten aanzien van grensoverschrijdende situaties concludeert hoofdstuk 13 dat zich 
in wezen twee categorieën van ‘legal responses’ op grensoverschrijdend verkeer 
voordoen in Casestudy II, namelijk ‘afweren’ en ‘accommodatie’. In hun uiterste 
vorm zijn deze in de context van deze casestudy onverenigbaar. Echter, uit de 
casestudy blijkt dat verschillende niveaus van afweren en van accommodatie 
mogelijk zijn. In sommige gevallen hebben staten gekozen voor gedeeltelijke of 
voorwaardelijke accommodatie in hun omgang met grensoverschrijdend verkeer 
in de context van Casestudy II. Zo erkennen Ierland en Duitsland huwelijken 
tussen personen van gelijk geslacht enkel tot op het niveau van geregistreerde 
partnerschappen (‘downgrading’), terwijl buitenlandse geregistreerde partner‑
schappen alleen worden erkend indien ze aan bepaalde criteria voldoen. Andere 
categorieën van ‘legal responses’ op grensoverschrijdend verkeer die zich – hoewel 
slechts in beperkte mate – in deze casestudy hebben voorgedaan zijn aanpassing 
en terugtrekking (‘backing out’). Met terugtrekking wordt gedoeld op de situatie 
waarbij vrees dat andere landen de keuzes van de nationale wetgever niet zullen 
aanvaarden of erkennen, wordt gepresenteerd als argument tegen het toekennen van 
bepaalde rechten aan koppels van gelijk geslacht.
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Op vergelijkbare wijze als in hoofdstuk 7, onderzoekt hoofdstuk 13 vervolgens hoe 
de verschillende ‘legal responses’ zich tot elkaar verhouden en wat de implicaties van 
iedere categorie van ‘legal responses’ zijn of zouden kunnen zijn voor de betrokken 
staten en individuen. Hoofdstuk 13 concludeert dat regelgeving op Europees niveau 
voor grensoverschrijdend verkeer in de context van deze casestudy tot dusver 
redelijk beperkt is gebleven. Uit de EU Vrij verkeersrichtlijn volgen wel enkele 
minimumverplichtingen ten aanzien van toegang en verblijf van partners van gelijk 
geslacht van EU‑burgers, maar in het bijzonder ten aanzien van de wettelijke positie 
van deze koppels nadat toegang en verblijf zijn toegekend, bestaan er vooralsnog 
diverse open vragen. Hierbij zijn rechtspraak van het EU HvJ en/of verdere hand‑
reikingen van de EU‑wetgever over de beoordelingsruimte die staten al dan niet 
genieten in deze kwesties, zeer gewenst.
conclusIes
Het afsluitende hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 14, bevat een synthese van de bevindingen 
van hoofdstukken 7 en 13, alsmede een aantal observaties over moreel gevoelige 
onderwerpen en grensoverschrijdend verkeer binnen de EU meer in het algemeen. 
Er worden parallellen getrokken en trends onderscheiden ten aanzien van 
belangenafwegingen en processen in wetgeving en rechtspraak in deze moreel 
gevoelige onderwerpen. Bijvoorbeeld, terwijl in de vijf rechtsstelsels die in dit 
onderzoek zijn bestudeerd, over het algemeen dezelfde belangen zijn erkend 
in de betreffende casestudy’s, zit er verschil in het gewicht dat daaraan wordt of 
is toegekend in de verschillende stelsels. Het belang van het kind heeft in beide 
casestudy’s een (prominente) rol gespeeld en uit beide casestudy’s is gebleken dat 
betrokkenheid van het belang van het (toekomstige) kind een cruciaal verschil 
maakt voor belangenafwegingen, met name in grensoverschrijdende situaties, zoals 
bij internationaal draagmoedershap. Uit beide casestudy’s komt bovendien een 
beginnende trend naar voren tot sterkere bescherming van relatief concrete belangen 
zoals het belang van het kind, in vergelijking met meer abstracte belangen als ‘het 
traditionele huwelijksinstituut’. Deze ontwikkeling kan ook worden geduid als een 
verschuiving van waarden die sterk in de maatschappij en het recht van een specifieke 
staat zijn verankerd naar minder beladen waarden die (meer) algemeen gedeeld 
en transnationaal zijn. Ten aanzien van de daadwerkelijke belangenafwegingen 
is een andere trend dat de facto situaties, bijvoorbeeld de facto gezinsleven, meer 
erkenning krijgen. Daarnaast lijkt er in toenemende mate aandacht te zijn voor 
belangenafwegingen in concrete, individuele gevallen.
De Europese jurisdicties hebben over het algemeen een behoorlijk reactieve, 
pragmatische en incrementalistische benadering gekozen in moreel gevoelige 
onderwerpen. Met name de benadering van beide Europese Hoven kan in sommige 
gevallen zelfs omschreven worden als ‘ontwijkend’. Niettemin hebben beide Hoven 
een vergelijkbare redeneringswijze toegepast, die ook wel wordt geduid met de term 
‘vastklikmethode’ (‘in for a penny, in for a pound approach’). Dit komt erop neer dat 
staten mogen beslissen of ze op deze terreinen een bepaald recht of een bepaalde 
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aanspraak op nationaal niveau toekennen, maar zodra ze inderdaad besluiten dat 
recht of die aanspraak toe te kennen en ze daarbij handelen binnen de reikwijdte 
van het Europees recht, moeten ze dat ook doen op een wijze die aan Europese 
standaarden voldoet. Staten worden dus gehouden de gevolgen van hun keuzes in 
moreel gevoelige onderwerpen te dragen. Daarnaast komen in de rechtspraak van 
het EHRM ten aanzien van beide casestudy’s variaties op de ‘margin of appreciation’ 
doctrine voor. Zij betreffen met name het gebruik van op consensus gebaseerde 
overwegingen bij bepaling van de omvang van deze beoordelingsruimte.
Eén van de algemene observaties van hoofdstuk 14 is dat ondanks dat de EU beperkte 
bevoegdheden heeft en het EHRM een wijde ‘margin of appreciation’ toekent in veel 
van de moreel gevoelige onderwerpen die in dit onderzoek centraal staan, niet kan 
worden ontkend dat er in toenemende mate (indirecte) Europese regulering bestaat 
op deze terreinen, zowel voor interne als voor grensoverschrijdende situaties. Dit 
heeft ook gevolgen voor de verscheidenheid aan nationale morele keuzes binnen 
de Europese Unie. De vastklikmethode van de Europese Hoven, zoals hierboven 
omschreven, heeft (potentieel) in het bijzonder gevolgen voor die verscheidenheid. 
Deze draagt namelijk het risico met zich een ‘alles of niets’ benadering te worden 
en kan op die manier een wig drijven tussen de Europese staten. Bovendien hebben 
grensoverschrijdend verkeer en de ‘legal responses’ daarop – of ze nu bewust door 
staten gekozen zijn of aan hen zijn opgelegd door Europees recht – ook gevolgen 
voor de (verscheidenheid in) morele keuzes. In beginsel kan grensoverschrijdend 
verkeer ertoe bijdragen dat nationale regelgeving voor interne situaties – en daarmee 
dus (een verscheidenheid in) morele keuzes – gehandhaafd kunnen worden. Dit 
geldt met name indien op Europees niveau een uitbestedingsbenadering (zie 
hierboven) is gekozen. Waar Europees recht daarentegen andere ‘legal responses’ 
voorschrijft, kan een dergelijk effect van grensoverschrijdend verkeer worden 
afgezwakt. Dit gaat met name op indien staten onder Europees recht verplicht 
worden de juridische implicaties van grens overschrijdend verkeer te erkennen en 
dus dat verkeer te accommoderen. In dat geval kunnen zij zich namelijk gedwongen 
voelen hun nationale regelgeving voor interne situaties aan te passen aan de normen 
die zij onder Europees recht op grensoverschrijdende situaties moeten toepassen. 
Dit impliceert tevens dat waar een uitbestedingsbenadering wordt toegepast, staten 
aan de restrictievere kant van het morele spectrum geneigd te zijn daar te blijven, 
terwijl accommodatieverplichtingen en zorgen over de juridische gevolgen van 
grensoverschrijdend verkeer staten ertoe kunnen aanzetten te verschuiven naar de 
liberalere kant van dit spectrum.
Hoofdstuk 14 concludeert verder dat in veel situaties complexe belangenafwegingen 
en ethische bezwaren tegen bepaalde praktijken zijn of worden ingehaald door 
de realiteit. Zelfs waar nationale wetgevers dat wensten op ethische of morele 
gronden, zijn zij niet in staat gebleken te voorkomen dat sommige zaken realiteit 
en dientengevolge rechtsfeiten werden. Staten kunnen sommige praktijken die zij 
ongewenst achten wel verbieden of beperken binnen de eigen rechtsorde, maar 
voorkomen dat mensen daarvoor naar het buitenland gaan is veel moeilijker gebleken. 
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Daardoor geldt des te meer in grensoverschrijdende situaties dat de realiteit het recht 
heeft ingehaald en voorgeschreven.
Het slothoofdstuk rondt af met de observatie dat in grensoverschrijdende situaties 
in feite een uniek rechtsdomein van toepassing is. Zij die grenzen oversteken 
(binnen de EU), betreden een speciale dimensie van het recht die, behalve de EU vrij 
verkeersregels en Internationaal privaatrecht ook andere rechtsgebieden omvat, eerst 
en vooral de mensenrechten.
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– ‘downgrading’ of civil status  9.6.3; 9.8; 
10.4.7; 10.5; 11.4.4; 12.4.7; 13.2.1.2; 13.2.1.3; 
13.2.2.2; 13.2.1.2; 13.2.1.3; 13.2.2.2; 13.2.4; 
14.1.4
– ‘upgrading’ of civil status  9.6.2.2; 9.8; 
10.4.5; 13.2.2.2
Conflict‑of‑laws rules  3.6.3.1; 9.7; 9.7.3; 9.8; 
10.4.3; 10.4.5; 10.5; 12.4.2; 12.4.5; 12.5
Consensus
– European consensus  2.1.2; 2.1.4; 2.2; 
2.2.3.3; 2.2.3.4; 2.2.4; 2.3.2; 2.3.3; 2.3.4; 2.3.5; 
2.3.6; 2.4.2; 2.5; 3.3.4; 3.6.3.2; 5.3.9; 7.1.1; 
7.1.7; 7.2.4; 8.2.1; 8.2.2.1; 8.2.2.2; 8.2.3.1; 
8.2.4.1.2; 8.2.5; 8.2.6; 8.3; 8.4; 9.2; 9.6.1; 
10.3.1; 11.3.2; 13.1.5; 14.1.3.3
Consistency of laws  2.3.4; 4.3.2; 7.1.3; 
14.1.3.2
Constitution
– of Ireland  1.4; 2.2.3; 3.5.2.1; 5.1*; 5.2*; 5.3*; 
5.6; 11.3.5; 11.5; 11.1*
– of Germany (see under Basic Law of 
Germany)
– of the Netherlands  6.1*; 6.6; 12.1*; 12.3.1; 
12.3.4; 12.4.5
Criminal law, EU competence on  3.1.3.4
Criminalisation of homosexual activities  
8.1.1; 10.2; 11.2; 11.5; 12.2; 13.1.2; 13.1.5
Criminal liability for treatment obtained 
abroad  3.6.2; 4.5.1; 5.5.1; 6.5.1
Criminal prosecution for abortions  4.2*; 
5.2.9; 6.2.4; 7.2.2.1
Cross‑border (see also under ‘statistics’)
– cross‑border abortions  2.2.3*; 2.4.1; 3.4.1; 
4.4.1*; 4.5.1; 4.5.2; 5.4.1; 5.5.1; 5.5.2; 5.5.3; 
6.4.1*; 6.5.1; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 6.5.4; 7.2.1.1; 7.2.1.2; 
7.2.1.3; 7.2.1.4; 7.2.1.7; 7.2.2.2; 7.2.2.3; ; 7.2.4; 
7.2.5
– cross‑border health care  3.5*; 3.6.2
– cross‑border movement by rainbow families  
9.5; 9.6*; 10.4*; 11.4*; 12.4*; 13.2*; 14.1.4
– cross‑border reproductive care  1.3; 3.4.2; 
3.5; 3.6.2; 5.4.2; 6.4.2; 6.6; 7.2; 14.1.4; 14.2.2
– cross‑border (international) surrogacy (see 
under ‘Surrogacy’)
D
Decriminalisation of homosexual activities 
(see under ‘Criminalisation’)
De facto family life (see under ‘Family’)
Discrimination
– on grounds of sexual orientation  5.3.3; 8.1.4; 
8.2.4.1.2 ; 8.4; 9.2; 9.3*; 9.4; 9.6.1; 9.6.2.1; 
9.6.2.3; 9.6.4; 9.8; 10.3.4.3; 10.3.5.3; 10.4.3; 
11.1.1; 12.1.1; 12.3.6.1; 13.1.2; 13.1.3; 13.2.1.2; 
13.2.2.1; 14.1.3.1; 14.1.3.3







– direct discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation  3.3.4; 8.2.3.2; 9.3.3.1; 9.3.3.2; 
9.3.3.3; 9.6.2.1; 9.8; 13.1.3;
– indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation  8.2.3.2; 8.4; 9.3.3; 9.3.3.1; 9.3.3.2; 
9.6.4; 9.7.2; 10.3.4.3; 13.1.3
– on grounds of civil status  8.4
Disorder
– genetic disorder  4.3.6; 5.2.3; 5.3.4; 5.3.5; 
5.3.6; 6.3.4; 6.3.5; 7.1.1
– prevention of disorder as legitimate aim 
under the ECHR  2.4.1; 8.1.1
Donation of gametes and embryos  2.3.3; 
3.3.2; 3.7; 4.1.6; 4.3.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.4; 4.4.2; 
5.1.3; 5.3; 5.3.4; 5.4.2; 6.3.3; 6.4.2
– altruistic (non‑commercial) donation of 
gametes  3.3; 5.3.4
– anonymous donation of gametes  2.3.6; 
3.3.2; 4.3.1; 5.3.4; 6.3.3; 6.5.2; 6.5.5; 6.6; 7.1.2; 
7.2.1.3; 7.2.5
– commercial donation of gametes  5.3.4; 
6.4.2.1; 6.5.2; 6.5.3; 7.2.1.3
– egg cell donation  2.3.3; 4.3.4.1; 4.4.2; 4.6; 
5.3.3; 5.6; 6.1.4; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.4.2.1; 6.6
– on social (non‑medical) grounds  6.3.7; 
6.4.2.3
Donor information  6.3.3; 6.4.2; 6.4.2.1; 6.5.2; 
6.5.5; 7.1.2




– egg cell donation bank  6.3.3
– donation of egg cells (see under Donation’)
– vitrification of egg cells  2.3; 4.3.7; 5.3.7; 
6.3.3.1; 6.3.6
Emergency
– emergency travel documents (see under 
‘Travel documents’)
– emergency situation in the context of 
abortion (see under ‘Abortion’)
Embryo
– donation of embryos (see under ‘Donation’)
– embryopathic indication for abortion (see 
Abortion – abortion on medical grounds)
Employment law  1.3.2; 3.3.4; 9.3; 10.3.4.1
Employment Equality Framework Directive 
(Directive 2000/78)  3.3.4; 9.3.2; 9.3.3*; 
10.1.1; 10.3.4.1; 10.4.7
Entry and residence under the EU Free 
Movement Directive  9.6*; 10.4.4; 11.4.3; 
12.4.3; 13.2.1.2; 13.2.1.3; 13.2.2.2; 13.2.4; 
14.1.4
European consensus (see under ‘Consensus’)
EU free movement rules  (see under ‘Free 
movement’)
European Arrest Warrant  3.6.2; 3.6.4
European Private International Law  9.7*
Equal treatment
– EU equal treatment law (EU 
non‑discrimination law)  3.3.3*; 9.3*; 9.8
– EU Equal Treatment Directive (2006/54)  
3.3.4
– Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive 
(proposed) 9.3.4.1; 9.4
Equalisation of civil or registered partnership 
with marriage (see under ‘Partnership’)
F
Family
– special protection of the family  10.1.2*; 
10.3.5.3; 11.1.2; 13.1.2
– traditional notions of family  8.2.4.1.2; 8.2.5; 
11.1.2; 11.3.5.1; 12.3.6; 13.1.2; 13.1.4
– the right to respect for family life  2.1.1; 
2.3.6; 2.4.2; 6.3.8; 8.1.2; 8.2.2.2; 8.2.4; 
8.2.4.1.2; 8.2.6; 8.3; 9.3.1; 11.3.5.1; 12.1
– de facto family life  2.1.1; 2.1.3; 5.3.4; 7.1.6; 
8.1.2; 8.2.4.1.2; 8.2.6; 8.3; 11.3.5; 11.3.5.1; 
12.3.6; 13.1.4; 13.1.6; 14.1.1; 14.2.3
– family reunification  9.4; 9.6; 9.6.4; 9.8; 
10.4.4; 11.4.3; 11.4.5; 12.4.4; 12.5; 13.2.1.2; 
13.2.2.2
Fathers‑to‑be, rights of  2.2.5
Follow‑up care  2.2.3; 2.4.1; 2.5; 3.5.3.1; 
3.6.2.3; 3.7; 4.5; 5.5.3; 6.5.3; 7.2.1.3; 
7.2.2.2; 7.2.4; 7.2.5; 14.1.4; 14.2.2
Free movement
– EU Free Movement Directive (2004/38)  
9.6.2*; 10.4.4; 11.4.3; 12.4.4







– EU free movement law/ rules 3.5*; 3.6.2*; 
6.5.2; 7.2*; 9.6*; 9.8; 13.2.1.1; 13.2.1.2; 
13.2.2.2; 14.1.2; 14.2.4
– obstacles to free movement (see also 
‘restrictions to free movement’)  1.1; 3.3.1; 
3.6.2.5; 3.6.3.1; 3.7; 6.5.2; 6.5.4; 9.2; 9.4; 9.6.1; 
9.6.3
– restrictions to free movement (see also 
‘obstacles to free movement’)  3.5.2.1; 3.5.2.2; 
3.5.2.1; 3.6.2; 3.6.2.3; 3.6.2.5; 3.6.3; 5.2.1.1; 
6.5.2; 7.2.1.6; 9.6; 9.6.2.1; 9.6.2.2; 9.6.3; 
14.1.3.1
G
Gametes, donation of (see under ‘Donation’)
Genetic origins
– the right to know one’s genetic origins  2.1.3; 
2.1.4; 2.3.3; 2.5; 3.3.2; 4.1.6; 4.3.4; 5.1.4; 5.3.4; 
5.6; 6.1.4; 6.3.3; 6.5.2; 6.5.4; 6.5.6; 6.6; 7.1.1; 
7.1.2; 14.1.4
Genetic parenthood (see under ‘Parenthood’)
H
Health (see ‘Public health’)
Human dignity  2.1.4; 2.3.2; 3.1.1; 3.1.2; 3.3.1; 
4.1.1; 4.1.4; 4.1.6; 4.2.2; 4.2.5; 4.3.2; 4.3.5; 
4.3.9; 4.5.3; 4.6; 5.3.1; 6.1.3; 6.3.1; 6.3.3; 
7.1.1; 7.2.1.5; 7.2.1.7; 7.2.4; 9.3.3.2; 10.1.1; 
14.1.1
I
‘In for a penny, in for a pound approach’ of the 
ECtHR  14.1.3.2; 14.1.3.3; 14.1.3.4; 14.2.1; 
14.2.2
Information
– abortion information (see under ‘Abortion’)
– Information about foreign treatment options  
2.4.1; 3.5.2.1; 3.5.3.2; 3.6.2.4; 4.5; 5.2.2; 5.2.3; 
5.2.6; 5.5.3; 6.5.3; 7.2.1.2; 7.2.1.7; 7.2.2.2; 
7.2.2.3; 7.2.4; 7.2.5; 14.1.4; 14.2.2
Indications model  4.2.1; 4.2.2
Intended parenthood (see under ‘Parenthood’)
J
Joint adoption (see under ‘Adoption’)
K
‘Kappungsgrenze’  10.4.5; 10.5; 13.2.1.2
L
Legal parenthood by operation of the law  
6.3.8; 8.2.4.2; 10.3.5.5; 10.4.8; 10.5; 
11.3.5.3; 11.5; 12.3.6; 12.3.6.1; 12.3.6.4; 
12.4.6; 13.1.4
Legal responses to cross‑border movement  
7.2*; 13.2*; 14.1.4; 14.2.1; 14.2.2; 14.2.3
LGBT rights  9.4; 9.8; 13.1.2; 13.1.6; 14.1.1; 
14.2.1
Licensing
– of abortion clinics  4.2.4; 6.2; 6.2.2; 6.2.2.4; 
6.2.5;
– of AHR clinics  3.3.2; 4.3.6; 5.3.6; 6.3.1; 
6.3.5; 6.3.8; 6.4.1.3; 6.5.2; 6.6; 7.1.1
M
Margin of appreciation doctrine 2.1*; 2.2*; 
2.3*; 2.4*; 2.5; 5.2.6;5.5.3; 7.2.4; 8.1.3; 
8.1.4; 8.2.1; 8.2.2.2; 8.2.3.1; 8.2.3.2; 
8.2.4.1.1; 8.2.4.1.2; 8.2.4.3; 8.2.5; 8.2.6; 
8.4; 13.1.2; 13.1.3; 13.1.5; 14.1.3; 14.1.3.4
Marriage
– access to marriage  8.1.3; 8.2.2*10.3.6; 
10.4.3; 11.3.6; 11.4.2;12.3.5; 12.4.3;13.2.1.1; 
13.2.2.1
– ‘marriage tourism’  13.2
– opening up of marriage ( see also ‘same‑sex 
marriage’)  10.3.1; 10.3.6; 10.4.2; 10.4.6; 10.5; 
11.3.1; 11.3.6; 11.5; 12.3.4; 12.3.5; 12.3.6.1; 
12.3.6.3; 12.3.6.4; 12.4.1; 12.4.2; 12.4.7; 12.5; 
13.1.2; 13.1.5; 13.2.3; 14.1.2
– same‑sex marriage (see also ‘opening up of 
marriage’); 8.2.1; 8.2.2*; 8.2.5; 8.2.6; 8.3.1; 
9.5; 9.6.2; 9.6.2.1; 9.6.3; 9.6.4; 9.7*; 9.8; 10.3.1; 
10.3.3; 10.4.4; 10.4.6; 10.4.7; 10.5; 11.3; 11.3.1; 
11.3.2; 11.3.5; 11.3.6; 11.4.4; 11.5; 12.3; 12.3.1; 







12.4.1; 12.4.2; 12.4.3; 12.4.5; 12.4.7; 12.5; 
13.2.1.2; 13.2.2.2; 13.2.2.3
– special protection of marriage  4.3.8; 
10.1.2*; 10.3.3; 10.3.3.3; 10.3.3.4; 10.3.5.2; 
10.3.5.3; 10.4.5; 10.4.7; 10.5; 11.1.2; 11.3.3; 
13.1.2; 13.2.1.1; 13.2.1.3
– special status of marriage 8.2.2.3; 8.2.3.1; 
8.2.3.2; 8.2.4.1.3; 8.4; 10.5; 11.1.2; 13.1.2; 
13.1.3; 14.1.1
– traditional notions of marriage  2.1.1; 8.2*; 
10.4.4; 11.3.2;12.3.1; 13.1.1; 13.1.2; 13.1.6; 
14.1.1
Marry, the right to  2.1.1; 3.1.2; 8.1.3; 8.2.1; 
8.2.2; 8.2.2.1; 8.2.2.3; 8.2.3.1; 8.2.3.2; 
8.2.5; 8.4; 9.1.1; 9.3.1; 10.1.2.1; 11.1.2; 
11.3.2; 12.1; 12.3.1; 13.1.2; 14.1.1
Mater semper certa est principle  4.3.9; 5.3.4; 
5.3.9; 6.3.3; 6.5.6; 7.1.1; 7.1.2
Medical follow‑up care (see under ‘Follow‑up 
care’)
Medical indication
– for abortion (see under ‘Abortion – abortion 
on medical grounds’)
– for IVF treatment  6.3.2
– for PGD  4.3.6; 6.3.6
– for surrogacy  6.3.8
– for vitrification of egg cells  6.3.6; 6.3.7
Morals, protection of  2.2.3.3; 2.2.3.4; 2.3.3; 
2.3.4; 2.4.1; 2.4.2; 3.3.1; 3.6.2.5; 7.1.2; 
8.1.1; 8.1.3; 8.2.5; 13.1.2
Mother‑to‑be, rights of the  2.1.2; 2.2; 2.2.2; 
2.2.3.2; 2.2.3.4; 2.2.4; 2.4.1; 2.5; 3.1.1; 
3.3.4; 4.2.1; 4.2.2; 4.2.4; 4.2.5; 4.2.6; 4.2.7; 
4.6; 5.2; 5.2.7; 5.2.8; 6.2.1; 6.2.2.2; 6.2.2.3; 
7.1.4; 7.2.4
N
Non‑discrimination law (see ‘Equal treatment 
law’)
O
Obstacles to free movement (see under ‘Free 
movement’)
‘Outsourcing’  7.2.4; 13.2.3; 14.1.4; 14.2.2
Oocyte freezing (see under ‘Egg 
cells – vitrification of egg cells’)




– establishment of parental links after AHR 
treatment or surrogacy  2.3.6; 5.3.9; 5.6; 6.3.3; 
6.3.8; 6.5.6; 6.6; 7.2.1.5; 7.2.2.1
– (non‑)recognition of parental links 
established abroad  2.3.5; 2.4.2; 2.5; 3.6.3; 
3.6.3.1; 3.7; 7.2.5; 10.4.8; 10.5; 11.4.5; 12.4.6; 
12.5; 13.2.1.2; 13.2.2.2; 13.2.2.3; 13.2.4; 14.1.4; 
14.2.2; 14.2.3
Parental rights for same‑sex couples  8.2.4*; 
8.2.5; 9.6.2.4; 9.6.3; 9.7.3; 10.3.5*; 11.3.5*; 
12.3.5; 12.3.6*
Parenthood
– genetic parenthood  1.3.1; 2.2.1; 2.1.4; 2.3; 
2.3.2; 2.3.6; 2.4.2; 4.5.3; 5.3.4; 5.3.9; 5.6; 6.1.4; 
6.3.3; 6.3.8; 6.5.6; 7.2.2.1; 7.2.4; 8.2.4.1.2; 
9.6.2.4; 10.3.5.3; 11.3.5.3; 12.3.6.2; 12.3.6.4; 
14.1.1
– intended parenthood  1.3.1; 2.4.2; 3.6.3; 
4.3.9; 4.5.3; 4.6; 5.3.9; 5.5.4; 6.3.8; 6.4.3; 6.5.6; 
7.1.1; 7.1.2.5; 7.1.2.6; 7.2.2.1; 7.2.4; 8.3.3
– social parenthood  10.3.5.3; 12.3.6.4
Partnership
– civil or registered partnership 8.2.3; 8.2.3.2; 
8.2.3.3; 8.2.5; 8.2.6; 8.3.1; 9.2; 9.3.3*; 9.5; 
9.6.2.2; 9.6.3; 9.7*; 9.8; 10.3*; 10.4.1; 10.4.2; 
10.4.4; 10.4.5; 10.4.7; 10.4.9; 10.5; 11.3*; 11.4.1; 
11.4.2; 11.4.3; 11.4.4; 11.4.6; 11.5; 12.3.2; 
12.3.3; 12.4.1; 12.4.2; 12.4.3; 12.4.4; 12.4.5; 
12.4.7; 12.5; 13.1.1; 13.1.2; 13.1.3; 13.1.5; 
13.2.1.1; 13.2.1.2; 13.2.2.1; 13.2.2.2; 13.2.2.3; 
13.2.3; 14.1.2; 14.1.4
– Equalisation of civil or registered 
partnership with marriage  10.3.4*; 10.3.5.3; 
10.3.6; 10.4.5; 10.5; 11.3.4; 12.3.3







Patient Mobility Directive (2011/24/EU)  3.5; 
3.5.3*; 3.6.2*
Post‑mortem reproduction  2.3; 4.3.4.2; 5.3.4.; 
6.3.3.1; 7.1.1; 7.1.5
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis 1.3.1; 2.3.4; 
4.3.6; 5.3.6; 6.3.5; 7.1.1
Pregnancy termination (see ‘Abortion’)
Private life, the right to respect for  2.1.1; 
2.1.3; 2.1.4; 2.2; 2.2.2; 2.2.3.4; 2.4.2; 8.1.2; 
2.2.3.5; 2.2.4; 2.3.3; 2.3.5; 2.3.6; 2.4.2; 
2.5; 5.1; 5.2; 6.1.1; 6.1.4; 7.1.2; 7.2.4; 
8.1.1; 8.1.2; 8.2.1; 8.2.3.1; 8.2.3.4; 8.2.4; 
8.2.4.1.2; 8.2.5; 8.3.3; 8.4; 10.3.1; 11.1; 
12.1; 14.1.1; 14.1.3.2
Private International Law
– Irish Private International Law  5.5.4; 11.4.4; 
11.4.5
– German Private International Law  4.5.3; 
10.4.2; 10.4.3; 10.4.5; 10.4.6; 10.4.8
– Dutch Private International Law  6.5.6; 
12.3.4; 12.3.5; 12.4.2; 12.4.3; 12.4.5; 12.4.6
– European Private International Law  3.6.3; 
9.7*
Procedural approach (in the ECtHR case law)  
2.2.2; 2.2.3.5; 2.2.4; 2.5
Procreate, a right to  2.1.1; 4.1.3; 4.3.4.1; 
4.3.4.2; 5.1.1; 6.1.1
Public funding
– of abortions  4.2.7; 4.5.2; 5.2.10; 5.5.2; 6.2.5; 
6.5.2
– of AHR treatment 4.3.8; 5.3.8; 6.3.7
– of (reimbursement for) treatment obtained 
abroad  3.5.2.3; 3.5.2.4; 3.5.3.1; 3.6.2.1; 4.5.2; 
5.5.2; 6.5.2; 7.2.1.4; 7.2.2.2; 7.2.5
Public health
– EU competence on public health  3.1.3.1
– Public health as justification ground under 
EU free movement law  3.3.1; 3.5.2.2; 3.6.1; 
3.6.2.5; 9.6.2; 9.6.3
– Protection of health as legitimate aim under 
the ECHR  2.3.3; 2.3.4; 2.4.1; 2.4.2;
Public order
– public order exceptions in International 
Private law  4.5.3; 6.5.6; 7.2.1.5; 9.7.3; 10.4.2; 
10.4.4; 10.4.5; 10.4.6; 12.4.3; 12.4.5; 12.4.7
– public order as justification ground under 
EU free movement rules  3.3.1; 3.6.2.5; 3.6.3
R
(non‑)Recognition
– of birth certificates (see under ‘Birth 
certificate’)
– of foreign partnerships and marriages  
8.3.1; 9.6.3; 9.7.1; 9.7.3; 10.4.5; 10.4.6; 10.4.9; 
11.4.4; 11.4.6; 12.4.5; 12.4.7; 13.2.1.2; 13.2.1.3; 
13.2.2.2; 13.2.2.3; 13.2.3; 13.2.4; 14.1.4; 14.2.2
– of legal effects of cross‑border movement  
7.2.1.5; 7.2.2.1; 14.1.4; 14.2.2
– of parental links established abroad (see 
under ‘Parental links – recognition of parental 
links established abroad)
Registered partnership (see under 
‘Partnership’)
Referendum  2.2.3.4; 5.1.3; 5.2; 5.2.1.1; 5.2.2; 
5.2.3; 5.2.4; 5.2.7; 11.3; 11.3.6; 11.5
Reflection period (in the context of abortion)  
4.2.2; 4.2.6; 6.2.2; 6.2.2.3; 6.5.4
Reimbursement (see ‘Public funding’)
Residence (see ‘Entry and residence’)




– access to AHR treatment for same‑sex 
couples (see under ‘AHR treatment’)
– Same‑sex marriage (see under ‘Marriage’)
– Same‑sex civil partnership (registered 
partnership) – see under ‘Partnership – civil 
partnership’)
– Same‑sex stable (unmarried) partners 1.3.2; 
2.2.1; 8.1.2; 8.2.2.2; 8.2.3; 8.2.3.1; 8.2.3.3; 
8.2.3.4; 8.2.4.1.1; 8.2.4.1.2; 9.2; 9.3.1; 9.6.1; 
9.6.2.3; 9.6.4; 9.8; 11.4.3; 12.3.6; 12.3.6.2; 
12.4.4; 13.1.2; 13.2.1.2; 13.2.1.3; 13.2.2.2; 
14.1.4
Social security
– EU competence on social secutiry  3.1.3.2
– position of same‑sex couples in social 
security law  1.3.2;8.2.3*; 9.3*; 9.3.4.1; 10.1.1; 
10.3.2; 12.3.3;







Sperm (semen) banks  5.4.2; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 6.5.5; 
12.3.6.4; 12.3.6.5
Staff cases (EU internal employment law)  9.2
Statistics
– on cross‑border abortions 3.4.1; 4.4.1*; 5.4.1; 
6.4.1*
– on cross‑border movement by rainbow 
families  9.5; 10.4.1; 11.4.1; 12.4.1
– on cross‑border reproductive care 3.4.2; 
4.4.2; 5.4.2; 6.4.2*
– on cross‑border surrogacy 3.4.3; 4.4.3; 5.4.3; 
6.4.3
Strict scrutiny test  8.1.4; 8.2.3.4; 8.2.4.2.1; 
8.4; 13.1.6
Surrogacy  1.3.1; 2.3.5; 3.3.4; 4.3.9; 4.4.3; 
4.5.3; 5.3.9; 6.3.8; 7.1.1; 7.1.5; 7.1.6; 14.1.3
– altruistic (non‑commercial) surrogacy  4.3.9; 
5.3.4; 6.3.8
– commercial surrogacy  4.3.9; 5.5.4; 5.6; 6.3.8
– cross‑border (international) surrogacy 2.4.2; 
3.4.3; 3.6.1; 3.6.2; 5.4.3; 5.5.4; 6.4.3; 6.5.6; 
7.2.1; 7.2.1.2; 7.2.1.4; 7.2.1.5; 7.2.1.6; 7.2.1.7; 
7.2.2.1; 7.2.2.2; 7.2.2.3; 7.2.3; 7.2.4; 7.2.5; 
13.2.1.2; 13.2.2.2; 14.1.4; 14.2.3
– high‑technological surrogacy  1.3.1; 3.6.2; 
6.3.7; 6.3.8; 7.1.1; 7.2.1.6
– low‑technological (traditional) surrogacy  
1.3.1; 3.4.3; 5.3.9; 6.3.8
Survivor’s pension (see also under Social 
security – position of same‑sex couples 




– tax deduction for AHR treatment  4.3.7; 
4.3.8; 4.5.2; 5.3.8; 5.5.2; 5.6; 6.3.7; 6.5.2
– position of same‑sex couples in tax law 
1.3.2; 8.2.3.1; 8.2.3.2; 10.3.2; 10.3.4; 10.3.4.3; 
10.3.6;10.5; 11.3.2; 11.3.4; 12.3.3; 13.1.5; 
13.2.1.3
Third‑country nationals  3.1.2; 9.4; 9.6; 9.6.2; 
9.6.3; 9.6.4; 9.8; 10.4.4; 13.2.1.2; 13.2.1.3; 
13.2.2.2
Travel documents
– emergency travel documents  2.4.2; 5.5.4; 
5.6; 6.5.6
U
Unborn child (see under ‘Child’)
– protection of the unborn (see under ‘Child’)
– the rights of the unborn (see under ‘Child’)
– the status of the unborn (see under ‘Child’)
‘Upgrading’ of civil status (see under ‘Civil 
status’)
V
Vitrification of egg cells  1.3.1; 2.3; 4.3.7; 
5.3.7; 6.3.6; 6.3.7; 6.4.3.2
W
‘Warding off’  7.2.1*; 7.2.3; 7.2.5; 13.2; 
13.2.1*; 13.2.2.3: 13.2.4; 14.1.4
Women on Waves  2.4.1; 3.6.1; 5.4.1; 6.4.1.3
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